\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Scott Michael HARRY Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2221\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Scott Michael Harry\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 16, 2019\n Filed: July 22, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n Scott Michael Harry challenges his conviction for possession with intent to\ndistribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and\n851. Harry argues the district court1 erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the Northern District of Iowa.\n\fgathered incident to a police search of a truck Harry was driving; admitting evidence\nof certain prior bad acts against him; and declining to admit similar prior bad acts\nevidence against Dennis Thul, the truck’s passenger. We disagree and affirm the\njudgment of the district court.2\n\n I. Background\n On the morning of February 10, 2017, Investigator Adam Williams of the\nDubuque Drug Task Force received a text message from a confidential informant (CI).\nThe CI informed him that Harry had left Dubuque, Iowa, around 4 a.m. to “pick up.”\nThe CI believed Harry would be driving about four hours both to and from the “pick\nup” and that he believed Harry would return to Dubuque around noon. United States\nv. Harry, No. 2:17-cr-01017-LTS, 2017 WL 5458002, at *1, (N.D. Iowa, Nov. 14,\n2017). The CI further stated that Harry would be riding with Dennis Thul in a newer,\nsingle-cab, white pickup truck registered to Thul’s father, Dale. At 12:24 p.m., the CI\nsent a text message to Williams informing him that Harry was about one hour away\nfrom Dubuque.\n\n Officers interpreted “pick up” as meaning “pick up drugs.” They researched\nDale’s vehicle registrations and identified a truck matching the CI’s description. They\nthen set up surveillance on the roads leading into Dubuque. While on surveillance,\nInvestigator Williams identified a truck matching the CI’s description and called\nDeputy Daniel Kearney, a K-9 officer also patrolling the highway, to inform him of\nthe sighting.\n\n Shortly thereafter, Deputy Kearney observed the truck traveling at 75 mph in\na 65 mph zone. He initiated a stop at 12:50 p.m. Harry was driving with Thul as a\npassenger. Deputy Kearney recognized Harry and Thul from previous encounters.\n\n\n 2\n Harry has also submitted a pro se motion for leave to file supplemental\nbriefing. We deny his motion.\n\n -2-\n\fInvestigator Williams arrived at the scene within moments and approached the vehicle\nat 12:51 p.m. Investigator Williams and Deputy Kearney then collaborated to process\nthe traffic violation while also searching the truck for drugs. At 12:52 p.m., Deputy\nKearney requested that Investigator Williams run Harry’s name and address, as Harry\npresented no driver’s license. Less than a minute later, Deputy Kearney deployed a\ndrug-sniffing dog on the truck. Within seconds,3 the dog detected drugs. At 12:58\np.m., Deputy Kearney advised Harry that he would be issuing him a speeding\nwarning. Then, at 1:03 p.m., Investigator Williams uncovered about a pound and a\nhalf of methamphetamine stashed inside a pipe in the truck’s bed.\n\n Investigator Williams advised Harry of his Miranda rights. Harry initially\ndenied knowledge of the drugs but subsequently claimed ownership of them,\nexplaining that he had been paid $5,000 to transport the drugs and that Thul was just\nriding along. Officers also viewed messages between Thul and Harry supporting\nHarry’s claim that the drugs belonged to Harry and not Thul.\n\n Prior to trial, Harry moved to have the search evidence suppressed. Harry\ninitially claimed the officers had not had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to\nstop the truck. He later amended his suppression motion to argue that the dog sniff had\nimproperly extended the stop. The magistrate judge disagreed, and the district court\nadopted the magistrate judge’s conclusions, finding that the CI’s tip had generated\n\n\n\n\n 3\n According to the timeline adopted by the district court, 23 seconds\n(12:52:54–12:53:17 p.m.) elapsed between Deputy Kearney’s deployment of the dog\nand the dog’s alert.\n\n -3-\n\freasonable suspicion for a search.4 However, the district court additionally found that\nthe dog sniff had not extended the stop.5\n\n Though Harry had admitted ownership of the drugs, he subsequently changed\nhis position. He later claimed the drugs actually belonged to Thul. He contended that\nThul had promised him a user amount of methamphetamine in exchange for riding\nalong with him. Consistent with his new position, prior to trial, Harry sought\npermission to introduce certain bad acts evidence against Thul. He also moved to\nprevent the government from introducing evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence\n404(b) showing certain prior bad acts he had committed. The district court granted\nHarry’s motion in part, excluding evidence of a prior conviction for distribution of a\ncontrolled substance to a minor but allowing the government to present witnesses who\nwould testify to Harry’s prior drug distribution activities. Not surprisingly, the\ngovernment moved to exclude the evidence of Thul’s prior bad acts. The district court\ngranted the government’s motion in part, excluding a 2000 judgment for conspiracy\nto manufacture methamphetamine; a 2003 judgment for operating a motor vehicle\nwhile intoxicated; and two 2000 judgments and one 2003 judgment for possession of\nmethamphetamine. However, it allowed Harry to present evidence of 2003 and 2005\ncitations for possessing drug paraphernalia and a 2006 judgment for possession of\nmethamphetamine.\n\n At trial, the government offered three witnesses to rebut Harry’s claim that he\nhad not possessed the drugs with intent to distribute them. Kyle Chyma and Edgar\nHernandez testified to selling Harry distribution quantities of methamphetamine, and\n\n 4\n Harry did not challenge the magistrate judge’s finding that the officers had\nprobable cause to conduct a traffic stop based on Harry’s speeding.\n 5\n Though the magistrate judge who initially reviewed Harry’s motion found the\nsniff had extended the stop by about 2½ minutes, the district court found the sniff had\nnot extended the stop as “the sniff and the routine processing of a traffic violation\noccurred simultaneously.” Harry, 2017 WL 5458002, at *5.\n\n -4-\n\fAshley Laufenberg testified to buying a user amount of methamphetamine from\nHarry.\n\n A jury found Harry guilty of possession with intent to distribute\nmethamphetamine, and the district court sentenced Harry to 280 months’\nimprisonment. On appeal, Harry renews his argument that the officers lacked\nreasonable suspicion to search the truck he was driving and that the officers\nimpermissibly extended the stop with the dog sniff. He also renews his prior bad acts\narguments, claiming the district court abused its discretion in admitting Chyma’s,\nHernandez’s, and Laufenberg’s testimony and in excluding several of Thul’s prior\nconvictions.\n\n II. Discussion\n A. Fourth Amendment Claim\n Harry argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the\nevidence collected incident to the search of the truck, claiming the dog sniff\nimpermissibly extended the traffic stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 135\nS. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015), and that the sniff was not supported by reasonable\nsuspicion. “This Court reviews the facts supporting a district court’s denial of a\nmotion to suppress for clear error and reviews its legal conclusions de novo.” United\nStates v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n The Supreme Court has held\n\n that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for\n which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against\n unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed\n traffic violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond\n the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket\n for the violation.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\fRodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (cleaned up). In sum, “absent the reasonable suspicion\nordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual,” an officer may not prolong\na traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete that stop. Id. at 1615.\n“Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries [i.e.,\nchecking for outstanding warrants], a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the\nofficer’s traffic mission.” Id. However, “as long as a traffic stop is not extended in\norder for officers to conduct a dog sniff, the dog sniff is lawful.” United States v.\nFuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2016).\n\n Fuehrer is instructive. There, as here, two officers collaborated to process a\nstop. Id. In Fuehrer,\n\n [Officer Two] arrived within two minutes of [Officer One] initiating the\n traffic stop. Because [the defendant] did not have a license, [Officer One]\n asked [the defendant] to sit in the patrol car while he completed\n paperwork. [Officer Two] conducted the dog sniff while [the defendant]\n was in the patrol car. [Officer One] completed the tasks related to the\n traffic stop and wrote [the defendant] a warning after the dog sniff was\n complete and the dog had alerted to the presence of narcotics.\n\nId. Because the traffic stop and the search had occurred simultaneously, we explained\n“there [was] no evidence that the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop” and\nconcluded that Rodriguez was inapposite. Id.\n\n Fuehrer’s logic applies to this case. The district court found that the dog sniff\ndid not extend the stop, and we agree. As the record demonstrates, Investigator\nWilliams and Deputy Kearney simultaneously processed the traffic violation and\nconducted the dog sniff.\n\n We note that there were two purposes for the stop of Harry’s vehicle: one was\nfor his traffic violation and the other was for his suspected transportation of illegal\n\n\n -6-\n\fdrugs. Even if the dog sniff had extended the traffic stop, the extension would have\nbeen permissible, as the CI’s tip provided reasonable suspicion for Deputy Kearney\nto perform the drug search.\n\n Harry argues the CI’s tip could not provide reasonable suspicion for a search\nas the CI’s reliability had not been established. However, “[a]n informant may . . .\nprove himself to be a reliable source for law enforcement by providing predictive\ninformation about a meeting time or place.” United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063,\n1067 (8th Cir. 2013). As the Supreme Court explained in Alabama v. White,\n“[b]ecause only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s\nitinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such\ninformation is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s\nillegal activities.” 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).\n\n Here, the CI provided police with accurate predictive information. This\ninformation included: a description of the truck Harry would be driving, including\ninformation about its registration; who would be in the truck; and what time the truck\nwould be arriving in Dubuque. The information was specific rather than generic and\ntherefore unlikely available to someone without reliable insight into Harry’s activities.\nBased on that information, Deputy Kearney had reasonable suspicion to search the\ntruck regardless of the speeding violation.\n\n We hold the district court properly denied Harry’s motion to suppress.\n\n B. Prior Bad Acts\n Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show criminal propensity;\nhowever, such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proving\nknowledge or intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). By its very language, Rule 404(b)\nencompasses both prior convictions and other bad acts not resulting in conviction.\n“[T]he party seeking to admit [such] evidence must show it is ‘(1) relevant to a\n\n -7-\n\fmaterial issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged;\n(3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) higher in probative value than prejudicial\neffect.’” United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 389 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United\nStates v. Trogdon, 575 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009)).\n\n 1. Harry’s Prior Bad Acts\n Harry argues the district court erred in allowing Chyma, Hernandez, and\nLaufenberg to testify about his buying and selling methamphetamine. He characterizes\ntheir testimony as impermissible propensity evidence. However, because Harry put\nhis mental state at issue at trial by arguing “mere presence,” evidence of prior bad acts\nwas admissible to prove his knowledge and intent. See United States v. Thomas, 58\nF.3d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1995).\n\n The lesson of [our] cases is clear. When a defendant raises the issue of\n mental state, whether by a “mere presence” defense that specifically\n challenges the mental element of the government’s case or by means of\n a general denial that forces the government to prove every element of its\n case, prior bad acts evidence is admissible because mental state is a\n material issue.\n\nId.\n\n Harry argues that the approach described in Thomas is suspect in light of our\nstatement in Turner that “[s]imply asserting—without explanation—that the\nconviction is relevant to a material issue such as intent or knowledge is not enough to\nestablish its admissibility under the Federal Rules.” 781 F.3d at 390. However, Turner\nis inapposite where a defendant places his knowledge and intent at issue during trial.\nSee United States v. Valerio, 731 F. App’x 551, 553 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)\n(explaining that Turner was inapposite where the defendant “placed his knowledge\nor intent at issue” during trial). Furthermore, the district court here did not simply\naccept the government’s assertion “without explanation,” Turner, 781 F.3d at 390,\n\n -8-\n\fthat Harry’s prior bad acts were relevant to a material issue. Rather, the court engaged\nin the type of analysis required by Turner: thoughtfully reviewing all of the prior bad\nacts the government sought to present at trial, admitting some and rejecting others.\n\n Because the evidence at issue served the legitimate non-propensity purpose of\nproving knowledge and intent, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\nallowing Chyma, Hernandez, and Laufenberg to testify.\n\n Even if the district court had erred in allowing their testimony, however, such\nerror would not constitute a basis for reversal. See United States v. Eggleston, 165\nF.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for possession with intent to\ndistribute where the district court erroneously admitted propensity evidence but where\nsuch admission was harmless in light of the suspect’s self-incriminating statements\nand other government evidence). Like the defendant in Eggleston, Harry made\n“damaging admissions out of his own mouth,” id., by claiming the drugs belonged to\nhim and that Thul was just riding along. In addition, the government presented ample\nevidence of Harry’s intent to distribute the methamphetamine, including the large\nquantity of drugs discovered in the truck he was driving; the text messages between\nhim and Thul; and the CI’s predictive tip. Considering the strength of the\ngovernment’s case, the district court’s alleged evidentiary error would have been\nharmless.\n\n 2. Thul’s Prior Bad Acts\n Harry argues the district court erred in excluding evidence of Thul’s 2000\nconviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and his 2000 and 2003\nconvictions for possession of methamphetamine.6 The district court excluded these\nacts due to their remoteness, finding 14–17 years—the time between the commission\n\n\n 6\n Harry does not appear to contest the district court’s decision to exclude Thul’s\nconviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.\n\n -9-\n\fof the excluded acts and the trial date—too great a gap. Harry challenges this finding,\narguing the bad acts were not remote, noting that Thul was incarcerated during a\nportion of the time between 2000 and 2017.\n\n We review a district court’s ruling excluding evidence for an abuse of\n discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute\n its judgment for the judgment of the district court. . . . “Reverse 404(b)”\n is a term some courts have used to refer to evidence of prior bad acts by\n a third party, introduced by the defendant and offered to implicate the\n third party in the charged crime.\n\nUnited States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). We apply the\nsame factors whether analyzing “regular” 404(b) evidence or so-called “reverse”\n404(b) evidence. See, e.g., id. at 513.\n\n To determine if evidence is too remote, the [district] court applies a\n reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of\n each case. There is no fixed period within which the prior acts must have\n occurred. We have generally been reluctant to uphold the introduction\n of evidence relating to acts or crimes which occurred more than thirteen\n years prior to the conduct challenged.\n\nUnited States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). We noted in\nHalk that a court may consider incarceration as a factor weighing against remoteness.\nId.\n\n Harry’s argument for not excluding the 2000 and 2003 bad acts makes sense.\nHowever, considering that we have identified 13 years as the typical outer limit for\nremoteness, see Halk, 634 F.3d at 487, we cannot say the district court abused its\ndiscretion in excluding 14–17 year old bad acts. We decline to “substitute [our]\njudgment for the judgment of the district court.” Battle, 774 F.3d at 512 (internal\nquotation omitted).\n\n -10-\n\f III. Conclusion\nWe affirm Harry’s conviction.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Scott Michael HARRY Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2221\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Scott Michael Harry\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 22, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Scott Michael Harry challenges his conviction for possession with intent to\\ndistribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and\\n851. Harry argues the district court1 erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the Northern District of Iowa.\\n\\fgathered incident to a police search of a truck Harry was driving; admitting evidence\\nof certain prior bad acts against him; and declining to admit similar prior bad acts\\nevidence against Dennis Thul, the truck’s passenger. We disagree and affirm the\\njudgment of the district court.2\\n\\n I. Background\\n On the morning of February 10, 2017, Investigator Adam Williams of the\\nDubuque Drug Task Force received a text message from a confidential informant (CI).\\nThe CI informed him that Harry had left Dubuque, Iowa, around 4 a.m. to “pick up.”\\nThe CI believed Harry would be driving about four hours both to and from the “pick\\nup” and that he believed Harry would return to Dubuque around noon. United States\\nv. Harry, No. 2:17-cr-01017-LTS, 2017 WL 5458002, at *1, (N.D. Iowa, Nov. 14,\\n2017). The CI further stated that Harry would be riding with Dennis Thul in a newer,\\nsingle-cab, white pickup truck registered to Thul’s father, Dale. At 12:24 p.m., the CI\\nsent a text message to Williams informing him that Harry was about one hour away\\nfrom Dubuque.\\n\\n Officers interpreted “pick up” as meaning “pick up drugs.” They researched\\nDale’s vehicle registrations and identified a truck matching the CI’s description. They\\nthen set up surveillance on the roads leading into Dubuque. While on surveillance,\\nInvestigator Williams identified a truck matching the CI’s description and called\\nDeputy Daniel Kearney, a K-9 officer also patrolling the highway, to inform him of\\nthe sighting.\\n\\n Shortly thereafter, Deputy Kearney observed the truck traveling at 75 mph in\\na 65 mph zone. He initiated a stop at 12:50 p.m. Harry was driving with Thul as a\\npassenger. Deputy Kearney recognized Harry and Thul from previous encounters.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Harry has also submitted a pro se motion for leave to file supplemental\\nbriefing. We deny his motion.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fInvestigator Williams arrived at the scene within moments and approached the vehicle\\nat 12:51 p.m. Investigator Williams and Deputy Kearney then collaborated to process\\nthe traffic violation while also searching the truck for drugs. At 12:52 p.m., Deputy\\nKearney requested that Investigator Williams run Harry’s name and address, as Harry\\npresented no driver’s license. Less than a minute later, Deputy Kearney deployed a\\ndrug-sniffing dog on the truck. Within seconds,3 the dog detected drugs. At 12:58\\np.m., Deputy Kearney advised Harry that he would be issuing him a speeding\\nwarning. Then, at 1:03 p.m., Investigator Williams uncovered about a pound and a\\nhalf of methamphetamine stashed inside a pipe in the truck’s bed.\\n\\n Investigator Williams advised Harry of his Miranda rights. Harry initially\\ndenied knowledge of the drugs but subsequently claimed ownership of them,\\nexplaining that he had been paid $5,000 to transport the drugs and that Thul was just\\nriding along. Officers also viewed messages between Thul and Harry supporting\\nHarry’s claim that the drugs belonged to Harry and not Thul.\\n\\n Prior to trial, Harry moved to have the search evidence suppressed. Harry\\ninitially claimed the officers had not had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to\\nstop the truck. He later amended his suppression motion to argue that the dog sniff had\\nimproperly extended the stop. The magistrate judge disagreed, and the district court\\nadopted the magistrate judge’s conclusions, finding that the CI’s tip had generated\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n According to the timeline adopted by the district court, 23 seconds\\n(12:52:54–12:53:17 p.m.) elapsed between Deputy Kearney’s deployment of the dog\\nand the dog’s alert.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\freasonable suspicion for a search.4 However, the district court additionally found that\\nthe dog sniff had not extended the stop.5\\n\\n Though Harry had admitted ownership of the drugs, he subsequently changed\\nhis position. He later claimed the drugs actually belonged to Thul. He contended that\\nThul had promised him a user amount of methamphetamine in exchange for riding\\nalong with him. Consistent with his new position, prior to trial, Harry sought\\npermission to introduce certain bad acts evidence against Thul. He also moved to\\nprevent the government from introducing evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence\\n404(b) showing certain prior bad acts he had committed. The district court granted\\nHarry’s motion in part, excluding evidence of a prior conviction for distribution of a\\ncontrolled substance to a minor but allowing the government to present witnesses who\\nwould testify to Harry’s prior drug distribution activities. Not surprisingly, the\\ngovernment moved to exclude the evidence of Thul’s prior bad acts. The district court\\ngranted the government’s motion in part, excluding a 2000 judgment for conspiracy\\nto manufacture methamphetamine; a 2003 judgment for operating a motor vehicle\\nwhile intoxicated; and two 2000 judgments and one 2003 judgment for possession of\\nmethamphetamine. However, it allowed Harry to present evidence of 2003 and 2005\\ncitations for possessing drug paraphernalia and a 2006 judgment for possession of\\nmethamphetamine.\\n\\n At trial, the government offered three witnesses to rebut Harry’s claim that he\\nhad not possessed the drugs with intent to distribute them. Kyle Chyma and Edgar\\nHernandez testified to selling Harry distribution quantities of methamphetamine, and\\n\\n 4\\n Harry did not challenge the magistrate judge’s finding that the officers had\\nprobable cause to conduct a traffic stop based on Harry’s speeding.\\n 5\\n Though the magistrate judge who initially reviewed Harry’s motion found the\\nsniff had extended the stop by about 2½ minutes, the district court found the sniff had\\nnot extended the stop as “the sniff and the routine processing of a traffic violation\\noccurred simultaneously.” Harry, 2017 WL 5458002, at *5.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fAshley Laufenberg testified to buying a user amount of methamphetamine from\\nHarry.\\n\\n A jury found Harry guilty of possession with intent to distribute\\nmethamphetamine, and the district court sentenced Harry to 280 months’\\nimprisonment. On appeal, Harry renews his argument that the officers lacked\\nreasonable suspicion to search the truck he was driving and that the officers\\nimpermissibly extended the stop with the dog sniff. He also renews his prior bad acts\\narguments, claiming the district court abused its discretion in admitting Chyma’s,\\nHernandez’s, and Laufenberg’s testimony and in excluding several of Thul’s prior\\nconvictions.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Fourth Amendment Claim\\n Harry argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the\\nevidence collected incident to the search of the truck, claiming the dog sniff\\nimpermissibly extended the traffic stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 135\\nS. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015), and that the sniff was not supported by reasonable\\nsuspicion. “This Court reviews the facts supporting a district court’s denial of a\\nmotion to suppress for clear error and reviews its legal conclusions de novo.” United\\nStates v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has held\\n\\n that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for\\n which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against\\n unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed\\n traffic violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond\\n the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket\\n for the violation.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fRodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 (cleaned up). In sum, “absent the reasonable suspicion\\nordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual,” an officer may not prolong\\na traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete that stop. Id. at 1615.\\n“Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries [i.e.,\\nchecking for outstanding warrants], a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the\\nofficer’s traffic mission.” Id. However, “as long as a traffic stop is not extended in\\norder for officers to conduct a dog sniff, the dog sniff is lawful.” United States v.\\nFuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n Fuehrer is instructive. There, as here, two officers collaborated to process a\\nstop. Id. In Fuehrer,\\n\\n [Officer Two] arrived within two minutes of [Officer One] initiating the\\n traffic stop. Because [the defendant] did not have a license, [Officer One]\\n asked [the defendant] to sit in the patrol car while he completed\\n paperwork. [Officer Two] conducted the dog sniff while [the defendant]\\n was in the patrol car. [Officer One] completed the tasks related to the\\n traffic stop and wrote [the defendant] a warning after the dog sniff was\\n complete and the dog had alerted to the presence of narcotics.\\n\\nId. Because the traffic stop and the search had occurred simultaneously, we explained\\n“there [was] no evidence that the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop” and\\nconcluded that Rodriguez was inapposite. Id.\\n\\n Fuehrer’s logic applies to this case. The district court found that the dog sniff\\ndid not extend the stop, and we agree. As the record demonstrates, Investigator\\nWilliams and Deputy Kearney simultaneously processed the traffic violation and\\nconducted the dog sniff.\\n\\n We note that there were two purposes for the stop of Harry’s vehicle: one was\\nfor his traffic violation and the other was for his suspected transportation of illegal\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fdrugs. Even if the dog sniff had extended the traffic stop, the extension would have\\nbeen permissible, as the CI’s tip provided reasonable suspicion for Deputy Kearney\\nto perform the drug search.\\n\\n Harry argues the CI’s tip could not provide reasonable suspicion for a search\\nas the CI’s reliability had not been established. However, “[a]n informant may . . .\\nprove himself to be a reliable source for law enforcement by providing predictive\\ninformation about a meeting time or place.” United States v. Winarske, 715 F.3d 1063,\\n1067 (8th Cir. 2013). As the Supreme Court explained in Alabama v. White,\\n“[b]ecause only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s\\nitinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such\\ninformation is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s\\nillegal activities.” 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).\\n\\n Here, the CI provided police with accurate predictive information. This\\ninformation included: a description of the truck Harry would be driving, including\\ninformation about its registration; who would be in the truck; and what time the truck\\nwould be arriving in Dubuque. The information was specific rather than generic and\\ntherefore unlikely available to someone without reliable insight into Harry’s activities.\\nBased on that information, Deputy Kearney had reasonable suspicion to search the\\ntruck regardless of the speeding violation.\\n\\n We hold the district court properly denied Harry’s motion to suppress.\\n\\n B. Prior Bad Acts\\n Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show criminal propensity;\\nhowever, such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proving\\nknowledge or intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). By its very language, Rule 404(b)\\nencompasses both prior convictions and other bad acts not resulting in conviction.\\n“[T]he party seeking to admit [such] evidence must show it is ‘(1) relevant to a\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fmaterial issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged;\\n(3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) higher in probative value than prejudicial\\neffect.’” United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 389 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United\\nStates v. Trogdon, 575 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n 1. Harry’s Prior Bad Acts\\n Harry argues the district court erred in allowing Chyma, Hernandez, and\\nLaufenberg to testify about his buying and selling methamphetamine. He characterizes\\ntheir testimony as impermissible propensity evidence. However, because Harry put\\nhis mental state at issue at trial by arguing “mere presence,” evidence of prior bad acts\\nwas admissible to prove his knowledge and intent. See United States v. Thomas, 58\\nF.3d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1995).\\n\\n The lesson of [our] cases is clear. When a defendant raises the issue of\\n mental state, whether by a “mere presence” defense that specifically\\n challenges the mental element of the government’s case or by means of\\n a general denial that forces the government to prove every element of its\\n case, prior bad acts evidence is admissible because mental state is a\\n material issue.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n Harry argues that the approach described in Thomas is suspect in light of our\\nstatement in Turner that “[s]imply asserting—without explanation—that the\\nconviction is relevant to a material issue such as intent or knowledge is not enough to\\nestablish its admissibility under the Federal Rules.” 781 F.3d at 390. However, Turner\\nis inapposite where a defendant places his knowledge and intent at issue during trial.\\nSee United States v. Valerio, 731 F. App’x 551, 553 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)\\n(explaining that Turner was inapposite where the defendant “placed his knowledge\\nor intent at issue” during trial). Furthermore, the district court here did not simply\\naccept the government’s assertion “without explanation,” Turner, 781 F.3d at 390,\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fthat Harry’s prior bad acts were relevant to a material issue. Rather, the court engaged\\nin the type of analysis required by Turner: thoughtfully reviewing all of the prior bad\\nacts the government sought to present at trial, admitting some and rejecting others.\\n\\n Because the evidence at issue served the legitimate non-propensity purpose of\\nproving knowledge and intent, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\nallowing Chyma, Hernandez, and Laufenberg to testify.\\n\\n Even if the district court had erred in allowing their testimony, however, such\\nerror would not constitute a basis for reversal. See United States v. Eggleston, 165\\nF.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for possession with intent to\\ndistribute where the district court erroneously admitted propensity evidence but where\\nsuch admission was harmless in light of the suspect’s self-incriminating statements\\nand other government evidence). Like the defendant in Eggleston, Harry made\\n“damaging admissions out of his own mouth,” id., by claiming the drugs belonged to\\nhim and that Thul was just riding along. In addition, the government presented ample\\nevidence of Harry’s intent to distribute the methamphetamine, including the large\\nquantity of drugs discovered in the truck he was driving; the text messages between\\nhim and Thul; and the CI’s predictive tip. Considering the strength of the\\ngovernment’s case, the district court’s alleged evidentiary error would have been\\nharmless.\\n\\n 2. Thul’s Prior Bad Acts\\n Harry argues the district court erred in excluding evidence of Thul’s 2000\\nconviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and his 2000 and 2003\\nconvictions for possession of methamphetamine.6 The district court excluded these\\nacts due to their remoteness, finding 14–17 years—the time between the commission\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Harry does not appear to contest the district court’s decision to exclude Thul’s\\nconviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fof the excluded acts and the trial date—too great a gap. Harry challenges this finding,\\narguing the bad acts were not remote, noting that Thul was incarcerated during a\\nportion of the time between 2000 and 2017.\\n\\n We review a district court’s ruling excluding evidence for an abuse of\\n discretion. Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not substitute\\n its judgment for the judgment of the district court. . . . “Reverse 404(b)”\\n is a term some courts have used to refer to evidence of prior bad acts by\\n a third party, introduced by the defendant and offered to implicate the\\n third party in the charged crime.\\n\\nUnited States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504, 512 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). We apply the\\nsame factors whether analyzing “regular” 404(b) evidence or so-called “reverse”\\n404(b) evidence. See, e.g., id. at 513.\\n\\n To determine if evidence is too remote, the [district] court applies a\\n reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of\\n each case. There is no fixed period within which the prior acts must have\\n occurred. We have generally been reluctant to uphold the introduction\\n of evidence relating to acts or crimes which occurred more than thirteen\\n years prior to the conduct challenged.\\n\\nUnited States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). We noted in\\nHalk that a court may consider incarceration as a factor weighing against remoteness.\\nId.\\n\\n Harry’s argument for not excluding the 2000 and 2003 bad acts makes sense.\\nHowever, considering that we have identified 13 years as the typical outer limit for\\nremoteness, see Halk, 634 F.3d at 487, we cannot say the district court abused its\\ndiscretion in excluding 14–17 year old bad acts. We decline to “substitute [our]\\njudgment for the judgment of the district court.” Battle, 774 F.3d at 512 (internal\\nquotation omitted).\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f III. Conclusion\\nWe affirm Harry’s conviction.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3275,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641538,"string":"4,641,538"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jaunte Lamar BERRY, Sr. Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jaunte Berry, Sr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1977"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1977\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: July 22, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr., appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed after\\nhe pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled\\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He challenges two aspects of his\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\fU.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range and the substantive reasonableness\\nof his sentence. We affirm.\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court made two Guidelines calculations that are\\nrelevant to Berry’s appeal. First, the district court found under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 that\\nBerry’s uncharged drug activity in 2015 was part of a common scheme or plan with\\nhis charged drug activity in 2017 and part of the same course of conduct. Berry\\nobjected on several grounds, including that he was in prison for over a year between\\nthe two time periods. The district court overruled his objection. Second, the district\\ncourt found under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016) that the 2017 drug activity was\\n“part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” Berry had objected\\nthat evidence of the money he wired to pay for drugs only established his debts, not\\nwhat he had received as “income,” and could not satisfy the criteria necessary for the\\nenhancement to apply. The district court overruled the objection, noting there was\\nalso evidence that Berry had large amounts of cash.\\n\\n Based on these rulings, the district court calculated Berry’s Guidelines range\\nas 360 to 480 months of imprisonment. The district court then varied downward to\\na sentence of 300 months of imprisonment.\\n\\n We review application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v.\\nWaln, 916 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2019). We review factual findings at sentencing\\nfor clear error. Id.\\n\\n On appeal, Berry first challenges the relevant conduct determination under\\nU.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 by arguing that his 2015 drug activity was too remote in time from\\nhis 2017 charge. Berry asks us to follow the Seventh Circuit’s position on relevant\\nconduct stated in United States v. Purham, 754 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2014). In\\nPurham, the Seventh Circuit made separate determinations regarding the “course of\\nconduct” and the “common scheme or plan” components of relevant conduct. See id.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fIt held that evidence of merely transporting the same drug between the same cities on\\ntwo different occasions was not sufficient to establish the same course of conduct\\nwhen the relevant conduct was separated by more than a year. See id. It also held\\nthat such conduct does not constitute a common scheme or plan where it lacks “at\\nleast one common factor, such as ‘common victims, common accomplices, common\\npurpose, or similar modus operandi.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt.\\nn.5(B)(i)).\\n\\n Even if we followed the Seventh Circuit and imposed a remoteness test to\\ndetermine whether the drug activity was part of the same course of conduct, the test\\nwould not help Berry because the Seventh Circuit’s test for a finding of a common\\nscheme or plan matches the evidence against Berry. In particular, evidence at\\nsentencing shows common accomplices (two cousins) assisted Berry in distributing\\nmethamphetamine in both 2015 and 2017. Berry protests that relatives should not be\\nconsidered common accomplices, but he cites no authority for that point, and we see\\nno reason to create a relatives exception to the test for common accomplices. Thus,\\nthe district court did not clearly err by finding that the 2015 drug activity was part of\\nthe same course of conduct as the 2017 charged conduct.\\n\\n Second, Berry challenges the criminal livelihood enhancement by arguing that\\nthe $22,000 he wired to California for drugs was not income. The Guidelines\\nrecommend a two-level enhancement if “the defendant committed the offense as part\\nof a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016). The term “engaged in as a livelihood” is defined as\\nfollows: “(A) the defendant derived income from the pattern of criminal conduct that\\nin any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then existing hourly minimum\\nwage under federal law; and (B) the totality of circumstances shows that such\\ncriminal conduct was the defendant’s primary occupation in that twelve-month\\nperiod.” Id. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2; see id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.20(C). The federal minimum\\nwage was $7.25 during the relevant time period. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Accordingly,\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fthe government needed to show that Berry derived more than $14,500 in income from\\nhis drug activity to prove the enhancement applied.\\n\\n Although we have not previously adopted a definition for income, we believe\\nthe term refers to gross income, not net income. See United States v. Gordon, 852\\nF.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2017). First, the definition is linked to the minimum wage,\\nsee U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2, which is a gross income figure itself. Second, we\\nthink that a substantial cash flow from criminal activity is sufficient evidence to\\nsatisfy the “income” requirement. We see no value in rewarding a defendant who\\nmay have poor profit margins on his criminal activity. The enhancement is for\\nengaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood, not for becoming wealthy from criminal\\nconduct.\\n\\n Applying that definition, we see no clear error in the district court’s decision\\nbelow. The district court found that Berry wired $22,000 for drugs in a single year,\\nthat he had no significant legitimate employment, and that evidence suggested he had\\nother large amounts of cash on hand. Because the record indicates that Berry derived\\nthe vast majority of these funds from his drug sales, the district court’s conclusion\\nthat these funds satisfied the income requirement could not be clearly erroneous under\\na gross income standard. Berry does not challenge that drug activity was his primary\\noccupation. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in applying the\\ncriminal livelihood enhancement.\\n\\n Finally, Berry challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence by\\narguing it failed to account for his “long history of drug addiction, his lack of prior\\ndrug-related convictions, and the fact that he has never received a sentence longer\\nthan 6 months.” We review substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See\\nUnited States v. Waters, 883 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018). A sentencing court\\nabuses its discretion “when it . . . fails to consider a relevant factor that should have\\nreceived significant weight . . . [or] gives significant weight to an improper or\\n\\n -4-\\n\\firrelevant factor.