\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Christian Narkiewicz-Laine v. Kevin Doyle\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2535\nCHRISTIAN K. NARKIEWICZ‐LAINE,\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\n v.\n\nKEVIN C. DOYLE, et al.,\n Defendants‐Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:11‐cv‐1826 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 5, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This case arose from the destruc‐\ntion of personal property and artwork belonging to Christian\nNarkiewicz‐Laine, an artist. Narkiewicz‐Laine stored his art‐\nwork and other belongings in a space in Galena, Illinois that\nhe rented from the defendants. Years into the lease, the de‐\nfendants emptied the unit, destroying the majority of Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine’s property. He responded by suing to recover for\nthe loss of his property. After a six‐day trial, the jury awarded\n\f2 No. 18‐2535\n\nhim damages on multiple claims. Unsatisfied with his dam‐\nages award, Narkiewicz‐Laine now appeals, challenging a\nnumber of the district court’s rulings made along the way. We\naffirm.\n I\n The lease between Narkiewicz‐Laine and the defendants,\nmembers of the Doyle family and affiliated entities, began in\n2004. About six years later, the defendants cleared the rental\nspace and discarded the majority of his property, including\nthe only records he had listing the property stored in the unit.\nNarkiewicz‐Laine then brought this suit, pursuing claims un‐\nder an amendment to the Copyright Act known as the Visual\nArtists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, to recover for the\ndestruction of his artwork. For certain types of visual art, the\nAct confers upon artists rights to attribution and integrity—\nincluding, for particular qualifying works, the right to pre‐\nvent the work’s destruction. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist.,\n635 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 2011).\n Narkiewicz‐Laine added common law claims for trespass,\nconversion, and negligence under Illinois law. He based these\nlatter claims on a broader theory of recovery that would allow\nhim to obtain damages for all of his lost property—the en‐\ntirety of his destroyed artwork and other items of personal\nproperty.\n The case proceeded to trial. Narkiewicz‐Laine testified on\nthe central issue of what property and art had been stored in\nthe rental unit. He did so by introducing a list of all the art‐\nwork and personal property, explaining that he prepared the\ninventory after learning of the destruction by checking his\npersonal records, contacting institutions where his work had\n\fNo. 18‐2535 3\n\nbeen exhibited, and attempting to obtain photographs of his\nwork from friends. The inventory listed 1,457 pieces of\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s own artwork, items of personal property,\nand artwork created by others that he had stored in the rental\nunit. He asked the jury to award him $11 million for his losses.\n For their part, the defendants presented evidence that\nNarkiewicz‐Laine had missed multiple rent payments and\nlong since stopped paying for the utilities for the property.\nThe defendants also underscored that, prior to emptying the\nspace, they saw nothing resembling art or valuable personal\nproperty in the rental unit. The defendants took the position\nthat they disposed of junk, not art.\n In the course of the trial, the defendants impeached\nNarkiewicz‐Laine with a prior conviction for lying to an FBI\nagent. Prior to trial, the district court had denied Narkiewicz‐\nLaine’s motion to exclude evidence of the conviction, which\nwas over ten years old.\n The jury returned a verdict in Narkiewicz‐Laine’s favor. It\nfound that the defendants had destroyed four pieces of art‐\nwork protected under the Visual Artists Rights Act and\nawarded $120,000 in damages. But the jury did not award him\ndamages on the remainder of the works for which he had\nclaimed damages under the Act—some 1,453 other pieces of\nartwork. As for the common law claims, the jury decided in\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s favor and awarded $300,000, reflecting\nthe loss of all the artwork and other belongings stored at the\nunit.\n Following the trial, the district court reduced Narkiewicz‐\nLaine’s total damages award from $420,000 to $300,000 to\navoid what it saw as an improper double recovery. It\n\f4 No. 18‐2535\n\ndetermined that the jury’s award on the common law claims\nneeded to be reduced by the amount he recovered for the de‐\nstruction of his works protected under the Visual Artists\nRights Act, as some of the damages were duplicative. Even\nmore specifically, the court reasoned that the award for\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s common law claims—which compen‐\nsated him for the loss of all property and artwork that had\nbeen destroyed—necessarily included the loss caused by the\ndestruction of the subset of his artwork protected under the\nVisual Artists Rights Act.\n Next, the district court concluded that Narkiewicz‐Laine\nwas not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act.\nThe court reasoned that, while he had won a damages award\ncovering some of the works, he also lost the majority of the\nclaims he brought under the Visual Artists Rights Act—his\nclaims covered 1,457 protected works, but he prevailed only\nas to four of those works. In the court’s view, then, there was\nno clear prevailing party and Narkiewicz‐Laine was not enti‐\ntled to attorneys’ fees.\n II\n On appeal Narkiewicz‐Laine seeks a new trial on his\nclaims under the Visual Artists Rights Act and a reversal of\nthe district court’s post‐trial rulings reducing his damages\naward from $420,000 to $300,000 and denying his application\nfor attorneys’ fees.\n A\n We begin with Narkiewicz‐Laine’s argument that he is en‐\ntitled to a new trial because the district court never should\nhave allowed the defense to impeach him with his 2003 con‐\nviction for making false statements to an FBI agent—a\n\fNo. 18‐2535 5\n\nconviction well over ten years old at the time of the trial.\nNarkiewicz‐Laine likewise takes issue with the scope of cross‐\nexamination that the district court allowed at trial regarding\nthe conviction. On that score, he asserts that the district court\nimproperly allowed the defendants to cross‐examine him\nwith the plea agreement from his 2003 conviction to elicit in‐\nformation about other charges of which he was never con‐\nvicted. He further contends that the district court erred in al‐\nlowing the defendants to impeach his expert witness by ask‐\ning a question that improperly characterized Narkiewicz‐\nLaine as an “art felon.”\n Our review of the district court’s decision to admit Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine’s prior conviction as well as its other evidentiary\nrulings related to the use of the conviction at trial is limited.\nWe ask only whether those rulings reflected an abuse of dis‐\ncretion. See Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.\n2013). Even then, we will not reverse if the error was harmless.\nSee Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Rather,\nreversal is required if the evidentiary error “had ‘a substantial\nand injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.’” United\nStates v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting\nUnited States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002)). Evi‐\ndentiary errors meet this standard “only when a significant\nchance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\nWhitehead, 680 F.3d at 930.\n Federal Rule of Evidence 609 supplies the controlling ana‐\nlytical framework. Rule 609(a)(2) allows into evidence—for\npurposes of impeachment—a witness’s prior conviction for a\ncrime involving dishonesty. But the Rule sets up different pre‐\nsumptions for convictions more than ten years old, like\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s here. Evidence of such a conviction is\n\f6 No. 18‐2535\n\nadmissible only if “its probative value, supported by specific\nfacts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudi‐\ncial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).\n In this way, Rule 609 tilts the analysis in favor of excluding\nevidence of convictions over ten years old. Such convictions,\nwe have emphasized, should be admitted “only in rare and\nexceptional circumstances.” United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d\n197, 201 (7th Cir. 2008). But so too is it true that there exists no\nabsolute bar to admitting a conviction over ten years old, and\nwe will uphold the district court’s decision doing so “as long\nas the record shows that the district court thoughtfully ana‐\nlyzed the facts and properly weighed the probative value of\nthe evidence against its prejudicial effect.” Redditt, 381 F.3d at\n601.\n The district court’s decision to allow Narkiewicz‐Laine’s\n2003 conviction respected these principles. The court rested\nits ruling on a thoughtful analysis balancing the probative\nvalue of the evidence of the conviction against the prejudicial\neffect of admitting it. See United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d\n1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004) (articulating the factors to be consid‐\nered in determining whether the probative value of a convic‐\ntion outweighs its prejudicial effect). Recognizing the proba‐\ntive value of the conviction to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s credibility,\nthe district judge took care to consider the importance of his\ntestimony to his case and the low risk that the jury would im‐\nproperly hold the conviction against him.\n Recall that with the emptying of the rental unit went all\ndocumentation of what existed in the space. Narkiewicz‐\nLaine attempted to recreate such an inventory after the fact,\nand testified to his compilation at trial. His testimony, then,\nserved as the evidence establishing the existence of many of\n\fNo. 18‐2535 7\n\nthe items for which he claimed damages. As the district court\nsaw it, this made Narkiewicz‐Laine’s testimony and credibil‐\nity pivotal to his case, weighing in favor of admitting the 2003\nconviction. Further, the district court saw the fact that the con‐\nviction implicated Narkiewicz‐Laine’s truthfulness—because\nit involved making false statements—as adding to its im‐\npeachment value. The district court also noted that the 2003\nconviction had little similarity to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s current\nclaims, a reality that lowered the risk of the jury using the ev‐\nidence for something other than impeachment.\n Narkiewicz‐Laine argues that the district court com‐\npounded the error of admitting his 2003 conviction by allow‐\ning the defendants too much latitude in their use of the con‐\nviction on cross‐examination. To be sure, these observations\nare not without weight. But, in the end, we need not deter‐\nmine whether these evidentiary rulings amounted to an abuse\nof discretion, because even assuming that the district court\nerred, any impact was harmless. Viewing the trial evidence as\na whole, we fail to see how the admission and use of the 2003\nconviction at trial adversely skewed the jury’s verdict. This is\nespecially so because the court instructed the jury that it could\nconsider the evidence of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s 2003 conviction\nonly for the limited purpose of determining whether his tes‐\ntimony was truthful. See Rogers, 542 F.3d at 201 (explaining\nthat “where a limiting instruction is given … the error usually\nwill be harmless”).\n And more significantly, it is far from clear that the admis‐\nsion of the 2003 conviction—and related testimony elicited on\ncross‐examination—had any effect whatsoever on the jury’s\nverdict. Remember that Narkiewicz‐Laine won part of the\ntrial: the jury awarded him damages for some of the claimed\n\f8 No. 18‐2535\n\nartwork and personal property. To do so, the jury had to have\ncredited at least some of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s testimony and,\nin the process, rejected the defendants’ position that the de‐\nstroyed property was all scrap without any significant value.\nNarkiewicz‐Laine presents no persuasive explanation as to\nwhy the use of his conviction at trial might have influenced\nthe jury’s decision regarding some of his claimed losses but\nnot others. It is equally telling that he seeks a new trial only\nas to his claims under the Visual Artists Rights Act. In chart‐\ning this course, Narkiewicz‐Laine seems to accept that the use\nof his 2003 conviction did not affect the jury’s consideration\nof his common law claims, even though those claims also de‐\npended heavily on his testimony and the jury’s assessment of\nhis credibility.\n None of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s evidentiary challenges clears\nthe reversible error hurdle because we cannot conclude that\nthe admission and use of his prior conviction at trial had a\nsubstantial or injurious effect—or indeed, any discernible ef‐\nfect at all—on the jury’s verdict.\n B\n That brings us to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s argument that the\ndistrict court abused its discretion in reducing the jury award.\nHere, too, we disagree.\n The jury returned a verdict for Narkiewicz‐Laine on his\nclaims under the Visual Artists Rights Act and determined\ntwo damage amounts: $120,000 in actual damages or, in the\nalternative, $120,000 in statutory damages. The jury also\nfound in his favor on his common law claims of trespass, con‐\nversion, and negligence and awarded him $300,000 for the\nloss of all of his property discarded from the rental unit. To\n\fNo. 18‐2535 9\n\npreclude what it saw as a double recovery, the district court\nreduced the jury’s award for the common law claims\n($300,000) by the actual loss he sustained for the works pro‐\ntected under the Visual Artists Rights Act ($120,000). Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine was instead compensated for the loss of these\nworks by the jury’s award of statutory damages under the Act\n($120,000). This left him with a total award of $300,000.\n Narkiewicz‐Laine brought his common law claims under\nIllinois law, so we begin there. Under Illinois law, “an injured\nplaintiff may receive only one full compensation for his or her\ninjuries.” Illinois Sch. Dist. Agency v. Pac. Ins. Co., 571 F.3d 611,\n615 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App.\n3d 813, 820 (2008)). To prevent a double recovery, a damage\naward must be reduced “to offset any amounts that the plain‐\ntiff already has collected from other sources in compensation\nfor the same injury.” Id. at 615–16.\n To assess whether the jury’s award would have afforded\nNarkiewicz‐Laine a double recovery, we must turn to § 504 of\nthe Copyright Act, the provision authorizing the recovery of\ndamages on his Visual Artists Rights Act claims. Under § 504,\na plaintiff may elect to recover either actual damages or stat‐\nutory damages but not both. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). A plain‐\ntiff electing statutory damages must make that choice “at any\ntime before final judgment is rendered” and may recover a set\nrange—between $750 and $30,000—for each work. Id. Here,\nNarkiewicz‐Laine elected to receive statutory damages. That\nchoice meant he could not recover actual damages for the\nsame works.\n What complicates our discussion here is the jury’s identi‐\ncal calculation of actual and statutory damages under the Vis‐\nual Artists Rights Act: $120,000 for each. That makes it\n\f10 No. 18‐2535\n\ntempting to view the awards as interchangeable. But statutory\ndamages and actual damages are distinct under the Copy‐\nright Act: statutory damages compensate for harms different\nfrom actual loss. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,\nLLP., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that § 504\n“authorize[s] statutory damages unrelated to losses or\ngains”). And in the context of the Visual Artists Rights Act\nspecifically, decoupling statutory damages from actual losses\naccords with the statute’s purpose to protect the “moral\nrights” of artists—rights “unrelated to the artist’s pecuniary\ninterests” and instead “grounded in philosophical ideas\nabout the intrinsic nature and cultural value of art rather than\nnatural‐property or utility justifications.” Kelley, 635 F.3d at\n296.\n Relying on Congress’s desire to protect the moral rights of\nartists, Narkiewicz‐Laine argues he is entitled to both the\n$120,000 in statutory damages under the Act and the $300,000\nin actual damages on his common law claims. To his mind,\nthis does not amount to a double recovery because the\n$120,000 he was awarded in statutory damages addressed his\nmoral rights, while the $300,000 in actual damages compen‐\nsated him for his property rights.\n Couched this way, Narkiewicz‐Laine’s position has sur‐\nface appeal. A closer look shows that the analysis misses the\nmark, though. The biggest problem for Narkiewicz‐Laine is\nthat § 504 of the Copyright Act precludes him from recovering\nfor both actual and statutory damages for the same works,\nand under his theory, that is exactly what he would be al‐\nlowed to do. The jury’s verdict and the related instructions\nbear this out.\n\fNo. 18‐2535 11\n\n The jury instructions made clear that both actual damages\nunder the Visual Artists Rights Act and damages for Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine’s common law claims would compensate him for\nthe same type of loss. We have no doubt on this point because\nthe district court instructed the jury to assess actual damages\nunder the Act and damages on the common law claims with\nthe same measuring stick: the “fair market value” of the de‐\nstroyed property. The court further explained that the dam‐\nages for the common law claims would compensate Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine for the value of all his property. This necessarily\nincluded any works the jury found to be protected under the\nVisual Artists Rights Act.\n The instructions did not direct the jury to exclude the loss\ncaused by the destruction of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s works pro‐\ntected under the Act from its calculation of damages on his\ncommon law claims. This had a clear consequence: the\n$300,000 awarded on the common law claims—for all prop‐\nerty lost—necessarily included the subset of works that were\nspecifically covered under the jury’s verdict on the Visual Art‐\nists Rights Act claims. And even though Narkiewicz‐Laine\nelected to receive statutory damages, we cannot ignore the\njury’s express finding that the fair value of his loss on the four\nworks covered by the Visual Artists Rights Act amounted to\n$120,000. Because Narkiewicz‐Laine is not entitled to recover\ntwice for the same property, the actual damages attributed to\nthose four works must be subtracted out of the jury’s award\nof actual damages for all destroyed property.\n\f12 No. 18‐2535\n\n Perhaps this conclusion is easier illustrated this way:\n Jury award on common law $300,000\n claims for all losses\n Portion of that award cover‐ ‐$120,000\n ing the four works protected\n by the Visual Artists Rights\n Act\n Net common law award $180,000\n Jury award of statutory dam‐ +$120,000\n ages for the four Visual Artists\n Rights Act works\n Adjusted total award $300,000\n\n Skipping the subtraction step would allow Narkiewicz‐\nLaine to recover twice for his loss of the same artwork covered\nby both the jury’s award on his common law claims and the\nseparate award on his claims under the Visual Artists Rights\nAct. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discre‐\ntion in reducing the damages on the common law claims.\n The trial record affords a different, alternative path to the\nsame conclusion. During the jury instruction conference,\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s counsel assured the defendants and the\njudge that his client was not seeking to recover under both the\ncommon law and the Visual Artists Rights Act for the same\nlosses. In no uncertain terms, he explained that Narkiewicz‐\nLaine was not taking the position that “a VARA work could\nrecover both under VARA and under the common law.” The\ncourt and the defendants accepted these assurances at face\nvalue. Indeed, the defendants had originally proposed a ver‐\ndict form for the common law claims that would have\n\fNo. 18‐2535 13\n\ninstructed the jury to exclude any award for property that was\nincluded in the damage award under the Visual Artists Rights\nAct claims. After receiving these assurances, the defendants\nagreed to withdraw their form, and the resulting jury verdict\nform did not instruct the jury to exclude damages for the Vis‐\nual Artists Rights Act artwork from its calculation of damages\non Narkiewicz‐Laine’s common law claims.\n In a similar vein, during closing argument, Narkiewicz‐\nLaine’s counsel asked the jury to include works protected un‐\nder the Visual Artists Rights Act in its calculation of actual\ndamages for the common law claims. He went so far as to as‐\nsure the jury that, even though these works would be in‐\ncluded in the calculation of damages for the common law\nclaims, “nobody is trying to get paid twice.” Cementing the\npoint, counsel then explained that, if the jury awarded actual\ndamages for the Visual Artists Rights Act works and actual\ndamages for the common law claims, then the actual damages\nfor the Visual Artists Rights Act works would be subtracted\nfrom the damage award for the common law claims, stating\n“[t]he Judge will do this.”\n On this record, Narkiewicz‐Laine cannot be allowed an\nunjust about‐face on appeal: he is urging us to reverse for the\nvery reason he expressly disavowed at trial. See New Hamp‐\nshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wake‐\nlee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)) (“[W]here a party assumes a cer‐\ntain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintain‐\ning that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his\ninterests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially\nif it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the\nposition formerly taken by him.”). Recognizing that Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine was attempting to assume a contrary position to\n\f14 No. 18‐2535\n\nthe detriment of the defendants, the district court got it right\nin reducing Narkiewicz‐Laine’s award from $420,000 to\n$300,000.\n C\n We owe a final word to the district court’s decision not to\naward Narkiewicz‐Laine attorneys’ fees. The Copyright Act—\nof which the Visual Artists Rights Act is part—provides that\n“in its discretion,” a district court may award costs, including\nattorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. Un‐\nder this section, “[p]revailing plaintiffs and prevailing de‐\nfendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s fees are to be\nawarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s\ndiscretion.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994).\n Narkiewicz‐Laine contends he is presumptively entitled\nto attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. See Riviera Distribu‐\ntors, Inc. v. Jones, 517 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining\nthat a prevailing party in copyright litigation is “presump‐\ntively entitled to reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees”). But\nhis argument misaligns with what happened here by assum‐\ning that he prevailed across the board at trial. Not so.\n True enough, the district court entered judgment in the\namount of $120,000 for Narkiewicz‐Laine on his Visual Artists\nRights Act claims. And Narkiewicz‐Laine is correct to observe\nthat a litigant is deemed to have prevailed when he obtains a\n“material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties”—\nin other words, a judgment in his favor. Id. (quoting Buckhan‐\nnon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hu‐\nman Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). But it is also true that—\nthough embodied in only one count in his complaint—\nNarkiewicz‐Laine asserted multiple claims under the Visual\n\fNo. 18‐2535 15\n\nArtists Rights Act covering 1,457 independent pieces of art‐\nwork and seeking damages far beyond what he actually re‐\ncovered. The jury found for Narkiewicz‐Laine on only four of\nthose claims. The flipside is that the jury necessarily found for\nthe defendants on the remaining claims under the Visual Art‐\nists Rights Act—indeed, on the vast majority of those claims.\n As the district court explained, that Narkiewicz‐Laine\n“chose to plead all of his VARA claims in one count should\nnot dictate who is determined to be the prevailing party.”\nAnd, unlike in the context of civil rights suits in which a plain‐\ntiff need not prevail on every claim to be considered the pre‐\nvailing party, plaintiffs and defendants are on equal footing\nfor the purposes of fee awards under § 505. See Fogerty, 510\nU.S. at 524 (explaining that, in the civil rights context, Con‐\ngress sought to redress an imbalance between plaintiffs and\ndefendants “by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably\nthan successful defendants in terms of the award of attorney’s\nfees,” but that no such objective existed for awarding fees un‐\nder the Copyright Act). Where, as here, the jury’s verdict\npoints in two directions as to who prevailed, the district court\nwas well within its discretion in declining to grant Narkie‐\nwicz‐Laine fees.\n The same reasoning leads us to reject the defendants’ ar‐\ngument that they should be awarded their costs and fees of\ndefending this appeal. While it is true that when a party “wins\na suit and is entitled by statute to a reasonable attorneys’ fee,\nthe entitlement extends to the fee he reasonably incurs in de‐\nfending the award of that fee,” JCW Investments, Inc. v. Nov‐\nelty, Inc., 509 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gorenstein\nEnterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care‐USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 438 (7th\nCir. 1989)), that is not the scenario before us. The district court\n\f16 No. 18‐2535\n\ndid not declare either side a prevailing party; nor does the de‐\nfendants’ victory on appeal transform them into one. The de‐\nfendants are thus not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees\nfor their costs in litigating this appeal.\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Christian Narkiewicz-Laine v. Kevin Doyle\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2535\\nCHRISTIAN K. NARKIEWICZ‐LAINE,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN C. DOYLE, et al.,\\n Defendants‐Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:11‐cv‐1826 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 5, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This case arose from the destruc‐\\ntion of personal property and artwork belonging to Christian\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine, an artist. Narkiewicz‐Laine stored his art‐\\nwork and other belongings in a space in Galena, Illinois that\\nhe rented from the defendants. Years into the lease, the de‐\\nfendants emptied the unit, destroying the majority of Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine’s property. He responded by suing to recover for\\nthe loss of his property. After a six‐day trial, the jury awarded\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2535\\n\\nhim damages on multiple claims. Unsatisfied with his dam‐\\nages award, Narkiewicz‐Laine now appeals, challenging a\\nnumber of the district court’s rulings made along the way. We\\naffirm.\\n I\\n The lease between Narkiewicz‐Laine and the defendants,\\nmembers of the Doyle family and affiliated entities, began in\\n2004. About six years later, the defendants cleared the rental\\nspace and discarded the majority of his property, including\\nthe only records he had listing the property stored in the unit.\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine then brought this suit, pursuing claims un‐\\nder an amendment to the Copyright Act known as the Visual\\nArtists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, to recover for the\\ndestruction of his artwork. For certain types of visual art, the\\nAct confers upon artists rights to attribution and integrity—\\nincluding, for particular qualifying works, the right to pre‐\\nvent the work’s destruction. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist.,\\n635 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n Narkiewicz‐Laine added common law claims for trespass,\\nconversion, and negligence under Illinois law. He based these\\nlatter claims on a broader theory of recovery that would allow\\nhim to obtain damages for all of his lost property—the en‐\\ntirety of his destroyed artwork and other items of personal\\nproperty.\\n The case proceeded to trial. Narkiewicz‐Laine testified on\\nthe central issue of what property and art had been stored in\\nthe rental unit. He did so by introducing a list of all the art‐\\nwork and personal property, explaining that he prepared the\\ninventory after learning of the destruction by checking his\\npersonal records, contacting institutions where his work had\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 3\\n\\nbeen exhibited, and attempting to obtain photographs of his\\nwork from friends. The inventory listed 1,457 pieces of\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s own artwork, items of personal property,\\nand artwork created by others that he had stored in the rental\\nunit. He asked the jury to award him $11 million for his losses.\\n For their part, the defendants presented evidence that\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine had missed multiple rent payments and\\nlong since stopped paying for the utilities for the property.\\nThe defendants also underscored that, prior to emptying the\\nspace, they saw nothing resembling art or valuable personal\\nproperty in the rental unit. The defendants took the position\\nthat they disposed of junk, not art.\\n In the course of the trial, the defendants impeached\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine with a prior conviction for lying to an FBI\\nagent. Prior to trial, the district court had denied Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine’s motion to exclude evidence of the conviction, which\\nwas over ten years old.\\n The jury returned a verdict in Narkiewicz‐Laine’s favor. It\\nfound that the defendants had destroyed four pieces of art‐\\nwork protected under the Visual Artists Rights Act and\\nawarded $120,000 in damages. But the jury did not award him\\ndamages on the remainder of the works for which he had\\nclaimed damages under the Act—some 1,453 other pieces of\\nartwork. As for the common law claims, the jury decided in\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s favor and awarded $300,000, reflecting\\nthe loss of all the artwork and other belongings stored at the\\nunit.\\n Following the trial, the district court reduced Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine’s total damages award from $420,000 to $300,000 to\\navoid what it saw as an improper double recovery. It\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2535\\n\\ndetermined that the jury’s award on the common law claims\\nneeded to be reduced by the amount he recovered for the de‐\\nstruction of his works protected under the Visual Artists\\nRights Act, as some of the damages were duplicative. Even\\nmore specifically, the court reasoned that the award for\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s common law claims—which compen‐\\nsated him for the loss of all property and artwork that had\\nbeen destroyed—necessarily included the loss caused by the\\ndestruction of the subset of his artwork protected under the\\nVisual Artists Rights Act.\\n Next, the district court concluded that Narkiewicz‐Laine\\nwas not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act.\\nThe court reasoned that, while he had won a damages award\\ncovering some of the works, he also lost the majority of the\\nclaims he brought under the Visual Artists Rights Act—his\\nclaims covered 1,457 protected works, but he prevailed only\\nas to four of those works. In the court’s view, then, there was\\nno clear prevailing party and Narkiewicz‐Laine was not enti‐\\ntled to attorneys’ fees.\\n II\\n On appeal Narkiewicz‐Laine seeks a new trial on his\\nclaims under the Visual Artists Rights Act and a reversal of\\nthe district court’s post‐trial rulings reducing his damages\\naward from $420,000 to $300,000 and denying his application\\nfor attorneys’ fees.\\n A\\n We begin with Narkiewicz‐Laine’s argument that he is en‐\\ntitled to a new trial because the district court never should\\nhave allowed the defense to impeach him with his 2003 con‐\\nviction for making false statements to an FBI agent—a\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 5\\n\\nconviction well over ten years old at the time of the trial.\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine likewise takes issue with the scope of cross‐\\nexamination that the district court allowed at trial regarding\\nthe conviction. On that score, he asserts that the district court\\nimproperly allowed the defendants to cross‐examine him\\nwith the plea agreement from his 2003 conviction to elicit in‐\\nformation about other charges of which he was never con‐\\nvicted. He further contends that the district court erred in al‐\\nlowing the defendants to impeach his expert witness by ask‐\\ning a question that improperly characterized Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine as an “art felon.”\\n Our review of the district court’s decision to admit Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine’s prior conviction as well as its other evidentiary\\nrulings related to the use of the conviction at trial is limited.\\nWe ask only whether those rulings reflected an abuse of dis‐\\ncretion. See Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Even then, we will not reverse if the error was harmless.\\nSee Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Rather,\\nreversal is required if the evidentiary error “had ‘a substantial\\nand injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.’” United\\nStates v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002)). Evi‐\\ndentiary errors meet this standard “only when a significant\\nchance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\\nWhitehead, 680 F.3d at 930.\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 609 supplies the controlling ana‐\\nlytical framework. Rule 609(a)(2) allows into evidence—for\\npurposes of impeachment—a witness’s prior conviction for a\\ncrime involving dishonesty. But the Rule sets up different pre‐\\nsumptions for convictions more than ten years old, like\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s here. Evidence of such a conviction is\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2535\\n\\nadmissible only if “its probative value, supported by specific\\nfacts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudi‐\\ncial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).\\n In this way, Rule 609 tilts the analysis in favor of excluding\\nevidence of convictions over ten years old. Such convictions,\\nwe have emphasized, should be admitted “only in rare and\\nexceptional circumstances.” United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d\\n197, 201 (7th Cir. 2008). But so too is it true that there exists no\\nabsolute bar to admitting a conviction over ten years old, and\\nwe will uphold the district court’s decision doing so “as long\\nas the record shows that the district court thoughtfully ana‐\\nlyzed the facts and properly weighed the probative value of\\nthe evidence against its prejudicial effect.” Redditt, 381 F.3d at\\n601.\\n The district court’s decision to allow Narkiewicz‐Laine’s\\n2003 conviction respected these principles. The court rested\\nits ruling on a thoughtful analysis balancing the probative\\nvalue of the evidence of the conviction against the prejudicial\\neffect of admitting it. See United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d\\n1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004) (articulating the factors to be consid‐\\nered in determining whether the probative value of a convic‐\\ntion outweighs its prejudicial effect). Recognizing the proba‐\\ntive value of the conviction to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s credibility,\\nthe district judge took care to consider the importance of his\\ntestimony to his case and the low risk that the jury would im‐\\nproperly hold the conviction against him.\\n Recall that with the emptying of the rental unit went all\\ndocumentation of what existed in the space. Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine attempted to recreate such an inventory after the fact,\\nand testified to his compilation at trial. His testimony, then,\\nserved as the evidence establishing the existence of many of\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 7\\n\\nthe items for which he claimed damages. As the district court\\nsaw it, this made Narkiewicz‐Laine’s testimony and credibil‐\\nity pivotal to his case, weighing in favor of admitting the 2003\\nconviction. Further, the district court saw the fact that the con‐\\nviction implicated Narkiewicz‐Laine’s truthfulness—because\\nit involved making false statements—as adding to its im‐\\npeachment value. The district court also noted that the 2003\\nconviction had little similarity to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s current\\nclaims, a reality that lowered the risk of the jury using the ev‐\\nidence for something other than impeachment.\\n Narkiewicz‐Laine argues that the district court com‐\\npounded the error of admitting his 2003 conviction by allow‐\\ning the defendants too much latitude in their use of the con‐\\nviction on cross‐examination. To be sure, these observations\\nare not without weight. But, in the end, we need not deter‐\\nmine whether these evidentiary rulings amounted to an abuse\\nof discretion, because even assuming that the district court\\nerred, any impact was harmless. Viewing the trial evidence as\\na whole, we fail to see how the admission and use of the 2003\\nconviction at trial adversely skewed the jury’s verdict. This is\\nespecially so because the court instructed the jury that it could\\nconsider the evidence of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s 2003 conviction\\nonly for the limited purpose of determining whether his tes‐\\ntimony was truthful. See Rogers, 542 F.3d at 201 (explaining\\nthat “where a limiting instruction is given … the error usually\\nwill be harmless”).\\n And more significantly, it is far from clear that the admis‐\\nsion of the 2003 conviction—and related testimony elicited on\\ncross‐examination—had any effect whatsoever on the jury’s\\nverdict. Remember that Narkiewicz‐Laine won part of the\\ntrial: the jury awarded him damages for some of the claimed\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2535\\n\\nartwork and personal property. To do so, the jury had to have\\ncredited at least some of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s testimony and,\\nin the process, rejected the defendants’ position that the de‐\\nstroyed property was all scrap without any significant value.\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine presents no persuasive explanation as to\\nwhy the use of his conviction at trial might have influenced\\nthe jury’s decision regarding some of his claimed losses but\\nnot others. It is equally telling that he seeks a new trial only\\nas to his claims under the Visual Artists Rights Act. In chart‐\\ning this course, Narkiewicz‐Laine seems to accept that the use\\nof his 2003 conviction did not affect the jury’s consideration\\nof his common law claims, even though those claims also de‐\\npended heavily on his testimony and the jury’s assessment of\\nhis credibility.\\n None of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s evidentiary challenges clears\\nthe reversible error hurdle because we cannot conclude that\\nthe admission and use of his prior conviction at trial had a\\nsubstantial or injurious effect—or indeed, any discernible ef‐\\nfect at all—on the jury’s verdict.\\n B\\n That brings us to Narkiewicz‐Laine’s argument that the\\ndistrict court abused its discretion in reducing the jury award.\\nHere, too, we disagree.\\n The jury returned a verdict for Narkiewicz‐Laine on his\\nclaims under the Visual Artists Rights Act and determined\\ntwo damage amounts: $120,000 in actual damages or, in the\\nalternative, $120,000 in statutory damages. The jury also\\nfound in his favor on his common law claims of trespass, con‐\\nversion, and negligence and awarded him $300,000 for the\\nloss of all of his property discarded from the rental unit. To\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 9\\n\\npreclude what it saw as a double recovery, the district court\\nreduced the jury’s award for the common law claims\\n($300,000) by the actual loss he sustained for the works pro‐\\ntected under the Visual Artists Rights Act ($120,000). Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine was instead compensated for the loss of these\\nworks by the jury’s award of statutory damages under the Act\\n($120,000). This left him with a total award of $300,000.\\n Narkiewicz‐Laine brought his common law claims under\\nIllinois law, so we begin there. Under Illinois law, “an injured\\nplaintiff may receive only one full compensation for his or her\\ninjuries.” Illinois Sch. Dist. Agency v. Pac. Ins. Co., 571 F.3d 611,\\n615 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App.\\n3d 813, 820 (2008)). To prevent a double recovery, a damage\\naward must be reduced “to offset any amounts that the plain‐\\ntiff already has collected from other sources in compensation\\nfor the same injury.” Id. at 615–16.\\n To assess whether the jury’s award would have afforded\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine a double recovery, we must turn to § 504 of\\nthe Copyright Act, the provision authorizing the recovery of\\ndamages on his Visual Artists Rights Act claims. Under § 504,\\na plaintiff may elect to recover either actual damages or stat‐\\nutory damages but not both. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). A plain‐\\ntiff electing statutory damages must make that choice “at any\\ntime before final judgment is rendered” and may recover a set\\nrange—between $750 and $30,000—for each work. Id. Here,\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine elected to receive statutory damages. That\\nchoice meant he could not recover actual damages for the\\nsame works.\\n What complicates our discussion here is the jury’s identi‐\\ncal calculation of actual and statutory damages under the Vis‐\\nual Artists Rights Act: $120,000 for each. That makes it\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2535\\n\\ntempting to view the awards as interchangeable. But statutory\\ndamages and actual damages are distinct under the Copy‐\\nright Act: statutory damages compensate for harms different\\nfrom actual loss. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,\\nLLP., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that § 504\\n“authorize[s] statutory damages unrelated to losses or\\ngains”). And in the context of the Visual Artists Rights Act\\nspecifically, decoupling statutory damages from actual losses\\naccords with the statute’s purpose to protect the “moral\\nrights” of artists—rights “unrelated to the artist’s pecuniary\\ninterests” and instead “grounded in philosophical ideas\\nabout the intrinsic nature and cultural value of art rather than\\nnatural‐property or utility justifications.” Kelley, 635 F.3d at\\n296.\\n Relying on Congress’s desire to protect the moral rights of\\nartists, Narkiewicz‐Laine argues he is entitled to both the\\n$120,000 in statutory damages under the Act and the $300,000\\nin actual damages on his common law claims. To his mind,\\nthis does not amount to a double recovery because the\\n$120,000 he was awarded in statutory damages addressed his\\nmoral rights, while the $300,000 in actual damages compen‐\\nsated him for his property rights.\\n Couched this way, Narkiewicz‐Laine’s position has sur‐\\nface appeal. A closer look shows that the analysis misses the\\nmark, though. The biggest problem for Narkiewicz‐Laine is\\nthat § 504 of the Copyright Act precludes him from recovering\\nfor both actual and statutory damages for the same works,\\nand under his theory, that is exactly what he would be al‐\\nlowed to do. The jury’s verdict and the related instructions\\nbear this out.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 11\\n\\n The jury instructions made clear that both actual damages\\nunder the Visual Artists Rights Act and damages for Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine’s common law claims would compensate him for\\nthe same type of loss. We have no doubt on this point because\\nthe district court instructed the jury to assess actual damages\\nunder the Act and damages on the common law claims with\\nthe same measuring stick: the “fair market value” of the de‐\\nstroyed property. The court further explained that the dam‐\\nages for the common law claims would compensate Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine for the value of all his property. This necessarily\\nincluded any works the jury found to be protected under the\\nVisual Artists Rights Act.\\n The instructions did not direct the jury to exclude the loss\\ncaused by the destruction of Narkiewicz‐Laine’s works pro‐\\ntected under the Act from its calculation of damages on his\\ncommon law claims. This had a clear consequence: the\\n$300,000 awarded on the common law claims—for all prop‐\\nerty lost—necessarily included the subset of works that were\\nspecifically covered under the jury’s verdict on the Visual Art‐\\nists Rights Act claims. And even though Narkiewicz‐Laine\\nelected to receive statutory damages, we cannot ignore the\\njury’s express finding that the fair value of his loss on the four\\nworks covered by the Visual Artists Rights Act amounted to\\n$120,000. Because Narkiewicz‐Laine is not entitled to recover\\ntwice for the same property, the actual damages attributed to\\nthose four works must be subtracted out of the jury’s award\\nof actual damages for all destroyed property.\\n\\f12 No. 18‐2535\\n\\n Perhaps this conclusion is easier illustrated this way:\\n Jury award on common law $300,000\\n claims for all losses\\n Portion of that award cover‐ ‐$120,000\\n ing the four works protected\\n by the Visual Artists Rights\\n Act\\n Net common law award $180,000\\n Jury award of statutory dam‐ +$120,000\\n ages for the four Visual Artists\\n Rights Act works\\n Adjusted total award $300,000\\n\\n Skipping the subtraction step would allow Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine to recover twice for his loss of the same artwork covered\\nby both the jury’s award on his common law claims and the\\nseparate award on his claims under the Visual Artists Rights\\nAct. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discre‐\\ntion in reducing the damages on the common law claims.\\n The trial record affords a different, alternative path to the\\nsame conclusion. During the jury instruction conference,\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine’s counsel assured the defendants and the\\njudge that his client was not seeking to recover under both the\\ncommon law and the Visual Artists Rights Act for the same\\nlosses. In no uncertain terms, he explained that Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine was not taking the position that “a VARA work could\\nrecover both under VARA and under the common law.” The\\ncourt and the defendants accepted these assurances at face\\nvalue. Indeed, the defendants had originally proposed a ver‐\\ndict form for the common law claims that would have\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 13\\n\\ninstructed the jury to exclude any award for property that was\\nincluded in the damage award under the Visual Artists Rights\\nAct claims. After receiving these assurances, the defendants\\nagreed to withdraw their form, and the resulting jury verdict\\nform did not instruct the jury to exclude damages for the Vis‐\\nual Artists Rights Act artwork from its calculation of damages\\non Narkiewicz‐Laine’s common law claims.\\n In a similar vein, during closing argument, Narkiewicz‐\\nLaine’s counsel asked the jury to include works protected un‐\\nder the Visual Artists Rights Act in its calculation of actual\\ndamages for the common law claims. He went so far as to as‐\\nsure the jury that, even though these works would be in‐\\ncluded in the calculation of damages for the common law\\nclaims, “nobody is trying to get paid twice.” Cementing the\\npoint, counsel then explained that, if the jury awarded actual\\ndamages for the Visual Artists Rights Act works and actual\\ndamages for the common law claims, then the actual damages\\nfor the Visual Artists Rights Act works would be subtracted\\nfrom the damage award for the common law claims, stating\\n“[t]he Judge will do this.”\\n On this record, Narkiewicz‐Laine cannot be allowed an\\nunjust about‐face on appeal: he is urging us to reverse for the\\nvery reason he expressly disavowed at trial. See New Hamp‐\\nshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wake‐\\nlee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)) (“[W]here a party assumes a cer‐\\ntain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintain‐\\ning that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his\\ninterests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially\\nif it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the\\nposition formerly taken by him.”). Recognizing that Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine was attempting to assume a contrary position to\\n\\f14 No. 18‐2535\\n\\nthe detriment of the defendants, the district court got it right\\nin reducing Narkiewicz‐Laine’s award from $420,000 to\\n$300,000.\\n C\\n We owe a final word to the district court’s decision not to\\naward Narkiewicz‐Laine attorneys’ fees. The Copyright Act—\\nof which the Visual Artists Rights Act is part—provides that\\n“in its discretion,” a district court may award costs, including\\nattorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. Un‐\\nder this section, “[p]revailing plaintiffs and prevailing de‐\\nfendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s fees are to be\\nawarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s\\ndiscretion.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994).\\n Narkiewicz‐Laine contends he is presumptively entitled\\nto attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. See Riviera Distribu‐\\ntors, Inc. v. Jones, 517 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining\\nthat a prevailing party in copyright litigation is “presump‐\\ntively entitled to reimbursement of its attorneys’ fees”). But\\nhis argument misaligns with what happened here by assum‐\\ning that he prevailed across the board at trial. Not so.\\n True enough, the district court entered judgment in the\\namount of $120,000 for Narkiewicz‐Laine on his Visual Artists\\nRights Act claims. And Narkiewicz‐Laine is correct to observe\\nthat a litigant is deemed to have prevailed when he obtains a\\n“material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties”—\\nin other words, a judgment in his favor. Id. (quoting Buckhan‐\\nnon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hu‐\\nman Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). But it is also true that—\\nthough embodied in only one count in his complaint—\\nNarkiewicz‐Laine asserted multiple claims under the Visual\\n\\fNo. 18‐2535 15\\n\\nArtists Rights Act covering 1,457 independent pieces of art‐\\nwork and seeking damages far beyond what he actually re‐\\ncovered. The jury found for Narkiewicz‐Laine on only four of\\nthose claims. The flipside is that the jury necessarily found for\\nthe defendants on the remaining claims under the Visual Art‐\\nists Rights Act—indeed, on the vast majority of those claims.\\n As the district court explained, that Narkiewicz‐Laine\\n“chose to plead all of his VARA claims in one count should\\nnot dictate who is determined to be the prevailing party.”\\nAnd, unlike in the context of civil rights suits in which a plain‐\\ntiff need not prevail on every claim to be considered the pre‐\\nvailing party, plaintiffs and defendants are on equal footing\\nfor the purposes of fee awards under § 505. See Fogerty, 510\\nU.S. at 524 (explaining that, in the civil rights context, Con‐\\ngress sought to redress an imbalance between plaintiffs and\\ndefendants “by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably\\nthan successful defendants in terms of the award of attorney’s\\nfees,” but that no such objective existed for awarding fees un‐\\nder the Copyright Act). Where, as here, the jury’s verdict\\npoints in two directions as to who prevailed, the district court\\nwas well within its discretion in declining to grant Narkie‐\\nwicz‐Laine fees.\\n The same reasoning leads us to reject the defendants’ ar‐\\ngument that they should be awarded their costs and fees of\\ndefending this appeal. While it is true that when a party “wins\\na suit and is entitled by statute to a reasonable attorneys’ fee,\\nthe entitlement extends to the fee he reasonably incurs in de‐\\nfending the award of that fee,” JCW Investments, Inc. v. Nov‐\\nelty, Inc., 509 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gorenstein\\nEnterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care‐USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 438 (7th\\nCir. 1989)), that is not the scenario before us. The district court\\n\\f16 No. 18‐2535\\n\\ndid not declare either side a prevailing party; nor does the de‐\\nfendants’ victory on appeal transform them into one. The de‐\\nfendants are thus not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees\\nfor their costs in litigating this appeal.\\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3166,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8444039,"string":"8,444,039"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Counterdefendant-Appellee v. The CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of Kianna Rudesill, and THE BABY FOLD, Counterplaintiffs-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chi. Trust Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 18-3181 & 18-3241"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415476/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444039/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Counterdefendant-Appellee v. The CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of Kianna Rudesill, and THE BABY FOLD, Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Counterdefendant-Appellee v. The CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of Kianna Rudesill, and THE BABY FOLD, Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3167,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641730,"string":"4,641,730"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Juana HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Et Al., Petitioners, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3297"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Easterbrook, Hamilton\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3297\\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\\n Petitioners,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\\n\\f2 No. 18-3297\\n\\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\\ntheir petitions for review.\\n I\\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\\nUnited States and left her on her own.\\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 3\\n\\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3297\\n\\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\\nbecause they thought she could pay.\\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\\navoid harm.\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 5\\n\\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\\nplied to her.\\n II\\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3297\\n\\n A\\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\\non to the merits of her petition.\\n B\\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 7\\n\\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\\nnexus to any protected ground.”\\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\\n\\f8 No. 18-3297\\n\\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\\ntected ground.” Id.\\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 9\\n\\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\\n(Emphasis added.)\\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\\n C\\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\\n\\f10 No. 18-3297\\n\\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 11\\n\\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\\npetition must also be rejected.\\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4418983/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641730/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juana HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Et Al., Petitioners, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3297\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\n Petitioners,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\n\f2 No. 18-3297\n\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\ntheir petitions for review.\n I\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\nUnited States and left her on her own.\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\n\fNo. 18-3297 3\n\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\n\f4 No. 18-3297\n\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\nbecause they thought she could pay.\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\navoid harm.\n\fNo. 18-3297 5\n\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\nplied to her.\n II\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\n(2018).\n\f6 No. 18-3297\n\n A\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\non to the merits of her petition.\n B\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\n\fNo. 18-3297 7\n\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\nnexus to any protected ground.”\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\n\f8 No. 18-3297\n\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\ntected ground.” Id.\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\n\fNo. 18-3297 9\n\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\n(Emphasis added.)\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\n C\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\n\f10 No. 18-3297\n\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\n\fNo. 18-3297 11\n\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\npetition must also be rejected.\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juana HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Et Al., Petitioners, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3297\\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\\n Petitioners,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\\n\\f2 No. 18-3297\\n\\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\\ntheir petitions for review.\\n I\\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\\nUnited States and left her on her own.\\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 3\\n\\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3297\\n\\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\\nbecause they thought she could pay.\\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\\navoid harm.\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 5\\n\\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\\nplied to her.\\n II\\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3297\\n\\n A\\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\\non to the merits of her petition.\\n B\\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 7\\n\\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\\nnexus to any protected ground.”\\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\\n\\f8 No. 18-3297\\n\\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\\ntected ground.” Id.\\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 9\\n\\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\\n(Emphasis added.)\\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\\n C\\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\\n\\f10 No. 18-3297\\n\\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 11\\n\\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\\npetition must also be rejected.\\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3168,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641773,"string":"4,641,773"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3297"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3297\\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\\n Petitioners,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\\n\\f2 No. 18-3297\\n\\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\\ntheir petitions for review.\\n I\\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\\nUnited States and left her on her own.\\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 3\\n\\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3297\\n\\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\\nbecause they thought she could pay.\\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\\navoid harm.\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 5\\n\\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\\nplied to her.\\n II\\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3297\\n\\n A\\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\\non to the merits of her petition.\\n B\\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 7\\n\\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\\nnexus to any protected ground.”\\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\\n\\f8 No. 18-3297\\n\\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\\ntected ground.” Id.\\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 9\\n\\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\\n(Emphasis added.)\\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\\n C\\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\\n\\f10 No. 18-3297\\n\\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 11\\n\\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\\npetition must also be rejected.\\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419026/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641773/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3297\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\n Petitioners,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\n\f2 No. 18-3297\n\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\ntheir petitions for review.\n I\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\nUnited States and left her on her own.\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\n\fNo. 18-3297 3\n\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\n\f4 No. 18-3297\n\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\nbecause they thought she could pay.\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\navoid harm.\n\fNo. 18-3297 5\n\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\nplied to her.\n II\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\n(2018).\n\f6 No. 18-3297\n\n A\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\non to the merits of her petition.\n B\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\n\fNo. 18-3297 7\n\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\nnexus to any protected ground.”\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\n\f8 No. 18-3297\n\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\ntected ground.” Id.\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\n\fNo. 18-3297 9\n\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\n(Emphasis added.)\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\n C\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\n\f10 No. 18-3297\n\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\n\fNo. 18-3297 11\n\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\npetition must also be rejected.\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3297\\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\\n Petitioners,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n Nos. A208-190-985, A208-190-986, A208-190-987\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 22, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and\\nHAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Juana Hernandez-Garcia is a citizen of\\nGuatemala. She and two of her children, Brian and Yeniser\\nMorales-Hernandez, entered the United States without\\nproper documentation on August 29, 2015. They immediately\\nreceived Notices to Appear for removal proceedings, but\\nthose Notices did not specify a date and time for their hearing.\\nLater, when they nonetheless appeared before an\\nimmigration judge, they conceded removability but filed\\n\\f2 No. 18-3297\\n\\nrequests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\nunder the Convention against Torture. As we detail below,\\nfirst the immigration judge and then the Board of\\nImmigration Appeals rejected those requests and ordered\\nremoval. Hernandez-Garcia, on behalf of both her children\\nand herself, has petitioned this court for review. We conclude\\nthat the Board’s decision must be upheld, and so we deny\\ntheir petitions for review.\\n I\\n In Guatemala, Hernandez-Garcia and her two youngest\\nchildren lived in the village of Chiantla, Huehuetenango. Her\\nhusband, Anacleto Morales-Fuentes, came to the United\\nStates illegally in 2001. He regularly sent $200 to $300 every\\ntwo weeks to his wife; in order to obtain access to that money,\\nshe took a bus to a nearby city and withdrew it from a bank.\\nAs a result of the extra funds she received, her home in the\\nvillage was larger than those of her neighbors, and she had a\\nhigher standard of living. Until 2013, her oldest son lived with\\nher and the two youngest children, but that year he left for the\\nUnited States and left her on her own.\\n It was not long before she began receiving anonymous\\nnotes asking for money and threatening her and the children.\\nShe told the immigration judge that she was certain the notes\\nwere from gang members. At first she did not take them seri-\\nously, but at the end of August 2015 they became more worri-\\nsome. One even threatened death if she did not pay the send-\\ners. On another occasion, someone knocked at the door and\\nleft a note with a vague threat that something bad would hap-\\npen to her. Hernandez-Garcia reported these incidents to the\\npolice, but they ignored her. Fearful, she left Guatemala with\\nBrian and Yeniser on August 27, 2015. When they reached the\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 3\\n\\nU.S. border, Hernandez-Garcia was interviewed by the Bor-\\nder Patrol. They were promptly served with Notices to Ap-\\npear, and on November 2, 2017, an immigration judge held a\\nhearing on their applications for asylum, withholding of re-\\nmoval, and protection under the United Nations Convention\\nAgainst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading\\nTreatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.\\nNo. 100-20, 1465 UNTS 114.\\n Hernandez-Garcia was designated the lead respondent at\\nthe hearing, but all three applicants testified. Hernandez-\\nGarcia described the events set forth above, but, as the\\nimmigration judge found, she also admitted that “she told the\\n[Border Patrol] officer that she had no fear of persecution or\\ntorture and that she had left her country because of the\\npoverty.” Brian, who was 18 years old by that time, recounted\\nthat just before the family left Guatemala he was regularly\\nstopped by gang members, asked to join the gang, and asked\\nabout his father. No one ever harmed him, but he said that he\\nwas afraid to return because “the people who left the notes”\\nthought that his family had money. Yeniser, age 16 at the\\nhearing, testified that she lived in fear in Guatemala because\\nthere was no older man in the house. No one ever approached\\nher personally, but her mother told her about the threats.\\n The immigration judge found all three to be credible, but\\nshe concluded that none of them had described harm that\\nqualifies as past persecution. The judge acknowledged that\\nthe threats and encounters Hernandez-Garcia described were\\n“unsettling,” but they were nonetheless not sufficiently immi-\\nnent or severe to be more than harassment.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3297\\n\\n In the alternative, the judge concluded that even assuming\\nthat the threats were severe enough to fall within the defini-\\ntion of persecution, Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding had to be rejected for an independent rea-\\nson: she failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the\\nharm she and her children experienced and a protected\\nground (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-\\nlar social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). In addition to her concerns about nexus, the\\nimmigration judge was also skeptical about the two proposed\\nsocial groups Hernandez-Garcia proposed: single females\\nwith no male head-of-household, and well-to-do persons op-\\nposed to gangs. Perceived or actual wealth, standing alone,\\ndoes not form the basis of a particular social group, the judge\\nsaid, and the gangs were extorting Hernandez-Garcia simply\\nbecause they thought she could pay.\\n The immigration judge wrapped up her opinion with sev-\\neral final points. First, the judge ruled that Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad not demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecu-\\ntion, nor had she shown that she and her children would be\\nsingled out individually for persecution in Guatemala. Fur-\\nthermore, she had not shown that they belonged to any group\\nthat is subjected to a pattern or practice of persecution in Gua-\\ntemala. Last, the judge found that nothing Hernandez-Garcia\\nhad described amounted to torture, for purposes of the CAT,\\nsee 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), nor did she have any evidence that a\\npublic official would perform or acquiesce in acts of torture,\\nor that she could not successfully relocate in the country to\\navoid harm.\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 5\\n\\n The Board of Immigration Appeals “adopt[ed] and af-\\nfirm[ed] the decision of the Immigration Judge.” For the asy-\\nlum and withholding petitions, it emphasized the immigra-\\ntion judge’s finding of a lack of a nexus between the extortion\\nthreats and gang harassment she had experienced and any\\nprotected ground for relief. It also agreed with the immigra-\\ntion judge that Hernandez-Garcia’s showing fell short for\\npurposes of the CAT. Finally, the Board addressed and re-\\njected Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings\\nagainst her were jurisdictionally barred because of the ab-\\nsence of date-and-place information in the Notice to Appear,\\nciting its decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441\\n(BIA 2018). Hernandez-Garcia did receive a later notice with\\nthat information; she appeared at several hearings; and\\nthrough counsel she admitted the factual allegations in the\\nNotice and conceded that the alleged grounds of removal ap-\\nplied to her.\\n II\\n Before this court, Hernandez-Garcia raises four points: she\\nargues that she presented enough evidence to demonstrate\\npast persecution in Guatemala; she contends that she and her\\nchildren belong to a particular social group that the immigra-\\ntion judge and the Board failed to consider (the group of sin-\\ngle females without a head of household, Petr. Brief at 33); she\\nargues that her showing of a well-founded fear of future per-\\nsecution was adequate; and she urges that the immigration\\ncourt lacked jurisdiction to hear her case, in light of the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3297\\n\\n A\\n We start with the last point, because it is one that we re-\\ncently resolved adversely to Hernandez-Garcia. The peti-\\ntioner in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019),\\nmade precisely the same argument. Like Hernandez-Garcia,\\npetitioner Ortiz-Santiago had received a Notice to Appear\\nthat did not include a specified time, date, and place for the\\nremoval proceeding, but also like our petitioner, he made no\\ntimely objection to that defect, he could show no prejudice\\nfrom it, and it was cured in a timely manner. We concluded\\nthat the holding of Pereira only went far enough to show that\\nthe agency erred by failing to include statutorily specified in-\\nformation. Pereira did not hold that this flaw was “jurisdic-\\ntional.” After examining the statute and regulations, we con-\\ncluded that the omission of time, date, and place, while a mis-\\ntake, is subject to normal rules of waiver and harmless error.\\nThat ruling disposes of Hernandez-Garcia’s jurisdictional ar-\\ngument. Not a shred of evidence in this record suggests that\\nshe or her children were prejudiced by the omission of that\\ninformation in her own Notice to Appear. We therefore move\\non to the merits of her petition.\\n B\\n We first address Hernandez-Garcia’s petitions for asylum\\nand withholding of removal. Like the immigration judge and\\nthe Board, we can assume for the sake of argument that her\\nevidence sufficed to show past persecution and move directly\\nto the question whether she proved both that she belonged to\\na particular social group and that the mistreatment she en-\\ndured was on account of her membership in that group. The\\ngovernment argues that she waived this point by failing to de-\\nvelop it in her brief. If it is correct, then we have no choice but\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 7\\n\\nto deny the petition for review insofar as it covers asylum and\\nwithholding of removal, because the statute permits relief on\\nthose grounds only if such a nexus is demonstrated.\\n Hernandez-Garcia’s brief starts off well enough, by quot-\\ning the pertinent statutory language requiring an asylum\\nseeker to demonstrate “persecution or a well-founded fear of\\npersecution on account of … membership in a particular social\\ngroup.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (our emphasis). But then she\\nturns immediately to the task of defining her proposed social\\ngroup. She notes, for example, that this court’s definition of a\\nsocial group in Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en\\nbanc)—young women who lived alone—is similar to the one\\nshe proposes. That may (or may not) be so. But the Board did\\nnot take issue with her proposed group. What it said instead\\nwas “the extortion threats the respondent experienced in Gua-\\ntemala, recruitment attempts upon her minor son, and the re-\\nspondents’ fear of criminal gang members do not have a\\nnexus to any protected ground.”\\n It is hard, at best, to see where Hernandez-Garcia takes is-\\nsue with the Board’s finding about nexus. While a sympa-\\nthetic reading of her brief might permit a finding that she has\\nsqueaked by the waiver hurdle, the fact is that she never\\nsquarely confronts the question whether she has shown a link\\nbetween her alleged social group and the persecution she ex-\\nperienced. The best she does is to say, Petr. Br. at 34, that\\n“Guatemala [is] a country that is well known for its history of\\nviolence against women who have no one to protect them,”\\nand that “[s]ingle mothers living alone are amongst these vul-\\nnerable women that are routinely subject to violence and as-\\nsaults.” After criticizing the Board for “dismiss[ing]” these\\npoints, the brief asserts that had the Board given these facts\\n\\f8 No. 18-3297\\n\\nproper weight, it “would have found a sufficient nexus be-\\ntween the threats and Petitioner’s membership in this pro-\\ntected ground.” Id.\\n Missing is any argument about why the Board should have\\nfound the necessary link. Hernandez-Garcia never directly\\naddresses the immigration judge’s finding that there is “no\\nevidence that the risk faced by the respondent is distinct be-\\ncause of her opposition to gangs or her lack of a male head of\\nhousehold.” Perhaps her discussion of the timing of the\\nthreats, which arose after her eldest son left, was designed to\\nfill that evidentiary gap, but she never says this in so many\\nwords. We do not know anything about the alleged persecu-\\ntors (whose identity is murky at best, unless one assumes\\ncounterfactually that Guatemala is plagued by only one\\ngang). We do not know whether they are concentrated in\\nHuehuetanango or country-wide. And we do not know if the\\ngang picks on vulnerable women or if it indiscriminately tar-\\ngets anyone with perceived wealth. These facts and others\\nwould be needed in order to demonstrate the link between\\nher status and the persecution that followed, but they are\\nmissing here. That is enough to support a finding of waiver.\\n We add that even if we were to find the nexus argument\\n(barely) preserved, we see no reason to overturn the Board on\\nthis point. Granted, the immigration judge’s reasoning left\\nsomething to be desired, insofar as she seemed to think that\\nthe persecutors’ goals were dispositive on the nexus point.\\nThat takes things too far. Gangs can raise money in all sorts of\\nways, some with a nexus to a particular social group and\\nsome without such a link, but all for the same goal. The ques-\\ntion is in which category does the persecution Hernandez-\\nGarcia experienced fall: nexus, random, or ubiquitous? The\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 9\\n\\nimmigration judge thought that Hernandez-Garcia was tar-\\ngeted because of her perceived wealth and no other reason. In\\nthis connection, the judge said that “there is no evidence that\\nthe risk faced by the respondent is distinct because of her opposi-\\ntion to the gangs or her lack of a male head of household.”\\n(Emphasis added.)\\n That is indeed the key question, and the immigration\\njudge and Board resolved it adversely to Hernandez-Garcia.\\nShe points us to no evidence that undermines this finding. In-\\ndeed, the record offers some support for the immigration\\njudge’s conclusion. Hernandez-Garcia lived alone without\\nher husband from 2001 until she left Guatemala in 2015. Dur-\\ning most of that period her sons were too young to serve as\\nhousehold protectors. Despite her situation, the regular remit-\\ntances from her husband did not lead to threats until 2014.\\nThis is not a record that compels a finding of nexus, and with-\\nout that strong showing, Hernandez-Garcia could not prevail\\neven if she has managed to preserve this point.\\n C\\n We conclude with a brief explanation of why\\nHernandez-Garcia’s remaining arguments do not save her\\npetition. Because she cannot show past persecution on\\naccount of a protected ground for purposes of asylum or\\nwithholding of removal, she is not entitled to a presumption\\nthat she will face future persecution upon her return to\\nGuatemala. In order to prevail on a stand-alone argument of\\na well-founded fear of future persecution, she must show that\\nher fear is “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable in\\nlight of credible evidence.” Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505,\\n508 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). We assume that she can\\nmeet the subjective part of this test. But in order to satisfy the\\n\\f10 No. 18-3297\\n\\nobjective part, she must prove either that “there is a\\nreasonable probability that she will be singled out\\nindividually for persecution or that there is a pattern or\\npractice of persecution of an identifiable group, to which [she]\\nbelongs, such that [her] fear is reasonable.” Ayele v. Holder, 564\\nF.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2009), as amended July 14, 2009.\\n The immigration judge’s finding that Hernandez-Garcia\\ncould not meet the objective test is grounded in the record.\\nThe judge noted that she offered no evidence that she would\\nbe singled out for persecution; that the authors of the threat-\\nening notes never sought her out; and that at most she had\\nshown generalized crime in the country. The judge also noted\\nthe dearth of evidence about any distinct group-based perse-\\ncution. We realize that Guatemala is unfortunately beset with\\nviolent crime, including a shocking level of violence against\\nwomen, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, “Why Does Guatemala\\nHave One of the Highest Rates of Femicide in the World?”,\\nhttps://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-\\none-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-in-the-world (last vis-\\nited July 22, 2019), but those general conditions do not alone\\nsuffice to satisfy Hernandez-Garcia’s burden.\\n Finally, we say a word about her argument under the CAT.\\nEven though it does not condition relief on a showing of\\nmembership in a social group and a nexus between torture\\nand such membership, there are other equally demanding\\ncriteria for that relief, and Hernandez-Garcia has not met\\nthem. Threats of imminent death that cause “prolonged\\nmental harm” can constitute torture under the regulations\\nimplementing the CAT. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(iii). The\\nevidence in this record, however, does not compel a finding\\nthat Hernandez-Garcia faced a threat of “imminent death”\\n\\fNo. 18-3297 11\\n\\nthat caused “prolonged mental harm.” Moreover,\\nHernandez-Garcia failed to show that “it was more likely than\\nnot that, if removed … [she] would be tortured by or with the\\nacquiescence of a public official.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900\\nF.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). It is too big a\\nleap from the indifference the police demonstrated about the\\nthreatening letters she received to a finding that public\\nofficials would either torture her or stand by while others did.\\nMore evidence was needed. Without it, this aspect of her\\npetition must also be rejected.\\n The petition for review filed by Juana Hernandez-Garcia\\non behalf of herself and derivative petitioners Brian Morales-\\nHernandez and Yeniser Morales-Hernandez is DENIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3169,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641861,"string":"4,641,861"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rod HUNT, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Rod Hunt"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1197; 18-1198"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Hamilton, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nROD HUNT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\\n William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\\nI. Background\\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\\n\\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\\nlease.\\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\\nno other issues to address.\\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\\nparties of risks.”\\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\\nII. Analysis\\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\\n\\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\\nWe held:\\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\\n waives reading of those conditions and their\\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\\n sion not to object.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\\nat —, *6.\\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\\n\\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\\nthe district courts.\\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419114/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641861/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rod HUNT, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nROD HUNT,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\n William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\n\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\nI. Background\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\n\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\nlease.\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\nno other issues to address.\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\n\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\nparties of risks.”\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\nII. Analysis\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\n2014).\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\n\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\nWe held:\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\n waives reading of those conditions and their\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\n sion not to object.\n\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\nat —, *6.\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\n\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\n\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\nthe district courts.\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rod HUNT, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nROD HUNT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\\n William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\\nI. Background\\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\\n\\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\\nlease.\\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\\nno other issues to address.\\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\\nparties of risks.”