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 562\\nU.S. 1267 (2011)). At sentencing, the district court acknowledged “the impact\\n[methamphetamine] . . . had on [his] life” and that Berry’s prior convictions were “for\\nthings that are not nearly as serious as this [crime].” It then varied downward from\\nthe Guidelines, basing the variance on Berry’s fairly young age and lack of a prior\\n“extremely long sentence.” Under our standard of review, this consideration is\\nsufficient.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4418791/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641538/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jaunte Lamar BERRY, Sr. Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1977\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Southern Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\n Filed: July 22, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr., appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed after\nhe pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He challenges two aspects of his\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\nof South Dakota.\n\fU.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range and the substantive reasonableness\nof his sentence. We affirm.\n\n At sentencing, the district court made two Guidelines calculations that are\nrelevant to Berry’s appeal. First, the district court found under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 that\nBerry’s uncharged drug activity in 2015 was part of a common scheme or plan with\nhis charged drug activity in 2017 and part of the same course of conduct. Berry\nobjected on several grounds, including that he was in prison for over a year between\nthe two time periods. The district court overruled his objection. Second, the district\ncourt found under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016) that the 2017 drug activity was\n“part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” Berry had objected\nthat evidence of the money he wired to pay for drugs only established his debts, not\nwhat he had received as “income,” and could not satisfy the criteria necessary for the\nenhancement to apply. The district court overruled the objection, noting there was\nalso evidence that Berry had large amounts of cash.\n\n Based on these rulings, the district court calculated Berry’s Guidelines range\nas 360 to 480 months of imprisonment. The district court then varied downward to\na sentence of 300 months of imprisonment.\n\n We review application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v.\nWaln, 916 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2019). We review factual findings at sentencing\nfor clear error. Id.\n\n On appeal, Berry first challenges the relevant conduct determination under\nU.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 by arguing that his 2015 drug activity was too remote in time from\nhis 2017 charge. Berry asks us to follow the Seventh Circuit’s position on relevant\nconduct stated in United States v. Purham, 754 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2014). In\nPurham, the Seventh Circuit made separate determinations regarding the “course of\nconduct” and the “common scheme or plan” components of relevant conduct. See id.\n\n -2-\n\fIt held that evidence of merely transporting the same drug between the same cities on\ntwo different occasions was not sufficient to establish the same course of conduct\nwhen the relevant conduct was separated by more than a year. See id. It also held\nthat such conduct does not constitute a common scheme or plan where it lacks “at\nleast one common factor, such as ‘common victims, common accomplices, common\npurpose, or similar modus operandi.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt.\nn.5(B)(i)).\n\n Even if we followed the Seventh Circuit and imposed a remoteness test to\ndetermine whether the drug activity was part of the same course of conduct, the test\nwould not help Berry because the Seventh Circuit’s test for a finding of a common\nscheme or plan matches the evidence against Berry. In particular, evidence at\nsentencing shows common accomplices (two cousins) assisted Berry in distributing\nmethamphetamine in both 2015 and 2017. Berry protests that relatives should not be\nconsidered common accomplices, but he cites no authority for that point, and we see\nno reason to create a relatives exception to the test for common accomplices. Thus,\nthe district court did not clearly err by finding that the 2015 drug activity was part of\nthe same course of conduct as the 2017 charged conduct.\n\n Second, Berry challenges the criminal livelihood enhancement by arguing that\nthe $22,000 he wired to California for drugs was not income. The Guidelines\nrecommend a two-level enhancement if “the defendant committed the offense as part\nof a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” U.S.S.G.\n§ 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016). The term “engaged in as a livelihood” is defined as\nfollows: “(A) the defendant derived income from the pattern of criminal conduct that\nin any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then existing hourly minimum\nwage under federal law; and (B) the totality of circumstances shows that such\ncriminal conduct was the defendant’s primary occupation in that twelve-month\nperiod.” Id. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2; see id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.20(C). The federal minimum\nwage was $7.25 during the relevant time period. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Accordingly,\n\n -3-\n\fthe government needed to show that Berry derived more than $14,500 in income from\nhis drug activity to prove the enhancement applied.\n\n Although we have not previously adopted a definition for income, we believe\nthe term refers to gross income, not net income. See United States v. Gordon, 852\nF.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2017). First, the definition is linked to the minimum wage,\nsee U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2, which is a gross income figure itself. Second, we\nthink that a substantial cash flow from criminal activity is sufficient evidence to\nsatisfy the “income” requirement. We see no value in rewarding a defendant who\nmay have poor profit margins on his criminal activity. The enhancement is for\nengaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood, not for becoming wealthy from criminal\nconduct.\n\n Applying that definition, we see no clear error in the district court’s decision\nbelow. The district court found that Berry wired $22,000 for drugs in a single year,\nthat he had no significant legitimate employment, and that evidence suggested he had\nother large amounts of cash on hand. Because the record indicates that Berry derived\nthe vast majority of these funds from his drug sales, the district court’s conclusion\nthat these funds satisfied the income requirement could not be clearly erroneous under\na gross income standard. Berry does not challenge that drug activity was his primary\noccupation. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in applying the\ncriminal livelihood enhancement.\n\n Finally, Berry challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence by\narguing it failed to account for his “long history of drug addiction, his lack of prior\ndrug-related convictions, and the fact that he has never received a sentence longer\nthan 6 months.” We review substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See\nUnited States v. Waters, 883 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018). A sentencing court\nabuses its discretion “when it . . . fails to consider a relevant factor that should have\nreceived significant weight . . . [or] gives significant weight to an improper or\n\n -4-\n\firrelevant factor.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 562\nU.S. 1267 (2011)). At sentencing, the district court acknowledged “the impact\n[methamphetamine] . . . had on [his] life” and that Berry’s prior convictions were “for\nthings that are not nearly as serious as this [crime].” It then varied downward from\nthe Guidelines, basing the variance on Berry’s fairly young age and lack of a prior\n“extremely long sentence.” Under our standard of review, this consideration is\nsufficient.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jaunte Lamar BERRY, Sr. Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1977\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: July 22, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jaunte Lamar Berry, Sr., appeals the sentence the district court1 imposed after\\nhe pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled\\nsubstance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He challenges two aspects of his\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District\\nof South Dakota.\\n\\fU.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range and the substantive reasonableness\\nof his sentence. We affirm.\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court made two Guidelines calculations that are\\nrelevant to Berry’s appeal. First, the district court found under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 that\\nBerry’s uncharged drug activity in 2015 was part of a common scheme or plan with\\nhis charged drug activity in 2017 and part of the same course of conduct. Berry\\nobjected on several grounds, including that he was in prison for over a year between\\nthe two time periods. The district court overruled his objection. Second, the district\\ncourt found under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016) that the 2017 drug activity was\\n“part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” Berry had objected\\nthat evidence of the money he wired to pay for drugs only established his debts, not\\nwhat he had received as “income,” and could not satisfy the criteria necessary for the\\nenhancement to apply. The district court overruled the objection, noting there was\\nalso evidence that Berry had large amounts of cash.\\n\\n Based on these rulings, the district court calculated Berry’s Guidelines range\\nas 360 to 480 months of imprisonment. The district court then varied downward to\\na sentence of 300 months of imprisonment.\\n\\n We review application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v.\\nWaln, 916 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2019). We review factual findings at sentencing\\nfor clear error. Id.\\n\\n On appeal, Berry first challenges the relevant conduct determination under\\nU.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 by arguing that his 2015 drug activity was too remote in time from\\nhis 2017 charge. Berry asks us to follow the Seventh Circuit’s position on relevant\\nconduct stated in United States v. Purham, 754 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 2014). In\\nPurham, the Seventh Circuit made separate determinations regarding the “course of\\nconduct” and the “common scheme or plan” components of relevant conduct. See id.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fIt held that evidence of merely transporting the same drug between the same cities on\\ntwo different occasions was not sufficient to establish the same course of conduct\\nwhen the relevant conduct was separated by more than a year. See id. It also held\\nthat such conduct does not constitute a common scheme or plan where it lacks “at\\nleast one common factor, such as ‘common victims, common accomplices, common\\npurpose, or similar modus operandi.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt.\\nn.5(B)(i)).\\n\\n Even if we followed the Seventh Circuit and imposed a remoteness test to\\ndetermine whether the drug activity was part of the same course of conduct, the test\\nwould not help Berry because the Seventh Circuit’s test for a finding of a common\\nscheme or plan matches the evidence against Berry. In particular, evidence at\\nsentencing shows common accomplices (two cousins) assisted Berry in distributing\\nmethamphetamine in both 2015 and 2017. Berry protests that relatives should not be\\nconsidered common accomplices, but he cites no authority for that point, and we see\\nno reason to create a relatives exception to the test for common accomplices. Thus,\\nthe district court did not clearly err by finding that the 2015 drug activity was part of\\nthe same course of conduct as the 2017 charged conduct.\\n\\n Second, Berry challenges the criminal livelihood enhancement by arguing that\\nthe $22,000 he wired to California for drugs was not income. The Guidelines\\nrecommend a two-level enhancement if “the defendant committed the offense as part\\nof a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.” U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2D1.1(b)(15)(E) (2016). The term “engaged in as a livelihood” is defined as\\nfollows: “(A) the defendant derived income from the pattern of criminal conduct that\\nin any twelve-month period exceeded 2,000 times the then existing hourly minimum\\nwage under federal law; and (B) the totality of circumstances shows that such\\ncriminal conduct was the defendant’s primary occupation in that twelve-month\\nperiod.” Id. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2; see id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.20(C). The federal minimum\\nwage was $7.25 during the relevant time period. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Accordingly,\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fthe government needed to show that Berry derived more than $14,500 in income from\\nhis drug activity to prove the enhancement applied.\\n\\n Although we have not previously adopted a definition for income, we believe\\nthe term refers to gross income, not net income. See United States v. Gordon, 852\\nF.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2017). First, the definition is linked to the minimum wage,\\nsee U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3 cmt. n.2, which is a gross income figure itself. Second, we\\nthink that a substantial cash flow from criminal activity is sufficient evidence to\\nsatisfy the “income” requirement. We see no value in rewarding a defendant who\\nmay have poor profit margins on his criminal activity. The enhancement is for\\nengaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood, not for becoming wealthy from criminal\\nconduct.\\n\\n Applying that definition, we see no clear error in the district court’s decision\\nbelow. The district court found that Berry wired $22,000 for drugs in a single year,\\nthat he had no significant legitimate employment, and that evidence suggested he had\\nother large amounts of cash on hand. Because the record indicates that Berry derived\\nthe vast majority of these funds from his drug sales, the district court’s conclusion\\nthat these funds satisfied the income requirement could not be clearly erroneous under\\na gross income standard. Berry does not challenge that drug activity was his primary\\noccupation. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in applying the\\ncriminal livelihood enhancement.\\n\\n Finally, Berry challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence by\\narguing it failed to account for his “long history of drug addiction, his lack of prior\\ndrug-related convictions, and the fact that he has never received a sentence longer\\nthan 6 months.” We review substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See\\nUnited States v. Waters, 883 F.3d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018). A sentencing court\\nabuses its discretion “when it . . . fails to consider a relevant factor that should have\\nreceived significant weight . . . [or] gives significant weight to an improper or\\n\\n -4-\\n\\firrelevant factor.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 562\\nU.S. 1267 (2011)). At sentencing, the district court acknowledged “the impact\\n[methamphetamine] . . . had on [his] life” and that Berry’s prior convictions were “for\\nthings that are not nearly as serious as this [crime].” It then varied downward from\\nthe Guidelines, basing the variance on Berry’s fairly young age and lack of a prior\\n“extremely long sentence.” Under our standard of review, this consideration is\\nsufficient.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3276,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641894,"string":"4,641,894"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Arthur Eugene JENNINGS, Sr., Also Known as Arthur Eugene Jennings, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Arthur Jennings, Sr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3584"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Beam, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3584\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Arthur Eugene Jennings, Sr., also known as Arthur Eugene Jennings\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Between 1993 and 2004 Arthur Jennings was incarcerated and served a\\nsentence for second degree sexual abuse of a minor under Iowa state law. When\\nreleased, Jennings was required to register every three months with the Iowa Sex\\nOffender Registry. In 2008, Jennings was convicted in state court for failing to\\nregister as a sex offender. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to be placed\\n\\fon the Iowa Sex Offender Registry for life. In 2016, Jennings was charged under 18\\nU.S.C. § 2250 for failing to register as a sex offender after it was discovered that he\\nhad not registered his latest address. Jennings pled guilty and was sentenced to a top-\\nof-the-guideline range sentence of 30 months. At the sentencing hearing, the district\\ncourt1 imposed a no-contact order restraining Jennings from unapproved\\ncommunication with his sister and adult son. Jennings now appeals this special\\ncondition. Additionally, Jennings makes an unpreserved claim that, because he was\\nconvicted of a sex offense before the passage of the Sex Offense Registry and\\nNotification Act (“SORNA”), the retroactive application violates the nondelegation\\ndoctrine. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n At the time of his sentencing, Jennings had been abusing drugs and alcohol and\\nwas embroiled in a bitter domestic drama with his adult family. The source of the\\ntension was rooted in Jennings’s relationship with his son’s ex-girlfriend, Valerie\\nLong. At sentencing Jennings was living with Long and her two-year-old son.\\nJennings’s son, Charles Spicer Sr., is the father of Long’s son. At some point\\ntensions boiled over and Jennings made threatening comments to Charles, as well as\\nto Angelia, Jennings’s sister. Jennings ultimately pled guilty to third-degree\\nharassment of Charles in Iowa state court.\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court discussed imposing a no-contact order\\nrestraining Jennings from initiating contact with Charles, Angelia, and Jennings’s\\nestranged wife, Darlene. The family dynamics of all involved are complex. At the\\ntime of the hearing Angelia was an active user of methamphetamine and cocaine.\\nCharles had a history of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol abuse. Darlene appeared to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fbe a relatively stable person. While Jennings admitted to the court that drugs and\\nalcohol were central to many family fights, he objected to the no-contact order as to\\nall three individuals. The district court eventually excluded Darlene from the no-\\ncontact order because Jennings had been corresponding with her from jail, and she\\nhad been helpful to his recovery process and in discovering Christianity. The\\ncondition at issue on appeal states:\\n\\n You must not initiate communication with Angelia Jennings or Charles\\n Spicer Sr. (personal, electronic, mail, or otherwise) without the prior\\n approval of the U.S. Probation Officer. If contact is approved, you must\\n comply with any conditions or limitations on this contact, as set forth by\\n the U.S. Probation Officer. Any unapproved direct contact must be\\n reported to the U.S. Probation Officer within 24 hours.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Special Condition of Supervised Release\\n\\n “When a defendant properly objects at sentencing, we review special\\nconditions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 757\\n(8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n“District courts are normally afforded wide discretion in imposing terms of\\nsupervised release.” United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), special conditions of a sentence must “(1) be\\nreasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s\\nhistory and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s educational,\\nvocational, medical or other correctional needs and (2) involve no greater deprivation\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof liberty than is reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the\\npublic from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional needs.”2\\nUnited States v. Wilson, 709 F.3d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Jennings challenges the no-contact order under both prongs. First, he claims\\nthat the order is both unnecessary and without evidentiary support. In support of this\\ncontention Jennings points out that he objected to the consideration of the text\\nmessages sent to Angelia, that they were not necessarily threatening and were actually\\nsent to a different sister. Jennings fails to note, however, that the order is only\\npartially based on the alleged threats. The court made plain during sentencing that\\nthe primary purpose of the condition was to facilitate Jennings’s rehabilitation from\\ndrugs and alcohol. It is undisputed that Jennings had difficulty maintaining sobriety,\\nand the record shows that Jennings has a long history of violent confrontations with\\nfamily members, often involving the use of drugs or alcohol. Even assuming that the\\ntext messages were not threats and were sent to a different sister, there is sufficient\\nevidence on this record to justify the order.\\n\\n Jennings next contends the order imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than\\nis reasonably necessary because it interferes with his constitutional right to maintain\\nfamilial relationships. We have repeatedly upheld no-contact orders requiring\\ndefendants to seek permission from a probation officer before contacting their own\\nminor children, even where there is no history or likelihood of abusive conduct. See\\nUnited States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Simons,\\n614 F.3d 475, 481–82 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850–51\\n(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 507–08 (8th Cir. 2005); Crume,\\n422 F.3d at 733–34; United States v. Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (per\\ncuriam). In this case, there is a long history of abusive conduct, and the no-contact\\n2\\n The conditions must also be consistent with any pertinent public policy statements\\nissued by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\forder concerns only adult family members, with whom Jennings has at best strained\\nrelations. Given this history the special condition is well within the constitutional\\nboundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).\\n\\n B. Nondelegation Doctrine\\n\\n Ordinarily, “[a] valid guilty plea . . . waives all non-jurisdictional defects and\\ndefenses.” United States v. Limely, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United\\nStates v. Smith, 422 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, a guilty plea does not\\nbar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.\\nClass v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018). Because Jennings\\ndid not preserve the issue by objecting or filing a pretrial motion to dismiss, we\\nreview this challenge under the plain error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To\\nsucceed under the plain error standard, Jennings must show (1) an error, (2) that is\\nplain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,\\nintegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct.\\n1038, 1046 (1985)). Jennings challenges the retroactive application of SORNA to\\nsex offenders convicted before its 2006 passage as unconstitutional. This challenge\\nfails because he cannot show an error, let alone a plain error.\\n\\n In 2007, the Attorney General retroactively applied SORNA to sex offenders,\\nacting under the authority delegated by Congress under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006).\\nWe ruled on this issue in United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2013),\\nconcluding that “SORNA provides the Attorney General with an intelligible\\nprinciple, and is a valid delegation of legislative authority.” Id. at 920. After\\nJennings’s trial concluded, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue in\\nGundy v. United States, 17-6086. On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court rejected the\\narguments relied upon by Jennings, stating “The question becomes: Did Congress\\nmake an impermissible delegation when it instructed the Attorney General to apply\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fSORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible? Under\\nthis Court’s long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.” Gundy v.\\nUnited States, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019). Kuehl remains the\\nbinding law in this circuit.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the special condition imposed by the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419147/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BEAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641894/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Arthur Eugene JENNINGS, Sr., Also Known as Arthur Eugene Jennings, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3584\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Arthur Eugene Jennings, Sr., also known as Arthur Eugene Jennings\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Between 1993 and 2004 Arthur Jennings was incarcerated and served a\nsentence for second degree sexual abuse of a minor under Iowa state law. When\nreleased, Jennings was required to register every three months with the Iowa Sex\nOffender Registry. In 2008, Jennings was convicted in state court for failing to\nregister as a sex offender. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to be placed\n\fon the Iowa Sex Offender Registry for life. In 2016, Jennings was charged under 18\nU.S.C. § 2250 for failing to register as a sex offender after it was discovered that he\nhad not registered his latest address. Jennings pled guilty and was sentenced to a top-\nof-the-guideline range sentence of 30 months. At the sentencing hearing, the district\ncourt1 imposed a no-contact order restraining Jennings from unapproved\ncommunication with his sister and adult son. Jennings now appeals this special\ncondition. Additionally, Jennings makes an unpreserved claim that, because he was\nconvicted of a sex offense before the passage of the Sex Offense Registry and\nNotification Act (“SORNA”), the retroactive application violates the nondelegation\ndoctrine. We affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n At the time of his sentencing, Jennings had been abusing drugs and alcohol and\nwas embroiled in a bitter domestic drama with his adult family. The source of the\ntension was rooted in Jennings’s relationship with his son’s ex-girlfriend, Valerie\nLong. At sentencing Jennings was living with Long and her two-year-old son.\nJennings’s son, Charles Spicer Sr., is the father of Long’s son. At some point\ntensions boiled over and Jennings made threatening comments to Charles, as well as\nto Angelia, Jennings’s sister. Jennings ultimately pled guilty to third-degree\nharassment of Charles in Iowa state court.\n\n At sentencing, the district court discussed imposing a no-contact order\nrestraining Jennings from initiating contact with Charles, Angelia, and Jennings’s\nestranged wife, Darlene. The family dynamics of all involved are complex. At the\ntime of the hearing Angelia was an active user of methamphetamine and cocaine.\nCharles had a history of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol abuse. Darlene appeared to\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\nSouthern District of Iowa.\n\n -2-\n\fbe a relatively stable person. While Jennings admitted to the court that drugs and\nalcohol were central to many family fights, he objected to the no-contact order as to\nall three individuals. The district court eventually excluded Darlene from the no-\ncontact order because Jennings had been corresponding with her from jail, and she\nhad been helpful to his recovery process and in discovering Christianity. The\ncondition at issue on appeal states:\n\n You must not initiate communication with Angelia Jennings or Charles\n Spicer Sr. (personal, electronic, mail, or otherwise) without the prior\n approval of the U.S. Probation Officer. If contact is approved, you must\n comply with any conditions or limitations on this contact, as set forth by\n the U.S. Probation Officer. Any unapproved direct contact must be\n reported to the U.S. Probation Officer within 24 hours.\n\nII. Discussion\n\n A. Special Condition of Supervised Release\n\n “When a defendant properly objects at sentencing, we review special\nconditions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 757\n(8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850 (8th Cir. 2009)).\n“District courts are normally afforded wide discretion in imposing terms of\nsupervised release.” United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)\n(quoting United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000)).\n\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), special conditions of a sentence must “(1) be\nreasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s\nhistory and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\npublic from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s educational,\nvocational, medical or other correctional needs and (2) involve no greater deprivation\n\n -3-\n\fof liberty than is reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the\npublic from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional needs.”2\nUnited States v. Wilson, 709 F.3d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting\nUnited States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005)).\n\n Jennings challenges the no-contact order under both prongs. First, he claims\nthat the order is both unnecessary and without evidentiary support. In support of this\ncontention Jennings points out that he objected to the consideration of the text\nmessages sent to Angelia, that they were not necessarily threatening and were actually\nsent to a different sister. Jennings fails to note, however, that the order is only\npartially based on the alleged threats. The court made plain during sentencing that\nthe primary purpose of the condition was to facilitate Jennings’s rehabilitation from\ndrugs and alcohol. It is undisputed that Jennings had difficulty maintaining sobriety,\nand the record shows that Jennings has a long history of violent confrontations with\nfamily members, often involving the use of drugs or alcohol. Even assuming that the\ntext messages were not threats and were sent to a different sister, there is sufficient\nevidence on this record to justify the order.\n\n Jennings next contends the order imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than\nis reasonably necessary because it interferes with his constitutional right to maintain\nfamilial relationships. We have repeatedly upheld no-contact orders requiring\ndefendants to seek permission from a probation officer before contacting their own\nminor children, even where there is no history or likelihood of abusive conduct. See\nUnited States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Simons,\n614 F.3d 475, 481–82 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850–51\n(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 507–08 (8th Cir. 2005); Crume,\n422 F.3d at 733–34; United States v. Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (per\ncuriam). In this case, there is a long history of abusive conduct, and the no-contact\n2\n The conditions must also be consistent with any pertinent public policy statements\nissued by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).\n\n -4-\n\forder concerns only adult family members, with whom Jennings has at best strained\nrelations. Given this history the special condition is well within the constitutional\nboundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).\n\n B. Nondelegation Doctrine\n\n Ordinarily, “[a] valid guilty plea . . . waives all non-jurisdictional defects and\ndefenses.” United States v. Limely, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United\nStates v. Smith, 422 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, a guilty plea does not\nbar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.\nClass v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018). Because Jennings\ndid not preserve the issue by objecting or filing a pretrial motion to dismiss, we\nreview this challenge under the plain error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To\nsucceed under the plain error standard, Jennings must show (1) an error, (2) that is\nplain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,\nintegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct.\n1038, 1046 (1985)). Jennings challenges the retroactive application of SORNA to\nsex offenders convicted before its 2006 passage as unconstitutional. This challenge\nfails because he cannot show an error, let alone a plain error.\n\n In 2007, the Attorney General retroactively applied SORNA to sex offenders,\nacting under the authority delegated by Congress under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006).\nWe ruled on this issue in United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2013),\nconcluding that “SORNA provides the Attorney General with an intelligible\nprinciple, and is a valid delegation of legislative authority.” Id. at 920. After\nJennings’s trial concluded, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue in\nGundy v. United States, 17-6086. On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court rejected the\narguments relied upon by Jennings, stating “The question becomes: Did Congress\nmake an impermissible delegation when it instructed the Attorney General to apply\n\n -5-\n\fSORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible? Under\nthis Court’s long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.” Gundy v.\nUnited States, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019). Kuehl remains the\nbinding law in this circuit.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n We affirm the special condition imposed by the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Arthur Eugene JENNINGS, Sr., Also Known as Arthur Eugene Jennings, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3584\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Arthur Eugene Jennings, Sr., also known as Arthur Eugene Jennings\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, BEAM, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Between 1993 and 2004 Arthur Jennings was incarcerated and served a\\nsentence for second degree sexual abuse of a minor under Iowa state law. When\\nreleased, Jennings was required to register every three months with the Iowa Sex\\nOffender Registry. In 2008, Jennings was convicted in state court for failing to\\nregister as a sex offender. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to be placed\\n\\fon the Iowa Sex Offender Registry for life. In 2016, Jennings was charged under 18\\nU.S.C. § 2250 for failing to register as a sex offender after it was discovered that he\\nhad not registered his latest address. Jennings pled guilty and was sentenced to a top-\\nof-the-guideline range sentence of 30 months. At the sentencing hearing, the district\\ncourt1 imposed a no-contact order restraining Jennings from unapproved\\ncommunication with his sister and adult son. Jennings now appeals this special\\ncondition. Additionally, Jennings makes an unpreserved claim that, because he was\\nconvicted of a sex offense before the passage of the Sex Offense Registry and\\nNotification Act (“SORNA”), the retroactive application violates the nondelegation\\ndoctrine. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n At the time of his sentencing, Jennings had been abusing drugs and alcohol and\\nwas embroiled in a bitter domestic drama with his adult family. The source of the\\ntension was rooted in Jennings’s relationship with his son’s ex-girlfriend, Valerie\\nLong. At sentencing Jennings was living with Long and her two-year-old son.\\nJennings’s son, Charles Spicer Sr., is the father of Long’s son. At some point\\ntensions boiled over and Jennings made threatening comments to Charles, as well as\\nto Angelia, Jennings’s sister. Jennings ultimately pled guilty to third-degree\\nharassment of Charles in Iowa state court.\\n\\n At sentencing, the district court discussed imposing a no-contact order\\nrestraining Jennings from initiating contact with Charles, Angelia, and Jennings’s\\nestranged wife, Darlene. The family dynamics of all involved are complex. At the\\ntime of the hearing Angelia was an active user of methamphetamine and cocaine.\\nCharles had a history of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol abuse. Darlene appeared to\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the\\nSouthern District of Iowa.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fbe a relatively stable person. While Jennings admitted to the court that drugs and\\nalcohol were central to many family fights, he objected to the no-contact order as to\\nall three individuals. The district court eventually excluded Darlene from the no-\\ncontact order because Jennings had been corresponding with her from jail, and she\\nhad been helpful to his recovery process and in discovering Christianity. The\\ncondition at issue on appeal states:\\n\\n You must not initiate communication with Angelia Jennings or Charles\\n Spicer Sr. (personal, electronic, mail, or otherwise) without the prior\\n approval of the U.S. Probation Officer. If contact is approved, you must\\n comply with any conditions or limitations on this contact, as set forth by\\n the U.S. Probation Officer. Any unapproved direct contact must be\\n reported to the U.S. Probation Officer within 24 hours.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Special Condition of Supervised Release\\n\\n “When a defendant properly objects at sentencing, we review special\\nconditions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 757\\n(8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850 (8th Cir. 2009)).\\n“District courts are normally afforded wide discretion in imposing terms of\\nsupervised release.” United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)\\n(quoting United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000)).\\n\\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), special conditions of a sentence must “(1) be\\nreasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s\\nhistory and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the\\npublic from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s educational,\\nvocational, medical or other correctional needs and (2) involve no greater deprivation\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof liberty than is reasonably necessary to advance deterrence, the protection of the\\npublic from future crimes of the defendant, and the defendant’s correctional needs.”2\\nUnited States v. Wilson, 709 F.3d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005)).\\n\\n Jennings challenges the no-contact order under both prongs. First, he claims\\nthat the order is both unnecessary and without evidentiary support. In support of this\\ncontention Jennings points out that he objected to the consideration of the text\\nmessages sent to Angelia, that they were not necessarily threatening and were actually\\nsent to a different sister. Jennings fails to note, however, that the order is only\\npartially based on the alleged threats. The court made plain during sentencing that\\nthe primary purpose of the condition was to facilitate Jennings’s rehabilitation from\\ndrugs and alcohol. It is undisputed that Jennings had difficulty maintaining sobriety,\\nand the record shows that Jennings has a long history of violent confrontations with\\nfamily members, often involving the use of drugs or alcohol. Even assuming that the\\ntext messages were not threats and were sent to a different sister, there is sufficient\\nevidence on this record to justify the order.\\n\\n Jennings next contends the order imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than\\nis reasonably necessary because it interferes with his constitutional right to maintain\\nfamilial relationships. We have repeatedly upheld no-contact orders requiring\\ndefendants to seek permission from a probation officer before contacting their own\\nminor children, even where there is no history or likelihood of abusive conduct. See\\nUnited States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Simons,\\n614 F.3d 475, 481–82 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 850–51\\n(8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 507–08 (8th Cir. 2005); Crume,\\n422 F.3d at 733–34; United States v. Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (per\\ncuriam). In this case, there is a long history of abusive conduct, and the no-contact\\n2\\n The conditions must also be consistent with any pertinent public policy statements\\nissued by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\forder concerns only adult family members, with whom Jennings has at best strained\\nrelations. Given this history the special condition is well within the constitutional\\nboundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).\\n\\n B. Nondelegation Doctrine\\n\\n Ordinarily, “[a] valid guilty plea . . . waives all non-jurisdictional defects and\\ndefenses.” United States v. Limely, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United\\nStates v. Smith, 422 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, a guilty plea does not\\nbar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.\\nClass v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018). Because Jennings\\ndid not preserve the issue by objecting or filing a pretrial motion to dismiss, we\\nreview this challenge under the plain error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To\\nsucceed under the plain error standard, Jennings must show (1) an error, (2) that is\\nplain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,\\nintegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct.\\n1038, 1046 (1985)). Jennings challenges the retroactive application of SORNA to\\nsex offenders convicted before its 2006 passage as unconstitutional. This challenge\\nfails because he cannot show an error, let alone a plain error.\\n\\n In 2007, the Attorney General retroactively applied SORNA to sex offenders,\\nacting under the authority delegated by Congress under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006).\\nWe ruled on this issue in United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2013),\\nconcluding that “SORNA provides the Attorney General with an intelligible\\nprinciple, and is a valid delegation of legislative authority.” Id. at 920. After\\nJennings’s trial concluded, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue in\\nGundy v. United States, 17-6086. On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court rejected the\\narguments relied upon by Jennings, stating “The question becomes: Did Congress\\nmake an impermissible delegation when it instructed the Attorney General to apply\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fSORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible? Under\\nthis Court’s long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.” Gundy v.\\nUnited States, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019). Kuehl remains the\\nbinding law in this circuit.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the special condition imposed by the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3277,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641895,"string":"4,641,895"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICES OF ARKANSAS, LLC, Doing Business as Covington Court Health and Rehabilitation Center ; NHS Management, LLC; Northport Health Services, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Mark Wesley POSEY, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Clyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde Wesley Posey, Defendant - Appellant Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association ; AARP; AARP Foundation, Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s) Arkansas Health Care Association ; American Health Care Association; National Center for Assisted Living, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC v. Posey"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2459"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2459\\n ___________________________\\n\\nNorthport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing business as Covington Court\\n Health and Rehabilitation Center; NHS Managment, LLC; Northport Health\\n Services, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Mark Wesley Posey, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of\\nClyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde\\n Wesley Posey\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association; AARP; AARP Foundation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n\\nArkansas Health Care Association; American Health Care Association; National\\n Center for Assisted Living\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: March 7, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Representing the estate of his deceased father, Clyde Posey, Mark Posey\\nappeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in his wrongful death\\naction against Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC (Northport). Having\\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.\\n\\n On September 2, 2004, Clyde and another son, Matt Posey, arrived at a\\nresidential rehabilitation center owned by Northport and sought Clyde’s admission\\nto the facility. Clyde was experiencing disorientation, delusions, and hallucinations.\\nAs part of the admission process, Matt and Clyde received an admission agreement\\n(the Agreement) that included an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury trial. Both\\nClyde and Matt signed the Agreement; Clyde signed as the “Resident,” Matt as the\\n“Responsible Party.” The Agreement defined Responsible Party as a legal guardian,\\nattorney-in-fact, “or some other individual or family member who agrees to assist the\\nFacility in providing for [the resident’s] health, care, and maintenance.” It also noted\\nthat “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility that he or she manages, uses,\\ndirects or controls funds or assets which may be used to pay for Resident’s Facility\\ncharges and/or that he or she tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf\\nof Resident.” It is undisputed that Matt was not his father’s legal guardian or\\nattorney-in-fact.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Northport admitted Clyde as a resident to its center, where he stayed until his\\ndeath in January 2016. A few months later, Mark Posey, as special administrator of\\nhis father’s estate, sued Northport in Arkansas state court for wrongful death.\\nNorthport filed a separate action in federal court, seeking to stay the state court action\\nand compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim pursuant to the Agreement. The\\nparties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court\\ndenied Mark’s motion and granted Northport’s motion to the extent that it sought to\\ncompel arbitration. Basing its reasoning solely on the Agreement, assuming without\\nfinding that Clyde was incompetent at the time of his admission, and recognizing that\\nMatt was not his father’s legal representative, the district court used the third-party\\nbeneficiary theory to find as a matter of law that Matt, in his individual capacity,\\nentered into a binding arbitration agreement with Northport, for which Clyde was the\\nintended beneficiary. Therefore, the district court directed Clyde’s estate to arbitrate\\nthe dispute. This appeal follows, with Mark asserting that the district court misused\\nthe third-party beneficiary theory when no underlying agreement was present between\\nthe Poseys and Northport.\\n\\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying\\nthe same standards as the district court.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237\\n(8th Cir. 1997). The record must indicate an absence of a genuine issue of material\\nfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “In the summary judgment context, we view the facts and the\\ninferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\\nparty.” P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, 265 F.3d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Though there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”\\nMoses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), “[a]\\nmatter should not be sent to arbitration unless there is a valid agreement to arbitrate\\nand the underlying dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Telectronics\\nPacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 143 F.3d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1998). While “any\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdoubts concerning the scope of arbitratable issues should be resolved in favor of\\narbitration[,] . . . a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a dispute cannot be forced to\\ndo so.” Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir.\\n2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n To determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, we look to the\\nforum state’s contract law—here, Arkansas’s. Baker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d\\n788, 791 (8th Cir. 1998). In doing so, we “are not bound to follow the decisions of\\nintermediate state courts,” but we consider their decisions “highly persuasive” and\\nfollow them “when they are the best evidence of state law.” First Tenn. Bank Nat.\\nAss’n v. Pathfinder Exploration, LLC, 754 F.3d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal\\nquotation marks and alterations omitted). Arkansas lists five contractual elements for\\na valid arbitration agreement: “(1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal\\nconsideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5) mutual obligations.” Tyson Foods, Inc.\\nv. Archer, 147 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Ark. 2004). Arkansas also recognizes the third-\\nparty beneficiary theory, typically used when a third-party beneficiary seeks to hold\\na contract party liable for breach of contract. See Perry v. Baptist Health,189 S.W.3d\\n54, 58 (Ark. 2004).\\n\\n The Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association’s amicus brief argues the district court\\nused the third-party beneficiary doctrine inappropriately, given that the doctrine\\ndeveloped in common law to allow beneficiaries to enforce agreements against\\npromisors and not vice versa. However, we need not reach this argument because the\\ndistrict court’s use of the third-party beneficiary doctrine was premised on the\\nconclusion that Matt Posey signed a contract with Northport in his individual capacity\\nand that Matt did not sign as a representative for his father. Arkansas courts have\\nrepeatedly declined to find that individuals like Matt—relatives without power-of-\\nattorney or other legal authority who admit a family member to a nursing\\nhome—possess valid authority to bind their relatives to arbitration under a third-party\\nbeneficiary theory. See Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles, 428\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fS.W.3d 437, 444-45 (Ark. 2013);1 Hickory Heights Health & Rehab., LLC v. Cook,\\n557 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Ark. Ct. App.), reh’g denied (Oct. 24, 2018); Pine Hills Health\\n& Rehab., LLC v. Talley, 546 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018); Broadway\\nHealth & Rehab, LLC v. Roberts, 524 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017);\\nProgressive Eldercare Servs.-Chicot, Inc. v. Long, 449 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Ark. Ct.\\nApp. 2014). The Arkansas Court of Appeals considered a factually similar case in\\nHickory Heights: a nursing home resident’s daughter, who was not the resident’s\\nlegal representative, signed an admission agreement as the resident’s “Responsible\\nParty” upon the resident’s admission to a nursing center. 557 S.W.3d at 288. The\\nagreement included a definition of “Responsible Party” virtually identical to the one\\nin this case. Id. at 289. When the resident sued the nursing center, it, like Northport,\\nresponded by filing a motion to compel arbitration. Id. The Court of Appeals held\\nthat there was an ambiguity in the contract as to whether the daughter attempted to\\nsign as her mother’s representative, and it construed the ambiguity against the\\nagreement’s drafter, the nursing center. Id. at 290. It therefore “conclude[d] that [the\\ndaughter] attempted to act in a representative capacity. Lacking authority to so act,\\nthere is no valid underlying contract to enforce against [the resident].” Id. The Court\\nthus declined to order the dispute to arbitration.\\n\\n Here, the form contract prepared by Northport states that its terms and\\nconditions are agreed by Clyde; Clyde’s Responsible Party, Matt; and Northport. As\\nin Hickory Heights, the definition of Responsible Party in the Agreement equates a\\nResponsible Party to a legal guardian, attorney-in-fact, or legal representative. The\\nAgreement goes on to state that “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility\\nthat he . . . tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf of Resident.” In the\\nabsence of other evidence, including testimony, we find as a matter of law that the\\n\\n 1\\n In Quarles, the court specifically noted that the third-party beneficiary\\nargument had not been preserved for its review. However, it found that a son did not\\nhave actual or apparent authority to bind his mother to a nursing home arbitration\\nagreement. Id.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fterm “Responsible Party” as used in the Agreement describes a representative similar\\nto a legal guardian. See Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 241 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Ark. 2006)\\n(“[A]mbiguities in a written contract are construed strictly against the drafter.” (citing\\nUniversal Security Ins. Co. v. Ring, 769 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ark. 1989)).\\n\\n\\n Accordingly, based on this record, Matt Posey attempted to sign in a\\nrepresentative capacity; he did not sign a contract with Northport in his individual\\ncapacity. See Hickory Heights, 557 S.W.3d at 290. As Matt was undisputedly not\\nhis father’s legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, he lacked the capacity to sign the\\ncontract as his father’s representative. Because the district court relied on the\\nexistence of a valid underlying agreement between Northport and Matt Posey in his\\nindividual capacity, we reverse the order compelling arbitration and remand to the\\ndistrict court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419148/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641895/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICES OF ARKANSAS, LLC, Doing Business as Covington Court Health and Rehabilitation Center ; NHS Management, LLC; Northport Health Services, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Mark Wesley POSEY, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Clyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde Wesley Posey, Defendant - Appellant Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association ; AARP; AARP Foundation, Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s) Arkansas Health Care Association ; American Health Care Association; National Center for Assisted Living, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2459\n ___________________________\n\nNorthport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing business as Covington Court\n Health and Rehabilitation Center; NHS Managment, LLC; Northport Health\n Services, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Mark Wesley Posey, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of\nClyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde\n Wesley Posey\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n\n ------------------------------\n\n Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association; AARP; AARP Foundation\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s)\n\nArkansas Health Care Association; American Health Care Association; National\n Center for Assisted Living\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s)\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith\n ____________\n\f Submitted: March 7, 2019\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Representing the estate of his deceased father, Clyde Posey, Mark Posey\nappeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in his wrongful death\naction against Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC (Northport). Having\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.\n\n On September 2, 2004, Clyde and another son, Matt Posey, arrived at a\nresidential rehabilitation center owned by Northport and sought Clyde’s admission\nto the facility. Clyde was experiencing disorientation, delusions, and hallucinations.\nAs part of the admission process, Matt and Clyde received an admission agreement\n(the Agreement) that included an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury trial. Both\nClyde and Matt signed the Agreement; Clyde signed as the “Resident,” Matt as the\n“Responsible Party.” The Agreement defined Responsible Party as a legal guardian,\nattorney-in-fact, “or some other individual or family member who agrees to assist the\nFacility in providing for [the resident’s] health, care, and maintenance.” It also noted\nthat “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility that he or she manages, uses,\ndirects or controls funds or assets which may be used to pay for Resident’s Facility\ncharges and/or that he or she tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf\nof Resident.” It is undisputed that Matt was not his father’s legal guardian or\nattorney-in-fact.\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f Northport admitted Clyde as a resident to its center, where he stayed until his\ndeath in January 2016. A few months later, Mark Posey, as special administrator of\nhis father’s estate, sued Northport in Arkansas state court for wrongful death.\nNorthport filed a separate action in federal court, seeking to stay the state court action\nand compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim pursuant to the Agreement. The\nparties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court\ndenied Mark’s motion and granted Northport’s motion to the extent that it sought to\ncompel arbitration. Basing its reasoning solely on the Agreement, assuming without\nfinding that Clyde was incompetent at the time of his admission, and recognizing that\nMatt was not his father’s legal representative, the district court used the third-party\nbeneficiary theory to find as a matter of law that Matt, in his individual capacity,\nentered into a binding arbitration agreement with Northport, for which Clyde was the\nintended beneficiary. Therefore, the district court directed Clyde’s estate to arbitrate\nthe dispute. This appeal follows, with Mark asserting that the district court misused\nthe third-party beneficiary theory when no underlying agreement was present between\nthe Poseys and Northport.\n\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying\nthe same standards as the district court.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237\n(8th Cir. 1997). The record must indicate an absence of a genuine issue of material\nfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “In the summary judgment context, we view the facts and the\ninferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\nparty.” P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, 265 F.3d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 2001).\n\n Though there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”\nMoses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), “[a]\nmatter should not be sent to arbitration unless there is a valid agreement to arbitrate\nand the underlying dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Telectronics\nPacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 143 F.3d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1998). While “any\n\n -3-\n\fdoubts concerning the scope of arbitratable issues should be resolved in favor of\narbitration[,] . . . a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a dispute cannot be forced to\ndo so.” Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir.\n2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n To determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, we look to the\nforum state’s contract law—here, Arkansas’s. Baker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d\n788, 791 (8th Cir. 1998). In doing so, we “are not bound to follow the decisions of\nintermediate state courts,” but we consider their decisions “highly persuasive” and\nfollow them “when they are the best evidence of state law.” First Tenn. Bank Nat.\nAss’n v. Pathfinder Exploration, LLC, 754 F.3d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal\nquotation marks and alterations omitted). Arkansas lists five contractual elements for\na valid arbitration agreement: “(1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal\nconsideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5) mutual obligations.” Tyson Foods, Inc.\nv. Archer, 147 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Ark. 2004). Arkansas also recognizes the third-\nparty beneficiary theory, typically used when a third-party beneficiary seeks to hold\na contract party liable for breach of contract. See Perry v. Baptist Health,189 S.W.3d\n54, 58 (Ark. 2004).\n\n The Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association’s amicus brief argues the district court\nused the third-party beneficiary doctrine inappropriately, given that the doctrine\ndeveloped in common law to allow beneficiaries to enforce agreements against\npromisors and not vice versa. However, we need not reach this argument because the\ndistrict court’s use of the third-party beneficiary doctrine was premised on the\nconclusion that Matt Posey signed a contract with Northport in his individual capacity\nand that Matt did not sign as a representative for his father. Arkansas courts have\nrepeatedly declined to find that individuals like Matt—relatives without power-of-\nattorney or other legal authority who admit a family member to a nursing\nhome—possess valid authority to bind their relatives to arbitration under a third-party\nbeneficiary theory. See Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles, 428\n\n -4-\n\fS.W.3d 437, 444-45 (Ark. 2013);1 Hickory Heights Health & Rehab., LLC v. Cook,\n557 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Ark. Ct. App.), reh’g denied (Oct. 24, 2018); Pine Hills Health\n& Rehab., LLC v. Talley, 546 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018); Broadway\nHealth & Rehab, LLC v. Roberts, 524 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017);\nProgressive Eldercare Servs.-Chicot, Inc. v. Long, 449 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Ark. Ct.\nApp. 2014). The Arkansas Court of Appeals considered a factually similar case in\nHickory Heights: a nursing home resident’s daughter, who was not the resident’s\nlegal representative, signed an admission agreement as the resident’s “Responsible\nParty” upon the resident’s admission to a nursing center. 557 S.W.3d at 288. The\nagreement included a definition of “Responsible Party” virtually identical to the one\nin this case. Id. at 289. When the resident sued the nursing center, it, like Northport,\nresponded by filing a motion to compel arbitration. Id. The Court of Appeals held\nthat there was an ambiguity in the contract as to whether the daughter attempted to\nsign as her mother’s representative, and it construed the ambiguity against the\nagreement’s drafter, the nursing center. Id. at 290. It therefore “conclude[d] that [the\ndaughter] attempted to act in a representative capacity. Lacking authority to so act,\nthere is no valid underlying contract to enforce against [the resident].” Id. The Court\nthus declined to order the dispute to arbitration.\n\n Here, the form contract prepared by Northport states that its terms and\nconditions are agreed by Clyde; Clyde’s Responsible Party, Matt; and Northport. As\nin Hickory Heights, the definition of Responsible Party in the Agreement equates a\nResponsible Party to a legal guardian, attorney-in-fact, or legal representative. The\nAgreement goes on to state that “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility\nthat he . . . tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf of Resident.” In the\nabsence of other evidence, including testimony, we find as a matter of law that the\n\n 1\n In Quarles, the court specifically noted that the third-party beneficiary\nargument had not been preserved for its review. However, it found that a son did not\nhave actual or apparent authority to bind his mother to a nursing home arbitration\nagreement. Id.\n\n -5-\n\fterm “Responsible Party” as used in the Agreement describes a representative similar\nto a legal guardian. See Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 241 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Ark. 2006)\n(“[A]mbiguities in a written contract are construed strictly against the drafter.” (citing\nUniversal Security Ins. Co. v. Ring, 769 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ark. 1989)).\n\n\n Accordingly, based on this record, Matt Posey attempted to sign in a\nrepresentative capacity; he did not sign a contract with Northport in his individual\ncapacity. See Hickory Heights, 557 S.W.3d at 290. As Matt was undisputedly not\nhis father’s legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, he lacked the capacity to sign the\ncontract as his father’s representative. Because the district court relied on the\nexistence of a valid underlying agreement between Northport and Matt Posey in his\nindividual capacity, we reverse the order compelling arbitration and remand to the\ndistrict court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICES OF ARKANSAS, LLC, Doing Business as Covington Court Health and Rehabilitation Center ; NHS Management, LLC; Northport Health Services, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Mark Wesley POSEY, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Clyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde Wesley Posey, Defendant - Appellant Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association ; AARP; AARP Foundation, Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s) Arkansas Health Care Association ; American Health Care Association; National Center for Assisted Living, Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2459\\n ___________________________\\n\\nNorthport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing business as Covington Court\\n Health and Rehabilitation Center; NHS Managment, LLC; Northport Health\\n Services, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Mark Wesley Posey, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of\\nClyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Clyde\\n Wesley Posey\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association; AARP; AARP Foundation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n\\nArkansas Health Care Association; American Health Care Association; National\\n Center for Assisted Living\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmici on Behalf of Appellee(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith\\n ____________\\n\\f Submitted: March 7, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Representing the estate of his deceased father, Clyde Posey, Mark Posey\\nappeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in his wrongful death\\naction against Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC (Northport). Having\\njurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.\\n\\n On September 2, 2004, Clyde and another son, Matt Posey, arrived at a\\nresidential rehabilitation center owned by Northport and sought Clyde’s admission\\nto the facility. Clyde was experiencing disorientation, delusions, and hallucinations.\\nAs part of the admission process, Matt and Clyde received an admission agreement\\n(the Agreement) that included an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury trial. Both\\nClyde and Matt signed the Agreement; Clyde signed as the “Resident,” Matt as the\\n“Responsible Party.” The Agreement defined Responsible Party as a legal guardian,\\nattorney-in-fact, “or some other individual or family member who agrees to assist the\\nFacility in providing for [the resident’s] health, care, and maintenance.” It also noted\\nthat “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility that he or she manages, uses,\\ndirects or controls funds or assets which may be used to pay for Resident’s Facility\\ncharges and/or that he or she tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf\\nof Resident.” It is undisputed that Matt was not his father’s legal guardian or\\nattorney-in-fact.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Northport admitted Clyde as a resident to its center, where he stayed until his\\ndeath in January 2016. A few months later, Mark Posey, as special administrator of\\nhis father’s estate, sued Northport in Arkansas state court for wrongful death.\\nNorthport filed a separate action in federal court, seeking to stay the state court action\\nand compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim pursuant to the Agreement. The\\nparties then filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court\\ndenied Mark’s motion and granted Northport’s motion to the extent that it sought to\\ncompel arbitration. Basing its reasoning solely on the Agreement, assuming without\\nfinding that Clyde was incompetent at the time of his admission, and recognizing that\\nMatt was not his father’s legal representative, the district court used the third-party\\nbeneficiary theory to find as a matter of law that Matt, in his individual capacity,\\nentered into a binding arbitration agreement with Northport, for which Clyde was the\\nintended beneficiary. Therefore, the district court directed Clyde’s estate to arbitrate\\nthe dispute. This appeal follows, with Mark asserting that the district court misused\\nthe third-party beneficiary theory when no underlying agreement was present between\\nthe Poseys and Northport.\\n\\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying\\nthe same standards as the district court.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237\\n(8th Cir. 1997). The record must indicate an absence of a genuine issue of material\\nfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “In the summary judgment context, we view the facts and the\\ninferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving\\nparty.” P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, 265 F.3d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n Though there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”\\nMoses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), “[a]\\nmatter should not be sent to arbitration unless there is a valid agreement to arbitrate\\nand the underlying dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Telectronics\\nPacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 143 F.3d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1998). While “any\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdoubts concerning the scope of arbitratable issues should be resolved in favor of\\narbitration[,] . . . a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a dispute cannot be forced to\\ndo so.” Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir.\\n2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n To determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, we look to the\\nforum state’s contract law—here, Arkansas’s. Baker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d\\n788, 791 (8th Cir. 1998). In doing so, we “are not bound to follow the decisions of\\nintermediate state courts,” but we consider their decisions “highly persuasive” and\\nfollow them “when they are the best evidence of state law.” First Tenn. Bank Nat.\\nAss’n v. Pathfinder Exploration, LLC, 754 F.3d 489, 490-91 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal\\nquotation marks and alterations omitted). Arkansas lists five contractual elements for\\na valid arbitration agreement: “(1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal\\nconsideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5) mutual obligations.” Tyson Foods, Inc.\\nv. Archer, 147 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Ark. 2004). Arkansas also recognizes the third-\\nparty beneficiary theory, typically used when a third-party beneficiary seeks to hold\\na contract party liable for breach of contract. See Perry v. Baptist Health,189 S.W.3d\\n54, 58 (Ark. 2004).\\n\\n The Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association’s amicus brief argues the district court\\nused the third-party beneficiary doctrine inappropriately, given that the doctrine\\ndeveloped in common law to allow beneficiaries to enforce agreements against\\npromisors and not vice versa. However, we need not reach this argument because the\\ndistrict court’s use of the third-party beneficiary doctrine was premised on the\\nconclusion that Matt Posey signed a contract with Northport in his individual capacity\\nand that Matt did not sign as a representative for his father. Arkansas courts have\\nrepeatedly declined to find that individuals like Matt—relatives without power-of-\\nattorney or other legal authority who admit a family member to a nursing\\nhome—possess valid authority to bind their relatives to arbitration under a third-party\\nbeneficiary theory. See Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC v. Quarles, 428\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fS.W.3d 437, 444-45 (Ark. 2013);1 Hickory Heights Health & Rehab., LLC v. Cook,\\n557 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Ark. Ct. App.), reh’g denied (Oct. 24, 2018); Pine Hills Health\\n& Rehab., LLC v. Talley, 546 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018); Broadway\\nHealth & Rehab, LLC v. Roberts, 524 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017);\\nProgressive Eldercare Servs.-Chicot, Inc. v. Long, 449 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Ark. Ct.\\nApp. 2014). The Arkansas Court of Appeals considered a factually similar case in\\nHickory Heights: a nursing home resident’s daughter, who was not the resident’s\\nlegal representative, signed an admission agreement as the resident’s “Responsible\\nParty” upon the resident’s admission to a nursing center. 557 S.W.3d at 288. The\\nagreement included a definition of “Responsible Party” virtually identical to the one\\nin this case. Id. at 289. When the resident sued the nursing center, it, like Northport,\\nresponded by filing a motion to compel arbitration. Id. The Court of Appeals held\\nthat there was an ambiguity in the contract as to whether the daughter attempted to\\nsign as her mother’s representative, and it construed the ambiguity against the\\nagreement’s drafter, the nursing center. Id. at 290. It therefore “conclude[d] that [the\\ndaughter] attempted to act in a representative capacity. Lacking authority to so act,\\nthere is no valid underlying contract to enforce against [the resident].” Id. The Court\\nthus declined to order the dispute to arbitration.\\n\\n Here, the form contract prepared by Northport states that its terms and\\nconditions are agreed by Clyde; Clyde’s Responsible Party, Matt; and Northport. As\\nin Hickory Heights, the definition of Responsible Party in the Agreement equates a\\nResponsible Party to a legal guardian, attorney-in-fact, or legal representative. The\\nAgreement goes on to state that “[t]he Responsible Party represents to the Facility\\nthat he . . . tends to make decisions for or otherwise act on behalf of Resident.” In the\\nabsence of other evidence, including testimony, we find as a matter of law that the\\n\\n 1\\n In Quarles, the court specifically noted that the third-party beneficiary\\nargument had not been preserved for its review. However, it found that a son did not\\nhave actual or apparent authority to bind his mother to a nursing home arbitration\\nagreement. Id.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fterm “Responsible Party” as used in the Agreement describes a representative similar\\nto a legal guardian. See Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 241 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Ark. 2006)\\n(“[A]mbiguities in a written contract are construed strictly against the drafter.” (citing\\nUniversal Security Ins. Co. v. Ring, 769 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ark. 1989)).\\n\\n\\n Accordingly, based on this record, Matt Posey attempted to sign in a\\nrepresentative capacity; he did not sign a contract with Northport in his individual\\ncapacity. See Hickory Heights, 557 S.W.3d at 290. As Matt was undisputedly not\\nhis father’s legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, he lacked the capacity to sign the\\ncontract as his father’s representative. Because the district court relied on the\\nexistence of a valid underlying agreement between Northport and Matt Posey in his\\nindividual capacity, we reverse the order compelling arbitration and remand to the\\ndistrict court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3278,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641896,"string":"4,641,896"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jeremy HEUTON Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jeremy Heuton v. Ford Motor Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2130"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2130\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jeremy Heuton\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Ford Motor Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jeremy Heuton appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment\\nin favor of Ford Motor Company on his claims of disability discrimination and\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fretaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§§ 213.010-.137. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Heuton was born without a left forearm and hand. But his left arm extends\\napproximately three to four inches below his left elbow, so he has adapted to using\\nthat portion of his left arm to perform some of the functions of his missing left hand.\\nHe applied for an entry-level assembler position at Ford’s Kansas City Assembly\\nPlant (KCAP), where Ford makes vehicles on a moving assembly line. There are over\\n700 such positions at KCAP.\\n\\n After Heuton disclosed to Ford that he was born with one hand, Barbara Patton,\\na nurse at Ford’s medical department, instructed Heuton to provide a doctor’s note\\nstating that he was unable to grip anything with his left hand. Heuton told Patton he\\n“[did not] have a left hand” but obtained the note anyway because Patton told him\\nthat, if he provided the note, Ford was “going to give [him] a [chance.]”\\nSubsequently, Heuton submitted two doctors’ notes to Ford. The first note provided\\nthat Heuton was “cleared to work” and that he was “unable to grip” with his left hand.\\nThe second note was from Dr. Stephanie Davis, which provided that Heuton “has a\\ncongenital defect of his left upper extremity[,]” that “[h]is only limitation is an\\ninability to grip with his left upper extremity[,]” and that “[h]e has an impressive\\nability to adapt and performs many tasks, jobs etc without difficulty.”\\n\\n After receiving these notes, Ford’s medical department listed Heuton’s\\nrestrictions as “Left hand: No gripping” on his Medical Examination Request Form.\\nDr. Kyla Kutch, the head of the medical department, then forwarded the Form to the\\nlabor relations department, headed by Ashlie O’Reilly. Eventually, Ford decided not\\nto hire Heuton. O’Reilly noted on Heuton’s Medical Examination Form that “[m]ost\\njobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms (hand-start bolts, grab stock,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fposition job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable to accommodate a one-hand\\nrestriction @ this time.”\\n\\n Heuton sued Ford for disability discrimination and retaliation under the MHRA\\nin Missouri state court. The matter was removed to federal district court on the basis\\nof diversity jurisdiction. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After the\\nsummary judgment briefing had completed, the district court requested supplemental\\nbriefing over whether the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act\\n(ADA) affected the relevant standards under the MHRA, and the court subsequently\\nconcluded that they did not. The court then scheduled oral argument on whether\\nHeuton had shown that Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from\\nperforming either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\\n\\n After oral argument, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of\\nFord. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719 (W.D. Mo. 2018). On\\nHeuton’s disability-discrimination claim, the court determined that Heuton, despite\\nhaving a “full opportunity” to do so, failed to show Ford, “at the time of his rejection,\\nhad an opinion that he was unemployable elsewhere at a broad range of jobs.” Id. at\\n715-18. On Heuton’s retaliation claim, the court found that Heuton “barely [went]\\nthrough the motions to save this count of his petition” but determined that he failed\\nto show “an adverse action taken because of [his] opposition to a prohibited\\nactivity[,]” and found no evidence that Ford’s failure to hire him was in any way\\nretaliatory. Id. at 718. The court concluded that Ford’s request for a doctor’s note\\nwas neither an adverse employment action nor evidence of hostility. Id. Heuton\\nappeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\nnovo[,] . . . viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fand giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn.”\\nEpps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). The “moving party is\\nentitled to summary judgment if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\\nand . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA. See\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to hire or\\ndiscriminating against an individual on the basis of disability). We primarily apply\\nMissouri law but may also apply federal employment discrimination law to the extent\\nfederal law is “applicable and authoritative under the MHRA.” Gipson v. KAS\\nSnacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nMissouri courts follow federal law so long as it is “consistent with Missouri law.”\\nDaugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007), abrogated\\non other grounds by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.4.\\n\\n A disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show\\nthat (1) he has a disability, (2) Ford “took an adverse action against him,” and (3) “his\\ndisability was a factor in the adverse action.” Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 756\\n(8th Cir. 2017). Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether Heuton has\\na disability.\\n\\n Under the MHRA, a disability is defined, in relevant part, as “a\\nphysical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major\\nlife activities,” and this definition includes “being regarded as having such an\\ni mp a i r me n t[.]” Daug h erty, 2 3 1 S.W.3 d at 8 2 1 ( e mp h a s i s\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fomitted) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4)).2 Heuton does not contend that he has\\na physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.\\nInstead, he alleges that he was not hired because Ford regarded him as having such\\nan impairment. Under such a theory, Heuton “must prove that [Ford] either: (1)\\nwrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more\\nmajor life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment\\nsubstantially limited one or more major life activities.” Id. (citing Mo. Code\\nRegs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(E)).\\n\\n Heuton is considered “substantially limited in performing a major life activity\\nfor purposes of the MHRA if he [is] unable to perform or significantly restricted as\\nto the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major\\nlife activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Employment is a ‘major life\\nactivity[.]’” Id. at 821 n.9 (citing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C)).\\nHeuton’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial\\nlimitation on the major life activity of working.” Id. (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Rather, a “substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means\\nthat an individual must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a\\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Id. at 821-22 (emphasis\\nadded) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Heuton argues that the district court erred in using the broad-range-of-jobs\\nstandard discussed in Daugherty because the district court, sua sponte, addressed his\\n\\n\\n 2\\n At the time Daugherty was decided, the definition of “disability” appeared\\nat Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4). The definition now appears at\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5). See S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.\\n2017).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdisability-discrimination claim as “an impairment from working or gripping” and not\\nas an “actual impairment of an anatomical loss of his left forearm and hand, affecting\\nhis musculoskeletal functions.” Appellant’s Br. 36. Citing State ex rel. Sir v.\\nGateway Taxi Management Co., 400 S.W.3d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), Heuton argues\\nthat “when the claim is that the applicant’s impairment, other than working, affects\\nemployability, the MHRA does not require the applicant to provide evidence of the\\nemployer’s perception that the applicant is restricted from performing a class of jobs\\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Appellant’s Br. 30 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Heuton’s reliance on Sir is misplaced. The court in Sir explained that\\n“‘working’ or ‘employment’ are not the only major life activities that affect\\nemployability” because “‘ambulation’” is also a major life activity under the MHRA.