\\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\\nII. Analysis\\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\\n\\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\\nWe held:\\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\\n waives reading of those conditions and their\\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\\n sion not to object.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\\nat —, *6.\\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\\n\\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\\nthe district courts.\\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3170,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641862,"string":"4,641,862"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Joseph Williams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2662"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Hamilton, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419115/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641862/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\n\f2 No. 18-2662\n\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine.”\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\n\fNo. 18-2662 3\n\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\nmonths in prison.\nII. Analysis\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\n\f4 No. 18-2662\n\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\nunder career-offender guideline).\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\n\fNo. 18-2662 5\n\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\ntwo independent reasons.\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\n\f6 No. 18-2662\n\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\ndential opinion.\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\n\fNo. 18-2662 7\n\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\n575, 600–01 (1990).\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\nvided in 2007:\n (a) A person who:\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\n (A) manufactures;\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\n (C) delivers; or\n (D) finances the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n I or II; or\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\n (A) manufacture;\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\n (C) deliver; or\n (D) finance the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n\f8 No. 18-2662\n\n I or II;\n\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\n as provided in subsection (b).\n\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\ndisagree.\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\nlivery of cocaine.\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\n\fNo. 18-2662 9\n\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\n\f10 No. 18-2662\n\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\nating the price of the sale.\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3171,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641889,"string":"4,641,889"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Rod Hunt"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1198"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nROD HUNT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\\n William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\\nI. Background\\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\\n\\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\\nlease.\\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\\nno other issues to address.\\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\\nparties of risks.”\\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\\nII. Analysis\\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\\n\\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\\nWe held:\\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\\n waives reading of those conditions and their\\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\\n sion not to object.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\\nat —, *6.\\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\\n\\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\\nthe district courts.\\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419142/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641889/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Rod Hunt\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nROD HUNT,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\n William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\n\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\nI. Background\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\n\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\nlease.\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\nno other issues to address.\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\n\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\nparties of risks.”\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\nII. Analysis\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\n2014).\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\n\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\nWe held:\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\n waives reading of those conditions and their\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\n sion not to object.\n\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\nat —, *6.\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\n\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\n\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\n\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\n\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\nthe district courts.\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Rod Hunt\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nROD HUNT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n Nos. 0758 3:15CR00079-001 & 0758 3:17CR00046-001\\n William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 24, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. While on supervised release for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender, Rod Hunt robbed a bank\\nin Madison, Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to bank robbery\\nand brandishing a gun during a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 2113(a), 924(c). The district judge revoked his term of su-\\npervised release and sentenced him to 172 months in prison\\nfollowed by three years of supervised release for the new\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\ncrimes. Hunt has appealed both the revocation (No. 18-1197)\\nand the new sentence (No. 18-1198), and we have consoli-\\ndated the appeals. His brief on appeal challenges only two\\nconditions of his new term of supervised release. We affirm\\non those points in No. 18-1198 because in the district court\\nHunt waived those two challenges. His brief says nothing\\nabout the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release,\\nand at oral argument counsel told us that Hunt has no quarrel\\nwith the revocation itself. We therefore dismiss No. 18-1197.\\nI. Background\\n Hunt’s supervised release began in 2016. He had pleaded\\nguilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration.\\n18 U.S.C. § 2250. His sentence was 30 days in prison and five\\nyears of supervised release. As part of his supervised release,\\nHunt was prohibited from committing another federal crime.\\n The following year, Hunt was convicted of robbing a bank.\\nDuring the robbery, he pointed a gun at people and threat-\\nened them verbally as well. He eventually pleaded guilty to\\nthe robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and to brandishing a firearm\\nduring a crime of violence, § 924(c). He told the judge that,\\nbecause of his medical problems, the robbery had been an at-\\ntempt to commit “suicide by cop.”\\n At sentencing, Hunt asked the judge to recall his age\\n(which was 56) and to give him a chance to be released before\\nhe dies. The judge gave Hunt a prison sentence totaling 154\\nmonths: 70 months for the robbery and 84 months for the\\n§ 924(c) gun charge, to be served consecutively. The new\\nprison sentence will be followed by concurrent three-year\\nterms of supervised release. The district court also revoked\\nHunt’s supervised release (on the sex-offender registration\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 3\\n\\ncrime) because Hunt committed another federal offense while\\non supervision. On that revocation, the judge sentenced him\\nto 18 months in prison (to be served consecutively to the sen-\\ntence for his new crimes) with no additional supervised re-\\nlease.\\n The new three-year term of supervised release on the bank\\nrobbery and firearm convictions came with conditions. The\\ntwo that Hunt challenges on appeal also were among the con-\\nditions of his original term of release that the judge revoked.\\nCritical to our waiver finding, before sentencing, Hunt re-\\nceived in the presentence investigation report all the pro-\\nposed conditions of supervision. Then, both before and at sen-\\ntencing, Hunt did not object to any of the proposed condi-\\ntions, including the two that he now challenges. When the\\njudge noted on the record that Hunt had not objected to any\\nproposed condition of supervised release, Hunt did not disa-\\ngree. Consistent with this on-the-record acquiescence, when\\nthe judge asked Hunt whether he wanted the judge to read\\nthe conditions for the record or to justify the conditions indi-\\nvidually, Hunt told the judge that he need not do so. Finally,\\nHunt told the judge at the end of the hearing that there were\\nno other issues to address.\\n The first challenged condition will prohibit Hunt from\\nleaving “the judicial district in which defendant is being su-\\npervised without the permission of the Court or probation of-\\nficer.” The other will require: “As directed by the probation\\nofficer, defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may\\nbe occasioned by defendant’s criminal record or personal his-\\ntory or characteristics. The probation officer may also take\\nsteps to confirm defendant’s compliance with this notification\\nrequirement or provide such notifications directly to third\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nparties.” Hunt asks us to excuse his failure to object by finding\\nthat it was “plain error” to impose both conditions. The gov-\\nernment responds that the first condition is error-free, and\\nthat on plain-error review this court should order the district\\ncourt to clarify the condition requiring Hunt to “notify third\\nparties of risks.”\\n At oral argument, we expressed concern that Hunt seemed\\nto have waived challenges to both conditions of supervised\\nrelease. Counsel replied that Hunt’s failure to object to these\\nconditions in the district court was a “miss” rather than an\\nintentional waiver. Even if Hunt waived his challenges, coun-\\nsel added, this case is similar to United States v. Adkins,\\n743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014), where we invalidated a condition\\nof supervised release that was unconstitutionally vague de-\\nspite the defendant’s written appeal waiver.\\nII. Analysis\\n We begin by reviewing the difference between waived ar-\\nguments and forfeited arguments. Waiver precludes appellate\\nreview. See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 386–87 (7th\\nCir. 2015). Forfeited arguments may be reviewed for “plain\\nerror.” See United States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n Waiver occurs when a defendant intends (by words or ac-\\ntions) to relinquish a known right. See United States v. Waldrip,\\n859 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 580\\nF.3d 528, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2009). In the supervised release con-\\ntext, a strategic choice provides strong evidence of waiver, but\\nthe key consideration is a knowing and intentional decision,\\nwhether motivated by strategy or not. See United States v. Flo-\\nres, — F.3d —, —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *4 (7th Cir. July 3, 2019)\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 5\\n\\n(in supervised release case, “evidence of a strategic reason not\\nto object in the district court is a sufficient, but not a necessary,\\nground on which to find waiver”). By contrast, a defendant\\nonly forfeits an argument when he fails to assert a right in a\\ntimely fashion because of accident or neglect. See United States\\nv. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n In criminal cases, we ordinarily construe waiver principles\\nliberally in favor of the defendant. See Butler, 777 F.3d at 387.\\nThat is why, at times, we have interpreted a defendant’s si-\\nlence in the face of objectionable conditions of supervised re-\\nlease as a forfeiture reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2016); United\\nStates v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). And that is\\nalso why, when a condition is so vague that it violates a de-\\nfendant’s right to due process of law, as in Adkins, we have\\nbeen willing to overlook even a signed appellate waiver. See\\n743 F.3d at 192–93.\\n In Flores, we recently tried to clarify our approach to\\nwaiver and forfeiture in our recent wave of appeals challeng-\\ning supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal.\\nWe held:\\n We will find waiver, as we do here, when the\\n defendant has notice of the proposed condi-\\n tions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and\\n she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she\\n does not object to the proposed conditions,\\n waives reading of those conditions and their\\n justifications, challenges certain conditions but\\n not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or other-\\n wise evidences an intentional or strategic deci-\\n sion not to object.\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\n— F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453, at *6. Our decision in Flores\\ntook into account the fact that a defendant can always chal-\\nlenge a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2) at any time, unlike other terms of a sentence. Id.\\nat —, *6.\\n Those conditions of waiver are all satisfied here. And in\\naddition to the advance notice and all of the opportunities\\nHunt had to raise these issues, Hunt was already subject to\\nthe same conditions that he now wishes to challenge. He\\nknew that they could be imposed and how they were en-\\nforced. Hunt also wanted to focus the sentencing decision on\\nhis arguments based on his age and his request to have a\\nchance to be released before he dies. It can make strategic\\nsense to focus arguments on such an important issue and not\\nto risk distracting or perhaps even antagonizing the judge by\\nnitpicking supervised release conditions. By choosing to pur-\\nsue one argument and forgoing others, Hunt waived those\\nother possible challenges. See United States v. Kennedy, 726\\nF.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objec-\\ntion amounted to waiver of other guideline issues), citing\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n In Flores, we also noted that we retain the discretion in\\ncompelling cases to overlook a party’s waiver of a challenge\\nto a condition of supervised release, as with a wide range of\\nother issues. — F.3d at —, 2019 WL 2847453 at *5, discussing\\nAdkins, 743 F.3d at 193 (relieving defendant of appellate\\nwaiver where vague condition of supervised release would\\nunconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights and “no\\nreasonable person could know what conduct is or is not pro-\\nscribed”); see also United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016,\\n1019 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing Adkins where defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198 7\\n\\ncould have sought clarification in district court and chal-\\nlenged condition did not implicate First Amendment rights or\\n“fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process”).\\n Even if we were to apply plain-error review to the condi-\\ntions at issue here, we would not find plain error. We start\\nwith Hunt’s objections to the condition preventing him from\\nleaving the “judicial district.” Hunt asserts that “judicial dis-\\ntrict” is vague, but that is not correct. Defendants can readily\\nand “objectively verif[y]” the boundaries of judicial districts\\nby, for example, consulting 28 U.S.C. § 130(b). United States\\nv. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1085 & n.2, 1086 (7th Cir. 2018) (re-\\nmanding with instructions that “judicial district” replace “ju-\\nrisdiction” in written judgment). Moreover, Hunt argues that\\nthe lack of a scienter requirement renders the condition\\nvague. But including a scienter requirement, while recom-\\nmended, is not required, especially where, as here, the de-\\nfendant does not say that he lives near a district’s boundary.\\nSee United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n That leaves the condition requiring Hunt to notify “third\\nparties” of “risks” “occasioned by [his] criminal record or per-\\nsonal history or characteristics.” We assume that the condition\\nwould benefit from further definition. See United States v. Can-\\nfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); Bickart, 825 F.3d at 841–\\n42. But Hunt has not established that any definitional prob-\\nlem, if uncorrected by us at this time, would jeopardize the\\nfairness, integrity, or public reputation of the criminal pro-\\nceedings. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 530. Hunt retains the right to\\nask the district court to modify this condition under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3583(e)(2), either before or during the term of supervised re-\\nlease. If he does so and is disappointed by the result, he may\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\\n\\nappeal to this court. In Flores, we did not abandon our respon-\\nsibility to review conditions of supervised release. We instead\\nrestored the regular processes of appellate review to chal-\\nlenges to supervised release, which should be raised first in\\nthe district courts.\\n We AFFIRM the judgment in appeal No. 18-1198. We\\nDISMISS appeal No. 18-1197.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3172,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641890,"string":"4,641,890"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Joseph Williams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2662"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419143/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641890/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Joseph Williams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\n\f2 No. 18-2662\n\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine.”\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\n\fNo. 18-2662 3\n\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\nmonths in prison.\nII. Analysis\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\n\f4 No. 18-2662\n\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\nunder career-offender guideline).\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\n\fNo. 18-2662 5\n\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\ntwo independent reasons.\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\n\f6 No. 18-2662\n\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\ndential opinion.\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\n\fNo. 18-2662 7\n\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\n575, 600–01 (1990).\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\nvided in 2007:\n (a) A person who:\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\n (A) manufactures;\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\n (C) delivers; or\n (D) finances the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n I or II; or\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\n (A) manufacture;\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\n (C) deliver; or\n (D) finance the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n\f8 No. 18-2662\n\n I or II;\n\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\n as provided in subsection (b).\n\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\ndisagree.\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\nlivery of cocaine.\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\n\fNo. 18-2662 9\n\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\n\f10 No. 18-2662\n\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\nating the price of the sale.\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Joseph Williams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3173,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641957,"string":"4,641,957"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Joseph Williams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2662"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419210/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641957/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Joseph Williams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\n\f2 No. 18-2662\n\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\nDealing Cocaine.”\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\n\fNo. 18-2662 3\n\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\nmonths in prison.\nII. Analysis\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\n\f4 No. 18-2662\n\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\nunder career-offender guideline).\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\n\fNo. 18-2662 5\n\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\ntwo independent reasons.\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\n\f6 No. 18-2662\n\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\ndential opinion.\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\n\fNo. 18-2662 7\n\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\n575, 600–01 (1990).\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\nvided in 2007:\n (a) A person who:\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\n (A) manufactures;\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\n (C) delivers; or\n (D) finances the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n I or II; or\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\n (A) manufacture;\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\n (C) deliver; or\n (D) finance the delivery of;\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\n\f8 No. 18-2662\n\n I or II;\n\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\n as provided in subsection (b).\n\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\ndisagree.\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\nlivery of cocaine.\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\n\fNo. 18-2662 9\n\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\n\f10 No. 18-2662\n\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\nating the price of the sale.\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Joseph Williams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2662\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJOSEPH A. WILLIAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.\\n No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty\\nto possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and pos-\\nsessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).\\nHe appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court\\nerred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convic-\\ntions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges\\nthe use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he\\n\\f2 No. 18-2662\\n\\nsays the record does not show just which statute he was con-\\nvicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on\\ndealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than\\nthe ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree\\non both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA.\\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\\n Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then\\nfound a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal\\nfirearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sen-\\ntencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies\\nif the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felo-\\nnies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The\\ngovernment offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convic-\\ntions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the co-\\ncaine conviction, the government established that the State of\\nIndiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with\\na Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited\\nIndiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged\\nthat Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine\\nwithin one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty\\nunder a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted\\nWilliams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of\\nDealing Cocaine.”\\n The district court concluded that Williams was an armed\\ncareer criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The par-\\nties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine\\nconviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Co-\\ncaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug of-\\nfense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 3\\n\\nwithout any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for de-\\nlivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the\\nACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an\\narmed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fif-\\nteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calcu-\\nlated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in\\nprison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category\\nVI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seri-\\nousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188\\nmonths in prison.\\nII. Analysis\\n On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improp-\\nerly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine\\noffense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the\\nACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include\\ncrimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing\\nwith intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled sub-\\nstance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not\\nraise this issue in the district court, we review the enhance-\\nment for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States\\nv. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing co-\\ncaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did\\nnot know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him.\\nHe concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but\\nhe points out that the state court judgment refers only to the\\n“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite\\na more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams rea-\\nsons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his stat-\\nute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug\\n\\f4 No. 18-2662\\n\\noffense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent\\nreasons, one legal and one factual.\\n First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court doc-\\numents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish\\nplain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s\\nreliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally,\\nthen, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough\\nrecord on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the un-\\ndisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as\\na finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d\\n470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve\\nthe issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error re-\\nview. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually\\noccurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United\\nStates v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting\\ngovernment’s confession of error on plain-error review; in ab-\\nsence of objection in district court, record did not show defin-\\nitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as\\ncrimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal,\\nWilliams points to no evidence suggesting that he was con-\\nvicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United\\nStates v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming\\nACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with\\nevidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong);\\nUnited States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same\\nunder career-offender guideline).\\n Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually re-\\nmoves uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction.\\nThe information charged Williams with delivering cocaine,\\nand it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s crimi-\\nnal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections,\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 5\\n\\nboth of which were also cited in the information. Subsection\\n(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a\\nclass B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class\\nA felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a\\nschool, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of\\nguilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this\\nadditional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime\\nof conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if\\nhe was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it can-\\nnot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indi-\\nvisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach un-\\nder the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover\\nmore than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another\\nportion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an\\nillegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006).\\nBy contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover\\nfinancing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing,\\ndistributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-\\ntribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financ-\\ning. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for\\ntwo independent reasons.\\n First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argu-\\nment—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in\\nUnited States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that\\nthis Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple\\ncrimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility).\\nWilliams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” co-\\ncaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably co-\\nvers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By\\n\\f6 No. 18-2662\\n\\nthat reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under\\n§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).\\n Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He\\nasks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from\\nthe Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that is-\\nsue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d\\n954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of\\nstate burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification\\nis appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See\\nVillage of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir.\\n2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility\\nof this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer\\nthan the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. More-\\nover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends,\\nhe would still lose on plain-error review because only a\\n“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793.\\nIn any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw\\nsupports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15\\n(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with\\na prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”\\nUnited States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if\\n§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not en-\\ncompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious\\ndrug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-preceden-\\ntial order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766\\nF. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the rea-\\nsoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this prece-\\ndential opinion.\\n As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply\\nthe “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 7\\n\\nthe crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s\\nconviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United\\nStates, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the\\nelements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than\\nthe definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that\\nit is possible to violate the underlying statute without com-\\nmitting a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the\\nACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a\\npredicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See\\nMathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.\\n575, 600–01 (1990).\\n The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s ap-\\nplication to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The\\nIndiana statute under which Williams was convicted pro-\\nvided in 2007:\\n (a) A person who:\\n (1) knowingly or intentionally:\\n (A) manufactures;\\n (B) finances the manufacture of;\\n (C) delivers; or\\n (D) finances the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n I or II; or\\n (2) possesses, with intent to:\\n (A) manufacture;\\n (B) finance the manufacture of;\\n (C) deliver; or\\n (D) finance the delivery of;\\n cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methampheta-\\n mine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule\\n\\f8 No. 18-2662\\n\\n I or II;\\n\\n commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug,\\n or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except\\n as provided in subsection (b).\\n\\nInd. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006).\\n Williams argues that by including financing the manufac-\\nturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more\\nbroadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We\\ndisagree.\\n Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving man-\\nufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manu-\\nfacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to\\nreach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or de-\\nlivery of cocaine.\\n As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts\\ninterpret the word “involving” as having “expansive conno-\\ntations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King,\\n325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit\\nruled that the word “must be construed as extending the fo-\\ncus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ...\\noffenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.”\\n325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have\\naffirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on\\nconvictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, dis-\\ntribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See\\nUnited States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (at-\\ntempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir.\\n2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45\\n\\fNo. 18-2662 9\\n\\n(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d\\n703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15\\n(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive\\ndefinition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180\\n(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing\\nbody armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious\\ndrug offense where the underlying felony was manufactur-\\ning, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute\\ndrugs. Id. at 184–85, 188.\\n Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the\\n“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of\\ndrugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals\\npersuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934\\nN.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term\\n“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a\\ncreditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a pur-\\nchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony\\nmurder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy\\nfor his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction\\nbecause he had not been “financing” the purchase with his\\nown money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely\\nas a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he\\ncould no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ec-\\nstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing\\nthe supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180.\\n To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate\\ncases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904\\nN.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court va-\\ncated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy\\ngrounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and un-\\njustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own\\n\\f10 No. 18-2662\\n\\npurchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No.\\n13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (non-\\nprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up\\nto sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating\\nwith the police, and the defendant had participated in negoti-\\nating the price of the sale.\\n These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute ac-\\ntually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug of-\\nfense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential,\\nand both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-rea-\\nsoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The de-\\nfendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600\\ncold pills” to make more than three grams of methampheta-\\nmine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5.\\n Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the\\nscope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture\\nand delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal\\ndefinition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3174,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641958,"string":"4,641,958"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"James GRAHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3508"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Barrett, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3508\\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3508\\n\\n I.\\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\\na rink.\\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\\nback to work.\\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 3\\n\\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\\n“night mechanic.”\\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\\nto its customers.\\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\\nappeals.\\n II.\\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\\n\\f4 No. 18-3508\\n\\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\\nwhile sitting down.\\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\\n III.\\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 5\\n\\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\\npretextual.\\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\\noccurred.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3508\\n\\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 7\\n\\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\\ncident did so.\\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n ***\\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419211/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641958/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James GRAHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3508\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\n\f2 No. 18-3508\n\n I.\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\na rink.\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\nback to work.\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\n\fNo. 18-3508 3\n\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\n“night mechanic.”\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\nto its customers.\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\nappeals.\n II.\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\n\f4 No. 18-3508\n\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\nwhile sitting down.\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\n III.\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\n\fNo. 18-3508 5\n\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\npretextual.\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\noccurred.\n\f6 No. 18-3508\n\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\n\fNo. 18-3508 7\n\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\ncident did so.\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\n ***\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James GRAHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3508\\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3508\\n\\n I.\\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\\na rink.\\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\\nback to work.\\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 3\\n\\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\\n“night mechanic.”\\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\\nto its customers.\\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\\nappeals.\\n II.\\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\\n\\f4 No. 18-3508\\n\\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\\nwhile sitting down.\\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\\n III.\\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 5\\n\\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\\npretextual.\\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\\noccurred.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3508\\n\\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 7\\n\\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\\ncident did so.\\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n ***\\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3175,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642008,"string":"4,642,008"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3508"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3508\\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3508\\n\\n I.\\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\\na rink.\\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\\nback to work.\\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 3\\n\\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\\n“night mechanic.”\\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\\nto its customers.\\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\\nappeals.\\n II.\\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\\n\\f4 No. 18-3508\\n\\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\\nwhile sitting down.\\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\\n III.\\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 5\\n\\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\\npretextual.\\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\\noccurred.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3508\\n\\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 7\\n\\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\\ncident did so.\\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n ***\\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419261/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642008/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3508\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\n\f2 No. 18-3508\n\n I.\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\na rink.\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\nback to work.\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\n\fNo. 18-3508 3\n\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\n“night mechanic.”\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\nto its customers.\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\nappeals.\n II.\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\n\f4 No. 18-3508\n\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\nwhile sitting down.\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\n III.\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\n\fNo. 18-3508 5\n\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\npretextual.\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\noccurred.\n\f6 No. 18-3508\n\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\n\fNo. 18-3508 7\n\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\ncident did so.\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\n ***\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3508\\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-01742 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. James Graham, Jr., sued Arctic\\nZone Iceplex, his former employer, for discrimination. Ac-\\ncording to Graham, Arctic Zone failed to accommodate his\\ndisability and ultimately fired him for it. The district court\\ngranted summary judgment to Arctic Zone. We affirm.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3508\\n\\n I.\\n In December 2014, Arctic Zone hired Graham as its head\\nmechanic and maintenance supervisor. Graham’s responsibil-\\nities included maintaining Arctic Zone’s ice rink and operat-\\ning its Zamboni, a machine that smooths the surface of ice on\\na rink.\\n Graham’s tenure at Arctic Zone was not without issues.\\nShortly after he began working at the rink, Arctic Zone re-\\nceived customer complaints about his attitude. And the cus-\\ntomers were not the only ones who noticed. Arctic Zone ob-\\nserved Graham’s attitude problems firsthand, as well as his\\ndifficulty completing tasks on time. Arctic Zone did not write\\nGraham up, however, for either the insubordination or time-\\nliness issues at the time that they occurred.\\n In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did\\nnot work from February to May of that year. During that time,\\nhe received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to\\nwork in May with certain medical restrictions, including the\\nrequirement that he work sitting down. In an effort to accom-\\nmodate him, Arctic Zone assigned Graham to the task of skate\\nsharpening. Arctic Zone asserts that skate sharpening is a job\\nthat can be accomplished from a seated position; Graham\\nmaintains that the task requires standing. Yet he did not in-\\nform Arctic Zone of his belief that skate sharpening did not\\nmeet his restrictions. He alleges that there were a few times\\nwhen he was caught sitting down to rest and was told to get\\nback to work.\\n Starting in August 2015, Graham transitioned back to full-\\ntime work. Arctic Zone assigned him to work evenings rather\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 3\\n\\nthan during the day, which it attributes to seasonal need. Gra-\\nham characterizes this as a “demotion” to the position of\\n“night mechanic.”\\n In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arc-\\ntic Zone says that the accident resulted in “over two feet of\\njagged plastic” protruding from the rink wall and onto the\\nrink itself. Arctic Zone suggests that the plastic was a hazard\\nto its customers.\\n Arctic Zone fired Graham on the day of the accident. It\\ngave five reasons for doing so in his Termination Notice. They\\ncan be summarized as follows: (1) poor attitude about his\\nchange in position; (2) poor attitude toward customers (citing\\ncustomer complaints); (3) lack of timeliness in completing his\\nduties; (4) insubordination with management; and (5) the\\nZamboni accident, which put customers in danger and caused\\nArctic Zone to lose revenue while the rink was being repaired.\\n Graham sued Arctic Zone for discrimination in violation\\nof the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.\\nHe alleged two violations: first, that Arctic Zone failed to rea-\\nsonably accommodate his disability; and second, that it termi-\\nnated him because of his disability. The district court granted\\nsummary judgment to Arctic Zone on both counts. Graham\\nappeals.\\n II.\\n We first address whether Arctic Zone failed to accommo-\\ndate Graham’s disability. “The [ADA] requires employers to\\nmake ‘reasonable accommodations that will allow a qualified\\nindividual with a disability to perform the essential functions\\nof his or her job.’” Brown v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d\\n818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Graham asserts that\\n\\f4 No. 18-3508\\n\\nArctic Zone fell short of this standard when it assigned him\\nto skate sharpening, which he says could not be accomplished\\nwhile sitting down.\\n But “[i]dentifying reasonable accommodations for a disa-\\nbled employee requires both employer and employee to en-\\ngage in a flexible, interactive process.” Id. at 821. If an em-\\nployee “does not provide sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations, the em-\\nployer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the\\ndisabled employee.” Id. (citations omitted). Graham acknowl-\\nedges that he did not make Arctic Zone aware of his belief\\nthat his skate sharpening assignment didn’t comport with his\\nmedical restrictions. This is a textbook example of an em-\\nployee “not provid[ing] sufficient information to the em-\\nployer to determine the necessary accommodations.” Id. (cita-\\ntions omitted). Because he failed to uphold his end of the in-\\nteractive process, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-\\nmary judgment on the accommodation issue.\\n III.\\n We next address whether Arctic Zone violated the ADA\\nwhen it fired Graham. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). While the dis-\\ntrict court assumed that Graham was disabled for purposes of\\nthe statute, it held that Graham had failed to provide suffi-\\ncient evidence that his disability was the but-for cause of the\\ntermination. It granted Arctic Zone summary judgment on\\nthat ground, and it was right to do so.\\n Under Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the ultimate ques-\\ntion in a discriminatory employment termination case is\\n“[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plain-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 5\\n\\ntiff] would have kept his job if he [was not disabled], and eve-\\nrything else had remained the same.” 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2016). One way to demonstrate this is by showing that the\\nstated reasons for the firing were pretextual. See Hitchcock v.\\nAngel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2013). In eval-\\nuating pretext, “the question is not whether the employer’s\\nstated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the em-\\nployer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain\\nthe discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Trans., 871 F.3d 495, 505\\n(7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Pretext requires more than\\njust “faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the\\nemployer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some ac-\\ntion.” Id. (alteration in original). Graham argues that the five\\nreasons that Arctic Zone gave in its Termination Notice were\\npretextual.\\n To start, Graham asserts that the behavioral problems\\ncited by the notice—his apparent bad attitude, inability to\\ncomplete work on time, and insubordination—could not be\\nlegitimate bases for his termination because he had received\\nno written notice or discipline for them before the Zamboni\\naccident. His premise seems to be that by not addressing the\\nissues earlier, Arctic Zone somehow forfeited its right to\\ncount these problems as black marks on his record. Not so.\\nArctic Zone’s decision to let something slide without a formal\\nresponse does not mean that it went unnoticed or untallied.\\nAnd even minor grievances can accumulate into a record that\\njustifies termination. A reasonable jury could not conclude\\nthat Arctic Zone was lying about the impact of these viola-\\ntions solely because Arctic Zone held its tongue when they\\noccurred.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3508\\n\\n Graham next tries to show pretext by pointing to the testi-\\nmony of his supervisor, Floyd Johnson. In a deposition, John-\\nson testified that Graham’s “position” never changed when\\nhe began working nights. Graham says that this contradicts\\nthe Termination Notice’s assertion that Graham was unhappy\\nabout his “change of position” when he became the “night\\nmechanic.” But Graham’s “gotcha” argument relies on an\\noverly technical reading of the word “position.” When he be-\\ngan working nights, Graham’s schedule changed, and in that\\nsense, his position could be thought to have changed as well.\\nThe Termination Notice acknowledges this fact, as well as the\\nfact that Graham apparently saw this change as significant.\\nBut according to Johnson, Graham’s schedule was the only\\nmeaningful change—his compensation and title remained\\nconstant. So in another sense, Johnson’s assertion that Gra-\\nham’s “position” didn’t change was a reasonable conclusion.\\nThe minor inconsistency in the usage of this nontechnical\\nterm does not support an inference of bad faith.\\n Graham’s last argument addresses the Zamboni incident.\\nHe disputes neither his responsibility for causing the accident\\nnor the fact that it caused damage. Instead, he makes two ar-\\nguments. First, he asserts that Arctic Zone overstated the se-\\nriousness of the accident, which ultimately cost only around\\n$150 in repairs. Second, he argues that Arctic Zone treated\\nhim differently than another former employee, Geoff\\nHeavner, who had previously caused a similar accident—\\nwhich caused roughly $1,500 in damage—but was not fired.\\n In response, Arctic Zone notes that when it fired Graham,\\nit did not yet know how much his accident would end up cost-\\ning. As to the differences between Graham and Heavner, Arc-\\n\\fNo. 18-3508 7\\n\\ntic Zone points to Heavner’s otherwise sterling employee rec-\\nord prior to the accident. It also states that it was particularly\\nconcerned because Graham’s accident created a hazard for its\\ncustomers, whereas there is no suggestion that Heavner’s ac-\\ncident did so.\\n Here too, Graham fails to provide enough evidence to sup-\\nport an inference of bad faith. Heavner ultimately caused\\nmore damage. But that was his first strike, whereas Graham\\nhad several strikes before the Zamboni incident. And the fact\\nthat Heavner’s accident did not pose a danger to customers\\nseals the deal—the two employees were not “similarly situ-\\nated” enough for us to infer that the stated reasons for their\\ndifferent treatment were pretextual. See Lloyd v. Swifty Trans.,\\nInc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n ***\\n Graham has failed to establish an issue of material fact\\nabout whether Arctic Zone discriminated against him by fail-\\ning to reasonably accommodate him or by terminating him.\\nThe district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3176,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642010,"string":"4,642,010"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Andrew L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Byran BARTOW, Respondent-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1168"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 —Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419263/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642010/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Andrew L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Byran BARTOW, Respondent-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBYRAN BARTOW,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 17-CV-17 —Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\n\f2 No. 19-1168\n\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\naffirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\nside communications.\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\n\fNo. 19-1168 3\n\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\nprepare it.”\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\n\f4 No. 19-1168\n\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\n\fNo. 19-1168 5\n\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\nbut neither is persuasive.\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\nfense is thus properly before this court.\n\f6 No. 19-1168\n\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\n(7th Cir. 2013).\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\n\fNo. 19-1168 7\n\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\nsons.\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\nsedes Gomez.\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\n\f8 No. 19-1168\n\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\n\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Andrew L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Byran BARTOW, Respondent-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 —Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3177,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642100,"string":"4,642,100"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard WALKER, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Richard Walker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3529"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Ripple, Rovner, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3529\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD WALKER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n I.\\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\\nfailing to do so.\\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 3\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\\nprisonment.\\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\\nquired to register during the relevant time.\\n II.\\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\\ntence must be affirmed.\\n A.\\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3529\\n\\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 5\\n\\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\\n193 (2007).2\\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\\n\\n\\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\\n\\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3529\\n\\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\\nage.”).\\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 7\\n\\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\\nproach in this case.\\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\\nfication determination.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 9\\n\\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\\n B.\\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\\nfederal offenses.\\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 11\\n\\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\\ncategorical analysis.\\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\\n ***\\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419353/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642100/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3529\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nRICHARD WALKER,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\n\f2 No. 18‐3529\n\n I.\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\nfailing to do so.\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 3\n\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\nprisonment.\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\nquired to register during the relevant time.\n II.\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\ntence must be affirmed.\n A.\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\n\f4 No. 18‐3529\n\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\n\n\n\n\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\n\fNo. 18‐3529 5\n\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\n193 (2007).2\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\n\n\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\n\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\n\f6 No. 18‐3529\n\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\nage.”).\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\n\fNo. 18‐3529 7\n\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\nproach in this case.\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\n\f8 No. 18‐3529\n\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\nfication determination.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 9\n\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\n B.\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\n\f10 No. 18‐3529\n\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\nfederal offenses.\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 11\n\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\ncategorical analysis.\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\n ***\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3529\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD WALKER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n I.\\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\\nfailing to do so.\\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 3\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\\nprisonment.\\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\\nquired to register during the relevant time.\\n II.\\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\\ntence must be affirmed.\\n A.\\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3529\\n\\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 5\\n\\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\\n193 (2007).2\\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\\n\\n\\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\\n\\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3529\\n\\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\\nage.”).\\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 7\\n\\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\\nproach in this case.\\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\\nfication determination.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 9\\n\\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\\n B.\\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\\nfederal offenses.\\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 11\\n\\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\\ncategorical analysis.\\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\\n ***\\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3178,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642101,"string":"4,642,101"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1168"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419354/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642101/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBYRAN BARTOW,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\n\f2 No. 19-1168\n\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\naffirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\nside communications.\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\n\fNo. 19-1168 3\n\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\nprepare it.”\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\n\f4 No. 19-1168\n\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\n\fNo. 19-1168 5\n\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\nbut neither is persuasive.\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\nfense is thus properly before this court.\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\n\f6 No. 19-1168\n\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\n(7th Cir. 2013).\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\n\fNo. 19-1168 7\n\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\nsons.\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\nsedes Gomez.\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\n\f8 No. 19-1168\n\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\n\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3179,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642168,"string":"4,642,168"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Richard Walker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3529"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3529\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD WALKER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n I.\\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\\nfailing to do so.\\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 3\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\\nprisonment.\\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\\nquired to register during the relevant time.\\n II.\\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\\ntence must be affirmed.\\n A.\\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3529\\n\\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 5\\n\\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\\n193 (2007).2\\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\\n\\n\\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\\n\\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3529\\n\\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\\nage.”).\\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 7\\n\\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\\nproach in this case.\\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\\nfication determination.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 9\\n\\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\\n B.\\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\\nfederal offenses.\\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 11\\n\\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\\ncategorical analysis.\\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\\n ***\\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419421/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642168/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Richard Walker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3529\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nRICHARD WALKER,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\n\f2 No. 18‐3529\n\n I.\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\nfailing to do so.\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 3\n\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\nprisonment.\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\nquired to register during the relevant time.\n II.\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\ntence must be affirmed.\n A.\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\n\f4 No. 18‐3529\n\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\n\n\n\n\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\n\fNo. 18‐3529 5\n\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\n193 (2007).2\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\n\n\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\n\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\n\f6 No. 18‐3529\n\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\nage.”).\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\n\fNo. 18‐3529 7\n\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\nproach in this case.\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\n\f8 No. 18‐3529\n\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\nfication determination.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 9\n\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\n B.\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\n\f10 No. 18‐3529\n\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\nfederal offenses.\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\n\fNo. 18‐3529 11\n\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\ncategorical analysis.\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\n ***\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Richard Walker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐3529\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD WALKER,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:17‐cr‐184 — Pamela Pepper, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Richard Walker was convicted for\\nfailing to register as a sex offender between 2016 and 2017, as\\nrequired by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification\\nAct. He argues that his conviction must be vacated because he\\ndid not have to register at that time. We agree. Because his\\nobligation to register—triggered by a 1998 Colorado convic‐\\ntion—expired after fifteen years, we reverse the district court\\nand vacate Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n I.\\n In 1997, Richard Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and\\nsix‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty to violating\\na Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child un‐\\nder fifteen by anyone who is a least four years older than the\\nchild. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). Walker was sentenced\\nto four years’ probation, but probation was later revoked, and\\nhe served a term in prison. After his release, Walker had to\\nregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration\\nand Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA imposes a three‐tier\\nprogressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the\\noriginal offense. Tier I offenders must register for 15 years,\\nTier II offenders for 25 years, and Tier III offenders for life. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).\\n In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex\\noffender from June 2016 to July 2017. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).\\nTo prove “failure to register,” the government must, among\\nother things, prove that the defendant was in fact required to\\nregister. Id. § 2250(a)(1). Walker moved to dismiss the indict‐\\nment, arguing that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I of‐\\nfense, which would mean that his obligation to register as a\\nsex offender ended 15 years after his conviction and sentence.\\nBecause he had no obligation to register between June 2016\\nand July 2017, he contended, he could not be convicted for\\nfailing to do so.\\n The district court disagreed. It determined that Walker\\nwas at least a Tier II offender and denied his motion to dis‐\\nmiss. Walker later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserv‐\\ning his right to appeal the district court’s decision about\\nwhether the law required him to register as a sex offender.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 3\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court had to determine more\\nprecisely whether Walker was a Tier II or Tier III offender in\\norder to calculate his guidelines range. The relevant differ‐\\nence between Tiers II and III for purposes of the district\\ncourt’s analysis is the age of the victim: if the defendant’s vic‐\\ntim was under 13, then he is a Tier III offender; if the victim\\nwas a minor age 13 or older, then he is a Tier II offender. See\\n34 U.S.C. § 20911(4)(A)(ii) & (3)(A). Though Walker’s convic‐\\ntion under the Colorado statute communicated only that his\\nvictim was under 15, the district court looked past the convic‐\\ntion to find that his victims were actually ages four and six.\\nThe court thus held that Walker was a Tier III offender and\\nsentenced him to a below‐guidelines 26‐month term of im‐\\nprisonment.\\n Walker appeals, arguing that his conviction must be va‐\\ncated because he is a Tier I offender and was therefore not re‐\\nquired to register during the relevant time.\\n II.\\n Walker’s conviction and sentence both turn on his tier\\nclassification. If he is a Tier I offender, we must reverse the\\ndenial of his motion to dismiss and vacate his conviction. If\\nhe is a Tier II offender, his conviction stands, but he must be\\nresentenced. If he is a Tier III offender, his conviction and sen‐\\ntence must be affirmed.\\n A.\\n As relevant here, a person is a Tier II sex offender if his\\noffense of conviction is “comparable to or more severe than …\\nabusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title\\n18)” and is “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A)(iv). A person is a Tier III offender if he commits\\n\\f4 No. 18‐3529\\n\\nthe same kind of offense “against a minor who has not at‐\\ntained the age of 13 years.” Id. § 20911(4)(A)(ii).1 And if a sex\\noffender does not satisfy the requirements of Tier II or Tier III,\\nthen he is a Tier I offender. Id. § 20911(2).\\n Determining Walker’s proper tier classification thus re‐\\nquires us to compare his 1998 Colorado conviction with\\nSORNA’s tier definitions. Because SORNA instructs us to\\ncompare Walker’s offense to the “offenses” described in cor‐\\nresponding sections of the Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 and offenses listed therein), we employ the “categori‐\\ncal approach.” See United States v. Taylor, 644 F.3d 573, 576 (7th\\nCir. 2011); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 US. 29, 36–37 (2009)\\n(explaining that reference “to an ‘offense described in’ a par‐\\nticular section of the Federal Criminal Code” indicates a ge‐\\nneric offense that calls for a categorical analysis); United States\\nv. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1132–33 (10th Cir. 2015). Under the\\ncategorical approach, the actual facts underlying the defend‐\\nant’s conviction don’t matter. Instead, the court compares the\\nelements of the predicate offense—i.e., the facts necessary for\\nconviction—to the elements of the relevant federal offense. If\\nthe elements of the predicate offense are the same (or nar‐\\nrower) than the federal offense, there is a categorical match.\\nSee Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260–61 (2013). But\\nif the elements of the state conviction sweep more broadly\\nsuch that there is a “realistic probability … that the State\\nwould apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the def‐\\ninition of the federal crime, then the prior offense is not a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 There are other ways to qualify as a Tier II or III offender, but none\\nis relevant here. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3) & (4).\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 5\\n\\ncategorical match. Gonzales v. Duenas‐Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,\\n193 (2007).2\\n SORNA, however, adds a wrinkle to the analysis. For a sex\\noffender to qualify for Tier II or III, SORNA also requires that\\nhis victim have certain characteristics distinct from the ele‐\\nments of the referenced federal offenses—namely, that the\\nvictim be under a specified age. The two circuits to have di‐\\nrectly considered the implications of SORNA’s age require‐\\nments agree that the text compels a circumstance‐specific\\nanalysis of the victim’s age on top of the otherwise categorical\\ncomparison between the state and federal offenses. See United\\nStates v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196–98 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying\\n“the categorical approach to the generic crimes listed in\\nSORNA’s tier III definition” but reading SORNA’s reference\\nto a victim “who has not attained the age of 13” to be “an\\n\\n\\n 2 Other courts that have applied SORNA’s tier provisions seem to read\\n\\n“whose offense … is comparable to or more severe than” one of the listed\\nfederal “offenses,” see 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A) & (4)(A), as collectively trig‐\\ngering a categorical approach identical to that employed under other stat‐\\nutes, see, e.g., United States v. Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311, 314 (4th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 745–47 (5th Cir. 2017); White, 782 F.3d\\nat 1137. As we note above, our caselaw suggests that SORNA triggers at\\nleast that much. It is possible, though, that the phrases “comparable to”\\nand “more severe than” trigger independent categorical commands such\\nthat the predicate offense must be either comparable to or more severe than\\nthe federal offense. On this reading, the latter phrase might encompass\\npredicate offenses that prohibit conduct that is not covered by, but is cat‐\\negorically more severe than, that prohibited by the baseline federal of‐\\nfenses. For example, that phrase might encompass a predicate offense\\nwhose elements reach victims younger than those included in the federal\\noffense because molesting a younger child is an even more severe offense\\nthan molesting an older one. The government does not raise this possibil‐\\nity, however, so we do not address it here.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐3529\\n\\ninstruction to courts to consider the specific circumstance of a\\nvictim’s age”); White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (“Congress intended\\ncourts to apply a categorical approach to sex offender tier\\nclassifications designated by reference to a specific federal\\ncriminal statute, but to employ a circumstance‐specific com‐\\nparison for the limited purpose of determining the victim’s\\nage.”).\\n We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that\\nSORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach. In so doing, we fol‐\\nlow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Nijhawan v. Holder. See\\n557 U.S. at 37–38 (acknowledging that a single provision\\nmight call for a hybrid approach—part categorical and part\\ncircumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s of‐\\nfense of conviction). In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court empha‐\\nsized that the “aggravated felony” provision of the Immigra‐\\ntion and Nationality Act “contains some language that refers\\nto generic crimes and some language that almost certainly re‐\\nfers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was com‐\\nmitted.” Id. at 38. Sometimes that dual language appears in a\\nsingle provision. The Court identified subparagraph (P) of the\\naggravated felony statute as one such example. Id. at 37–38.\\nThat provision refers to “an offense” that amounts to “forg‐\\ning … passport[s]” but adds an exception to that qualifying\\ncrime for offenses committed under particular circumstances.\\nId. (alterations in original). The Court explained that while the\\nforging‐passports language “may well refer to a generic\\ncrime … the exception cannot possibly refer to a generic\\ncrime … because there is no such generic crime.” Id. at 37. If\\nno criminal statute contains both the offense and the excep‐\\ntion outlined in subparagraph (P), then it would be impossi‐\\nble for a defendant’s conviction to qualify as a predicate un‐\\nder that provision, and the provision would be void of any\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 7\\n\\nmeaningful application. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that\\n“the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in\\nwhich an offender committed the crime on a particular occa‐\\nsion.” Id. at 38; see also id. (explaining that, in the same way,\\nsubparagraph (K)(ii) would be severely diluted without a hy‐\\nbrid analysis). Similar considerations dictate a hybrid ap‐\\nproach in this case.\\n A person is a Tier II offender only if his prior offense\\nmatches “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18)” and was “committed against a minor.” 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(3)(A). And he is a Tier III offender only if his prior\\noffense matches one of the same federal offenses and was com‐\\nmitted “against a minor who has not attained the age of 13\\nyears.” Id. § 20911(4)(A). While the references to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 2244 trigger a categorical approach, we must also give\\nmeaning to the age‐qualifiers that appear in both Tier II and\\nTier III. Only two of the five offenses cross‐referenced in\\n§ 2244 even refer to age, and none of them have SORNA’s spe‐\\ncific age requirements as elements. Cf. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38\\n(when the statute’s added textual condition appears in only\\none of three cross‐referenced criminal statutes, reading the\\ncondition as part of the generic crime would render the other\\ntwo cross references “pointless”). Under Nijhawan, the age re‐\\nquirements are best and most naturally read to refer to the\\n“particular circumstances in which an offender committed\\nthe crime on a particular occasion.” Id. Because SORNA’s tier\\nprovisions highlight victim age as an additional circum‐\\nstance‐specific consideration—apart from the categorical\\nanalysis comparing the defendant’s offense to the federal of‐\\nfenses listed in § 2244—we must treat it like one.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n The government argues that a circumstance‐specific in‐\\nquiry into victim age resolves this case because knowing the\\nactual ages of Walker’s victims (four and six) not only satisfies\\nSORNA’s Tier III victim‐age requirement, but also places his\\noffense within the scope of “abusive sexual contact (as de‐\\nscribed in section 2244 of title 18).” See 34 U.S.C.\\n§ 20911(4)(A)(ii); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (sexual contact\\nwith a person who has not attained the age of 12 years consti‐\\ntutes abusive sexual contact). In other words, the government\\nwants to double dip: it asks us to apply SORNA’s age require‐\\nment as both an independent addition to the categorical anal‐\\nysis and an exception within the categorical analysis, thereby\\ncollapsing the two‐part inquiry outlined above.\\n That approach is inconsistent with both the text of\\nSORNA—which, as we have already said, calls for a categor‐\\nical approach—and the Supreme Court’s precedent on con‐\\nducting a categorical analysis. The Court has made clear that\\nin a categorical analysis, there are no exceptions to the ele‐\\nmental comparison. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243,\\n2257 (2016) (“For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly\\nmade clear that application of the [categorical approach] in‐\\nvolves, and involves only, comparing elements.”). While it\\nmay “seem counterintuitive,” id. at 2251, it isn’t enough to\\nknow that Walker’s victims were four and six—nor is it\\nenough to know that he satisfies the “against a minor who has\\nnot attained the age of 13” requirement of Tier III. We must\\nfirst consider whether his Colorado conviction is a categorical\\nmatch to “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244\\nof title 18).” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv) & (4)(A)(ii). If it is, we\\nthen consider the age of the victim to complete the tier‐classi‐\\nfication determination.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 9\\n\\n This kind of distinction, derived from the text and struc‐\\nture of the statute, is familiar to our SORNA jurisprudence.\\nSee United States v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1234 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(“We conclude that the threshold definition of ‘sex offense’\\nfound in § 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical approach—an\\ninquiry limited to the elements of the offense—but the excep‐\\ntion in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the spe‐\\ncific facts of the offense conduct.”). We follow the same ap‐\\nproach in analyzing Walker’s case.\\n B.\\n We start with a categorical comparison of Walker’s Colo‐\\nrado conviction to the generic federal crime of abusive sexual\\ncontact as defined by § 2244.\\n To sustain a conviction under the Colorado statute, a jury\\nmust find (or, as here, a guilty plea must admit) that the de‐\\nfendant “knowingly subject[ed]” a child who was “less than\\nfifteen years of age” to “any sexual contact” and that the de‐\\nfendant was “at least four years older than the victim.” COLO.\\nREV. STAT. § 18‐3‐405(1). For its part, § 2244 defines abusive\\nsexual contact as “knowingly engag[ing] in or caus[ing] sex‐\\nual contact with or by another person, if doing so would vio‐\\nlate” any one of five cross‐referenced offenses “had the sexual\\ncontact been a sexual act.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a). As relevant\\nhere, those cross‐referenced offenses prohibit knowingly en‐\\ngaging in a sexual act with another person if that person: is\\n“incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,”\\n§ 2242(2)(A); “has attained the age of 12 years but has not at‐\\ntained the age of 16 years” and “is at least four years younger\\nthan the person so engaging,” § 2243(a); or “has not attained\\nthe age of 12 years,” § 2241(c). See id. § 2244(a)(2), (3), & (5).