\\n400 S.W.3d at 490. The court concluded that “evidence that complainant’s stroke had\\nimpeded his ability to ambulate was sufficient evidence that complainant was\\nsubstantially limited in performing the major life activity of ambulation and was\\nsufficient standing alone to support the finding that complainant was statutorily\\ndisabled.” Id. However, Heuton does not allege that he is substantially limited in\\nperforming the major life activity of ambulation. Nor does he identify a major life\\nactivity other than working or employment that would be sufficient, standing alone,\\nto support his claim that he is statutorily disabled under the MHRA. Based on the\\napplicable regulation, the most applicable major life activity in this case is\\nemployment. See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C) (“Major life activities\\nmeans those life activities which affect employability such as communication,\\nambulation, self-care, socialization, education, vocational training, employment and\\ntransportation[.]”).\\n\\n While the ADA protects the loss of the operation of musculoskeletal functions\\nfor purposes of a major life activity, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); 29\\nC.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii), the MHRA does not. Under the ADA, an individual is\\nconsidered disabled under a regarded-as-having-an-impairment theory “if the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\findividual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under\\nth[e ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical . . . impairment whether or not\\nthe impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42\\nU.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), (3)(A) (emphasis added). However, because Heuton sought\\nrelief under the MHRA, it is that statute, not the ADA, that governs this case. Thus,\\nunder Heuton’s chosen theory of liability, even if Heuton has shown that he has a\\nphysical impairment, see Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(A)(1) (defining\\nphysical impairment to include anatomical loss affecting musculoskeletal body\\nsystem), he must nonetheless show that Ford wrongly believed that physical\\nimpairment substantially limited a major life activity. See Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at\\n821. In other words, under the MHRA, “the finding of an impairment [is] only the\\nfirst step in finding a disability.” Morris v. VCW, Inc., No. 95-0737-CV-W-3-6, 1996\\nWL 429014, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 1996). Because this case only involves the\\nmajor life activity of working or employment, the broad-range-of-jobs standard\\napplies and, therefore, the district court did not err in using that standard.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Next, Heuton argues that the district court erred in concluding that he had not\\nsatisfied the broad-range-of-jobs standard because “Ford considered [him]\\npermanently restricted from all 700 assembly line jobs at [KCAP.]” Appellant’s Br.\\n56.\\n\\n Heuton points to the deposition testimony of Wesley Edwards, KCAP’s Senior\\nLabor Representative, who testified that, if an employee receives a “no gripping”\\nrestriction, the employee is placed on medical, “no work available” status until such\\nrestrictions are removed because the employee cannot do the work. However, we fail\\nto see the relevance, if any, of Edwards’s statement to the central question of whether\\nFord regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either a class of jobs\\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes. Moreover, Heuton does not point us to\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fany evidence that Edwards, who answered to O’Reilly, was personally involved in the\\ndecision not to hire him.\\n\\n Heuton also points to O’Reilly’s notation on his Medical Examination Form,\\nwhich provided that “[m]ost jobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms\\n(hand-start bolts, grab stock, position job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable\\nto accommodate a one-hand restriction @ this time.” O’Reilly’s notation is evidence\\nthat Ford regarded Heuton as unable to perform the single, particular job he applied\\nfor: an entry-level assembler on a moving line. But this does not constitute\\nevidence that Ford regarded him as significantly restricted from performing either a\\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\\n\\n We have been mindful of the danger that an inability to perform a\\n specific job always can be recast as an inability to perform a class of\\n tasks associated with that specific job. Our court thus has emphasized\\n that a person’s inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial\\n limitation on the major life activity of working, and that working does\\n not mean working at a particular job of the person’s choice.\\n\\nKnutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal\\nquotation marks and citations omitted).\\n\\n O’Reilly made no judgment about Heuton’s ability to perform other kinds of\\nassembly-line work. She simply believed Heuton could not perform the particular\\ndemands of the particular job for which he submitted an application.\\nCompare Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 822 (concluding that the plaintiff’s evidence\\ndemonstrated that “the City believed he was incapable of performing an entire class\\nof jobs—uniformed officer positions of any rank” and not merely “the particular job\\nof police captain”), with Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516,\\n524 (1999) (concluding that the evidence, “[a]t most,” demonstrated that the plaintiff\\nwas “unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fcommercial motor vehicle” and stating that the plaintiff had “put forward no evidence\\nthat he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for\\ndriving a commercial motor vehicle”).\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Additionally, Heuton argues that he provided direct evidence of discrimination,\\nwhich is sufficient to survive summary judgment. “Direct evidence is that which\\nshows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged\\ndecision, sufficient to support a finding that an illegitimate criterion actually\\nmotivated the employment decision.” Id. at 818 n.4. Heuton points to the deposition\\ntestimony and certain actions of Kutch, the head of the medical department.\\nHowever, he neither referenced nor asserted in his summary judgment briefing that\\nanything Kutch said or did was direct evidence of discrimination, as he does now on\\nappeal. See Platte Valley Bank v. Tetra Fin. Grp., LLC, 682 F.3d 1078, 1086 (8th\\nCir. 2012) (concluding that the appellant waived argument because it was not raised\\nin summary judgment briefing). “Absent exceptional circumstances, not present here,\\nwe cannot consider issues not raised in the district court.” Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted). Accordingly, this argument has been waived.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n Heuton further argues that Ford should be precluded from relitigating the issue\\nof whether Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either\\na class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes because this issue has been\\nfully and adversely determined against Ford in Peterson v. Ford Motor\\nCo., Civ. No. 03-5027 (DWF/AJB), 2006 WL 2375653 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).\\n\\n Heuton invokes the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, which “applies\\nwhen a plaintiff is attempting to prevent a defendant from pursuing an issue that the\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdefendant previously litigated and lost to a different plaintiff.” Kent v. United of\\nOmaha Life Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2007). “The application of\\ncollateral estoppel is a question of law that we . . . review de novo.” Robinette v.\\nJones, 476 F.3d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Heuton, however, has waived this argument because he did not raise it before\\nthe district court. Accord Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 710\\nF.3d 527, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a party waives a preclusion defense “by\\nwaiting too long to assert the defense after it becomes available”). “Collateral\\nestoppel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, so long as it is raised at the\\nfirst reasonable opportunity after the rendering of the decision having the preclusive\\neffect.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 711 (8th\\nCir. 1992). In support of its holding, this Court in Aetna cited the Eleventh Circuit’s\\ndecision in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.\\n1984). In Cotton, the court concluded that the appellee had not waived the use of\\noffensive collateral estoppel despite the failure to raise the argument before the\\ndistrict court because briefing had been completed before the issuance of a state court\\ndecision that was adverse to the appellant. Id. at 665-66.\\n\\n Here, unlike in Cotton, Peterson was available to Heuton at the outset of the\\ncase; it was decided in 2006, well before the commencement of this litigation\\nin federal court in 2016. Unlike the appellee in Cotton, Heuton had ample\\nopportunity to raise the use of offensive collateral estoppel before the district court\\nbut did not. See Von Drehle, 710 F.3d at 533-34.\\n\\n Heuton argues that he did not waive the use of offensive collateral estoppel\\nbecause “Ford did not assert that Heuton’s regarded as disability claims are regarded\\nas disability from working claims” and, therefore, “[t]his issue was not raised by any\\npleading or motion, and was only addressed by the [district court] after the parties[’]\\nbriefing on the 2008 amendments issue.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 12-13. However, as\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fexplained above, Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim cannot be anything other\\nthan a “disability from working claim[]” because Heuton fails to identify a cognizable\\nmajor life activity other than working or employment under Missouri law.\\n\\n Moreover, the district court scheduled oral argument on whether Heuton had\\nshown that Ford regarded him as having an impairment under the broad-range-of-jobs\\nstandard and instructed the parties to “file a list of cases they anticipate will be\\ndiscussed by them in argument, if previously uncited cases will be discussed.” Order\\n4, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 112; see also Order 1, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 113 (“Counsel are reminded to\\nfile a list of relied upon cases not previously cited, at least two days before the date\\nof argument.”). Notably absent from Heuton’s list of cases was citation to Peterson,\\nsee Pl.’s Statement Add’l Supp. 1-2, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 115, which Heuton now claims\\nadversely determined against Ford the very issue the district court scheduled for oral\\nargument. Nor did Heuton raise at the oral argument the use of Peterson for purposes\\nof collateral estoppel or use of the doctrine generally. See Oral Arg. Tr., Dist. Ct.\\nDkt. 129. Heuton does not argue that the avenues the district court provided were\\nunreasonable opportunities to raise the potential offensive collateral estoppel effect\\nof Peterson. See Aetna, 968 F.2d at 711. Accordingly, Heuton has waived the use\\nof offensive collateral estoppel.\\n\\n Because Heuton has failed to show that Ford regarded him as having a\\ndisability, his claim of discrimination under the MHRA fails.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Finally, Heuton argues that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to Ford on his retaliation claim. An employer cannot “retaliate or\\ndiscriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed\\nany practice prohibited by th[e MHRA.]” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.1(2). A\\nretaliation claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show that (1) he “complained\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fof an MHRA-prohibited activity,” (2) Ford “took an adverse employment action,”\\nand (3) “a causal connection exists between the complaint and adverse action.”\\nShirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing McCrainey\\nv. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)).\\n\\n Heuton, however, provides neither meaningful argument nor Missouri\\nprecedent supporting any variation of his retaliation claim. “Allegations of error not\\naccompanied by convincing argument and citation to authority need not be addressed\\non appeal” and “we regularly decline to consider cursory or summary arguments that\\nare unsupported by citations to legal authorities.” Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609,\\n615 (8th Cir. 2004). Heuton’s opening brief merely recites the applicable legal\\nstandard for a retaliation claim under the MHRA and, in a one sentence footnote,\\nmakes passing reference to Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009).\\nBut see Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Jeffries, 653 F.3d 755, 763 n.4 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (refusing to address argument on the merits that was “mentioned in the[] brief\\nonly by way of a footnote”). By Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter, Heuton directs us to\\nthe Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Li Lin v. Ellis, No. ED 105886, 2018 WL\\n5915533 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018). However, the Supreme Court of\\nMissouri granted transfer in Li Lin, see Li Lin v. Ellis, No. SC97641 (Mo. Apr. 2,\\n2019), which means that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was “necessarily\\nvacated and set aside[.]” State v. Norman, 380 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Mo. 1964).\\nAccordingly, we decline to consider Heuton’s retaliation claim on appeal.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419149/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641896/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jeremy HEUTON Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2130\n ___________________________\n\n Jeremy Heuton\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Ford Motor Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jeremy Heuton appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment\nin favor of Ford Motor Company on his claims of disability discrimination and\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\fretaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat.\n§§ 213.010-.137. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n Heuton was born without a left forearm and hand. But his left arm extends\napproximately three to four inches below his left elbow, so he has adapted to using\nthat portion of his left arm to perform some of the functions of his missing left hand.\nHe applied for an entry-level assembler position at Ford’s Kansas City Assembly\nPlant (KCAP), where Ford makes vehicles on a moving assembly line. There are over\n700 such positions at KCAP.\n\n After Heuton disclosed to Ford that he was born with one hand, Barbara Patton,\na nurse at Ford’s medical department, instructed Heuton to provide a doctor’s note\nstating that he was unable to grip anything with his left hand. Heuton told Patton he\n“[did not] have a left hand” but obtained the note anyway because Patton told him\nthat, if he provided the note, Ford was “going to give [him] a [chance.]”\nSubsequently, Heuton submitted two doctors’ notes to Ford. The first note provided\nthat Heuton was “cleared to work” and that he was “unable to grip” with his left hand.\nThe second note was from Dr. Stephanie Davis, which provided that Heuton “has a\ncongenital defect of his left upper extremity[,]” that “[h]is only limitation is an\ninability to grip with his left upper extremity[,]” and that “[h]e has an impressive\nability to adapt and performs many tasks, jobs etc without difficulty.”\n\n After receiving these notes, Ford’s medical department listed Heuton’s\nrestrictions as “Left hand: No gripping” on his Medical Examination Request Form.\nDr. Kyla Kutch, the head of the medical department, then forwarded the Form to the\nlabor relations department, headed by Ashlie O’Reilly. Eventually, Ford decided not\nto hire Heuton. O’Reilly noted on Heuton’s Medical Examination Form that “[m]ost\njobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms (hand-start bolts, grab stock,\n\n -2-\n\fposition job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable to accommodate a one-hand\nrestriction @ this time.”\n\n Heuton sued Ford for disability discrimination and retaliation under the MHRA\nin Missouri state court. The matter was removed to federal district court on the basis\nof diversity jurisdiction. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After the\nsummary judgment briefing had completed, the district court requested supplemental\nbriefing over whether the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act\n(ADA) affected the relevant standards under the MHRA, and the court subsequently\nconcluded that they did not. The court then scheduled oral argument on whether\nHeuton had shown that Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from\nperforming either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\n\n After oral argument, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of\nFord. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719 (W.D. Mo. 2018). On\nHeuton’s disability-discrimination claim, the court determined that Heuton, despite\nhaving a “full opportunity” to do so, failed to show Ford, “at the time of his rejection,\nhad an opinion that he was unemployable elsewhere at a broad range of jobs.” Id. at\n715-18. On Heuton’s retaliation claim, the court found that Heuton “barely [went]\nthrough the motions to save this count of his petition” but determined that he failed\nto show “an adverse action taken because of [his] opposition to a prohibited\nactivity[,]” and found no evidence that Ford’s failure to hire him was in any way\nretaliatory. Id. at 718. The court concluded that Ford’s request for a doctor’s note\nwas neither an adverse employment action nor evidence of hostility. Id. Heuton\nappeals.\n\n II.\n\n “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de\nnovo[,] . . . viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party\n\n -3-\n\fand giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn.”\nEpps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). The “moving party is\nentitled to summary judgment if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\nand . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal\nquotation marks omitted).\n\n A.\n\n We begin with Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA. See\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to hire or\ndiscriminating against an individual on the basis of disability). We primarily apply\nMissouri law but may also apply federal employment discrimination law to the extent\nfederal law is “applicable and authoritative under the MHRA.” Gipson v. KAS\nSnacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nMissouri courts follow federal law so long as it is “consistent with Missouri law.”\nDaugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007), abrogated\non other grounds by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.4.\n\n A disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show\nthat (1) he has a disability, (2) Ford “took an adverse action against him,” and (3) “his\ndisability was a factor in the adverse action.” Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 756\n(8th Cir. 2017). Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether Heuton has\na disability.\n\n Under the MHRA, a disability is defined, in relevant part, as “a\nphysical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major\nlife activities,” and this definition includes “being regarded as having such an\ni mp a i r me n t[.]” Daug h erty, 2 3 1 S.W.3 d at 8 2 1 ( e mp h a s i s\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fomitted) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4)).2 Heuton does not contend that he has\na physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.\nInstead, he alleges that he was not hired because Ford regarded him as having such\nan impairment. Under such a theory, Heuton “must prove that [Ford] either: (1)\nwrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more\nmajor life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment\nsubstantially limited one or more major life activities.” Id. (citing Mo. Code\nRegs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(E)).\n\n Heuton is considered “substantially limited in performing a major life activity\nfor purposes of the MHRA if he [is] unable to perform or significantly restricted as\nto the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major\nlife activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Employment is a ‘major life\nactivity[.]’” Id. at 821 n.9 (citing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C)).\nHeuton’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial\nlimitation on the major life activity of working.” Id. (internal quotation marks\nomitted). Rather, a “substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means\nthat an individual must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Id. at 821-22 (emphasis\nadded) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n 1.\n\n Heuton argues that the district court erred in using the broad-range-of-jobs\nstandard discussed in Daugherty because the district court, sua sponte, addressed his\n\n\n 2\n At the time Daugherty was decided, the definition of “disability” appeared\nat Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4). The definition now appears at\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5). See S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.\n2017).\n\n -5-\n\fdisability-discrimination claim as “an impairment from working or gripping” and not\nas an “actual impairment of an anatomical loss of his left forearm and hand, affecting\nhis musculoskeletal functions.” Appellant’s Br. 36. Citing State ex rel. Sir v.\nGateway Taxi Management Co., 400 S.W.3d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), Heuton argues\nthat “when the claim is that the applicant’s impairment, other than working, affects\nemployability, the MHRA does not require the applicant to provide evidence of the\nemployer’s perception that the applicant is restricted from performing a class of jobs\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Appellant’s Br. 30 (emphasis added).\n\n Heuton’s reliance on Sir is misplaced. The court in Sir explained that\n“‘working’ or ‘employment’ are not the only major life activities that affect\nemployability” because “‘ambulation’” is also a major life activity under the MHRA.\n400 S.W.3d at 490. The court concluded that “evidence that complainant’s stroke had\nimpeded his ability to ambulate was sufficient evidence that complainant was\nsubstantially limited in performing the major life activity of ambulation and was\nsufficient standing alone to support the finding that complainant was statutorily\ndisabled.” Id. However, Heuton does not allege that he is substantially limited in\nperforming the major life activity of ambulation. Nor does he identify a major life\nactivity other than working or employment that would be sufficient, standing alone,\nto support his claim that he is statutorily disabled under the MHRA. Based on the\napplicable regulation, the most applicable major life activity in this case is\nemployment. See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C) (“Major life activities\nmeans those life activities which affect employability such as communication,\nambulation, self-care, socialization, education, vocational training, employment and\ntransportation[.]”).\n\n While the ADA protects the loss of the operation of musculoskeletal functions\nfor purposes of a major life activity, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); 29\nC.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii), the MHRA does not. Under the ADA, an individual is\nconsidered disabled under a regarded-as-having-an-impairment theory “if the\n\n -6-\n\findividual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under\nth[e ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical . . . impairment whether or not\nthe impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42\nU.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), (3)(A) (emphasis added). However, because Heuton sought\nrelief under the MHRA, it is that statute, not the ADA, that governs this case. Thus,\nunder Heuton’s chosen theory of liability, even if Heuton has shown that he has a\nphysical impairment, see Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(A)(1) (defining\nphysical impairment to include anatomical loss affecting musculoskeletal body\nsystem), he must nonetheless show that Ford wrongly believed that physical\nimpairment substantially limited a major life activity. See Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at\n821. In other words, under the MHRA, “the finding of an impairment [is] only the\nfirst step in finding a disability.” Morris v. VCW, Inc., No. 95-0737-CV-W-3-6, 1996\nWL 429014, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 1996). Because this case only involves the\nmajor life activity of working or employment, the broad-range-of-jobs standard\napplies and, therefore, the district court did not err in using that standard.\n\n 2.\n\n Next, Heuton argues that the district court erred in concluding that he had not\nsatisfied the broad-range-of-jobs standard because “Ford considered [him]\npermanently restricted from all 700 assembly line jobs at [KCAP.]” Appellant’s Br.\n56.\n\n Heuton points to the deposition testimony of Wesley Edwards, KCAP’s Senior\nLabor Representative, who testified that, if an employee receives a “no gripping”\nrestriction, the employee is placed on medical, “no work available” status until such\nrestrictions are removed because the employee cannot do the work. However, we fail\nto see the relevance, if any, of Edwards’s statement to the central question of whether\nFord regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either a class of jobs\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes. Moreover, Heuton does not point us to\n\n -7-\n\fany evidence that Edwards, who answered to O’Reilly, was personally involved in the\ndecision not to hire him.\n\n Heuton also points to O’Reilly’s notation on his Medical Examination Form,\nwhich provided that “[m]ost jobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms\n(hand-start bolts, grab stock, position job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable\nto accommodate a one-hand restriction @ this time.” O’Reilly’s notation is evidence\nthat Ford regarded Heuton as unable to perform the single, particular job he applied\nfor: an entry-level assembler on a moving line. But this does not constitute\nevidence that Ford regarded him as significantly restricted from performing either a\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\n\n We have been mindful of the danger that an inability to perform a\n specific job always can be recast as an inability to perform a class of\n tasks associated with that specific job. Our court thus has emphasized\n that a person’s inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial\n limitation on the major life activity of working, and that working does\n not mean working at a particular job of the person’s choice.\n\nKnutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal\nquotation marks and citations omitted).\n\n O’Reilly made no judgment about Heuton’s ability to perform other kinds of\nassembly-line work. She simply believed Heuton could not perform the particular\ndemands of the particular job for which he submitted an application.\nCompare Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 822 (concluding that the plaintiff’s evidence\ndemonstrated that “the City believed he was incapable of performing an entire class\nof jobs—uniformed officer positions of any rank” and not merely “the particular job\nof police captain”), with Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516,\n524 (1999) (concluding that the evidence, “[a]t most,” demonstrated that the plaintiff\nwas “unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a\n\n -8-\n\fcommercial motor vehicle” and stating that the plaintiff had “put forward no evidence\nthat he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for\ndriving a commercial motor vehicle”).\n\n 3.\n\n Additionally, Heuton argues that he provided direct evidence of discrimination,\nwhich is sufficient to survive summary judgment. “Direct evidence is that which\nshows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged\ndecision, sufficient to support a finding that an illegitimate criterion actually\nmotivated the employment decision.” Id. at 818 n.4. Heuton points to the deposition\ntestimony and certain actions of Kutch, the head of the medical department.\nHowever, he neither referenced nor asserted in his summary judgment briefing that\nanything Kutch said or did was direct evidence of discrimination, as he does now on\nappeal. See Platte Valley Bank v. Tetra Fin. Grp., LLC, 682 F.3d 1078, 1086 (8th\nCir. 2012) (concluding that the appellant waived argument because it was not raised\nin summary judgment briefing). “Absent exceptional circumstances, not present here,\nwe cannot consider issues not raised in the district court.” Id. (internal quotation\nmarks omitted). Accordingly, this argument has been waived.\n\n 4.\n\n Heuton further argues that Ford should be precluded from relitigating the issue\nof whether Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either\na class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes because this issue has been\nfully and adversely determined against Ford in Peterson v. Ford Motor\nCo., Civ. No. 03-5027 (DWF/AJB), 2006 WL 2375653 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).\n\n Heuton invokes the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, which “applies\nwhen a plaintiff is attempting to prevent a defendant from pursuing an issue that the\n\n -9-\n\fdefendant previously litigated and lost to a different plaintiff.” Kent v. United of\nOmaha Life Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2007). “The application of\ncollateral estoppel is a question of law that we . . . review de novo.” Robinette v.\nJones, 476 F.3d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2007).\n\n Heuton, however, has waived this argument because he did not raise it before\nthe district court. Accord Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 710\nF.3d 527, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a party waives a preclusion defense “by\nwaiting too long to assert the defense after it becomes available”). “Collateral\nestoppel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, so long as it is raised at the\nfirst reasonable opportunity after the rendering of the decision having the preclusive\neffect.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 711 (8th\nCir. 1992). In support of its holding, this Court in Aetna cited the Eleventh Circuit’s\ndecision in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.\n1984). In Cotton, the court concluded that the appellee had not waived the use of\noffensive collateral estoppel despite the failure to raise the argument before the\ndistrict court because briefing had been completed before the issuance of a state court\ndecision that was adverse to the appellant. Id. at 665-66.\n\n Here, unlike in Cotton, Peterson was available to Heuton at the outset of the\ncase; it was decided in 2006, well before the commencement of this litigation\nin federal court in 2016. Unlike the appellee in Cotton, Heuton had ample\nopportunity to raise the use of offensive collateral estoppel before the district court\nbut did not. See Von Drehle, 710 F.3d at 533-34.\n\n Heuton argues that he did not waive the use of offensive collateral estoppel\nbecause “Ford did not assert that Heuton’s regarded as disability claims are regarded\nas disability from working claims” and, therefore, “[t]his issue was not raised by any\npleading or motion, and was only addressed by the [district court] after the parties[’]\nbriefing on the 2008 amendments issue.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 12-13. However, as\n\n -10-\n\fexplained above, Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim cannot be anything other\nthan a “disability from working claim[]” because Heuton fails to identify a cognizable\nmajor life activity other than working or employment under Missouri law.\n\n Moreover, the district court scheduled oral argument on whether Heuton had\nshown that Ford regarded him as having an impairment under the broad-range-of-jobs\nstandard and instructed the parties to “file a list of cases they anticipate will be\ndiscussed by them in argument, if previously uncited cases will be discussed.” Order\n4, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 112; see also Order 1, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 113 (“Counsel are reminded to\nfile a list of relied upon cases not previously cited, at least two days before the date\nof argument.”). Notably absent from Heuton’s list of cases was citation to Peterson,\nsee Pl.’s Statement Add’l Supp. 1-2, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 115, which Heuton now claims\nadversely determined against Ford the very issue the district court scheduled for oral\nargument. Nor did Heuton raise at the oral argument the use of Peterson for purposes\nof collateral estoppel or use of the doctrine generally. See Oral Arg. Tr., Dist. Ct.\nDkt. 129. Heuton does not argue that the avenues the district court provided were\nunreasonable opportunities to raise the potential offensive collateral estoppel effect\nof Peterson. See Aetna, 968 F.2d at 711. Accordingly, Heuton has waived the use\nof offensive collateral estoppel.\n\n Because Heuton has failed to show that Ford regarded him as having a\ndisability, his claim of discrimination under the MHRA fails.\n\n B.\n\n Finally, Heuton argues that the district court erred in granting summary\njudgment to Ford on his retaliation claim. An employer cannot “retaliate or\ndiscriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed\nany practice prohibited by th[e MHRA.]” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.1(2). A\nretaliation claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show that (1) he “complained\n\n -11-\n\fof an MHRA-prohibited activity,” (2) Ford “took an adverse employment action,”\nand (3) “a causal connection exists between the complaint and adverse action.”\nShirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing McCrainey\nv. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)).\n\n Heuton, however, provides neither meaningful argument nor Missouri\nprecedent supporting any variation of his retaliation claim. “Allegations of error not\naccompanied by convincing argument and citation to authority need not be addressed\non appeal” and “we regularly decline to consider cursory or summary arguments that\nare unsupported by citations to legal authorities.” Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609,\n615 (8th Cir. 2004). Heuton’s opening brief merely recites the applicable legal\nstandard for a retaliation claim under the MHRA and, in a one sentence footnote,\nmakes passing reference to Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009).\nBut see Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Jeffries, 653 F.3d 755, 763 n.4 (8th Cir.\n2011) (refusing to address argument on the merits that was “mentioned in the[] brief\nonly by way of a footnote”). By Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter, Heuton directs us to\nthe Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Li Lin v. Ellis, No. ED 105886, 2018 WL\n5915533 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018). However, the Supreme Court of\nMissouri granted transfer in Li Lin, see Li Lin v. Ellis, No. SC97641 (Mo. Apr. 2,\n2019), which means that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was “necessarily\nvacated and set aside[.]” State v. Norman, 380 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Mo. 1964).\nAccordingly, we decline to consider Heuton’s retaliation claim on appeal.\n\n III.\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jeremy HEUTON Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2130\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jeremy Heuton\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Ford Motor Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jeremy Heuton appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary judgment\\nin favor of Ford Motor Company on his claims of disability discrimination and\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\fretaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§§ 213.010-.137. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Heuton was born without a left forearm and hand. But his left arm extends\\napproximately three to four inches below his left elbow, so he has adapted to using\\nthat portion of his left arm to perform some of the functions of his missing left hand.\\nHe applied for an entry-level assembler position at Ford’s Kansas City Assembly\\nPlant (KCAP), where Ford makes vehicles on a moving assembly line. There are over\\n700 such positions at KCAP.\\n\\n After Heuton disclosed to Ford that he was born with one hand, Barbara Patton,\\na nurse at Ford’s medical department, instructed Heuton to provide a doctor’s note\\nstating that he was unable to grip anything with his left hand. Heuton told Patton he\\n“[did not] have a left hand” but obtained the note anyway because Patton told him\\nthat, if he provided the note, Ford was “going to give [him] a [chance.]”\\nSubsequently, Heuton submitted two doctors’ notes to Ford. The first note provided\\nthat Heuton was “cleared to work” and that he was “unable to grip” with his left hand.\\nThe second note was from Dr. Stephanie Davis, which provided that Heuton “has a\\ncongenital defect of his left upper extremity[,]” that “[h]is only limitation is an\\ninability to grip with his left upper extremity[,]” and that “[h]e has an impressive\\nability to adapt and performs many tasks, jobs etc without difficulty.”\\n\\n After receiving these notes, Ford’s medical department listed Heuton’s\\nrestrictions as “Left hand: No gripping” on his Medical Examination Request Form.\\nDr. Kyla Kutch, the head of the medical department, then forwarded the Form to the\\nlabor relations department, headed by Ashlie O’Reilly. Eventually, Ford decided not\\nto hire Heuton. O’Reilly noted on Heuton’s Medical Examination Form that “[m]ost\\njobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms (hand-start bolts, grab stock,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fposition job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable to accommodate a one-hand\\nrestriction @ this time.”\\n\\n Heuton sued Ford for disability discrimination and retaliation under the MHRA\\nin Missouri state court. The matter was removed to federal district court on the basis\\nof diversity jurisdiction. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After the\\nsummary judgment briefing had completed, the district court requested supplemental\\nbriefing over whether the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act\\n(ADA) affected the relevant standards under the MHRA, and the court subsequently\\nconcluded that they did not. The court then scheduled oral argument on whether\\nHeuton had shown that Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from\\nperforming either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\\n\\n After oral argument, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of\\nFord. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719 (W.D. Mo. 2018). On\\nHeuton’s disability-discrimination claim, the court determined that Heuton, despite\\nhaving a “full opportunity” to do so, failed to show Ford, “at the time of his rejection,\\nhad an opinion that he was unemployable elsewhere at a broad range of jobs.” Id. at\\n715-18. On Heuton’s retaliation claim, the court found that Heuton “barely [went]\\nthrough the motions to save this count of his petition” but determined that he failed\\nto show “an adverse action taken because of [his] opposition to a prohibited\\nactivity[,]” and found no evidence that Ford’s failure to hire him was in any way\\nretaliatory. Id. at 718. The court concluded that Ford’s request for a doctor’s note\\nwas neither an adverse employment action nor evidence of hostility. Id. Heuton\\nappeals.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\nnovo[,] . . . viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fand giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn.”\\nEpps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). The “moving party is\\nentitled to summary judgment if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\\nand . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA. See\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to hire or\\ndiscriminating against an individual on the basis of disability). We primarily apply\\nMissouri law but may also apply federal employment discrimination law to the extent\\nfederal law is “applicable and authoritative under the MHRA.” Gipson v. KAS\\nSnacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nMissouri courts follow federal law so long as it is “consistent with Missouri law.”\\nDaugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007), abrogated\\non other grounds by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.4.\\n\\n A disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show\\nthat (1) he has a disability, (2) Ford “took an adverse action against him,” and (3) “his\\ndisability was a factor in the adverse action.” Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 756\\n(8th Cir. 2017). Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether Heuton has\\na disability.\\n\\n Under the MHRA, a disability is defined, in relevant part, as “a\\nphysical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major\\nlife activities,” and this definition includes “being regarded as having such an\\ni mp a i r me n t[.]” Daug h erty, 2 3 1 S.W.3 d at 8 2 1 ( e mp h a s i s\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fomitted) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4)).2 Heuton does not contend that he has\\na physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.\\nInstead, he alleges that he was not hired because Ford regarded him as having such\\nan impairment. Under such a theory, Heuton “must prove that [Ford] either: (1)\\nwrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more\\nmajor life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment\\nsubstantially limited one or more major life activities.” Id. (citing Mo. Code\\nRegs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(E)).\\n\\n Heuton is considered “substantially limited in performing a major life activity\\nfor purposes of the MHRA if he [is] unable to perform or significantly restricted as\\nto the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major\\nlife activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Employment is a ‘major life\\nactivity[.]’” Id. at 821 n.9 (citing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C)).\\nHeuton’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial\\nlimitation on the major life activity of working.” Id. (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Rather, a “substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means\\nthat an individual must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a\\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Id. at 821-22 (emphasis\\nadded) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Heuton argues that the district court erred in using the broad-range-of-jobs\\nstandard discussed in Daugherty because the district court, sua sponte, addressed his\\n\\n\\n 2\\n At the time Daugherty was decided, the definition of “disability” appeared\\nat Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4). The definition now appears at\\nMo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(5). See S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.\\n2017).\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fdisability-discrimination claim as “an impairment from working or gripping” and not\\nas an “actual impairment of an anatomical loss of his left forearm and hand, affecting\\nhis musculoskeletal functions.” Appellant’s Br. 36. Citing State ex rel. Sir v.\\nGateway Taxi Management Co., 400 S.W.3d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), Heuton argues\\nthat “when the claim is that the applicant’s impairment, other than working, affects\\nemployability, the MHRA does not require the applicant to provide evidence of the\\nemployer’s perception that the applicant is restricted from performing a class of jobs\\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Appellant’s Br. 30 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Heuton’s reliance on Sir is misplaced. The court in Sir explained that\\n“‘working’ or ‘employment’ are not the only major life activities that affect\\nemployability” because “‘ambulation’” is also a major life activity under the MHRA.\\n400 S.W.3d at 490. The court concluded that “evidence that complainant’s stroke had\\nimpeded his ability to ambulate was sufficient evidence that complainant was\\nsubstantially limited in performing the major life activity of ambulation and was\\nsufficient standing alone to support the finding that complainant was statutorily\\ndisabled.” Id. However, Heuton does not allege that he is substantially limited in\\nperforming the major life activity of ambulation. Nor does he identify a major life\\nactivity other than working or employment that would be sufficient, standing alone,\\nto support his claim that he is statutorily disabled under the MHRA. Based on the\\napplicable regulation, the most applicable major life activity in this case is\\nemployment. See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C) (“Major life activities\\nmeans those life activities which affect employability such as communication,\\nambulation, self-care, socialization, education, vocational training, employment and\\ntransportation[.]”).\\n\\n While the ADA protects the loss of the operation of musculoskeletal functions\\nfor purposes of a major life activity, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); 29\\nC.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii), the MHRA does not. Under the ADA, an individual is\\nconsidered disabled under a regarded-as-having-an-impairment theory “if the\\n\\n -6-\\n\\findividual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under\\nth[e ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical . . . impairment whether or not\\nthe impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42\\nU.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), (3)(A) (emphasis added). However, because Heuton sought\\nrelief under the MHRA, it is that statute, not the ADA, that governs this case. Thus,\\nunder Heuton’s chosen theory of liability, even if Heuton has shown that he has a\\nphysical impairment, see Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(A)(1) (defining\\nphysical impairment to include anatomical loss affecting musculoskeletal body\\nsystem), he must nonetheless show that Ford wrongly believed that physical\\nimpairment substantially limited a major life activity. See Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at\\n821. In other words, under the MHRA, “the finding of an impairment [is] only the\\nfirst step in finding a disability.” Morris v. VCW, Inc., No. 95-0737-CV-W-3-6, 1996\\nWL 429014, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 1996). Because this case only involves the\\nmajor life activity of working or employment, the broad-range-of-jobs standard\\napplies and, therefore, the district court did not err in using that standard.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Next, Heuton argues that the district court erred in concluding that he had not\\nsatisfied the broad-range-of-jobs standard because “Ford considered [him]\\npermanently restricted from all 700 assembly line jobs at [KCAP.]” Appellant’s Br.\\n56.\\n\\n Heuton points to the deposition testimony of Wesley Edwards, KCAP’s Senior\\nLabor Representative, who testified that, if an employee receives a “no gripping”\\nrestriction, the employee is placed on medical, “no work available” status until such\\nrestrictions are removed because the employee cannot do the work. However, we fail\\nto see the relevance, if any, of Edwards’s statement to the central question of whether\\nFord regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either a class of jobs\\nor a broad range of jobs in various classes. Moreover, Heuton does not point us to\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fany evidence that Edwards, who answered to O’Reilly, was personally involved in the\\ndecision not to hire him.\\n\\n Heuton also points to O’Reilly’s notation on his Medical Examination Form,\\nwhich provided that “[m]ost jobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms\\n(hand-start bolts, grab stock, position job elements, etc.)” and that KCAP was “unable\\nto accommodate a one-hand restriction @ this time.” O’Reilly’s notation is evidence\\nthat Ford regarded Heuton as unable to perform the single, particular job he applied\\nfor: an entry-level assembler on a moving line. But this does not constitute\\nevidence that Ford regarded him as significantly restricted from performing either a\\nclass of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.\\n\\n We have been mindful of the danger that an inability to perform a\\n specific job always can be recast as an inability to perform a class of\\n tasks associated with that specific job. Our court thus has emphasized\\n that a person’s inability to perform one particular job is not a substantial\\n limitation on the major life activity of working, and that working does\\n not mean working at a particular job of the person’s choice.\\n\\nKnutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal\\nquotation marks and citations omitted).\\n\\n O’Reilly made no judgment about Heuton’s ability to perform other kinds of\\nassembly-line work. She simply believed Heuton could not perform the particular\\ndemands of the particular job for which he submitted an application.\\nCompare Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 822 (concluding that the plaintiff’s evidence\\ndemonstrated that “the City believed he was incapable of performing an entire class\\nof jobs—uniformed officer positions of any rank” and not merely “the particular job\\nof police captain”), with Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516,\\n524 (1999) (concluding that the evidence, “[a]t most,” demonstrated that the plaintiff\\nwas “unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fcommercial motor vehicle” and stating that the plaintiff had “put forward no evidence\\nthat he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for\\ndriving a commercial motor vehicle”).\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Additionally, Heuton argues that he provided direct evidence of discrimination,\\nwhich is sufficient to survive summary judgment. “Direct evidence is that which\\nshows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged\\ndecision, sufficient to support a finding that an illegitimate criterion actually\\nmotivated the employment decision.” Id. at 818 n.4. Heuton points to the deposition\\ntestimony and certain actions of Kutch, the head of the medical department.\\nHowever, he neither referenced nor asserted in his summary judgment briefing that\\nanything Kutch said or did was direct evidence of discrimination, as he does now on\\nappeal. See Platte Valley Bank v. Tetra Fin. Grp., LLC, 682 F.3d 1078, 1086 (8th\\nCir. 2012) (concluding that the appellant waived argument because it was not raised\\nin summary judgment briefing). “Absent exceptional circumstances, not present here,\\nwe cannot consider issues not raised in the district court.” Id. (internal quotation\\nmarks omitted). Accordingly, this argument has been waived.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n Heuton further argues that Ford should be precluded from relitigating the issue\\nof whether Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either\\na class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes because this issue has been\\nfully and adversely determined against Ford in Peterson v. Ford Motor\\nCo., Civ. No. 03-5027 (DWF/AJB), 2006 WL 2375653 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2006).\\n\\n Heuton invokes the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, which “applies\\nwhen a plaintiff is attempting to prevent a defendant from pursuing an issue that the\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fdefendant previously litigated and lost to a different plaintiff.” Kent v. United of\\nOmaha Life Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2007). “The application of\\ncollateral estoppel is a question of law that we . . . review de novo.” Robinette v.\\nJones, 476 F.3d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n Heuton, however, has waived this argument because he did not raise it before\\nthe district court. Accord Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 710\\nF.3d 527, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a party waives a preclusion defense “by\\nwaiting too long to assert the defense after it becomes available”). “Collateral\\nestoppel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, so long as it is raised at the\\nfirst reasonable opportunity after the rendering of the decision having the preclusive\\neffect.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 711 (8th\\nCir. 1992). In support of its holding, this Court in Aetna cited the Eleventh Circuit’s\\ndecision in Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.\\n1984). In Cotton, the court concluded that the appellee had not waived the use of\\noffensive collateral estoppel despite the failure to raise the argument before the\\ndistrict court because briefing had been completed before the issuance of a state court\\ndecision that was adverse to the appellant. Id. at 665-66.\\n\\n Here, unlike in Cotton, Peterson was available to Heuton at the outset of the\\ncase; it was decided in 2006, well before the commencement of this litigation\\nin federal court in 2016. Unlike the appellee in Cotton, Heuton had ample\\nopportunity to raise the use of offensive collateral estoppel before the district court\\nbut did not. See Von Drehle, 710 F.3d at 533-34.\\n\\n Heuton argues that he did not waive the use of offensive collateral estoppel\\nbecause “Ford did not assert that Heuton’s regarded as disability claims are regarded\\nas disability from working claims” and, therefore, “[t]his issue was not raised by any\\npleading or motion, and was only addressed by the [district court] after the parties[’]\\nbriefing on the 2008 amendments issue.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 12-13. However, as\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fexplained above, Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim cannot be anything other\\nthan a “disability from working claim[]” because Heuton fails to identify a cognizable\\nmajor life activity other than working or employment under Missouri law.\\n\\n Moreover, the district court scheduled oral argument on whether Heuton had\\nshown that Ford regarded him as having an impairment under the broad-range-of-jobs\\nstandard and instructed the parties to “file a list of cases they anticipate will be\\ndiscussed by them in argument, if previously uncited cases will be discussed.” Order\\n4, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 112; see also Order 1, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 113 (“Counsel are reminded to\\nfile a list of relied upon cases not previously cited, at least two days before the date\\nof argument.”). Notably absent from Heuton’s list of cases was citation to Peterson,\\nsee Pl.’s Statement Add’l Supp. 1-2, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 115, which Heuton now claims\\nadversely determined against Ford the very issue the district court scheduled for oral\\nargument. Nor did Heuton raise at the oral argument the use of Peterson for purposes\\nof collateral estoppel or use of the doctrine generally. See Oral Arg. Tr., Dist. Ct.\\nDkt. 129. Heuton does not argue that the avenues the district court provided were\\nunreasonable opportunities to raise the potential offensive collateral estoppel effect\\nof Peterson. See Aetna, 968 F.2d at 711. Accordingly, Heuton has waived the use\\nof offensive collateral estoppel.\\n\\n Because Heuton has failed to show that Ford regarded him as having a\\ndisability, his claim of discrimination under the MHRA fails.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Finally, Heuton argues that the district court erred in granting summary\\njudgment to Ford on his retaliation claim. An employer cannot “retaliate or\\ndiscriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed\\nany practice prohibited by th[e MHRA.]” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.070.1(2). A\\nretaliation claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show that (1) he “complained\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fof an MHRA-prohibited activity,” (2) Ford “took an adverse employment action,”\\nand (3) “a causal connection exists between the complaint and adverse action.”\\nShirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing McCrainey\\nv. Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)).\\n\\n Heuton, however, provides neither meaningful argument nor Missouri\\nprecedent supporting any variation of his retaliation claim. “Allegations of error not\\naccompanied by convincing argument and citation to authority need not be addressed\\non appeal” and “we regularly decline to consider cursory or summary arguments that\\nare unsupported by citations to legal authorities.” Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609,\\n615 (8th Cir. 2004). Heuton’s opening brief merely recites the applicable legal\\nstandard for a retaliation claim under the MHRA and, in a one sentence footnote,\\nmakes passing reference to Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. 2009).\\nBut see Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Jeffries, 653 F.3d 755, 763 n.4 (8th Cir.\\n2011) (refusing to address argument on the merits that was “mentioned in the[] brief\\nonly by way of a footnote”). By Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter, Heuton directs us to\\nthe Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Li Lin v. Ellis, No. ED 105886, 2018 WL\\n5915533 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018). However, the Supreme Court of\\nMissouri granted transfer in Li Lin, see Li Lin v. Ellis, No. SC97641 (Mo. Apr. 2,\\n2019), which means that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision was “necessarily\\nvacated and set aside[.]” State v. Norman, 380 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Mo. 1964).\\nAccordingly, we decline to consider Heuton’s retaliation claim on appeal.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3279,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641898,"string":"4,641,898"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Irma PEREZ ; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. John and Jane DOES 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Irma Perez v. John and Jane Does 1-10"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2524"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Kelly, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2524\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Irma Perez; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n John and Jane Does 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their\\nIndividual Capacity; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In Their\\nIndividual Capacity; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\\n Their Individual Capacity; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\\n Their Individual Capacity; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named\\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named\\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named\\n Defendants In Their Individual Capacity\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Irma Perez, John Espino, Joshua Espino, Jeremy Espino, and Manuel Espino\\n(collectively “Plaintiffs”) are Hispanic residents of Hastings, Nebraska. They were\\narrested in December 2011 on charges of conspiracy and witness tampering for their\\nalleged actions in the aftermath of a domestic disturbance in Hastings. All charges\\nwere eventually dismissed. On April 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in Adams County\\n(Nebraska) District Court, alleging a variety of state and federal claims against\\nvarious city and county employees, the State of Nebraska, Adams County, and the\\nCity of Hastings.\\n\\n At issue in this appeal is Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, which was\\nfiled in the Adams County District Court, alleging only federal claims under 42\\nU.S.C. § 1983 against Rick Schmidt, Raelee Van Winkle, Jerry Esch, Michael\\nDoremus, Kelly Scarlett, and Allen Sedlak (collectively the “Officer Defendants”)\\nand John and Jane Does 1-10 (collectively the “Doe Defendants”). The Second\\nAmended Complaint alleges that the investigation, arrest, confinement, and\\nprosecutions were racially motivated and violated the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments. The Officer Defendants removed the case to the United\\nStates District Court for the District of Nebraska and moved to dismiss pursuant to\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\n\\n On April 9, 2018, the district court1 granted the motion to dismiss, concluding\\nthat the § 1983 claims were time-barred and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon\\nwhich relief may be granted. On June 12, 2018, the district court denied Plaintiffs’\\nmotion to alter or amend the judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district\\ncourt erred by (1) granting the motion to dismiss and (2) denying the motion to alter\\nor amend the judgment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Nebraska.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fI. Background\\n\\n A. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint\\n\\n In this appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the\\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 764\\nF.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).\\n\\n During the early morning hours of August 13, 2011, a disturbance occurred at\\nthe 1200 block of North Lexington Street in Hastings involving several family\\nmembers, friends, and acquaintances of Plaintiffs. The Officer Defendants, each of\\nwhom is employed by the Hastings Police Department, responded to the scene. Upon\\narrival the officers separated the involved parties and began to take witness\\nstatements. Meanwhile, Perez called Alma Rosa Infante and asked her to help settle\\nthe disturbance. When Infante arrived, she and her daughter spoke with several of the\\nindividuals involved to “determine what had caused the [d]isturbance, and what,\\nexactly, had occurred” and to ensure that “the underlying complaint against their\\nfamily member be fairly and fully investigated.” Plaintiffs and Infante did not intend\\nto interfere with the Officer Defendants or their investigation. Based on their\\ninvestigation, the Officer Defendants arrested Juan Anthony Espino, who was later\\ncharged with five counts, including domestic assault.\\n\\n Plaintiffs observed the interviews conducted by the Officer Defendants at the\\nscene and believed that the officers were “more interested in coaching witnesses in\\norder to build a criminal case against them or their family members, than they were\\ninterested in getting to the truth about the [d]isturbance.” The following day, the\\nOfficer Defendants “expanded their investigations in an attempt to make out cases of\\ncriminal conspiracy and witness tampering against the Plaintiffs and other of their\\nfamily members . . . [without] a factual basis for doing so.” On August 15, 2011,\\nOfficer Doremus spoke to Shawn Parks, a cooperating witness or confidential\\n\\n -3-\\n\\finformant who was involved in some form in the disturbance. Officer Doremus told\\nParks, “Maybe if we put pressure on them and you put enough pressure on them,\\nthey’ll get the hell out of this neighborhood.”\\n\\n On December 29, 2011, Plaintiffs were arrested by unnamed “law enforcement\\nofficers” pursuant to arrest warrants that were based upon “false and misleading\\ninformation” that was more than ninety days old. Plaintiffs were held the next five\\ndays in maximum-security confinement and charged in county court with conspiracy\\nand witness tampering. On December 19, 2011, or January 19, 2012, each of the\\nOfficer Defendants prepared an affidavit in cooperation with Adams County Attorney\\nAlyson Keiser Roudebush to use in the prosecution.\\n\\n On January 19, 2012, Plaintiffs appeared for their preliminary hearings, which\\nwere conducted on affidavit evidence alone over the objections of defense counsel.\\nThe cases were bound over to the Adams County District Court “in clear violation of\\ntheir rights to due process and in violation of the Confrontation Clause.” The first\\ncase proceeded to a jury trial and resulted in one of the Plaintiffs being acquitted.\\nThe other Plaintiffs filed pleas in abatement to contest the validity of their preliminary\\nhearings. In October 2012, the state district court sustained their pleas and dismissed\\nthe charges, finding that there was “no evidence in the record to substantiate or bind\\nover” and “no basis in statute or case law for preliminary hearings to proceed forward\\non affidavits only.” Plaintiffs claim damages, asserting that the investigation, arrest,\\nconfinement, and prosecutions subjected them to ridicule and destroyed their good\\nreputations.\\n\\n B. Procedural History\\n\\n The original Complaint was filed on April 7, 2016, in Adams County District\\nCourt. On September 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, stating eight\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcauses of action, seven arising under state law and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal law\\nclaim.\\n\\n In October 2016, the defendants jointly removed the action to the United States\\nDistrict Court for the District of Nebraska, and over the next few weeks various\\ndefendants filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. On March 21, 2017,\\nthe district court dismissed the § 1983 claims without prejudice because (1) the State\\nand its employees acting in their official capacities are not persons against whom a\\n§ 1983 claim for money damages may be asserted and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a\\nclaim against the remaining defendants. The district court declined to exercise\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and remanded the surviving\\nclaims to the state court.\\n\\n Upon remand, the defendants filed motions to dismiss as well as a motion for\\nsummary judgment. The motions were set for hearing on July 10, 2017. Forty-three\\nminutes before the motion hearing was to commence, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed\\nthe remaining state-law causes of action. That same day, the state court formally\\ndismissed the Amended Complaint.2\\n\\n On August 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the now non-\\nextant Amended Complaint, attaching a proposed Second Amended Complaint\\nessentially restating all of the previously dismissed claims. On August 24, 2017,\\nPlaintiffs filed an amended motion with an attached “revised” Second Amended\\nComplaint, which now repled only the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants\\nand Doe Defendants in their individual capacities.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Under these circumstances, the state court judgment of July 10 disposed of the\\nentire case.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f On December 28, 2017, the state district court granted the amended motion for\\nleave to amend. The state district court explained that a Nebraska court’s discretion\\nto deny leave to amend is limited and “appropriate only in . . . limited circumstances\\nin which undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the\\namendment, or unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party can be demonstrated.” The\\nstate district court found that “[n]one of those factors . . . are clearly evident in this\\ncase.” The state court opinion is silent as to how a complaint that had been dismissed\\nin its entirety could be amended, deciding instead that the relevant Nebraska rule that\\nleave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires” controlled. On\\nJanuary 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint.\\n\\n The Officer Defendants once again removed the action to the United States\\nDistrict Court and moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On April 9, 2018, the district court granted\\nthe motion and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. The district court\\nconcluded that the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants were time barred by\\nthe applicable four-year statute of limitations and that, in the alternative, Plaintiffs\\nfailed to state a plausible claim for relief against the Officer Defendants. With regard\\nto the Doe Defendants, the district court noted the general prohibition against naming\\nfictitious parties as defendants and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to make allegations\\nspecific enough to permit the identity of the Doe Defendants to be ascertained after\\nreasonable discovery.\\n\\n On May 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment\\npursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60, arguing that the district\\ncourt did not “consider[] . . . the amendments made to the Plaintiffs’ complaint filed\\nin the State District Court.” On June 12, 2018, the district court denied the motion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Jurisdiction\\n\\n As an initial matter, we address the Officer Defendants’ argument, raised for\\nthe first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case\\nfollowing the second removal. The Officer Defendants argue that under Nebraska\\nlaw, once an entire case is voluntarily dismissed, the court lacks jurisdiction to\\nconsider any further motions or enter any further orders. It follows, they argue, that\\nthe filing of the Second Amended Complaint and any subsequent state and federal\\nproceedings are a nullity.\\n\\n We have grave reservations about the state court’s ability to amend an entirely\\ndismissed complaint under Nebraska law. That said, we need not determine whether\\nit was permissible under Nebraska law for the state court to grant leave to amend and\\nallow Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint. Under the removal statute,\\n28 U.S.C. § 1441, the district court “is not precluded from hearing and determining\\nany claim in [a civil action removed under that section] because the State court from\\nwhich such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.” 28\\nU.S.C. § 1441(f); see also St. Clair v. Fred Spigarelli, P.C., 348 F. App’x 190, 191\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding that the district court erred by dismissing a\\n“removed case on the basis of a state law venue defect” because the doctrine of\\nderivative jurisdiction was abrogated by § 1441(f)); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940\\nF.2d 333, 336–38 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the derivative jurisdiction doctrine has\\nbeen completely abandoned). It is sufficient that the district court had original\\njurisdiction over this action arising out of federal law and that the proper procedures\\nfor removal were followed. Applying these principles we conclude the district court\\nhad jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims and the Second Amended Complaint is\\nproperly before us.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f B. Pleading Standards\\n\\n We turn to the issues raised by Plaintiffs on appeal. Plaintiffs first contend that\\nthe district court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the § 1983\\nclaims were not time-barred and (2) the Second Amended Complaint adequately\\npleads a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the Second Amended\\nComplaint did not meet federal pleading standards, we will not address the statute of\\nlimitations question.\\n\\n We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, “accepting\\nthe well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable\\ninferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Varga, 764 F.3d at 838 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim has\\nsufficient facial plausibility to survive where the plaintiff has pled enough facts to\\nallow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged\\nmisconduct. Id. at 838–39 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).\\n\\n The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against the Officer\\nDefendants. Here the Plaintiffs’ pleading consists almost entirely of non-specific\\nconclusory allegations—mostly against the Officer Defendants as a group—and fails\\nto provide enough factual detail to support a plausible claim that any of the Officer\\nDefendants deprived them of their rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that tie any of the Officer\\nDefendants’ actions to the Plaintiffs’ race or ethnicity. Nor have they shown how\\nPlaintiffs were treated differently from any similarly situated non-Hispanic residents.\\nDespite the claim that Plaintiffs’ arrest and confinement were unlawful, no allegations\\ntie any of the Officer Defendants to any wrongdoing related to Plaintiffs’ arrest or\\nconfinement. The only actual alleged conduct attributable to the Officer Defendants\\n\\n -8-\\n\\frelated to the investigation or prosecution does not plausibly give rise to a\\nconstitutional violation. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint consists mostly of\\nlegal conclusions and speculation, which is insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6). See\\nHamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at\\n678).3\\n\\n Likewise, the district court committed no error in dismissing the claims against\\nthe Doe Defendants. It is generally impermissible to name fictitious parties as\\ndefendants in federal court, but “an action may proceed against a party whose name\\nis unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity\\nof the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.” Estate of Rosenberg by\\nRosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The\\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint regarding the Doe Defendants are not\\nsufficiently specific to satisfy the exception to the general prohibition against\\nfictitious parties. The Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege who\\nthe Doe Defendants are, what they allegedly did, what their position is for the City,\\nor any other facts that would permit the Doe Defendants to be noticed or identified\\nthrough discovery.\\n\\n Lastly, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied\\nPlaintiffs’ motion to amend or alter the judgment. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any\\nmanifest errors of law or fact or demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that\\nwould justify this extraordinary relief. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer\\nDist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); Sellers v.\\nMineta, 350 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Plaintiffs’ argument that the law of the case doctrine should govern is without\\nmerit. There is no indication that the state district court considered—let alone, ruled\\nbased on—federal pleading standards when it determined that amendment was not\\nfutile.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fPlaintiffs’ argument that the district court did not consider the amendments to their\\ncomplaint is without merit.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419151/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641898/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Irma PEREZ ; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. John and Jane DOES 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2524\n ___________________________\n\n Irma Perez; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n John and Jane Does 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their\nIndividual Capacity; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In Their\nIndividual Capacity; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\n Their Individual Capacity; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\n Their Individual Capacity; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named\n Defendants In Their Individual Capacity\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\n ____________\n\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\f Irma Perez, John Espino, Joshua Espino, Jeremy Espino, and Manuel Espino\n(collectively “Plaintiffs”) are Hispanic residents of Hastings, Nebraska. They were\narrested in December 2011 on charges of conspiracy and witness tampering for their\nalleged actions in the aftermath of a domestic disturbance in Hastings. All charges\nwere eventually dismissed. On April 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in Adams County\n(Nebraska) District Court, alleging a variety of state and federal claims against\nvarious city and county employees, the State of Nebraska, Adams County, and the\nCity of Hastings.\n\n At issue in this appeal is Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, which was\nfiled in the Adams County District Court, alleging only federal claims under 42\nU.S.C. § 1983 against Rick Schmidt, Raelee Van Winkle, Jerry Esch, Michael\nDoremus, Kelly Scarlett, and Allen Sedlak (collectively the “Officer Defendants”)\nand John and Jane Does 1-10 (collectively the “Doe Defendants”). The Second\nAmended Complaint alleges that the investigation, arrest, confinement, and\nprosecutions were racially motivated and violated the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\nFourteenth Amendments. The Officer Defendants removed the case to the United\nStates District Court for the District of Nebraska and moved to dismiss pursuant to\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\n\n On April 9, 2018, the district court1 granted the motion to dismiss, concluding\nthat the § 1983 claims were time-barred and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon\nwhich relief may be granted. On June 12, 2018, the district court denied Plaintiffs’\nmotion to alter or amend the judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district\ncourt erred by (1) granting the motion to dismiss and (2) denying the motion to alter\nor amend the judgment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the\nDistrict of Nebraska.\n\n -2-\n\fI. Background\n\n A. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint\n\n In this appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 764\nF.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).\n\n During the early morning hours of August 13, 2011, a disturbance occurred at\nthe 1200 block of North Lexington Street in Hastings involving several family\nmembers, friends, and acquaintances of Plaintiffs. The Officer Defendants, each of\nwhom is employed by the Hastings Police Department, responded to the scene. Upon\narrival the officers separated the involved parties and began to take witness\nstatements. Meanwhile, Perez called Alma Rosa Infante and asked her to help settle\nthe disturbance. When Infante arrived, she and her daughter spoke with several of the\nindividuals involved to “determine what had caused the [d]isturbance, and what,\nexactly, had occurred” and to ensure that “the underlying complaint against their\nfamily member be fairly and fully investigated.” Plaintiffs and Infante did not intend\nto interfere with the Officer Defendants or their investigation. Based on their\ninvestigation, the Officer Defendants arrested Juan Anthony Espino, who was later\ncharged with five counts, including domestic assault.\n\n Plaintiffs observed the interviews conducted by the Officer Defendants at the\nscene and believed that the officers were “more interested in coaching witnesses in\norder to build a criminal case against them or their family members, than they were\ninterested in getting to the truth about the [d]isturbance.” The following day, the\nOfficer Defendants “expanded their investigations in an attempt to make out cases of\ncriminal conspiracy and witness tampering against the Plaintiffs and other of their\nfamily members . . . [without] a factual basis for doing so.” On August 15, 2011,\nOfficer Doremus spoke to Shawn Parks, a cooperating witness or confidential\n\n -3-\n\finformant who was involved in some form in the disturbance. Officer Doremus told\nParks, “Maybe if we put pressure on them and you put enough pressure on them,\nthey’ll get the hell out of this neighborhood.”\n\n On December 29, 2011, Plaintiffs were arrested by unnamed “law enforcement\nofficers” pursuant to arrest warrants that were based upon “false and misleading\ninformation” that was more than ninety days old. Plaintiffs were held the next five\ndays in maximum-security confinement and charged in county court with conspiracy\nand witness tampering. On December 19, 2011, or January 19, 2012, each of the\nOfficer Defendants prepared an affidavit in cooperation with Adams County Attorney\nAlyson Keiser Roudebush to use in the prosecution.\n\n On January 19, 2012, Plaintiffs appeared for their preliminary hearings, which\nwere conducted on affidavit evidence alone over the objections of defense counsel.\nThe cases were bound over to the Adams County District Court “in clear violation of\ntheir rights to due process and in violation of the Confrontation Clause.” The first\ncase proceeded to a jury trial and resulted in one of the Plaintiffs being acquitted.\nThe other Plaintiffs filed pleas in abatement to contest the validity of their preliminary\nhearings. In October 2012, the state district court sustained their pleas and dismissed\nthe charges, finding that there was “no evidence in the record to substantiate or bind\nover” and “no basis in statute or case law for preliminary hearings to proceed forward\non affidavits only.” Plaintiffs claim damages, asserting that the investigation, arrest,\nconfinement, and prosecutions subjected them to ridicule and destroyed their good\nreputations.\n\n B. Procedural History\n\n The original Complaint was filed on April 7, 2016, in Adams County District\nCourt. On September 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, stating eight\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fcauses of action, seven arising under state law and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal law\nclaim.\n\n In October 2016, the defendants jointly removed the action to the United States\nDistrict Court for the District of Nebraska, and over the next few weeks various\ndefendants filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. On March 21, 2017,\nthe district court dismissed the § 1983 claims without prejudice because (1) the State\nand its employees acting in their official capacities are not persons against whom a\n§ 1983 claim for money damages may be asserted and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a\nclaim against the remaining defendants. The district court declined to exercise\nsupplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and remanded the surviving\nclaims to the state court.\n\n Upon remand, the defendants filed motions to dismiss as well as a motion for\nsummary judgment. The motions were set for hearing on July 10, 2017. Forty-three\nminutes before the motion hearing was to commence, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed\nthe remaining state-law causes of action. That same day, the state court formally\ndismissed the Amended Complaint.2\n\n On August 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the now non-\nextant Amended Complaint, attaching a proposed Second Amended Complaint\nessentially restating all of the previously dismissed claims. On August 24, 2017,\nPlaintiffs filed an amended motion with an attached “revised” Second Amended\nComplaint, which now repled only the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants\nand Doe Defendants in their individual capacities.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Under these circumstances, the state court judgment of July 10 disposed of the\nentire case.\n\n -5-\n\f On December 28, 2017, the state district court granted the amended motion for\nleave to amend. The state district court explained that a Nebraska court’s discretion\nto deny leave to amend is limited and “appropriate only in . . . limited circumstances\nin which undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the\namendment, or unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party can be demonstrated.” The\nstate district court found that “[n]one of those factors . . . are clearly evident in this\ncase.” The state court opinion is silent as to how a complaint that had been dismissed\nin its entirety could be amended, deciding instead that the relevant Nebraska rule that\nleave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires” controlled. On\nJanuary 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint.\n\n The Officer Defendants once again removed the action to the United States\nDistrict Court and moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On April 9, 2018, the district court granted\nthe motion and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. The district court\nconcluded that the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants were time barred by\nthe applicable four-year statute of limitations and that, in the alternative, Plaintiffs\nfailed to state a plausible claim for relief against the Officer Defendants. With regard\nto the Doe Defendants, the district court noted the general prohibition against naming\nfictitious parties as defendants and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to make allegations\nspecific enough to permit the identity of the Doe Defendants to be ascertained after\nreasonable discovery.\n\n On May 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment\npursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60, arguing that the district\ncourt did not “consider[] . . . the amendments made to the Plaintiffs’ complaint filed\nin the State District Court.” On June 12, 2018, the district court denied the motion.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fII. Discussion\n\n A. Jurisdiction\n\n As an initial matter, we address the Officer Defendants’ argument, raised for\nthe first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case\nfollowing the second removal. The Officer Defendants argue that under Nebraska\nlaw, once an entire case is voluntarily dismissed, the court lacks jurisdiction to\nconsider any further motions or enter any further orders. It follows, they argue, that\nthe filing of the Second Amended Complaint and any subsequent state and federal\nproceedings are a nullity.