\\n\\f10 No. 18‐3529\\n\\n Because the cross‐referenced offenses (as modified by\\n§ 2244) and the Colorado statute both contain the element of\\nknowing sexual contact with another, the only question is\\nwhether the Colorado statute’s requirements that the victim\\nbe under 15 and at least four years younger than the defend‐\\nant categorically match the remaining element(s) in any of the\\nfederal offenses.\\n The district court determined that the Colorado statute is\\na categorical match for § 2242(2)(A) (victim incapable of ap‐\\npraising the nature of sexual conduct). In reaching that con‐\\nclusion it explained that the federal statute “appears to be\\nvery broad,” encompassing adult victims with cognitive dis‐\\nabilities, those incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, and seniors\\nwith cognitive impairment. The court reasoned that young\\nchildren are incapable of understanding the nature of sexual\\nconduct. So, it continued, “if one assumes that children under\\nthe age of fifteen are ‘incapable of appraising the nature’ of\\nsexual contact/assault, then § 2242(2)(A) appears to be much\\nbroader, and to encompass far more behavior, than the Colo‐\\nrado statute,” making it a categorical match.\\n We disagree. Certainly, many children, and indisputably\\nall children under a certain age, are incapable of appraising\\nthe nature of sexual conduct. But the assumption that children\\nunder the age of 15 are categorically incapable of understand‐\\ning sexual conduct goes too far. At the very least, it is safe to\\nsay that many 14‐year‐olds understand the nature of sexual\\nconduct. That means that the Colorado statute criminalizes\\nconduct not covered by § 2242(2)(A)—i.e., the state statute\\n“sweeps more broadly” than the federal statute—and there is\\nno categorical match. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261.\\n\\fNo. 18‐3529 11\\n\\n So that leaves either § 2243(a) (victim at least 12 but under\\n16, and four years younger than the defendant) or § 2241(c)\\n(victim under 12). Neither is a categorical match for the Colo‐\\nrado statute at issue here. Though narrower in some respects,\\nthe Colorado statute sweeps more broadly than § 2243(a) be‐\\ncause it covers sexual contact against some victims under 12,\\nand § 2243(a) does not. Likewise, the Colorado statute is\\nbroader than § 2241(c) to the extent that it covers some victims\\nbetween the ages of 12 and 15, and § 2241(c) does not. In short,\\na conviction under the Colorado statute doesn’t necessarily\\nsatisfy the elements of either federal offense and so fails the\\ncategorical analysis.\\n Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical\\nmatch with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section\\n2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III sta‐\\ntus regardless of the actual ages of his victims. Walker is thus\\na Tier I offender. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(2).\\n ***\\n As a Tier I offender, Walker was not required to register\\nduring the relevant period. We therefore REVERSE the dis‐\\ntrict court’s decision denying Walker’s motion to dismiss, and\\nwe VACATE Walker’s conviction and sentence.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3180,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642169,"string":"4,642,169"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1168"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419422/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642169/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBYRAN BARTOW,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\n\f2 No. 19-1168\n\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\naffirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\nside communications.\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\n\fNo. 19-1168 3\n\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\nprepare it.”\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\n\f4 No. 19-1168\n\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\n\fNo. 19-1168 5\n\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\nbut neither is persuasive.\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\nfense is thus properly before this court.\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\n\f6 No. 19-1168\n\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\n(7th Cir. 2013).\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\n\fNo. 19-1168 7\n\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\nsons.\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\nsedes Gomez.\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\n\f8 No. 19-1168\n\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\n\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1168\\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBYRAN BARTOW,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 17-CV-17 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n SUBMITTED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM. A Wisconsin trial court denied Andrew L.\\nJackson’s request to represent himself at trial, and Jackson\\nlater pleaded guilty. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2554, arguing that Wisconsin unreasonably ap-\\nplied Supreme Court precedent involving the Sixth\\nAmendment right for competent defendants to represent\\nthemselves at trial. The district court agreed with Jackson\\nthat the Wisconsin trial court erred in ruling that he could\\n\\f2 No. 19-1168\\n\\nnot represent himself at trial, but it nonetheless denied his\\npetition. It correctly concluded that under Gomez v. Berge,\\n434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), Jackson waived his right to chal-\\nlenge that earlier ruling when he later entered an uncondi-\\ntional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea. Therefore, we\\naffirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Jackson faced serious charges in Wisconsin state court,\\nand the court appointed a lawyer for him. Prosecutors ac-\\ncused him of throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in\\nfront of their children, and later, threatening her from pris-\\non. At a hearing in January 2012, Jackson asked the judge to\\nremove his counsel. He complained that counsel had with-\\nheld discovery and met with him too late in the proceedings\\nto adequately discuss strategy. The court granted the mo-\\ntion. At the same time, the court barred Jackson from com-\\nmunicating with anyone but his attorney of record because\\nof his threatening phone calls to his wife.\\n After the court appointed another lawyer, that lawyer\\nreported that Jackson also asked him to withdraw. Jackson\\ncomplained that he had not yet received some discovery ma-\\nterials and that counsel had no faith in him. The court ruled\\nthat these reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint a\\nthird lawyer. The judge allowed Jackson to seek a private\\nattorney so long as he adhered to the restrictions on his out-\\nside communications.\\n Jackson told the trial judge that he wanted to represent\\nhimself, but the judge denied that request. He said that he\\nwould consider Jackson’s request only if Jackson was “capa-\\nble of and ready and prepared” to represent himself, but it\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 3\\n\\nwas “not a given [he] could do it.” Months later, the court\\nreturned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of\\nthe case, explaining that it would not trust someone with\\nunder five years of defense experience to represent Jackson\\nand warning that Jackson “can’t do this.” Jackson still insist-\\ned that he could. The court ultimately denied Jackson’s re-\\nquest. It reasoned that Jackson was “clearly incompetent …\\nto present a case of this complexity” and lacked “the abil-\\nity[…], the training, the knowledge, and the time to properly\\nprepare it.”\\n Jackson pleaded guilty a few days later to two counts of\\nfelony intimidation of a witness, one count of first-degree\\nreckless injury, and one count of aggravated battery. He re-\\nceived a prison sentence of 20 years. Jackson filed a post-\\nconviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his\\nguilty plea on the ground that he was denied his right to\\nself-representation at trial. The post-conviction court denied\\nhis motion. Jackson appealed, but the Wisconsin Court of\\nAppeals affirmed, reasoning that Jackson “did not sufficient-\\nly understand the complexity of his trial or the law concern-\\ning the charges against him.” He petitioned the Wisconsin\\nSupreme Court, but it denied review.\\n Jackson’s next step was a federal petition for a writ of ha-\\nbeas corpus. In it, he argues that Wisconsin unreasonably\\napplied Supreme Court precedent by affirming the denial of\\nhis request to represent himself at trial. (He does not claim\\nthat he had a right to self-representation at his guilty plea, or\\nthat, because unwanted counsel represented him at his\\nguilty plea, his plea was not knowing and voluntary.) He\\nstresses that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he\\nwas competent to represent himself at trial.\\n\\f4 No. 19-1168\\n\\n Presiding by consent, a magistrate judge denied the peti-\\ntion. She explained that, even though the Wisconsin appeals\\ncourt had unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent\\non the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial,\\nJackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. Under\\nGomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 2006), his valid guilty\\nplea waived any defects in the proceedings before the plea,\\nincluding any Sixth Amendment violation.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gov-\\nerns our review of Jackson’s petition. As relevant here, the\\nAct allows habeas relief only if the decision of the Wisconsin\\nCourt of Appeals, the last state court to address Jackson’s\\nclaim, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by\\nthe Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2254(d)(1). Echoing the district court, Jackson argues that,\\nby refusing to let him represent himself at trial, the Wiscon-\\nsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Faretta v. Califor-\\nnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held\\nthat under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right\\nto represent themselves at trial so long as they competently\\nchoose to do so. 422 U.S. at 807.\\n Jackson is correct: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unrea-\\nsonably applied Faretta when it affirmed the trial court. The\\nappellate court based its decision solely on Jackson’s\\nknowledge deficits (he did not know “the law” or the trial’s\\n“complexity”), not mental health problems (which he did\\nnot have). By relying on Jackson’s lack of skill, the appellate\\ncourt’s decision was contrary to and an unreasonable appli-\\ncation of Faretta. As we recently explained in Tatum v. Foster,\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 5\\n\\n Faretta protects the right of a criminal defend-\\n ant to make this (usually) self-defeating choice\\n [of self-representation]. By failing to recognize\\n that the Supreme Court's Faretta line of cases\\n focus only on competence as it relates to men-\\n tal functioning, and forbids the consideration\\n of competence in the sense of accomplishment,\\n the Wisconsin courts reached a result that is\\n contrary to, as well as an unreasonable applica-\\n tion of, the Supreme Court's rulings.\\n847 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n This error, however, does not entitle Jackson to relief if he\\nvalidly waived his right to contest it. See Ward v. Hinsley, 377\\nF.3d 719, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2004). The magistrate judge ruled,\\nand the state maintains on appeal, that Jackson’s guilty plea\\nwaives his claim of any error. Jackson offers two responses,\\nbut neither is persuasive.\\n Jackson’s first response is that the State may not assert\\nwaiver because it did not raise waiver as an affirmative de-\\nfense in its answer to Jackson’s federal petition. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 8(c). But the district court and this court may raise\\nJackson’s waiver sua sponte, as Jackson admits. See, e.g.,\\nGomez, 434 F.3d at 942; Gomez v. Berge, 2004 WL 1852978, at\\n*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 2004). And the district court gave\\nJackson an opportunity to address the defense, so he has not\\nbeen prejudiced by its omission from the answer. The de-\\nfense is thus properly before this court.\\n Jackson’s second argument is equally unavailing. He con-\\ntends that the district court improperly relied on Gomez to\\nrule that he waived any error. Gomez held that “an uncondi-\\n\\f6 No. 19-1168\\n\\ntional plea of guilty operates as a waiver of all formal defects\\nin the proceedings, including any constitutional violations\\nthat occurred before the plea was entered.” 434 F.3d at 942.\\nGomez made a no-contest plea, and we ruled that this plea\\nprecluded him from “contesting the trial court's determina-\\ntion that he was not competent to represent himself at trial.”\\nId. at 943. We have reiterated Gomez several times in recent\\nyears. See, e.g., United States v. Lockett, 859 F.3d 425, 427\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Stoller, 827 F.3d 591, 594\\n(7th Cir. 2016); Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 966\\n(7th Cir. 2013).\\n Jackson’s case is identical to Gomez. Both Gomez and\\nJackson were indicted in Wisconsin state court; both were\\ndenied the right to self-representation at trial; both later en-\\ntered pleas in lieu of going to trial (Gomez pleaded no con-\\ntest, and Jackson pleaded guilty); and both petitioned for a\\nfederal writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of the right\\nto self-representation. But because their pleas waived any\\nclaim about pre-plea errors, neither received federal relief.\\nUnder Gomez, Jackson must lose.\\n To avoid this result, Jackson argues that United States v.\\nSmith, 618 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2010), supersedes Gomez. Smith\\nwas a direct appeal. It vacated a guilty plea that a defendant\\nentered after the district court refused to allow him to re-\\nplace one attorney with another. According to Jackson, Smith\\napplied a new rule: an unconstitutional denial of a defend-\\nant’s choice of counsel is a “structural error” that “brings in-\\nto question the voluntary and intelligent character of the\\nguilty plea itself.” 618 F.3d at 663 (quotations omitted). Jack-\\nson contends that, under Smith, his denial of\\nself-representation is also a structural error that similarly\\n\\fNo. 19-1168 7\\n\\novercomes the defense that he waived it by pleading guilty.\\nJackson’s argument fails, and Gomez controls, for three rea-\\nsons.\\n First, Jackson incorrectly asserts that Smith espoused a\\nnew rule about structural errors in the context of self-\\nrepresentation. It is true that in Smith this court observed\\nthat in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the\\nSupreme Court held for the first time that the denial of a de-\\nfendant’s choice of counsel is structural and not subject to\\nharmless-error review. Smith, 618 F.3d at 663 (citing Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148). But Gonzalez-Lopez also noted that\\nthe wrongful denial of the right to self-representation at trial\\nhas been considered a structural defect since at least 1984.\\n548 U.S. at 149. (“[Structural] errors include … the denial of\\nthe right of self-representation … .”) (citing McKaskle v. Wig-\\ngins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984)). So, when this court de-\\ncided Gomez in 2006, it knew that the erroneous denial of\\nself-representation at trial was a structural defect—yet it en-\\nforced the guilty-plea-waiver rule anyway. Thus, Smith did\\nnot create a new rule about self-representation that super-\\nsedes Gomez.\\n Second, the consequence of a “structural” error is that it\\nis not subject to harmless-error review, see Gonzalez-Lopez,\\n548 U.S. at 148; but such errors can still be waived. Doctrines\\nof default and waiver are grounded in federalism and comi-\\nty, so they apply on federal habeas review even if the “claim\\nraised before the federal habeas court is one of structural er-\\nror.” Ward, 377 F.3d at 725–26; United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d\\n634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “there is no reason to\\nexempt ‘structural errors’” from waiver). Nothing in Gonza-\\nlez-Lopez or Smith suggests that a defendant like Jackson\\n\\f8 No. 19-1168\\n\\ncannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his claim of a prior\\nstructural error by validly pleading guilty.\\n Third, Smith is consistent with Gomez. Smith vacated the\\ndefendant’s guilty plea because we decided that the denial\\nof his counsel of choice at trial called into question his plea’s\\nvoluntariness. See 618 F.3d at 663, 667. Here, Jackson does\\nnot claim in his petition in the district court (nor does he ar-\\ngue in this court) that, because the trial court would not let\\nhim represent himself at trial, his counseled guilty plea was\\nunknowing or involuntary. To the contrary, Jackson’s peti-\\ntion appears to imply that his guilty plea was valid—he ar-\\ngues that he was competent to represent himself at trial pre-\\ncisely because he was “competent” to plead guilty. By not\\nraising that claim in the district court, Jackson did not devel-\\nop an argument or record on the voluntariness of his plea,\\nand the district court had no chance to assess the argument\\nor the State’s responses to it. Therefore, Jackson has forfeited\\nthat claim for review in this court. Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d\\n258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). (“Regardless of whether a habeas\\nclaim was fairly presented or defaulted in the state courts, if\\nan argument was not presented to the federal district court,\\nit is forfeited in this court.”) Without a preserved claim that\\nhis guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, Smith is in-\\napposite and Gomez demonstrates that Jackson’s plea waived\\nany prior errors in the state trial court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3181,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642241,"string":"4,642,241"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Joseph KRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1100"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1100\\nJOSEPH KRELL,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nANDREW M. SAUL,\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\\nCt. 1148 (2019).\\n I. Background\\nA. The Relevant Framework\\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\\n(7th Cir. 2005).\\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 3\\n\\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\\nthe ALJ and describe:\\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\\n nesses are;\\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\\n The important facts you expect the document or\\n witness to prove; and\\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\\n poena.”\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\\npoena).\\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 5\\n\\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\\njobs in Wisconsin.\\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\\nexpert’s testimony.\\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\\nquested documents would show. And although the request\\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\\n The Commissioner appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 7\\n\\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1100\\n\\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\\nsources at the hearing.\\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\\nquest.\\n\\n\\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\\nlegal authority.”).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 9\\n\\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\\nALJ’s determination.\\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\\nhearing or are not provided at all.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419494/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642241/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Joseph KRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1100\nJOSEPH KRELL,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nANDREW M. SAUL,\nCommissioner of Social Security,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\n\f2 No. 18‐1100\n\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\nCt. 1148 (2019).\n I. Background\nA. The Relevant Framework\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\n(7th Cir. 2005).\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\n\fNo. 18‐1100 3\n\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\nthe ALJ and describe:\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\n nesses are;\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\n The important facts you expect the document or\n witness to prove; and\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\n poena.”\n\f4 No. 18‐1100\n\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\npoena).\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\n\fNo. 18‐1100 5\n\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\njobs in Wisconsin.\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\nexpert’s testimony.\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\nquested documents would show. And although the request\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\n\f6 No. 18‐1100\n\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\n The Commissioner appeals.\n II. Discussion\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\n\fNo. 18‐1100 7\n\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\n\n\n\n1\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\n\f8 No. 18‐1100\n\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\nsources at the hearing.\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\nquest.\n\n\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\nlegal authority.”).\n\fNo. 18‐1100 9\n\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\nALJ’s determination.\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\n\f10 No. 18‐1100\n\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\nhearing or are not provided at all.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Joseph KRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1100\\nJOSEPH KRELL,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nANDREW M. SAUL,\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\\nCt. 1148 (2019).\\n I. Background\\nA. The Relevant Framework\\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\\n(7th Cir. 2005).\\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 3\\n\\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\\nthe ALJ and describe:\\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\\n nesses are;\\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\\n The important facts you expect the document or\\n witness to prove; and\\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\\n poena.”\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\\npoena).\\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 5\\n\\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\\njobs in Wisconsin.\\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\\nexpert’s testimony.\\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\\nquested documents would show. And although the request\\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\\n The Commissioner appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 7\\n\\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1100\\n\\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\\nsources at the hearing.\\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\\nquest.\\n\\n\\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\\nlegal authority.”).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 9\\n\\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\\nALJ’s determination.\\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\\nhearing or are not provided at all.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3182,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642491,"string":"4,642,491"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delrico J. NELSON, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Delrico Nelson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2811"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2811\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\\ncount of possession of cannabis.\\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\\nmonths later.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 3\\n\\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2811\\n\\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\\nstipulation.\\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\\nson answered yes.\\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 5\\n\\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 7\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\\nmitted the crimes as charged.\\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\\nevidentiary hearing.\\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419744/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642491/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delrico J. NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2811\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\nJudges.\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\n\f2 No. 18‐2811\n\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\ncount of possession of cannabis.\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\nmonths later.\n\fNo. 18‐2811 3\n\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\n\n\n\n\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\n\f4 No. 18‐2811\n\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\nstipulation.\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\nson answered yes.\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\n\fNo. 18‐2811 5\n\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\n II. ANALYSIS\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\n\f6 No. 18‐2811\n\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\n\fNo. 18‐2811 7\n\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\nmitted the crimes as charged.\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\n\f8 No. 18‐2811\n\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\nevidentiary hearing.\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delrico J. NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2811\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\\ncount of possession of cannabis.\\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\\nmonths later.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 3\\n\\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2811\\n\\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\\nstipulation.\\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\\nson answered yes.\\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 5\\n\\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 7\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\\nmitted the crimes as charged.\\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\\nevidentiary hearing.\\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3183,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642492,"string":"4,642,492"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1100"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1100\\nJOSEPH KRELL,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nANDREW M. SAUL,\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\\nCt. 1148 (2019).\\n I. Background\\nA. The Relevant Framework\\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\\n(7th Cir. 2005).\\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 3\\n\\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\\nthe ALJ and describe:\\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\\n nesses are;\\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\\n The important facts you expect the document or\\n witness to prove; and\\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\\n poena.”\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\\npoena).\\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 5\\n\\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\\njobs in Wisconsin.\\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\\nexpert’s testimony.\\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\\nquested documents would show. And although the request\\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\\n The Commissioner appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 7\\n\\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1100\\n\\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\\nsources at the hearing.\\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\\nquest.\\n\\n\\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\\nlegal authority.”).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 9\\n\\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\\nALJ’s determination.\\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\\nhearing or are not provided at all.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419745/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642492/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1100\nJOSEPH KRELL,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nANDREW M. SAUL,\nCommissioner of Social Security,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\n\f2 No. 18‐1100\n\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\nCt. 1148 (2019).\n I. Background\nA. The Relevant Framework\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\n(7th Cir. 2005).\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\n\fNo. 18‐1100 3\n\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\nthe ALJ and describe:\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\n nesses are;\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\n The important facts you expect the document or\n witness to prove; and\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\n poena.”\n\f4 No. 18‐1100\n\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\npoena).\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\n\fNo. 18‐1100 5\n\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\njobs in Wisconsin.\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\nexpert’s testimony.\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\nquested documents would show. And although the request\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\n\f6 No. 18‐1100\n\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\n The Commissioner appeals.\n II. Discussion\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\n\fNo. 18‐1100 7\n\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\n\n\n\n1\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\n\f8 No. 18‐1100\n\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\nsources at the hearing.\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\nquest.\n\n\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\nlegal authority.”).\n\fNo. 18‐1100 9\n\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\nALJ’s determination.\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\n\f10 No. 18‐1100\n\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\nhearing or are not provided at all.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1100\\nJOSEPH KRELL,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nANDREW M. SAUL,\\nCommissioner of Social Security,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 2:16‐cv‐00951 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. We focus here on an issue involving\\na well‐known figure in Social Security cases: the vocational\\nexpert. Specifically, we address whether an administrative\\nlaw judge (ALJ) can decline to issue a subpoena requiring a\\nvocational expert to produce his underlying data sources.\\nGiven recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that,\\nhere, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by denying a\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nrequest to issue such a subpoena. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.\\nCt. 1148 (2019).\\n I. Background\\nA. The Relevant Framework\\n A person suffering from a disability that renders him un‐\\nable to work may apply to the Social Security Administration\\nfor disability benefits. If a claimant’s application is denied in‐\\nitially and on reconsideration, he may request a hearing be‐\\nfore an ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); see also Smith v. Berryhill,\\n139 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2019). The ALJ is responsible for con‐\\nducting a five‐step sequential evaluation process. Step one is\\nto determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in\\ngainful employment. At steps two and three, the ALJ consid‐\\ners the severity of the disability. At step four, the ALJ deter‐\\nmines what the claimant’s disability leaves him able to do, i.e.,\\nhis residual functional capacity, and whether given that ca‐\\npacity he may still perform his past work. And last, at step\\nfive, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capac‐\\nity, age, education, and work experience to determine\\nwhether the claimant can perform work that is available in\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.1520; Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352\\n(7th Cir. 2005).\\n The final step is the crucial one in this case. It is also the\\nonly step for which the Administration bears the burden of\\nproof. Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009). To\\nassess a claimant’s ability to continue working, the ALJ often\\nrelies on the testimony of vocational experts. See Weatherbee v.\\nAstrue, 649 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011). Vocational experts\\nmust have specialized and current knowledge of “working\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 3\\n\\nconditions and physical demands of various jobs; … the exist‐\\nence and numbers of those jobs in the national economy; and\\ninvolvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers with\\ndisabilities into jobs.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quo‐\\ntation marks omitted); see also Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962,\\n964 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 808 (2019). In provid‐\\ning assessments, vocational experts may rely on publicly\\navailable sources as well as data developed through their own\\nexperiences and research. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (citing\\nSocial Security Ruling, SSR 00–4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75760 (2000)).\\nB. Joseph Krell’s Application\\n Joseph Krell, a former ironworker in Wisconsin, applied\\nfor disability benefits due to problems with his knee. His ap‐\\nplication was denied initially and on reconsideration. He then\\nrequested a hearing before an ALJ.\\n In October 2014, Krell was notified that the ALJ had sched‐\\nuled his hearing in December 2014. The notice stated that a\\nvocational expert would testify at the hearing. It also stated\\nthat Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents\\nor testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case\\nfully.” If Krell wished to obtain a subpoena, he could write to\\nthe ALJ and describe:\\n “What documents you need and/or who the wit‐\\n nesses are;\\n The location of the documents or witnesses;\\n The important facts you expect the document or\\n witness to prove; and\\n Why you cannot prove these facts without a sub‐\\n poena.”\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nSee also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) (describing how to obtain a sub‐\\npoena).\\n Before the hearing, Krell’s counsel wrote to the ALJ re‐\\nquesting a subpoena that would require the vocational expert\\nto produce at the hearing “certain documents upon which the\\nexpert may rely in forming opinions during the course of the\\nhearing.” The requested documents were extensive and in‐\\ncluded statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product,\\nand more. Counsel also requested a description of the meth‐\\nodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics\\nupon which the expert planned to rely. Counsel noted that he\\ncould not adequately cross‐examine the vocational expert if\\nthe expert did not bring these materials to the hearing.\\nAmong other objections, counsel objected to the expert testi‐\\nfying without producing reliable supporting data, and asked\\nthat the ALJ notify him in advance of the hearing if he be‐\\nlieved the request was overbroad or burdensome. The ALJ\\ndid not respond to the subpoena request before the hearing.\\n At the hearing, the ALJ denied the subpoena request, rea‐\\nsoning that the request was deficient because it had not spec‐\\nified what the documents would show and why these facts\\ncould not be shown without a subpoena. See 20 C.F.R.\\n§ 404.950(d). Counsel reiterated that he needed the materials\\nthe vocational expert would rely on at the hearing so that he\\ncould adequately cross‐examine the expert about them. The\\nALJ told counsel that if he took issue with the vocational ex‐\\npert’s testimony, he could challenge it on a post‐hearing basis.\\n The ALJ proceeded with the hearing, allowing the voca‐\\ntional expert to testify by phone. The ALJ provided the expert\\nwith a hypothetical residual functional capacity mirroring his\\nassessment of Krell’s abilities. In response, the expert testified\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 5\\n\\nthat Krell could work as a mail clerk, unskilled inspector, or\\nretail clerk, per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In the\\nexpert’s estimation, these positions together made up 73,000\\njobs in Wisconsin.\\n During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated\\nthat to determine available job numbers, he relied on the oc‐\\ncupational projections for the state of Wisconsin, produced by\\nthe Department of Workforce Development in 2014. Counsel\\nasked that the expert provide page numbers and codes for the\\nWisconsin projections, which the expert did for the mail clerk\\nposition. When he did not immediately find this information\\nfor the inspector position, counsel responded “Okay” and\\nended his cross‐examination. Despite the ALJ’s invitation to\\ndo so, Krell made no post‐hearing submission challenging the\\nexpert’s testimony.\\n The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that\\nKrell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of\\nMarch 2014 (due to his advancing age), rather than July 2011,\\nas Krell had claimed. Based on the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, the ALJ concluded that up to March 2014, Krell was\\nable to perform work existing in significant numbers in the\\nnational economy. The ALJ noted that the expert was “thor‐\\noughly examine[d]” and “unimpeached.”\\n The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, end‐\\ning Krell’s pathway within the Administration. Krell then\\nsuccessfully appealed to the district court, with a magistrate\\njudge presiding by consent. Krell’s subpoena request, the\\nmagistrate judge explained, had stated what facts the re‐\\nquested documents would show. And although the request\\nhad not stated expressly why a subpoena was necessary, it\\nwas clear that counsel could not adequately cross‐examine\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nthe vocational expert without prior access to his underlying\\nsources. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that the\\nALJ had erred in denying Krell’s request for a subpoena.\\n The Commissioner appeals.\\n II. Discussion\\n The only issue before us is whether the ALJ erred in deny‐\\ning Krell’s prehearing subpoena request. We review the mag‐\\nistrate judge’s determination de novo. Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878\\nF.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the ALJ’s denial of the\\nsubpoena request for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Barrett v.\\nBerryhill, 906 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2018); Passmore v. Astrue,\\n533 F.3d 658, 665 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n While this case was pending, the Supreme Court held in\\nBiestek that a vocational expert is not categorically required to\\nproduce his supporting data. 139 S. Ct. at 1156–57. Instead,\\nthe factfinder should evaluate the vocational expert’s testi‐\\nmony, including his failure to produce the data, and deter‐\\nmine whether the testimony is reliable. If an ALJ, for example,\\nfinds an expert trustworthy and believes he has good reason\\nto withhold underlying sources—the sources might include\\nprivate information or take significant time to compile, for ex‐\\nample—the failure to produce such sources “need not make a\\ndifference.” Id. at 1156. In other cases, “the refusal to disclose\\ndata, considered along with other shortcomings, will prevent\\na court from finding that a reasonable mind could accept the\\nexpert’s testimony.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Although an expert’s refusal to provide his sources\\nmay interfere with the claimant’s cross‐examination of the ex‐\\npert, “an ALJ and reviewing court may properly consider\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 7\\n\\nobstacles to such questioning when deciding how much to\\ncredit an expert’s opinion.” Id. at 1156.\\n Turning to Krell’s case, it is within an ALJ’s discretion to\\nissue a prehearing subpoena. He may do so when the sub‐\\npoena is “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a\\ncase” and when certain “facts could not be proven without\\nissuing a subpoena.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d).\\n We agree with Krell and the magistrate judge that the sub‐\\npoena request did state why Krell thought the requested doc‐\\numents were important and that Krell believed he needed\\nthem to “adequately cross examine” the vocational expert.\\nBut that Krell alleged that a subpoena was necessary did not\\nautomatically make it so. See Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049,\\n1058–59 (7th Cir. 1999). At the hearing, the ALJ pointed out\\nthat, despite Krell’s assertion, Krell had not in fact shown why\\nit was necessary for the expert to produce his sources, a pre‐\\nrequisite to obtaining a subpoena. Why, the ALJ asked,\\ncouldn’t counsel just question the expert about his sources at\\nthe hearing? And if Krell wanted to challenge the expert’s re‐\\nliance on those sources, why couldn’t he do so post‐hearing?\\nThese questions, it turns out, were spot on.\\n We keep in mind here that Krell’s argument is that the ALJ\\nerred in denying the subpoena request, requiring reversal. He\\nhas not argued that, putting the subpoena request aside, the\\nvocational expert’s testimony did not constitute substantial\\nevidence.1 See Chavez, 895 F.3d at 967 (noting that, on appeal,\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n While Krell alluded to this in his post‐Biestek position statement, the dis‐\\ncussion was brief and underdeveloped. Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding &\\nEquip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1100\\n\\n“we ask whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s\\nconclusion”). So, we analyze only the subpoena request, not\\nthe expert’s eventual testimony, and ask whether Krell was\\nentitled to require that the expert produce his underlying\\nsources at the hearing.\\n What Krell sought to do, it seems, was to require the vo‐\\ncational expert to make his underlying sources available on\\ndemand. See McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (“A vocational expert is free to give a bottom line, but\\nthe data and reasoning underlying that bottom line must be\\navailable on demand if the claimant challenges the founda‐\\ntion of the vocational expertʹs opinions.”) (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted), abrogated by Biestek, 139 S. Ct. 1148. Biestek,\\nhowever, rejects such a requirement; Biestek clearly held that\\nvocational experts are not categorically required to provide\\ntheir underlying data. The expert may decline to do so, and if\\nhe does, this failure goes to the weight the ALJ may give the\\ntestimony. Considering the totality of his testimony, the ex‐\\npert can be deemed credible even if he provides no underly‐\\ning data. The ALJ makes such determinations on a case‐by‐\\ncase basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157.\\n We acknowledge that it would be helpful to have the ex‐\\npert’s underlying sources at a hearing. But, beyond arguing\\nfor a categorical rule, which, like in Biestek, cannot be imposed\\nhere, Krell has advanced no reason why it was necessary for\\nthe expert to produce his underlying sources. We therefore\\ncannot say that the ALJ erred in denying the subpoena re‐\\nquest.\\n\\n\\nundeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by\\nlegal authority.”).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1100 9\\n\\n We want to be clear that our holding today and that of\\nBiestek do not give vocational experts carte blanche to testify\\nwithout providing underlying sources. It is certainly best\\npractice for vocational experts to provide underlying sources\\nat hearings, and we encourage them to do so. See Biestek, 139\\nS. Ct. at 1155 (noting that a vocational expert’s testimony\\nwould be “more reliable and probative” and “a best practice\\nfor the SSA and its experts” if the expert “produced support‐\\ning data”); see also Social Security Administration, Vocational\\nExpert Handbook, 37 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ssa.gov/ap‐\\npeals/public_experts/Vocational_Experts_(VE)_Handbook‐\\n508.pdf (“You should have available, at the hearing, any vo‐\\ncational resource materials that you are likely to rely upon\\nand should be able to thoroughly explain what resource ma‐\\nterials you used and how you arrived at your opinions.”). We\\nwill review on a case‐by‐case basis situations where a voca‐\\ntional expert does not produce his sources and the ALJ de‐\\nclines to require him to do so. In some cases, the vocational\\nexpert’s testimony may prove to be unreliable without under‐\\nlying sources, and in those cases the testimony may neither\\nconstitute substantial evidence nor be used as the basis for an\\nALJ’s determination.\\n On a final note, we have previously suggested that in cases\\nwhere underlying data may not be available at the hearing,\\n(say, for example, the vocational expert testified by phone, as\\nwas the case here), the claimant should have the opportunity\\nto make additional argument about the data post‐hearing.\\nBritton v. Astrue, 521 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).\\nThis suggestion stems from the recognition “that the lack of\\npretrial discovery in Social Security hearings can make the\\ntask of cross‐examining a [vocational expert] quite difficult.”\\nId. We have never mandated that post‐hearing challenges be\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1100\\n\\nallowed, and we decline to do so here. But nothing in Biestek\\nforces us to reconsider our recommendation, and we continue\\nto encourage ALJs to allow claimants to submit post‐hearing\\nargument about a vocational expert’s testimony, especially\\nwhen the underlying sources are not available during the\\nhearing or are not provided at all.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of\\nthe district court and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3184,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642631,"string":"4,642,631"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Delrico Nelson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2811"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2811\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\\ncount of possession of cannabis.\\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\\nmonths later.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 3\\n\\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2811\\n\\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\\nstipulation.\\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\\nson answered yes.\\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 5\\n\\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 7\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\\nmitted the crimes as charged.\\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\\nevidentiary hearing.\\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419884/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642631/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Delrico Nelson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2811\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\nJudges.\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\n\f2 No. 18‐2811\n\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\ncount of possession of cannabis.\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\nmonths later.\n\fNo. 18‐2811 3\n\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\n\n\n\n\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\n\f4 No. 18‐2811\n\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\nstipulation.\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\nson answered yes.\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\n\fNo. 18‐2811 5\n\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\n II. ANALYSIS\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\n\f6 No. 18‐2811\n\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\n\fNo. 18‐2811 7\n\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\nmitted the crimes as charged.\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\n\f8 No. 18‐2811\n\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\nevidentiary hearing.\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Delrico Nelson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2811\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDELRICO J. NELSON,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 1:04‐cr‐10073‐001 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 10, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n PER CURIAM. Delrico Nelson appeals the revocation of his\\nsupervised release and ensuing 60‐month prison sentence. At\\nhis revocation proceeding, he waived his right to a contested\\nhearing and stipulated that the government would be able to\\nprovide evidence to show that he violated his terms of release.\\nNelson now argues that his waiver was not knowing and\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nvoluntary. Because the totality of the circumstances demon‐\\nstrates otherwise, we affirm the district court’s judgment.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2006, Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possessing\\nmore than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute,\\nsee 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to 16\\nyears’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. After\\nbeing released from prison in 2014, Nelson—then serving su‐\\npervised release—was arrested and charged with possession\\nof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Based on Nel‐\\nson’s stipulation to violating his conditions of release, the dis‐\\ntrict court (Judge Mihm) revoked Nelson’s supervised release\\nand sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment and 18\\nmonths’ additional supervised release.\\n Nelson began his second term of supervised release in\\n2017. In November that year, Nelson’s parole officer peti‐\\ntioned to revoke his supervised release based on allegations\\nthat he had committed two counts of aggravated battery, one\\ncount of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and one\\ncount of possession of cannabis.\\n Nelson was brought to the district court (before Magis‐\\ntrate Judge Shields) for an initial hearing on the petition to\\nrevoke. The judge asked defense counsel whether he had the\\nchance to discuss the revocation petition with Nelson, and\\ncounsel confirmed that he had. The judge then asked Nelson\\nif he understood “what the government [sought] to have oc‐\\ncur if this petition would be granted,” to which Nelson said\\nyes. The judge scheduled the final revocation hearing for two\\nmonths later.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 3\\n\\n At the final hearing, the parties informed the court (this\\ntime, Judge Darrow) that the government had agreed to rec‐\\nommend a lower sentence (41 months’ imprisonment—\\n10 months below the recommended guideline range†) in ex‐\\nchange for Nelson’s stipulation that he violated his terms of\\nrelease and waiver of his right to a contested revocation hear‐\\ning. Judge Darrow informed Nelson that, if he wished to pro‐\\nceed and so stipulate, his stipulation could not be conditioned\\non the court’s acceptance of the proposed sentence. Nelson\\nresponded “I ain’t got no say no way. Just go on and agree to\\nit.” The judge expressed concern about the voluntariness of\\nhis stipulation. She directed Nelson to confer with his lawyer,\\nwho, after an exchange with Nelson, assured the court that\\nNelson understood “all the principles” and did not “want to\\nfight it anymore.” The judge asked Nelson if he agreed with\\nhis attorney’s statement, and Nelson answered that he did.\\n Nelson, under oath, then stipulated that the government\\nwould be able to provide enough evidence for the court to\\nfind by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated\\nconditions of his supervised release. The judge then ques‐\\ntioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation and\\nsaid that she sensed reluctance. Nelson responded that he was\\nfrustrated with the situation because he had “no say in noth‐\\ning that happened.” Nelson added, however, that he was\\n“okay with stipulating” and did not need a full hearing be‐\\ncause he had violated the conditions of his supervised release\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n † Based on Nelson’s criminal history category, the guidelines recom‐\\nmended 51–63 months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4(a), though\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped any sentence at 60 months.\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2811\\n\\n“just by being arrested.” The judge proceeded to accept the\\nstipulation.\\n The government and defense counsel then argued in sup‐\\nport of their jointly proposed 41‐month prison term. The gov‐\\nernment defended the need for a downward departure be‐\\ncause Nelson’s stipulation avoided the expense and time of\\nconducting a contested evidentiary hearing and, besides,\\nthere were “some Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues with\\nproving up the violations beyond a reasonable doubt.” The\\ngovernment added that there was less of a need for specific\\ndeterrence because Nelson would likely be prosecuted and\\nreceive a sentence in state court for the underlying violations.\\nDefense counsel seconded the need for a lesser penalty, given\\nthat Nelson was being punished not because he had been\\nfound guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing state\\nlaw violations, but because he had violated his terms of su‐\\npervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.\\n Nelson was then invited to allocute. He began by stating\\nthat he “was under the impression from reading the statute\\n… that just being arrested [was] a violation of [his] term.” The\\ndistrict court interrupted him: “Well, just being arrested isn’t\\nenough, but [it would be enough] if you’re agreeing that the\\ngovernment would call the witnesses … to testify and that\\nthey would testify to the facts that they outlined. So it’s not\\njust being arrested.” When asked if he understood that, Nel‐\\nson answered yes.\\n The court ultimately rejected the parties’ joint recommen‐\\ndation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months’ imprisonment,\\nthe statutory maximum. The court did not agree that a down‐\\nward departure was warranted, explaining that it was unper‐\\nsuaded that avoiding the expense of a contested hearing\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 5\\n\\njustified a reduced sentence. The court then dismissed as\\nspeculative the government’s suggestion that Nelson would\\nbe separately convicted in state court, and so it refused to ad‐\\njust the sentence based on that argument. Finally, the court\\nwas concerned with Nelson’s criminal history and the fact\\nthat his prior revocation and subsequent sentence did not de‐\\nter him from engaging in unlawful conduct.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n Nelson’s appeal centers on one overarching argument:\\nthat his waiver of a contested revocation hearing was not\\nknowing and voluntary. See United States v. Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that defend‐\\nant’s waiver of any procedural right granted by Rule 32.1\\nmust be knowing and voluntary); United States v. LeBlanc,\\n175 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).\\n At the outset, the parties disagree on the standard of re‐\\nview that governs this issue. Nelson asserts that the question\\nwhether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is subject to de\\nnovo review. The government counters that plain error must\\napply when a defendant like Nelson challenges his waiver of\\na contested revocation hearing for the first time on appeal.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The government is correct: Nelson’s\\nfailure to preserve his challenge constitutes forfeiture and\\nlimits this court’s review of his claim to plain error. See United\\nStates v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Luepke,\\n495 F.3d 443, 446–47 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Reyna,\\n358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).\\n As for the merits, Nelson first argues that his waiver was\\nnot knowing and voluntary because he did not understand\\nthe charges against him. Pointing to his colloquy with Judge\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nDarrow, he contends that he misunderstood whether “just be‐\\ning arrested” constituted a violation of his release. But even if\\nwe assumed that Nelson still was confused after the district\\njudge told him that “being arrested isn’t enough” to constitute\\na violation, the totality of the circumstances show that his\\nwaiver was knowing and voluntary. Nelson had the oppor‐\\ntunity to review the violation memorandum and discuss it\\nwith his attorney in advance of the hearing. See FED. R. CRIM.\\nP. 32.1(b)(2)(A); United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant] received all the process due\\nhim at his revocation proceedings. He was given adequate no‐\\ntice, represented at all times, [and] appeared at the hear‐\\ning….”). He did not object to the contents of the revocation\\nmemorandum, and further conceded that the government\\ncould and would present facts demonstrating that he commit‐\\nted the offenses of aggravated battery, possession, and intent\\nto distribute. And he acknowledged that the offense that led\\nto his prior revocation of supervised release resembled the of‐\\nfenses that he was alleged to have committed this time.\\n The cases that Nelson relies on in support of his argument\\nare unavailing. In United States v. Correa‐Torres, 326 F.3d 18\\n(1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit concluded that the appellant’s\\nrevocation waiver was not knowing and voluntary because\\nthe charges underlying his alleged violation were never set\\nforth in the revocation proceedings, and the appellant ap‐\\npeared to believe that he did not commit a crime at all, id. at\\n24. But here, Nelson read the violation memorandum and de‐\\nclared that he understood the charges against him: aggra‐\\nvated assault, possession of cannabis, and intent to distribute\\ncannabis. The government also orally described the factual\\npredicate of the allegations during the hearing. Likewise, Nel‐\\nson cites United States v. Pineda‐Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761\\n\\fNo. 18‐2811 7\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that a waiver is unknowing\\nwhen a court fails to remedy a mistaken understanding that\\nan arrest by itself violates the terms of supervised release. But\\nthat case involved allegations of an inchoate crime, and the\\ndefendant there demonstrated a lack of understanding of\\nwhat crime he was charged with committing. Here, Nelson\\nacknowledged what conduct he was alleged to have engaged\\nin and what the resulting charges were. And unlike the de‐\\nfendant in Pineda‐Buenaventura, Nelson admitted that the gov‐\\nernment here had sufficient evidence to prove that he com‐\\nmitted the crimes as charged.\\n Nelson next contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because he did not understand that he would\\nbe waiving his right to present evidence and cross examine\\nwitnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B). But the district\\ncourt was not required to address in checklist fashion each\\nprocedural right that Nelson was waiving when stipulating\\nthat he had violated his terms of release. See Boultinghouse,\\n784 F.3d at 1172. Instead, “where the record confirms that the\\ndefendant had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con‐\\nsequence of the waiver that the court may have omitted from\\nits admonishments, we will sustain the waiver as knowing\\nnotwithstanding the gap in the colloquy.” Id. And based on\\nthe record, Nelson had to have understood the rights that he\\nwas waiving and the consequences of doing so. He was rep‐\\nresented by counsel, and he said that he understood that he\\nwas waiving his right to a full hearing and his right to chal‐\\nlenge the length of his sentence. What is more, earlier at his\\nfirst revocation hearing (where he similarly stipulated that he\\nhad violated the terms of his release), Nelson waived his\\nrights to compel witnesses to appear on his own behalf and to\\ncross‐examine the government’s witnesses. Based on his prior\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2811\\n\\nexperience waiving a contested revocation hearing, see United\\nStates v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2018), Nelson had to\\nhave known what rights he was waiving by foregoing a full\\nevidentiary hearing.\\n Finally, Nelson contends that his waiver was not knowing\\nand voluntary because it was premised on erroneous legal ad‐\\nvice. He contends that, had he known that his lawyer’s argu‐\\nments for a 41‐month sentence would have been summarily\\ndismissed by the court, he never would have waived his right\\nto a contested revocation hearing. But he cites no cases to sug‐\\ngest that reliance on a lawyer’s unsuccessful arguments ren‐\\nders such a waiver not knowing and voluntary. The cases that\\nhe relies on for this contention deal with the ineffective assis‐\\ntance of counsel, see United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 690–91\\n(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107–08\\n(D.C. Cir. 2000), which is not a claim that he develops here.\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3185,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642953,"string":"4,642,953"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyjuan ANDERSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2211 & 18-2232"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Kanne, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\\n I\\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\\n\\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\\n A. The Murder and Investigation\\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\\nknow who killed his nephew.\\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\\nforgery charge.\\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\\n\\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\\n B. Criminal Trials\\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\\nrecordings.\\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\\n\\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\\nonment.\\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\\nwas false.\\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\\n\\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\\nthat his recantation was false.\\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\\nof Palmer’s threats.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\\ncrimination and did not testify.\\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\\nday, October 21.\\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\\nI’m saying.”\\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\\n\\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\\nhands on me.”\\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\\nare not relevant here.\\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\\nhis statements on the tapes.\\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\\nrecorded jail calls.\\n D. Criminal Retrial\\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\\n\\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\\n E. Civil Litigation\\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\\ntify.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\\n II\\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\\nolations.\\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\\n242, 249 (1986).\\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\\nCir. 2019).\\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\\n\\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\\ntheir due process rights—by:\\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young;\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\\n statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\\n the murder.\\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\\nagainst particular defendants.\\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\\nknew.\\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\\n\\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\\nhis original statement to police) was false.\\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\\ncase against the plaintiffs.\\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\\n\\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\\nment. We cannot agree.\\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\\n\\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\\nCir. 2014).\\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\\ntil the eve of trial.\\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\\n\\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\\nserted in the statement.”).\\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\\nof their Brady claim.\\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\\nto Detective Palmer.\\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\\n\\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\\nwere false.\\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\\ntrue”).\\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\\nspect to Detective Palmer.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\\n\\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\\nclaim.\\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\\nstatements.\\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\\n III\\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\\nings as the case returns to the district court.\\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\\nceed against which defendants on remand.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\\n\\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\\n Palmer;\\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\\n and\\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\\n ant Joseph Stevens.\\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\\nants.\\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\\n(2017)).\\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\\n\\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\\ntheir claims on remand.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420206/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642953/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tyjuan ANDERSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\n\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\n I\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\n\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\n A. The Murder and Investigation\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\nknow who killed his nephew.\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\n\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\nforgery charge.\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\n\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\n B. Criminal Trials\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\n\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\nrecordings.\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\n\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\nonment.\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\n\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\nwas false.\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\n\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\nthat his recantation was false.\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\nof Palmer’s threats.\n\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\ncrimination and did not testify.\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\nday, October 21.\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\nI’m saying.”\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\n\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\nhands on me.”\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\nare not relevant here.\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\n\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\nhis statements on the tapes.\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\nrecorded jail calls.\n D. Criminal Retrial\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\n\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\n E. Civil Litigation\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\n\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\ntify.\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\n II\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\nolations.\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\n\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\n242, 249 (1986).\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\n\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\nCir. 2019).\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\n\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\ntheir due process rights—by:\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\n fered by Rickedda Young;\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\n statement;\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\n the murder.\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\nagainst particular defendants.\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\n\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\nknew.\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\n\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\nhis original statement to police) was false.\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\n\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\ncase against the plaintiffs.\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\n\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\n\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\nment. We cannot agree.\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\n\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\nCir. 2014).\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\ntil the eve of trial.\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\n\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\n\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\n\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\nserted in the statement.”).\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\nof their Brady claim.\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\nto Detective Palmer.\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\n\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\nwere false.\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\n\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\ntrue”).\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\nspect to Detective Palmer.\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\n\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\nclaim.\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\n\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\nstatements.\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\n III\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\nings as the case returns to the district court.\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\nceed against which defendants on remand.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\n\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\n Palmer;\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\n and\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\n ant Joseph Stevens.\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\n\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\nants.\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\n(2017)).\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\n\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\ntheir claims on remand.\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tyjuan ANDERSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\\n I\\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\\n\\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\\n A. The Murder and Investigation\\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\\nknow who killed his nephew.\\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\\nforgery charge.\\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\\n\\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\\n B. Criminal Trials\\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\\nrecordings.\\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\\n\\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\\nonment.\\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\\nwas false.\\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\\n\\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\\nthat his recantation was false.\\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\\nof Palmer’s threats.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\\ncrimination and did not testify.\\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\\nday, October 21.\\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\\nI’m saying.”\\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\\n\\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\\nhands on me.”\\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\\nare not relevant here.\\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\\nhis statements on the tapes.\\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\\nrecorded jail calls.\\n D. Criminal Retrial\\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\\n\\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\\n E. Civil Litigation\\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\\ntify.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\\n II\\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\\nolations.\\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\\n242, 249 (1986).\\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\\nCir. 2019).\\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\\n\\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\\ntheir due process rights—by:\\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young;\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\\n statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\\n the murder.\\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\\nagainst particular defendants.\\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\\nknew.\\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\\n\\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\\nhis original statement to police) was false.\\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\\ncase against the plaintiffs.\\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\\n\\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\\nment. We cannot agree.\\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\\n\\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\\nCir. 2014).\\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\\ntil the eve of trial.\\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\\n\\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\\nserted in the statement.”).\\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\\nof their Brady claim.\\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\\nto Detective Palmer.\\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\\n\\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\\nwere false.\\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\\ntrue”).\\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\\nspect to Detective Palmer.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\\n\\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\\nclaim.\\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\\nstatements.\\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\\n III\\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\\nings as the case returns to the district court.\\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\\nceed against which defendants on remand.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\\n\\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\\n Palmer;\\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\\n and\\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\\n ant Joseph Stevens.\\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\\nants.\\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\\n(2017)).\\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\\n\\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\\ntheir claims on remand.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3186,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643077,"string":"4,643,077"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2211"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\\n I\\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\\n\\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\\n A. The Murder and Investigation\\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\\nknow who killed his nephew.\\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\\nforgery charge.\\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\\n\\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\\n B. Criminal Trials\\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\\nrecordings.\\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\\n\\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\\nonment.\\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\\nwas false.\\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\\n\\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\\nthat his recantation was false.\\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\\nof Palmer’s threats.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\\ncrimination and did not testify.\\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\\nday, October 21.\\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\\nI’m saying.”\\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\\n\\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\\nhands on me.”\\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\\nare not relevant here.\\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\\nhis statements on the tapes.\\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\\nrecorded jail calls.\\n D. Criminal Retrial\\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\\n\\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\\n E. Civil Litigation\\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\\ntify.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\\n II\\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\\nolations.\\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\\n242, 249 (1986).\\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\\nCir. 2019).\\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\\n\\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\\ntheir due process rights—by:\\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young;\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\\n statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\\n the murder.\\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\\nagainst particular defendants.\\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\\nknew.\\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\\n\\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\\nhis original statement to police) was false.\\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\\ncase against the plaintiffs.\\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\\n\\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\\nment. We cannot agree.\\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\\n\\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\\nCir. 2014).\\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\\ntil the eve of trial.\\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\\n\\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\\nserted in the statement.”).\\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\\nof their Brady claim.\\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\\nto Detective Palmer.\\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\\n\\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\\nwere false.\\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\\ntrue”).\\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\\nspect to Detective Palmer.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\\n\\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\\nclaim.\\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\\nstatements.\\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\\n III\\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\\nings as the case returns to the district court.\\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\\nceed against which defendants on remand.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\\n\\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\\n Palmer;\\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\\n and\\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\\n ant Joseph Stevens.\\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\\nants.\\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\\n(2017)).\\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\\n\\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\\ntheir claims on remand.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420330/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643077/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\n\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\n I\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\n\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\n A. The Murder and Investigation\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\nknow who killed his nephew.\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\n\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\nforgery charge.\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\n\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\n B. Criminal Trials\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\n\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\nrecordings.\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\n\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\nonment.\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\n\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\nwas false.\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\n\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\nthat his recantation was false.\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\nof Palmer’s threats.\n\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\ncrimination and did not testify.\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\nday, October 21.\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\nI’m saying.”\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\n\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\nhands on me.”\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\nare not relevant here.\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\n\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\nhis statements on the tapes.\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\nrecorded jail calls.\n D. Criminal Retrial\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\n\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\n E. Civil Litigation\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\n\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\ntify.\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\n II\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\nolations.\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\n\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\n242, 249 (1986).