\n\n We have grave reservations about the state court’s ability to amend an entirely\ndismissed complaint under Nebraska law. That said, we need not determine whether\nit was permissible under Nebraska law for the state court to grant leave to amend and\nallow Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint. Under the removal statute,\n28 U.S.C. § 1441, the district court “is not precluded from hearing and determining\nany claim in [a civil action removed under that section] because the State court from\nwhich such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.” 28\nU.S.C. § 1441(f); see also St. Clair v. Fred Spigarelli, P.C., 348 F. App’x 190, 191\n(8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding that the district court erred by dismissing a\n“removed case on the basis of a state law venue defect” because the doctrine of\nderivative jurisdiction was abrogated by § 1441(f)); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940\nF.2d 333, 336–38 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the derivative jurisdiction doctrine has\nbeen completely abandoned). It is sufficient that the district court had original\njurisdiction over this action arising out of federal law and that the proper procedures\nfor removal were followed. Applying these principles we conclude the district court\nhad jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims and the Second Amended Complaint is\nproperly before us.\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f B. Pleading Standards\n\n We turn to the issues raised by Plaintiffs on appeal. Plaintiffs first contend that\nthe district court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the § 1983\nclaims were not time-barred and (2) the Second Amended Complaint adequately\npleads a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the Second Amended\nComplaint did not meet federal pleading standards, we will not address the statute of\nlimitations question.\n\n We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, “accepting\nthe well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable\ninferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Varga, 764 F.3d at 838 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.\n12(b)(6)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\nface.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim has\nsufficient facial plausibility to survive where the plaintiff has pled enough facts to\nallow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged\nmisconduct. Id. at 838–39 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).\n\n The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against the Officer\nDefendants. Here the Plaintiffs’ pleading consists almost entirely of non-specific\nconclusory allegations—mostly against the Officer Defendants as a group—and fails\nto provide enough factual detail to support a plausible claim that any of the Officer\nDefendants deprived them of their rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\nFourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that tie any of the Officer\nDefendants’ actions to the Plaintiffs’ race or ethnicity. Nor have they shown how\nPlaintiffs were treated differently from any similarly situated non-Hispanic residents.\nDespite the claim that Plaintiffs’ arrest and confinement were unlawful, no allegations\ntie any of the Officer Defendants to any wrongdoing related to Plaintiffs’ arrest or\nconfinement. The only actual alleged conduct attributable to the Officer Defendants\n\n -8-\n\frelated to the investigation or prosecution does not plausibly give rise to a\nconstitutional violation. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint consists mostly of\nlegal conclusions and speculation, which is insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6). See\nHamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at\n678).3\n\n Likewise, the district court committed no error in dismissing the claims against\nthe Doe Defendants. It is generally impermissible to name fictitious parties as\ndefendants in federal court, but “an action may proceed against a party whose name\nis unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity\nof the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.” Estate of Rosenberg by\nRosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint regarding the Doe Defendants are not\nsufficiently specific to satisfy the exception to the general prohibition against\nfictitious parties. The Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege who\nthe Doe Defendants are, what they allegedly did, what their position is for the City,\nor any other facts that would permit the Doe Defendants to be noticed or identified\nthrough discovery.\n\n Lastly, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied\nPlaintiffs’ motion to amend or alter the judgment. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any\nmanifest errors of law or fact or demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that\nwould justify this extraordinary relief. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer\nDist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); Sellers v.\nMineta, 350 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).\n\n\n 3\n Plaintiffs’ argument that the law of the case doctrine should govern is without\nmerit. There is no indication that the state district court considered—let alone, ruled\nbased on—federal pleading standards when it determined that amendment was not\nfutile.\n\n -9-\n\fPlaintiffs’ argument that the district court did not consider the amendments to their\ncomplaint is without merit.\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Irma PEREZ ; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. John and Jane DOES 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2524\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Irma Perez; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n John and Jane Does 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their\\nIndividual Capacity; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In Their\\nIndividual Capacity; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\\n Their Individual Capacity; Jerry Esch, All of Whom Are Named Defendants In\\n Their Individual Capacity; Michael Doremus, All of Whom Are Named\\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Kelly Scarlett, All of Whom Are Named\\nDefendants In Their Individual Capacity; Allen Sedlak, All of Whom Are Named\\n Defendants In Their Individual Capacity\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\f Irma Perez, John Espino, Joshua Espino, Jeremy Espino, and Manuel Espino\\n(collectively “Plaintiffs”) are Hispanic residents of Hastings, Nebraska. They were\\narrested in December 2011 on charges of conspiracy and witness tampering for their\\nalleged actions in the aftermath of a domestic disturbance in Hastings. All charges\\nwere eventually dismissed. On April 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit in Adams County\\n(Nebraska) District Court, alleging a variety of state and federal claims against\\nvarious city and county employees, the State of Nebraska, Adams County, and the\\nCity of Hastings.\\n\\n At issue in this appeal is Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, which was\\nfiled in the Adams County District Court, alleging only federal claims under 42\\nU.S.C. § 1983 against Rick Schmidt, Raelee Van Winkle, Jerry Esch, Michael\\nDoremus, Kelly Scarlett, and Allen Sedlak (collectively the “Officer Defendants”)\\nand John and Jane Does 1-10 (collectively the “Doe Defendants”). The Second\\nAmended Complaint alleges that the investigation, arrest, confinement, and\\nprosecutions were racially motivated and violated the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments. The Officer Defendants removed the case to the United\\nStates District Court for the District of Nebraska and moved to dismiss pursuant to\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\n\\n On April 9, 2018, the district court1 granted the motion to dismiss, concluding\\nthat the § 1983 claims were time-barred and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon\\nwhich relief may be granted. On June 12, 2018, the district court denied Plaintiffs’\\nmotion to alter or amend the judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district\\ncourt erred by (1) granting the motion to dismiss and (2) denying the motion to alter\\nor amend the judgment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nDistrict of Nebraska.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fI. Background\\n\\n A. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint\\n\\n In this appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the\\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint. Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 764\\nF.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).\\n\\n During the early morning hours of August 13, 2011, a disturbance occurred at\\nthe 1200 block of North Lexington Street in Hastings involving several family\\nmembers, friends, and acquaintances of Plaintiffs. The Officer Defendants, each of\\nwhom is employed by the Hastings Police Department, responded to the scene. Upon\\narrival the officers separated the involved parties and began to take witness\\nstatements. Meanwhile, Perez called Alma Rosa Infante and asked her to help settle\\nthe disturbance. When Infante arrived, she and her daughter spoke with several of the\\nindividuals involved to “determine what had caused the [d]isturbance, and what,\\nexactly, had occurred” and to ensure that “the underlying complaint against their\\nfamily member be fairly and fully investigated.” Plaintiffs and Infante did not intend\\nto interfere with the Officer Defendants or their investigation. Based on their\\ninvestigation, the Officer Defendants arrested Juan Anthony Espino, who was later\\ncharged with five counts, including domestic assault.\\n\\n Plaintiffs observed the interviews conducted by the Officer Defendants at the\\nscene and believed that the officers were “more interested in coaching witnesses in\\norder to build a criminal case against them or their family members, than they were\\ninterested in getting to the truth about the [d]isturbance.” The following day, the\\nOfficer Defendants “expanded their investigations in an attempt to make out cases of\\ncriminal conspiracy and witness tampering against the Plaintiffs and other of their\\nfamily members . . . [without] a factual basis for doing so.” On August 15, 2011,\\nOfficer Doremus spoke to Shawn Parks, a cooperating witness or confidential\\n\\n -3-\\n\\finformant who was involved in some form in the disturbance. Officer Doremus told\\nParks, “Maybe if we put pressure on them and you put enough pressure on them,\\nthey’ll get the hell out of this neighborhood.”\\n\\n On December 29, 2011, Plaintiffs were arrested by unnamed “law enforcement\\nofficers” pursuant to arrest warrants that were based upon “false and misleading\\ninformation” that was more than ninety days old. Plaintiffs were held the next five\\ndays in maximum-security confinement and charged in county court with conspiracy\\nand witness tampering. On December 19, 2011, or January 19, 2012, each of the\\nOfficer Defendants prepared an affidavit in cooperation with Adams County Attorney\\nAlyson Keiser Roudebush to use in the prosecution.\\n\\n On January 19, 2012, Plaintiffs appeared for their preliminary hearings, which\\nwere conducted on affidavit evidence alone over the objections of defense counsel.\\nThe cases were bound over to the Adams County District Court “in clear violation of\\ntheir rights to due process and in violation of the Confrontation Clause.” The first\\ncase proceeded to a jury trial and resulted in one of the Plaintiffs being acquitted.\\nThe other Plaintiffs filed pleas in abatement to contest the validity of their preliminary\\nhearings. In October 2012, the state district court sustained their pleas and dismissed\\nthe charges, finding that there was “no evidence in the record to substantiate or bind\\nover” and “no basis in statute or case law for preliminary hearings to proceed forward\\non affidavits only.” Plaintiffs claim damages, asserting that the investigation, arrest,\\nconfinement, and prosecutions subjected them to ridicule and destroyed their good\\nreputations.\\n\\n B. Procedural History\\n\\n The original Complaint was filed on April 7, 2016, in Adams County District\\nCourt. On September 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, stating eight\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcauses of action, seven arising under state law and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal law\\nclaim.\\n\\n In October 2016, the defendants jointly removed the action to the United States\\nDistrict Court for the District of Nebraska, and over the next few weeks various\\ndefendants filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. On March 21, 2017,\\nthe district court dismissed the § 1983 claims without prejudice because (1) the State\\nand its employees acting in their official capacities are not persons against whom a\\n§ 1983 claim for money damages may be asserted and (2) Plaintiffs failed to state a\\nclaim against the remaining defendants. The district court declined to exercise\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and remanded the surviving\\nclaims to the state court.\\n\\n Upon remand, the defendants filed motions to dismiss as well as a motion for\\nsummary judgment. The motions were set for hearing on July 10, 2017. Forty-three\\nminutes before the motion hearing was to commence, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed\\nthe remaining state-law causes of action. That same day, the state court formally\\ndismissed the Amended Complaint.2\\n\\n On August 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the now non-\\nextant Amended Complaint, attaching a proposed Second Amended Complaint\\nessentially restating all of the previously dismissed claims. On August 24, 2017,\\nPlaintiffs filed an amended motion with an attached “revised” Second Amended\\nComplaint, which now repled only the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants\\nand Doe Defendants in their individual capacities.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Under these circumstances, the state court judgment of July 10 disposed of the\\nentire case.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f On December 28, 2017, the state district court granted the amended motion for\\nleave to amend. The state district court explained that a Nebraska court’s discretion\\nto deny leave to amend is limited and “appropriate only in . . . limited circumstances\\nin which undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of the\\namendment, or unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party can be demonstrated.” The\\nstate district court found that “[n]one of those factors . . . are clearly evident in this\\ncase.” The state court opinion is silent as to how a complaint that had been dismissed\\nin its entirety could be amended, deciding instead that the relevant Nebraska rule that\\nleave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires” controlled. On\\nJanuary 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint.\\n\\n The Officer Defendants once again removed the action to the United States\\nDistrict Court and moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On April 9, 2018, the district court granted\\nthe motion and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. The district court\\nconcluded that the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants were time barred by\\nthe applicable four-year statute of limitations and that, in the alternative, Plaintiffs\\nfailed to state a plausible claim for relief against the Officer Defendants. With regard\\nto the Doe Defendants, the district court noted the general prohibition against naming\\nfictitious parties as defendants and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to make allegations\\nspecific enough to permit the identity of the Doe Defendants to be ascertained after\\nreasonable discovery.\\n\\n On May 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment\\npursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60, arguing that the district\\ncourt did not “consider[] . . . the amendments made to the Plaintiffs’ complaint filed\\nin the State District Court.” On June 12, 2018, the district court denied the motion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fII. Discussion\\n\\n A. Jurisdiction\\n\\n As an initial matter, we address the Officer Defendants’ argument, raised for\\nthe first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case\\nfollowing the second removal. The Officer Defendants argue that under Nebraska\\nlaw, once an entire case is voluntarily dismissed, the court lacks jurisdiction to\\nconsider any further motions or enter any further orders. It follows, they argue, that\\nthe filing of the Second Amended Complaint and any subsequent state and federal\\nproceedings are a nullity.\\n\\n We have grave reservations about the state court’s ability to amend an entirely\\ndismissed complaint under Nebraska law. That said, we need not determine whether\\nit was permissible under Nebraska law for the state court to grant leave to amend and\\nallow Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint. Under the removal statute,\\n28 U.S.C. § 1441, the district court “is not precluded from hearing and determining\\nany claim in [a civil action removed under that section] because the State court from\\nwhich such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.” 28\\nU.S.C. § 1441(f); see also St. Clair v. Fred Spigarelli, P.C., 348 F. App’x 190, 191\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (concluding that the district court erred by dismissing a\\n“removed case on the basis of a state law venue defect” because the doctrine of\\nderivative jurisdiction was abrogated by § 1441(f)); North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940\\nF.2d 333, 336–38 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the derivative jurisdiction doctrine has\\nbeen completely abandoned). It is sufficient that the district court had original\\njurisdiction over this action arising out of federal law and that the proper procedures\\nfor removal were followed. Applying these principles we conclude the district court\\nhad jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims and the Second Amended Complaint is\\nproperly before us.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f B. Pleading Standards\\n\\n We turn to the issues raised by Plaintiffs on appeal. Plaintiffs first contend that\\nthe district court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the § 1983\\nclaims were not time-barred and (2) the Second Amended Complaint adequately\\npleads a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the Second Amended\\nComplaint did not meet federal pleading standards, we will not address the statute of\\nlimitations question.\\n\\n We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, “accepting\\nthe well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable\\ninferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Varga, 764 F.3d at 838 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\\nface.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim has\\nsufficient facial plausibility to survive where the plaintiff has pled enough facts to\\nallow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged\\nmisconduct. Id. at 838–39 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).\\n\\n The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against the Officer\\nDefendants. Here the Plaintiffs’ pleading consists almost entirely of non-specific\\nconclusory allegations—mostly against the Officer Defendants as a group—and fails\\nto provide enough factual detail to support a plausible claim that any of the Officer\\nDefendants deprived them of their rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and\\nFourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that tie any of the Officer\\nDefendants’ actions to the Plaintiffs’ race or ethnicity. Nor have they shown how\\nPlaintiffs were treated differently from any similarly situated non-Hispanic residents.\\nDespite the claim that Plaintiffs’ arrest and confinement were unlawful, no allegations\\ntie any of the Officer Defendants to any wrongdoing related to Plaintiffs’ arrest or\\nconfinement. The only actual alleged conduct attributable to the Officer Defendants\\n\\n -8-\\n\\frelated to the investigation or prosecution does not plausibly give rise to a\\nconstitutional violation. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint consists mostly of\\nlegal conclusions and speculation, which is insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6). See\\nHamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at\\n678).3\\n\\n Likewise, the district court committed no error in dismissing the claims against\\nthe Doe Defendants. It is generally impermissible to name fictitious parties as\\ndefendants in federal court, but “an action may proceed against a party whose name\\nis unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity\\nof the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.” Estate of Rosenberg by\\nRosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The\\nallegations in the Second Amended Complaint regarding the Doe Defendants are not\\nsufficiently specific to satisfy the exception to the general prohibition against\\nfictitious parties. The Second Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege who\\nthe Doe Defendants are, what they allegedly did, what their position is for the City,\\nor any other facts that would permit the Doe Defendants to be noticed or identified\\nthrough discovery.\\n\\n Lastly, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when it denied\\nPlaintiffs’ motion to amend or alter the judgment. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any\\nmanifest errors of law or fact or demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that\\nwould justify this extraordinary relief. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer\\nDist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); Sellers v.\\nMineta, 350 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Plaintiffs’ argument that the law of the case doctrine should govern is without\\nmerit. There is no indication that the state district court considered—let alone, ruled\\nbased on—federal pleading standards when it determined that amendment was not\\nfutile.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fPlaintiffs’ argument that the district court did not consider the amendments to their\\ncomplaint is without merit.\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3280,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641899,"string":"4,641,899"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Crystal THOMPSON; Z.T., by and Through His Next Friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler Hutson; G.T., III, by and Through His Next Friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Andrew DILL Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Crystal Thompson v. Andrew Dill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3358"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Kelly, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888977/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888978/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3358\\n ___________________________\\n\\nCrystal Thompson; Z.T., by and through his next friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler\\n Hutson; G.T., III, by and through his next friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and\\n through her next friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and through her next friend\\n Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Andrew Dill\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This interlocutory appeal is about whether Trooper Andrew Dill of the\\nMissouri Highway Patrol is immune from a lawsuit filed against him for shooting and\\nkilling Gerry Thompson during Dill’s response to a serious domestic disturbance.\\n\\nThe district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding there were\\ngenuine issues of material fact in dispute preventing it from concluding Dill was\\nentitled to his asserted immunity defenses. Because Dill’s appeal turns on disputed\\nissues of fact as to what occurred before the shooting, we lack jurisdiction and\\ndismiss.\\n\\n I. Background1\\n\\n On May 4, 2016, law enforcement officers were dispatched to Gerry and\\nCrystal Thompson’s residence. The radio dispatcher reported that a male had\\nassaulted Crystal and was now holding her and a small child against their will. The\\ndispatcher reported the man — who was later identified as Crystal’s husband Gerry\\n— threatened to kill Crystal if police came to the house. Dill and other law\\nenforcement officers from various departments responded to the call.\\n\\n Dill arrived at the residence and stationed himself in a neighboring yard to the\\neast of the Thompson residence. The record reveals that another officer, Dallas\\nCounty Deputy Sheriff Darren Cheek, conversed with Gerry at the front door\\nentryway and ultimately employed his taser against Gerry. The taser did not subdue\\nGerry, and Gerry tried to push Cheek out of the entryway and close the door. Dill\\ntestified the sound of the taser combined with the fact Cheek staggered backward led\\nDill to believe Gerry had shot the officer. Dill then observed Cheek and several other\\nofficers forcibly enter the home.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We recite the background facts primarily as set forth in the district court’s\\nsummary judgment opinion. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 2019)\\n(explaining we must accept as true the facts the district court found were adequately\\nsupported unless they are blatantly contradicted by the record). Certain additional\\nundisputed facts are gleaned from the record.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\n While Gerry and the officers were inside, Dill walked toward the residence and\\nlooked in the front door, where he observed Crystal, with blood on her face, holding\\na child. Dill heard screaming, yelling, and banging inside the house and concluded\\nGerry was not under police control and that Crystal and her child were in danger.\\n\\n Gerry soon charged out a separate door. Almost immediately and without\\ngiving any warning to Gerry, Dill discharged his firearm a single time, fatally\\nshooting Gerry in his right side. Dill testified he saw Gerry move his hands toward\\nhis waistband and turn back toward the door, which Dill said caused him to believe\\nGerry was reaching for a gun to possibly shoot into the house. Gerry was actually\\nunarmed. A video taken by Deputy Cheek’s body camera inside the house showed\\nGerry rushing out of the house and slamming the door shut. Although the door\\nprevented recording video of the actual shooting, the audio of the shooting was\\nrecorded.\\n\\n Gerry’s children and parents and Crystal sued Dill in federal court. The\\ncomplaint alleged excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Missouri\\nstate law claim of battery.\\n\\n After discovery, Dill filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming he was\\nentitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and official immunity on\\nthe battery claim. The essence of Dill’s argument was that his decision to use deadly\\nforce was reasonable under the circumstances involved, including because Dill\\nbelieved Gerry posed a threat to others considering he “disobeyed commands and fled\\nfrom officers, only to immediately turn back toward them, while reaching to his\\nwaistband.”\\n\\n The district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a\\ngenuine issue of material fact was in dispute as to whether Gerry acted in a way that\\nmade it objectively reasonable to believe he posed an immediate threat to officers or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nothers at the scene. The district court explained the body-camera video “shows only\\nthe view from inside the residence, such that the shooting at issue and the actions of\\nDill and [Gerry] occurred on the other side of an opaque door.” Thus, the district\\ncourt reasoned it could not “conclude that [Gerry] reached for his waist, or otherwise\\nbehaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that [Gerry] was\\nbehaving in a threatening manner.”\\n\\n As for the battery claim, the district court denied Dill official immunity. The\\ndistrict court credited the Plaintiffs’ arguments that there were open fact questions as\\nto whether Dill acted maliciously since Dill shot Gerry almost immediately upon\\nleaving the house and, contrary to his officer training, without first giving Gerry any\\nverbal warning.\\n\\n Dill filed a timely interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial\\nof his motion for summary judgment on both the § 1983 excessive force claim and\\nthe Missouri battery claim.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Summary judgment is proper if a party “shows that there is no genuine dispute\\nas to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a). When engaging in this analysis, “the nonmoving party is given the\\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences.” Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir.\\n2012).\\n\\n In cases where a government official seeks summary judgment on the basis of\\nqualified immunity, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. See id. A\\ngovernment official is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim unless (1) “the\\nfacts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nright,” and (2) the “right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged\\nmisconduct.” Id.\\n\\n Typically, we do not have jurisdiction over a district court’s denial of summary\\njudgment. When the denial is based on qualified immunity, however, we have limited\\njurisdiction to decide the purely legal issue of whether the alleged facts support a\\nclaim of violation of clearly established law. See Raines v. Counseling Assocs. Inc.,\\n883 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 2018). The standard of review to reach that particular\\nquestion is de novo. See id.\\n\\n Our jurisdiction does not extend to the issue of “whether or not the pretrial\\nrecord sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,\\n320 (1995). Consequently, we generally do not have jurisdiction to review a district\\ncourt’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage simply because\\nwe disagree with the district court as to whether there is sufficient evidence to\\nconclude a material fact is genuinely in dispute. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518,\\n523 (8th Cir. 2019). Jurisdiction is thus typically lacking where there is a dispute of\\nfact “at the heart of the argument.” Id. (quoting Austin v. Long, 779 F.3d 522, 524\\n(8th Cir. 2015)).\\n\\n There is an exception to this rule. Reversal of a denial of qualified immunity\\nis warranted “where the record plainly forecloses the district court’s finding of a\\nmaterial factual dispute.” Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.\\n372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is\\nblatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a\\ncourt should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for\\nsummary judgment.”).\\n\\n Similarly, we have limited jurisdiction to review issues of law related to the\\ndistrict court’s denial of summary judgment based on Dill’s official immunity\\n\\n -5-\\n\\ndefense. See Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (recognizing the “scope of review is limited to issues of law,” which\\nare reviewed de novo, as to denials of claims of qualified immunity, sovereign\\nimmunity, and official immunity).\\n\\n A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim\\n\\n With our jurisdictional limitations in mind, we first consider the district court’s\\ndenial of qualified immunity to Dill on the § 1983 excessive force claim. An\\nexcessive force claim “is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against\\nunreasonable seizures.” Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012).\\nIn deciding whether an officer’s use of force amounts to a constitutional violation, the\\nquestion turns on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s\\nconduct was reasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989);\\nRaines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\\n\\n “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police\\nofficers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are\\ntense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary\\nin a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Courts therefore must not\\nmake immunity conditional on the government officer’s “pursu[ing] the most prudent\\ncourse of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight vision.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497.\\n\\n We have identified certain factors as relevant to determine if an officer’s use\\nof force was objectively unreasonable:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\n the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of\\n force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the\\n officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the\\n security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;\\n and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.\\n\\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Our jurisprudence on the use of deadly force is particularly relevant here. We\\nhave held it is not constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force “if an officer has\\nprobable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,\\neither to the officer or others.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497. This is true even if the\\nofficer’s objectively reasonable belief or perception about the threat turns out to be\\nmistaken. See Loch, 689 F.3d at 966. So “[e]ven if a suspect is ultimately ‘found to\\nbe unarmed, a police officer can still employ deadly force if objectively reasonable.’”\\nId. (quoting Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2002)). But\\nwhere it is not objectively reasonable for an officer to believe a suspect poses an\\nimmediate threat to the officer or others, “deadly force is not justified.” See Raines,\\n883 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Ellison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015)).\\n\\n Since there is no dispute Gerry was unarmed when Dill shot and killed him, the\\ncritical question is this: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\nPlaintiffs, was it objectively reasonable for Dill to believe Gerry posed a threat of\\nserious physical harm to anyone as he fled from his house? If so, then Dill is entitled\\nto qualified immunity and thus summary judgment. If not, then the case must proceed\\nto trial.\\n\\n The district court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that under\\nthe summary judgment standard it could not conclude Gerry “reached for his waist,\\nor otherwise behaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that\\n[Gerry] was behaving in a threatening manner.” Dill argues this was error because,\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nat the moment he employed deadly force, he had reason to believe Gerry was about\\nto cause death or serious bodily injury to the officers inside the residence by reaching\\nfor a gun to shoot back into the house at the officers. Dill contends this belief was\\nreasonable considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact Gerry\\nreached for his waist and turned back toward the officers inside the house.\\n\\n Dill may ultimately be able to show his split-second decision to shoot Gerry\\nwas objectively reasonable considering the chaotic circumstances. But we do not\\nhave jurisdiction to decide whether or not we disagree with the district court as to\\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to find a genuine issue of material fact for\\nresolution at trial. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. That question is beyond our\\nlimited jurisdiction unless Dill can show the record plainly forecloses the district\\ncourt’s finding that a material factual dispute existed as to whether Gerry was acting\\nin a threatening manner. See Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\\n\\n Dill cannot show such a one-sided record here. It is true nothing in the record\\ndirectly contradicts Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waistband and turned\\nback toward the door as he exited. At the same time, there is evidence that could\\nindicate Gerry did not act as Dill described. For example, the body-camera recording2\\ntaken from inside the house demonstrates that Dill shot Gerry immediately upon\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Dill argues the district court’s decision relied on the faulty premise that to\\nprevail on summary judgment an officer’s testimony must be confirmed by video.\\nDill correctly points out there is no such requirement in the law. However, we do not\\ninterpret the district court’s order as imposing such a rule. Instead, read in context,\\nthe district court simply concluded the body camera video did not resolve the factual\\ndispute as to how Gerry behaved as he fled the house. In other words, because the\\nbody camera video did not show the shooting, the district court concluded it did not\\nwarrant discrediting the Plaintiffs’ version of events at the summary judgment stage\\nas permitted in appropriate circumstances. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81, 386\\n(reversing a denial of qualified immunity in an excessive force case where the facts\\ndepicted by the videotape utterly discredited the plaintiff’s version of events).\\n -8-\\n\\nexiting the house. Considering this, one could question whether Gerry even had time\\nto reach toward his waist and turn back toward the house.3 There are also\\nphotographs and an autopsy report in the record clearly showing the entry wound was\\non Gerry’s right side, which Plaintiffs argue casts doubt on whether Gerry turned\\nback to the house as Dill testified.4\\n\\n This evidence does not necessarily mean it was unreasonable for Dill to believe\\nGerry posed a threat justifying his use of deadly force. But it does mean the record\\ndoes not plainly foreclose the district court’s finding of a factual dispute as to whether\\nGerry’s actions just prior to the shooting were consistent with Dill’s testimony. And\\nresolution of whether the evidence is sufficient to make that dispute “genuine” is\\nbeyond our limited jurisdiction. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20.\\n\\n B. Missouri Battery Claim\\n\\n We next review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the battery\\nclaim, as to which Dill asserts he is entitled to official immunity.\\n\\n “Under the Missouri doctrine of official immunity, ‘public officers acting\\nwithin the scope of their authority are not liable for injuries arising from their\\ndiscretionary acts or omissions, but they may be held liable for torts committed when\\nacting in a ministerial capacity.’” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 979 (quoting\\nMissouri ex rel. Hill v. Baldridge, 186 S.W.3d 258, 259 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)\\n(cleaned up)). An officer’s actions when interacting with “a suspected criminal are\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The video does not show Gerry reaching for his waist before the door closed.\\n 4\\n The autopsy photos and report indicate the point of entry of the shotgun pellets\\nto be on the right side of Gerry’s body, which was the side nearest to Dill when Gerry\\nexited the house. Plaintiffs argue that if Gerry had turned as Dill described, the entry\\nwounds would have been expected “in the center/belly button.”\\n -9-\\n\\ngenerally discretionary, and thus they are protected by official immunity.” Id. This\\nincludes when a police officer “draws and fires a weapon.” Seiner v. Drenon, 304\\nF.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2002).\\n\\n However, acts performed in bad faith or with malice do not qualify as\\ndiscretionary acts. See Conway v. St. Louis Cnty., 254 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Mo. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). “Bad faith signifies a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing or\\nbreach of a known duty through ulterior motives or ill will.” Id. “Malice [] requires\\nintent, [and t]o act with malice the officer must do that which a man of reasonable\\nintelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and intend such action to be\\ninjurious to another.” Id.\\n\\n Under our limited review, we do not have jurisdiction to reverse the district\\ncourt’s determination that there were open fact questions as to whether Dill acted\\nmaliciously. Dill shot Gerry immediately and, contrary to his training, without\\nwarning, when Gerry fled the house. Further, the autopsy photographs and report\\nraise doubt as to Dill’s claim that Gerry turned back toward the door. Considering\\nthose facts, and discounting Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waist and\\nacted in a threatening manner, “a jury could find that [Dill] acted with the prohibited\\n. . . malice.” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 980. Once again, Dill may very\\nwell show his actions were reasonable and consistent with his duty, but we have no\\nbasis to decide that factual question under our limited jurisdiction.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419152/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring.\\n\\n I concur in the court’s opinion, but mindful of our lack of jurisdiction over\\nDill’s appeal, I would offer no comment on the likelihood of what either party\\nultimately may be able to show with respect to whether Dill’s actions were\\nreasonable.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419152/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641899/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Crystal THOMPSON; Z.T., by and Through His Next Friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler Hutson; G.T., III, by and Through His Next Friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Andrew DILL Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3358\n ___________________________\n\nCrystal Thompson; Z.T., by and through his next friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler\n Hutson; G.T., III, by and through his next friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and\n through her next friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and through her next friend\n Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\n\n v.\n\n Andrew Dill\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n This interlocutory appeal is about whether Trooper Andrew Dill of the\nMissouri Highway Patrol is immune from a lawsuit filed against him for shooting and\nkilling Gerry Thompson during Dill’s response to a serious domestic disturbance.\n\nThe district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding there were\ngenuine issues of material fact in dispute preventing it from concluding Dill was\nentitled to his asserted immunity defenses. Because Dill’s appeal turns on disputed\nissues of fact as to what occurred before the shooting, we lack jurisdiction and\ndismiss.\n\n I. Background1\n\n On May 4, 2016, law enforcement officers were dispatched to Gerry and\nCrystal Thompson’s residence. The radio dispatcher reported that a male had\nassaulted Crystal and was now holding her and a small child against their will. The\ndispatcher reported the man — who was later identified as Crystal’s husband Gerry\n— threatened to kill Crystal if police came to the house. Dill and other law\nenforcement officers from various departments responded to the call.\n\n Dill arrived at the residence and stationed himself in a neighboring yard to the\neast of the Thompson residence. The record reveals that another officer, Dallas\nCounty Deputy Sheriff Darren Cheek, conversed with Gerry at the front door\nentryway and ultimately employed his taser against Gerry. The taser did not subdue\nGerry, and Gerry tried to push Cheek out of the entryway and close the door. Dill\ntestified the sound of the taser combined with the fact Cheek staggered backward led\nDill to believe Gerry had shot the officer. Dill then observed Cheek and several other\nofficers forcibly enter the home.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n We recite the background facts primarily as set forth in the district court’s\nsummary judgment opinion. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 2019)\n(explaining we must accept as true the facts the district court found were adequately\nsupported unless they are blatantly contradicted by the record). Certain additional\nundisputed facts are gleaned from the record.\n\n -2-\n\n While Gerry and the officers were inside, Dill walked toward the residence and\nlooked in the front door, where he observed Crystal, with blood on her face, holding\na child. Dill heard screaming, yelling, and banging inside the house and concluded\nGerry was not under police control and that Crystal and her child were in danger.\n\n Gerry soon charged out a separate door. Almost immediately and without\ngiving any warning to Gerry, Dill discharged his firearm a single time, fatally\nshooting Gerry in his right side. Dill testified he saw Gerry move his hands toward\nhis waistband and turn back toward the door, which Dill said caused him to believe\nGerry was reaching for a gun to possibly shoot into the house. Gerry was actually\nunarmed. A video taken by Deputy Cheek’s body camera inside the house showed\nGerry rushing out of the house and slamming the door shut. Although the door\nprevented recording video of the actual shooting, the audio of the shooting was\nrecorded.\n\n Gerry’s children and parents and Crystal sued Dill in federal court. The\ncomplaint alleged excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Missouri\nstate law claim of battery.\n\n After discovery, Dill filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming he was\nentitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and official immunity on\nthe battery claim. The essence of Dill’s argument was that his decision to use deadly\nforce was reasonable under the circumstances involved, including because Dill\nbelieved Gerry posed a threat to others considering he “disobeyed commands and fled\nfrom officers, only to immediately turn back toward them, while reaching to his\nwaistband.”\n\n The district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a\ngenuine issue of material fact was in dispute as to whether Gerry acted in a way that\nmade it objectively reasonable to believe he posed an immediate threat to officers or\n\n -3-\n\nothers at the scene. The district court explained the body-camera video “shows only\nthe view from inside the residence, such that the shooting at issue and the actions of\nDill and [Gerry] occurred on the other side of an opaque door.” Thus, the district\ncourt reasoned it could not “conclude that [Gerry] reached for his waist, or otherwise\nbehaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that [Gerry] was\nbehaving in a threatening manner.”\n\n As for the battery claim, the district court denied Dill official immunity. The\ndistrict court credited the Plaintiffs’ arguments that there were open fact questions as\nto whether Dill acted maliciously since Dill shot Gerry almost immediately upon\nleaving the house and, contrary to his officer training, without first giving Gerry any\nverbal warning.\n\n Dill filed a timely interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial\nof his motion for summary judgment on both the § 1983 excessive force claim and\nthe Missouri battery claim.\n\n II. Analysis\n\n Summary judgment is proper if a party “shows that there is no genuine dispute\nas to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\nCiv. P. 56(a). When engaging in this analysis, “the nonmoving party is given the\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences.” Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir.\n2012).\n\n In cases where a government official seeks summary judgment on the basis of\nqualified immunity, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. See id. A\ngovernment official is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim unless (1) “the\nfacts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory\n\n\n\n -4-\n\nright,” and (2) the “right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged\nmisconduct.” Id.\n\n Typically, we do not have jurisdiction over a district court’s denial of summary\njudgment. When the denial is based on qualified immunity, however, we have limited\njurisdiction to decide the purely legal issue of whether the alleged facts support a\nclaim of violation of clearly established law. See Raines v. Counseling Assocs. Inc.,\n883 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 2018). The standard of review to reach that particular\nquestion is de novo. See id.\n\n Our jurisdiction does not extend to the issue of “whether or not the pretrial\nrecord sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,\n320 (1995). Consequently, we generally do not have jurisdiction to review a district\ncourt’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage simply because\nwe disagree with the district court as to whether there is sufficient evidence to\nconclude a material fact is genuinely in dispute. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518,\n523 (8th Cir. 2019). Jurisdiction is thus typically lacking where there is a dispute of\nfact “at the heart of the argument.” Id. (quoting Austin v. Long, 779 F.3d 522, 524\n(8th Cir. 2015)).\n\n There is an exception to this rule. Reversal of a denial of qualified immunity\nis warranted “where the record plainly forecloses the district court’s finding of a\nmaterial factual dispute.” Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.\n372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is\nblatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a\ncourt should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for\nsummary judgment.”).\n\n Similarly, we have limited jurisdiction to review issues of law related to the\ndistrict court’s denial of summary judgment based on Dill’s official immunity\n\n -5-\n\ndefense. See Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978\n(8th Cir. 2017) (recognizing the “scope of review is limited to issues of law,” which\nare reviewed de novo, as to denials of claims of qualified immunity, sovereign\nimmunity, and official immunity).\n\n A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim\n\n With our jurisdictional limitations in mind, we first consider the district court’s\ndenial of qualified immunity to Dill on the § 1983 excessive force claim. An\nexcessive force claim “is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against\nunreasonable seizures.” Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012).\nIn deciding whether an officer’s use of force amounts to a constitutional violation, the\nquestion turns on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s\nconduct was reasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989);\nRaines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\n\n “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police\nofficers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are\ntense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary\nin a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Courts therefore must not\nmake immunity conditional on the government officer’s “pursu[ing] the most prudent\ncourse of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight vision.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497.\n\n We have identified certain factors as relevant to determine if an officer’s use\nof force was objectively unreasonable:\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\n the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of\n force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the\n officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the\n security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;\n and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.\n\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018).\n\n Our jurisprudence on the use of deadly force is particularly relevant here. We\nhave held it is not constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force “if an officer has\nprobable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,\neither to the officer or others.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497. This is true even if the\nofficer’s objectively reasonable belief or perception about the threat turns out to be\nmistaken. See Loch, 689 F.3d at 966. So “[e]ven if a suspect is ultimately ‘found to\nbe unarmed, a police officer can still employ deadly force if objectively reasonable.’”\nId. (quoting Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2002)). But\nwhere it is not objectively reasonable for an officer to believe a suspect poses an\nimmediate threat to the officer or others, “deadly force is not justified.” See Raines,\n883 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Ellison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015)).\n\n Since there is no dispute Gerry was unarmed when Dill shot and killed him, the\ncritical question is this: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\nPlaintiffs, was it objectively reasonable for Dill to believe Gerry posed a threat of\nserious physical harm to anyone as he fled from his house? If so, then Dill is entitled\nto qualified immunity and thus summary judgment. If not, then the case must proceed\nto trial.\n\n The district court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that under\nthe summary judgment standard it could not conclude Gerry “reached for his waist,\nor otherwise behaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that\n[Gerry] was behaving in a threatening manner.” Dill argues this was error because,\n\n -7-\n\nat the moment he employed deadly force, he had reason to believe Gerry was about\nto cause death or serious bodily injury to the officers inside the residence by reaching\nfor a gun to shoot back into the house at the officers. Dill contends this belief was\nreasonable considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact Gerry\nreached for his waist and turned back toward the officers inside the house.\n\n Dill may ultimately be able to show his split-second decision to shoot Gerry\nwas objectively reasonable considering the chaotic circumstances. But we do not\nhave jurisdiction to decide whether or not we disagree with the district court as to\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to find a genuine issue of material fact for\nresolution at trial. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. That question is beyond our\nlimited jurisdiction unless Dill can show the record plainly forecloses the district\ncourt’s finding that a material factual dispute existed as to whether Gerry was acting\nin a threatening manner. See Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\n\n Dill cannot show such a one-sided record here. It is true nothing in the record\ndirectly contradicts Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waistband and turned\nback toward the door as he exited. At the same time, there is evidence that could\nindicate Gerry did not act as Dill described. For example, the body-camera recording2\ntaken from inside the house demonstrates that Dill shot Gerry immediately upon\n\n\n 2\n Dill argues the district court’s decision relied on the faulty premise that to\nprevail on summary judgment an officer’s testimony must be confirmed by video.\nDill correctly points out there is no such requirement in the law. However, we do not\ninterpret the district court’s order as imposing such a rule. Instead, read in context,\nthe district court simply concluded the body camera video did not resolve the factual\ndispute as to how Gerry behaved as he fled the house. In other words, because the\nbody camera video did not show the shooting, the district court concluded it did not\nwarrant discrediting the Plaintiffs’ version of events at the summary judgment stage\nas permitted in appropriate circumstances. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81, 386\n(reversing a denial of qualified immunity in an excessive force case where the facts\ndepicted by the videotape utterly discredited the plaintiff’s version of events).\n -8-\n\nexiting the house. Considering this, one could question whether Gerry even had time\nto reach toward his waist and turn back toward the house.3 There are also\nphotographs and an autopsy report in the record clearly showing the entry wound was\non Gerry’s right side, which Plaintiffs argue casts doubt on whether Gerry turned\nback to the house as Dill testified.4\n\n This evidence does not necessarily mean it was unreasonable for Dill to believe\nGerry posed a threat justifying his use of deadly force. But it does mean the record\ndoes not plainly foreclose the district court’s finding of a factual dispute as to whether\nGerry’s actions just prior to the shooting were consistent with Dill’s testimony. And\nresolution of whether the evidence is sufficient to make that dispute “genuine” is\nbeyond our limited jurisdiction. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20.\n\n B. Missouri Battery Claim\n\n We next review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the battery\nclaim, as to which Dill asserts he is entitled to official immunity.\n\n “Under the Missouri doctrine of official immunity, ‘public officers acting\nwithin the scope of their authority are not liable for injuries arising from their\ndiscretionary acts or omissions, but they may be held liable for torts committed when\nacting in a ministerial capacity.’” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 979 (quoting\nMissouri ex rel. Hill v. Baldridge, 186 S.W.3d 258, 259 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)\n(cleaned up)). An officer’s actions when interacting with “a suspected criminal are\n\n\n 3\n The video does not show Gerry reaching for his waist before the door closed.\n 4\n The autopsy photos and report indicate the point of entry of the shotgun pellets\nto be on the right side of Gerry’s body, which was the side nearest to Dill when Gerry\nexited the house. Plaintiffs argue that if Gerry had turned as Dill described, the entry\nwounds would have been expected “in the center/belly button.”\n -9-\n\ngenerally discretionary, and thus they are protected by official immunity.” Id. This\nincludes when a police officer “draws and fires a weapon.” Seiner v. Drenon, 304\nF.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2002).\n\n However, acts performed in bad faith or with malice do not qualify as\ndiscretionary acts. See Conway v. St. Louis Cnty., 254 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Mo. Ct.\nApp. 2008). “Bad faith signifies a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing or\nbreach of a known duty through ulterior motives or ill will.” Id. “Malice [] requires\nintent, [and t]o act with malice the officer must do that which a man of reasonable\nintelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and intend such action to be\ninjurious to another.” Id.\n\n Under our limited review, we do not have jurisdiction to reverse the district\ncourt’s determination that there were open fact questions as to whether Dill acted\nmaliciously. Dill shot Gerry immediately and, contrary to his training, without\nwarning, when Gerry fled the house. Further, the autopsy photographs and report\nraise doubt as to Dill’s claim that Gerry turned back toward the door. Considering\nthose facts, and discounting Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waist and\nacted in a threatening manner, “a jury could find that [Dill] acted with the prohibited\n. . . malice.” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 980. Once again, Dill may very\nwell show his actions were reasonable and consistent with his duty, but we have no\nbasis to decide that factual question under our limited jurisdiction.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Crystal THOMPSON; Z.T., by and Through His Next Friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler Hutson; G.T., III, by and Through His Next Friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Andrew DILL Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3358\\n ___________________________\\n\\nCrystal Thompson; Z.T., by and through his next friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler\\n Hutson; G.T., III, by and through his next friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and\\n through her next friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and through her next friend\\n Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Andrew Dill\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 14, 2018\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n This interlocutory appeal is about whether Trooper Andrew Dill of the\\nMissouri Highway Patrol is immune from a lawsuit filed against him for shooting and\\nkilling Gerry Thompson during Dill’s response to a serious domestic disturbance.\\n\\nThe district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding there were\\ngenuine issues of material fact in dispute preventing it from concluding Dill was\\nentitled to his asserted immunity defenses. Because Dill’s appeal turns on disputed\\nissues of fact as to what occurred before the shooting, we lack jurisdiction and\\ndismiss.\\n\\n I. Background1\\n\\n On May 4, 2016, law enforcement officers were dispatched to Gerry and\\nCrystal Thompson’s residence. The radio dispatcher reported that a male had\\nassaulted Crystal and was now holding her and a small child against their will. The\\ndispatcher reported the man — who was later identified as Crystal’s husband Gerry\\n— threatened to kill Crystal if police came to the house. Dill and other law\\nenforcement officers from various departments responded to the call.\\n\\n Dill arrived at the residence and stationed himself in a neighboring yard to the\\neast of the Thompson residence. The record reveals that another officer, Dallas\\nCounty Deputy Sheriff Darren Cheek, conversed with Gerry at the front door\\nentryway and ultimately employed his taser against Gerry. The taser did not subdue\\nGerry, and Gerry tried to push Cheek out of the entryway and close the door. Dill\\ntestified the sound of the taser combined with the fact Cheek staggered backward led\\nDill to believe Gerry had shot the officer. Dill then observed Cheek and several other\\nofficers forcibly enter the home.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We recite the background facts primarily as set forth in the district court’s\\nsummary judgment opinion. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518, 521 (8th Cir. 2019)\\n(explaining we must accept as true the facts the district court found were adequately\\nsupported unless they are blatantly contradicted by the record). Certain additional\\nundisputed facts are gleaned from the record.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\n While Gerry and the officers were inside, Dill walked toward the residence and\\nlooked in the front door, where he observed Crystal, with blood on her face, holding\\na child. Dill heard screaming, yelling, and banging inside the house and concluded\\nGerry was not under police control and that Crystal and her child were in danger.\\n\\n Gerry soon charged out a separate door. Almost immediately and without\\ngiving any warning to Gerry, Dill discharged his firearm a single time, fatally\\nshooting Gerry in his right side. Dill testified he saw Gerry move his hands toward\\nhis waistband and turn back toward the door, which Dill said caused him to believe\\nGerry was reaching for a gun to possibly shoot into the house. Gerry was actually\\nunarmed. A video taken by Deputy Cheek’s body camera inside the house showed\\nGerry rushing out of the house and slamming the door shut. Although the door\\nprevented recording video of the actual shooting, the audio of the shooting was\\nrecorded.\\n\\n Gerry’s children and parents and Crystal sued Dill in federal court. The\\ncomplaint alleged excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Missouri\\nstate law claim of battery.\\n\\n After discovery, Dill filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming he was\\nentitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and official immunity on\\nthe battery claim. The essence of Dill’s argument was that his decision to use deadly\\nforce was reasonable under the circumstances involved, including because Dill\\nbelieved Gerry posed a threat to others considering he “disobeyed commands and fled\\nfrom officers, only to immediately turn back toward them, while reaching to his\\nwaistband.”\\n\\n The district court denied Dill’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a\\ngenuine issue of material fact was in dispute as to whether Gerry acted in a way that\\nmade it objectively reasonable to believe he posed an immediate threat to officers or\\n\\n -3-\\n\\nothers at the scene. The district court explained the body-camera video “shows only\\nthe view from inside the residence, such that the shooting at issue and the actions of\\nDill and [Gerry] occurred on the other side of an opaque door.” Thus, the district\\ncourt reasoned it could not “conclude that [Gerry] reached for his waist, or otherwise\\nbehaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that [Gerry] was\\nbehaving in a threatening manner.”\\n\\n As for the battery claim, the district court denied Dill official immunity. The\\ndistrict court credited the Plaintiffs’ arguments that there were open fact questions as\\nto whether Dill acted maliciously since Dill shot Gerry almost immediately upon\\nleaving the house and, contrary to his officer training, without first giving Gerry any\\nverbal warning.\\n\\n Dill filed a timely interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court’s denial\\nof his motion for summary judgment on both the § 1983 excessive force claim and\\nthe Missouri battery claim.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n Summary judgment is proper if a party “shows that there is no genuine dispute\\nas to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.\\nCiv. P. 56(a). When engaging in this analysis, “the nonmoving party is given the\\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences.” Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir.\\n2012).\\n\\n In cases where a government official seeks summary judgment on the basis of\\nqualified immunity, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. See id. A\\ngovernment official is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim unless (1) “the\\nfacts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nright,” and (2) the “right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged\\nmisconduct.” Id.\\n\\n Typically, we do not have jurisdiction over a district court’s denial of summary\\njudgment. When the denial is based on qualified immunity, however, we have limited\\njurisdiction to decide the purely legal issue of whether the alleged facts support a\\nclaim of violation of clearly established law. See Raines v. Counseling Assocs. Inc.,\\n883 F.3d 1071, 1074 (8th Cir. 2018). The standard of review to reach that particular\\nquestion is de novo. See id.\\n\\n Our jurisdiction does not extend to the issue of “whether or not the pretrial\\nrecord sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,\\n320 (1995). Consequently, we generally do not have jurisdiction to review a district\\ncourt’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage simply because\\nwe disagree with the district court as to whether there is sufficient evidence to\\nconclude a material fact is genuinely in dispute. See Riggs v. Gibbs, 923 F.3d 518,\\n523 (8th Cir. 2019). Jurisdiction is thus typically lacking where there is a dispute of\\nfact “at the heart of the argument.” Id. (quoting Austin v. Long, 779 F.3d 522, 524\\n(8th Cir. 2015)).\\n\\n There is an exception to this rule. Reversal of a denial of qualified immunity\\nis warranted “where the record plainly forecloses the district court’s finding of a\\nmaterial factual dispute.” Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.\\n372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is\\nblatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a\\ncourt should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for\\nsummary judgment.”).\\n\\n Similarly, we have limited jurisdiction to review issues of law related to the\\ndistrict court’s denial of summary judgment based on Dill’s official immunity\\n\\n -5-\\n\\ndefense. See Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (recognizing the “scope of review is limited to issues of law,” which\\nare reviewed de novo, as to denials of claims of qualified immunity, sovereign\\nimmunity, and official immunity).\\n\\n A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim\\n\\n With our jurisdictional limitations in mind, we first consider the district court’s\\ndenial of qualified immunity to Dill on the § 1983 excessive force claim. An\\nexcessive force claim “is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against\\nunreasonable seizures.” Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012).\\nIn deciding whether an officer’s use of force amounts to a constitutional violation, the\\nquestion turns on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s\\nconduct was reasonable. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989);\\nRaines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\\n\\n “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police\\nofficers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are\\ntense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary\\nin a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Courts therefore must not\\nmake immunity conditional on the government officer’s “pursu[ing] the most prudent\\ncourse of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight vision.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497.\\n\\n We have identified certain factors as relevant to determine if an officer’s use\\nof force was objectively unreasonable:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\n the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of\\n force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the\\n officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the\\n security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;\\n and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.\\n\\nZubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Our jurisprudence on the use of deadly force is particularly relevant here. We\\nhave held it is not constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force “if an officer has\\nprobable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,\\neither to the officer or others.” Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497. This is true even if the\\nofficer’s objectively reasonable belief or perception about the threat turns out to be\\nmistaken. See Loch, 689 F.3d at 966. So “[e]ven if a suspect is ultimately ‘found to\\nbe unarmed, a police officer can still employ deadly force if objectively reasonable.’”\\nId. (quoting Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2002)). But\\nwhere it is not objectively reasonable for an officer to believe a suspect poses an\\nimmediate threat to the officer or others, “deadly force is not justified.” See Raines,\\n883 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Ellison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015)).\\n\\n Since there is no dispute Gerry was unarmed when Dill shot and killed him, the\\ncritical question is this: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\nPlaintiffs, was it objectively reasonable for Dill to believe Gerry posed a threat of\\nserious physical harm to anyone as he fled from his house? If so, then Dill is entitled\\nto qualified immunity and thus summary judgment. If not, then the case must proceed\\nto trial.\\n\\n The district court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that under\\nthe summary judgment standard it could not conclude Gerry “reached for his waist,\\nor otherwise behaved in a manner that would have justified the perception that\\n[Gerry] was behaving in a threatening manner.” Dill argues this was error because,\\n\\n -7-\\n\\nat the moment he employed deadly force, he had reason to believe Gerry was about\\nto cause death or serious bodily injury to the officers inside the residence by reaching\\nfor a gun to shoot back into the house at the officers. Dill contends this belief was\\nreasonable considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact Gerry\\nreached for his waist and turned back toward the officers inside the house.\\n\\n Dill may ultimately be able to show his split-second decision to shoot Gerry\\nwas objectively reasonable considering the chaotic circumstances. But we do not\\nhave jurisdiction to decide whether or not we disagree with the district court as to\\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to find a genuine issue of material fact for\\nresolution at trial. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20. That question is beyond our\\nlimited jurisdiction unless Dill can show the record plainly forecloses the district\\ncourt’s finding that a material factual dispute existed as to whether Gerry was acting\\nin a threatening manner. See Raines, 883 F.3d at 1074.\\n\\n Dill cannot show such a one-sided record here. It is true nothing in the record\\ndirectly contradicts Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waistband and turned\\nback toward the door as he exited. At the same time, there is evidence that could\\nindicate Gerry did not act as Dill described. For example, the body-camera recording2\\ntaken from inside the house demonstrates that Dill shot Gerry immediately upon\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Dill argues the district court’s decision relied on the faulty premise that to\\nprevail on summary judgment an officer’s testimony must be confirmed by video.\\nDill correctly points out there is no such requirement in the law. However, we do not\\ninterpret the district court’s order as imposing such a rule. Instead, read in context,\\nthe district court simply concluded the body camera video did not resolve the factual\\ndispute as to how Gerry behaved as he fled the house. In other words, because the\\nbody camera video did not show the shooting, the district court concluded it did not\\nwarrant discrediting the Plaintiffs’ version of events at the summary judgment stage\\nas permitted in appropriate circumstances. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81, 386\\n(reversing a denial of qualified immunity in an excessive force case where the facts\\ndepicted by the videotape utterly discredited the plaintiff’s version of events).\\n -8-\\n\\nexiting the house. Considering this, one could question whether Gerry even had time\\nto reach toward his waist and turn back toward the house.3 There are also\\nphotographs and an autopsy report in the record clearly showing the entry wound was\\non Gerry’s right side, which Plaintiffs argue casts doubt on whether Gerry turned\\nback to the house as Dill testified.4\\n\\n This evidence does not necessarily mean it was unreasonable for Dill to believe\\nGerry posed a threat justifying his use of deadly force. But it does mean the record\\ndoes not plainly foreclose the district court’s finding of a factual dispute as to whether\\nGerry’s actions just prior to the shooting were consistent with Dill’s testimony. And\\nresolution of whether the evidence is sufficient to make that dispute “genuine” is\\nbeyond our limited jurisdiction. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319–20.\\n\\n B. Missouri Battery Claim\\n\\n We next review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the battery\\nclaim, as to which Dill asserts he is entitled to official immunity.\\n\\n “Under the Missouri doctrine of official immunity, ‘public officers acting\\nwithin the scope of their authority are not liable for injuries arising from their\\ndiscretionary acts or omissions, but they may be held liable for torts committed when\\nacting in a ministerial capacity.’” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 979 (quoting\\nMissouri ex rel. Hill v. Baldridge, 186 S.W.3d 258, 259 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)\\n(cleaned up)). An officer’s actions when interacting with “a suspected criminal are\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The video does not show Gerry reaching for his waist before the door closed.\\n 4\\n The autopsy photos and report indicate the point of entry of the shotgun pellets\\nto be on the right side of Gerry’s body, which was the side nearest to Dill when Gerry\\nexited the house. Plaintiffs argue that if Gerry had turned as Dill described, the entry\\nwounds would have been expected “in the center/belly button.”\\n -9-\\n\\ngenerally discretionary, and thus they are protected by official immunity.” Id. This\\nincludes when a police officer “draws and fires a weapon.” Seiner v. Drenon, 304\\nF.3d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 2002).\\n\\n However, acts performed in bad faith or with malice do not qualify as\\ndiscretionary acts. See Conway v. St. Louis Cnty., 254 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Mo. Ct.\\nApp. 2008). “Bad faith signifies a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing or\\nbreach of a known duty through ulterior motives or ill will.” Id. “Malice [] requires\\nintent, [and t]o act with malice the officer must do that which a man of reasonable\\nintelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and intend such action to be\\ninjurious to another.” Id.\\n\\n Under our limited review, we do not have jurisdiction to reverse the district\\ncourt’s determination that there were open fact questions as to whether Dill acted\\nmaliciously. Dill shot Gerry immediately and, contrary to his training, without\\nwarning, when Gerry fled the house. Further, the autopsy photographs and report\\nraise doubt as to Dill’s claim that Gerry turned back toward the door. Considering\\nthose facts, and discounting Dill’s testimony that Gerry reached for his waist and\\nacted in a threatening manner, “a jury could find that [Dill] acted with the prohibited\\n. . . malice.” Div. of Emp’t Sec., Mo., 864 F.3d at 980. Once again, Dill may very\\nwell show his actions were reasonable and consistent with his duty, but we have no\\nbasis to decide that factual question under our limited jurisdiction.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3281,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4641900,"string":"4,641,900"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"AIR EVAC EMS, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. USABLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Doing Business as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Air Evac Ems, Inc. v. United Statesble Mut. Ins. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2264"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2264\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Air Evac EMS, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUSAble Mutual Insurance Company, doing business as Arkansas Blue Cross and\\n Blue Shield\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Air Evac EMS, Inc. (“Air Evac”) asserts numerous claims against USAble\\nMutual Insurance Company, d/b/a Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“Arkansas\\nBlue”), regarding Arkansas Blue’s allegedly inadequate reimbursement for air\\nambulance services that Air Evac provided to Arkansas Blue plan members. The\\n\\fdistrict court1 dismissed all of Air Evac’s claims for failure to state a claim under Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Emergency air transport is expensive. Air Evac’s base rate for a single\\ntransport in 2014 was $19,250. With a per mile charge of between $115 and $205,\\nAir Evac’s average actual charge for air ambulance transportation in 2014 was over\\n$30,000. Federal law requires Air Evac to provide its services without regard to a\\npatient’s ability to pay, which means Air Evac relies heavily on government and\\nprivate insurers for reimbursement. But most government and private insurers\\nprovide only limited reimbursement for air ambulance services. For instance,\\nArkansas Blue, as a matter of policy, does not contract with air ambulance providers,\\nand therefore has no in-network providers of air ambulance services. Moreover,\\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans typically limit reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices to $5,000 per trip, though in some cases reimbursement is limited to $1,000\\nor less. Thus, when Air Evac provides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan\\nmembers, it is regularly compensated less than it charges. According to the Amended\\nComplaint, Air Evac has two options for making up such shortfalls: balance-bill the\\nremaining cost to the plan member or appeal to Arkansas Blue. (To effectuate\\nappeals, Air Evac obtains assignments from patients of their right to appeal coverage\\ndecisions.) Neither option has proved very successful.\\n\\n Air Evac argues that Arkansas Blue’s limited reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices violates a number of federal and state laws, including laws that prohibit\\nannual limits on “essential health benefits,” laws that mandate minimum payments\\nfor certain emergency services, and laws that require adequate provider networks.\\nThese laws do not provide a private cause of action, however, so Air Evac has chosen\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto seek relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974\\n(“ERISA”), the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”), and contract\\nlaw. We address each set of claims in turn.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6) de novo, “accept[ing] the well-pled allegations in the complaint as true and\\ndraw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Meiners v. Wells Fargo\\n& Co., 898 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2018). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a\\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to\\nrelief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n B. ERISA\\n\\n Under ERISA, Air Evac seeks equitable relief, namely an injunction and\\nreformation of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plan terms “so that they do not include\\nlimits on benefits for emergency air ambulance transportation.” The district court\\nconcluded that Air Evac did not have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA.\\n\\n The primary remedy for challenging plan terms under ERISA is found in 29\\nU.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That section permits suit by a participant or beneficiary “to\\nrecover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the\\nterms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the\\nplan.” Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In addition to allowing suit for recovery of benefits,\\nERISA allows suit for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2) and equitable relief\\nunder § 1132(a)(3). Section 1132(a)(3) provides for suit “by a participant,\\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable\\nrelief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter\\nor the terms of the plan.”\\n\\n Thus, to have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA, a party must\\neither be a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, or the assignee of a participant,\\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary. Air Evac concedes that it is not a participant, beneficiary,\\nor fiduciary. Air Evac argues, however, that it still has the right to sue Arkansas Blue\\nfor equitable relief under ERISA because Arkansas Blue plan members with ERISA-\\ngoverned plans have assigned it that right. Accordingly, we must determine whether\\nAir Evac’s assignment actually conveys the right to sue for equitable relief.\\n\\n The relevant language from the assignment2 reads:\\n\\n [Patient] completely assigns to [Air Evac] all rights to (and related or\\n associated with) any benefit claims and/or payments due from any third-\\n party payor as reimbursement or payment for the Services, including but\\n not limited to the rights to pursue administrative claims, request\\n documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain\\n payment.\\n\\nThe district court concluded that the assignment “only convey[ed] patients’ benefits\\nand rights to bring related litigation in order to obtain payment” and that “[n]othing\\n. . . appear[ed] to convey the right to sue for clarification or reformation of plan terms,\\nwhich are extraordinary equitable remedies that extend far beyond litigation for\\npayment on claims.”\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Air Evac’s assignment language has changed over the years. Before the\\ndistrict court, Air Evac cited six versions of its assignment. On appeal, Air Evac only\\ncites three versions, all of which are essentially identical.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f On appeal, Air Evac argues that ERISA assignments should be liberally\\nconstrued and, accordingly, the language regarding rights “related or associated with\\n. . . benefit claims” should be interpreted to include the right to pursue equitable\\nremedies. Arkansas Blue counters that ERISA assignments should be construed\\nnarrowly and, accordingly, the assignment should be interpreted to convey only the\\nright to sue for “payment of benefits.” See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324\\n(Am. Law. Inst. 1981) (“It is essential to an assignment of a right that the obligee\\nmanifest an intention to transfer the right to another person without further action or\\nmanifestation of intention by the obligee.”); see also Sanctuary Surgical Ctr., Inc. v.\\nAetna Inc., 546 F. App’x 846, 851 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Assignment\\nagreements are generally interpreted narrowly. For that reason, the right to bring suit\\nunder 29 U.S.C. § 1132 cannot be assigned by ‘implication or by operation of law.’”\\n(citation omitted)).\\n\\n More important than general statements as to liberal or narrow constructions,\\nhowever, is the fact that our job is to interpret the express language of the assignment\\nin the context in which it was made. When Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\\ntheir rights to Air Evac, they did so in the context of facilitating payment for Air\\nEvac’s past provision of services. Thus, when Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\\n“all rights to (and related or associated with) any benefit claims” to Air Evac, its\\nseems clear, at a minimum, that they assigned Air Evac the right to recover benefits\\nunder § 1132(a)(1)(B). Given the context of the assignment, however, it does not\\nautomatically follow that such language also conveyed the right to sue for\\nreformation of plan terms and other equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). Indeed, the\\nassignment does not specifically mention the right to sue for equitable relief; rather\\nit limits the rights conveyed to those “related or associated with . . . benefit claims\\nand/or payments due from any third-party payor.