\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\n\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\nCir. 2019).\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\n\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\ntheir due process rights—by:\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\n fered by Rickedda Young;\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\n statement;\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\n the murder.\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\nagainst particular defendants.\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\n\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\nknew.\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\n\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\nhis original statement to police) was false.\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\n\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\ncase against the plaintiffs.\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\n\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\n\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\nment. We cannot agree.\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\n\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\nCir. 2014).\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\ntil the eve of trial.\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\n\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\n\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\n\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\nserted in the statement.”).\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\nof their Brady claim.\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\nto Detective Palmer.\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\n\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\nwere false.\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\n\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\ntrue”).\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\nspect to Detective Palmer.\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\n\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\nclaim.\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\n\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\nstatements.\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\n III\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\nings as the case returns to the district court.\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\nceed against which defendants on remand.\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\n\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\n Palmer;\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\n and\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\n ant Joseph Stevens.\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\n\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\n\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\nants.\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\n(2017)).\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\n\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\n\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\ntheir claims on remand.\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROCKFORD, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n Nos. 3:15-cv-50065 & 3:15-cv-50064 — Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 14, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Nowhere does the Constitution’s\\npromise of due process mean more than in a criminal trial.\\nThis promise translates into an obligation when police and\\nprosecutors find themselves in possession of information that\\nexculpates a criminal defendant. That is the cornerstone of the\\nSupreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, and this\\ncase presents serious and unresolved questions whether cer-\\ntain detectives in Rockford, Illinois, failed to adhere to their\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nBrady obligations when prosecuting three men for the murder\\nof eight-year-old Demarcus Hanson on April 14, 2002. One of\\nthose detectives has since admitted—under oath no less—to\\nengaging in serious misconduct during the investigation.\\n In 2013 an Illinois court found a Brady violation as part of\\nvacating the murder convictions of Tyjuan Anderson, Lumont\\nJohnson, and Anthony Ross after each man served more than\\na decade in prison. The case entered federal court when An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross then brought claims for money\\ndamages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City\\nof Rockford and a score of individual defendants. The district\\ncourt granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of all\\ndefendants. We reverse. While the case entails many complex-\\nities, Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth suffi-\\ncient evidence to move forward against particular defendants\\non particular aspects of their alleged due process violations.\\n I\\n Demarcus Hanson was killed by shots fired into his grand-\\nmother’s Rockford home. The State successfully prosecuted\\nTyjuan Anderson, Lumont Johnson, and Anthony Ross for the\\nmurder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent\\nmore than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered\\na new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady mate-\\nrial—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s\\nkey witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. An-\\nderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They\\nthen turned to federal court by filing this lawsuit against the\\nCity of Rockford and multiple Rockford police officers alleg-\\ning that the defendant officers violated their rights under the\\nU.S. Constitution and Illinois law by not only withholding the\\nrecorded jail calls and other exculpatory information, but also\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 3\\n\\nby fabricating evidence leading to their convictions for a\\ncrime they insist they did not commit.\\n A. The Murder and Investigation\\n At approximately 2:51 a.m. on April 14, 2002, someone\\nfired shots into Estelle Dowthard’s home. One of the bullets\\nstruck and killed her eight-year-old grandson Demarcus Han-\\nson as he was sleeping in his bed. Responding officers from\\nthe Rockford Police Department soon learned that Estelle’s\\nson, Alex Dowthard, was likely the shooter’s intended target.\\nDowthard would come to play a substantial role in the inves-\\ntigation and, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ trials and convictions.\\n Detectives Doug Palmer and Joseph Stevens—both de-\\nfendants in this case—led the investigation. Within hours of\\nthe shooting, Palmer and another detective, defendant James\\nRandall, interviewed Dowthard, who denied any knowledge\\nabout his nephew’s murder. Dowthard told the detectives\\nthat, in the hours before the murder, he had a verbal alterca-\\ntion with Anderson, Johnson, and Ross near the M+M Market\\nin Rockford and he shot at the trio as they drove in a white\\nSuburban. Dowthard explained that he then drove to his\\nmother’s home and hid his gun under a car parked outside.\\nHe insisted, however, that he was not present when shots\\nwere later fired at his mother’s house and therefore did not\\nknow who killed his nephew.\\n The police used Dowthard’s admission that he possessed\\na gun (and shot at the plaintiffs) to detain him on a parole vi-\\nolation. A few weeks later, on May 2, Detectives Palmer and\\nStevens again sought to speak with Dowthard, this time at Big\\nMuddy River Correctional Center, where he was incarcerated\\non the parole violation. And Dowthard again denied any\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nknowledge about his nephew’s murder. During this visit, De-\\ntective Stevens also requested copies of Dowthard’s jail calls\\nto assist with the investigation. Less than two weeks later, un-\\ndoubtedly to increase the pressure on Dowthard to cooperate,\\nthe State resurrected an old set of forgery allegations (dating\\nto February 2002) that had gone uncharged. The new charges\\nprovided a second basis to revoke Dowthard’s parole.\\n Rockford police met with Dowthard a third time on May\\n31, 2002. This time Dowthard, who was still incarcerated for\\nthe parole violation, agreed to talk, but only if detectives\\nagreed to inform the parole board of his cooperation. He then\\nprovided Sergeant Gregory Lindmark and defendant Detec-\\ntive Theo Glover a written statement claiming, for the first\\ntime, that he was present when his nephew was shot. Despite\\nhis initial denials, Dowthard now claimed he saw three indi-\\nviduals—Anderson, Johnson, and Ross—exit a red car with\\nguns and then, as he was fleeing, heard shots fired toward his\\nmother’s house. He told the police that he initially denied see-\\ning the shooters because he thought he could handle the mat-\\nter himself. Later that summer, Dowthard repeated this story\\nbefore the grand jury, and on July 31, the State dismissed his\\nforgery charge.\\n Detectives Stevens and Palmer also interviewed Lataurean\\nBrown, who was with Dowthard in the hours before the mur-\\nder. While Brown would eventually become an important\\nprosecution witness, during his initial interview on April 24,\\nhe denied knowing who shot at the Dowthard home. But he\\nadmitted to seeing Alex Dowthard fire shots at the plaintiffs’\\nSuburban earlier that night. He also told police that he drove\\nDowthard to his mother’s house, where Dowthard hid his\\ngun under a car. The two men then drove to the Concord\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 5\\n\\nCommons, where Brown saw and spoke to his cousin\\nRickedda Young. A few weeks later, Detectives Stevens and\\nPalmer interviewed Brown a second time. By the end of the\\nten-hour interview, Brown changed his account and signed a\\nwritten statement claiming Anderson, Johnson, and Ross\\nwere responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n In April 2002, and following up on the information pro-\\nvided by Brown, the police spoke with Rickedda Young.\\nYoung told Detectives Stevens and Scott Mastroinanni (also a\\ndefendant in this case) that she saw and spoke to Brown and\\nDowthard at the Concord Commons during the early morn-\\ning hours of April 14. She stated that Dowthard and Brown\\ntold her that someone had just fired shots at them as they fled\\nDowthard’s mother’s house, but they did not know who. Nei-\\nther Stevens nor Mastroinanni documented or disclosed this\\nfact—that immediately after the shooting, the State’s key wit-\\nnesses told a family member they did not see the shooter—in\\nthe subsequent prosecution of Anderson, Johnson, and Ross.\\n The Rockford police also investigated but ultimately ex-\\ncluded two other possible suspects, Kefentse Taylor and Casel\\nMontgomery, before arresting the three plaintiffs (Anderson,\\nJohnson, and Ross) for Demarcus Hanson’s murder.\\n B. Criminal Trials\\n Anderson and Johnson proceeded to trial in October 2002.\\nThe Thursday before trial was to begin, the prosecution re-\\nceived more than 40 hours of Alex Dowthard’s recorded jail\\ncalls from the Rockford police. The tapes, which were made\\navailable to the plaintiffs’ then-defense attorneys the follow-\\ning afternoon, included Dowthard’s conversations with fam-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nily and friends while he was incarcerated for the parole viola-\\ntion in May 2002. The conversations predated Dowthard’s\\nMay 31 written statement in which he first implicated the\\nplaintiffs. Given the length and poor quality of the recordings,\\nthe attorneys for the plaintiffs (then defendants) requested a\\ncontinuance for more time to listen to all of them and to de-\\ntermine whether they contained exculpatory or otherwise\\nuseful defense evidence. The trial court denied the request\\nand proceeded with jury selection, affording the attorneys for\\nAnderson and Johnson only a couple of days to review the\\nrecordings.\\n With no physical or forensic evidence connecting the\\nplaintiffs to the crime, the prosecution’s case rested on the tes-\\ntimony of Alex Dowthard and Lautaurean Brown. Dowthard\\ntestified consistent with his May 31 written statement impli-\\ncating the plaintiffs, though he offered a different explanation\\nfor his evolving account of the murder. Recall that in his writ-\\nten statement Dowthard claimed that he initially lied to the\\npolice (by denying knowledge of who shot Hanson) because\\nhe thought he could handle the situation himself. At trial,\\nhowever, Dowthard testified that during his first two inter-\\nviews he told detectives he did not witness the murder be-\\ncause he was on parole and telling the police the true and full\\naccount of what happened during the early morning hours of\\nApril 14 would mean admitting that he had a gun and thus\\nadmitting to a parole violation. (This explanation made little\\nsense because Dowthard admitted to possessing a gun during\\nhis first interview with police just hours after the murder,\\nwhich resulted in a parole violation.)\\n Dowthard further testified that he eventually cooperated\\nwith police without receiving anything in return. During\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 7\\n\\ncross-examination, however, he conceded that following his\\ntestimony in the grand jury, the State dropped his unrelated\\nforgery charge, sent a letter to the parole board relaying this\\ninformation, and decided not to charge him for the shots he\\nfired at the plaintiffs just before Hanson’s murder. Neither\\nparty introduced or otherwise used any aspect of Dowthard’s\\njail calls at Anderson and Johnson’s trial.\\n Lautaurean Brown also testified for the prosecution and,\\nlike Dowthard, pointed the finger at the plaintiffs, though he\\ndenied seeing anyone carrying a gun.\\n As for the defense case, Anderson and Johnson presented\\nalibi witnesses and argued that two other individuals, Kefen-\\ntse Taylor and Casel Montgomery, were the actual shooters.\\nThe jury found Anderson and Johnson guilty of murder, and\\nthe trial court later sentenced each of them to 50 years’ impris-\\nonment.\\n The third plaintiff, Anthony Ross, proceeded to trial in\\n2004. Brown and Dowthard again testified for the prosecution\\nand echoed the accounts provided in the trial of Johnson and\\nAnderson. The jury also heard from Ross’s cousin, Sonya\\nWhite, who claimed she was with Ross when he tossed the\\nmurder weapon into a lake and confessed to killing Hanson.\\nRoss then testified in his own defense and denied any involve-\\nment in the murder while also presenting an alibi witness.\\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and, as with Johnson and\\nAnderson, Ross received a sentence of 50 years.\\n C. Post-conviction Proceedings\\n Following unsuccessful direct appeals, all three plaintiffs\\nfiled petitions for post-conviction relief in which they asserted\\ntheir innocence and alleged, as they do here, that the officers\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ninvestigating Demarcus Hanson’s murder committed numer-\\nous Brady violations. They also alleged that the defendant of-\\nficers engaged in misconduct by coercing witnesses and fab-\\nricating evidence. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs sub-\\nmitted an affidavit by Detective Palmer—the lead investiga-\\ntor—in which Palmer admitted that he threatened witnesses,\\nfalsified witness statements, neutralized exculpatory evi-\\ndence, and instructed witnesses to offer testimony he believed\\nwas false.\\n The trial court reacted to Detective Palmer’s admissions of\\nmisconduct by holding an evidentiary hearing on the plain-\\ntiffs’ petitions for post-conviction relief. The court heard tes-\\ntimony from Palmer and approximately 34 other witnesses.\\nPalmer’s testimony focused on three topics: the circumstances\\nsurrounding his resignation from the Rockford Police Depart-\\nment in 2004, his own wrongdoing during the Hanson mur-\\nder investigation, and his belief that Anderson, Johnson, and\\nRoss did not commit the murder. We need focus only on the\\ntestimony regarding police misconduct.\\n Palmer admitted at length and in substantial detail that he\\nthreatened and coerced witnesses to give statements and en-\\ncouraged witnesses to provide false testimony during the\\nplaintiffs’ criminal trials. He described, for example, how he\\nhad instructed the two key prosecution witnesses—\\nDowthard and Brown—to testify consistently with their writ-\\nten statements implicating the plaintiffs even though he be-\\nlieved those statements were false. He also explained how he\\nfalsified a statement from a man named Bryce Croft and then\\ncompelled Croft to sign the statement.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 9\\n\\n The details matter. According to Palmer, in the summer of\\n2002 and before the plaintiffs’ trials, Bryce Croft, then an in-\\nmate at Winnebago County Jail, requested to see him and,\\nduring the meeting that followed, provided detailed infor-\\nmation implicating an alternative suspect, Casel Montgom-\\nery, in Hanson’s murder. Palmer testified that instead of pur-\\nsuing this lead against Montgomery, he took a deliberate step\\nto prevent Croft’s statement from being of any use to the\\nplaintiffs during their criminal trials. He told the court that he\\ndid so at the direction of his supervisor, testifying that “Ser-\\ngeant Lindmark told me to make a liar out of Bryce Croft.”\\nPalmer explained that, upon receiving this instruction, he met\\na second time with Croft and, during that meeting, forced\\nCroft to sign a pre-written and false statement recanting his\\noriginal statement. The plaintiffs went to trial knowing none\\nof the circumstances surrounding Croft’s second statement or\\nthat his recantation was false.\\n Croft, too, testified at the evidentiary hearing and corrob-\\norated much of Detective Palmer’s account. He explained that\\nhe met with Palmer in July 2002 to provide information about\\nCasel Montgomery’s role in the murder. After doing so,\\nthough, Palmer returned a few months later and, as Croft re-\\ncounted, threatened him with perjury charges if he did not\\nrecant his original statement implicating Montgomery. Croft\\nrecalled that Palmer brought with him a pre-written state-\\nment and, as part of leveling a threat of prosecution, de-\\nmanded Croft sign it. Croft explained that he signed the sec-\\nond statement—even though he knew it was false—because\\nof Palmer’s threats.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n The plaintiffs also called Alex Dowthard as a witness, but\\nhe asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-\\ncrimination and did not testify.\\n As part of assessing the plaintiffs’ Brady claims, the trial\\ncourt also considered statements Dowthard made during tel-\\nephone calls from jail in May 2002. It was undisputed that\\nthese recorded conversations, which totaled approximately\\n40 hours, were not made available to the attorneys for Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross until Friday, October 18, and Ander-\\nson and Johnson’s joint trial was to begin the following Mon-\\nday, October 21.\\n Contrary to his testimony at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials,\\nduring several conversations with family, Dowthard denied\\nbeing present when his nephew was shot and killed. These\\nconversations took place shortly after Dowthard’s incarcera-\\ntion for the parole violation and, importantly, at the time the\\npolice were visiting him and pressing for information on the\\nHanson murder. On May 2, for example, the same day Detec-\\ntives Palmer and Stevens visited Dowthard at Big Muddy,\\nDowthard told his mother that “he told them the truth,” a\\nclear reference to telling the police that he did not know who\\nshot the young boy. And again, on May 11, Dowthard told his\\ncousin Antowan Lambert that, at the time of the murder, he\\n“wasn’t no mother f* * * ing where around, you know what\\nI’m saying.”\\n The jail calls further revealed that Lambert, who officers\\nwere also pressing for information about Hanson’s murder,\\ncoached Dowthard on what to tell the police about the mur-\\nder and fed him information about what Lautaurean Brown\\nhad told the police—all in an effort to enable Dowthard to\\nalign his account with Brown’s. For example, on May 16, two\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 11\\n\\nweeks before Dowthard gave police a statement incriminating\\nthe plaintiffs, Lambert told Dowthard to memorize what he\\nwas telling him so that Dowthard’s statement “w[ould] coin-\\ncide” with what Brown had already told police.\\n In other calls from jail, Dowthard told friends and family\\nthat the police were pressuring him to cooperate. In early\\nMay, for instance, he told his mother that “[the police] talkin’\\nabout bringin’ me up on some federal charges or whatever.”\\nOn May 13, Dowthard learned he was being charged with an\\nunrelated forgery that would impact his parole status. On\\nMay 20, Dowthard told someone named Maria that the police\\nwere “playin’ with me, hurtin’ me until I’m damn near at the\\npoint man, you just don’t know.” In this same call, Dowthard\\nadded “[Detective] Palmer man got—hittin’ me all upside my\\nhead and everything, man tellin’ my sister what to—put his\\nhands on me.”\\n Following the hearing, the court rejected any claims of po-\\nlice misconduct, emphasizing that it did not find Detective\\nPalmer’s testimony credible. While recognizing the extraordi-\\nnary nature of Palmer’s admissions, the court concluded that\\n“through his words, actions and timing of his ‘disclosures,’”\\nthe former detective had “cast a pall over the credibility of his\\nlatter day revelations.” Our review of the record suggests that\\nthe court’s credibility finding may have been driven in large\\npart by the circumstances surrounding Palmer’s resignation\\nfrom the Rockford Police Department. Those circumstances\\nare not relevant here.\\n Turning to the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding\\nDowthard’s jail calls, the court awarded each plaintiff a new\\ntrial, concluding that the State impermissibly delayed disclo-\\nsure of the recordings. The calls, the court explained, included\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n“outright denials of knowledge about the facts of the case” as\\nwell as “potential coaching” and “potential incentive” to im-\\nplicate the plaintiffs—and without timely access to the record-\\nings, the plaintiffs were “denied an essential tool in testing the\\ncredibility of Alex Dowthard.” The delayed disclosure was\\nparticularly concerning, the court emphasized, because this\\nwas “essentially a one-eyewitness case,” and the key im-\\npeachment material was turned over “on the virtual eve of\\ntrial,” making it impossible for the attorneys to “meaningfully\\nlisten to [the tapes] and evaluate them.” Due process de-\\nmanded a new trial, the court concluded, because it could not\\nbe sufficiently assured that the outcome of the trial would\\nhave been the same had Dowthard been cross-examined with\\nhis statements on the tapes.\\n The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s award\\nof post-conviction relief. See People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App\\n(2d) 130368-U. The Illinois appellate court did not upset the\\ntrial court’s finding that Anderson and Johnson established\\na Brady violation. But the court reached a different conclusion\\nas to Ross. Because Ross’s trial took place in 2004—more than\\na year after the prosecution turned over the Dowthard\\ntapes—the court determined that he was not prejudiced by\\nthe delayed disclosure of the recordings. Instead, the court af-\\nfirmed the grant of post-conviction relief as to Ross on alter-\\nnative grounds, holding that Ross’s counsel was ineffective\\nfor failing to impeach Dowthard with the statements from his\\nrecorded jail calls.\\n D. Criminal Retrial\\n In 2015 the defendants were retried for the Hanson mur-\\nder in a bench trial. This time Alex Dowthard invoked his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 13\\n\\nFifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and re-\\nfused to testify. Lautaurean Brown initially did the same but\\nthen ultimately took the stand and stated that he “couldn’t see\\n[the shooting] ‘cause I pulled off.” Finally, Sonya White, who\\ntestified at Ross’s original trial that Ross confessed to the mur-\\nder, recanted her prior testimony and stated that she did not\\nknow who was responsible for Hanson’s death.\\n The court acquitted all three men of murder.\\n E. Civil Litigation\\n In March 2015 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, raising\\nmany of the same issues that formed the basis of their state\\npost-conviction petitions. In two separate complaints, the\\nplaintiffs asserted nine claims against the City of Rockford\\nand multiple Rockford police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983: violation of their due process right to a fair trial under\\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive them of a\\nright to a fair trial, failure to intervene, supervisory liability,\\nand malicious prosecution. Each claim alleged that the de-\\nfendant officers engaged in gross misconduct while investi-\\ngating Demarcus Hanson’s murder. The plaintiffs further al-\\nleged that the officers’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant\\nto a policy and practice of the Rockford Police Department.\\nThey also advanced four separate claims under Illinois law:\\nmalicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress, respondeat superior, and indemnification based on the\\nsame underlying conduct as alleged in their federal claims.\\n The case proceeded to discovery. What is most relevant for\\npurposes of appeal is that during the depositions of Detective\\nPalmer and Alex Dowthard, both individuals invoked their\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nprotection under the Fifth Amendment and declined to tes-\\ntify.\\n The district court entered summary judgment for all de-\\nfendants on all claims. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ § 1983\\ndue process claim, the court concluded the plaintiffs failed to\\nidentify sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of the de-\\nfendant police officers committed any of the alleged Brady vi-\\nolations or instances of evidence fabrication. Because each of\\nthe remaining claims allege the same underlying conduct, this\\nconclusion led directly to the entry of summary judgment in\\nthe defendants’ favor on every other claim.\\n The plaintiffs now appeal.\\n II\\n We begin with the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant\\npolice officers deprived them of a fair trial in violation of their\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process\\nClause. The plaintiffs root their claim in two different theo-\\nries: the defendant officers both withheld exculpatory evi-\\ndence in violation of their Brady obligations and fabricated\\nfalse witness statements. While we agree that summary judg-\\nment was proper on the fabrication allegations (with one lim-\\nited exception), we conclude that the plaintiffs presented\\nenough evidence to move forward on four particular grounds\\nsupporting their due process claim based on alleged Brady vi-\\nolations.\\n A. Due Process Claim: Brady Violations\\n The district court concluded that the record showed no\\ngenuine dispute as to whether the defendant police officers\\nsuppressed exculpatory evidence. In reaching this conclusion,\\nhowever, the court failed to view the evidence in the light\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 15\\n\\nmost favorable to the plaintiffs and adhere to the fundamental\\nprinciple that “at the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs\\nfunction is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine\\nthe truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a\\ngenuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.\\n242, 249 (1986).\\n The teachings of Brady are clear. In Brady itself the Su-\\npreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of\\nevidence favorable to an accused…violates due process\\nwhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-\\nment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-\\ncution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Subsequent decisions make\\nplain that this precept translates into an affirmative duty to\\ndisclose to defendants all potentially exculpatory evidence,\\nincluding impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley,\\n473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Because Brady material also “encom-\\npasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not\\nto the prosecutor,’” prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to\\nlearn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on\\nthe governmentʹs behalf in [a] case, including the police.”\\nStrickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (quoting Kyles v.\\nWhitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995)). This “Brady rule,” the\\nCourt has explained, is not intended “to displace the adver-\\nsary system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-\\nered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-\\ncur.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.\\n “While most commonly viewed as a prosecutor’s duty to\\ndisclose to the defense,” it is settled that the duty imposed by\\nBrady “extends to the police and requires that they similarly\\nturn over exculpatory/impeaching evidence to the prosecu-\\ntor.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008);\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nsee also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 925 F.3d 336, 349 (7th\\nCir. 2019).\\n To prevail on a civil Brady-based due process claim against\\na police officer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence\\nin question was favorable to him, the police “suppressed” the\\nfavorable evidence, and prejudice ensued because the sup-\\npressed evidence was material. See Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 566–\\n67; see also Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 832 & n.2 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes if the “pros-\\necution failed to disclose evidence that it or law enforcement\\nwas aware of before it was too late for the defendant to make\\nuse of the evidence” and “the evidence was not otherwise\\navailable to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable\\ndiligence.” Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n To satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, a civil plaintiff must\\ndemonstrate that the withheld evidence was material, mean-\\ning “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would\\nhave been different had the suppressed evidence been put be-\\nfore the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422). The Supreme Court has\\nmade clear that Brady’s “reasonable probability” standard is\\nless onerous than the traditional preponderance standard. See\\nKyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Indeed, “[t]he question is not whether\\nthe defendant would more likely than not have received a dif-\\nferent verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he\\nreceived a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict\\nworthy of confidence.” Id. To make this determination, courts\\nmust assess the cumulative effect of all the suppressed evi-\\ndence “in the context of the entire record.” United States v.\\nAgurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 460.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 17\\n\\n Turning to the merits, the plaintiffs argue that the defend-\\nant officers failed to adhere to Brady’s mandate—and violated\\ntheir due process rights—by:\\n Failing to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young;\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s second statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s May 9, 2002\\n statement;\\n Failing to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Alex Dowthard’s May 31, 2002\\n statement and, relatedly, failing to timely dis-\\n close Dowthard’s jail calls; and\\n Failing to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Sonya White’s statement implicating Ross in\\n the murder.\\n With the exception of the allegations involving Sonya\\nWhite, which lack support in the record, and the allegations\\ninvolving the improper police tactics used on Dowthard,\\nwhich lack admissible evidence in the record, we conclude\\nthat the plaintiffs have come forward with enough evidence\\nto move forward with each of their alleged Brady violations\\nagainst particular defendants.\\n Rickedda Young Testimony. The plaintiffs contend that\\ntwo of the defendants, Detectives Joseph Stevens and Scott\\nMastroianni, committed a Brady violation by failing to dis-\\nclose that Rickedda Young informed them that she saw Brown\\nand Dowthard immediately following the murder and they\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\ntold her they did not see who shot at Dowthard’s mother’s\\nhouse and killed Hanson. For purposes of summary judg-\\nment, the defendants do not dispute that this evidence was\\nfavorable to the plaintiffs and that Stevens and Mastroianni\\nsuppressed it by not including it in their police reports or oth-\\nerwise disclosing it to the prosecutors or plaintiffs. The de-\\nfendants nonetheless urge us to view the evidence as falling\\nshort of Brady’s materiality threshold. Because the evidence\\nallows a contrary inference, we decline this invitation.\\n As the district court saw it, Young’s statement was imma-\\nterial—and therefore its omission did not prejudice the plain-\\ntiffs—because “it merely echoed the fact that [Alex]\\nDowthard and [Lautaurean] Brown had initially indicated\\nthat they did not know who [fired] shot[s] [at] Dowthard’s\\nmother’s house.” The district court, in short, saw Young’s\\nstatement as cumulative of information the jury heard and\\nknew.\\n But this perspective reflects too narrow a view of the evi-\\ndence, divorced from favorable and indeed exculpatory infer-\\nences available to the plaintiffs on these facts. The district\\ncourt correctly observed that the jurors learned that both\\nBrown and Dowthard initially told police they did not see the\\nshooters—in direct contradiction to their ultimate trial testi-\\nmony. What the court did not account for, though, was the\\ntestimony explaining these inconsistencies. Dowthard, for ex-\\nample, testified that he told police he did not know who killed\\nhis nephew because he was on parole and was not supposed\\nto have a gun. Young’s statement—that immediately after the\\nshooting, Brown and Dowthard told her, a family member,\\nthat they did not know who had just shot at them—would\\nhave directly impeached Dowthard’s explanation for why his\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 19\\n\\nstory changed. And the impeachment was on a point of sub-\\nstantial significance. Had the trial testimony included\\nYoung’s statement, the jury could have concluded that\\nDowthard in fact did not see who fired the shots into his\\nmother’s house. Put differently, the jury could have con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s and Brown’s statements to Young im-\\nmediately following the murder were true—that, in fact, they\\ndid not know who shot into Dowthard’s mother’s house—\\nand that their trial testimony (and Dowthard’s explanation of\\nhis original statement to police) was false.\\n Suppressed impeachment evidence “may not be material\\nif the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confi-\\ndence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012). But\\nsuppressed evidence takes on particular significance—and is\\n“plainly material”—where the prosecution’s case rests solely\\non the credibility of an eyewitness. Id.\\n That is the case here. No physical or forensic evidence\\nlinked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder. Rather, the State’s\\ncase hinged on the reliability of what the prosecution insisted\\nwas eyewitness testimony from Brown and Dowthard.\\nRickedda Young’s suppressed evidence would have directly\\nimpeached Brown and Dowthard’s testimony that they saw\\nthe plaintiffs commit the murder—the central issue at trial.\\nYoung’s statement also would have lent credibility to the\\nplaintiffs’ argument that Dowthard, the State’s key witness,\\ninitially told the police the truth (that he did not see the shoot-\\ning) but later lied during his trial testimony to garner personal\\nfavor with the State. Based on these inferences, reasonably\\navailable from the record, the plaintiffs came forward with\\nenough evidence to survive summary judgement on their the-\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nory that the defendant officers (in particular, Detectives Ste-\\nvens and Mastroianni) violated Brady by withholding Young’s\\nstatement. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.\\n Bryce Croft Evidence. What the record shows regarding\\nBryce Croft is most troubling. In the summer of 2002—before\\nthe plaintiffs’ criminal trials—Croft provided Detective\\nPalmer with firsthand information that someone other than\\nthe plaintiffs committed the murder. This development,\\nPalmer has admitted, later led him to prepare a false state-\\nment on behalf of Bryce Croft, which he then forced Croft to\\nsign. The statement was significant because it recanted the in-\\nformation Croft previously provided police about the alterna-\\ntive suspect (Casel Montgomery). Palmer did so—he has\\nstated under oath—not only knowing the statement was false,\\nbut also for the sole purpose of neutralizing a witness who\\nhad a meaningful chance of undermining the prosecution’s\\ncase against the plaintiffs.\\n The district court accepted that the plaintiffs knew nothing\\nof Detective Palmer’s misconduct before their criminal trials\\nor that Croft’s recantation was false. But it nonetheless con-\\ncluded that “the concealment of the coercion and fabrication\\nof Croft’s second statement did not prevent plaintiffs from\\ncalling him as a witness at their trials” because “[e]ither side\\ncould have called Croft and allowed the adversarial trial pro-\\ncess to flesh out the truth.”\\n This conclusion too discounts the evidence, especially at\\nsummary judgment. Nothing we see in the record shows that,\\nat the time of their criminal trials, the plaintiffs had any idea\\nthat Croft’s recantation was the product of police coercion or\\nfabrication. And, without Detective Palmer’s admission, the\\nplaintiffs had no way to prove the recantation was false.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 21\\n\\n Due process entitled the plaintiffs to learn before their trial\\nwhat went on with Bryce Croft. See Avery v. City of Milwaukee,\\n847 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the right to a\\nfair trial is implicated if the State fails to disclose “facts about\\nthe coercive tactics used to obtain” a witness’s statement). Re-\\nmember that Croft was not a fringe player for the plaintiffs’\\ndefense. To the contrary, he was a witness the plaintiffs very\\nwell may have called to assign responsibility for the Hanson\\nmurder to someone else. Croft had given an initial statement\\nto the police saying that he had firsthand knowledge that Ca-\\nsel Montgomery—not the plaintiffs—was responsible for the\\nmurder. But there was no way the plaintiffs would have run\\nthe risk of calling Croft as a witness at their criminal trials in\\nthe wake of his statement recanting that Montgomery was re-\\nsponsible for the murder. And that simple observation—as\\nDetective Palmer has since admitted—is precisely why he fal-\\nsified the recantation and then forced Croft to sign it. The\\nwhole point was to neutralize Croft without the plaintiffs ever\\nknowing that Croft’s about-face was the fruit of police mis-\\nconduct. The plaintiffs have brought forth plenty here to\\nmove forward on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Lautaurean Brown’s Statement. We next consider the\\nplaintiffs’ contention that Detectives Palmer and Stevens vio-\\nlated Brady by failing to disclose the coercive tactics used to\\nextract Lautaurean Brown’s statement implicating them in\\nHanson’s murder. The district court accepted that, when\\nviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi-\\ndence showed that Brown’s May 9, 2002 statement (and his\\ncorresponding trial testimony) implicating the plaintiffs was\\nthe product of Palmer’s threat that he would go to jail if he\\ndid not give a written statement incriminating the plaintiffs.\\nBut from there the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nidentify adequate evidence to satisfy Brady’s prejudice ele-\\nment because, during the plaintiffs’ retrial in 2015, Brown tes-\\ntified that the threat did not impact the accuracy of his state-\\nment. We cannot agree.\\n The district court’s reasoning effectively required the\\nplaintiffs to accept that Brown’s testimony in 2002 and 2004\\nwas true because he later said so. The proper Brady analysis\\nworks a different way. Regardless of whether Brown’s state-\\nment (and resulting testimony) was true or false, Brady im-\\nposed a disclosure obligation: due process required disclo-\\nsure to the plaintiffs of the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement. See Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Armed with\\nthat information, the plaintiffs could have contended, in their\\ncross examinations of Brown and during closing arguments,\\nthat Brown’s testimony implicating the plaintiffs in the Han-\\nson murder was false—the fruit of police coercion. Put most\\nsimply, a criminal defendant has a due process right to infor-\\nmation that may materially impeach the testimony of a state’s\\nwitness. Indeed, that is the very promise—the essential pro-\\ntection—of Brady. Because it is undisputed that the defend-\\nants failed to disclose the coercive tactics used to obtain\\nBrown’s statement, the district court erred by granting sum-\\nmary judgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n Alex Dowthard’s Jail Calls. Finally, the district court com-\\npounded these errors by rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention\\nthat an interrelated Brady violation occurred with the delayed\\ndisclosure of the recordings of Alex Dowthard’s telephone\\ncalls from Big Muddy River Correctional Center. Recall that\\nthe tapes contain 40 hours of conversations Dowthard had\\nwith his family and friends in May 2002, following his incar-\\nceration on a parole violation. In the recorded conversations,\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 23\\n\\nDowthard told his family and friends that he was not present\\nwhen his nephew was shot; he was threatened with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate; he was physically\\nthreatened by police; and he was coached on what to say to\\npolice. Without question this evidence is both favorable and\\nmaterial to the plaintiffs. The only issue, then, is whether the\\ntapes were suppressed within the meaning of Brady. The\\nplaintiffs have come forward with enough at summary judg-\\nment showing the answer may well be yes.\\n To establish that the tapes were suppressed, the plaintiffs\\nmust show that the State “failed to disclose known evidence\\nbefore it was too late for [them] to make use of the evidence”\\nat their criminal trials. Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th\\nCir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry,” we have emphasized, “is\\nnot whether the [State] disclosed the potentially exculpatory\\ninformation at all, but whether [the criminal defendant] had\\nsufficient time to use any exculpatory information revealed to\\nhim during trial.” Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 423 (7th\\nCir. 2014).\\n The record shows that the prosecution received the\\nDowthard recordings from Rockford police on October 17,\\n2002—the Thursday before Anderson and Johnson’s trial. The\\nState produced the tapes to the plaintiffs’ (then defendants’)\\nattorneys the next day, a period that two Illinois courts con-\\ncluded was insufficient to allow for meaningful review and\\nuse of the tapes at trial. The plaintiffs contend, however, that\\nDetective Stevens—not the prosecutors—suppressed the\\ntapes by willfully withholding them from the prosecution un-\\ntil the eve of trial.\\n In most circumstances “a police officer’s Brady obligations\\nare discharged by disclosing material exculpatory evidence to\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nthe prosecutor, [because] it is the prosecutor’s responsibility\\nto turn the evidence over to defense counsel.” Beaman v.\\nFreesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 512 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, though, the\\nfacts as they presently stand permit a different conclusion.\\nThe record shows that Detective Stevens requested\\nDowthard’s jail calls on May 2, 2002. He testified that the jail\\nsent him the recorded calls piecemeal on 20 different tapes,\\nand he then listened to each of them. Though we are unable\\nto discern with precision when Stevens actually received or\\nlistened to each of the tapes, there are indications in the record\\nthat he received them in May and June. In a supplemental po-\\nlice report dated September 9, 2002, for example, Stevens de-\\nscribed his work on the Hanson case in May 2002, noting that\\n“[w]hile Dowthard was in prison, [Stevens] received pack-\\nages of cassette tapes which had recorded phone calls Alex\\nDowthard made while incarcerated at Big Muddy River Cor-\\nrectional Center.” Dowthard testified that he was released\\nfrom custody at the end of June 2002, permitting the inference\\nthat Detective Stevens possessed the jail tapes for at least three\\nmonths before Anderson and Johnson’s criminal trial yet\\nwaited to disclose them until the Thursday before trial, while\\nalso assuring the lead prosecutor that the calls contained\\nnothing relevant to the Hanson case.\\n When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nthe plaintiffs—as we must on summary judgment—the rec-\\nord allows the inference that, after receiving the tapes in May\\nand June 2002, Detective Stevens withheld the calls, waited\\nuntil the eve of trial to turn them over (when it was already\\ntoo late for the plaintiffs to use them), and may well have com-\\npounded the delay by inaccurately describing their content\\nand significance when he eventually turned them over to the\\nprosecution. On this record, we conclude that there is enough\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 25\\n\\nhere to infer that Stevens suppressed the Dowthard tapes\\nwithin the meaning of Brady. Of course, the ultimate facts may\\ncome out differently at trial and fully absolve Detective Ste-\\nvens. Our conclusion is limited to observing that the record,\\nas it now stands, allows the plaintiffs to survive summary\\njudgment on this alleged Brady violation.\\n For the sake of completeness, we briefly address an evi-\\ndentiary matter the parties have raised with respect to the\\nDowthard tapes. The parties devote considerable attention to\\nthe admissibility of the recordings. The district court con-\\ncluded that Dowthard’s calls could not be used as evidence in\\nopposition to summary judgment because they contain inad-\\nmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (“[A] court may consider only admissible evidence\\nin assessing a motion for summary judgment.”). To the extent\\nthat the plaintiffs seek to admit Dowthard’s statements on the\\ncalls for their truth, we agree.\\n But observing that the statements made on the recorded\\ncalls may not be admissible for their truth under one or an-\\nother exception to the hearsay rule does not mean the evi-\\ndence is not relevant and admissible for another purpose. The\\nalternative purpose here is to establish the existence of a Brady\\nviolation based on Detectives Stevens’s failure to disclose the\\nimpeachment material contained on the tapes. To succeed on\\nthis aspect of their due process claim, Anderson and Johnson\\nmust show not that Dowthard was telling the truth during his\\nphone conversations with family and friends, but rather that\\nthe plaintiffs could have used his statements for impeachment\\npurposes during their criminal trial—to undermine the cred-\\nibility of testimony offered by Dowthard. See 28 Wright &\\nGold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6206 at 593 (2012)\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\n(“Where a prior inconsistent statement is offered only to im-\\npeach, it is not hearsay since it merely shows the witness is\\nunreliable and says nothing about the truth of the facts as-\\nserted in the statement.”).\\n To the extent that the parties debate the authenticity of the\\nDowthard tapes, we note only that, as best we can tell, no one\\nquestions whether the tapes came from the State and reflect\\nDowthard’s voice and telephone discussions while incarcer-\\nated at Big Muddy. And what we see in the summary judg-\\nment record are certified transcripts of the recorded calls (just\\nas a deposition transcript would be certified), and there too\\nnobody seems to say the certification is false. We have no rea-\\nson, in short, to question that the plaintiffs have sufficiently\\nauthenticated the tapes and transcripts to allow us to consider\\ntheir impeachment value for purposes of assessing this aspect\\nof their Brady claim.\\n B. Due Process Claim: Fabricated Evidence\\n In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that\\nthe officers fabricated a laundry list of evidence. Those allega-\\ntions extend to Alex Dowthard’s and Lautaurean Brown’s\\nstatements (and subsequent trial testimony) implicating the\\nplaintiffs in Hanson’s murder as well as Bryce Croft’s recan-\\ntation. While we agree that the plaintiffs brought forward ev-\\nidence of coercion, we see no error with the district court dis-\\nallowing the due process claim to go forward on a theory of\\nfabricated evidence with one limited exception as it pertains\\nto Detective Palmer.\\n It is well-established that “a police officer who manufac-\\ntures false evidence against a criminal defendant violates due\\nprocess if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 27\\n\\nof [his] liberty in some way.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682\\nF.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). To establish such a violation, the\\nplaintiffs must demonstrate not only that the defendant offic-\\ners “created evidence that they knew to be false,” Petty, 754\\nF.3d at 423, but also that the evidence was used “in some way”\\nto deprive them of liberty, Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580.\\n The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the defendant of-\\nficers coerced the prosecution’s two key witnesses, Dowthard\\nand Brown, to give statements implicating the plaintiffs that\\nthe defendants knew were false, with the statements then be-\\ning used to convict the plaintiffs of the Hanson murder. Be-\\nginning with Brown, the plaintiffs assert that Detectives\\nPalmer and Stevens secured a false statement blaming Ander-\\nson, Johnson, and Ross for Hanson’s murder by threatening\\nBrown with jail time if he failed to cooperate and detaining\\nhim for more than ten hours. They also contend that Palmer\\nand Stevens, along with Detective Theo Glover, coerced\\nDowthard into falsely implicating the plaintiffs, this time\\nthrough physical force and by threatening him with addi-\\ntional charges if he failed to cooperate. And, with respective\\nto both Dowthard and Brown, the plaintiffs maintain that De-\\ntective Palmer instructed both witnesses to testify consistently\\nwith their statements, even though he knew those statements\\nwere false.\\n As a threshold matter, we agree that the record shows a\\ngenuine and unresolved dispute about whether the police co-\\nerced Brown and Dowthard to provide statements blaming\\nthe plaintiffs for Hanson’s murder. But coercion and fabrica-\\ntion are not synonyms, and we have stressed that “[an allega-\\ntion] that an officer coerced a witness to give incriminating\\nevidence does not, at least standing alone, violate the wrongly\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nconvicted person’s due-process rights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439.\\nEven more specifically, we have drawn a line between coerced\\ntestimony—“testimony that a witness is forced by improper\\nmeans to give… [it] may be true or false”—and fabricated tes-\\ntimony—which is “invariably false.” Fields v. Wharrie, 740\\nF.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). Only the latter supports a due\\nprocess claim, and even then, only if the record shows that the\\nofficers “created evidence they knew to be false.” Avery, 847\\nF.3d at 439; see also Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 584 (explaining that\\n“[c]oercively interrogating witnesses, paying witnesses for\\ntestimony, and witness-shopping may be deplorable, and\\nthese tactics may contribute to wrongful convictions, but they\\ndo not necessarily add up to a constitutional violation even\\nwhen their fruits are introduced at trial” because “[e]vidence\\ncollected with these kinds of suspect techniques, unlike falsi-\\nfied evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be\\ntrue”).\\n The plaintiffs have not brought forth enough evidence to\\ncreate a genuine material dispute as to whether Detectives\\nStevens or Glover knew that Brown and Dowthard’s state-\\nments implicating the plaintiffs were false as required to\\nmaintain a due process claim premised on a theory of evi-\\ndence fabrication. But we reach a different conclusion with re-\\nspect to Detective Palmer.\\n The plaintiffs insist that the record shows more than mere\\ncoercion because Detective Palmer admitted that he knew that\\nBrown and Dowthard’s statements were false and nonethe-\\nless instructed them to testify consistent with these false state-\\nments at the plaintiffs’ criminal trials. See Fields, 740 F.3d at\\n1112 (explaining that investigators fabricated evidence when\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 29\\n\\nthey “told witnesses what to say knowing that what the [wit-\\nness] was telling them was false”). Indeed during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings, Palmer repeatedly shared his\\nbelief that Anderson, Johnson, and Ross did not shoot Demar-\\ncus Hanson—and that Dowthard’s claim that he witnessed\\nthe plaintiffs shoot at his mother’s house was not true. And,\\nperhaps most critical to our analysis, Palmer testified that, de-\\nspite this belief, he instructed Dowthard and Brown to testify\\nconsistent with their written statements implicating the plain-\\ntiffs. Against the backdrop of Palmer’s admissions of wrong-\\ndoing—not an everyday occurrence—it is very difficult to\\nconclude that the plaintiffs have not done enough to survive\\nsummary judgment on this dimension of their due process\\nclaim.\\n This conclusion finds additional support in the record.\\nWhen deposed in this matter, for example, Detective Palmer\\nexercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-\\ntion when asked whether he told Brown and Dowthard to tes-\\ntify consistent with their statements “even though [he] be-\\nlieve[d] their statements [were] not truthful.” The Fifth\\nAmendment permits an adverse inference against parties in\\ncivil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-\\ntive evidence against them. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.\\n308, 318 (1976). Based on the record before us, and upon com-\\nbining the weight of Palmer’s admissions during the state\\npost-conviction proceedings with this adverse factual infer-\\nence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have carried their sum-\\nmary judgment burden on their allegation that Detective\\nPalmer fabricated Brown and Dowthard’s statements. Palmer\\ndid so by coercing the witnesses to give statements he be-\\nlieved were false—and this evidence was used to deprive the\\nplaintiffs of their liberty when Palmer then instructed Brown\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nand Dowthard to testify consistent with these allegedly false\\nstatements.\\n We turn next to the allegations involving Bryce Croft.\\nAgain, the plaintiffs maintain that Detective Palmer drafted a\\nstatement for Croft to sign which falsely recanted the infor-\\nmation he previously provided about Casel Montgomery’s\\ninvolvement in the murder. Palmer’s actions, the plaintiffs\\ncontend, prohibited them from presenting evidence of an al-\\nternate suspect through Croft because, if called as a witness,\\nhe would have been impeached by his false recantation.\\nWhile this description of events finds support in the record,\\nthe plaintiffs cannot show that the prosecution used Croft’s\\nsecond statement (the one prepared by Palmer) to convict any\\nof the plaintiffs. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropri-\\nate as it pertains to the plaintiffs’ evidence fabrication theory.\\n III\\n The plaintiffs’ amended complaints are expansive—nam-\\ning nine defendants and advancing nine separate claims. On\\nappeal, their arguments are equally sprawling, advancing nu-\\nmerous claims against numerous parties and raising multiple\\nlegal issues. Based upon our thorough review of the record\\nand the parties’ briefs, we have focused only on those issues\\nwe believe warrant discussion and on those aspects of the\\nplaintiffs’ claims that survive summary judgment. We have\\ndone so in part to aid and sharpen the focus of the proceed-\\nings as the case returns to the district court.\\n In furtherance of this effort, we conclude by recapping\\nwhich of the plaintiffs’ claims (or aspects of claims) may pro-\\nceed against which defendants on remand.\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 31\\n\\n Beginning with Count I, we affirm the entry of summary\\njudgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ evidence fabri-\\ncation allegations with respect to all defendants except Detec-\\ntive Doug Palmer, and only then as it pertains to the testi-\\nmony of Brown and Dowthard. On this same count, the plain-\\ntiffs may proceed with a due process claim rooted in each of\\nfollowing alleged Brady violations:\\n Failure to disclose impeachment evidence of-\\n fered by Rickedda Young: defendants Joseph\\n Stevens and Scott Mastroianni;\\n Failure to disclose the circumstances surround-\\n ing Bryce Croft’s statement: defendant Doug\\n Palmer;\\n Failure to disclose the improper police tactics\\n that produced Lautaurean Brown’s statement:\\n defendants Joseph Stevens and Doug Palmer;\\n and\\n Failure to timely disclose the recordings of Alex\\n Dowthard’s jailhouse telephone calls: defend-\\n ant Joseph Stevens.\\n As for the remaining defendants named in Count I (on ei-\\nther theory), we affirm the entry of summary judgment in fa-\\nvor of defendants Theo Glover, Dominic Iasparro, James Ran-\\ndall, and Torrey Regez because the plaintiffs have failed to set\\nforth any arguments or identify any evidence that any of these\\nofficers engaged in any of the alleged due process violations.\\n Turning to Count II (failure to intervene), Count III (con-\\nspiracy), and Count VII (supervisor liability), the district court\\nconcluded that the defendants necessarily were entitled to\\nsummary judgment owing to its determination that plaintiffs\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\\n\\nfailed to bring forth enough evidence to support their Brady\\nand fabrication allegations. In these circumstances, and espe-\\ncially given the expanse and complexity of the factual record,\\nremand is appropriate to allow the district court to consider\\neach of these claims in the first instance—and to determine\\nwhether they may proceed and, if so, against which defend-\\nants.\\n The district court also granted summary judgment on\\nCount VIII (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) and Count IX (Illi-\\nnois malicious prosecution). We affirm this aspect of the dis-\\ntrict court’s judgment. Beginning with the § 1983 claim, the\\nplaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that the defendant of-\\nficers violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendments by improperly subjecting them to judicial pro-\\nceedings without probable cause. But “[t]here is no such thing\\nas a constitutional right not to be prosecuted without proba-\\nble cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667, 670\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 593 (7th\\nCir. 2013)). There is, however, “a constitutional right not to be\\nheld in custody without probable cause,” id., and the Supreme\\nCourt has “ma[de] clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the\\nDue Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial de-\\ntention,” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911\\n(2017)).\\n The plaintiffs do not assert they were subjected to pretrial\\ndetention (though evidence in the record suggests they\\nwere)—but even if they had, their claim would still fail be-\\ncause it hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause\\nto support their arrests and confinement. The record supports\\n\\fNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232 33\\n\\nthe district court’s conclusion that at least some of the defend-\\nant officers reasonably believed that the plaintiffs were guilty\\nof murder based on the accounts given by Dowthard and\\nBrown. And it cannot reasonably be disputed that the written\\nstatements of Dowthard and Brown provided probable cause\\nto support the arrests. Summary judgment, therefore, was ap-\\npropriate on the plaintiffs’ federal claim. Because an Illinois\\nclaim for malicious prosecution likewise requires the absence\\nof probable cause, the district court properly granted sum-\\nmary judgment on this claim as well. See Johnson v. Saville, 575\\nF.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (identifying the elements of a ma-\\nlicious prosecution claim under Illinois law).\\n Finally, the district court concluded that the City of Rock-\\nford was entitled to summary judgment on Count XI (re-\\nspondeat superior) and Count XII (indemnification) because\\nthe plaintiffs failed to maintain a claim against any defendant\\npolice officer. In light of our conclusion regarding the poten-\\ntial liability of certain individual officers, the entry of sum-\\nmary judgment on these claims was likewise premature. We\\nleave it to the district court to evaluate these claims on the\\nmerits in the first instance on remand. For the sake of com-\\npleteness, however, we note that the district court rejected the\\nplaintiffs’ claims against the City premised on a Monell theory\\nof liability. Because the plaintiffs failed to challenge this as-\\npect of the district court’s ruling, we consider this argument\\nwaived and the plaintiffs may not seek to revive this aspect of\\ntheir claims on remand.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in\\npart, and REMAND for further proceedings.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3187,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643209,"string":"4,643,209"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eleazar Corral VALENZUELA, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2789"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2789\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\\n\\f2 No. 18-2789\\n\\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\\n I\\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\\ncitizen in June 2000.\\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\\nwhich charged:\\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\\n gratification of the defendant.\\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\\nhis conviction stated:\\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\\n member.\\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 3\\n\\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\\nset aside.”).\\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\\n II\\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2789\\n\\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 5\\n\\n III\\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\\nwe review it de novo.\\n A\\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\\n\\f6 No. 18-2789\\n\\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\\nit.\\n B\\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\\ncourt are waived.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 7\\n\\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\\ntion defense.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420462/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643209/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eleazar Corral VALENZUELA, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2789\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\n\f2 No. 18-2789\n\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\n I\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\ncitizen in June 2000.\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\nwhich charged:\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\n gratification of the defendant.\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\nhis conviction stated:\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\n member.\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\n\fNo. 18-2789 3\n\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\nset aside.”).\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\n II\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\n2019).\n\f4 No. 18-2789\n\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\fNo. 18-2789 5\n\n III\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\nwe review it de novo.\n A\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\n\f6 No. 18-2789\n\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\nit.\n B\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\n\n\n\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\ncourt are waived.”).\n\fNo. 18-2789 7\n\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\ntion defense.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eleazar Corral VALENZUELA, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2789\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\\n\\f2 No. 18-2789\\n\\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\\n I\\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\\ncitizen in June 2000.\\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\\nwhich charged:\\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\\n gratification of the defendant.\\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\\nhis conviction stated:\\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\\n member.\\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 3\\n\\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\\nset aside.”).\\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\\n II\\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2789\\n\\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 5\\n\\n III\\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\\nwe review it de novo.\\n A\\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\\n\\f6 No. 18-2789\\n\\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\\nit.\\n B\\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\\ncourt are waived.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 7\\n\\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\\ntion defense.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3188,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643210,"string":"4,643,210"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Refugio RUIZ-CORTEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1078"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1078\\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\\n\\f2 No. 18-1078\\n\\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination.\\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\\nfundamentally unfair trial.\\n I. Background\\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 3\\n\\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\\nto this appeal.\\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\\n\\f4 No. 18-1078\\n\\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\\ncriminal trial.\\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\\nthe course of several years.\\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 5\\n\\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\\njury.\\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\\nto 18 years in prison.\\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\\n\\f6 No. 18-1078\\n\\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\\ndeprivation.\\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\\nmissed the City from the case.\\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\\nLewellen went to trial.\\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 7\\n\\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\\n\\f8 No. 18-1078\\n\\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 9\\n\\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\\nappealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\\nturn.\\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\\n\\f10 No. 18-1078\\n\\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\\n404–07 (1997).\\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 11\\n\\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\\n\\f12 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2006).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 13\\n\\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\\nhappened here.\\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\\n\\f14 No. 18-1078\\n\\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\\nis not so easily avoided.\\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 15\\n\\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\\nBrady).\\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\\nCir. 2018).\\n\\f16 No. 18-1078\\n\\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\\notherwise.\\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 17\\n\\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\\nment as a matter of law.\\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\\n\\f18 No. 18-1078\\n\\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 19\\n\\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\\n\\f20 No. 18-1078\\n\\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\\nconsider adding one.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 21\\n\\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\\nRuiz-Cortez.\\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\\n\\f22 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\\ncall.2\\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\\nand remand for a new trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\\noral argument.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420463/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643210/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Refugio RUIZ-CORTEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1078\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\n\f2 No. 18-1078\n\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\nincrimination.\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\nfundamentally unfair trial.\n I. Background\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\n\fNo. 18-1078 3\n\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\nto this appeal.\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\n\f4 No. 18-1078\n\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\ncriminal trial.\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\nthe course of several years.\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\n\fNo. 18-1078 5\n\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\njury.\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\nto 18 years in prison.\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\n\f6 No. 18-1078\n\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\ndeprivation.\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\nmissed the City from the case.\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\nLewellen went to trial.\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\n\fNo. 18-1078 7\n\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\n\f8 No. 18-1078\n\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\n\fNo. 18-1078 9\n\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\nappealed.\n II. Discussion\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\nturn.\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\n(7th Cir. 2018).\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\n\f10 No. 18-1078\n\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\n404–07 (1997).\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\n\fNo. 18-1078 11\n\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\n\f12 No. 18-1078\n\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\n(7th Cir. 2006).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\n\fNo. 18-1078 13\n\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\nhappened here.\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\n\f14 No. 18-1078\n\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\nis not so easily avoided.\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\n\fNo. 18-1078 15\n\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\nBrady).\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\n2018).\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\nCir. 2018).\n\f16 No. 18-1078\n\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\notherwise.\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\n\fNo. 18-1078 17\n\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\nment as a matter of law.\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\n\f18 No. 18-1078\n\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\n\fNo. 18-1078 19\n\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\n\f20 No. 18-1078\n\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment.\n\n\n\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\nconsider adding one.\n\fNo. 18-1078 21\n\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\nRuiz-Cortez.\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\n\f22 No. 18-1078\n\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\ncall.2\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\n III. Conclusion\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\nand remand for a new trial.\n\n\n\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\noral argument.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Refugio RUIZ-CORTEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1078\\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\\n\\f2 No. 18-1078\\n\\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination.\\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\\nfundamentally unfair trial.\\n I. Background\\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 3\\n\\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\\nto this appeal.\\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\\n\\f4 No. 18-1078\\n\\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\\ncriminal trial.\\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\\nthe course of several years.\\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 5\\n\\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\\njury.\\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\\nto 18 years in prison.\\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\\n\\f6 No. 18-1078\\n\\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\\ndeprivation.\\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\\nmissed the City from the case.\\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\\nLewellen went to trial.\\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 7\\n\\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\\n\\f8 No. 18-1078\\n\\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 9\\n\\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\\nappealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\\nturn.\\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\\n\\f10 No. 18-1078\\n\\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\\n404–07 (1997).\\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 11\\n\\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\\n\\f12 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2006).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 13\\n\\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\\nhappened here.\\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\\n\\f14 No. 18-1078\\n\\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\\nis not so easily avoided.\\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 15\\n\\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\\nBrady).\\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\\nCir. 2018).\\n\\f16 No. 18-1078\\n\\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\\notherwise.\\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 17\\n\\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\\nment as a matter of law.\\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\\n\\f18 No. 18-1078\\n\\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 19\\n\\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\\n\\f20 No. 18-1078\\n\\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\\nconsider adding one.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 21\\n\\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\\nRuiz-Cortez.\\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\\n\\f22 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\\ncall.2\\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\\nand remand for a new trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\\noral argument.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3189,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643327,"string":"4,643,327"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2789"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2789\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\\n\\f2 No. 18-2789\\n\\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\\n I\\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\\ncitizen in June 2000.\\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\\nwhich charged:\\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\\n gratification of the defendant.\\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\\nhis conviction stated:\\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\\n member.\\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 3\\n\\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\\nset aside.”).\\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\\n II\\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2789\\n\\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 5\\n\\n III\\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\\nwe review it de novo.\\n A\\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\\n\\f6 No. 18-2789\\n\\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\\nit.\\n B\\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\\ncourt are waived.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 7\\n\\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\\ntion defense.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420580/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643327/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2789\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\n\f2 No. 18-2789\n\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\n I\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\ncitizen in June 2000.\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\nwhich charged:\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\n gratification of the defendant.\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\nhis conviction stated:\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\n member.\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\n\fNo. 18-2789 3\n\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\nset aside.”).\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\n II\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\n2019).\n\f4 No. 18-2789\n\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\fNo. 18-2789 5\n\n III\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\nwe review it de novo.\n A\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\n\f6 No. 18-2789\n\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\nit.\n B\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\n\n\n\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\ncourt are waived.”).\n\fNo. 18-2789 7\n\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\ntion defense.\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2789\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nELEAZAR CORRAL VALENZUELA,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:17-cv-08423 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Seventeen years after Eleazar Corral\\nValenzuela (Corral) was convicted of aggravated criminal sex-\\nual abuse of a minor family member in Illinois state court, the\\nUnited States filed a civil complaint to revoke his naturalized\\ncitizenship and cancel his certificate of naturalization. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1451(a). The district court granted the government judgment\\n\\f2 No. 18-2789\\n\\non the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), after dismissing Cor-\\nral’s affirmative defenses. We affirm.\\n I\\n Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the United\\nStates as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In January 1999,\\nhe applied for naturalization, and he became a United States\\ncitizen in June 2000.\\n Shortly after, a grand jury in Kane County, Illinois in-\\ndicted Corral on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual\\nabuse. Less than five months after becoming a United States\\ncitizen, Corral pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment,\\nwhich charged:\\n On or about June 9, 1998 through February 26, 2000,\\n Eleazar Corral committed the offense of Aggravated\\n Criminal Sexual Abuse, Class 2 Felony in violation\\n of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-16(b) of the Illinois\\n Compiled Statutes, as amended, in that said defend-\\n ant committed an act of sexual conduct with [re-\\n dacted] in that the defendant knowingly touched the\\n vagina of [redacted] for the purpose of the sexual\\n gratification of the defendant.\\nCorral was convicted under Illinois’s aggravated criminal\\nsexual abuse statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), which at the time of\\nhis conviction stated:\\n The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual\\n abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual conduct\\n with a victim who was under 18 years of age when\\n the act was committed and the accused was a family\\n member.\\n In 2017, the United States filed a five-count civil complaint\\nseeking to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 3\\n\\nobtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresen-\\ntation or concealment of a material fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\nWe focus on the first count of the government’s complaint,\\nwhich alleged that Corral lacked good moral character be-\\ncause he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within\\nthe statutory period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 316.10(a)(1). In other words, the government sought to re-\\nvoke Corral’s citizenship based on his failure to comply with\\na statutory prerequisite for naturalization, namely, having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449\\nU.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“Failure to comply with any of these con-\\nditions renders the certificate of citizenship ‘illegally pro-\\ncured,’ and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be\\nset aside.”).\\n Corral filed an answer and a motion to dismiss/strike seek-\\ning discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Around the same\\ntime, the United States filed its motion for judgment on the\\npleadings. The district court denied Corral’s motion and\\ngranted the government’s motion with respect to the first\\ncount of the complaint. The district court dismissed the re-\\nmaining counts as moot and granted Corral’s motion to stay\\nexecution of the judgment. This appeal followed.\\n II\\n We first turn to the district court’s grant of the govern-\\nment’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we re-\\nview de novo. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440-41 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2789\\n\\n We have described a crime involving moral turpitude as\\n“conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inher-\\nently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted\\nrules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to\\nsociety in general.” Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 715 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Corral concedes that his Illi-\\nnois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a mi-\\nnor is a crime of moral turpitude under our precedent, but he\\nnonetheless makes a half-hearted request that we reconsider.\\nHis argument is waived—and doubly so.\\n Corral cites to Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692-\\n94 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that there the Ninth Circuit “de-\\ncided differently” than we have “based on similar facts.” He\\nfailed, however, to cite Quintero-Salazar or make this argu-\\nment to the district court. We therefore cannot consider it.\\nWheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d 1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018). If\\nthat were not enough, the argument Corral now makes is\\nwoefully underdeveloped. He cites Quintero-Salazar without\\nexplaining or defending its rationale. What is more, for the\\nargument to succeed, Corral would likely need to show that\\nhis crime, 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b), is categorically not one of moral\\nturpitude. See Garcia-Martinez v. Barr, 921 F.3d 674, 681 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (explaining that the categorical approach applies,\\nunless the underlying statute is divisible, in which case a\\nmodified categorical approach applies). That is often a com-\\nplicated question in any case, id. at 675, and it is one with\\nwhich Corral does not even attempt to wrestle. For this rea-\\nson, too, the argument is waived. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909\\nF.3d 182, 190 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 5\\n\\n III\\n Corral’s other arguments concern his laches and selective\\nprosecution affirmative defenses. He raised these defenses in\\nhis “Motion to Dismiss / Strike Complaint,” which, as the dis-\\ntrict court recognized, was “not so much a motion to dismiss\\nas a request for discovery and a hearing.” The district court’s\\ndenial of Corral’s motion involved purely legal questions, so\\nwe review it de novo.\\n A\\n To establish his laches defense, Corral must show the gov-\\nernment’s lack of diligence and resulting prejudice. Navarro v.\\nNeal, 716 F.3d 425, 439 (7th Cir. 2013). Assuming the govern-\\nment did not exercise diligence in bringing this revocation ac-\\ntion, Corral argues that the government’s 17-year delay\\ncaused evidentiary prejudice due to the government’s failure\\nto provide an affidavit of the immigration officer who con-\\nducted his naturalization interview and the subsequent una-\\nvailability of the immigration officer. He argues that had the\\nimmigration officer provided testimony, he would have clar-\\nified whether Corral made misrepresentations or concealed\\nmaterial facts during the naturalization process, thus support-\\ning a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).\\n Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or con-\\ncealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not\\nrelate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. Recall that\\nCorral’s citizenship was revoked based on his failure to com-\\nply with a statutory prerequisite for naturalization—having\\ngood moral character during the five years preceding his ap-\\nplication for citizenship until the time he took the oath of al-\\nlegiance to the United States. His citizenship was not revoked\\n\\f6 No. 18-2789\\n\\nfor willfully mispresenting or concealing a material fact.\\nTherefore, Corral’s “evidentiary prejudice” argument fails. 1\\n Still, the government asks us to clarify that laches never\\napplies in civil denaturalization actions. We are reluctant to\\nadopt such a categorical rule in light of possible changes to\\ncriminalization standards and public mores. And we decline\\nto do so here given that resolution of this case does not require\\nit.\\n B\\n Corral further asserts a selective prosecution defense un-\\nder equal protection standards, arguing that the govern-\\nment’s decision to denaturalize him 17 years after his criminal\\nconviction is suspicious based on perceived changes in exec-\\nutive policy. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465\\n(1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985). As-\\nsuming that any such defense applies in the context of civil\\ndenaturalization proceedings, by challenging the exercise of\\nbroad prosecutorial discretion, Corral encounters “a formida-\\nble obstacle.” United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Corral cannot merely challenge the exercise of prosecu-\\ntorial discretion on the ground that it was irrational, but ra-\\nther he must show that the decision to prosecute was deliber-\\nately based on invidious criteria such as race, religion, or\\nother arbitrary classifications. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464;\\nMoore, 543 F.3d at 900.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We need not address Corral’s “expectational prejudice” argument\\nraised for the first time on appeal. See Duncan Place Owners Assoc. v. Danze,\\nInc., 927 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Arguments not raised in the district\\ncourt are waived.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2789 7\\n\\n Corral argues that the government targeted only a handful\\nof child sexual abusers for denaturalization, including him-\\nself, and that “[i]t would seem to defy simple logic that in sev-\\nenteen (17) years, the Government had only become aware of\\nthese five (5) individuals who had been naturalized and later\\nconvicted of felony offenses who they then chose to target.”\\nNot only is Corral’s argument based on a questionable prem-\\nise, namely, that the United States selectively sought to denat-\\nuralize convicted child sexual abusers in only five instances\\nin the last 17 years, but he fails to explain how the govern-\\nment’s decision was deliberately based on invidious criteria.\\nIndeed, all he has shown is that the government brought de-\\nnaturalization actions against some individuals who were\\nconvicted of the sexual abuse of children. Otherwise, Corral’s\\nposition that a change in executive policy might have had\\nsomething to do with the timing of his denaturalization pro-\\nceedings, alone, simply does not support a selective prosecu-\\ntion defense.\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3190,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643328,"string":"4,643,328"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1078"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1078\\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\\n\\f2 No. 18-1078\\n\\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination.\\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\\nfundamentally unfair trial.\\n I. Background\\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 3\\n\\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\\nto this appeal.\\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\\n\\f4 No. 18-1078\\n\\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\\ncriminal trial.\\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\\nthe course of several years.\\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 5\\n\\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\\njury.\\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\\nto 18 years in prison.\\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\\n\\f6 No. 18-1078\\n\\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\\ndeprivation.\\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\\nmissed the City from the case.\\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\\nLewellen went to trial.\\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 7\\n\\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\\n\\f8 No. 18-1078\\n\\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 9\\n\\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\\nappealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\\nturn.\\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\\n\\f10 No. 18-1078\\n\\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\\n404–07 (1997).\\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 11\\n\\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\\n\\f12 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2006).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 13\\n\\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\\nhappened here.\\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\\n\\f14 No. 18-1078\\n\\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\\nis not so easily avoided.\\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 15\\n\\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\\nBrady).\\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\\nCir. 2018).\\n\\f16 No. 18-1078\\n\\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\\notherwise.\\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 17\\n\\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\\nment as a matter of law.\\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\\n\\f18 No. 18-1078\\n\\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 19\\n\\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\\n\\f20 No. 18-1078\\n\\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\\nconsider adding one.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 21\\n\\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\\nRuiz-Cortez.\\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\\n\\f22 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\\ncall.2\\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\\nand remand for a new trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\\noral argument.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420581/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643328/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1078\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\n\f2 No. 18-1078\n\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\nincrimination.\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\nfundamentally unfair trial.\n I. Background\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\n\fNo. 18-1078 3\n\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\nto this appeal.\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\n\f4 No. 18-1078\n\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\ncriminal trial.\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\nthe course of several years.\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\n\fNo. 18-1078 5\n\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\njury.\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\nto 18 years in prison.\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\n\f6 No. 18-1078\n\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\ndeprivation.\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\nmissed the City from the case.\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\nLewellen went to trial.\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\n\fNo. 18-1078 7\n\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\n\f8 No. 18-1078\n\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\n\fNo. 18-1078 9\n\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\nappealed.\n II. Discussion\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\nturn.\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\n(7th Cir. 2018).\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\n\f10 No. 18-1078\n\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\n404–07 (1997).\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\n\fNo. 18-1078 11\n\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\n\f12 No. 18-1078\n\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\n(7th Cir. 2006).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\n\fNo. 18-1078 13\n\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\nhappened here.\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\n\f14 No. 18-1078\n\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\nis not so easily avoided.\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\n\fNo. 18-1078 15\n\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\nBrady).\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\n2018).\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\nCir. 2018).\n\f16 No. 18-1078\n\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\notherwise.\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\n\fNo. 18-1078 17\n\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\nment as a matter of law.\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\n\f18 No. 18-1078\n\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\n\fNo. 18-1078 19\n\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\n\f20 No. 18-1078\n\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment.\n\n\n\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\nconsider adding one.\n\fNo. 18-1078 21\n\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\nRuiz-Cortez.\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\n\f22 No. 18-1078\n\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\ncall.2\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\n III. Conclusion\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\nand remand for a new trial.\n\n\n\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\noral argument.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1078\\nREFUGIO RUIZ-CORTEZ,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:11-cv-01420 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 29, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Glenn Lewellen, a dirty cop with the\\nChicago Police Department (CPD), arrested Refugio Ruiz-\\nCortez for possessing cocaine. Lewellen served as the key\\nwitness at the trial, where Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-\\nCortez then spent a decade in prison before the federal\\ngovernment discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included\\ndrug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the\\ngovernment, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government\\n\\f2 No. 18-1078\\n\\nprosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction, recognizing that without Lewellen’s testimony\\nthere was no evidence to prosecute Ruiz-Cortez.\\n Ruiz-Cortez sued the City of Chicago and Lewellen for\\nviolating his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He\\ncomplained that the City and Lewellen withheld material\\nimpeachment evidence—namely, evidence of Lewellen’s\\ndrug and racketeering crimes. See Giglio v. United States, 405\\nU.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The\\ndistrict court dismissed the claim against the City at summary\\njudgment, concluding that there was no evidence of\\nmunicipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.\\n658 (1978). A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal\\nto testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-\\nincrimination.\\n We affirm the dismissal of the City. Ruiz-Cortez failed to\\nmarshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard.\\nBut we vacate the judgment for Lewellen and remand for a\\nnew trial against him. The district court allowed Lewellen to\\noffer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invoca-\\ntion, ones that fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law, and it\\nthen failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment\\ninvocation is proper. Those errors, taken together, made for a\\nfundamentally unfair trial.\\n I. Background\\n The background to this appeal concerns two drug-dealing\\nschemes, one involving Ruiz-Cortez and the other involving\\nLewellen and his go-to informant Saul Rodriguez. It also con-\\ncerns three trials: the prosecution of Ruiz-Cortez, the\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 3\\n\\nprosecution of Lewellen, and the civil dispute that gives rise\\nto this appeal.\\n In June 1999, the CPD and Drug Enforcement Administra-\\ntion (DEA) started surveilling Ruiz-Cortez’s suburban home,\\nsuspecting it was a part of a drug-dealing operation. They ar-\\nrested two people for picking up drugs from the home on\\nJune 23, 1999, and a few weeks later, on July 8, 1999, they ar-\\nrested Ruiz-Cortez. Lewellen claimed to have recovered a bag\\nfilled with cocaine bricks just outside of Ruiz-Cortez’s home.\\nA search of the home turned up $1,800 in hundred-dollar bills\\nstored in a broken vacuum cleaner.\\n A grand jury indicted Ruiz-Cortez for cocaine possession\\nwith intent to distribute in December 1999. At trial, the gov-\\nernment relied primarily on Lewellen as a witness; he was the\\nonly member of law enforcement who claimed to have seen\\nRuiz-Cortez with the drugs. Lewellen testified that he and\\nothers had been observing Ruiz-Cortez’s home on the day of\\nthe arrest, when Lewellen saw Ruiz-Cortez stick his head out\\nthe door a few times, as if he was expecting company. Lewel-\\nlen said that Ruiz-Cortez later walked onto his back porch\\nwith a plastic bag. Lewellen and another officer pulled up to\\nthe home, and, according to Lewellen, Ruiz-Cortez dropped\\nthe bag and returned inside. Ruiz-Cortez, for his part, took\\nthe stand and maintained that the drugs had been planted.\\nThe jury found Ruiz-Cortez guilty, and the district court sen-\\ntenced him to 17 and a half years in prison.\\n Several years later, the DEA began investigating Lewellen\\nand Rodriguez for their crimes. In 2009, a grand jury indicted\\nthe two for, among other things, conspiracy and racketeering.\\nThe predicate acts in the racketeering count included murder,\\nkidnapping, and—most relevant here—obstruction of justice,\\n\\f4 No. 18-1078\\n\\nstemming from Lewellen’s testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s trial.\\nRodriguez pleaded guilty and began cooperating with the\\ngovernment, including by testifying at Lewellen’s eventual\\ncriminal trial.\\n At Lewellen’s trial, in 2012, Rodriguez testified that he met\\nLewellen in 1996. He quickly began providing Lewellen con-\\nfidential information about local drug sales. Rodriguez also\\ncontinued selling drugs himself, and in 1997, federal agents\\narrested him after discovering more than 150 pounds of ma-\\nrijuana in his vehicle. Lewellen, however, convinced federal\\nlaw enforcement not to press charges against Rodriguez, cit-\\ning his substantial cooperation with the CPD. And substantial\\nit was—records, according to Ruiz-Cortez, show the CPD\\npaid Rodriguez more than $800,000 for his information over\\nthe course of several years.\\n Rodriguez’s testimony highlighted the various crimes he\\ncommitted with Lewellen. Rodriguez explained, for example,\\nthat in 1998 Lewellen gave him multiple kilograms of cocaine,\\nwhich he resold. The same year, Rodriguez and Lewellen\\nplotted to rob another drug dealer of $500,000 under the guise\\nof a legitimate police stop. The two planned to repeat that\\ncrime against another dealer some months later, this time for\\n$800,000. Rodriguez also testified that he had planted drugs\\non at least one unwitting person at Lewellen’s behest.\\n Rodriguez further touched on the events that led to Ruiz-\\nCortez’s arrest. Rodriguez testified that he knew two suppli-\\ners, Carlos Rodriguez (no relation; we will refer to him as Car-\\nlos to avoid confusion) and Lisette Venegas. In July 1999,\\nVenegas told Rodriguez that she planned to pick up drugs\\nfrom the suburbs at what turned out to be Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nhome. Rodriguez shared the information with Lewellen, and\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 5\\n\\nhe told Lewellen what kind of car Venegas would be driving\\nto ensure that she was not arrested during the bust. This tes-\\ntimony formed the basis of the obstruction-of-justice charge:\\nthe government submitted that Lewellen perjured himself at\\nRuiz-Cortez’s trial by lying about the circumstances of the ar-\\nrest in order to protect Rodriguez and Venegas. Rodriguez,\\nhowever, faced serious impeachment at trial; he admitted he\\nwas cooperating to avoid the death penalty or a life sentence\\nand he had previously lied to law enforcement and the grand\\njury.\\n The jury ultimately found Lewellen guilty of conspiring to\\npossess cocaine with intent to distribute. But it hung on the\\nracketeering count. The government did not retry Lewellen\\non that count, and the district court later sentenced Lewellen\\nto 18 years in prison.\\n The revelation of Lewellen’s wrongdoing led the govern-\\nment in 2010 to move the district court to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nconviction. Recognizing that the case against Ruiz-Cortez\\nrested almost solely on Lewellen’s testimony and reports, the\\ngovernment noted that “there is virtually no admissible evi-\\ndence of defendant’s guilt.” The district court granted the mo-\\ntion and Ruiz-Cortez was released from custody.\\n Ruiz-Cortez then filed this suit against Lewellen, other\\nCPD officers, and the City. He brought a slew of claims, but\\nthe only ones relevant to this appeal sound in due process.\\nRuiz-Cortez asserted that the defendants deprived him of due\\nprocess in two ways: by withholding exculpatory infor-\\nmation—namely, Lewellen’s crimes and his conspiracy with\\nRodriguez—in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83\\n(1963), and by fabricating evidence against him. And, Ruiz-\\nCortez claimed, the City was liable under Monell v. Dep’t of\\n\\f6 No. 18-1078\\n\\nSocial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permits liability when\\na municipality is directly responsible for the constitutional\\ndeprivation.\\n After discovery, the parties cross moved for summary\\njudgment. The City argued that there was no issue of fact re-\\ngarding its liability. Ruiz-Cortez, in response, relied heavily\\non the 1997 Report of the Commission for Police Integrity—\\nor the “Webb Report,” named for the Commission’s Chair-\\nman, Dan Webb. The Webb Report, Ruiz-Cortez argued, high-\\nlighted for the City the dangers of police corruption, and thus,\\nthere was reason to hold the City liable for failing to act ade-\\nquately in its wake. The district court, however, disagreed; it\\nconcluded that there was no issue of fact regarding the City’s\\nliability, the Webb Report notwithstanding, and so it dis-\\nmissed the City from the case.\\n As to Lewellen’s liability, the district court decided that\\nthere was an outstanding issue of fact. Lewellen had invoked\\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when\\nRuiz-Cortez sought to depose him. But the court concluded it\\nwould not draw from that invocation a conclusively adverse\\ninference against Lewellen. So the due process claims against\\nLewellen went to trial.\\n At trial, Ruiz-Cortez testified that he had been coerced by\\na man named Carlos into holding the cocaine and giving it to\\nVenegas. He admitted, however, that this narrative was incon-\\nsistent with the one he advanced during his criminal trial,\\nwhen he testified that he had never held the drugs and that\\nthey were planted by law enforcement.\\n Lewellen also took the stand, so to speak, testifying by\\nvideo from prison. When asked if he lied in a police report\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 7\\n\\nand at trial, Lewellen stated: “as I’m currently in the process\\nof challenging my federal case, I have been advised by my\\ncriminal lawyers to decline to answer any questions under my\\nFifth Amendment. Mr. Smith, I would love to testify in\\nthis … .” Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer cut him off with an objection\\nand the court instructed Lewellen to simply answer the\\nquestion, though it did not instruct the jury to disregard\\nLewellen’s comment about how he would “love to testify.”\\nAfter a few more Fifth Amendment invocations, the parties\\nstipulated that Lewellen would assert the Fifth Amendment\\nto all additional questions. Lewellen’s testimony from Ruiz-\\nCortez’s criminal case was also read to the jury.\\n Other witnesses testified, including Ruiz-Cortez’s girl-\\nfriend, his sister, Venegas, and DEA agents. Ruiz-Cortez’s\\ncriminal lawyer also testified, stating that federal prosecutors\\nnever shared Rodriguez’s relationship with Lewellen during\\nRuiz-Cortez’s criminal case. Rodriguez’s testimony from\\nLewellen’s prosecution was read to the jury as well (he had\\nasserted the Fifth Amendment during his deposition). The\\nparties then entered stipulations relating to Lewellen’s crimi-\\nnal case: (1) Lewellen had been “indicted on charges of ob-\\nstruction of justice as part of the” racketeering count, which\\nrelated to his testimony in Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution; (2) the\\njury had hung on the racketeering count; and (3) the jury had,\\nhowever, convicted Lewellen “of felony conspiracy to possess\\nwith intent to distribute cocaine.”\\n After the presentation of the evidence, the district court\\nheld a conference to discuss jury instructions. It was off the\\nrecord, for reasons unknown. But we can gather that during\\nthe conference the parties disputed how to properly instruct\\nthe jury regarding the consequences of Lewellen’s Fifth\\n\\f8 No. 18-1078\\n\\nAmendment invocation. Ruiz-Cortez says that he offered an\\ninstruction which stated that the jury could infer from that\\ninvocation that truthful answers would have incriminated\\nLewellen—that is, the jury could make an “adverse inference”\\nagainst Lewellen for his invocation. Ruiz-Cortez’s proposed\\ninstruction also made clear that the Fifth Amendment could\\nonly be invoked “when honest answers would tend to subject\\nthe answerer to criminal liability.”\\n The district court rejected that instruction. It is not clear\\nwhy—again, the conference was held off the record—but the\\nparties seem to agree that the district court’s decision\\nstemmed from a belief that incrimination is not the sole basis\\nfor a Fifth Amendment invocation. The district court had, in\\nfact, made this belief express in its motion-in-limine rulings.\\nThere, in deciding that Lewellen and his lawyers could ex-\\nplain Lewellen’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the dis-\\ntrict court asserted that “potential liability” is not “the only\\nreason a defendant may have to invoke the Fifth.” So at trial\\nthe district court opted to give another instruction, as it briefly\\nnoted during a subsequent, on-the-record conference. This in-\\nstruction told the jury that it could, but did not have to, draw\\nan adverse inference from a Fifth Amendment invocation. It\\ndid not, as Ruiz-Cortez wanted, instruct the jury about when\\na Fifth Amendment invocation is proper.\\n After receiving this and other instructions, and after\\ndeliberation, the jury found for Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez then\\nfiled a motion for judgment as a matter law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50,\\nor alternatively a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The district\\ncourt granted the first motion and overturned the jury’s\\nverdict, concluding that the stipulation to Lewellen’s\\nconviction required a finding that he had withheld Brady\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 9\\n\\nmaterial, namely, his criminal activity. But on the City’s\\nmotion for reconsideration, the district court reversed course.\\nIt decided that the stipulation did not indicate when that\\ncriminal activity had occurred—it was possible that it\\noccurred after Ruiz-Cortez’s arrest and prosecution and\\ntherefore had not been withheld—and the jury did not have\\nto accept the other testimonial evidence. Ruiz-Cortez\\nappealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n On appeal, Ruiz-Cortez contends that the judge erred both\\nat summary judgment, in dismissing his Monell claim against\\nthe City, and after trial, reversing course and letting the jury’s\\njudgment for Lewellen stand. We address both contentions in\\nturn.\\nA. Monell Claim Against the City\\n The district court dismissed the Monell claim against the\\nCity at summary judgment, so we review that decision de\\nnovo. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.\\n2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no\\ngenuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the mo-\\nvant, here the City, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We interpret the record in favor of Ruiz-\\nCortez, as the nonmovant. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429\\n(7th Cir. 2018).\\n There is no respondeat superior liability for municipalities\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, however, holds that munici-\\npalities may be liable for § 1983 claims when they are directly\\nresponsible for the constitutional deprivation. 436 U.S. at 691–\\n94. To establish that responsibility, and thus liability under\\nMonell, a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) a\\n\\f10 No. 18-1078\\n\\nmunicipal action, which can be an express policy, a wide-\\nspread custom, or an act by an individual with policy-making\\nauthority; (2) culpability, meaning, at a minimum, deliberate\\nconduct; and (3) causation, which means the municipal action\\nwas the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury. See\\nBd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,\\n404–07 (1997).\\n At summary judgment, Ruiz-Cortez complained of two\\nCity customs: the practice of using paid, active criminals as\\ninformants and the failure to supervise informants and their\\nofficer-handlers. We can generously assume, for analytical\\npurposes only, that both customs were widespread and\\nattributable to the City, thus meeting the first step of Monell.\\n(And we can also assume, again for analytical purposes only,\\nthat Ruiz-Cortez in fact suffered a Brady injury by virtue of\\nLewellen’s failure to disclose his criminal activity.) Ruiz-\\nCortez’s claim against the City still falters at Monell’s other\\nsteps: there is no record evidence of culpability or causation.\\n Start with the first custom. Even assuming that there was\\na custom of using paid criminal informants, that practice is\\nnot “itself” violative of any federal right, including Brady. So\\nRuiz-Cortez must, as he concedes, show that the City engaged\\nin that practice with deliberate indifference to the fact that it\\nwould lead officers to violate federal law. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.\\nat 406–07 (a plaintiff challenging municipal action that is not\\n“itself” violative of federal law must show that the action was\\ntaken with “deliberate indifference”); Lapre v. City of Chicago,\\n911 F.3d 424, 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (same). But no record ev-\\nidence shows that degree of culpability. The Webb Report, on\\nwhich Ruiz-Cortez relies most heavily, does not conclude that\\nthe use of informants poses a constitutional hazard to\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 11\\n\\ncivilians. Nor does Ruiz-Cortez point to others who have suf-\\nfered the Brady injuries he has as a result of the custom. Accord\\nCity of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plural-\\nity) (“[W]here the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitu-\\ntional, considerably more proof than the single incident will\\nbe necessary.”). Without evidence that could have put the\\nCity on notice of the Brady risks in employing informants,\\nthere is no issue of fact regarding the City’s lack of culpability.\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s first custom suffers an even greater causa-\\ntion problem. Causation under Monell requires a “direct\\ncausal link” between the municipal action and the constitu-\\ntional injury. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 404. Ruiz-Cortez has not\\nidentified such causation-related evidence, which makes\\nsense: there is a real gap between a custom of paying criminal\\ninformants, even handsomely paying prolific informants, and\\nRuiz-Cortez’s alleged Brady injury, which resulted from an of-\\nficer’s corruption. Indeed, as far as the record shows, Lewel-\\nlen’s rogue decision to engage in a drug conspiracy entirely\\ngave rise to the Brady injury. The City, therefore, cannot be\\nliable; Monell does not subject municipalities to liability for\\nthe actions of misfit employees. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of\\nCorr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Thomas v. Cook\\nCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Ruiz-Cortez understands causation this way: Without the\\ncustom, there would have been no long-term relationship be-\\ntween Lewellen and Rodriguez; and without the Lewellen-\\nRodriguez relationship, Lewellen would not have engaged in\\na drug conspiracy and other crimes with Rodriguez—the im-\\npeachment evidence Lewellen failed to disclose in violation\\nof Brady. That reasoning, however, amounts only to a\\n\\f12 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshowing of but-for causation, which does not suffice under\\nMonell. Wilson v. Cook Cty., 742 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s second custom fares no better. Failure-to-\\nsupervise claims, like failure-to-train claims, are a “tenuous”\\nform of Monell liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61\\n(2011). This is because such claims seek to hold a municipality\\nliable not for directly inflicting injury, as was the case in Mo-\\nnell, but rather for causing an employee’s misconduct. See\\nBryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405; see also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822–23.\\nMunicipal failure claims are thus available only in “limited\\ncircumstances,” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387\\n(1989), and they are subject to “rigorous” fault and causation\\nrequirements, Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 405. As to fault, here too\\nRuiz-Cortez must show deliberate indifference. See Connick,\\n563 U.S. at 61; Alexander v. City of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 557\\n(7th Cir. 2006).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s failure-to-supervise claim does not meet\\nthese high requirements. There is, to start, no issue of fact re-\\nlating to the City’s deliberate indifference. The record does\\nnot contain evidence that would have, or should have, noti-\\nfied the City that the informant-handler relationship would\\ndevolve into a drug conspiracy and give rise to Brady prob-\\nlems. See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 345 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Most conspicuously absent: any evidence that others,\\nbesides Lewellen, committed Brady violations like the ones\\nRuiz-Cortez allegedly suffered. That kind of evidence is nor-\\nmally required for a failure-to-supervise or a failure-to-train\\nclaim. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.\\n Ruiz-Cortez again cites the Webb Report. But that report,\\nas we explained earlier, deals with police corruption and nar-\\ncotics crimes generally. It does not criticize the use of criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 13\\n\\ninformants or mention potential Brady violations. Ruiz-Cortez\\nalso emphasizes the magnitude of Rodriguez’s work and pay:\\nmore than sixty cases worked (most of which occurred after\\nhe was caught with bales of marijuana in 1996) and pay total-\\ning about $800,000. Should that record have raised eyebrows?\\nProbably. But it is a stretch to assert, as Ruiz-Cortez does, that\\nRodriguez’s record put the City on notice of the high proba-\\nbility of the injury Ruiz-Cortez eventually suffered. See Con-\\nnick, 563 U.S. at 61–62. Lewellen’s crimes, not Rodriguez’s ex-\\nploits, caused the alleged Brady violation, and nothing pre-\\nsented suggests that an informant’s prolific and well-paid rec-\\nord alone indicates that a handler may become so criminally\\ncorrupt as to create Brady risks. The record instead shows, at\\nmost, negligent supervision on the City’s part, but negligence\\ndoes not suffice under Monell. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407.\\n There is a causation problem, too. Ruiz-Cortez relies again\\non a but-for line of reasoning, which is insufficient. And the\\nrequisite “moving force” causation cannot be reasonably in-\\nferred from this record. A municipality’s failure to supervise\\nhandlers and informants is one thing; it is entirely another for\\nthose handlers and informants to conspire to deal drugs, as\\nhappened here.\\n Moving away from Monell’s teachings, Ruiz-Cortez makes\\na final, novel argument. He contends the district court should\\nnot have dismissed the City at summary judgment because it\\nleft the jury to decide the Brady claim against Lewellen with-\\nout learning about the “landscape” of the CPD’s corrupt his-\\ntory. This is not an evidentiary argument; Ruiz-Cortez does\\nnot argue that the CPD’s history was relevant to his Brady\\nclaim against Lewellen. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. The argu-\\nment is instead an end-run to Monell: even if there is no claim\\n\\f14 No. 18-1078\\n\\nagainst the City, Ruiz-Cortez believes, the City needed to be\\nput on trial to understand its employee’s misconduct. Monell\\nis not so easily avoided.\\n The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Ruiz-\\nCortez’s Monell claim at summary judgment.\\nB. Brady Claim Against Lewellen\\n We move from summary judgment to trial. Ruiz-Cortez\\nchallenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motions\\nfor judgment as a matter of law (after reconsideration), Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 50, and for a new trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Both mo-\\ntions asked the district court to upset the jury’s finding that\\nLewellen did not violate Brady.\\n Under Brady, “a defendant’s due process rights are vio-\\nlated if the state withholds favorable evidence from the de-\\nfense that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.”\\nSims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The strain\\nof Brady relevant here is Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150\\n(1972), which extends Brady’s holding about exculpatory evi-\\ndence to “material impeachment evidence.” Thompson v. City\\nof Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United\\nStates v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting a “distinc-\\ntion between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evi-\\ndence” under Brady). Brady applies even if evidence is known\\nonly to police officers. Youngblood v. W. Virginia, 547 U.S. 867,\\n869 (2006); see also Coleman v. City of Peoria, Ill., 925 F.3d 336,\\n349 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s claim at trial was that Lewellen violated\\nBrady by failing to disclose his corruption and criminal con-\\nduct. These facts, as even Lewellen concedes, could have sig-\\nnificantly impeached Lewellen’s credibility when he acted as\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 15\\n\\nthe key witness in Ruiz-Cortez’s earlier criminal prosecution.\\nSee, e.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016) (withhold-\\ning impeachment evidence of state’s star witness violated\\nBrady).\\n 1. Rule 50: Judgment as a Matter of Law\\n With the Brady rights established, we first turn to the mo-\\ntion for judgment as a matter of law. We review the district\\ncourt’s decision to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s Rule 50 motion de\\nnovo. Martin v. Milwaukee Cty., 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Rule 50 states that after a jury verdict a district court may\\n“direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law” if “a reason-\\nable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis\\nto find” as the actual jury did. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b). This is\\na high bar. In our Rule 50 review, we give the nonmovant “the\\nbenefit of every inference” while refraining from weighing for\\nourselves the credibility of evidence and testimony. Equal Em-\\nployment Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903\\nF.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2018). We look at the entire trial record,\\nbut we must “disregard all evidence favorable” to the movant\\nthat “the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson\\nPlumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000). This means,\\nin practice, that we accept all evidence in the nonmovant’s fa-\\nvor plus the “uncontradicted and unimpeached” testimony\\nfrom “disinterested” witnesses and, as in this case, the parties’\\nstipulations. Id. Only if no rational jury could have found for\\nthe nonmovant may we disturb the jury’s verdict. United\\nStates v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand & One\\nHundred Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 901 F.3d 758, 770 (7th\\nCir. 2018).\\n\\f16 No. 18-1078\\n\\n Ruiz-Cortez cannot meet Rule 50’s high bar. For Lewellen\\nto have violated Ruiz-Cortez’s Brady rights, he must have\\nbeen conspiring with Rodriguez before Ruiz-Cortez’s\\nprosecution—otherwise there was no impeachment material\\nto disclose. But no undisputed evidence established that fact,\\nas Lewellen pointed out in his motion for reconsideration. The\\nstipulations, most notably, did not date the start of Lewellen’s\\ncrimes. So reading the record in Lewellen’s favor, as we must,\\nthe jury could have believed that whatever crimes Lewellen\\ncommitted, he committed after Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Or\\nat a minimum, the jury could have concluded that Ruiz-\\nCortez, the claimant, had not borne his burden to show\\notherwise.\\n To be sure, Rodriguez testified to crimes he committed\\nwith Lewellen before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. In 1998, Ro-\\ndriguez claimed, Lewellen gave him two kilograms of co-\\ncaine, and not long after the pair robbed a drug dealer to-\\ngether. Ruiz-Cortez makes much of this testimony—but the\\njury was not required to believe it. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–\\n51. Rodriguez was not a disinterested party; he was a cooper-\\nator during Lewellen’s prosecution. Nor was his testimony\\nunimpeached; he admitted to perjuring himself before the\\ngrand jury, to say nothing of his long rap sheet. The jury,\\ntherefore, was not required to accept his testimony. Most of\\nRuiz-Cortez’s remaining Rule 50 arguments ask us to reweigh\\nthe evidence, which we cannot do.\\n A different argument from Ruiz-Cortez is worth address-\\ning. At times in his brief, he seems to stray from his core Brady\\nclaim and argue that the impeachment evidence was not Lew-\\nellen’s corruption but rather his use of Rodriguez, a well-paid\\ncriminal informant, to arrest Ruiz-Cortez. This alternative\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 17\\n\\ntheory presents a different obstacle for Ruiz-Cortez: even as-\\nsuming that Rodriguez’s involvement constituted impeach-\\nment evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that it\\nwas immaterial under Brady. Evidence is material under Brady\\n“if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence\\nbeen disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding\\nwould have been different.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,\\n280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Ruiz-Cortez offers\\nno explanation as to why the jury had to accept that his pros-\\necution could have come out differently if Rodriguez’s use\\nhad been highlighted at his trial. We do not see one either.\\nCriminal informants are commonplace in drug investigations.\\n A rational jury could have found, based on the evidence it\\nwas required to accept, that Ruiz-Cortez had not carried his\\nburden of showing that Lewellen violated Brady. The district\\ncourt was thus correct to deny Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for judg-\\nment as a matter of law.\\n 2. Rule 59: New Trial\\n Ruiz-Cortez’s motion for a new trial is a different matter.\\nWe review the district court’s denial of that motion for an\\nabuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a legal error can\\namount to an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. City of Chicago,\\n900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dessart, 823\\nF.3d 395, 404 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n Rule 59 differs from Rule 50. See Mejia v. Cook Cty., 650 F.3d\\n631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011). Unlike Rule 50, a new trial under Rule\\n59 may be based on “any reason” recognized by federal law.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). This most commonly takes one of\\ntwo forms: the trial was fundamentally unfair to the movant\\nor the jury’s verdict went against the manifest weight of the\\n\\f18 No. 18-1078\\n\\nevidence. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Ruiz-Cortez argues that both happened. We begin and\\nend with his argument about unfairness. When errors oc-\\ncurred and the trial was fundamentally unfair as a result, a\\nnew trial is appropriate. Christmas v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d\\n632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n According to Ruiz-Cortez, the problem started just before\\ntrial. The district court ruled in limine that “potential liability”\\nis not “the only reason a defendant may have to invoke the\\nFifth.” It therefore concluded that Lewellen and his lawyers\\ncould explain at trial that Lewellen’s Fifth Amendment invo-\\ncation was grounded in reasons other than “the good faith be-\\nlief that truthful answers may tend to incriminate.” At trial,\\nLewellen followed suit: he invoked his Fifth Amendment\\nright but quickly explained that he would “love to testify” if\\nhis criminal case was not on appeal. Ruiz-Cortez’s lawyer\\nmade an objection, which the court sustained, but it did not\\ninstruct the jury to disregard Lewellen’s explanation.\\n The district court’s premise was faulty. Witnesses do not\\nenjoy “carte blanche … to refuse to answer questions.” In re\\nHigh Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 663–64\\n(7th Cir. 2002). The only valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment is a reasonable fear that truthful answers may\\nincriminate the witness. As we have said: “To be privileged\\n… the answer one would give if one did answer it (and answer\\nit truthfully) must have some tendency to subject the person\\nbeing asked the question to criminal liability.” Id. at 663–64\\n(emphases added and omitted). The Supreme Court has re-\\npeatedly made the same point: “To qualify for the Fifth\\nAmendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial,\\nincriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 19\\n\\nCourt of Nevada, Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (em-\\nphasis added); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408\\n(1976) (the privilege “applies only when the accused is com-\\npelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incrimi-\\nnating”); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (the\\n“protection must be confined to instances where the witness\\nhas reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct an-\\nswer”); see also 1 McCormick On Evid. § 120 (7th ed. 2016)\\n(“The privilege applies only if compelled action is incriminat-\\ning”). It is, of course, a privilege against self-incrimination,\\nnot inconvenience or embarrassment.\\n Lewellen defends the district court’s error by citing Evans\\nv. City of Chicago, 513 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2008). There, in ad-\\ndressing whether a defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment\\nin bad faith, we said: “denying wrongdoing is different than\\nadmitting that there was no basis for invoking the Fifth\\nAmendment.” Id. at 744. The statement is undoubtedly true;\\na witness may believe that she is innocent but nevertheless\\nrecognize that a truthful answer may make her look guilty.\\nThat, however, is not what happened here. Lewellen asserted\\nthat he had nothing to hide and would testify but for his on-\\ngoing, extraneous litigation, unlike the witness in Evans. That\\nis not a valid excuse under the Fifth Amendment.\\n Lewellen also downplays his errant explanation, but it\\nclearly mattered. When a defendant in a civil case invokes the\\nFifth Amendment, juries are permitted, but not required, to\\ndraw a negative inference against the defendant. E.g., Baxter\\nv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Thompson v. City of Chi-\\ncago, 722 F.3d 963, 976 (7th Cir. 2013). Key to the trial was\\nwhether the jury would draw such an inference against Lew-\\nellen and find that he sat on evidence of his crimes in violation\\n\\f20 No. 18-1078\\n\\nof Brady. And key to the jury’s decision was its understanding\\nof when a defendant may properly invoke the Fifth Amend-\\nment. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment on the simple ground that there was other ongo-\\ning litigation—and not because truthful answers may have in-\\ncriminated him, as Lewellen indicated—the jury was almost\\ncertainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation.\\n Perhaps the error would not have misled the jury if there\\nhad been a clarifying instruction. The district court, however,\\ndid not give one during or after Lewellen’s testimony, and it\\nrejected Ruiz-Cortez’s effort to explain to the jury when a\\nFifth Amendment invocation is proper. The court opted in-\\nstead not to instruct the jury on the Fifth Amendment’s limits,\\ntelling the jury only that it could, but did not have to, infer\\nfrom Lewellen’s assertion that his answers “would have been\\nadverse.” We do not quarrel with this instruction in the ab-\\nstract.1 Cf. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club,\\nInc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar\\ninstruction); Evans, 513 F.3d at 741 (similar). But in this case,\\nwith Lewellen’s innocent but improper explanation firmly on\\nthe record, the jury could well have mistakenly believed that\\nextraneous litigation was a valid reason to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 We do, though, note that a word like “unfavorable” instead of “ad-\\nverse” would likely be more accessible to lay people. See Federal Civil Jury\\nInstructions of the Seventh Circuit 1.19 (2017 ed.) (using “unfavorable” to\\ndescribe the inference drawn from missing witnesses). Our pattern in-\\nstructions do not contain an instruction specifically for cases in which wit-\\nnesses invoke the Fifth Amendment, and we encourage the Committee to\\nconsider adding one.\\n\\fNo. 18-1078 21\\n\\n As we noted earlier, we cannot be sure why the district\\ncourt rejected Ruiz-Cortez’s explanatory instruction because\\nthe conference was held off the record. (Ruiz-Cortez later\\nstated his objection on the record, which was wise for preser-\\nvation purposes, but that part of the transcript does not detail\\nthe district court’s reasoning.) When critical moments of a\\ntrial happen off the record, it makes appellate review difficult.\\nA court should make every reasonable effort to ensure there\\nis a record for its decisions. See also 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (describ-\\ning when court reporters must transcribe court proceedings).\\nAnd litigants should remember their obligation to develop a\\nrecord. Accord Fed. R. App. P. 10; McBride v. Hanks, 202 F.3d\\n274 (7th Cir. 1999). Yet even with a missing record, here, we\\nhave little trouble concluding that Lewellen’s explanation\\nplus a noncorrective jury instruction led to an unfair trial for\\nRuiz-Cortez.\\n Lewellen also makes an argument about Brady materiality,\\nwhich is really one about harmless error. Setting aside Lewel-\\nlen’s “love to testify” statement and the instruction, Lewellen\\nargues, the evidence at trial allowed the jury to conclude that\\nLewellen’s crimes were not material in Ruiz-Cortez’s prose-\\ncution. Recall that materiality under Brady requires only a\\n“reasonable probability” that the result would be different.\\nWhere, as here, the impeachment evidence is about the gov-\\nernment’s star witness, it is often material. See, e.g., Wearry,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1007; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (1995).\\nEven more importantly, here, the prosecution itself conceded\\nmateriality. In moving to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction, the\\ngovernment admitted that, with Lewellen’s crimes in the\\nopen, there was “virtually no admissible evidence of defend-\\nant’s guilt.” When the government admits that a prosecution\\n\\f22 No. 18-1078\\n\\nshould not have even happened, materiality is not a close\\ncall.2\\n We do not order a new trial lightly. See, e.g., Thompson, 722\\nF.3d at 980. And we, of course, recognize the skill and experi-\\nence of the district court overseeing this case. The errors that\\nplayed out at trial, however, misinformed the jury about the\\ncentral question it faced: whether to infer from Lewellen’s in-\\nvocation that he was, in fact, corrupt when he testified against\\nRuiz-Cortez. It had been told, contrary to the law, that extra-\\nneous litigation was reason enough to invoke the Fifth\\nAmendment, and no correction was ever made. No doubt a\\n“significant chance exists” that those errors “affected the out-\\ncome of the trial,” especially in light of the evidence of Lew-\\nellen’s corruption before Ruiz-Cortez’s prosecution. Mihailo-\\nvich v. Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 913 (7th Cir. 2004). Because we\\norder a new trial on these grounds, we need not address Ruiz-\\nCortez’s remaining Rule 59 arguments.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the claims\\nagainst the City. We vacate the judgment in favor of Lewellen\\nand remand for a new trial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Lewellen also takes the position in his brief that the jury could have\\nfound that he discharged his Brady obligations. This necessarily means\\nthat Lewellen would have confessed his crimes to federal prosecutors—\\nprosecutors who years later charged and prosecuted Lewellen. See Whit-\\nlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). It also requires be-\\nlieving that those same federal prosecutors, knowing Lewellen was a dirty\\ncop, put him on the stand at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial anyway. Lewellen offered\\nno support for this serious accusation and wisely backed away from it at\\noral argument.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3191,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643329,"string":"4,643,329"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Chetty SEVUGAN, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Corporation Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3082"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Rovner, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3082\\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\\nlarly situated,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\\na Delaware Corporation\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3082\\n\\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\\n I\\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 3\\n\\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\\nselling it to customers.\\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\\nto that alternative supplier.\\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\\ntract’s pricing terms:\\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\\n your electric generation services a price set for\\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\\n generation service and transmission charges … .\\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\\n(emphasis added).\\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\\n\\f4 No. 18-3082\\n\\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\\nhis price set at a variable rate.\\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\\n\\n\\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 5\\n\\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3082\\n\\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\\nwas deficient.\\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\\n763.\\n II\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 7\\n\\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\\ntations omitted).\\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquote marks omitted).\\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\\ninfer the third element, breach.\\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\\n\\f8 No. 18-3082\\n\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\\n(paragraph 3).\\n A\\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\\nelectricity rates.\\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 9\\n\\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\\nator price.\\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\\na proper comparator:\\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\\n\\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\\nparator in these circumstances.\\n\\f10 No. 18-3082\\n\\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission.\\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\\nswitch.”\\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\\n\\n\\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\\n\\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 11\\n\\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\\nity.”\\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\\nthe Renewal Clause.\\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3082\\n\\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\\n B\\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 13\\n\\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\\nficient, as detailed above.\\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\\nsale price, found wanting above).\\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\\n C\\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3082\\n\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\\n added).\\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\\nself.\\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\\nthe contract.”\\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\\nsion.\\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 15\\n\\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\\nClause.5\\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\\n\\n\\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\\n\\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\\n\\f16 No. 18-3082\\n\\n III\\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420582/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643329/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Chetty SEVUGAN, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Corporation Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3082\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\nlarly situated,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\na Delaware Corporation\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\n\f2 No. 18-3082\n\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\n I\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\n\fNo. 18-3082 3\n\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\nselling it to customers.\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\nto that alternative supplier.\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\ntract’s pricing terms:\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\n your electric generation services a price set for\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\n generation service and transmission charges … .\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\n(emphasis added).\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\n\f4 No. 18-3082\n\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\nhis price set at a variable rate.\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\n\n\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\n\fNo. 18-3082 5\n\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\n\n\n\n\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\n\f6 No. 18-3082\n\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\nwas deficient.\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\n763.\n II\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\n\fNo. 18-3082 7\n\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\ntations omitted).\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\nquote marks omitted).\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\ninfer the third element, breach.\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\n\f8 No. 18-3082\n\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\n(paragraph 3).\n A\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\nelectricity rates.\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\n\fNo. 18-3082 9\n\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\nator price.\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\na proper comparator:\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\n\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\nparator in these circumstances.\n\f10 No. 18-3082\n\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\nCommission.\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\nswitch.”\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\n\n\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\n\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\fNo. 18-3082 11\n\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\nity.”\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\nthe Renewal Clause.\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\n\f12 No. 18-3082\n\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\n B\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\n\fNo. 18-3082 13\n\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\nficient, as detailed above.\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\nsale price, found wanting above).\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\n C\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\n\f14 No. 18-3082\n\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\n added).\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\nself.\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\nthe contract.”\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\nsion.\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\n\fNo. 18-3082 15\n\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\nClause.5\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\n\n\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\n\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\n\f16 No. 18-3082\n\n III\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\n\n\n\n\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Chetty SEVUGAN, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Corporation Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3082\\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\\nlarly situated,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\\na Delaware Corporation\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3082\\n\\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\\n I\\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 3\\n\\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\\nselling it to customers.\\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\\nto that alternative supplier.\\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\\ntract’s pricing terms:\\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\\n your electric generation services a price set for\\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\\n generation service and transmission charges … .\\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\\n(emphasis added).\\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\\n\\f4 No. 18-3082\\n\\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\\nhis price set at a variable rate.\\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\\n\\n\\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 5\\n\\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3082\\n\\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\\nwas deficient.\\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\\n763.\\n II\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 7\\n\\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\\ntations omitted).\\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquote marks omitted).\\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\\ninfer the third element, breach.\\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\\n\\f8 No. 18-3082\\n\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\\n(paragraph 3).\\n A\\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\\nelectricity rates.\\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 9\\n\\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\\nator price.\\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\\na proper comparator:\\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\\n\\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\\nparator in these circumstances.\\n\\f10 No. 18-3082\\n\\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission.\\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\\nswitch.”\\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\\n\\n\\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\\n\\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 11\\n\\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\\nity.”\\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\\nthe Renewal Clause.\\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3082\\n\\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\\n B\\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 13\\n\\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\\nficient, as detailed above.\\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\\nsale price, found wanting above).\\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\\n C\\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3082\\n\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\\n added).\\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\\nself.\\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\\nthe contract.”\\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\\nsion.\\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 15\\n\\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\\nClause.5\\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\\n\\n\\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\\n\\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\\n\\f16 No. 18-3082\\n\\n III\\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3192,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643405,"string":"4,643,405"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Gregory S. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2499"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Bauer, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2499\\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\\n\\f2 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\\n I\\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 3\\n\\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\\nleft Stateville.\\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\\n\\f4 No. 18-2499\\n\\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\\nsavings statute cannot help him.\\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 5\\n\\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\\nliness grounds.\\n II\\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\\n A. Williams\\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\\n\\f6 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\\ndid he mention the hernia.\\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\\n B. Dr. Obaisi\\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 7\\n\\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\\n\\f8 No. 18-2499\\n\\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\\n10, 2014.\\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\\naddressed pain.\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 9\\n\\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\\n\\f10 No. 18-2499\\n\\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\\n C. Wexford\\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 11\\n\\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\\n therapy.\\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\\nPolicy goes on to say:\\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\\n\\f12 No. 18-2499\\n\\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\\nas the district court recognized.\\n III\\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 13\\n\\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\\nthe conditions at Stateville.\\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2499\\n\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420658/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643405/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gregory S. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2499\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\n\f2 No. 18-2499\n\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\n I\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\n\fNo. 18-2499 3\n\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\nleft Stateville.\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\n\f4 No. 18-2499\n\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\nsavings statute cannot help him.\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\n\fNo. 18-2499 5\n\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\nliness grounds.\n II\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\n A. Williams\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\n\f6 No. 18-2499\n\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\ndid he mention the hernia.\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\n B. Dr. Obaisi\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\n\fNo. 18-2499 7\n\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\n\f8 No. 18-2499\n\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\n10, 2014.\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\naddressed pain.\n\fNo. 18-2499 9\n\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\n\f10 No. 18-2499\n\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\n C. Wexford\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\n\fNo. 18-2499 11\n\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\n therapy.\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\nPolicy goes on to say:\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\n\f12 No. 18-2499\n\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\nas the district court recognized.\n III\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\n\fNo. 18-2499 13\n\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\nthe conditions at Stateville.\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\n\f14 No. 18-2499\n\n IV\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gregory S. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2499\\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\\n\\f2 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\\n I\\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 3\\n\\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\\nleft Stateville.\\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\\n\\f4 No. 18-2499\\n\\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\\nsavings statute cannot help him.\\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 5\\n\\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\\nliness grounds.\\n II\\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\\n A. Williams\\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\\n\\f6 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\\ndid he mention the hernia.\\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\\n B. Dr. Obaisi\\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 7\\n\\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\\n\\f8 No. 18-2499\\n\\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\\n10, 2014.\\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\\naddressed pain.\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 9\\n\\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\\n\\f10 No. 18-2499\\n\\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\\n C. Wexford\\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 11\\n\\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\\n therapy.\\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\\nPolicy goes on to say:\\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\\n\\f12 No. 18-2499\\n\\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\\nas the district court recognized.\\n III\\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 13\\n\\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\\nthe conditions at Stateville.\\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2499\\n\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3193,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643406,"string":"4,643,406"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3082"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3082\\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\\nlarly situated,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\\na Delaware Corporation\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3082\\n\\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\\n I\\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 3\\n\\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\\nselling it to customers.\\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\\nto that alternative supplier.\\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\\ntract’s pricing terms:\\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\\n your electric generation services a price set for\\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\\n generation service and transmission charges … .\\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\\n(emphasis added).\\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\\n\\f4 No. 18-3082\\n\\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\\nhis price set at a variable rate.\\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\\n\\n\\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 5\\n\\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3082\\n\\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\\nwas deficient.\\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\\n763.\\n II\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 7\\n\\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\\ntations omitted).\\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquote marks omitted).\\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\\ninfer the third element, breach.\\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\\n\\f8 No. 18-3082\\n\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\\n(paragraph 3).\\n A\\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\\nelectricity rates.\\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 9\\n\\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\\nator price.\\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\\na proper comparator:\\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\\n\\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\\nparator in these circumstances.\\n\\f10 No. 18-3082\\n\\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission.\\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\\nswitch.”\\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\\n\\n\\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\\n\\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 11\\n\\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\\nity.”\\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\\nthe Renewal Clause.\\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3082\\n\\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\\n B\\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 13\\n\\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\\nficient, as detailed above.\\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\\nsale price, found wanting above).\\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\\n C\\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3082\\n\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\\n added).\\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\\nself.\\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\\nthe contract.”\\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\\nsion.\\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 15\\n\\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\\nClause.5\\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\\n\\n\\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\\n\\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\\n\\f16 No. 18-3082\\n\\n III\\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420659/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643406/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3082\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\nlarly situated,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\na Delaware Corporation\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\n\f2 No. 18-3082\n\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\n I\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\n\fNo. 18-3082 3\n\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\nselling it to customers.\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\nto that alternative supplier.\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\ntract’s pricing terms:\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\n your electric generation services a price set for\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\n generation service and transmission charges … .\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\n(emphasis added).\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\n\f4 No. 18-3082\n\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\nhis price set at a variable rate.\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\n\n\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\n\fNo. 18-3082 5\n\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\n\n\n\n\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\n\f6 No. 18-3082\n\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\nwas deficient.\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\n763.\n II\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\n\fNo. 18-3082 7\n\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\ntations omitted).\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\nquote marks omitted).\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\ninfer the third element, breach.\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\n\f8 No. 18-3082\n\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\n(paragraph 3).\n A\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\nelectricity rates.\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\n\fNo. 18-3082 9\n\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\nator price.\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\na proper comparator:\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\n\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\nparator in these circumstances.\n\f10 No. 18-3082\n\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\nCommission.\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\nswitch.”\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\n\n\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\n\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\fNo. 18-3082 11\n\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\nity.”\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\nthe Renewal Clause.\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\n\f12 No. 18-3082\n\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\n B\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\n\fNo. 18-3082 13\n\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\nficient, as detailed above.\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\nsale price, found wanting above).\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\n C\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\n\f14 No. 18-3082\n\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\n added).\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\nself.\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\nthe contract.”\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\nsion.\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\n\fNo. 18-3082 15\n\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\nClause.5\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\n\n\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\n\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\n\f16 No. 18-3082\n\n III\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\n\n\n\n\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3082\\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf of others simi-\\nlarly situated,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,\\na Delaware Corporation\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division\\n No. 1:17-cv-06569 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 26, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Unhappy with his utility bill,\\nChetty Sevugan filed this putative class action challenging the\\nelectricity prices of Direct Energy Services, LLC, an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier in the Chicago market. After\\nSevugan’s third attempt to plead a breach of contract claim,\\nthe district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.\\n\\f2 No. 18-3082\\n\\nRepetition does not make a claim more valid; just so for the\\ncustomer here. Given his failure to allege facts which allow a\\nreasonable inference that the parties’ contract was breached,\\nhis claim is not facially plausible, so dismissal was proper.\\n I\\n This case comes to us after a grant of a motion to dismiss,\\nso “[w]hen evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, we\\nconstrue it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,\\naccept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in\\n[the nonmovant’s] favor.” Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,\\n592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dom-\\ninated the U.S. electricity market. These utility companies (in\\nIllinois, Commonwealth Edison Company or “ComEd”) gen-\\nerated, transmitted, distributed, billed, and collected pay-\\nments for electricity. ComEd’s rates are set by the Illinois\\nCommerce Commission, a state regulatory agency.\\n More than twenty years ago, Illinois restructured its elec-\\ntricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and\\nRate Relief Law of 1997, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ACT 5, ART. XVI,\\nwhich allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete\\nwith ComEd and against each other to service retail custom-\\ners, both residential and commercial. Unlike ComEd, alterna-\\ntive retail electric suppliers set their own rates and are not\\nregulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd\\n(which in the 1990’s divested itself of its power plants) and\\nalternative suppliers serve as middlemen, purchasing elec-\\ntricity wholesale from PJM Interconnection LLC—a regional\\ntransmission organization that controls the electric grid\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 3\\n\\ncovering northern Illinois and several other states—and re-\\nselling it to customers.\\n Today, Illinois retail consumers choose their electricity\\nsupplier from among ComEd and a collection of state-certi-\\nfied alternative retail electric suppliers serving their area.\\nComEd serves as the default energy provider; consumers\\nwho wish to buy from an alternative supplier must “opt-in”\\nto that alternative supplier.\\n Direct Energy is one such alternative retail electric sup-\\nplier. Sevugan, hoping to save money on his monthly electric\\nbills, contracted with Direct Energy in 2011. Sevugan’s allega-\\ntions center on two clauses in his contract with Direct Energy.\\nThe first, which we call the “Terms Clause,” explains the con-\\ntract’s pricing terms:\\n 3. Pricing, Billing and Payment Terms. During\\n the Initial Term, you will pay Direct Energy for\\n your electric generation services a price set for\\n the Initial Term … . This price includes electric\\n generation service and transmission charges … .\\n Electric generation service prices of electric suppli-\\n ers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .\\n(emphasis added).\\n The contract required Direct Energy to supply electricity\\nat a fixed price per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first twelve\\nmonths. At the end of that initial term, Sevugan renewed for\\nan additional twelve months at a lower fixed rate. In 2013,\\nthough, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor cancelled service,\\nwhich triggered what we will call the “Renewal Clause”:\\n\\f4 No. 18-3082\\n\\n 5. Renewal: Notice of a Change to this Agree-\\n ment. Upon completion of the Initial Term, this\\n Agreement will automatically renew on a\\n month-to-month basis at a variable price per\\n kWh with no early cancellation fee. Direct En-\\n ergy will charge you at a variable price per kWh\\n based upon generally prevailing market prices for\\n electricity in the PJM market at the Electric Utility\\n load zone for the applicable period, plus an adder, de-\\n termined solely by Direct Energy in its discretion.\\n(emphasis added). Per the Renewal Clause, Sevugan’s con-\\ntract automatically renewed on a month-to-month basis, with\\nhis price set at a variable rate.\\n After several years as a customer, Sevugan became un-\\nhappy with his electricity costs, believing them to be above\\nmarket rates and more expensive than if he had remained\\nwith ComEd. He cancelled service with Direct Energy and\\nsued in September 2017, alleging Direct Energy deceived him\\n(and others like him) in the parties’ four-page form contract.\\n Sevugan made a variety of claims in his lawsuit,1 asserting\\nthat after his fixed-rate term expired, the variable charges\\nshould have been based on market-related factors. He\\nclaimed the rates he paid did not reflect changes in wholesale-\\nmarket prices and failed to correspond to rates offered by\\nComEd. Direct Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that\\nSevugan did not plausibly allege that the parties’ contract\\n\\n\\n 1 Ten days after Sevugan filed his initial complaint, but before Direct\\nEnergy responded, Sevugan amended his complaint, apparently to delete\\nreferences to New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules. This first amend-\\nment did not alter Sevugan’s substantive allegations or claims.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 5\\n\\nmade those promises. In a thorough opinion, the district court\\ndismissed Sevugan’s breach of contract claim without preju-\\ndice under FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6), concluding that\\nSevugan failed to allege enough facts to show that Direct\\nEnergy plausibly breached a contractual duty.\\n As the dismissal was without prejudice, Sevugan filed a\\nsecond amended complaint, which asserted only that Direct\\nEnergy breached paragraphs 3 and 5 of the parties’ contract\\nby: “(a) fail[ing] to base its prices upon generally prevailing\\nmarket prices for electricity in the PJM market at the Electric\\nUtility load zone for the applicable period, (b) fail[ing] to pro-\\nvide a competitive rate, (c) increas[ing] its adder2 to an unrea-\\nsonable level, or (d) all of the above.”\\n Direct Energy again moved to dismiss, contending\\nSevugan’s breach of contract claim was too speculative and\\nlacked sufficient factual allegations. In a second detailed opin-\\nion, the district court again dismissed Sevugan’s case, this\\ntime with prejudice. The court concluded Sevugan did not al-\\nlege facts showing Direct Energy’s rates were not “based on\\ngenerally prevailing market prices,” as the complaint pleaded\\nonly the prices of ComEd and the PJM market. The complaint\\nwas silent on rates charged by other Illinois alternative retail\\nenergy suppliers, which the district court considered Direct\\nEnergy’s competition. The court further ruled that the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not defined in the parties’ contract, an “adder” can be de-\\nscribed as a discretionary component of the electricity price. In his briefs,\\nSevugan presumes an “adder” is a charge in addition to the base price\\n(whether that base was variable or fixed) that is “fixed and reflects all non-\\nenergy costs to provide service to its customers.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3082\\n\\ncontract did not promise to charge rates lower than ComEd,\\nso a breach of contract had not been alleged.\\n The district court also held that Sevugan failed to include\\nfacts showing the “adder” Direct Energy charged was “unrea-\\nsonable.” Sevugan failed to allege the amount of the adder,\\nwhat percentage of the variable rates the adder constituted,\\nor the adders charged by other suppliers. Without any such\\nfacts, the district court concluded Sevugan’s pleaded claim\\nwas deficient.\\n Likewise, the district court rejected Sevugan’s argument\\nthat Direct Energy breached by not setting its variable rates\\n“competitively.” Sevugan failed to allege the prices of any\\nother alternative retail energy suppliers, making it impossible\\nto know whether Direct Energy’s pricing of its variable rates\\nwere competitive in the variable market. The district court ex-\\nplained that factual allegations regarding ComEd’s prices\\nwere insufficient, as they are set by regulators, not the market.\\n Sevugan timely appealed from the second dismissal,\\nwhich we review de novo. Reger Development, LLC, 592 F.3d at\\n763.\\n II\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead\\nmore than conclusions; it must allege sufficient facts that\\nmake the plaintiff’s claim plausible. “A claim has facial plau-\\nsibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows\\nthe court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant\\nis liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n662, 678 (2009); see also West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher,\\n844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016) (setting forth principles gov-\\nerning assessment of complaint after Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 7\\n\\n“‘Plausibility’ is not a synonym for ‘probability’ in this\\ncontext, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a de-\\nfendant has acted unlawfully.” Schumacher, 844 F.3d at 675 (ci-\\ntations omitted).\\n Under this standard, a plaintiff who seeks to survive a mo-\\ntion to dismiss must “plead some facts that suggest a right to\\nrelief that is beyond the speculative level.” In re marchFIRST\\nInc., 589 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary\\nto survive a motion to dismiss, it does require “more than\\nmere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the\\nelements of a cause of action to be considered adequate.” Bell\\nv. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal\\nquote marks omitted).\\n The law of Illinois, the forum state, applies in this diversity\\ncase. Fednav Intern. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834,\\n838-39 (7th Cir. 2010). “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking\\nto state a colorable breach of contract claim must allege four\\nelements: ‘(1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract;\\n(2) substantial performance by the plaintiff; (3) a breach by the\\ndefendant; and (4) resultant damages.’” Reger Dev., LLC v.\\nNat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting W.W.\\nVincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 967\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). The district court concluded Direct En-\\nergy failed to plausibly allege facts from which to reasonably\\ninfer the third element, breach.\\n A breach of contract claim requires an identifiable breach\\nof a contract term. Harvey v. Mackay, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1027 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1982) (dismissing complaint because “[t]here are no\\nfacts alleged which purport to show what acts constitute a\\nbreach”); Talbert v. Home Sav. of Am., F.A., 638 N.E.2d 354, 358\\n\\f8 No. 18-3082\\n\\n(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“A breach can only exist where a party\\nfails to carry out a term, promise, or condition of a contract; a\\nbreach cannot result from a party's performance of a contract\\nterm.”). We review Sevugan’s pleading on the contractual\\nterms he claims Direct Energy breached, first the Renewal\\nClause (paragraph 5), including whether Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder is an unreasonable charge, and then the Terms Clause\\n(paragraph 3).\\n A\\n The parties agree the Renewal Clause establishes two\\nparts to the contract price: (1) a “generally prevailing market\\nprice for electricity in the PJM market,” plus (2) “an adder”;\\nthe sum of these two parts is the retail price. Sevugan first\\ncontests how Direct Energy exercised its discretion in setting\\nelectricity rates.\\n Sevugan interprets “generally prevailing market price” to\\nmean Direct Energy was required to set its variable rates\\nlower than the PJM wholesale price, as well as below\\nComEd’s prices. To support this reading, Sevugan included a\\nchart in this latest complaint. The chart lists the PJM whole-\\nsale market price and the rates per kWh, for each billing\\nperiod, charged by Direct Energy and ComEd. Sevugan con-\\ntends the chart shows that Direct Energy’s rates were consist-\\nently higher than ComEd’s, although both prices fluctuated\\nin comparison to the wholesale price.\\n But Sevugan’s complaint lacks a critical feature of compar-\\nison: it does not contain a valid comparator against which to\\nmeasure “generally prevailing market prices.” The complaint\\ncontains allegations concerning the PJM wholesale price. But\\nthat is the price to the energy companies, not the consumer.\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 9\\n\\nIndividual customers like Sevugan could not go out and pur-\\nchase electricity at the PJM rate, no matter their electricity\\nsupplier. So, the PJM wholesale price is not a proper compar-\\nator price.\\n Sevugan’s latest complaint includes a different chart that\\nillustrates why the PJM wholesale price is not a sound com-\\nparator. That graphic shows that in early 2014, Direct Energy\\nand ComEd each charged consumers prices below the whole-\\nsale rate, and that between 2013 and 2016 ComEd’s price per\\nkWh was consistently higher than the PJM wholesale price.\\n Sevugan’s second proposed comparator, ComEd, is also\\nnot valid for assessing the “generally prevailing market price\\nfor electricity.” The Illinois Commerce Commission sets\\nComEd’s rates, excluding them from market forces. The\\nSecond Circuit recently considered whether a public utility is\\na proper comparator:\\n If we were to hold private electricity suppliers\\n liable for departing from the Standard Service\\n Rates [the Illinois Commerce Commission\\n equivalent], we would in effect make those []\\n rates binding on private electricity suppliers on\\n Direct Energy. Yet the entire point of electricity\\n deregulation was to allow the market, rather\\n than the [state regulator], to determine rates.\\nRichards v. Direct Energy Serv., LLC, 915 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.\\n2019) (internal citations removed and footnote omitted).3 The\\n\\n 3 While the contract terms in Richards differed somewhat from those\\nhere (and discovery had already taken place), the Second Circuit’s reason-\\ning in Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant com-\\nparator in these circumstances.\\n\\f10 No. 18-3082\\n\\nentire point of Illinois’s rate relief law was to permit the rates\\nof alternative retail energy suppliers to diverge from\\nComEd’s rates, allowing them to fluctuate according to mar-\\nket conditions. In contrast, ComEd’s regulated rates change\\nonly according to the directives of the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission.\\n To argue ComEd suffices as a comparator, Sevugan relies\\non Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC.4 The consumer-\\nplaintiff in Zahn also alleged breach of contract by an alterna-\\ntive retail energy supplier for purportedly overcharging for\\nelectricity. Sevugan points out this court ruled it was “plausi-\\nble” to conclude that the legislative intent of Illinois’s Rate\\nRelief Law as “to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow\\nfor competition.” 815 F.3d at 1090. To Sevugan, it follows that\\n“Direct Energy competes with ComEd, and not other ARESs\\n[alternative retail energy suppliers], to get consumers to\\nswitch.”\\n But Sevugan’s reliance on Zahn is misplaced, as that case\\ninvolved a very different claim. Zahn alleged her alternative\\nretail energy supplier induced her to switch electricity suppli-\\ners through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never\\nreceived. 815 F.3d at 1086. After certifying to the Illinois\\nSupreme Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce\\nCommission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815\\nF.3d at 1095, and receiving the answer that it did not, 72\\nN.E.2d at 340, this Court concluded Zahn plausibly stated a\\nclaim for such bait-and-switch conduct. 847 F.3d at 878. Here,\\n\\n\\n 4 815 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2016), certified question answered, 72 N.E.3d 333\\n\\n(Ill. 2016), reh’g denied (Jan. 23, 2017), conforming to answer to certified ques-\\ntion, 845 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 11\\n\\nby contrast, Sevugan does not contest that he received the\\nfixed rates for which he contracted for the first two years of\\nhis contract. This court’s opinion in Zahn said nothing about\\nSevugan’s theory that ComEd’s prices are a valid method to\\ndetermine the “generally prevailing market price for electric-\\nity.”\\n ComEd’s price is not a market price at all; it is a regulated\\nprice. Neither PJM nor ComEd participate in the general mar-\\nket for electricity, and thus they are not proper comparators\\nwith Direct Energy to gauge market price. The only other ac-\\ntors in the electricity market engaging in price competition are\\nthe other alternative retail energy suppliers in Illinois—the\\ncompanies most similarly situated to Direct Energy. But none\\nof Sevugan’s complaints offered allegations about those sup-\\npliers’ rates in comparison with Direct Energy’s. The closest\\nSevugan got to pleading such information was in his second\\namended complaint, in which he alleged Direct Energy’s\\n“prices are substantially higher than not only ComEd’s prices\\nbut also other ARES’s [alternative retail energy supplier’s]\\nprices.” But without additional supporting factual allega-\\ntions, this conclusory claim is not sufficient to allow a reason-\\nable inference that Direct Energy breached the Renewal\\nClause. Bell, 835 F.3d at 738. Further, Sevugan admits he has\\nnot pleaded any facts about what an alternative retail energy\\nsupplier would charge; he argues he does not need them.\\nWith nothing pleaded about the prices of Direct Energy’s\\ncompetitors, Sevugan’s complaint does not contain sufficient\\nfacts to allow a reasonable inference Direct Energy breached\\nthe Renewal Clause.\\n At bottom, Sevugan’s claim that Direct Energy did not\\ncharge rates commensurate with ComEd, or with the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3082\\n\\nwholesale price of PJM, fails to allege a breach. The parties’\\ncontract does not require Direct Energy to charge such rates.\\nWithout any information about valid market comparators,\\nsuch as other alternative retail energy suppliers, Sevugan’s\\nbreach of contract claim is speculative and implausible.\\n B\\n Sevugan next claims Direct Energy breached the contract\\nby using an unreasonable adder. Recall, the Renewal Clause\\ndictates the contract price is the generally prevailing market\\nprice plus the discretionary adder set by Direct Energy.\\nSevugan alleges the amount of Direct Energy’s adder is un-\\nreasonable, resulting in overcharges. As part of his argument\\nhe asserts the “adder is fixed and does not fluctuate over\\ntime.” From this, Sevugan contends that, because Direct\\nEnergy’s kWh prices exceeded ComEd’s (and did not de-\\ncrease when ComEd’s prices dropped), Direct Energy could\\nnot have charged him rates based on generally prevailing\\nmarket prices, and thus breached the contract. To the extent\\nDirect Energy did charge him such rates, Sevugan argues\\nDirect Energy’s “excessive prices could only have resulted\\nfrom charging an unreasonable adder,” which also would vi-\\nolate Illinois contract law that implies a price must be a rea-\\nsonable one where a contract for goods or services is silent on\\nthat term. See Protestant Hosp. Builders Club, Inc. v. Goedde, 424\\nN.E.2d 1302, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).\\n Unpacking this argument shows it is not well grounded.\\nSevugan’s allegations about the size of the adder presumes it\\nis fixed over time. But Sevugan provides no basis for this\\n“fixed adder” theory. In the district court, Sevugan pointed to\\na contract with a municipal client, and a checklist for contracts\\nwith commercial clients, each of which referred to a “fixed\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 13\\n\\nadder.” But if anything, such allegations make it less likely\\nSevugan’s adder was fixed, as Direct Energy explicitly re-\\nferred to fixed adders in other contracts, but not in Sevugan’s.\\n On appeal, Sevugan backs away from this fixed adder\\ntheory. He submits “[w]hether [Direct Energy]’s adder is\\nfixed or not is very much beside the point.” He says his alle-\\ngations on this topic were “merely [his] attempt, and a very\\nuncertain one at that, to explain the disparity between Direct\\nEnergy’s retail price and the known PJM wholesale price.”\\nGiven the incorrect comparator, though, this contrast is insuf-\\nficient, as detailed above.\\n All the more, the Renewal Clause in the parties’ contract\\ngrants Direct Energy price-setting discretion. The complaint\\nfails to allege how Direct Energy unreasonably exercised its\\ndiscretion in setting the adder amount (other than its claim\\nthat the prices were greater than ComEd and the PJM whole-\\nsale price, found wanting above).\\n Sevugan has offered no new arguments for how the adder\\nin the price is unreasonable. He admits he does not know how\\nthe adder charge is established, or how Direct Energy formu-\\nlated its prices. Nor does Sevugan allege Direct Energy’s ad-\\nder was greater than that charged by other market partici-\\npants. Sevugan has not plausibly alleged Direct Energy\\ncharged him unreasonably for this component of the price.\\n C\\n Finally, Sevugan disputes the electricity prices Direct\\n Energy set by invoking a different portion of the contract,\\nthe Terms Clause, paragraph 3. As relayed above, that clause\\n provides in part: “Electric generation service prices of elec-\\ntric suppliers, such as Direct Energy, are set competitively and\\n\\f14 No. 18-3082\\n\\n are not regulated by the Commission … .” (emphasis\\n added).\\n The district court held that this term did not relate to\\nDirect Energy’s pricing, so it could not obligate Direct\\nEnergy’s setting of its variable rates. To the court, “competi-\\ntively” described the method in which prices are set—inde-\\npendently, by privately operated providers—rather than the\\nterm establishing a contractual obligation about the price it-\\nself.\\n Sevugan argues “competitively” in the Terms Clause\\nmeans Direct Energy was contractually bound to set a varia-\\nble rate competitive with ComEd’s price. Sevugan relies on\\ndictionary definitions of “competitive” and similar terms to\\ncontend he has stated a plausible claim by alleging that Direct\\nEnergy’s prices “were exorbitantly higher than ComEd and\\ntherefore not ‘competitively’ set—contravening the terms of\\nthe contract.”\\n Sevugan’s arguments fare no better on appeal than in the\\ndistrict court. Unambiguous terms are to be given their plain,\\nordinary, and popular meaning. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948\\nN.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (citing Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins.\\nCo., 821 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ill. 2004) (same)). The Terms Clause\\nread plainly does not promise Direct Energy’s rates will be\\nsimilar to ComEd’s; in fact, it warns customers they may be\\nsignificantly different. “Competitively” explains that Direct\\nEnergy’s rates are unregulated by a public rate commission,\\nunlike ComEd’s rates set by the Illinois Commerce Commis-\\nsion.\\n A contract should be construed as a whole. Hongbo Han v.\\nUnited Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2014)\\n\\fNo. 18-3082 15\\n\\n(holding “a court must give meaning and effect to every part\\nof the contract,” interpreting Illinois law in putative class ac-\\ntion); Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58 (Ill. 2007)\\n(“[B]ecause words derive their meaning from the context in\\nwhich they are used, a contract must be construed as a whole,\\nviewing each part in light of the others.”) (citation omitted);\\nsee ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012) (“The text must be\\nconstrued as a whole.”). The Renewal Clause fixes Direct\\nEnergy’s obligations when setting variable rates. But as the\\ndistrict court noted, the Terms Clause refers only to the fixed\\nrate during the twelve-month initial term, so it may not even\\napply to a later variable rate charged under the Renewal\\nClause.5\\n Even if the Terms Clause did control pricing, Sevugan\\nagain has failed to plausibly allege Direct Energy improperly\\nset its variable rate for electricity. As described above, the\\ncomplaint contains no references to proper comparators, in-\\ncluding alternative retail energy suppliers. Sevugan’s conten-\\ntion that the variable rates he paid were not competitive be-\\ncause they were higher than ComEd’s rates does not speak to\\nDirect Energy’s competitiveness in the broader market.6\\n\\n\\n 5 The cases Sevugan cites on this point differ materially from this one.\\n\\nWe distinguished Zahn above. And Oladapo v. Smart One Energy, LLC, No.\\n14 CV 7117-LTS, 2016 WL 344976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), involved more\\nspecific language than that used in Sevugan’s contract, such as a “guaran-\\ntee” and a promise that the energy supplier would set prices “in response\\nto changing market conditions.” Id. at *3.\\n 6 Sevugan submits as persuasive supplemental authority Mercado v.\\nVerde Energy USA, Inc., No. 18 CV 2068, 2019 WL 978531 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,\\n2019), in which the district court denied a motion to dismiss based on\\n\\f16 No. 18-3082\\n\\n III\\n Sevugan’s complaints failed to contain allegations from\\nwhich it can be reasonably inferred Direct Energy breached\\nthe parties’ contract. Because his claim is not facially plausi-\\nble, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this case.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nallegations that variable rates were not priced according to market condi-\\ntions. Mercado is not convincing because the contract language in that case\\ndid not give the supplier discretion in setting rates, id. at *2, as Direct En-\\nergy has here. Further, the district court in Mercado did not apply the plau-\\nsibility standard at the center of our evaluation in this case. See id. at *4.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3194,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643420,"string":"4,643,420"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Vanessa MATHEWS and Randy Mathews, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REV RECREATION GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1982"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Hamilton, Barrett, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1982\\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment to REV.\\n I.\\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 3\\n\\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\\nyear warranty period.\\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\\n\\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 5\\n\\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\\nheld that those claims failed too.\\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\\n II.\\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\\nagree.\\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\\nfect”).\\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 7\\n\\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\\nthe water tank.\\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\\n\\n\\n\\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1982\\n\\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\\n sale.\\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 9\\n\\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\\n ***\\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420673/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643420/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Vanessa MATHEWS and Randy Mathews, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REV RECREATION GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1982\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\n v.\n\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\n Defendant‐Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\n\f2 No. 18‐1982\n\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment to REV.\n I.\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\n\fNo. 18‐1982 3\n\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\n\f4 No. 18‐1982\n\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\nyear warranty period.\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\n\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\n\fNo. 18‐1982 5\n\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\nheld that those claims failed too.\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\n II.\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\n\f6 No. 18‐1982\n\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\nagree.\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\nfect”).\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\n\fNo. 18‐1982 7\n\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\nthe water tank.\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\n\n\n\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\n\f8 No. 18‐1982\n\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\n sale.\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\n\fNo. 18‐1982 9\n\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\n ***\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Vanessa MATHEWS and Randy Mathews, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REV RECREATION GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1982\\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment to REV.\\n I.\\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 3\\n\\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\\nyear warranty period.\\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\\n\\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 5\\n\\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\\nheld that those claims failed too.\\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\\n II.\\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\\nagree.\\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\\nfect”).\\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 7\\n\\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\\nthe water tank.\\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\\n\\n\\n\\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1982\\n\\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\\n sale.\\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 9\\n\\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\\n ***\\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3195,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643421,"string":"4,643,421"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael BONIN, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Bonin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1479"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Hamilton, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1479\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL BONIN,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\\nine the limits of protected speech.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\\n I\\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\\n\\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 3\\n\\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\\nmonths.”\\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\\nica” imprinted in the center.\\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\\nof the night.\\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\\nstated:\\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\\n government was calling him and everyone can\\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\\n hallway[.]\\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 5\\n\\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\\non the theater charge.\\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\\n\\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\\nments.\\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\\n\\n\\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\\nals.\\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\\n\\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 7\\n\\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\\n\\n\\n\\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent.”\\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 9\\n\\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\\nlaw enforcement officer.\\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\\nplaced on three years’ probation.\\n II\\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\\ntiary disputes.\\n A\\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Section 912 provides:\\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\\n officer or employee acting under the authority\\n of the United States or any department, agency\\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\\n tended character demands or obtains any\\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\\n more than three years, or both.\\n(emphasis added).\\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 11\\n\\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\\ntionality of § 912.6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\\nprotection in their own right”).\\n\\f12 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\\nted).\\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 13\\n\\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\\nrestriction on free speech).7\\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\\nment processes is compelling.\\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\\n\\n\\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\\narm[s]” himself.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\\nlie.\\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 15\\n\\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\\nconduct in the theater.\\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\\nests.\\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\\nbreadth doctrine.\\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\\n\\f16 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 17\\n\\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\\nno overbreadth problems.\\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\\nvagueness claim.\\n B\\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\\n\\f18 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\\n Here, the instruction read:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n these charges, the government must prove each\\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\\n able doubt:\\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\\n ployee acting under authority of the United\\n States Marshals Service; and\\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\\n as an officer or employee of the United States\\n Marshals Service.\\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 19\\n\\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\\nysis. Id. at 10.\\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\\n\\f20 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\\nment was harmless error.\\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\\n\\n\\n 11\\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\\nU.S. Marshal.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 21\\n\\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\\n\\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n\\f22 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\\nrequested.\\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 23\\n\\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction.\\n C\\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\\n(7th Cir. 2015).\\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\\n\\f24 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\\non propensity evidence.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 25\\n\\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\\nproper.\\n\\f26 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\\nthe challenged evidence.\\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 27\\n\\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\\ndiscretion.\\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\f28 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 29\\n\\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\\n\\f30 No. 18‐1479\\n\\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\\nrequests on appeal.\\n III\\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420674/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643421/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael BONIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1479\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL BONIN,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\nine the limits of protected speech.\n\f2 No. 18‐1479\n\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\n I\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\n\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNo. 18‐1479 3\n\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\nmonths.”\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\nica” imprinted in the center.\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\nof the night.\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\n\f4 No. 18‐1479\n\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\nstated:\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\n government was calling him and everyone can\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\n hallway[.]\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\n\fNo. 18‐1479 5\n\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\non the theater charge.\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\n\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\n\f6 No. 18‐1479\n\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\nments.\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\n\n\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\nals.\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\n\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 7\n\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\n\n\n\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\n\f8 No. 18‐1479\n\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\nRecovery Agent.”\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\n\fNo. 18‐1479 9\n\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\nlaw enforcement officer.\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\nplaced on three years’ probation.\n II\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\ntiary disputes.\n A\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\n\n\n\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\n\f10 No. 18‐1479\n\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\n Section 912 provides:\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\n officer or employee acting under the authority\n of the United States or any department, agency\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\n tended character demands or obtains any\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\n more than three years, or both.\n(emphasis added).\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\n\fNo. 18‐1479 11\n\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\ntionality of § 912.6\n\n\n\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\nprotection in their own right”).\n\f12 No. 18‐1479\n\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\nted).\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\n\fNo. 18‐1479 13\n\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\nrestriction on free speech).7\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\nment processes is compelling.\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\n\n\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\narm[s]” himself.\n\f14 No. 18‐1479\n\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\nlie.\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\n\n\n\n 9\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 15\n\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\nconduct in the theater.\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\nests.\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\nbreadth doctrine.\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\n\f16 No. 18‐1479\n\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\n\fNo. 18‐1479 17\n\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\nno overbreadth problems.\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\nvagueness claim.\n B\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\n\f18 No. 18‐1479\n\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\n Here, the instruction read:\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\n these charges, the government must prove each\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\n able doubt:\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\n ployee acting under authority of the United\n States Marshals Service; and\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\n as an officer or employee of the United States\n Marshals Service.\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\n\fNo. 18‐1479 19\n\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\nysis. Id. at 10.\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\n\f20 No. 18‐1479\n\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\nment was harmless error.\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\n\n\n 11\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\nU.S. Marshal.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 21\n\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\n\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\n\f22 No. 18‐1479\n\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\nrequested.\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\n\fNo. 18‐1479 23\n\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\nstruction.\n C\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\n(7th Cir. 2015).\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\n\f24 No. 18‐1479\n\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\non propensity evidence.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 25\n\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\n\n\n\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\nproper.\n\f26 No. 18‐1479\n\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\nthe challenged evidence.\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\n\fNo. 18‐1479 27\n\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\ndiscretion.\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\f28 No. 18‐1479\n\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\n\fNo. 18‐1479 29\n\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\n\f30 No. 18‐1479\n\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\nrequests on appeal.\n III\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael BONIN, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1479\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL BONIN,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\\nine the limits of protected speech.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\\n I\\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\\n\\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 3\\n\\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\\nmonths.”\\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\\nica” imprinted in the center.\\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\\nof the night.\\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\\nstated:\\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\\n government was calling him and everyone can\\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\\n hallway[.]\\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 5\\n\\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\\non the theater charge.\\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\\n\\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\\nments.\\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\\n\\n\\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\\nals.\\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\\n\\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 7\\n\\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\\n\\n\\n\\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent.”\\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 9\\n\\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\\nlaw enforcement officer.\\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\\nplaced on three years’ probation.\\n II\\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\\ntiary disputes.\\n A\\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Section 912 provides:\\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\\n officer or employee acting under the authority\\n of the United States or any department, agency\\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\\n tended character demands or obtains any\\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\\n more than three years, or both.\\n(emphasis added).\\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 11\\n\\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\\ntionality of § 912.6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\\nprotection in their own right”).\\n\\f12 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\\nted).\\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 13\\n\\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\\nrestriction on free speech).7\\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\\nment processes is compelling.\\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\\n\\n\\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\\narm[s]” himself.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\\nlie.\\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 15\\n\\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\\nconduct in the theater.\\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\\nests.\\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\\nbreadth doctrine.\\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\\n\\f16 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 17\\n\\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\\nno overbreadth problems.\\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\\nvagueness claim.\\n B\\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\\n\\f18 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\\n Here, the instruction read:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n these charges, the government must prove each\\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\\n able doubt:\\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\\n ployee acting under authority of the United\\n States Marshals Service; and\\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\\n as an officer or employee of the United States\\n Marshals Service.\\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 19\\n\\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\\nysis. Id. at 10.\\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\\n\\f20 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\\nment was harmless error.\\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\\n\\n\\n 11\\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\\nU.S. Marshal.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 21\\n\\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\\n\\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n\\f22 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\\nrequested.\\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 23\\n\\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction.\\n C\\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\\n(7th Cir. 2015).\\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\\n\\f24 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\\non propensity evidence.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 25\\n\\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\\nproper.\\n\\f26 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\\nthe challenged evidence.\\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 27\\n\\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\\ndiscretion.\\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\f28 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 29\\n\\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\\n\\f30 No. 18‐1479\\n\\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\\nrequests on appeal.\\n III\\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3196,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643422,"string":"4,643,422"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2499"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2499\\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\\n\\f2 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\\n I\\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 3\\n\\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\\nleft Stateville.\\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\\n\\f4 No. 18-2499\\n\\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\\nsavings statute cannot help him.\\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 5\\n\\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\\nliness grounds.\\n II\\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\\n A. Williams\\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\\n\\f6 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\\ndid he mention the hernia.\\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\\n B. Dr. Obaisi\\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 7\\n\\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\\n\\f8 No. 18-2499\\n\\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\\n10, 2014.\\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\\naddressed pain.\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 9\\n\\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\\n\\f10 No. 18-2499\\n\\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\\n C. Wexford\\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 11\\n\\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\\n therapy.\\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\\nPolicy goes on to say:\\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\\n\\f12 No. 18-2499\\n\\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\\nas the district court recognized.\\n III\\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 13\\n\\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\\nthe conditions at Stateville.\\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2499\\n\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420675/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643422/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2499\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\nJudges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\n\f2 No. 18-2499\n\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\n I\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\n\fNo. 18-2499 3\n\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\nleft Stateville.\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\n\f4 No. 18-2499\n\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\nsavings statute cannot help him.\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\n\fNo. 18-2499 5\n\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\nliness grounds.\n II\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\n A. Williams\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\n\f6 No. 18-2499\n\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\ndid he mention the hernia.\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\n B. Dr. Obaisi\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\n\fNo. 18-2499 7\n\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\n\f8 No. 18-2499\n\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\n10, 2014.\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\naddressed pain.\n\fNo. 18-2499 9\n\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\n\f10 No. 18-2499\n\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\n C. Wexford\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\n\fNo. 18-2499 11\n\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\n therapy.\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\nPolicy goes on to say:\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\n\f12 No. 18-2499\n\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\nas the district court recognized.\n III\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\n\fNo. 18-2499 13\n\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\nthe conditions at Stateville.\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\n\f14 No. 18-2499\n\n IV\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2499\\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 8446 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 15, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. Gregory Wilson was an inmate at Illi-\\nnois’s Stateville Correctional Center. This case concerns the\\nmedical care he received there for an inguinal hernia. The her-\\nnia was first spotted in the 1990s, but then it apparently sub-\\nsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson, by\\n\\f2 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthat time at Stateville, says that the 2011 recurrence was ex-\\ntremely painful. He complains that the prison’s medical offic-\\ners refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-\\nrepair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly\\nto push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity.\\n Eventually, however, in September 2014 Wilson did re-\\nceive surgery, which was successful. Precisely what Wilson\\ntold medical personnel and what kind of treatment he should\\nhave received during the three years before the surgery is the\\nsubject of this case. Wilson asserts that Wexford Health\\nSources, LLC (“Wexford”), the private company that pro-\\nvides medical services at Stateville, along with Dr. Imhotep\\nCarter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Physician’s Assistant (PA) LaT-\\nanya Williams, violated his Eighth Amendment rights\\nthrough deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.\\nHe seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\\n After the court dismissed Dr. Carter on statute of limita-\\ntions grounds, the case proceeded to discovery. Before trial,\\nthe district court granted several motions in limine filed by the\\ndefendants. This resulted in the exclusion of several reports\\nand a ban on Wilson’s mentioning a respondeat superior theory\\nof liability for Wexford. After the close of Wilson’s case, the\\ndefendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court granted the mo-\\ntion and dismissed the case. Although we agree with most of\\nthese rulings, we conclude that the court dismissed Dr. Obaisi\\ntoo quickly, and so a remand is necessary with respect to him.\\n I\\n Given the posture of the case, our account of the facts pre-\\nsents them in the light most favorable to Wilson; these are not\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 3\\n\\neither the jury’s or our independent findings. Wilson testified\\nthat he first noticed the reappearance of his hernia in 2011.\\nThough painful, the hernia was small and “reducible,” mean-\\ning that Wilson could manually push the protruding tissue\\nback into his abdominal cavity. At trial, Wilson said that he\\nfirst submitted a complaint about the hernia in January 2012,\\nand around that time he saw Dr. Carter, who was then the\\nmedical director of Stateville. Dr. Carter refused to listen to\\nWilson or help him with his hernia. In May 2012, Dr. Carter\\nleft Stateville.\\n Because Wilson did not file this suit until August 30, 2016,\\nthe question naturally arises whether it is time-barred with\\nrespect to Dr. Carter. We review this question de novo. Middle-\\nton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2009). All par-\\nties agree that this action under section 1983 is subject to Illi-\\nnois’s two-year statute of limitations and tolling rules.\\nDevbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual,\\nhowever, is governed by federal law. Id. In Heard v. Sheahan,\\n253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), we recognized that a section 1983\\nEighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference in\\nthe delivery of medical care does not necessarily allege a sin-\\ngle event or a series of events, but may describe an ongoing\\ndenial of care. Id. at 319. In such cases, we have a continuing\\nviolation for accrual purposes. The alleged wrong—the re-\\nfusal to provide medical care—“continued for as long as the\\ndefendants had the power to do something about [the plain-\\ntiff’s] condition.” Id. at 318. But even under that theory, if a\\ndefendant leaves the institution altogether, his involvement\\nin the alleged wrong is over. The date of the defendant’s de-\\nparture thus marks the last possible time when the claim\\nmight have accrued. In Dr. Carter’s case, that date is in May\\n\\f4 No. 18-2499\\n\\n2012, when he resigned. See also Heard v. Elyea, 525 F. App’x\\n510 (7th Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).\\n Initially Wilson filed a complaint in May 2013. After sev-\\neral amendments and years of discovery, the court dismissed\\nthat complaint without prejudice, because Wilson was still\\npursuing administrative remedies within Stateville. See Ford\\nv. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). By the time Wilson\\nrefiled the complaint, it was August 2016. That is the date that\\nmatters here. Wilson cannot rely for limitations purposes on\\nthe filing date of the dismissed complaint. Dupuy v. McEwen,\\n495 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen a suit is dismissed\\nwithout prejudice, the statute of limitations continues to run\\nfrom the date (normally the date of the injury) on which the\\nclaim accrued.”). Because the accrual date is no later than Dr.\\nCarter’s last day of work at Stateville, Wilson’s claim against\\nhim is untimely unless another legal rule saves it.\\n Wilson believes that he has found such a rule in Illinois’s\\nsavings statute. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. That statute gives plaintiffs\\na year to refile a state suit following a dismissal by a federal\\ndistrict court, as relevant here, “for lack of jurisdiction” or\\n“improper venue.” Id. The statute also applies to cases that\\nwere “voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff or dismissed for\\nwant of prosecution by the court.” Id. But, even assuming that\\na state statute is capable of providing extra time for filing a\\nsuit in federal court, none of those reasons applies to Wilson’s\\ncase—the court dismissed for lack of exhaustion, and so the\\nsavings statute cannot help him.\\n We note as well that Wilson cannot rely on another Illinois\\ntolling rule, which applies when the commencement of an ac-\\ntion is stayed by statutory prohibition. See 735 ILCS 5/13–216.\\nThis provision applies to prisoner litigants such as Wilson\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 5\\n\\nwho are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirement\\nimposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Johnson v. Ri-\\nvera, 272 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s limitations\\nclock for Dr. Carter did not begin to run until his administra-\\ntive grievance was denied. Id. That happened, at the latest, in\\nJanuary 2014—a date that is also more than two years before\\nthe date when Wilson re-filed suit. The district court thus\\nproperly dismissed Wilson’s claim against Dr. Carter on time-\\nliness grounds.\\n II\\n We turn now to Dr. Obaisi and PA Williams. The district\\ncourt granted their motions for judgment as a matter of law\\nafter Wilson completed his presentation at trial. See FED. R.\\nCIV. P. 50(a). We review that decision de novo, construing the\\ntrial evidence in favor of Wilson. Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson &\\nCo., 211 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000). Proving that prison\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof) was so inadequate that it\\nviolated a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from\\ncruel and unusual punishment is no small feat. Negligence in\\ndiagnosis or treatment does not suffice—only deliberate in-\\ndifference to a serious medical need will do. Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).\\n A. Williams\\n On February 21, 2012, Wilson saw PA Williams for a gen-\\neral check-up. PA Williams testified that although she did not\\nspecifically remember her conversation with Wilson, her nor-\\nmal advice for someone with a reducible hernia would have\\nbeen to try therapy and to see the medical director if that\\nproved ineffective. Her notes on Wilson are consistent with\\n\\f6 No. 18-2499\\n\\nthis general practice. Wilson’s attorney tried to tie PA Wil-\\nliams’s treatment to Wexford’s general policies on hernia\\ntreatment, and Wilson himself testified that he remembers\\nWilliams mentioning Wexford policy. PA Williams, however,\\ndenied that she blindly followed the Wexford policy and as-\\nserted that her treatment was based on her own independent\\nmedical assessment and judgment. Throughout March and\\nApril 2012, Wilson contacted PA Williams several times and\\nsaw her once for other medical issues. In none of those visits\\ndid he mention the hernia.\\n Though she did not refer Wilson for the surgery he\\nwanted, PA Williams did evaluate him and use her medical\\njudgment to provide a reasonable treatment option. In the\\nEighth Amendment context, medical professionals receive a\\ngreat deal of deference in their treatment decisions. A consti-\\ntutional violation exists only if “no minimally competent pro-\\nfessional would have so responded under those circum-\\nstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th\\nCir. 1998). It was Wilson’s burden to submit evidence that, if\\nbelieved, would show such a serious deficit in PA Williams’s\\ncourse of action. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839\\nF.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016). He failed to do so. He had no\\nexpert of his own, and the two doctors whose testimony was\\nadmitted at trial, co-defendant Dr. Obaisi and Wilson’s sur-\\ngeon Dr. Gangemi, both testified that a “wait and see” ap-\\nproach was appropriate for a minimally symptomatic hernia.\\nOn such a sparse record, the district court had no choice but\\nto grant judgment as a matter of law for PA Williams.\\n B. Dr. Obaisi\\n As spring of 2012 turned to summer, Wilson continued to\\nreport pain and request surgical treatment for his hernia. On\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 7\\n\\nMay 7, August 14, and December 3, he sent letters to the Stat-\\neville Health Care Unit requesting to be seen for his hernia\\nbecause he was in serious pain. While the first two letters\\nwere addressed more generally to the Unit, the December let-\\nter was addressed specifically to Stateville Medical Director\\nDr. Obaisi. One month later, on January 10, 2013, Wilson saw\\nDr. Obaisi. According to Wilson, he brought up the hernia but\\nDr. Obaisi refused to discuss it or listen to Wilson’s plea for\\nsurgery, saying he was not there to discuss the hernia and im-\\nplying Wilson was not “special.” Dr. Obaisi recalled that en-\\ncounter differently, although unfortunately he died before\\ntrial and so his trial “participation” was limited to his rec-\\norded deposition. In his deposition, Dr. Obaisi pointed out\\nthat there was no mention of the alleged hernia conversation\\nin his notes, and he insisted that his practice was diligently to\\nrecord everything in the chart. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi admit-\\nted that he had no specific memory of Wilson’s appointment.\\n Wilson’s medical records and testimony over the next year\\npaint a confusing picture. Wilson says that he unsuccessfully\\nrequested treatment several times before he ultimately filed a\\ngrievance. But he supported that statement only with copies\\nof handwritten complaints without any proof beyond his\\nword that they were ever sent or received. Wilson’s medical\\nchart documents one appointment to address the hernia in\\nSeptember 2013, but the notes from the nurse who saw him\\nthat day do not mention the hernia. The nurse and Wilson\\nprovided conflicting testimony about whether the hernia was\\ndiscussed at all. In February 2014, Dr. Obaisi recorded in Wil-\\nson’s medical chart that Wilson filed a grievance about the\\ntreatment of his hernia. On March 3, 2014, Dr. Obaisi saw Wil-\\nson and referred him for surgery. After a few scheduling and\\n\\f8 No. 18-2499\\n\\ntransportation delays, Dr. Antonio Gangemi of Chicago Med-\\nical Center surgically repaired Wilson’s hernia on September\\n10, 2014.\\n Wilson contends that he should have been referred for sur-\\ngery long before March 3, 2014. It is undisputed that Dr.\\nObaisi saw Wilson over a year earlier, that Wilson had a her-\\nnia at the time, and that Dr. Obaisi did not treat the hernia at\\nthat appointment. What happened between Wilson and Dr.\\nObaisi at that January 10, 2013, appointment and what Dr.\\nObaisi knew and did afterwards are disputed.\\n Deliberate indifference requires knowledge and disre-\\ngard. If there is no direct evidence of knowing disregard,\\nthere must be at least enough evidence for a jury to draw an\\ninference to that effect. Whether circumstantial or direct, the\\nevidence must show that the physician was both “aware of\\nfacts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan-\\ntial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the in-\\nference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).\\n Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury\\ncould believe Wilson’s testimony over Dr. Obaisi’s insistence\\non the completeness of his notes. If the jury credited Wilson,\\nthen Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in Jan-\\nuary 2013, but he also explicitly refused to hear potentially\\nrelevant medical details (including the ineffectiveness of at-\\ntempts to “reduce” it) and was dismissive about Wilson’s\\npain. If the jury further credited Wilson’s records and testi-\\nmony about his later complaints, Dr. Obaisi not only knew\\nabout the hernia in January 2013, but he inexplicably never\\nfollowed up on it despite his knowledge of ongoing and un-\\naddressed pain.\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 9\\n\\n While a medical expert is not always essential for an\\nEighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on\\nmedical treatment (or lack thereof), most such claims require\\nus to take a peek at the physician’s judgment, to ensure that\\nhe was actually exercising medical judgment and was not oth-\\nerwise deliberately indifferent. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662. By\\nclaiming that he was exercising his medical judgment, a treat-\\ning physician is “asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpa-\\nble mental state, and if no reasonable jury could discredit that\\nclaim, the doctor is entitled to summary judgment.” Zaya v.\\nSood, 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). The plaintiff cannot\\nreach the jury without evidence to overcome that deference to\\nmedical judgment. Such evidence can include standard treat-\\nment protocols, which can support an inference that the doc-\\ntor “’knew better’ than to pursue the course of treatment that\\nhe did.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 663.\\n In this case, Dr. Obaisi’s own testimony suggests that his\\nrefusal to assess Wilson’s hernia and his failure to monitor it\\nwould have contradicted his own medical judgment about\\nappropriate basic treatment for hernias. If a trier of fact were\\nto believe Wilson’s account of events and Dr. Obaisi’s testi-\\nmony about what treatment is necessary, then it would be en-\\ntitled to conclude that Dr. Obaisi “knew better” than to disre-\\ngard Wilson’s complaints. That finding, in turn, would be\\nsupport for a conclusion of deliberate indifference.\\n Deliberate indifference alone, however, cannot carry the\\nday for Wilson. He must also show that his hernia presented\\na serious medical need. This record includes conflicting facts\\nabout the severity of his hernia and the pain Wilson was feel-\\ning. In other cases, however, we have recognized that “a her-\\nnia can be an objectively serious medical problem” and that\\n\\f10 No. 18-2499\\n\\nfor some hernias, the “chronic pain presents a separate objec-\\ntively serious condition.” Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311,\\n314 (7th Cir. 2011). Wexford’s own Medical Policy and Proce-\\ndures on the Repair of Abdominal Wall/Inguinal Hernias (in-\\ntroduced into evidence by Wilson) identify three types of her-\\nnias: reducible, incarcerated, and strangulated. Incarcerated\\nhernias “require urgent surgical surveillance,” while strangu-\\nlated hernias “represent a surgical emergency.” Wilson pre-\\nsented evidence that he was experiencing significant pain,\\nand thus his “reducible” hernia might have been getting\\nworse; he also presented evidence that Wexford recom-\\nmended him for surgery in March 2014 and Dr. Gangemi\\npromptly agreed when he saw Wilson.\\n While Dr. Obaisi stresses that Wilson did not mention his\\nhernia or his pain every time he interacted with medical staff,\\nthat does not end the discussion. Taking the facts favorably to\\nWilson, his failure constantly to mention the pain is inconclu-\\nsive. Wilson testified that he was in terrible pain and that he\\nfiled grievances to this effect. Whether that testimony is ulti-\\nmately believable is a credibility determination for the jury.\\nSee Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his is\\na case about pain … the textbook example of a uniquely sub-\\njective experience.”). Construing the evidence in favor of Wil-\\nson, we conclude that a jury could find that Dr. Obaisi was\\ndeliberately indifferent to Wilson’s serious medical needs\\nduring the 14-month period between the January 2013 visit\\nand the March 2014 reference for surgery. It was therefore er-\\nror to grant judgment as a matter of law in Dr. Obaisi’s favor.\\n C. Wexford\\n Last, we consider the judgment in favor of Wexford. In Is-\\nkander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 11\\n\\nholding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable\\nunder § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil\\nrights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff may try,\\nhowever, to demonstrate that a private corporation has a\\ncompany policy or rule that is the “moving force of the con-\\nstitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.\\nof City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The Wexford\\nMedical Policy and Procedures on the “Repair of Abdominal\\nWall/Inguinal Hernias” include this statement:\\n Based upon the current medical literature regarding\\n the natural history of abdominal hernias, their repair\\n and reoccurrence, it is Wexford Health’s position that:\\n Patients with stable abdominal wall hernias are not, in\\n general, candidates for herniorrhaphy and will be\\n monitored and treated with appropriate non-surgical\\n therapy.\\nWilson says this policy explains why PA Williams and Dr.\\nObaisi did not immediately refer him to surgery. The problem\\nwith his argument is that the Policy itself is not a flat prohibi-\\ntion against surgical intervention. It purports only to describe\\nwhat happens “in general.” Lest there were any doubt, the\\nPolicy goes on to say:\\n Decisions regarding patient suitability for considera-\\n tion of abdominal wall herniorrhaphy must be made\\n on a case by case basis. These recommendations are in-\\n tended only as a guide for the site physician and are\\n not intended to replace hands-on clinical judgment.\\nThis language, combined with the testimony from both Wil-\\nliams and Dr. Obaisi that they exercised their medical judg-\\nment on a case-by-case basis and that the Policy does not play\\n\\f12 No. 18-2499\\n\\na large role in their treatment decisions, leaves no room for a\\nreasonable jury to find that Wexford’s policy blocked Wil-\\nson’s chance for surgical correction.\\n Wilson also seeks to hold Wexford liable for its medical\\nproviders’ conduct under a respondeat superior theory, but he\\nrealizes that this is an uphill battle. The district court granted\\ndefendants’ motion in limine preventing Wilson from making\\nthis argument, because our holding in Iskander forecloses it.\\nWe recognize that in Shields v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,\\nJudge Hamilton called for a re-examination of Iskander’s hold-\\ning in an appropriate case, and he outlined why Monell’s logic,\\ndeveloped for municipalities, may not apply to private corpo-\\nrations. 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014). But we declined to\\nhear Shields en banc, and since then we have chosen to leave\\nIskander undisturbed. See Gaston v. Ghosh, 920 F.3d 493, 498\\n(7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., concurring). Wilson has not con-\\nvinced us that this is the case in which we should change\\ncourse. He is free, of course, to make this argument to the Su-\\npreme Court, but it does not carry the day here.\\n Wexford was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\\nas the district court recognized.\\n III\\n Wilson finally blames his loss on the district court’s trial-\\nmanagement rulings, including its decision to exclude certain\\nevidence and the respondeat superior theory of liability. We al-\\nready have explained why the latter decision was correct. As\\nfor the motions in limine, our review is only for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, 862 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.\\n2017). “We will reverse only if no reasonable person would\\nagree with the trial court's ruling and the error likely affected\\n\\fNo. 18-2499 13\\n\\nthe outcome of the trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248,\\n252 (7th Cir. 2013). Wilson objects to two exclusions.\\n The first is the exclusion of two reports: the Lippert Report\\nand the John Howard Association Report. Wilson wanted to\\nintroduce them as proof that Wexford generally provides sub-\\nstandard care. The Lippert Report was prepared by a team of\\nexperts for a federal district court in another case. It includes\\nan audit of medical records and interviews from Stateville, as\\npart of a general report on Illinois prisoner medical care state-\\nwide. The John Howard Association Report is an annual as-\\nsessment by a prison-reform watchdog organization about\\nthe conditions at Stateville.\\n Wilson is not the first litigant who has tried to introduce\\nthese reports. Numerous others have, too, but the reports\\nhave been excluded each time as inadmissible hearsay. Boyce\\nv. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 7580, 2017 WL\\n1436963, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2017); Mathis v. Carter, No. 13\\nC 8024, 2017 WL 56631, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2017); Diaz v.\\nChandler, No. 14 C 50047, 2016 WL 1073103, at *12 (N.D. Ill.\\nMar. 18, 2016); Gray v. Hardy, No. 11 C 7097, 2013 WL 5433280,\\nat *5 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 826\\nF.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4147, 2012\\nWL 5363415, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2012). We agree with that\\nassessment. The reports are not authenticated by their authors\\nor the numerous persons quoted within them. FED. R. EVID.\\n801, 802. They are not public records. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Nor\\nis the residual hearsay exception appropriate. FED. R. EVID.\\n807. At best, these reports reveal problems with Stateville gen-\\nerally without linking those problems to Wilson’s personal\\nexperience. We find no abuse of discretion in the district\\ncourt’s handling of the motions in limine.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2499\\n\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims\\nagainst Dr. Carter, and the grants of judgment as a matter of\\nlaw to defendants Williams and Wexford. We REVERSE the\\ngrant of judgment in Dr. Obaisi’s favor and REMAND this\\ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3197,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643433,"string":"4,643,433"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1982"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1982\\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment to REV.\\n I.\\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 3\\n\\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\\nyear warranty period.\\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\\n\\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 5\\n\\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\\nheld that those claims failed too.\\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\\n II.\\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\\nagree.\\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\\nfect”).\\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 7\\n\\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\\nthe water tank.\\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\\n\\n\\n\\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1982\\n\\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\\n sale.\\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 9\\n\\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\\n ***\\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420686/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643433/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1982\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\n v.\n\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\n Defendant‐Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\n\f2 No. 18‐1982\n\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\njudgment to REV.\n I.\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\n\fNo. 18‐1982 3\n\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\n\f4 No. 18‐1982\n\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\nyear warranty period.\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\n\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\n\fNo. 18‐1982 5\n\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\nheld that those claims failed too.\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\n II.\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\n\f6 No. 18‐1982\n\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\nagree.\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\nfect”).\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\n\fNo. 18‐1982 7\n\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\nthe water tank.\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\n\n\n\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\n\f8 No. 18‐1982\n\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\n sale.\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\n\fNo. 18‐1982 9\n\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\n ***\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1982\\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nREV RECREATION GROUP, INC.,\\n Defendant‐Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.\\n No. 1:15‐cv‐247 — William C. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 2, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Vanessa and Randy Mathews pur‐\\nchased an RV, which came with a one‐year warranty from the\\nmanufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc. The RV was rid‐\\ndled with problems from the time that they bought it, and\\nthese problems ultimately led the Mathews to sue REV. We\\nsympathize with the Mathews’ plight; they bought a lemon.\\nBut because they have not shown that REV failed to honor its\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nwarranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscion‐\\nable, we must affirm the district court’s grant of summary\\njudgment to REV.\\n I.\\n Vanessa and Randy Mathews purchased a Holiday Ram‐\\nbler Presidential RV on May 7, 2014 from Mellott Brothers\\nTrailer Sales, Inc. The RV came with a warranty from the man‐\\nufacturer, REV Recreation Group, Inc., which limited both ex‐\\npress and implied warranties to one year from the purchase\\ndate. To take advantage of the warranty, the Mathews had to\\nnotify REV or an authorized dealer within five days of discov‐\\nering a defect. Moreover, the warranty stated that “[i]f the re‐\\npair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect\\nafter [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the de‐\\nfect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to War‐\\nrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third\\nparty perform repair(s) to the defect(s).” The Mathews were\\ntold about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they\\nwere not initially given a hard copy.\\n The Mathews say that they encountered problems with\\nthe RV almost as soon as they drove it off the lot. They called\\nthe dealership to report that there were issues with the inte‐\\nrior lights, the refrigerator, and the leveling system. The Mel‐\\nlott Brothers service manager recommended that they go to\\nan auto parts store and replace the fuses in order to fix the\\nissues, which they did. The Mathews say that they also no‐\\nticed other problems on this first trip: water leaked from the\\nshower, and the TV and DVD player didn’t work. But they\\ndidn’t contact anyone about these issues.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 3\\n\\n A month later, the Mathews went on another trip and\\nclaim to have had even more difficulty: the converter was\\nblowing fuses, the leveling jacks worked only intermittently,\\nthe curbside slide cable broke, and there were still problems\\nwith the TV and DVD player. After calling the Mellott Broth‐\\ners again, the Mathews were given the number for REV so\\nthat they could locate an authorized repair center. REV told\\nthem that they could go to a local dealer near them, Johnson’s\\nRV, but would need to obtain approval from REV before the\\ndealer performed repairs that would be covered under the\\nwarranty. Johnson’s RV completed the repairs and told the\\nMathews that the repair work was covered, but neither the\\nMathews nor anyone from Johnson’s RV ever contacted REV\\nabout this work (though notably, the Mathews were never\\nforced to pay for the repairs). This happened again a few\\nmonths later when Johnson’s RV fixed the curbside slide ca‐\\nble—no one notified REV that repair work had been done.\\n Around a month later, the Mathews contacted REV to in‐\\nform them that they were having issues with the RV. REV ar‐\\nranged to repair the RV at its factory store. After completing\\nthe repairs, it issued an extended goodwill warranty for “de‐\\nfective workmanship or materials in manufacturing”—alt‐\\nhough the warranty specifically excluded an extension of the\\nlimited warranty “or any other warranties.”\\n In March 2015, the Mathews again contacted REV, this\\ntime about problems with the cable for the air conditioning\\nunit, the main slide, and the sealing tape on the slides. The\\nMathews asked REV to buy back the RV, but REV declined to\\ndo so and instead promised to repair the issues pursuant to\\nthe warranty. REV arranged to pick up the RV to repair it and\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nonce again extended the goodwill warranty. In May 2015,\\nREV also provided the Mathews a copy of the warranty.\\n REV returned the RV to the Mathews in June 2015, and the\\nMathews never again took the RV to REV or any other author‐\\nized or independent dealer for repair. Instead, their attorney\\nsent a letter to REV in July 2015 alleging that it had breached\\nits warranties. Fed up, the Mathews filed suit soon after. In\\ntheir amended complaint, they alleged breaches of express\\nand implied warranties, as well as violations of both the Indi‐\\nana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) and the Mag‐\\nnuson–Moss Warranty Act.1 They claimed that REV had\\nfailed to fix the TV, DVD player, and air conditioning/slide\\nout seals. They also asserted that in 2016, after they had filed\\nsuit, they noticed problems with the kitchen cabinets, a latent\\nissue with the water tank, and that the rear of the coach was\\nfalling out. The Mathews conceded, however, that they did\\nnot raise this second group of issues with REV within the one‐\\nyear warranty period.\\n REV moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the\\ndistrict court granted the motion. It explained that “while the\\nfacts and evidence support the Mathews’ contention that the\\nRV had numerous problems, they do not support the allega‐\\ntions that REV failed to honor its warranties.” Because REV\\nwas not given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects,\\nthe court said, REV did not breach its express or implied war‐\\nranties. It also concluded that the warranty’s limitations were\\nnot unconscionable. And because the alleged warranty violat‐\\nins had been the basis for the Matthews’ claims under both\\n\\n1 The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act is a federal statute that, among other\\nthings, permits consumers to sue to enforce state law warranty obliga‐\\ntions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 5\\n\\nthe IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, the court\\nheld that those claims failed too.\\n The Mathews appealed. Although, as the district court\\nrightly noted, “[t]his case is a cluttered mess of immaterial\\nfactual disputes, unsupportable claims and maze‐like presen‐\\ntation of arguments,” we gather that the Mathews raise the\\nsame arguments before us that they did below: that REV\\nbreached express and implied warranties and that REV vio‐\\nlated both the IDCSA and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act.\\n II.\\n The Mathews first argue that REV breached its express\\nwarranty. To prevail on a breach of warranty claim in Indiana,\\na plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) a\\nbreach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Peltz Const. Co. v.\\nDunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). REV argues\\nthat the Mathews cannot establish a breach because it re‐\\npaired all of the issues that the Mathews presented to it dur‐\\ning the warranty period. Indeed, the Mathews admit that they\\nfailed to give REV a chance to complete any new repairs after\\nREV returned the RV to them in June 2015.\\n But the Mathews argue that REV still breached the war‐\\nranty because, under Indiana law, a warranty can be breached\\n“[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy\\nto fail of its essential purpose.” Ind. Code § 26‐1‐2‐719(2); see\\nalso Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2004). The district court concluded that because the\\nMathews had not given REV a reasonable opportunity to cure\\nthe defects, which the warranty required, the warranty could\\nnot have failed in its essential purpose. See Anderson v. Gulf\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1982\\n\\nStream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2011) (ex‐\\nplaining that, under Indiana law, the buyer has to give the\\nseller a reasonable opportunity to cure “if the terms of the\\nwarranty impose that requirement”); Aamco Transmissions v.\\nAir Sys., Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). We\\nagree.\\n The Mathews rightly note that REV was in fact given a\\nchance to fix at least some of the issues: the TV, the DVD\\nplayer, and the air conditioning/slide out seals. But even as‐\\nsuming that we can count the repair attempts at Johnson’s\\nRV—and it’s doubtful that we should because REV was not\\nnotified about them—REV had only two chances to fix each\\nof these problems. Under Indiana law, two chances is not a\\nreasonable opportunity to cure the defects such that the war‐\\nranty failed of its essential purpose. Cf. General Motors Corp. v.\\nSheets, 818 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that\\nunder Indiana’s Lemon Law, “[a] reasonable number of at‐\\ntempts is considered to have been undertaken if the noncon‐\\nformity has been subject to repair at least four times but contin‐\\nues to exist or if the vehicle has been out of service for at least\\nthirty business days and the nonconformity continues to ex‐\\nist” (emphasis added)); Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL\\n4447707, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that under the\\nDelaware Warranty Act, “a plaintiff must permit the dealer at\\nleast four opportunities to attempt to repair the alleged de‐\\nfect”).\\n And even if the Mathews could show that REV had a rea‐\\nsonable opportunity to repair the RV’s defects, the limited\\nwarranty did not fail in its essential purpose because the\\nMathews did not avail themselves of the contract’s back‐up\\nremedy—which required that if REV failed to cure a defect,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 7\\n\\nthe Mathews’ “sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to\\nWarrantor paying you the costs of having an independent\\nthird party perform repair(s) to the defect(s).”\\n The Mathews next argue that REV breached the implied\\nwarranty of merchantability by selling them an RV that was\\nnot in merchantable condition at the time that they bought it.\\nBut here too the Mathews’ failure to give REV a reasonable\\nopportunity to cure the alleged defects is fatal to their claim.2\\nRecognizing this, the Mathews instead contend that the war‐\\nranty’s limitations—for both the express and implied warran‐\\nties—were unconscionable for two main reasons. First, they\\ndidn’t receive a copy of the warranty at the time of purchase.\\nSecond, the one‐year limited warranty period was an insuffi‐\\ncient amount of time for them to recognize a latent defect like\\nthe water tank.\\n Indiana courts have held that an unconscionable contract\\nis one that “no sensible man not under delusion, duress or in\\ndistress would make, and … no honest and fair man would\\naccept.” Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 1971)\\n(citation omitted). The district court correctly held that the\\nMathews’ arguments did not satisfy that standard. As for\\n\\n\\n\\n2 In one conclusory sentence and citation, the Mathews suggest that they\\ndid not have to give REV an opportunity to cure its failure to comply with\\nthe implied warranty. But without anything more by way of argument or\\ncitation to Indiana case law, we do not consider the argument. See United\\nStates v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument,’\\nreally nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); United\\nStates v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A litigant who\\nfails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by show‐\\ning why it is a good point despite a lack of supporting authority or in the\\nface of contrary authority, forfeits the point.” (emphasis omitted)).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1982\\n\\ntheir claim that the warranty was unconscionable because\\nthey didn’t receive a hard copy, the district court observed:\\n [T]he Mathews were aware of the Limited War‐\\n ranty and its terms, and even took advantage of\\n it by having repair work done at REV’s factory\\n on two (and only two) occasions, so they cannot\\n claim now that any of its terms or limitations are\\n unconscionable based on the fact that they did\\n not receive [a] physical copy of it at the time of\\n sale.\\nIn other words, the Mathews cannot have it both ways: rely‐\\ning on the contract when it works to their advantage to get\\nrepairs done and then alleging that it is unconscionable when\\nit doesn’t. See Dixon v. Monaco Coach Corp., 2009 WL 187837,\\nat *3 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (“[T]he evidence is undisputed that the\\nDixons took advantage of the warranty prior to the filing of\\ntheir claim, requesting and receiving numerous repairs from\\nMonaco during the applicable warranty period. As such, the\\nDixons can not [sic] now argue that they are suddenly sur‐\\nprised by the application of the limited warranty and its terms\\nrelating to the filing of breach of warranty claims.”). And as\\nfor the Mathews’ contention that the warranty’s one‐year time\\nlimitation was unconscionable, the district court rightly noted\\nthat “[t]he possibility that a latent defect may exist is one of\\nthe risks present at the time the contract is formed, and does\\nnot, in and of itself, render a contract unconscionable.” (quot‐\\ning Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 WL 4993393, at *6 (N.D.\\nInd. 2016)). We thus agree with the district court that the con‐\\ntract’s limited warranty was not unconscionable—it was not\\none that “no honest and fair man” would accept. See Weaver,\\n276 N.E.2d at 146.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1982 9\\n\\n Finally, because the Mathews have not established that a\\nwarranty was breached or that the limitations in the warranty\\nwere unconscionable, their remaining claims under the\\nIDCSA and Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, which were\\nbased on the same arguments, fail as well.\\n ***\\n We are sympathetic to the Mathews; they were sold an RV\\nthat had problems from the day that they bought it. But be‐\\ncause they have not established that REV breached its express\\nor implied warranties—or any other law—we agree with the\\ndistrict court that their claims fail.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3198,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643434,"string":"4,643,434"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Bonin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1479"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1479\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL BONIN,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\\nine the limits of protected speech.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\\n I\\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\\n\\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 3\\n\\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\\nmonths.”\\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\\nica” imprinted in the center.\\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\\nof the night.\\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\\nstated:\\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\\n government was calling him and everyone can\\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\\n hallway[.]\\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 5\\n\\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\\non the theater charge.\\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\\n\\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\\nments.\\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\\n\\n\\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\\nals.\\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\\n\\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 7\\n\\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\\n\\n\\n\\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent.”\\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 9\\n\\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\\nlaw enforcement officer.\\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\\nplaced on three years’ probation.\\n II\\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\\ntiary disputes.\\n A\\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Section 912 provides:\\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\\n officer or employee acting under the authority\\n of the United States or any department, agency\\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\\n tended character demands or obtains any\\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\\n more than three years, or both.\\n(emphasis added).\\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 11\\n\\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\\ntionality of § 912.6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\\nprotection in their own right”).\\n\\f12 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\\nted).\\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 13\\n\\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\\nrestriction on free speech).7\\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\\nment processes is compelling.\\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\\n\\n\\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\\narm[s]” himself.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\\nlie.\\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 15\\n\\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\\nconduct in the theater.\\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\\nests.\\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\\nbreadth doctrine.\\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\\n\\f16 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 17\\n\\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\\nno overbreadth problems.\\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\\nvagueness claim.\\n B\\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\\n\\f18 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\\n Here, the instruction read:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n these charges, the government must prove each\\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\\n able doubt:\\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\\n ployee acting under authority of the United\\n States Marshals Service; and\\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\\n as an officer or employee of the United States\\n Marshals Service.\\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 19\\n\\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\\nysis. Id. at 10.\\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\\n\\f20 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\\nment was harmless error.\\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\\n\\n\\n 11\\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\\nU.S. Marshal.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 21\\n\\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\\n\\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n\\f22 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\\nrequested.\\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 23\\n\\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction.\\n C\\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\\n(7th Cir. 2015).\\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\\n\\f24 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\\non propensity evidence.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 25\\n\\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\\nproper.\\n\\f26 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\\nthe challenged evidence.\\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 27\\n\\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\\ndiscretion.\\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\f28 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 29\\n\\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\\n\\f30 No. 18‐1479\\n\\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\\nrequests on appeal.\\n III\\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420687/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643434/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael Bonin\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1479\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL BONIN,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\nine the limits of protected speech.\n\f2 No. 18‐1479\n\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\n I\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\n\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNo. 18‐1479 3\n\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\nmonths.”\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\nica” imprinted in the center.\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\nof the night.\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\n\f4 No. 18‐1479\n\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\nstated:\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\n government was calling him and everyone can\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\n hallway[.]\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\n\fNo. 18‐1479 5\n\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\non the theater charge.\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\n\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\n\f6 No. 18‐1479\n\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\nments.\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\n\n\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\nals.\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\n\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 7\n\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\n\n\n\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\n\f8 No. 18‐1479\n\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\nRecovery Agent.”\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\n\fNo. 18‐1479 9\n\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\nlaw enforcement officer.\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\nplaced on three years’ probation.\n II\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\ntiary disputes.\n A\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\n\n\n\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\n\f10 No. 18‐1479\n\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\n Section 912 provides:\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\n officer or employee acting under the authority\n of the United States or any department, agency\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\n tended character demands or obtains any\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\n more than three years, or both.\n(emphasis added).\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\n\fNo. 18‐1479 11\n\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\ntionality of § 912.6\n\n\n\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\nprotection in their own right”).\n\f12 No. 18‐1479\n\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\nted).\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\n\fNo. 18‐1479 13\n\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\nrestriction on free speech).7\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\nment processes is compelling.\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\n\n\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\narm[s]” himself.\n\f14 No. 18‐1479\n\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\nlie.\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\n\n\n\n 9\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 15\n\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\nconduct in the theater.\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\nests.\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\nbreadth doctrine.\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\n\f16 No. 18‐1479\n\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\n\fNo. 18‐1479 17\n\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\nno overbreadth problems.\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\nvagueness claim.\n B\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\n\f18 No. 18‐1479\n\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\n Here, the instruction read:\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\n these charges, the government must prove each\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\n able doubt:\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\n ployee acting under authority of the United\n States Marshals Service; and\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\n as an officer or employee of the United States\n Marshals Service.\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\n\fNo. 18‐1479 19\n\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\nysis. Id. at 10.\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\n\f20 No. 18‐1479\n\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\nment was harmless error.\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\n\n\n 11\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\nU.S. Marshal.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 21\n\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\n\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\n\f22 No. 18‐1479\n\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\nrequested.\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\n\fNo. 18‐1479 23\n\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\nstruction.\n C\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\n(7th Cir. 2015).\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\n\f24 No. 18‐1479\n\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\non propensity evidence.\n\fNo. 18‐1479 25\n\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\n\n\n\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\nproper.\n\f26 No. 18‐1479\n\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\nthe challenged evidence.\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\n\fNo. 18‐1479 27\n\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\ndiscretion.\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\f28 No. 18‐1479\n\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\n\fNo. 18‐1479 29\n\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\n\f30 No. 18‐1479\n\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\nrequests on appeal.\n III\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael Bonin\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐1479\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL BONIN,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 cr 22‐1 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justice Holmes introduced a\\nmainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence when he wrote:\\n“The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro‐\\ntect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a\\npanic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). A cen‐\\ntury later, Michael Bonin brings us back to a theater to exam‐\\nine the limits of protected speech.\\n\\f2 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his\\nphone during a film, Bonin scolded the audience, said he was\\na U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a\\ngun on his belt, and threatened “anyone [who] had a problem\\nwith it, they could take it out in the hall.” Panicked patrons\\ncalled 911 and theater security in response. Everyone now\\nknows Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived,\\nBonin convinced them too that he was, and they allowed him\\nto reenter the theater. Such a second chance usually preludes\\na character arc, but not in this story. As Bonin walked to his\\nseat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed,\\n“See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police\\nreturned and removed him from the theater.\\n Bonin’s ruse resulted in an indictment under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 912. That statute makes it a crime to impersonate an officer\\nor employee of the United States. A jury found Bonin guilty.\\nHe now claims § 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free\\nspeech and challenges multiple evidentiary rulings and jury\\ninstructions. Because none of his claims offer any reason to\\nreverse the jury verdict, we affirm.\\n I\\n The events described above occurred in 2014 at the AMC\\nRiver East theater in Chicago.1 Brian Reidy, an off‐duty\\nChicago police officer moonlighting as theater security, re‐\\nsponded first and asked Bonin to step out into the hallway.\\nReidy observed that Bonin openly wore a gold badge and gun\\non his belt. When Reidy asked Bonin about his employment,\\nBonin again falsely claimed to be a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also\\n\\n 1 We recount the facts in the light reasonably most favorable to the\\njury’s verdict. Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 3\\n\\ntold Reidy this was his “first night off” after “working many\\nmonths.”\\n Minutes later, Chicago police officer Brenda Guillory ar‐\\nrived in response to a 911 call about a person in a theater caus‐\\ning a disturbance with a gun. Two more police officers\\nresponded as backup. As Guillory approached Bonin, she saw\\nthat he wore a “full duty belt” typically worn by law enforce‐\\nment with a gun, magazine, and badge on it. Guillory’s con‐\\ncerns were “relaxed,” however, after Bonin told her that he\\nwas a U.S. Marshal. Bonin also gave Guillory his driver’s li‐\\ncense and photo identification classifying him as a “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Agent” for the “U.S. Fugitive Enforce‐\\nment Bureau.” The identification card also contained a “star”\\nlogo with the words “U.S. Investigations.” Similarly, Bonin’s\\ngold badge read, “U.S. Fugitive Enforcement Bureau,” with\\nthe Seal of the United States and “The United States of Amer‐\\nica” imprinted in the center.\\n Guillory ran a check on Bonin’s driver’s license, which re‐\\nvealed no outstanding warrants and Bonin’s valid concealed\\ncarry license. The exchange between Guillory and Bonin\\nlasted about ten to fifteen minutes. Because police and theater\\nsecurity believed Bonin was a U.S. Marshal, they allowed him\\nback into the movie and asked him to keep quiet for the rest\\nof the night.\\n Bonin immediately ignored the instruction. As he reen‐\\ntered the theater, he raised his arms above his head, displayed\\nhis gun, and blustered, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.”\\nOne moviegoer ran out of the theater and told Reidy that\\nBonin returned boasting, “I’m a U.S. [expletive] Marshal, and\\nthere’s nothing you can do about it.” Another patron, Patrick\\n\\f4 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nAlfich, sent a series of text messages to a friend in which he\\nstated:\\n [J]ust got out of the movie w[h]ere drunk US\\n marshal with a gun threatened the audience …\\n [.] Everyone started yelling when he took a\\n phone call during the movie[.] … Then the po‐\\n lice let him back into the theater because he’s a\\n US marshal … [H]e had his gun on him and his\\n belt loop[.] … [S]aid he’s a US marshal and the\\n government was calling him and everyone can\\n go [expletive] themselves and that they had an\\n issue that he was going to take it out into the\\n hallway[.]\\n Police, who had yet to leave the scene, escorted Bonin out.\\nAs Bonin exited, he walked with a limp and explained to\\nGuillory that he injured his leg executing a search warrant;\\nanother lie, as Bonin actually injured his leg in a motorcycle\\naccident. At that point, Guillory offered Bonin a ride home “as\\na courtesy” because she still believed he was a law enforce‐\\nment officer. Bonin declined Guillory’s offer.\\n In response to Bonin’s ruckus, the theater gave customers\\nfree movie passes and advised them to contact the U.S. Mar‐\\nshals Service if they wished to complain. Alfich did just that.\\nSix weeks later, Bonin was charged with false impersonation\\nof a U.S. Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Bonin for twice falsely im‐\\npersonating a U.S. Marshal: once in 2013 in Markham, Illinois\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 5\\n\\n(Count One),2 and the 2014 incident described above (Count\\nTwo). At the government’s request, the district court dis‐\\nmissed Count One of the indictment in January 2017.\\n One month later—while awaiting trial on the movie thea‐\\nter charge—Bonin took his show on the road. Police observed\\na car driving in Beecher, Illinois, with flashing red and white\\nemergency lights activated. As the car approached, the police\\npulled over to allow it to pass, believing it was an emergency\\nvehicle. But when the vehicle sped by police realized it was\\nnot a paramedic or patrol car as they expected, but a Ford\\nBronco adorned with a large “AGENT” decal on the wind‐\\nshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was\\nthe driver. After that, a grand jury returned a two‐count su‐\\nperseding indictment charging Bonin with § 912 violations for\\nthe AMC theater incident (Count One) and this new act of\\nfalse impersonation while driving. At Bonin’s request, the dis‐\\ntrict court severed the two counts and ordered trial to proceed\\non the theater charge.\\n Bonin raised numerous pretrial challenges to the govern‐\\nment’s movie theater charge. Initially he moved to dismiss the\\nindictment, pointing to United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709\\n\\n 2 Count One alleged an off‐duty Markham police officer observed\\nBonin drive through a red light with red and blue emergency lights acti‐\\nvated. When the officer asked Bonin about the emergency lights, Bonin\\nresponded he was a U.S. Marshal and opened his trench coat to reveal a\\ngun holstered at his waist. The officer reported Bonin as a suspicious per‐\\nson to on‐duty Markham police, who issued traffic tickets to Bonin for\\nrunning the red light and improperly using emergency lights. After this\\nincident, U.S. Marshals met with Bonin and cautioned that pretending to\\nbe a U.S. Marshal was illegal and could lead to Bonin unintentionally plac‐\\ning himself in harm’s way. At the end of this meeting, Bonin voluntarily\\nsurrendered two fake U.S. Marshal badges.\\n\\f6 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n(2012) (plurality opinion), which held speech restrictions im‐\\nposed by the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 violated the First\\nAmendment. Bonin claims the logic of Alvarez renders § 912\\nunconstitutional by extension.3 The district court denied\\nBonin’s motion because his “arguments rely on an over‐exag‐\\ngerated interpretation of Alvarez,” in which the Supreme\\nCourt’s plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions discuss\\n§ 912 in dicta as an example of a constitutional statute. The\\ncourt concluded that no part of the plurality’s opinion in\\nAlvarez made § 912 “somehow vulnerable” to Bonin’s argu‐\\nments.\\n The district court also refused to give several of Bonin’s\\nproposed jury instructions. On the elements of the offense,\\nBonin proposed instructions that explained a § 912 violation\\nrequires: (1) a false assertion of authority; (2) an intent to de‐\\nfraud or a “knowing” violation; and (3) evidence that the false\\npretense of federal authority caused others to change their be‐\\nhavior in some way. Bonin also requested an instruction re‐\\nquiring unanimity on which alleged false representation\\nviolated the law, as well as an instruction informing that the\\nFirst Amendment protects freedom of expression.\\n On the elements, the district court found that Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction focused on the incorrect § 912 offense.4 It\\n\\n\\n 3 The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 704(b), made it a crime to\\nfalsely claim to be an award recipient of any military decorations or med‐\\nals.\\n 4 Section 912 prohibits: (1) false impersonation of a federal official cou‐\\n\\npled with an overt act in conformity with the pretense (the “acts‐as‐such\\nclause”); and (2) false impersonation of a federal official coupled with de‐\\nmanding or obtaining a thing of value (the “demands clause”). United\\nStates v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1943); see also United States v.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 7\\n\\nrejected Bonin’s proposal and instructed the jury that, to con‐\\nvict, it would need to find that Bonin: (1) “falsely assumed or\\npretended to have been an officer or employee acting under\\nauthority of the United States Marshals Service”; and (2)\\n“acted as such.” The district court’s instructions further stated\\nthat “[w]ith respect to acting ‘as such,’ the government must\\nprove that [Bonin] acted in a manner consistent with his pre‐\\ntended authority as an officer or employee of the United\\nStates.” With respect to Bonin’s proposed unanimity and First\\nAmendment instructions, the court concluded they were in‐\\nconsistent with the facts and law at issue in the case.\\n Bonin also moved to suppress his statements to Reidy and\\nGuillory on two theories: that his removal from the theater\\nconstituted an unlawful seizure, and that the officer failed to\\nread him Miranda warnings. The district court denied Bonin’s\\nsuppression motion, finding Bonin’s encounter with police\\nwas consensual, and ruling police had reasonable suspicion\\nto question Bonin based on reports that a person with a gun\\nwas causing a disturbance in the theater.\\n At trial, the jury heard from Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\neach of whom testified that Bonin held himself out to be a U.S.\\nMarshal. Alfich also testified about Bonin’s threats and his be‐\\nrating of the movie audience. The government also presented\\ntestimony from deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Woods‐Haw‐\\nkins who explained the basic duties of the position, including\\nfugitive recovery and the accessories of a U.S. Marshal, such\\nas wearing a weapon and badge on the belt.\\n\\n\\n\\nRippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1992). Bonin’s proposal involved the\\ndemands clause, but he was charged under the acts‐as‐such clause.\\n\\f8 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n Bonin testified on his own behalf. On direct examination,\\nhe contradicted the testimony of Reidy, Guillory, and Alfich,\\ndenying that he raised his voice at the movie audience or pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal. He also testified the badge he\\nwore at the theater and the identification card he presented to\\nGuillory were given to him by the entity that “employed” him\\nas a bounty hunter. The gold badge bore the words “U.S.\\nFugitive Enforcement Bureau” with the Seal of the United\\nStates and the words “The United States of America” in the\\ncenter of the badge. The ID card contained the title “U.S. Fu‐\\ngitive Enforcement Bureau,” and termed Bonin as a “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent.”\\n On cross‐examination, Bonin again testified that he never\\ncursed at the audience, never said he was a U.S. Marshal, nor\\ntried to trick anyone into thinking he was a U.S. Marshal at\\nany time in his life, including the night at the theater. To rebut\\nthis testimony, the government showed Bonin an assortment\\nof badges and other items seized from his home that con‐\\ntained the words “Fugitive Recovery Agent,” “U.S.,” or\\n“United States.” The items also applied semblances of the Seal\\nof the United States. Bonin admitted he purchased these items\\nfor himself. One of these items, a knit cap with federal insig‐\\nnia, included the motto of the United States Marshals Service.\\nHe also acknowledged he put a gold magnet on his vehicle\\nbearing an image of a star badge with the words “Fugitive\\nRecovery Agent” encircling the Seal of the United States.\\n The government also asked Bonin about pictures he\\nposted on his public Facebook page. These included a picture\\nof Bonin wearing a uniform with a badge, and another picture\\nof his car with the decals “U.S. Detective” and “CAUTION\\nK‐9.” Bonin admitted placing those indicators on his vehicle,\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 9\\n\\nbut he denied doing so to make people think he was a federal\\nlaw enforcement officer.\\n Because Bonin’s testimony called into question the verac‐\\nity of Alfich’s prior testimony, the government re‐called\\nAlfich. Before trial, the district court had excluded Alfich’s\\ntext messages. But after Bonin denied Alfich’s account of Bo‐\\nnin’s actions during the movie, the court allowed the govern‐\\nment to introduce Alfich’s texts as prior consistent statements.\\n After a three‐day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict.\\nBonin moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, but\\nthe district court denied his motions. At sentencing he was\\nplaced on three years’ probation.\\n II\\n On appeal Bonin submits a horde of legal challenges.5\\nThree predominate: a challenge to § 912 under the First\\nAmendment, objections to the jury instructions, and eviden‐\\ntiary disputes.\\n A\\n The Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no\\nlaw ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend.\\nI. Bonin claims § 912 imperils that freedom. We review this\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We have explained “one of the most important parts of appellate\\nadvocacy is the selection of the proper claims to urge on appeal.” Howard\\nv. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). The kitchen‐sink approach\\nBonin embraces can be criticized as “consum[ing] space that should be\\ndevoted to developing the arguments with some promise.” Id.\\n\\f10 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconstitutional question de novo. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.\\nMadigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Section 912 provides:\\n Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an\\n officer or employee acting under the authority\\n of the United States or any department, agency\\n or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pre‐\\n tended character demands or obtains any\\n money, paper, document, or thing of value,\\n shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not\\n more than three years, or both.\\n(emphasis added).\\n Bonin was charged under the “acts as such” clause of\\n§ 912, which criminalizes “false impersonation of a federal of‐\\nficial coupled with an overt act in conformity with the pre‐\\ntense.” United States v. Rippee, 961 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1992).\\nHe mounts a facial challenge to this clause, advancing three\\narguments. First, he claims the Supreme Court facially inval‐\\nidated it in United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Next,\\nhe invokes the overbreadth doctrine, arguing the acts‐as‐such\\nclause reaches a “substantial amount” of constitutionally pro‐\\ntected conduct. Last, he argues it is unconstitutionally vague.\\nWe begin our analysis with Bonin’s broader facial attack be‐\\nfore turning to the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.\\n Bonin confronts a “heavy burden” in raising a facial con‐\\nstitutional challenge to § 912. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.\\nFinley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998). The Supreme Court has repeat‐\\nedly stated that facial invalidation of legislation is disfavored.\\nSee Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.\\n442, 450 (2008); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 580\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 11\\n\\n(noting facial invalidation “has been employed by the Court\\nsparingly and only as a last resort”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,\\n493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are\\ngenerally disfavored.”). To prevail on a facial attack, Bonin\\nmust establish “that no set of circumstances exists” in which\\n§ 912 would be valid or that it “lacks any plainly legitimate\\nsweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (in‐\\nternal quotations and citations omitted).\\n Bonin offers no such arguments, nor could he under\\nAlvarez. There, a plurality of the Court described § 912 as a\\n“permissible” restriction on false speech because it “protect[s]\\nthe integrity of Government processes” and “is itself confined\\nto ‘maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of …\\ngovernment … service itself.’” 567 U.S. at 720–21 (plurality\\nopinion) (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704\\n(1943)). Likewise, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion and\\nJustice Alito’s dissent discussed § 912 as a constitutional re‐\\nstriction on speech. Id. at 735 (Breyer, J., concurring in the\\njudgment); id. at 748 (Alito, J., dissenting). Despite the splin‐\\ntered decision, no Justice in Alvarez questioned the constitu‐\\ntionality of § 912.6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Bonin argues Alvarez “confirms that … Section 912 is facially uncon‐\\nstitutional.” Each of the opinions in Alvarez said just the opposite. The\\nCourt explained that § 912, along with other statutes that “implicate fraud\\nor speech integral to criminal conduct,” are “inapplicable” to the reason‐\\ning of its holding. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); see also id. at\\n734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing § 912 from\\nthe Stolen Valor Act because of its “focus on acts of impersonation” (em‐\\nphasis in original)); id. at 748–49 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing § 912 vi‐\\nolations as “false statements of fact [that] merit no First Amendment\\nprotection in their own right”).\\n\\f12 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n The Alvarez plurality applied “most exacting scrutiny” in\\nstriking down the Stolen Valor Act. Id. at 724 (plurality opin‐\\nion) (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.\\n622, 642 (1994)). The concurring opinion applied intermediate\\nscrutiny. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). We\\nwill assume, without deciding, that the more demanding\\nstandard discussed in Alvarez applies here, as survival under\\nthe former yields the same result under the latter.\\n “Most exacting scrutiny” requires the government to es‐\\ntablish that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling\\nstate interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that\\nend.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1988). Here, the stat‐\\nute prohibits impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees to “protect the integrity of Government processes,”\\nAlvarez, 567 U.S at 721 (plurality opinion), and “maintain the\\ngeneral good repute and dignity of the government service\\nitself,” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (internal parentheses omit‐\\nted).\\n Bonin does not dispute that public safety and protection\\nof the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests.\\nWe are not alone in concluding they are. The Fourth Circuit\\naddressed the same issue and held that “Alvarez … confirms\\n… the very real problem of law enforcement impersonations\\nand the misfortunes that can flow from them.” United States v.\\nChappell, 691 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting that\\nAlvarez invalidated Virginia law prohibiting impersonation of\\npolice). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held: “As Alvarez\\nmade clear, the government has the constitutional power to\\nprohibit the impersonation of federal officials and employ‐\\nees” and characterized that prohibition as serving “substan‐\\ntial government interests.” United States v. Tomsha‐Miguel, 766\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 13\\n\\nF.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate\\nscrutiny and holding § 912 is a constitutionally permissible\\nrestriction on free speech).7\\n Pretending to be a law enforcement officer could, without\\nmore, help someone improperly gain entrance to a home,\\nschool, or any other secured location. See Chappell, 691 F.3d at\\n392 (observing same). That is what happened here: Bonin’s\\nlies gave him cover to bring a gun and loaded magazine clip\\ninto a dark and crowded theater.8 Because false impersona‐\\ntion of a federal officer could have serious security ramifica‐\\ntions and erode the public’s trust in federal institutions, the\\ngovernment’s interest in protecting the integrity of govern‐\\nment processes is compelling.\\n Given the government’s compelling interest, the only\\nquestion is whether § 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve”\\nthose interests. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321–22. We look again to\\nAlvarez. False statements are not categorically excluded from\\nFirst Amendment protections. In recognizing this principle,\\nAlvarez distinguished between unprotected lies (like fraud,\\nspeech integral to criminal conduct, defamation, and perjury)\\n\\n\\n 7 Bonin argues the Tomsha‐Miguel holding was “called into doubt” by\\na subsequent Ninth Circuit en banc opinion, which held unconstitutional\\n18 U.S.C. § 704(a), a section of the Stolen Valor Act that criminalizes the\\nunauthorized wearing of military medals. See United States v. Swisher, 811\\nF.3d 299, 318 (9th Cir. 2016). We disagree, as the Ninth Circuit said the\\nopposite in Swisher when it “reject[ed] … reasoning that § 704(a) is like the\\nstatutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation of government\\nofficials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912.” Id. at 316.\\n 8Although witnesses at the theater observed only one gun, Bonin re‐\\nported he actually carried six firearms because that is how he “usually\\narm[s]” himself.\\n\\f14 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nand protected lies (like those covered by the Stolen Valor Act,\\nwhich “targets falsity and nothing more”).9 567 U.S. at 717,\\n719; see also id. at 734–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg‐\\nment) (distinguishing § 912 and its “narrower” scope from the\\nStolen Valor Act). What sets § 912 apart from the Stolen Valor\\nAct is the requirement of an overt act in conformity with the\\nlie.\\n The Stolen Valor Act’s flaw was that “its plain terms ap‐\\nplie[d] to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to\\nany person. … And it does so entirely without regard to\\nwhether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.”\\nId. at 722–23 (plurality opinion).10 Section 912’s acts‐as‐such\\nclause is more narrowly tailored because it requires inten‐\\ntional “act[ion] in the pretended character … sought to cause\\nthe deceived person to follow some course he would not have\\npursued but for the deceitful conduct.” Lepowitch, 318 U.S. at\\n704; see also Tomsha‐Miguel, 766 F.3d at 1049 (finding the stat‐\\nutory elements of § 912 incorporate an intent to deceive). Ap‐\\nplying the reasoning of Lepowitch here, the evidence showed\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n The Stolen Valor Act provided: “Whoever falsely represents himself\\nor herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or\\nmedal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States\\n… shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or\\nboth.” 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2005).\\n 10 The plurality opinion in Alvarez called the government’s interests\\n“compelling” but held that the Stolen Valor Act’s restriction was not “the\\nleast restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” 567 U.S. at\\n725–29. Notably, Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act after the Alvarez\\ndecision, now making it a crime to “fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be\\na recipient” of specified military decorations or medals “with the intent to\\nobtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.” See 18 U.S.C. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 15\\n\\nthat Bonin both sought to deceive the movie audience to tol‐\\nerate his rude behavior and sought to deceive the police offic‐\\ners to avoid taking action against him for his threatening\\nconduct in the theater.\\n Because the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits more than mere\\nlies, it falls outside the scope of Alvarez’s holding. Alvarez, 567\\nU.S. at 721 (“Statutes that … prohibit impersonating a Gov‐\\nernment officer, also protect the integrity of Government pro‐\\ncesses, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”).\\nInstead, the clause is “narrowed … to a subset of lies where\\nspecific harm is more likely to occur,” which “help[s] to make\\ncertain that the statute does not allow its threat of liability or\\ncriminal punishment to roam at large.” Id. at 736 (Breyer, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). “Where false claims are made to\\neffect a fraud … it is well established that the Government\\nmay restrict speech without affronting the First Amend‐\\nment.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion). Although\\nthe Court’s observations on § 912 arose in dicta, they inform\\nus where the Court stands. McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598\\nF.3d 388, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e must treat with great re‐\\nspect the prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court, even\\nif those pronouncements are technically dicta.”). For these\\nreasons, we follow Alvarez’s approach and hold that § 912 is\\nnarrowly drawn to serve the government’s compelling inter‐\\nests.\\n We turn now to whether the acts‐as‐such clause prohibits\\na substantial amount of protected speech, violating the over‐\\nbreadth doctrine.\\n Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally\\nprotected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows persons,\\nlike Bonin, “to attack overly broad statutes even though the\\n\\f16 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nconduct of the person making the attack is clearly unpro‐\\ntected and could be proscribed by a law drawn with the req‐\\nuisite specificity.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).\\nEven still, the “strong medicine” of the doctrine is employed\\n“with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last resort.’” Id. (citation\\nomitted). “[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some im‐\\npermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render\\nit susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Members of City\\nCouncil of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.\\n789, 800 (1984) (denying overbreadth challenge after plaintiffs\\n“simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordi‐\\nnance will significantly compromise recognized First Amend‐\\nment protections of individuals not before the Court”).\\nRather, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself\\nwill significantly compromise recognized First Amendment\\nprotections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially\\nchallenged on overbreadth grounds.” Id. at 801.\\n Bonin fails to raise any “realistic danger” that the acts‐as‐\\nsuch clause will compromise First Amendment rights. Bonin\\noffers weak examples: “a fired Treasury employee” who\\n“conceal[s] his unemployment from his spouse and claim[s]\\nhe is ‘going to work’ each morning”; and “[a]n Internet dater”\\nwho “fak[es] an FBI agent work emergency to end a bad date\\nearly.” According to Bonin, “the ‘acts’ offense [even] criminal‐\\nizes theater and Halloween.” These far‐fetched hypotheticals\\ndo not presage any risk that the acts‐as‐such clause will cause\\nthird parties to avoid constitutionally protected speech.\\nMoreover, “[t]he overbreadth claimant bears the burden of\\ndemonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact,\\nthat substantial overbreadth exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.\\n113, 122 (2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see\\nalso Ctr. for Individual Freedom, 697 F.3d at 479–80 (“The central\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 17\\n\\nquestion … is whether the provisions at issue potentially\\nreach a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech.”). Bonin’s\\nhypothetical cadre of costume wearers and regretful suitors\\nfail to satisfy these conditions. The acts‐as‐such clause raises\\nno overbreadth problems.\\n Bonin’s last attack on § 912’s constitutionality is for vague‐\\nness. It is a “basic principle of due process” that a statute is\\nvoid for vagueness “if its prohibitions are not clearly de‐\\nfined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).\\n Critically, Bonin makes no claim that the acts‐as‐such\\nclause is vague with respect to his own conduct. The flagrancy\\nand frequency of Bonin’s lies at the theater fit within the pro‐\\nhibition of § 912 to “falsely assume[] or pretend[] to be an of‐\\nficer or employee acting under the authority of the United\\nStates.” Bonin’s vagueness claim does not survive “the rule\\nthat ‘a plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly\\nproscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as ap‐\\nplied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v. Humanitarian Law\\nProject, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (internal brackets omitted) (quot‐\\ning Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455\\nU.S. 489, 495 (1982)). “That rule makes no exception for con‐\\nduct in the form of speech.” Id. The facts here do not present\\na close call on this issue. Because Bonin’s conduct is “clearly\\nproscribed,” we see no reason to evaluate the merits of his\\nvagueness claim.\\n B\\n Bonin next argues the district court “misinstructed the\\njury on essential elements” of an acts‐as‐such offense. He also\\ncontends the district court erred in refusing to give his prof‐\\nfered First Amendment and unanimity instructions.\\n\\f18 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n We review Bonin’s challenge to the elements instruction\\nin two steps. First, we review de novo “whether [the] jury in‐\\nstructions accurately summarize the law, but give the district\\ncourt substantial discretion to formulate the instructions pro‐\\nvided that the instructions represent a complete and correct\\nstatement of the law.” United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 613\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If the instructions are legally\\naccurate, then we review the district court’s phrasing of the\\ninstructions for abuse of discretion. Id.\\n Here, the instruction read:\\n In order for you to find the defendant guilty of\\n these charges, the government must prove each\\n of the following two elements beyond a reason‐\\n able doubt:\\n 1. That the defendant falsely assumed or\\n pretended to have been an officer or em‐\\n ployee acting under authority of the United\\n States Marshals Service; and\\n 2. That the defendant acted as such.\\n With respect to acting “as such,” the govern‐\\n ment must prove that the defendant acted in a\\n manner consistent with his pretended authority\\n as an officer or employee of the United States\\n Marshals Service.\\n The components of the instruction are either direct quota‐\\ntions from § 912’s text (the numbered portion of the instruc‐\\ntion) or an accurate restatement of case precedent from the\\nSupreme Court and this court (the final sentence). Compare\\nLepowitch, 318 U.S. at 704 (“Government officials are imper‐\\nsonated by any persons who ‘assume to act in the pretended\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 19\\n\\ncharacter.’”) with Rippee, 961 F.2d at 678 (“Section 912 crimi‐\\nnalizes … false impersonation of a federal official coupled\\nwith an overt act in conformity with the pretense … .”) and\\nUnited States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960) (“The\\nwords ‘acts as such’ as used in [§] 912 … have been construed\\nto mean acting in the pretended character, [without] neces‐\\nsarily doing an act which defendant would have been author‐\\nized to do under authority of the assumed [office].”).\\nProviding jurors with these accurate summaries of applicable\\nlaw is not an abuse of discretion.\\n Bonin argues the district court should have instructed the\\njury on three additional elements of an acts‐as‐such offense: a\\nmens rea component, an assertion of authority component,\\nand causation. We address his proposed elements in turn.\\n The government concedes the district court erred in omit‐\\nting a mens rea instruction. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135\\nS. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“The fact that the statute does not\\nspecify any required mental state, however, does not mean\\nthat none exists.”). Even so, “an instruction that omits an ele‐\\nment of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial\\nfundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining\\nguilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).\\nThe omission of an element is subject to harmless‐error anal‐\\nysis. Id. at 10.\\n In Neder, the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine\\nwhether an error is harmless: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant\\nguilty absent the error?” Id. at 18. Here, Bonin not only pre‐\\ntended to be a U.S. Marshal to break a rule, he did so with an\\nattitude of entitlement, undermining the integrity and profes‐\\nsionalism of the U.S. Marshals Service. Then, he kept the con\\n\\f20 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ngoing, lying to police to avoid being arrested or kicked out of\\nthe theater. And after that scam worked, he gloated and\\nflashed a gun as he reentered the theater. Section 912 prohibits\\nsuch conduct. More importantly, a fairly selected and impar‐\\ntial jury weighed all the evidence, including Bonin’s own tes‐\\ntimony, and rejected his defense.11 See id. at 9. On the record\\nin this case, no jury could reasonably find that Bonin’s contin‐\\nual falsehoods were not knowing and intentional. We thus\\nhold that the district court’s failure to submit a mens rea ele‐\\nment was harmless error.\\n Bonin also claims the district court erred when it failed to\\ninstruct that acts‐as‐such impersonation requires an assertion\\nof authority. He contends this instruction is required to “har‐\\nmonize” our holdings in Hamilton and Rippee. We disagree on\\nboth fronts. First, Bonin’s proposed instruction ignores the\\nplain language of § 912, which contains no “assertion of au‐\\nthority” requirement. Second, Bonin’s proposal would nullify\\nthe acts‐as‐such clause as a separate and distinct violation of\\n§ 912. On this point, he labors under the misimpression that a\\ntension exists between Hamilton and Rippee. In Hamilton, the\\ndefendant committed acts‐as‐such impersonation when\\nwearing a firearm in someone’s home while falsely pretend‐\\ning to be an F.B.I. agent. 276 F.2d at 97–98 (affirming judgment\\nof conviction). Rippee involved a defendant charged under the\\n\\n\\n 11\\n At trial, Bonin denied making false representations. He did not ar‐\\ngue his conduct was based on his mistake, an accident, or his ignorance of\\nthe law. On appeal, Bonin claims to be a “fugitive recovery agent” and\\n“proud bounty hunter,” although he has never recovered a fugitive. Ac‐\\ncording to Bonin, the “confusing relationship between bounty hunting\\nand the Marshal Service” created the misperception that he said he was a\\nU.S. Marshal.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 21\\n\\ndemands clause who pretended to be a U.S. Marshal and as‐\\nserted false authority (that he was dispatched to break up a\\nfight) to avoid a traffic ticket for an illegal U‐turn. 961 F.2d at\\n678 (affirming judgment of conviction). These opinions apply\\ndifferent requirements because they concern different § 912\\noffenses, and there is no conflict in their holdings.\\n Bonin’s request for a causation instruction—telling jurors\\nthe “acts” must cause someone to change their behavior—also\\nfails because the text of § 912 does not mention causation. Nor\\nhas our court interpreted the statute to require causation to\\nprove an acts‐as‐such offense. We decline Bonin’s invitation\\nto decree requirements not included in the statute itself.\\n Bonin also asked for unanimity and First Amendment in‐\\nstructions. “We review de novo a district court’s refusal to\\nprovide a requested jury instruction when the underlying as‐\\nsignment of error implicates a question of law, but general at‐\\ntacks on the jury instructions are reviewed for an abuse of\\ndiscretion. United States v. Bloom, 846 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).12\\n Bonin speculates the jury may have convicted him without\\nagreeing on which of his false representations violated the\\n\\n 12 Bonin additionally contends “[t]he district court erroneously re‐\\nfused to instruct the jury” as follows: (1) “[a] person does not falsely rep‐\\nresent himself if he tells the truth as he understands it”; and (2) “if you\\nfind that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that\\nMr. Bonin did not act in good faith, then you must find him not guilty.”\\nBut he neither explains these defense theories nor develops any argument\\napplying them to this case. Because the claims are “perfunctory and un‐\\ndeveloped,” they are waived. Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d\\n647, 652 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n\\f22 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nlaw. He claims a unanimity instruction would have fixed that\\nproblem. “[W]hile a jury’s unanimity is required in regard to\\neach principal element of a criminal offense, ‘a federal jury\\nneed not always decide unanimously which of several possi‐\\nble sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular ele‐\\nment, say, which of several possible means the defendant used\\nto commit an element of the crime.’” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 613\\n(quoting Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)\\n(emphasis added)). Here, Bonin’s repeated false statements\\nthat he was a U.S. Marshal, in addition to his brandishing a\\nbadge and a gun, were the “underlying brute facts” of the ver‐\\ndict against him. In other words, “they were merely the\\nmeans he used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. at 614.\\nBecause “the instructions used in this case accurately con‐\\nveyed the law,” id., the district court did not abuse its discre‐\\ntion when it declined to give the unanimity instructions Bonin\\nrequested.\\n Bonin also claims the absence of a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction exposed him to a conviction for protected expres‐\\nsion. He insists the district court erred by refusing an\\ninstruction saying “the First Amendment … prevents the\\ngovernment from criminalizing mere hyperbole, sleaziness,\\nbad behavior, bragging, or puffery, or the expression of an\\nopinion. It is not illegal to simply pretend to be a United States\\nMarshal.” But for the reasons explained above, Bonin’s pro‐\\nposed instruction misstates the law. And allowing a jury to\\nmuse on the First Amendment’s influence on a constitution‐\\nally valid statute risks confusion on the elements of the of‐\\nfense and on the government’s burden of proof. The\\ngovernment needed to prove the elements of § 912’s acts‐as‐\\nsuch offense beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. The\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 23\\n\\ndistrict court properly refused to give a First Amendment in‐\\nstruction.\\n C\\n Finally, Bonin presents a series of evidentiary issues he be‐\\nlieves warrant reversal. We start with his claim that the ad‐\\nmission of pseudo law enforcement items seized from his\\nhome, as well as social media images of him in law enforce‐\\nment regalia, unfairly prejudiced his defense. After that, we\\nconsider the admission of Alfich’s text messages. Then, we ex‐\\namine whether the district court erred by denying Bonin’s\\nmotion to suppress his statements to Officer Guillory. Last,\\nwe consider whether Bonin was entitled to present certain ev‐\\nidence that he lawfully carried his gun in the theater.\\n During cross‐examination of Bonin, the government intro‐\\nduced three badges, one automobile magnet, and a knit cap\\nseized from Bonin’s home, in addition to Facebook photos of\\nBonin posing as a law enforcement officer. Bonin alleges the\\nadmission of these items violated FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and 403,\\nas they were used to demonstrate his propensity to imperson‐\\nate law enforcement and resulted in unfair prejudice. We re‐\\nview the district court’s decision to admit this evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 882\\n(7th Cir. 2015).\\n Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,\\nor other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in\\norder to show that on a particular occasion the person acted\\nin accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (em‐\\nphasis added). Yet the rule permits other‐act evidence for\\nnon‐propensity purposes, including proof of intent. Id. When,\\nas in this case, “intent is ‘at issue’ because the defendant\\n\\f24 No. 18‐1479\\n\\nmakes it an issue,” other‐act evidence may be admissible to\\nprove intent, “but it must be relevant without relying on a\\npropensity inference, and its probative value must not be sub‐\\nstantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” United\\nStates v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Before trial, the district court excluded the items seized\\nfrom Bonin’s home and his social media postings. Yet the\\ncourt allowed this other‐acts evidence on cross‐examination\\nafter Bonin denied ever intending to give the impression that\\nhe was a U.S. Marshal, not just in the theater, but at any time\\nin his life. Bonin also testified that any resemblance the iden‐\\ntification card he gave to Guillory and the badge he wore at\\nthe theater had to official law enforcement items was coinci‐\\ndental and created by his “employer.” At that point, Bonin\\nopened the door to the government’s impeachment with evi‐\\ndence of pseudo federal law enforcement items from his\\nhome. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 858 (“[I]n order for the govern‐\\nment to introduce prior bad acts to show intent, the defendant\\nmust put his intent at issue first.”).\\n The government asked Bonin whether he purchased these\\nitems himself, which he affirmed. These questions were also\\npermissible impeachment after Bonin disclaimed an intent to\\ntrick anyone at any time into believing he was a U.S. Marshal.\\nFor example, Bonin acknowledged placing the words “U.S.\\nDetective” and a gold star magnet similar to a U.S. Marshal\\ninsignia on his vehicle, but he denied any intent to make peo‐\\nple think he was a federal law enforcement officer. When\\nBonin denied such an intent, this evidence became relevant\\nfor the non‐propensity purpose of proving his contrary intent.\\nAccordingly, the challenged evidence clears Rule 404(b)’s bar\\non propensity evidence.\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 25\\n\\n The next question, then, is whether the probative value of\\nthis evidence “is substantially outweighed by a danger of …\\nunfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. As a general matter, “in‐\\ntent becomes more relevant, and evidence tending to prove\\nintent becomes more probative, when the defense actually\\nworks to deny intent, joining the issue by contesting it.”\\nUnited States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n Here, intent became a contested issue after Bonin denied\\nintending to deceive others at any point in time into believing\\nhe was federal law enforcement. The challenged evidence—\\nwhich bore stark resemblances to federal law enforcement at‐\\ntire, phrases, and insignia, and which Bonin purchased him‐\\nself—had high probative value because it went directly to\\nBonin’s intent to deceive the public.\\n We “accord great deference” to the district court’s eviden‐\\ntiary determinations “because of the judge’s first‐hand expo‐\\nsure to the evidence[,] … familiarity with the case[,] and\\nability to gauge the impact of the evidence on the jury in the\\ncontext of the trial.” United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 615\\n(7th Cir. 2000).13 In addition, the district court gave a limiting\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 Two days before trial, the district court’s executive committee reas‐\\nsigned this case from Judge Robert Gettleman to Judge Donald E. Walter\\nof the Western District of Louisiana, who had been designated to perform\\njudicial duties in the Northern District of Illinois. Bonin contends Judge\\nWalter’s substitution on the eve of trial rendered him incapable of famili‐\\narity with this case, and therefore, “no deference is due” to his evidentiary\\nrulings and we should apply a heightened standard of review to all his\\ndecisions. Bonin cites no authority to support this argument. Regardless,\\nthe argument fails because Judge Walter’s evidentiary rulings were\\nproper.\\n\\f26 No. 18‐1479\\n\\ninstruction to avoid any possibility that the jury would im‐\\nproperly view this as “propensity” evidence. The court di‐\\nrected the jury to consider this evidence for impeachment\\nalone, as well as that the jury could not infer that because\\nBonin committed any act in the past he was more likely to\\nhave committed the charged offense. Affording “great defer‐\\nence” here, the district court was within its discretion to admit\\nthe challenged evidence.\\n Bonin also argues the district court erred by admitting the\\ntext messages sent from the theater by witness Patrick Alfich.\\nOnce again, we review for abuse of discretion. Anzaldi, 800\\nF.3d at 882. In the government’s rebuttal case, Alfich testified\\nregarding text messages he sent immediately after witnessing\\nBonin’s outbursts. The statements contained in those text\\nmessages were admitted as prior consistent statements under\\nFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).\\n A statement is not hearsay, and is admissible as a prior\\nconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), if four condi‐\\ntions are met: (1) the declarant testifies at trial and is subject\\nto cross‐examination; (2) the prior statement is consistent with\\nthe declarant’s trial testimony; (3) the statement is offered to\\nrebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or im‐\\nproper motive; and (4) the statement was made before the de‐\\nclarant had a motive to fabricate. United States v. Davis, 896\\nF.3d 784, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2018). Bonin argues the third re‐\\nquirement was not met because he never directly accused\\nAlfich of fabrication. But his argument ignores that Rule\\n801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior statement to rebut an “implied\\ncharge that the declarant recently fabricated.” FED. R. EVID.\\n801(d)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 27\\n\\n “[T]he precise contours” of a charge of fabrication “may\\nbe unclear.” Miller v. Greenleaf Orthopedic Assocs., S.C., 827\\nF.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2016). Yet “determining whether a wit‐\\nness’s past statement has any potential to rebut the allegation\\nwill necessarily involve an exercise of the trial judge’s discre‐\\ntion.” Id. Here, Bonin’s testimony on direct and cross‐exami‐\\nnation directly contradicted Alfich and implied that Alfich’s\\ntestimony about Bonin’s false statements, threats, and behav‐\\nior was fictional. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647–48\\n(7th Cir. 2001) (holding an accusation of fabrication existed\\nwhere defendant “raised the implication” that the witness’s\\ntestimony “was fictional”). Given these reasons, the district\\ncourt’s ruling was supported and reflects a proper exercise of\\ndiscretion.\\n As to the admission of the pseudo law enforcement items,\\nthe social media images, and the text messages, reversal is re‐\\nquired if an evidentiary error “had a substantial and injurious\\neffect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” United States v.\\nReddit, 381 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2004) (quote omitted). An\\nevidentiary error meets this standard “only when a signifi‐\\ncant chance exists that they affected the outcome of the trial.”\\nWhitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the\\ntrial evidence, these standards are not met here.\\n Bonin also appeals his initial police encounter. He argues\\nthe officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was in‐\\nvolved in criminal activity at the theater, and therefore “eve‐\\nrything that happened during the stop should have been\\nsuppressed.” We review a district court’s denial of a motion\\nto suppress under a “dual standard of review”; legal conclu‐\\nsions are reviewed de novo, but findings of fact for clear error.\\nUnited States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n\\f28 No. 18‐1479\\n\\n “A limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy is per‐\\nmitted under the Fourth Amendment where the police have\\nreasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot.”\\nUnited States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (ci‐\\ntations omitted). Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer\\ncan point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably\\nwarrant that intrusion. Id. We “presume the reliability of an\\nemergency 911 call reporting an emergency situation for pur‐\\nposes of establishing reasonable suspicion.” United States v.\\nDrake, 456 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Here, Guillory arrived at the theater in response to a 911\\ncall reporting a person with a gun causing a disturbance at the\\ntheater. Reidy identified Bonin as the person causing the dis‐\\nturbance, and Guillory observed the gun on Bonin’s belt. Ob‐\\njectively reasonable grounds existed for police to suspect that\\nBonin was engaged in unlawful activity. As for the scope of\\nGuillory’s questioning, “[i]t is well settled that police may ap‐\\nproach an individual in a public place and seek the individ‐\\nual’s cooperation in answering a few questions. Such an\\nencounter is not a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment.” United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 519–20\\n(7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,\\n201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no ba‐\\nsis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose ques‐\\ntions, [and] ask for identification … .”). After learning Bonin\\nwas the suspect reported, Guillory asked him for his version\\nof events, and took his driver’s license only long enough to\\nverify he had a valid concealed carry license. Minutes later,\\nBonin reentered the theater. Because the evidence supported\\na finding of reasonable suspicion, and that Bonin was not\\n\\fNo. 18‐1479 29\\n\\n“seized” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the district\\ncourt did not err in denying Bonin’s motion to suppress.\\n Finally, Bonin argues the district court violated the Sixth\\nAmendment by excluding evidence of: Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry law; the absence of signs prohibiting guns at the theater;\\nand testimony from Bonin’s bounty hunting instructor, John\\nHoward, about firearms training he gave Bonin.\\n We review the district court’s decisions to exclude Bonin’s\\nproffered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.\\nAlayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\nBut we review de novo the question of whether the eviden‐\\ntiary ruling infringed upon a defendant’s constitutional\\nrights. Id. (citation omitted).\\n The district court properly excluded Bonin’s proffered ev‐\\nidence for three reasons. First, the district court correctly ob‐\\nserved the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 401 because\\nBonin was not charged with violating Illinois’s concealed\\ncarry laws or the movie theater’s policy prohibiting firearms.\\nEvidence about Bonin openly wearing a gun and a badge on\\nhis belt was relevant because that conduct was part and parcel\\nof his false impersonation of a U.S. Marshal. Conversely,\\nwhether Illinois law allowed Bonin to have a gun in the thea‐\\nter, the theater’s signage on this issue, and what John Howard\\ntold Bonin about Illinois law, were all irrelevant. None of that\\nevidence had a tendency to make a fact of consequence to his\\nguilt or innocence more or less probable. See FED. R. EVID. 401.\\n Second, Bonin’s proposed evidence failed under Rule 403\\nbalancing. Any probative value of the evidence was substan‐\\ntially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the is‐\\nsues and mislead the jury into thinking that Bonin’s guilt on\\n\\f30 No. 18‐1479\\n\\na § 912 charge was somehow intertwined with his compliance\\nwith Illinois law and training he received from some third\\nparty. Third, Bonin presented a defense on all these issues.\\nFor example, Howard did testify on the training he gave his\\n“agents,” like Bonin, as to how and when they could carry\\nguns. Likewise, Bonin testified about his concealed carry li‐\\ncense, his purported work as a bounty hunter, his training for\\nthat position, and that he was unaware the theater prohibited\\nguns. So the district court neither prevented Bonin from pre‐\\nsenting this defense, nor abused its discretion when it ex‐\\ncluded irrelevant and misleading evidence that Bonin\\nrequests on appeal.\\n III\\n Fictional tales are a part of the cinema experience. But\\nwhen Bonin upstaged the on‐screen performances as a make‐\\nbelieve marshal, he broke the law. The First Amendment can‐\\nnot save him, and his jury instruction and evidentiary claims\\ndo not persuade us, so we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3199,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643435,"string":"4,643,435"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Tristana HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tristana Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3403"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Manion, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3403\\n\\nTRISTANA HUNT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWAL-MART STORES, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 05924 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 23, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Tristana Hunt worked the overnight\\nshift in the electronics department of a Wal-Mart store and\\nDaniel Watson was her supervisor. After Watson made several\\nunprofessional remarks toward Hunt over a four-month\\nperiod, Hunt filed a complaint with human resources. Wal-\\nMart promptly investigated the claims but was unable to\\n\\f2 No. 18-3403\\n\\nsubstantiate them. Hunt then filed a complaint in federal court\\nalleging Watson sexually harassed her by creating a hostile\\nwork environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights\\nAct of 1964. At summary judgment, the district court held that\\nWal-Mart established the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense\\nto liability because it reasonably prevented and corrected\\nsexual harassment, and Hunt unreasonably delayed in report-\\ning the harassment. We agree and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Before Watson and Hunt worked together on the night\\nshift, Watson worked as a supervisor on the day shift. While\\nworking on the day shift Watson was accused of sexually\\nharassing an individual he supervised, Toyanna Campbell.\\nCampbell filed a complaint on October 24, 2012, which\\ninformed human resources that Watson had told Campbell he\\nliked her several times. After she said she did not like him he\\nclosed the door and window to his office, put his hand on her\\narm, and refused to let go of her until she screamed. Watson\\nwas provided with a written “coaching” for the conduct\\ndescribed in the complaint. “Coaching” is the Wal-Mart\\nequivalent of being written up and is intended to provide\\ninstruction and assistance when an employee’s performance is\\nnot up to Wal-Mart’s standards.\\n On November 7, 2012, Campbell filed another complaint\\nalleging Watson had acted inappropriately. According to the\\ncomplaint he asked her what perfume she was wearing,\\ncomplimented her on her “musk,” implied that she liked him\\nwhen she called him to the front of the store, informed her that\\nhe was single and asked if she was single, told her he was\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 3\\n\\nlooking for a girlfriend, and told her he really liked her. In\\nresponse to this incident, Wal-Mart provided Watson with a\\nsecond written coaching and moved him to the overnight shift.\\n Hunt met Watson for the first time during a shift in May\\n2013. Watson came up to her and asked her why she was\\nwearing a particular shirt, saying that he could see her breasts,\\nand then commented that he did not understand how a\\nwoman could have breasts so large despite having a small\\nbody. Hunt was uncomfortable and walked away from the\\nincident to avoid further comments. About a month later,\\nWatson walked up behind Hunt while she was bending over,\\nstood close to her, and made another comment about her\\nbreasts. Hunt told him that his comments were inappropriate\\nand again walked away. This time Watson followed her and\\ntold her he wanted to shower with her and feel her breasts.\\n On June 25, 2013, Hunt showed Watson a picture of a fallen\\ntree on her phone to explain that inclement weather had\\ncaused her to miss the previous workday. Watson took the\\nphone from her hand and indicated he was looking through it\\nfor naked pictures. Hunt asked him to stop and took her phone\\nback. Watson replied that he would not excuse her absence and\\nagain asked when he could see her breasts.\\n In late August Watson made similar offensive comments\\ntowards Hunt and in mid-September, Watson asked to see\\nHunt’s breasts several times within a few days. On Septem-\\nber 27, 2013, after Hunt refused another advance, Watson gave\\nher written coaching for not working her scheduled shifts and\\ncited her June 24 absence as one such absence. Immediately\\nfollowing this formal discipline, Hunt decided to report\\n\\f4 No. 18-3403\\n\\nWatson’s harassment to the store manager, Mark Turner, at the\\nend of her shift.\\n Hunt asked Turner for a complaint form when he arrived\\nfor his shift. This was the first time Hunt informed Turner of\\nany issues between her and Watson. When Turner asked Hunt\\nif she knew of any witnesses, she told him to ask around about\\nWatson’s behavior. Turner collected the complaint from Hunt\\nand provided it to human resources. Later that day, human\\nresources informed Turner that he needed to complete an\\ninvestigation into Hunt’s complaint. Turner opened an\\ninvestigation immediately and interviewed Watson eight days\\nlater. Watson denied making any sexual comments towards\\nHunt. Turner concluded Hunt’s claims could not be substanti-\\nated without corroborating witnesses. Nonetheless, he re-\\nquired Watson to retake the company’s ethics training course\\nwhich included anti-harassment training. Watson completed\\nthe course on November 6, 2013. Hunt reported no incidents of\\nharassment following the discipline.\\n Hunt filed a complaint in federal court on June 7, 2016, and\\nan amended complaint on July 1, 2016. Hunt alleged she was\\nsubjected to a hostile work environment by being sexually\\nharassed on a daily basis for five months. Wal-Mart moved for\\nsummary judgment arguing that Watson’s actions did not\\ncreate a hostile work environment or in the alternative that\\nWal-Mart had established an affirmative defense to liability as\\na matter of law. The district court admitted it was “unable to\\ndetermine whether Plaintiff suffered a hostile work environ-\\nment claim,” but granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-\\nMart, holding it had proved the affirmative defense outlined\\nby the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 5\\n\\n742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775\\n(1998). Because we agree, we affirm.\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Parker v.\\nFour Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2017). The\\nCourt must decide whether the evidence is such that a reason-\\nable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.\\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).\\n A hostile work environment claim requires a plaintiff show:\\n(1) the work environment was objectively and subjectively\\noffensive, (2) the harassment complained of was based on\\ngender, (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive, and\\n(4) a basis for employer liability exists. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co.,\\n587 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has held\\nthat Title VII does not demand employers be held vicariously\\nliable for hostile work environments created by their supervi-\\nsors unless it is accompanied by an adverse employment\\naction. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06\\n(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). An\\nemployer may escape liability if it can show the hostile work\\nenvironment was not accompanied by an adverse employment\\naction and prove an affirmative defense. Id.\\n The Faragher-Ellerth defense is one such defense and\\nrequires the employer prove by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and\\ncorrect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the\\nplaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-\\ntive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to\\notherwise avoid harm. Id. at 765.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3403\\n\\n A. Adverse Employment Action\\n As noted above, if Hunt can establish an adverse employ-\\nment action was taken against her, she can prevent Wal-Mart\\nfrom claiming the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Hunt argues that a\\nreasonable jury could conclude she was constructively dis-\\ncharged. Constructive discharge requires an employee prove\\nher working conditions were so intolerable that she was forced\\ninto involuntary resignation. Roby v. CWI, Inc., 579 F.3d 779,\\n785 (7th Cir. 2009). To establish such a claim a plaintiff must\\nshow working conditions “even more egregious than the high\\nstandard for hostile work environment claims.” Boumehdi v.\\nPlastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2007).\\n No evidence indicates that Hunt was forced into involun-\\ntary resignation due to Watson’s conduct. Quite the contrary,\\nHunt continued to work the same shift at the same Wal-Mart\\nstore for several years without alleging any additional inci-\\ndents of sexual harassment. Not until more than three years\\nlater, when Hunt failed to return to work after a period of\\nmedical leave, was she let go. This failure to present evidence\\nthat her employment ceased due to an intolerable working\\nenvironment precludes a finding of constructive discharge as\\na matter of law. See Roby, 579 F.3d at 786 (finding no construc-\\ntive discharge when plaintiff “essentially just quit coming to\\nwork while [her employer] was attempting to resolve the\\nissue”).\\n Even if we were able to construe Hunt’s delayed decision\\nto stop showing up to work as a “resignation,” we must\\ndetermine whether it was “involuntary” by assessing whether\\nthe conditions were intolerable. The cases where we have\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 7\\n\\nfound constructive discharge are significantly more egregious\\nthan the facts at hand. Here, Hunt avers Watson made sexually\\nsuggestive comments towards her on a number of occasions;\\nthe only evidence that these incidents occurred are found in\\nHunt’s deposition. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353,\\n361 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “an adverse party may not rest\\nupon the mere allegations … but … must set forth specific facts\\nshowing there is a genuine issue for trial.”).\\n The conduct in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417\\n(7th Cir. 1989) is an example. Brooms was employed by Regal\\nTube Company for sixteen months and during her time with\\nthe company endured numerous racist and sexually suggestive\\ncomments from a supervisor. The supervisor showed Brooms\\na pornographic photograph depicting “an interracial act of\\nsodomy and told her that the photograph showed the ‘talent’\\nof a black woman.” Id. The supervisor also showed her a racist\\npornographic picture involving bestiality and threatened that\\nthe photograph depicted was the fate in store for Brooms. Id.\\nHe then grabbed her by the arm and threatened to kill her if\\nshe moved. Id.\\n Here, the alleged conduct, while unacceptable, does not\\namount to constructive discharge. While comments like these\\nhave no place in the workplace, our precedent makes clear that\\na plaintiff must provide evidence of an environment of\\nsignificantly greater severity before an actionable claim of\\nconstructive discharge materializes. Additionally, there are\\nnumerous cases in which employees were subjected to similar\\nbehavior that we held the conduct was not actionable. See\\nSaxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993)\\n(affirming summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff\\n\\f8 No. 18-3403\\n\\nalleged her supervisor rubbed her upper leg several times,\\nkissed her without consent, and lurched at her as if to grab her\\nafter hiding behind some bushes); Roby, 579 F.3d at 785\\n(finding no constructive discharge when a co-worker made\\nsexually suggestive remarks, pressed his body against plain-\\ntiff’s backside, put his arm around her, patted her on the\\nbuttocks, and pushed plaintiff by the hips); Koelsch v. Beltone\\nElecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary\\njudgment for defendant where supervisor removed his shoe\\nand suggestively rubbed his foot against plaintiff’s legs under\\nthe table, grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks, told plaintiff he found\\nher attractive and that he was unable to control himself around\\nher, and asked plaintiff to go out with him); Gleason v. Mesirow\\nFin., 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997) (no hostile work environment\\nclaim where supervisor referred to female customers as\\n“bitchy” and “dumb,” spoke about the size of female em-\\nployee’s breasts, told a female employee that he liked her in\\ntighter skirts, told plaintiff he dreamt about holding hands\\nwith her); Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (no actionable harassment where harasser referenced\\nplaintiff’s “tits,” commented that plaintiff was attractive and\\nhad nice legs, used profanity, made comments about his penis\\nsize, and commented that a female coworker needed to have\\nsex); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (no sexual harassment where supervisor commented on\\nplaintiff’s looks, made grunting noises at her, indicated he was\\nlonely, and made gestures intending to suggest masturbation).\\nThe case at hand is similar to the above cases in severity. Hunt\\nalleges that Watson made several sexually suggestive com-\\nments that were inappropriate. But Hunt has not alleged she\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 9\\n\\nwas ever touched by Watson, that she was ever threatened by\\nWatson, nor that she was concerned for her safety at any point.\\nAs such, we agree with the district court’s holding that\\nconstructive discharge was not established.\\n B. Reasonable Care\\n The first element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires a\\ndefendant to show that it took both preventative and corrective\\nmeasures to address sexual harassment. Gentry v. Exp. Packagin\\nCo., 238 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2001). Employers must “take all\\nsteps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring.”\\nFaragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997)).\\n“Prevention can involve proactive steps such as constructing\\na reporting system for instances of sexual harassment, training\\nemployees about sexual harassment risks and what can be\\ndone to ameliorate them … and taking reasonable steps to\\nprevent harassment once informed of a reasonable probability\\nthat it will occur.” Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 469\\nF.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Hunt’s primary argument is that Watson’s harassment of\\nCampbell demonstrates that the measures taken by Wal-Mart\\nwere deficient. When raised properly, this argument has force.\\nThe prior harassment demonstrates that Wal-Mart was on\\nnotice that harassment was likely to occur. Wal-Mart, in fact,\\nmoved Watson to the night shift because he had been accused\\nof harassing Campbell on the day shift. On the night shift\\nWatson was the highest ranking employee and often alone\\nwith employees. In Cerros, we noted that prevention should\\ninclude close monitoring when an employer has knowledge of\\nprior harassment: “at a minimum [the employer] could have\\n\\f10 No. 18-3403\\n\\nhad a manager check on the area in question on a regular basis\\nto ensure the problem did not recur.” Cerros v. Steel Techs., 398\\nF.3d, 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv.\\nCorp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, EEOC\\nguidance states, “If … the employer has an adequate policy\\nand complaint procedure and properly responded to an\\nemployee’s complaint of harassment, but management ignored\\nprevious complaints by other employees by the same harasser,\\nthen the employer has not exercised reasonable care in pre-\\nventing harassment.” Equal Employment Opportunity\\nCommission, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability\\nfor Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, available at\\nwww.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. But Hunt failed to\\nmake these arguments in the district court and “[f]ailing to\\nbring an argument to the district court means that you waive\\nthat argument on appeal.” Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d\\n1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Based on the arguments properly presented, no reasonable\\njury could find that Wal-Mart acted unreasonably. Wal-Mart\\nhad a comprehensive policy that explicitly prohibited sexual\\nharassment. The policy states that Wal-Mart “will not tolerate\\nany form of discrimination or harassment in any aspect of our\\nbusiness.” Included in the list of prohibited forms of harass-\\nment is “repeated unwanted sexual flirtations, advances, or\\npropositions.”Additionally, the options for reporting retalia-\\ntion were robust:\\n If you experience conduct that may violate this\\n policy or if you observe or become aware of any\\n conduct that may violate this policy by being\\n discriminatory, harassing or retaliatory, you\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 11\\n\\n should immediately report the violation to any\\n salaried member of management or confiden-\\n tially and/or anonymously to the Global Ethics\\n Office []. If you believe a salaried member of\\n management may be violating this policy, you\\n do not have to report the violation to that per-\\n son. You may report the possible violation to\\n another salaried member of management or call\\n the Global Ethics Office.\\nAn employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy\\nis an important factor in determining whether it exercised\\nreasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. Smith v. First\\nUnion Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Wal-\\nMart had such a policy.\\n Additionally, investigation into the incident was prompt\\nand thorough. After Turner received the complaint from Hunt,\\nhe provided a copy of the complaint form to human resources.\\nThe same day, human resources instructed him to complete an\\ninvestigation into the matter. This Court has often said, “a\\nprompt investigation is the hallmark of a reasonable corrective\\naction.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (quoting Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 985 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). During the investigation, Turner asserts he met with\\nHunt and Watson on two separate occasions, first to gather\\ninformation and then to discuss the findings and the course of\\naction as recommended by human resources. Because Hunt\\ndid not provide Turner with any witnesses, his investigation\\nwas limited to interviewing the involved parties. The investi-\\ngation was completed quickly and Turner determined he was\\nunable to substantiate the claims. Nevertheless, Turner\\n\\f12 No. 18-3403\\n\\nreiterated to Watson the importance of a harassment-free work\\nenvironment and required him to retake the company’s ethics\\ncourse which included anti-harassment training. Furthermore,\\nHunt did not allege any instances of sexual harassment\\noccurred after the investigation was complete. “There is no\\nquestion that a stoppage of harassment shows effectiveness.”\\nPorter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n In sum, we find that Wal-Mart did what a reasonable\\nemployer should. It promulgated a comprehensive sexual\\nharassment policy, trained its employees, maintained an\\neffective reporting system, expeditiously investigated Hunt’s\\ncomplaint, and communicated its zero-tolerance policy and\\nretrained Watson even though the investigation failed to\\nsubstantiate the allegations against him.\\n C. Unreasonable Delay\\n The second element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires\\nthe defendant to show plaintiff unreasonably failed to take\\nadvantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities the\\nemployer provided. This is a functional test that asks “whether\\nthe employee adequately alerted her employer to the harass-\\nment, thereby satisfying her obligation to avoid the harm, not\\nwhether she followed the letter of the reporting procedures set\\nout in the employer’s harassment policy.” Cerros, 398 F.3d at\\n952. But demonstrating a plaintiff failed to use the provided\\nreporting procedures “will normally suffice to satisfy the\\nemployer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”\\nId. (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08).\\n Here, Hunt failed to take advantage of any reporting\\nmechanisms for four months and thereby prevented Wal-Mart\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 13\\n\\nfrom taking corrective measures. Hunt argues that she did not\\nreport Watson’s behavior because she was unaware of the\\nanonymous hotline and believed that she had to report to\\nTurner. She further asserts that she feared retaliation for\\nreporting. But “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation,\\nunpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s\\nduty to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environ-\\nment.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quoting Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th\\nCir. 2000)). The record indicates that the anonymous phone\\nline for reporting sexual harassment was included in\\nWal-Mart’s sexual harassment policy and the policy also\\nindicates that Hunt could have reported the incident to any\\nsalaried employee she felt comfortable with. While we do not\\nintend to minimize the difficulty involved in reporting these\\nissues, employees have a duty to utilize reporting mechanisms\\nprovided by their employer, or otherwise alert their employer\\nof the problem, when they can do so without “undue risk or\\nexpense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. Not only did Hunt fail to\\nuse any of these reporting mechanisms, she otherwise\\ncompletely failed to alert Wal-Mart of the problem for months.\\nMcPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(“An employer cannot be considered to have knowledge of\\nsexual harassment unless the employee makes a concerted\\neffort to inform the employer that a problem exists”). Because\\nHunt could have utilized the reporting systems implemented\\nby Wal-Mart without undue risk or expense, but failed to for\\nseveral months, we find Wal-Mart has carried its burden of\\nshowing Hunt’s delay was unreasonable. See Jackson v. Cty. of\\nRacine, 474 F.3d 493, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding it was\\n\\f14 No. 18-3403\\n\\nunreasonable for an employee to wait four months before\\nreporting sexual harassment to her employer); Roby, 579 F.3d\\nat 786 (holding that a five month delay under similar\\ncircumstances was unreasonable).\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n With the various contentions of the plaintiff considered, the\\njudgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420688/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643435/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tristana HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3403\n\nTRISTANA HUNT,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n\nWAL-MART STORES, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 16 C 05924 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED MAY 23, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\n\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Tristana Hunt worked the overnight\nshift in the electronics department of a Wal-Mart store and\nDaniel Watson was her supervisor. After Watson made several\nunprofessional remarks toward Hunt over a four-month\nperiod, Hunt filed a complaint with human resources. Wal-\nMart promptly investigated the claims but was unable to\n\f2 No. 18-3403\n\nsubstantiate them. Hunt then filed a complaint in federal court\nalleging Watson sexually harassed her by creating a hostile\nwork environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights\nAct of 1964. At summary judgment, the district court held that\nWal-Mart established the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense\nto liability because it reasonably prevented and corrected\nsexual harassment, and Hunt unreasonably delayed in report-\ning the harassment. We agree and affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n Before Watson and Hunt worked together on the night\nshift, Watson worked as a supervisor on the day shift. While\nworking on the day shift Watson was accused of sexually\nharassing an individual he supervised, Toyanna Campbell.\nCampbell filed a complaint on October 24, 2012, which\ninformed human resources that Watson had told Campbell he\nliked her several times. After she said she did not like him he\nclosed the door and window to his office, put his hand on her\narm, and refused to let go of her until she screamed. Watson\nwas provided with a written “coaching” for the conduct\ndescribed in the complaint. “Coaching” is the Wal-Mart\nequivalent of being written up and is intended to provide\ninstruction and assistance when an employee’s performance is\nnot up to Wal-Mart’s standards.\n On November 7, 2012, Campbell filed another complaint\nalleging Watson had acted inappropriately. According to the\ncomplaint he asked her what perfume she was wearing,\ncomplimented her on her “musk,” implied that she liked him\nwhen she called him to the front of the store, informed her that\nhe was single and asked if she was single, told her he was\n\fNo. 18-3403 3\n\nlooking for a girlfriend, and told her he really liked her. In\nresponse to this incident, Wal-Mart provided Watson with a\nsecond written coaching and moved him to the overnight shift.\n Hunt met Watson for the first time during a shift in May\n2013. Watson came up to her and asked her why she was\nwearing a particular shirt, saying that he could see her breasts,\nand then commented that he did not understand how a\nwoman could have breasts so large despite having a small\nbody. Hunt was uncomfortable and walked away from the\nincident to avoid further comments. About a month later,\nWatson walked up behind Hunt while she was bending over,\nstood close to her, and made another comment about her\nbreasts. Hunt told him that his comments were inappropriate\nand again walked away. This time Watson followed her and\ntold her he wanted to shower with her and feel her breasts.\n On June 25, 2013, Hunt showed Watson a picture of a fallen\ntree on her phone to explain that inclement weather had\ncaused her to miss the previous workday. Watson took the\nphone from her hand and indicated he was looking through it\nfor naked pictures. Hunt asked him to stop and took her phone\nback. Watson replied that he would not excuse her absence and\nagain asked when he could see her breasts.\n In late August Watson made similar offensive comments\ntowards Hunt and in mid-September, Watson asked to see\nHunt’s breasts several times within a few days. On Septem-\nber 27, 2013, after Hunt refused another advance, Watson gave\nher written coaching for not working her scheduled shifts and\ncited her June 24 absence as one such absence. Immediately\nfollowing this formal discipline, Hunt decided to report\n\f4 No. 18-3403\n\nWatson’s harassment to the store manager, Mark Turner, at the\nend of her shift.\n Hunt asked Turner for a complaint form when he arrived\nfor his shift. This was the first time Hunt informed Turner of\nany issues between her and Watson. When Turner asked Hunt\nif she knew of any witnesses, she told him to ask around about\nWatson’s behavior. Turner collected the complaint from Hunt\nand provided it to human resources. Later that day, human\nresources informed Turner that he needed to complete an\ninvestigation into Hunt’s complaint. Turner opened an\ninvestigation immediately and interviewed Watson eight days\nlater. Watson denied making any sexual comments towards\nHunt. Turner concluded Hunt’s claims could not be substanti-\nated without corroborating witnesses. Nonetheless, he re-\nquired Watson to retake the company’s ethics training course\nwhich included anti-harassment training. Watson completed\nthe course on November 6, 2013. Hunt reported no incidents of\nharassment following the discipline.\n Hunt filed a complaint in federal court on June 7, 2016, and\nan amended complaint on July 1, 2016. Hunt alleged she was\nsubjected to a hostile work environment by being sexually\nharassed on a daily basis for five months. Wal-Mart moved for\nsummary judgment arguing that Watson’s actions did not\ncreate a hostile work environment or in the alternative that\nWal-Mart had established an affirmative defense to liability as\na matter of law. The district court admitted it was “unable to\ndetermine whether Plaintiff suffered a hostile work environ-\nment claim,” but granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-\nMart, holding it had proved the affirmative defense outlined\nby the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.\n\fNo. 18-3403 5\n\n742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775\n(1998). Because we agree, we affirm.\n II. DISCUSSION\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Parker v.\nFour Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2017). The\nCourt must decide whether the evidence is such that a reason-\nable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).\n A hostile work environment claim requires a plaintiff show:\n(1) the work environment was objectively and subjectively\noffensive, (2) the harassment complained of was based on\ngender, (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive, and\n(4) a basis for employer liability exists. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co.,\n587 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has held\nthat Title VII does not demand employers be held vicariously\nliable for hostile work environments created by their supervi-\nsors unless it is accompanied by an adverse employment\naction. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06\n(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). An\nemployer may escape liability if it can show the hostile work\nenvironment was not accompanied by an adverse employment\naction and prove an affirmative defense. Id.\n The Faragher-Ellerth defense is one such defense and\nrequires the employer prove by a preponderance of the\nevidence that: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and\ncorrect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the\nplaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-\ntive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to\notherwise avoid harm. Id. at 765.\n\f6 No. 18-3403\n\n A. Adverse Employment Action\n As noted above, if Hunt can establish an adverse employ-\nment action was taken against her, she can prevent Wal-Mart\nfrom claiming the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Hunt argues that a\nreasonable jury could conclude she was constructively dis-\ncharged. Constructive discharge requires an employee prove\nher working conditions were so intolerable that she was forced\ninto involuntary resignation. Roby v. CWI, Inc., 579 F.3d 779,\n785 (7th Cir. 2009). To establish such a claim a plaintiff must\nshow working conditions “even more egregious than the high\nstandard for hostile work environment claims.” Boumehdi v.\nPlastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2007).\n No evidence indicates that Hunt was forced into involun-\ntary resignation due to Watson’s conduct. Quite the contrary,\nHunt continued to work the same shift at the same Wal-Mart\nstore for several years without alleging any additional inci-\ndents of sexual harassment. Not until more than three years\nlater, when Hunt failed to return to work after a period of\nmedical leave, was she let go. This failure to present evidence\nthat her employment ceased due to an intolerable working\nenvironment precludes a finding of constructive discharge as\na matter of law. See Roby, 579 F.3d at 786 (finding no construc-\ntive discharge when plaintiff “essentially just quit coming to\nwork while [her employer] was attempting to resolve the\nissue”).\n Even if we were able to construe Hunt’s delayed decision\nto stop showing up to work as a “resignation,” we must\ndetermine whether it was “involuntary” by assessing whether\nthe conditions were intolerable. The cases where we have\n\fNo. 18-3403 7\n\nfound constructive discharge are significantly more egregious\nthan the facts at hand. Here, Hunt avers Watson made sexually\nsuggestive comments towards her on a number of occasions;\nthe only evidence that these incidents occurred are found in\nHunt’s deposition. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353,\n361 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “an adverse party may not rest\nupon the mere allegations … but … must set forth specific facts\nshowing there is a genuine issue for trial.”).\n The conduct in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417\n(7th Cir. 1989) is an example. Brooms was employed by Regal\nTube Company for sixteen months and during her time with\nthe company endured numerous racist and sexually suggestive\ncomments from a supervisor. The supervisor showed Brooms\na pornographic photograph depicting “an interracial act of\nsodomy and told her that the photograph showed the ‘talent’\nof a black woman.” Id. The supervisor also showed her a racist\npornographic picture involving bestiality and threatened that\nthe photograph depicted was the fate in store for Brooms. Id.\nHe then grabbed her by the arm and threatened to kill her if\nshe moved. Id.\n Here, the alleged conduct, while unacceptable, does not\namount to constructive discharge. While comments like these\nhave no place in the workplace, our precedent makes clear that\na plaintiff must provide evidence of an environment of\nsignificantly greater severity before an actionable claim of\nconstructive discharge materializes. Additionally, there are\nnumerous cases in which employees were subjected to similar\nbehavior that we held the conduct was not actionable. See\nSaxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993)\n(affirming summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff\n\f8 No. 18-3403\n\nalleged her supervisor rubbed her upper leg several times,\nkissed her without consent, and lurched at her as if to grab her\nafter hiding behind some bushes); Roby, 579 F.3d at 785\n(finding no constructive discharge when a co-worker made\nsexually suggestive remarks, pressed his body against plain-\ntiff’s backside, put his arm around her, patted her on the\nbuttocks, and pushed plaintiff by the hips); Koelsch v. Beltone\nElecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary\njudgment for defendant where supervisor removed his shoe\nand suggestively rubbed his foot against plaintiff’s legs under\nthe table, grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks, told plaintiff he found\nher attractive and that he was unable to control himself around\nher, and asked plaintiff to go out with him); Gleason v. Mesirow\nFin., 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997) (no hostile work environment\nclaim where supervisor referred to female customers as\n“bitchy” and “dumb,” spoke about the size of female em-\nployee’s breasts, told a female employee that he liked her in\ntighter skirts, told plaintiff he dreamt about holding hands\nwith her); Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir.\n2004) (no actionable harassment where harasser referenced\nplaintiff’s “tits,” commented that plaintiff was attractive and\nhad nice legs, used profanity, made comments about his penis\nsize, and commented that a female coworker needed to have\nsex); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir.\n1995) (no sexual harassment where supervisor commented on\nplaintiff’s looks, made grunting noises at her, indicated he was\nlonely, and made gestures intending to suggest masturbation).\nThe case at hand is similar to the above cases in severity. Hunt\nalleges that Watson made several sexually suggestive com-\nments that were inappropriate. But Hunt has not alleged she\n\fNo. 18-3403 9\n\nwas ever touched by Watson, that she was ever threatened by\nWatson, nor that she was concerned for her safety at any point.\nAs such, we agree with the district court’s holding that\nconstructive discharge was not established.\n B. Reasonable Care\n The first element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires a\ndefendant to show that it took both preventative and corrective\nmeasures to address sexual harassment. Gentry v. Exp. Packagin\nCo., 238 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2001). Employers must “take all\nsteps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring.”\nFaragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997)).\n“Prevention can involve proactive steps such as constructing\na reporting system for instances of sexual harassment, training\nemployees about sexual harassment risks and what can be\ndone to ameliorate them … and taking reasonable steps to\nprevent harassment once informed of a reasonable probability\nthat it will occur.” Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 469\nF.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006).\n Hunt’s primary argument is that Watson’s harassment of\nCampbell demonstrates that the measures taken by Wal-Mart\nwere deficient. When raised properly, this argument has force.\nThe prior harassment demonstrates that Wal-Mart was on\nnotice that harassment was likely to occur. Wal-Mart, in fact,\nmoved Watson to the night shift because he had been accused\nof harassing Campbell on the day shift. On the night shift\nWatson was the highest ranking employee and often alone\nwith employees. In Cerros, we noted that prevention should\ninclude close monitoring when an employer has knowledge of\nprior harassment: “at a minimum [the employer] could have\n\f10 No. 18-3403\n\nhad a manager check on the area in question on a regular basis\nto ensure the problem did not recur.” Cerros v. Steel Techs., 398\nF.3d, 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv.\nCorp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, EEOC\nguidance states, “If … the employer has an adequate policy\nand complaint procedure and properly responded to an\nemployee’s complaint of harassment, but management ignored\nprevious complaints by other employees by the same harasser,\nthen the employer has not exercised reasonable care in pre-\nventing harassment.” Equal Employment Opportunity\nCommission, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability\nfor Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, available at\nwww.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. But Hunt failed to\nmake these arguments in the district court and “[f]ailing to\nbring an argument to the district court means that you waive\nthat argument on appeal.” Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d\n1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Based on the arguments properly presented, no reasonable\njury could find that Wal-Mart acted unreasonably. Wal-Mart\nhad a comprehensive policy that explicitly prohibited sexual\nharassment. The policy states that Wal-Mart “will not tolerate\nany form of discrimination or harassment in any aspect of our\nbusiness.” Included in the list of prohibited forms of harass-\nment is “repeated unwanted sexual flirtations, advances, or\npropositions.”Additionally, the options for reporting retalia-\ntion were robust:\n If you experience conduct that may violate this\n policy or if you observe or become aware of any\n conduct that may violate this policy by being\n discriminatory, harassing or retaliatory, you\n\fNo. 18-3403 11\n\n should immediately report the violation to any\n salaried member of management or confiden-\n tially and/or anonymously to the Global Ethics\n Office []. If you believe a salaried member of\n management may be violating this policy, you\n do not have to report the violation to that per-\n son. You may report the possible violation to\n another salaried member of management or call\n the Global Ethics Office.\nAn employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy\nis an important factor in determining whether it exercised\nreasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. Smith v. First\nUnion Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Wal-\nMart had such a policy.\n Additionally, investigation into the incident was prompt\nand thorough. After Turner received the complaint from Hunt,\nhe provided a copy of the complaint form to human resources.\nThe same day, human resources instructed him to complete an\ninvestigation into the matter. This Court has often said, “a\nprompt investigation is the hallmark of a reasonable corrective\naction.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th\nCir. 2009) (quoting Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 985 (7th Cir.\n2008)). During the investigation, Turner asserts he met with\nHunt and Watson on two separate occasions, first to gather\ninformation and then to discuss the findings and the course of\naction as recommended by human resources. Because Hunt\ndid not provide Turner with any witnesses, his investigation\nwas limited to interviewing the involved parties. The investi-\ngation was completed quickly and Turner determined he was\nunable to substantiate the claims. Nevertheless, Turner\n\f12 No. 18-3403\n\nreiterated to Watson the importance of a harassment-free work\nenvironment and required him to retake the company’s ethics\ncourse which included anti-harassment training. Furthermore,\nHunt did not allege any instances of sexual harassment\noccurred after the investigation was complete. “There is no\nquestion that a stoppage of harassment shows effectiveness.”\nPorter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2009).\n In sum, we find that Wal-Mart did what a reasonable\nemployer should. It promulgated a comprehensive sexual\nharassment policy, trained its employees, maintained an\neffective reporting system, expeditiously investigated Hunt’s\ncomplaint, and communicated its zero-tolerance policy and\nretrained Watson even though the investigation failed to\nsubstantiate the allegations against him.\n C. Unreasonable Delay\n The second element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires\nthe defendant to show plaintiff unreasonably failed to take\nadvantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities the\nemployer provided. This is a functional test that asks “whether\nthe employee adequately alerted her employer to the harass-\nment, thereby satisfying her obligation to avoid the harm, not\nwhether she followed the letter of the reporting procedures set\nout in the employer’s harassment policy.” Cerros, 398 F.3d at\n952. But demonstrating a plaintiff failed to use the provided\nreporting procedures “will normally suffice to satisfy the\nemployer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”\nId. (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08).\n Here, Hunt failed to take advantage of any reporting\nmechanisms for four months and thereby prevented Wal-Mart\n\fNo. 18-3403 13\n\nfrom taking corrective measures. Hunt argues that she did not\nreport Watson’s behavior because she was unaware of the\nanonymous hotline and believed that she had to report to\nTurner. She further asserts that she feared retaliation for\nreporting. But “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation,\nunpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s\nduty to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environ-\nment.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir.\n2009) (quoting Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th\nCir. 2000)). The record indicates that the anonymous phone\nline for reporting sexual harassment was included in\nWal-Mart’s sexual harassment policy and the policy also\nindicates that Hunt could have reported the incident to any\nsalaried employee she felt comfortable with. While we do not\nintend to minimize the difficulty involved in reporting these\nissues, employees have a duty to utilize reporting mechanisms\nprovided by their employer, or otherwise alert their employer\nof the problem, when they can do so without “undue risk or\nexpense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. Not only did Hunt fail to\nuse any of these reporting mechanisms, she otherwise\ncompletely failed to alert Wal-Mart of the problem for months.\nMcPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2004)\n(“An employer cannot be considered to have knowledge of\nsexual harassment unless the employee makes a concerted\neffort to inform the employer that a problem exists”). Because\nHunt could have utilized the reporting systems implemented\nby Wal-Mart without undue risk or expense, but failed to for\nseveral months, we find Wal-Mart has carried its burden of\nshowing Hunt’s delay was unreasonable. See Jackson v. Cty. of\nRacine, 474 F.3d 493, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding it was\n\f14 No. 18-3403\n\nunreasonable for an employee to wait four months before\nreporting sexual harassment to her employer); Roby, 579 F.3d\nat 786 (holding that a five month delay under similar\ncircumstances was unreasonable).\n III. CONCLUSION\n With the various contentions of the plaintiff considered, the\njudgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tristana HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3403\\n\\nTRISTANA HUNT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nWAL-MART STORES, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 16 C 05924 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 23, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 26, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. Tristana Hunt worked the overnight\\nshift in the electronics department of a Wal-Mart store and\\nDaniel Watson was her supervisor. After Watson made several\\nunprofessional remarks toward Hunt over a four-month\\nperiod, Hunt filed a complaint with human resources. Wal-\\nMart promptly investigated the claims but was unable to\\n\\f2 No. 18-3403\\n\\nsubstantiate them. Hunt then filed a complaint in federal court\\nalleging Watson sexually harassed her by creating a hostile\\nwork environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights\\nAct of 1964. At summary judgment, the district court held that\\nWal-Mart established the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense\\nto liability because it reasonably prevented and corrected\\nsexual harassment, and Hunt unreasonably delayed in report-\\ning the harassment. We agree and affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Before Watson and Hunt worked together on the night\\nshift, Watson worked as a supervisor on the day shift. While\\nworking on the day shift Watson was accused of sexually\\nharassing an individual he supervised, Toyanna Campbell.\\nCampbell filed a complaint on October 24, 2012, which\\ninformed human resources that Watson had told Campbell he\\nliked her several times. After she said she did not like him he\\nclosed the door and window to his office, put his hand on her\\narm, and refused to let go of her until she screamed. Watson\\nwas provided with a written “coaching” for the conduct\\ndescribed in the complaint. “Coaching” is the Wal-Mart\\nequivalent of being written up and is intended to provide\\ninstruction and assistance when an employee’s performance is\\nnot up to Wal-Mart’s standards.\\n On November 7, 2012, Campbell filed another complaint\\nalleging Watson had acted inappropriately. According to the\\ncomplaint he asked her what perfume she was wearing,\\ncomplimented her on her “musk,” implied that she liked him\\nwhen she called him to the front of the store, informed her that\\nhe was single and asked if she was single, told her he was\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 3\\n\\nlooking for a girlfriend, and told her he really liked her. In\\nresponse to this incident, Wal-Mart provided Watson with a\\nsecond written coaching and moved him to the overnight shift.\\n Hunt met Watson for the first time during a shift in May\\n2013. Watson came up to her and asked her why she was\\nwearing a particular shirt, saying that he could see her breasts,\\nand then commented that he did not understand how a\\nwoman could have breasts so large despite having a small\\nbody. Hunt was uncomfortable and walked away from the\\nincident to avoid further comments. About a month later,\\nWatson walked up behind Hunt while she was bending over,\\nstood close to her, and made another comment about her\\nbreasts. Hunt told him that his comments were inappropriate\\nand again walked away. This time Watson followed her and\\ntold her he wanted to shower with her and feel her breasts.\\n On June 25, 2013, Hunt showed Watson a picture of a fallen\\ntree on her phone to explain that inclement weather had\\ncaused her to miss the previous workday. Watson took the\\nphone from her hand and indicated he was looking through it\\nfor naked pictures. Hunt asked him to stop and took her phone\\nback. Watson replied that he would not excuse her absence and\\nagain asked when he could see her breasts.\\n In late August Watson made similar offensive comments\\ntowards Hunt and in mid-September, Watson asked to see\\nHunt’s breasts several times within a few days. On Septem-\\nber 27, 2013, after Hunt refused another advance, Watson gave\\nher written coaching for not working her scheduled shifts and\\ncited her June 24 absence as one such absence. Immediately\\nfollowing this formal discipline, Hunt decided to report\\n\\f4 No. 18-3403\\n\\nWatson’s harassment to the store manager, Mark Turner, at the\\nend of her shift.\\n Hunt asked Turner for a complaint form when he arrived\\nfor his shift. This was the first time Hunt informed Turner of\\nany issues between her and Watson. When Turner asked Hunt\\nif she knew of any witnesses, she told him to ask around about\\nWatson’s behavior. Turner collected the complaint from Hunt\\nand provided it to human resources. Later that day, human\\nresources informed Turner that he needed to complete an\\ninvestigation into Hunt’s complaint. Turner opened an\\ninvestigation immediately and interviewed Watson eight days\\nlater. Watson denied making any sexual comments towards\\nHunt. Turner concluded Hunt’s claims could not be substanti-\\nated without corroborating witnesses. Nonetheless, he re-\\nquired Watson to retake the company’s ethics training course\\nwhich included anti-harassment training. Watson completed\\nthe course on November 6, 2013. Hunt reported no incidents of\\nharassment following the discipline.\\n Hunt filed a complaint in federal court on June 7, 2016, and\\nan amended complaint on July 1, 2016. Hunt alleged she was\\nsubjected to a hostile work environment by being sexually\\nharassed on a daily basis for five months. Wal-Mart moved for\\nsummary judgment arguing that Watson’s actions did not\\ncreate a hostile work environment or in the alternative that\\nWal-Mart had established an affirmative defense to liability as\\na matter of law. The district court admitted it was “unable to\\ndetermine whether Plaintiff suffered a hostile work environ-\\nment claim,” but granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-\\nMart, holding it had proved the affirmative defense outlined\\nby the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 5\\n\\n742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775\\n(1998). Because we agree, we affirm.\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Parker v.\\nFour Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2017). The\\nCourt must decide whether the evidence is such that a reason-\\nable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.\\nAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).\\n A hostile work environment claim requires a plaintiff show:\\n(1) the work environment was objectively and subjectively\\noffensive, (2) the harassment complained of was based on\\ngender, (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive, and\\n(4) a basis for employer liability exists. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co.,\\n587 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has held\\nthat Title VII does not demand employers be held vicariously\\nliable for hostile work environments created by their supervi-\\nsors unless it is accompanied by an adverse employment\\naction. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06\\n(1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). An\\nemployer may escape liability if it can show the hostile work\\nenvironment was not accompanied by an adverse employment\\naction and prove an affirmative defense. Id.\\n The Faragher-Ellerth defense is one such defense and\\nrequires the employer prove by a preponderance of the\\nevidence that: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and\\ncorrect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the\\nplaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preven-\\ntive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to\\notherwise avoid harm. Id. at 765.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3403\\n\\n A. Adverse Employment Action\\n As noted above, if Hunt can establish an adverse employ-\\nment action was taken against her, she can prevent Wal-Mart\\nfrom claiming the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Hunt argues that a\\nreasonable jury could conclude she was constructively dis-\\ncharged. Constructive discharge requires an employee prove\\nher working conditions were so intolerable that she was forced\\ninto involuntary resignation. Roby v. CWI, Inc., 579 F.3d 779,\\n785 (7th Cir. 2009). To establish such a claim a plaintiff must\\nshow working conditions “even more egregious than the high\\nstandard for hostile work environment claims.” Boumehdi v.\\nPlastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2007).\\n No evidence indicates that Hunt was forced into involun-\\ntary resignation due to Watson’s conduct. Quite the contrary,\\nHunt continued to work the same shift at the same Wal-Mart\\nstore for several years without alleging any additional inci-\\ndents of sexual harassment. Not until more than three years\\nlater, when Hunt failed to return to work after a period of\\nmedical leave, was she let go. This failure to present evidence\\nthat her employment ceased due to an intolerable working\\nenvironment precludes a finding of constructive discharge as\\na matter of law. See Roby, 579 F.3d at 786 (finding no construc-\\ntive discharge when plaintiff “essentially just quit coming to\\nwork while [her employer] was attempting to resolve the\\nissue”).\\n Even if we were able to construe Hunt’s delayed decision\\nto stop showing up to work as a “resignation,” we must\\ndetermine whether it was “involuntary” by assessing whether\\nthe conditions were intolerable. The cases where we have\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 7\\n\\nfound constructive discharge are significantly more egregious\\nthan the facts at hand. Here, Hunt avers Watson made sexually\\nsuggestive comments towards her on a number of occasions;\\nthe only evidence that these incidents occurred are found in\\nHunt’s deposition. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353,\\n361 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “an adverse party may not rest\\nupon the mere allegations … but … must set forth specific facts\\nshowing there is a genuine issue for trial.”).\\n The conduct in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 417\\n(7th Cir. 1989) is an example. Brooms was employed by Regal\\nTube Company for sixteen months and during her time with\\nthe company endured numerous racist and sexually suggestive\\ncomments from a supervisor. The supervisor showed Brooms\\na pornographic photograph depicting “an interracial act of\\nsodomy and told her that the photograph showed the ‘talent’\\nof a black woman.” Id. The supervisor also showed her a racist\\npornographic picture involving bestiality and threatened that\\nthe photograph depicted was the fate in store for Brooms. Id.\\nHe then grabbed her by the arm and threatened to kill her if\\nshe moved. Id.\\n Here, the alleged conduct, while unacceptable, does not\\namount to constructive discharge. While comments like these\\nhave no place in the workplace, our precedent makes clear that\\na plaintiff must provide evidence of an environment of\\nsignificantly greater severity before an actionable claim of\\nconstructive discharge materializes. Additionally, there are\\nnumerous cases in which employees were subjected to similar\\nbehavior that we held the conduct was not actionable. See\\nSaxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993)\\n(affirming summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff\\n\\f8 No. 18-3403\\n\\nalleged her supervisor rubbed her upper leg several times,\\nkissed her without consent, and lurched at her as if to grab her\\nafter hiding behind some bushes); Roby, 579 F.3d at 785\\n(finding no constructive discharge when a co-worker made\\nsexually suggestive remarks, pressed his body against plain-\\ntiff’s backside, put his arm around her, patted her on the\\nbuttocks, and pushed plaintiff by the hips); Koelsch v. Beltone\\nElecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary\\njudgment for defendant where supervisor removed his shoe\\nand suggestively rubbed his foot against plaintiff’s legs under\\nthe table, grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks, told plaintiff he found\\nher attractive and that he was unable to control himself around\\nher, and asked plaintiff to go out with him); Gleason v. Mesirow\\nFin., 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997) (no hostile work environment\\nclaim where supervisor referred to female customers as\\n“bitchy” and “dumb,” spoke about the size of female em-\\nployee’s breasts, told a female employee that he liked her in\\ntighter skirts, told plaintiff he dreamt about holding hands\\nwith her); Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (no actionable harassment where harasser referenced\\nplaintiff’s “tits,” commented that plaintiff was attractive and\\nhad nice legs, used profanity, made comments about his penis\\nsize, and commented that a female coworker needed to have\\nsex); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (no sexual harassment where supervisor commented on\\nplaintiff’s looks, made grunting noises at her, indicated he was\\nlonely, and made gestures intending to suggest masturbation).\\nThe case at hand is similar to the above cases in severity. Hunt\\nalleges that Watson made several sexually suggestive com-\\nments that were inappropriate. But Hunt has not alleged she\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 9\\n\\nwas ever touched by Watson, that she was ever threatened by\\nWatson, nor that she was concerned for her safety at any point.\\nAs such, we agree with the district court’s holding that\\nconstructive discharge was not established.\\n B. Reasonable Care\\n The first element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires a\\ndefendant to show that it took both preventative and corrective\\nmeasures to address sexual harassment. Gentry v. Exp. Packagin\\nCo., 238 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2001). Employers must “take all\\nsteps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring.”\\nFaragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1997)).\\n“Prevention can involve proactive steps such as constructing\\na reporting system for instances of sexual harassment, training\\nemployees about sexual harassment risks and what can be\\ndone to ameliorate them … and taking reasonable steps to\\nprevent harassment once informed of a reasonable probability\\nthat it will occur.” Erickson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 469\\nF.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006).\\n Hunt’s primary argument is that Watson’s harassment of\\nCampbell demonstrates that the measures taken by Wal-Mart\\nwere deficient. When raised properly, this argument has force.\\nThe prior harassment demonstrates that Wal-Mart was on\\nnotice that harassment was likely to occur. Wal-Mart, in fact,\\nmoved Watson to the night shift because he had been accused\\nof harassing Campbell on the day shift. On the night shift\\nWatson was the highest ranking employee and often alone\\nwith employees. In Cerros, we noted that prevention should\\ninclude close monitoring when an employer has knowledge of\\nprior harassment: “at a minimum [the employer] could have\\n\\f10 No. 18-3403\\n\\nhad a manager check on the area in question on a regular basis\\nto ensure the problem did not recur.” Cerros v. Steel Techs., 398\\nF.3d, 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv.\\nCorp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, EEOC\\nguidance states, “If … the employer has an adequate policy\\nand complaint procedure and properly responded to an\\nemployee’s complaint of harassment, but management ignored\\nprevious complaints by other employees by the same harasser,\\nthen the employer has not exercised reasonable care in pre-\\nventing harassment.” Equal Employment Opportunity\\nCommission, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability\\nfor Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, available at\\nwww.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. But Hunt failed to\\nmake these arguments in the district court and “[f]ailing to\\nbring an argument to the district court means that you waive\\nthat argument on appeal.” Wheeler v. Hronopoulos, 891 F.3d\\n1072, 1073 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Based on the arguments properly presented, no reasonable\\njury could find that Wal-Mart acted unreasonably. Wal-Mart\\nhad a comprehensive policy that explicitly prohibited sexual\\nharassment. The policy states that Wal-Mart “will not tolerate\\nany form of discrimination or harassment in any aspect of our\\nbusiness.” Included in the list of prohibited forms of harass-\\nment is “repeated unwanted sexual flirtations, advances, or\\npropositions.”Additionally, the options for reporting retalia-\\ntion were robust:\\n If you experience conduct that may violate this\\n policy or if you observe or become aware of any\\n conduct that may violate this policy by being\\n discriminatory, harassing or retaliatory, you\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 11\\n\\n should immediately report the violation to any\\n salaried member of management or confiden-\\n tially and/or anonymously to the Global Ethics\\n Office []. If you believe a salaried member of\\n management may be violating this policy, you\\n do not have to report the violation to that per-\\n son. You may report the possible violation to\\n another salaried member of management or call\\n the Global Ethics Office.\\nAn employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy\\nis an important factor in determining whether it exercised\\nreasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. Smith v. First\\nUnion Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Wal-\\nMart had such a policy.\\n Additionally, investigation into the incident was prompt\\nand thorough. After Turner received the complaint from Hunt,\\nhe provided a copy of the complaint form to human resources.\\nThe same day, human resources instructed him to complete an\\ninvestigation into the matter. This Court has often said, “a\\nprompt investigation is the hallmark of a reasonable corrective\\naction.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2009) (quoting Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 985 (7th Cir.\\n2008)). During the investigation, Turner asserts he met with\\nHunt and Watson on two separate occasions, first to gather\\ninformation and then to discuss the findings and the course of\\naction as recommended by human resources. Because Hunt\\ndid not provide Turner with any witnesses, his investigation\\nwas limited to interviewing the involved parties. The investi-\\ngation was completed quickly and Turner determined he was\\nunable to substantiate the claims. Nevertheless, Turner\\n\\f12 No. 18-3403\\n\\nreiterated to Watson the importance of a harassment-free work\\nenvironment and required him to retake the company’s ethics\\ncourse which included anti-harassment training. Furthermore,\\nHunt did not allege any instances of sexual harassment\\noccurred after the investigation was complete. “There is no\\nquestion that a stoppage of harassment shows effectiveness.”\\nPorter v. Erie Foods Intern., Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2009).\\n In sum, we find that Wal-Mart did what a reasonable\\nemployer should. It promulgated a comprehensive sexual\\nharassment policy, trained its employees, maintained an\\neffective reporting system, expeditiously investigated Hunt’s\\ncomplaint, and communicated its zero-tolerance policy and\\nretrained Watson even though the investigation failed to\\nsubstantiate the allegations against him.\\n C. Unreasonable Delay\\n The second element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense requires\\nthe defendant to show plaintiff unreasonably failed to take\\nadvantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities the\\nemployer provided. This is a functional test that asks “whether\\nthe employee adequately alerted her employer to the harass-\\nment, thereby satisfying her obligation to avoid the harm, not\\nwhether she followed the letter of the reporting procedures set\\nout in the employer’s harassment policy.” Cerros, 398 F.3d at\\n952. But demonstrating a plaintiff failed to use the provided\\nreporting procedures “will normally suffice to satisfy the\\nemployer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”\\nId. (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08).\\n Here, Hunt failed to take advantage of any reporting\\nmechanisms for four months and thereby prevented Wal-Mart\\n\\fNo. 18-3403 13\\n\\nfrom taking corrective measures. Hunt argues that she did not\\nreport Watson’s behavior because she was unaware of the\\nanonymous hotline and believed that she had to report to\\nTurner. She further asserts that she feared retaliation for\\nreporting. But “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation,\\nunpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s\\nduty to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environ-\\nment.” Porter v. Erie Foods Intern., 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir.\\n2009) (quoting Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th\\nCir. 2000)). The record indicates that the anonymous phone\\nline for reporting sexual harassment was included in\\nWal-Mart’s sexual harassment policy and the policy also\\nindicates that Hunt could have reported the incident to any\\nsalaried employee she felt comfortable with. While we do not\\nintend to minimize the difficulty involved in reporting these\\nissues, employees have a duty to utilize reporting mechanisms\\nprovided by their employer, or otherwise alert their employer\\nof the problem, when they can do so without “undue risk or\\nexpense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. Not only did Hunt fail to\\nuse any of these reporting mechanisms, she otherwise\\ncompletely failed to alert Wal-Mart of the problem for months.\\nMcPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(“An employer cannot be considered to have knowledge of\\nsexual harassment unless the employee makes a concerted\\neffort to inform the employer that a problem exists”). Because\\nHunt could have utilized the reporting systems implemented\\nby Wal-Mart without undue risk or expense, but failed to for\\nseveral months, we find Wal-Mart has carried its burden of\\nshowing Hunt’s delay was unreasonable. See Jackson v. Cty. of\\nRacine, 474 F.3d 493, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding it was\\n\\f14 No. 18-3403\\n\\nunreasonable for an employee to wait four months before\\nreporting sexual harassment to her employer); Roby, 579 F.3d\\nat 786 (holding that a five month delay under similar\\ncircumstances was unreasonable).\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n With the various contentions of the plaintiff considered, the\\njudgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":31,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":3100,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NjQ0NjM4MSwianRpIjoiNWU5YTZhZjgtYjRiOS00NTMwLWIzNmItNjczZDcxMzdkNWVjIiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3ODY0NDk5ODEsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.ru6I8zfPy-3fpTKuxio6IkA6SGIOwsjGZnMYjuxmWg67HKLqAzythLL3lqOoNCV8HoFkbDD61LszjTpcl3GBBQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
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4,638,232 | Jiri VYLOHA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Jiri Vyloha v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-10 | 18-2290 & 18-3298 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2290 & 18-3298\nJIR... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638232/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,233 | Jiri Vyloha v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-10 | 18-2290 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "St__Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4415486/", "author_raw": ""}]} | ST EVE | ST EVE | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638233/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
4,638,234 | Horace Fox v. Julia Hathaway | 2019-07-10 | 17-2354 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-2354\nIN RE:\n CHICAGO M... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638234/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,638,290 | John Doe v. Kevin K. McAleenan | 2019-07-10 | 17-2040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Acting Secretary of Homeland John Z. Lee, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n ... | KENNETH F RIPPLE | DANIEL A MANION | DIANE S SYKES | 1 | {"KENNETH F RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "DANIEL A MANION": ", Circuit", "DIANE S SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638290/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,638,291 | Jiri Vyloha v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-10 | 18-3298 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2290 & 18-3298\nJIR... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638291/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
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4,638,292 | Jiri Vyloha v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-10 | 18-2290 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2290 & 18-3298\nJIR... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638292/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,638,634 | Bill CONROY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Scott THOMPSON, Respondent-Appellee. | Bill Conroy v. Scott Thompson | 2019-07-11 | 17-3624 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3624\nBILL CONROY,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638634/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,731 | Bill Conroy v. Scott Thompson | 2019-07-11 | 17-3624 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3624\nBILL CONR... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,638,789 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas M. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Thomas M. Smith | 2019-07-11 | 18-3265 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Easterbrook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐3265\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plainti... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638789/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,791 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jimmy L. DESOTELL, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jimmy Desotell | 2019-07-11 | 18-2778 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Barrett, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2778\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638791/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,638,903 | United States v. Thomas M. Smith | 2019-07-11 | 18-3265 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐3265\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638903/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,638,905 | United States v. Jimmy Desotell | 2019-07-11 | 18-2778 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2778\nUNITED STATES ... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,638,980 | Oliver COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. | Oliver Collins v. University of Notre Dame Du La | 2019-07-12 | 18-2559 & 18-2579 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Rovner, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2559 & 18‐2579\nOLIVER COLLINS,\n ... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638980/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
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4,639,160 | Oliver Collins v. University of Notre Dame Du La | 2019-07-12 | 18-2579 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2559 & 18‐2579\nOLIVER... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639160/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,559 | Neringa VENCKIENE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. | Neringa Venckiene v. United States | 2019-07-15 | 18-2529 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2529\nNERINGA VENCKIENE,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639559/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,560 | AMERICAN HOMELAND TITLE AGENCY, INC., John Yonas, and Martin Rink, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stephen W. ROBERTSON, Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance, Defendant-Appellee. | American Homeland Title Agency v. Stephen Robertson | 2019-07-15 | 18-3293 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3293\nAMERICAN HOMELAND TITLE AGENCY, INC.,\nJOHN YONA... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639560/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,561 | ALARM DETECTION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, an Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, a Municipal Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, Corp. | 2019-07-15 | 18-3316 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3316\n... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639561/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,562 | ALARM DETECTION SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ORLAND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Alarm Detection Systems, Incor v. Orland Fire Protection Distri | 2019-07-15 | 18-2926 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2926... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639562/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,587 | Neringa Venckiene v. United States | 2019-07-15 | 18-2529 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2529\nNERINGA VENCKI... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639587/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,588 | Matthew CARELLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AURORA POLICEMEN CREDIT UNION, Defendant-Appellee. | Matthew Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union | 2019-07-15 | 18-2887 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2887\nMATTHEW CARELLO,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639588/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,589 | American Homeland Title Agency v. Stephen Robertson | 2019-07-15 | 18-3293 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3293\nAMERICAN HOMELAND TI... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639589/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,590 | Alarm Detection Systems, Incor v. Village of Schaumburg | 2019-07-15 | 18-3316 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3316\n... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639590/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,591 | Alarm Detection Systems, Incor v. Orland Fire Protection Distri | 2019-07-15 | 18-2926 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2926... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639591/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,615 | Neringa Venckiene v. United States | 2019-07-15 | 18-2529 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2529\nNERINGA VENCKI... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639615/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,616 | Matthew Carello v. Aurora Policeman Credit Union | 2019-07-15 | 18-2887 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2887\nMATTHEW C... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639616/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,617 | American Homeland Title Agency v. Stephen Robertson | 2019-07-15 | 18-3293 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3293\nAMERICAN HOMELAND TI... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639617/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,618 | Alarm Detection Systems, Incor v. Village of Schaumburg | 2019-07-15 | 18-3316 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3316\n... | WOOD | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639618/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,865 | Eddie R. BRADLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS, an Illinois Home Rule Municipality, and Vivian Covington, Mayor, in Her Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellees. | Eddie R. Bradley v. Village of University Park, IL | 2019-07-16 | 16-3456 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Manion, Rovner, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888932/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/o... | MANION | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639865/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,967 | PARAMOUNT MEDIA GROUP, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF BELLWOOD and Image Media Advertising, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. | Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood | 2019-07-16 | 17-1562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Sykes, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1562\nPARAMOUNT MEDIA GROUP, INC.,\n ... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639967/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,968 | Eddie R. Bradley v. Village of University Park, IL | 2019-07-16 | 16-3456 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-3456\nEDDIE R. BRADL... | MANION | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639968/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,969 | Delores Henry v. Russell Reynolds | 2019-07-16 | 16-4234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Lee dissents", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "ENTRY REMOVED AS\nENTERED IN ERROR", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4417222/", "author_raw": ""}]} | LEE DISSENTS | LEE DISSENTS | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639969/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
4,639,980 | Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood | 2019-07-16 | 17-1562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1562\nPARAMOUNT MEDIA GROUP, I... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639980/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,639,987 | Delores HENRY, Et Al., on Behalf of a Class, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Melody HULETT, Former Warden of Lincoln Correctional Center, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Delores Henry v. Russell Reynolds | 2019-07-16 | 16-4234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Manion, Lee", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888936/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/o... | EASTERBROOK | MANION | LEE | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639987/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,060 | Paramount Media Group, Inc. v. Village of Bellwood | 2019-07-16 | 17-1562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1562\nPARAMOUNT MEDIA GROUP, I... | RIPPLE | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640060/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,062 | Delores Henry v. Russell Reynolds | 2019-07-16 | 16-4234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges, and JOHN Z. LEE, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN Z. LEE, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____... | EASTERBROOK | MANION | JOHN Z LEE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "JOHN Z LEE": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640062/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,290 | E.A. and J.A., Minors, by Their Father Dana A. Alden as Next Friend, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mary K. GARDNER, Defendant-Appellee. | E.A. v. Mary Gardner | 2019-07-17 | 18-2550 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2550\nE.A. and J.A., minors, by their f... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640290/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,291 | In Re: CRANBERRY GROWERS COOPERATIVE, Doing Business as CranGrow, Debtor-Appellee, v. Appeal Of: Patrick S. LAYNG, United States Trustee for Western District of Wisconsin. | Cranberry Growers Cooperative v. Patrick Layng | 2019-07-17 | 18-3289 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3289\nIN RE: CRANBERRY GROWERS\nCOOPERATIVE, doin... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640291/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,435 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Erik C. SCHMIDT, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Erik C. Schmidt | 2019-07-17 | 18-1259 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Kanne, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1259\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640435/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,436 | Rita GUERRERO, Individually and as the Special Administrator of the Estate of Celso N. Guerrero, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. | Rita Guerrero v. BNSF Railway Company | 2019-07-17 | 19-1187 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Easterbrook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1187\nRITA GUERRERO, individually and as the Special A... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640436/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,437 | E.A. v. Mary Gardner | 2019-07-17 | 18-2550 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2550\nE.A. ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640437/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,438 | Cranberry Growers Cooperative v. Patrick Layng | 2019-07-17 | 18-3289 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3289\nIN RE: CRANBERR... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640438/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,477 | United States v. Erik C. Schmidt | 2019-07-17 | 18-1259 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1259\nUNITED STATES O... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640477/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,478 | Rita Guerrero v. BNSF Railway Company | 2019-07-17 | 19-1187 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1187\nRITA... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,479 | Lawrence L. PICKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee. | Pickett v. Chi. Transit Auth. | 2019-07-17 | 18-2785 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Barrett, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2785\nLAWRENCE L. PICKETT,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640479/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,486 | Rita Guerrero v. BNSF Railway Company | 2019-07-17 | 19-1187 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19‐1187\nRITA... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640486/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,487 | Lawrence Pickett v. CTA | 2019-07-17 | 18-2785 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2785\nLAWRE... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640487/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,503 | Lawrence Pickett v. CTA | 2019-07-17 | 18-2785 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2785\nLAWRE... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640503/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,699 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua T. HERMAN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Joshua Herman | 2019-07-18 | 18-3057 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Easterbrook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3057\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640699/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,792 | United States v. Joshua Herman | 2019-07-18 | 18-3057 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640792/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,640,793 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry POSADA, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Henry Posada | 2019-07-18 | 18-1586 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1586\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Ap... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640793/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,059 | United States v. Henry Posada | 2019-07-18 | 18-1586 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1586\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641059/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,270 | N.Y.C.C., Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | N. Y. C. C. v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-19 | 18-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2618\nN.Y.C.C.,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641270/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,275 | N. Y. C. C. v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-19 | 18-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2618\nN.Y.C.C.,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641275/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,276 | Charles Donelson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-07-19 | 18-2739 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2739\nCHARLES DONELSON,... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641276/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,315 | N. Y. C. C. v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-19 | 18-2618 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2618\nN.Y.C.C.,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641315/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,316 | Charles Donelson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-07-19 | 18-2739 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2739\nCHARLES DONELSON,... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641316/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,361 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher ANSTICE, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Christopher Anstice | 2019-07-19 | 18-3171 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Eve, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3171\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641361/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,362 | Joseph BERNAL, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NRA GROUP, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | Joseph Bernal v. NRA Group, LLC | 2019-07-19 | 17-3629 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3629\nJOSEPH BERNAL, individually and on\nbehalf of other... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641362/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,363 | Christian K. NARKIEWICZ-LAINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin C. DOYLE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Christian Narkiewicz-Laine v. Kevin Doyle | 2019-07-19 | 18-2535 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2535\nCHRISTIAN K. NARKIEWICZ‐LAINE,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641363/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,372 | United States v. Christopher Anstice | 2019-07-19 | 18-3171 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3171\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641372/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,373 | Philadelphia Indemnity Insuran v. Chicago Trust Company | 2019-07-19 | 18-3181 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 18-318... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641373/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,374 | Joseph Bernal v. NRA Group, LLC | 2019-07-19 | 17-3629 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3629\nJOSEPH BERNAL, individu... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641374/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,375 | Christian Narkiewicz-Laine v. Kevin Doyle | 2019-07-19 | 18-2535 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2535\nCHRISTIAN K. NA... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641375/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,435 | United States v. Christopher Anstice | 2019-07-19 | 18-3171 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3171\nUNITED STA... | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641435/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,436 | Philadelphia Indemnity Insuran v. Chicago Trust Company | 2019-07-19 | 18-3181 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNos. 18-318... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641436/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,437 | Christian Narkiewicz-Laine v. Kevin Doyle | 2019-07-19 | 18-2535 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2535\nCHRISTIAN K. NA... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641437/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,444,039 | PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Counterdefendant-Appellee v. The CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of Kianna Rudesill, and THE BABY FOLD, Counterplaintiffs-Appellants. | Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chi. Trust Co. | 2019-07-19 | Nos. 18-3181 & 18-3241 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415476/", "author_raw": ""}]} | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444039/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,730 | Juana HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, Et Al., Petitioners, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-22 | 18-3297 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3297\nJUANA HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, et al.,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641730/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,773 | Juana Hernandez-Garcia v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-22 | 18-3297 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3297... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641773/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,861 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rod HUNT, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Rod Hunt | 2019-07-23 | 18-1197; 18-1198 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Hamilton, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641861/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,862 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Joseph Williams | 2019-07-23 | 18-2662 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641862/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,889 | United States v. Rod Hunt | 2019-07-23 | 18-1198 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1197 & 18-1198\nUNITE... | KANNE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641889/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,890 | United States v. Joseph Williams | 2019-07-23 | 18-2662 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641890/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,957 | United States v. Joseph Williams | 2019-07-23 | 18-2662 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2662\nUNITED STATES ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641957/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,641,958 | James GRAHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCTIC ZONE ICEPLEX, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC | 2019-07-23 | 18-3508 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Barrett, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3508\nJAMES GRAHAM, JR.,\n ... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641958/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,008 | James Graham, Jr. v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC | 2019-07-23 | 18-3508 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3508\nJAMES GRAHAM,... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642008/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,010 | Andrew L. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Byran BARTOW, Respondent-Appellee. | Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow | 2019-07-23 | 19-1168 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642010/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,100 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard WALKER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Richard Walker | 2019-07-23 | 18-3529 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3529\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642100/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,101 | Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow | 2019-07-23 | 19-1168 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642101/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,168 | United States v. Richard Walker | 2019-07-23 | 18-3529 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐3529\nUNITED STAT... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642168/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,169 | Andrew Jackson v. Byran Bartow | 2019-07-23 | 19-1168 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1168\nANDREW L. JACKSON,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642169/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,241 | Joseph KRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant. | Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul | 2019-07-24 | 18-1100 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1100\nJOSEPH KRE... | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642241/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,491 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delrico J. NELSON, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Delrico Nelson | 2019-07-24 | 18-2811 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2811\nUNITED STATES OF AM... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642491/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,492 | Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul | 2019-07-24 | 18-1100 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1100\nJOSEPH KRE... | EASTERBROOK | ROVNER | ST EVE | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642492/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,631 | United States v. Delrico Nelson | 2019-07-24 | 18-2811 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2811\nUNITED STATES OF AM... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,642,953 | Tyjuan ANDERSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois | 2019-07-25 | 18-2211 & 18-2232 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\nTYJUAN ANDERSON, et al.,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642953/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,077 | Tyjuan Anderson v. City of Rockford, Illinois | 2019-07-25 | 18-2211 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2211 & 18-2232\nTYJU... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643077/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,209 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eleazar Corral VALENZUELA, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela | 2019-07-26 | 18-2789 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2789\n... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643209/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,210 | Refugio RUIZ-CORTEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen | 2019-07-26 | 18-1078 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1078\nREFUGIO RU... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643210/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,327 | United States v. Eleazar Corral Valenzuela | 2019-07-26 | 18-2789 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2789\n... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643327/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,328 | Refugio Ruiz-Cortez v. Glenn Lewellen | 2019-07-26 | 18-1078 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1078\nREFUGIO RU... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643328/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,329 | Chetty SEVUGAN, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIRECT ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Corporation Defendant-Appellee. | Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC | 2019-07-26 | 18-3082 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Rovner, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3082\nCHETTY SEVUGAN, individually and on behalf... | BAUER | ROVNER | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643329/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,405 | Gregory S. WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-2499 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2499\nGREGORY S. WILSON,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643405/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,406 | Chetty Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC | 2019-07-26 | 18-3082 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3082\nCHETTY SEVUGAN... | BAUER | ROVNER | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643406/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,420 | Vanessa MATHEWS and Randy Mathews, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REV RECREATION GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-1982 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Hamilton, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1982\nVANESSA MATHEWS and RANDY MATHEWS\n ... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643420/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,421 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael BONIN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Michael Bonin | 2019-07-26 | 18-1479 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1479\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643421/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,422 | Gregory Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-2499 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2499\nGREGO... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643422/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,433 | Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-1982 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1982\nVANESSA MATH... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643433/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,434 | United States v. Michael Bonin | 2019-07-26 | 18-1479 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1479\nUNITED STATE... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643434/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,435 | Tristana HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Tristana Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-3403 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3403\n\nTRISTANA HUNT,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643435/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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