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the\\nrights that are specifically mentioned—“the rights to pursue administrative claims,\\nrequest documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain payment”\\n(emphasis added)—all suggest that Air Evac sought assignment of ERISA rights\\n\\n -5-\\n\\frelated to obtaining payment, not equitable relief. Accordingly, we conclude that Air\\nEvac’s assignment does not convey the right to sue for equitable relief under\\n§ 1132(a)(3).\\n\\n The limited case law supports our conclusion. For example, in Spinedex\\nPhysical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of Arizona, Inc., the Ninth Circuit\\nconsidered whether an assignment conveyed the right to sue for breach of fiduciary\\nduty under § 1132(a)(2). 770 F.3d 1282, 1292 (9th Cir. 2014). According to the\\nNinth Circuit, the assignment “provided that the Plans would make payments directly\\nto Spinedex for services rendered.” Id. The assignment read that such payments\\nwould be considered\\n\\n payment toward the total charges for the professional services rendered.\\n THIS IS A DIRECT ASSIGNMENT OF MY RIGHTS AND\\n BENEFITS UNDER THIS POLICY. This payment, will not exceed my\\n indebtedness to the above mentioned assignee, and I have agreed to pay,\\n in a current manner, any balance of said professional service charges\\n over and above this insurance payment.\\n\\nId. The plaintiff argued that the word “benefits” referred to the right to payment and\\nthat the word “rights” referred to “rights to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty.”\\nId. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s argument was “divorced\\nfrom context” and that “[t]he entire focus of the Assignment [was] payment for\\nmedical services.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that “[t]he Assignment nowhere\\nindicate[d] that . . . patients were assigning to [plaintiff] rights to bring claims for\\nbreach of fiduciary duty.” Id. Similarly, in the present case, context suggests that the\\nfocus of the assignment is payment, and there is no indication that Arkansas Blue\\nplan members were assigning their right to bring claims for equitable relief.\\n\\n Air Evac points to several cases involving assignments that conveyed the right\\nto sue for equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). But in all of those cases, the breadth\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fof the assignments was not at issue and the courts’ analyses were largely conclusory.\\nMoreover, the assignments in those cases appear to have been broader than the\\nassignment in this case. See Grasso Entrs., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d\\n1033, 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding assignment “authorizing the pharmacy ‘to\\npursue any and all remedies to which [the beneficiaries] may be entitled, including\\nthe use of legal action in any court’” conveyed the right to sue under § 1132(a)(3))\\n(alteration in original) (emphasis added)); Podiatric OR of Midtown Manhattan, P.C.\\nv. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 15-3234(DSD/HB), 2016 WL 126362, at *1, *3–4 (D.\\nMinn. Jan. 11, 2016) (finding assignment of “all of [beneficiary’s] rights, claims, and\\nother interests—including the right to file an ERISA suit” conveyed the right to sue\\nunder § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)); Riverview Health Inst. v. UnitedHealth Grp.\\nInc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1034, 1036 (D. Minn. 2015) (finding assignment of “any\\ncauses of action against the Health Insurer or Insurers arising from [the beneficiary’s]\\ncontractual rights arising out of the procedure” conveyed the right to sue under\\n§ 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)), aff’d on another ground, Peterson ex rel. E v.\\nUnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 913 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.\\nMay, 30, 2019) (No. 18-1498). The assignment in this case is simply not as broad as\\nthe assignments in the cases cited by Air Evac.\\n\\n C. Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act\\n\\n The ADTPA makes it unlawful to, among other things, “[k]nowingly mak[e]\\na false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations,\\nsource, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.” Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 4-88-107(a)(1). The ADTPA also makes it unlawful to “[e]ngag[e] in any other\\nunconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade.”\\nId. § 4-88-107(a)(10). Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue violated the ADTPA in\\ntwo ways. First, as an assignee of Arkansas Blue plan members with plans not\\ngoverned by ERISA, Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue misled those plan members.\\nSpecifically, Air Evac argues that while Arkansas Blue did not provide any in-\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fnetwork coverage of air ambulance services, its plans indicated “Emergency or\\nImperative Care Services” provided by an out-of-network provider would always be\\nreimbursed as if they were provided by an in-network provider. According to Air\\nEvac, Arkansas Blue’s plans therefore led plan members to believe “they c[ould]\\navoid substantial out-of-pocket expense for emergency air ambulance transportation\\nwhen it [was], in fact, . . . impossible for them to do so.” Second, Air Evac alleges\\non its own behalf that Arkansas Blue engaged in the unconscionable practice of\\nrefusing to provide in-network coverage of air ambulance transportation. This\\npractice, Air Evac argues, allowed Arkansas Blue to accept Air Evac’s “valuable\\nservices,” while paying only “a small fraction of the value of those services,” thereby\\ncreating a windfall.\\n\\n The district court concluded Arkansas Blue’s conduct was not actionable\\nbecause it fell within the ADTPA’s safe harbor for “[a]ctions or transactions\\npermitted under laws administered by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017). In Arkansas, there are two approaches to\\napplying statutory safe harbors: the specific-conduct rule and the general-activity\\nrule. The specific-conduct rule “looks to whether state law permits or prohibits the\\nconduct at issue,” whereas the general-activity rule “looks to whether a state agency\\nregulates the conduct.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.3d\\n572, 574 (Ark. 2017). Prior to determining that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\\nADTPA’s safe harbor, the district court certified the following question to the\\nArkansas Supreme Court: “Should the ADTPA’s safe-harbor provision be applied\\naccording to the specific-conduct rule or the general-activity rule?” Id. at 573\\n(citation omitted). The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the specific-conduct rule,\\nholding that the ADTPA’s safe harbor protects only actions or transactions that “have\\nbeen specifically permitted or authorized under laws administered by a state or federal\\nregulatory body or officer.” Id. at 575–76. In light of that ruling from the Arkansas\\nSupreme Court, the district court determined that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\\nADTPA safe harbor because Air Evac’s claims were based on the terms and rates of\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fArkansas Blue’s insurance plans, which pursuant to Arkansas law, are “filed with and\\napproved by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-109(a)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n On appeal, Air Evac does not suggest that the Insurance Commissioner failed\\nto approve the terms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Rather, Air Evac\\nargues that the safe harbor does not apply because its claims are based on Arkansas\\nBlue’s “unfair and unconscionable” actions, which “have never been approved by the\\nInsurance Commissioner.” We reject Air Evac’s characterization of the basis for its\\nADTPA claims. The overall driving force behind Air Evac’s claims is the allegation\\nthat Arkansas Blue inadequately reimbursed air ambulance services and misled its\\nplan members about the nature of that reimbursement. But, the limits that Arkansas\\nBlue imposes on reimbursement for air ambulance services are expressly stated in\\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Indeed, as Air Evac notes in its Amended\\nComplaint, “[a] typical limit is $5,000, but some plans include limits of $1,000 or\\npossibly less.”3 Consequently, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are, in fact, based on the\\nterms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s plans. Thus, for the reasons discussed by the\\ndistrict court, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor\\nfor “[a]ctions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the Insurance\\nCommissioner.”4 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017).\\n\\n 3\\n For example, Arkansas Blue’s “Gold Plan” specifically states under “Benefits\\nand Specific Limitations In Your Plan,” that reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices “may not exceed $5,000 per trip.”\\n 4\\n Air Evac also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Advocate Health\\nCare Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) at least requires remand to\\ndetermine whether its “ADPTA claims on behalf of church-affiliated hospital self-\\nfunded plans can proceed.” According to Air Evac, such plans are now neither\\ngoverned by ERISA, see Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1656, nor subject to the Insurance\\nCommissioner’s approval, which means Air Evac’s ADTPA claims on behalf of\\npatients with such plans are not precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor. We do not\\nconsider this argument, however, because Air Evac failed to alert the district court to\\nthe significance of Stapleton, which was decided well before the district court issued\\n -9-\\n\\f D. Contract Law\\n\\n Air Evac seeks damages under contract law for breach of implied contract or,\\nin the alternative, unjust enrichment. The district court concluded that Air Evac did\\nnot plausibly allege either the existence of an implied contract or unjust enrichment.\\n\\n i. Implied Contract\\n\\n Under Arkansas law, implied contracts are “inferred from the acts of the\\nparties.” Steed v. Busby, 593 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Ark. 1980). Thus, they can be “proven\\nby circumstances showing the parties intended to contract or by circumstances\\nshowing the general course of dealing between the parties.” Id. The elements of an\\nimplied contract, however, are the same as an express contract. K.C. Props. of N.W.\\nArk., Inc. v. Lowell Inv. Partners, LLC, 280 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Ark. 2008). “[T]here must\\nbe: (a) competent parties; (b) subject matter; (c) legal consideration; (d) mutual\\nagreement; (e) mutual obligations.” Berry v. Cherokee Village Sewer, Inc., 155\\nS.W.3d 35, 38 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). The difference, therefore, between an express\\ncontract and an implied contract “is merely in the mode of manifesting assent and in\\nthe mode of proof.” K.C. Props., 280 S.W.3d at 13 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Air Evac alleges that its general course of dealing with Arkansas Blue\\nestablished an implied contract. Specifically, Air Evac argues that: (1) it routinely\\nprovides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan members; (2) Arkansas Blue\\n“routinely receives and pays claims for [those services]”; and (3) “[a]t all relevant\\n\\nits decision in 2018, and additional factual development would be required. See\\nUnited States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 751 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Ordinarily, we will not\\nconsider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. However, we may consider\\na newly raised argument ‘if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual\\ndevelopment, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.’” (citations omitted)).\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\ftimes, Arkansas Blue was fully aware of the rates charged by Air Evac.” Air Evac\\nfurther alleges that the implied contract is for “payment in full” because “Arkansas\\nBlue was fully aware that Air Evac expected to be paid its set rates when patients\\ncovered by Arkansas Blue’s plans required emergency air ambulance transport.”\\n\\n Even assuming that an implied contract existed, Air Evac alleges no facts to\\nsupport its assertion that such a contract was for payment in full. As Air Evac notes\\nin its Amended Complaint, Arkansas Blue has consistently refused to contract with\\nproviders of air ambulance services, meaning it does not provide the favorable\\nreimbursement associated with in-network coverage. Instead, Arkansas Blue’s\\ninsurance plans expressly limit reimbursement for air ambulance services, typically\\nto $5,000 per trip, though in some cases to $1,000 or less. Thus, Air Evac knew that\\nit was an out-of-network provider and that reimbursement for its services would be\\nlimited accordingly. See Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Aetna Life Ins.\\nCo., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding “it would have been\\nunreasonable for [a health care provider] to expect that [an insurer’s] authorization\\nconstituted a promise to pay 100 percent of billed charges” in light of the “standard\\npractice in the industry” and the fact that the provider knew it “would be paid at an\\nout-of-network” level). Consequently, Air Evac’s implied contract claim for payment\\nin full is not plausible on its face because any implied contract between Air Evac and\\nArkansas Blue would only be for the amount paid in their course of dealings—the\\namount stated in Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans.\\n\\n ii. Unjust Enrichment\\n\\n To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something\\n of value, to which he or she is not entitled and which he or she must\\n restore. There must also be some operative act, intent, or situation to\\n make the enrichment unjust and compensable. One who is free from\\n fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he or she has\\n chosen to exercise a legal or contractual right. In short, an action based\\n -11-\\n\\f on unjust enrichment is maintainable where a person has received\\n money or its equivalent under such circumstances that, in equity and\\n good conscience, he or she ought not to retain.\\n\\nCampbell v. Asbury Auto., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 (Ark. 2011) (citations omitted).\\n\\n Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue has been unjustly enriched because it has\\n“willingly accepted Air Evac’s valuable services,” yet “has paid Air Evac a small\\nfraction of the value of those services.” The unjust enrichment, according to Air\\nEvac, is the “windfall” that Arkansas Blue received “[b]y wrongfully withholding\\npayments to Air Evac . . . while at the same time retaining the amounts its members\\npaid for air ambulance services (through premium payments).” Air Evac alleges\\nunjust enrichment in the alternative to breach of implied contract because “[t]here can\\nbe no ‘unjust enrichment’ in contract cases.” Campbell, 381 S.W.3d at 36 (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n Arkansas Blue was not unjustly enriched because it was acting in accordance\\nwith its “contractual right[s].” Id. In return for their premium payments, Arkansas\\nBlue provided its plan members with health insurance, including the expressly limited\\nreimbursement for air ambulance services. Thus, as long as Arkansas Blue provided\\nthat limited reimbursement (and Air Evac does not allege otherwise), the premium\\npayments Arkansas Blue received in exchange did not constitute money that it “ought\\nnot to retain.” Id.; cf. 32nd Street Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Right Choice Managed Care,\\n820 F.3d 950, 957 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a health care provider’s claim of unjust\\nenrichment against health insurance companies because the insurers’ policies\\n“‘clearly intend[ed] to govern’ the amounts the insurers were obligated to pay on\\nbehalf of their insureds”). Consequently, Air Evac fails to state a claim of unjust\\nenrichment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f IV. Conclusion\\n\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419153/\", \"author_raw\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641900/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: AIR EVAC EMS, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. USABLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Doing Business as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2264\n ___________________________\n\n Air Evac EMS, Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\nUSAble Mutual Insurance Company, doing business as Arkansas Blue Cross and\n Blue Shield\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\n Filed: July 23, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Air Evac EMS, Inc. (“Air Evac”) asserts numerous claims against USAble\nMutual Insurance Company, d/b/a Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“Arkansas\nBlue”), regarding Arkansas Blue’s allegedly inadequate reimbursement for air\nambulance services that Air Evac provided to Arkansas Blue plan members. The\n\fdistrict court1 dismissed all of Air Evac’s claims for failure to state a claim under Fed.\nR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n Emergency air transport is expensive. Air Evac’s base rate for a single\ntransport in 2014 was $19,250. With a per mile charge of between $115 and $205,\nAir Evac’s average actual charge for air ambulance transportation in 2014 was over\n$30,000. Federal law requires Air Evac to provide its services without regard to a\npatient’s ability to pay, which means Air Evac relies heavily on government and\nprivate insurers for reimbursement. But most government and private insurers\nprovide only limited reimbursement for air ambulance services. For instance,\nArkansas Blue, as a matter of policy, does not contract with air ambulance providers,\nand therefore has no in-network providers of air ambulance services. Moreover,\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans typically limit reimbursement for air ambulance\nservices to $5,000 per trip, though in some cases reimbursement is limited to $1,000\nor less. Thus, when Air Evac provides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan\nmembers, it is regularly compensated less than it charges. According to the Amended\nComplaint, Air Evac has two options for making up such shortfalls: balance-bill the\nremaining cost to the plan member or appeal to Arkansas Blue. (To effectuate\nappeals, Air Evac obtains assignments from patients of their right to appeal coverage\ndecisions.) Neither option has proved very successful.\n\n Air Evac argues that Arkansas Blue’s limited reimbursement for air ambulance\nservices violates a number of federal and state laws, including laws that prohibit\nannual limits on “essential health benefits,” laws that mandate minimum payments\nfor certain emergency services, and laws that require adequate provider networks.\nThese laws do not provide a private cause of action, however, so Air Evac has chosen\n\n 1\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fto seek relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974\n(“ERISA”), the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”), and contract\nlaw. We address each set of claims in turn.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n A. Standard of Review\n\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.\n12(b)(6) de novo, “accept[ing] the well-pled allegations in the complaint as true and\ndraw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Meiners v. Wells Fargo\n& Co., 898 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2018). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to\nrelief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citation omitted).\n\n B. ERISA\n\n Under ERISA, Air Evac seeks equitable relief, namely an injunction and\nreformation of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plan terms “so that they do not include\nlimits on benefits for emergency air ambulance transportation.” The district court\nconcluded that Air Evac did not have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA.\n\n The primary remedy for challenging plan terms under ERISA is found in 29\nU.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That section permits suit by a participant or beneficiary “to\nrecover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the\nterms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the\nplan.” Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In addition to allowing suit for recovery of benefits,\nERISA allows suit for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2) and equitable relief\nunder § 1132(a)(3). Section 1132(a)(3) provides for suit “by a participant,\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision\n\n -3-\n\fof this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable\nrelief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter\nor the terms of the plan.”\n\n Thus, to have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA, a party must\neither be a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, or the assignee of a participant,\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary. Air Evac concedes that it is not a participant, beneficiary,\nor fiduciary. Air Evac argues, however, that it still has the right to sue Arkansas Blue\nfor equitable relief under ERISA because Arkansas Blue plan members with ERISA-\ngoverned plans have assigned it that right. Accordingly, we must determine whether\nAir Evac’s assignment actually conveys the right to sue for equitable relief.\n\n The relevant language from the assignment2 reads:\n\n [Patient] completely assigns to [Air Evac] all rights to (and related or\n associated with) any benefit claims and/or payments due from any third-\n party payor as reimbursement or payment for the Services, including but\n not limited to the rights to pursue administrative claims, request\n documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain\n payment.\n\nThe district court concluded that the assignment “only convey[ed] patients’ benefits\nand rights to bring related litigation in order to obtain payment” and that “[n]othing\n. . . appear[ed] to convey the right to sue for clarification or reformation of plan terms,\nwhich are extraordinary equitable remedies that extend far beyond litigation for\npayment on claims.”\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Air Evac’s assignment language has changed over the years. Before the\ndistrict court, Air Evac cited six versions of its assignment. On appeal, Air Evac only\ncites three versions, all of which are essentially identical.\n\n -4-\n\f On appeal, Air Evac argues that ERISA assignments should be liberally\nconstrued and, accordingly, the language regarding rights “related or associated with\n. . . benefit claims” should be interpreted to include the right to pursue equitable\nremedies. Arkansas Blue counters that ERISA assignments should be construed\nnarrowly and, accordingly, the assignment should be interpreted to convey only the\nright to sue for “payment of benefits.” See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324\n(Am. Law. Inst. 1981) (“It is essential to an assignment of a right that the obligee\nmanifest an intention to transfer the right to another person without further action or\nmanifestation of intention by the obligee.”); see also Sanctuary Surgical Ctr., Inc. v.\nAetna Inc., 546 F. App’x 846, 851 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Assignment\nagreements are generally interpreted narrowly. For that reason, the right to bring suit\nunder 29 U.S.C. § 1132 cannot be assigned by ‘implication or by operation of law.’”\n(citation omitted)).\n\n More important than general statements as to liberal or narrow constructions,\nhowever, is the fact that our job is to interpret the express language of the assignment\nin the context in which it was made. When Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\ntheir rights to Air Evac, they did so in the context of facilitating payment for Air\nEvac’s past provision of services. Thus, when Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\n“all rights to (and related or associated with) any benefit claims” to Air Evac, its\nseems clear, at a minimum, that they assigned Air Evac the right to recover benefits\nunder § 1132(a)(1)(B). Given the context of the assignment, however, it does not\nautomatically follow that such language also conveyed the right to sue for\nreformation of plan terms and other equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). Indeed, the\nassignment does not specifically mention the right to sue for equitable relief; rather\nit limits the rights conveyed to those “related or associated with . . . benefit claims\nand/or payments due from any third-party payor.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the\nrights that are specifically mentioned—“the rights to pursue administrative claims,\nrequest documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain payment”\n(emphasis added)—all suggest that Air Evac sought assignment of ERISA rights\n\n -5-\n\frelated to obtaining payment, not equitable relief. Accordingly, we conclude that Air\nEvac’s assignment does not convey the right to sue for equitable relief under\n§ 1132(a)(3).\n\n The limited case law supports our conclusion. For example, in Spinedex\nPhysical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of Arizona, Inc., the Ninth Circuit\nconsidered whether an assignment conveyed the right to sue for breach of fiduciary\nduty under § 1132(a)(2). 770 F.3d 1282, 1292 (9th Cir. 2014). According to the\nNinth Circuit, the assignment “provided that the Plans would make payments directly\nto Spinedex for services rendered.” Id. The assignment read that such payments\nwould be considered\n\n payment toward the total charges for the professional services rendered.\n THIS IS A DIRECT ASSIGNMENT OF MY RIGHTS AND\n BENEFITS UNDER THIS POLICY. This payment, will not exceed my\n indebtedness to the above mentioned assignee, and I have agreed to pay,\n in a current manner, any balance of said professional service charges\n over and above this insurance payment.\n\nId. The plaintiff argued that the word “benefits” referred to the right to payment and\nthat the word “rights” referred to “rights to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty.”\nId. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s argument was “divorced\nfrom context” and that “[t]he entire focus of the Assignment [was] payment for\nmedical services.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that “[t]he Assignment nowhere\nindicate[d] that . . . patients were assigning to [plaintiff] rights to bring claims for\nbreach of fiduciary duty.” Id. Similarly, in the present case, context suggests that the\nfocus of the assignment is payment, and there is no indication that Arkansas Blue\nplan members were assigning their right to bring claims for equitable relief.\n\n Air Evac points to several cases involving assignments that conveyed the right\nto sue for equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). But in all of those cases, the breadth\n\n -6-\n\fof the assignments was not at issue and the courts’ analyses were largely conclusory.\nMoreover, the assignments in those cases appear to have been broader than the\nassignment in this case. See Grasso Entrs., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d\n1033, 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding assignment “authorizing the pharmacy ‘to\npursue any and all remedies to which [the beneficiaries] may be entitled, including\nthe use of legal action in any court’” conveyed the right to sue under § 1132(a)(3))\n(alteration in original) (emphasis added)); Podiatric OR of Midtown Manhattan, P.C.\nv. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 15-3234(DSD/HB), 2016 WL 126362, at *1, *3–4 (D.\nMinn. Jan. 11, 2016) (finding assignment of “all of [beneficiary’s] rights, claims, and\nother interests—including the right to file an ERISA suit” conveyed the right to sue\nunder § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)); Riverview Health Inst. v. UnitedHealth Grp.\nInc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1034, 1036 (D. Minn. 2015) (finding assignment of “any\ncauses of action against the Health Insurer or Insurers arising from [the beneficiary’s]\ncontractual rights arising out of the procedure” conveyed the right to sue under\n§ 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)), aff’d on another ground, Peterson ex rel. E v.\nUnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 913 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.\nMay, 30, 2019) (No. 18-1498). The assignment in this case is simply not as broad as\nthe assignments in the cases cited by Air Evac.\n\n C. Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act\n\n The ADTPA makes it unlawful to, among other things, “[k]nowingly mak[e]\na false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations,\nsource, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.” Ark. Code Ann.\n§ 4-88-107(a)(1). The ADTPA also makes it unlawful to “[e]ngag[e] in any other\nunconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade.”\nId. § 4-88-107(a)(10). Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue violated the ADTPA in\ntwo ways. First, as an assignee of Arkansas Blue plan members with plans not\ngoverned by ERISA, Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue misled those plan members.\nSpecifically, Air Evac argues that while Arkansas Blue did not provide any in-\n\n -7-\n\fnetwork coverage of air ambulance services, its plans indicated “Emergency or\nImperative Care Services” provided by an out-of-network provider would always be\nreimbursed as if they were provided by an in-network provider. According to Air\nEvac, Arkansas Blue’s plans therefore led plan members to believe “they c[ould]\navoid substantial out-of-pocket expense for emergency air ambulance transportation\nwhen it [was], in fact, . . . impossible for them to do so.” Second, Air Evac alleges\non its own behalf that Arkansas Blue engaged in the unconscionable practice of\nrefusing to provide in-network coverage of air ambulance transportation. This\npractice, Air Evac argues, allowed Arkansas Blue to accept Air Evac’s “valuable\nservices,” while paying only “a small fraction of the value of those services,” thereby\ncreating a windfall.\n\n The district court concluded Arkansas Blue’s conduct was not actionable\nbecause it fell within the ADTPA’s safe harbor for “[a]ctions or transactions\npermitted under laws administered by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann.\n§ 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017). In Arkansas, there are two approaches to\napplying statutory safe harbors: the specific-conduct rule and the general-activity\nrule. The specific-conduct rule “looks to whether state law permits or prohibits the\nconduct at issue,” whereas the general-activity rule “looks to whether a state agency\nregulates the conduct.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.3d\n572, 574 (Ark. 2017). Prior to determining that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\nADTPA’s safe harbor, the district court certified the following question to the\nArkansas Supreme Court: “Should the ADTPA’s safe-harbor provision be applied\naccording to the specific-conduct rule or the general-activity rule?” Id. at 573\n(citation omitted). The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the specific-conduct rule,\nholding that the ADTPA’s safe harbor protects only actions or transactions that “have\nbeen specifically permitted or authorized under laws administered by a state or federal\nregulatory body or officer.” Id. at 575–76. In light of that ruling from the Arkansas\nSupreme Court, the district court determined that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\nADTPA safe harbor because Air Evac’s claims were based on the terms and rates of\n\n -8-\n\fArkansas Blue’s insurance plans, which pursuant to Arkansas law, are “filed with and\napproved by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-109(a)(1)(A)(i).\n\n On appeal, Air Evac does not suggest that the Insurance Commissioner failed\nto approve the terms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Rather, Air Evac\nargues that the safe harbor does not apply because its claims are based on Arkansas\nBlue’s “unfair and unconscionable” actions, which “have never been approved by the\nInsurance Commissioner.” We reject Air Evac’s characterization of the basis for its\nADTPA claims. The overall driving force behind Air Evac’s claims is the allegation\nthat Arkansas Blue inadequately reimbursed air ambulance services and misled its\nplan members about the nature of that reimbursement. But, the limits that Arkansas\nBlue imposes on reimbursement for air ambulance services are expressly stated in\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Indeed, as Air Evac notes in its Amended\nComplaint, “[a] typical limit is $5,000, but some plans include limits of $1,000 or\npossibly less.”3 Consequently, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are, in fact, based on the\nterms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s plans. Thus, for the reasons discussed by the\ndistrict court, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor\nfor “[a]ctions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the Insurance\nCommissioner.”4 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017).\n\n 3\n For example, Arkansas Blue’s “Gold Plan” specifically states under “Benefits\nand Specific Limitations In Your Plan,” that reimbursement for air ambulance\nservices “may not exceed $5,000 per trip.”\n 4\n Air Evac also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Advocate Health\nCare Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) at least requires remand to\ndetermine whether its “ADPTA claims on behalf of church-affiliated hospital self-\nfunded plans can proceed.” According to Air Evac, such plans are now neither\ngoverned by ERISA, see Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1656, nor subject to the Insurance\nCommissioner’s approval, which means Air Evac’s ADTPA claims on behalf of\npatients with such plans are not precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor. We do not\nconsider this argument, however, because Air Evac failed to alert the district court to\nthe significance of Stapleton, which was decided well before the district court issued\n -9-\n\f D. Contract Law\n\n Air Evac seeks damages under contract law for breach of implied contract or,\nin the alternative, unjust enrichment. The district court concluded that Air Evac did\nnot plausibly allege either the existence of an implied contract or unjust enrichment.\n\n i. Implied Contract\n\n Under Arkansas law, implied contracts are “inferred from the acts of the\nparties.” Steed v. Busby, 593 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Ark. 1980). Thus, they can be “proven\nby circumstances showing the parties intended to contract or by circumstances\nshowing the general course of dealing between the parties.” Id. The elements of an\nimplied contract, however, are the same as an express contract. K.C. Props. of N.W.\nArk., Inc. v. Lowell Inv. Partners, LLC, 280 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Ark. 2008). “[T]here must\nbe: (a) competent parties; (b) subject matter; (c) legal consideration; (d) mutual\nagreement; (e) mutual obligations.” Berry v. Cherokee Village Sewer, Inc., 155\nS.W.3d 35, 38 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). The difference, therefore, between an express\ncontract and an implied contract “is merely in the mode of manifesting assent and in\nthe mode of proof.” K.C. Props., 280 S.W.3d at 13 (citation omitted).\n\n Air Evac alleges that its general course of dealing with Arkansas Blue\nestablished an implied contract. Specifically, Air Evac argues that: (1) it routinely\nprovides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan members; (2) Arkansas Blue\n“routinely receives and pays claims for [those services]”; and (3) “[a]t all relevant\n\nits decision in 2018, and additional factual development would be required. See\nUnited States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 751 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Ordinarily, we will not\nconsider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. However, we may consider\na newly raised argument ‘if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual\ndevelopment, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.’” (citations omitted)).\n\n\n -10-\n\ftimes, Arkansas Blue was fully aware of the rates charged by Air Evac.” Air Evac\nfurther alleges that the implied contract is for “payment in full” because “Arkansas\nBlue was fully aware that Air Evac expected to be paid its set rates when patients\ncovered by Arkansas Blue’s plans required emergency air ambulance transport.”\n\n Even assuming that an implied contract existed, Air Evac alleges no facts to\nsupport its assertion that such a contract was for payment in full. As Air Evac notes\nin its Amended Complaint, Arkansas Blue has consistently refused to contract with\nproviders of air ambulance services, meaning it does not provide the favorable\nreimbursement associated with in-network coverage. Instead, Arkansas Blue’s\ninsurance plans expressly limit reimbursement for air ambulance services, typically\nto $5,000 per trip, though in some cases to $1,000 or less. Thus, Air Evac knew that\nit was an out-of-network provider and that reimbursement for its services would be\nlimited accordingly. See Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Aetna Life Ins.\nCo., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding “it would have been\nunreasonable for [a health care provider] to expect that [an insurer’s] authorization\nconstituted a promise to pay 100 percent of billed charges” in light of the “standard\npractice in the industry” and the fact that the provider knew it “would be paid at an\nout-of-network” level). Consequently, Air Evac’s implied contract claim for payment\nin full is not plausible on its face because any implied contract between Air Evac and\nArkansas Blue would only be for the amount paid in their course of dealings—the\namount stated in Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans.\n\n ii. Unjust Enrichment\n\n To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something\n of value, to which he or she is not entitled and which he or she must\n restore. There must also be some operative act, intent, or situation to\n make the enrichment unjust and compensable. One who is free from\n fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he or she has\n chosen to exercise a legal or contractual right. In short, an action based\n -11-\n\f on unjust enrichment is maintainable where a person has received\n money or its equivalent under such circumstances that, in equity and\n good conscience, he or she ought not to retain.\n\nCampbell v. Asbury Auto., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 (Ark. 2011) (citations omitted).\n\n Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue has been unjustly enriched because it has\n“willingly accepted Air Evac’s valuable services,” yet “has paid Air Evac a small\nfraction of the value of those services.” The unjust enrichment, according to Air\nEvac, is the “windfall” that Arkansas Blue received “[b]y wrongfully withholding\npayments to Air Evac . . . while at the same time retaining the amounts its members\npaid for air ambulance services (through premium payments).” Air Evac alleges\nunjust enrichment in the alternative to breach of implied contract because “[t]here can\nbe no ‘unjust enrichment’ in contract cases.” Campbell, 381 S.W.3d at 36 (citation\nomitted).\n\n Arkansas Blue was not unjustly enriched because it was acting in accordance\nwith its “contractual right[s].” Id. In return for their premium payments, Arkansas\nBlue provided its plan members with health insurance, including the expressly limited\nreimbursement for air ambulance services. Thus, as long as Arkansas Blue provided\nthat limited reimbursement (and Air Evac does not allege otherwise), the premium\npayments Arkansas Blue received in exchange did not constitute money that it “ought\nnot to retain.” Id.; cf. 32nd Street Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Right Choice Managed Care,\n820 F.3d 950, 957 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a health care provider’s claim of unjust\nenrichment against health insurance companies because the insurers’ policies\n“‘clearly intend[ed] to govern’ the amounts the insurers were obligated to pay on\nbehalf of their insureds”). Consequently, Air Evac fails to state a claim of unjust\nenrichment.\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n\f IV. Conclusion\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -13-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: AIR EVAC EMS, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. USABLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Doing Business as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2264\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Air Evac EMS, Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUSAble Mutual Insurance Company, doing business as Arkansas Blue Cross and\\n Blue Shield\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 23, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Air Evac EMS, Inc. (“Air Evac”) asserts numerous claims against USAble\\nMutual Insurance Company, d/b/a Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“Arkansas\\nBlue”), regarding Arkansas Blue’s allegedly inadequate reimbursement for air\\nambulance services that Air Evac provided to Arkansas Blue plan members. The\\n\\fdistrict court1 dismissed all of Air Evac’s claims for failure to state a claim under Fed.\\nR. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Emergency air transport is expensive. Air Evac’s base rate for a single\\ntransport in 2014 was $19,250. With a per mile charge of between $115 and $205,\\nAir Evac’s average actual charge for air ambulance transportation in 2014 was over\\n$30,000. Federal law requires Air Evac to provide its services without regard to a\\npatient’s ability to pay, which means Air Evac relies heavily on government and\\nprivate insurers for reimbursement. But most government and private insurers\\nprovide only limited reimbursement for air ambulance services. For instance,\\nArkansas Blue, as a matter of policy, does not contract with air ambulance providers,\\nand therefore has no in-network providers of air ambulance services. Moreover,\\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans typically limit reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices to $5,000 per trip, though in some cases reimbursement is limited to $1,000\\nor less. Thus, when Air Evac provides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan\\nmembers, it is regularly compensated less than it charges. According to the Amended\\nComplaint, Air Evac has two options for making up such shortfalls: balance-bill the\\nremaining cost to the plan member or appeal to Arkansas Blue. (To effectuate\\nappeals, Air Evac obtains assignments from patients of their right to appeal coverage\\ndecisions.) Neither option has proved very successful.\\n\\n Air Evac argues that Arkansas Blue’s limited reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices violates a number of federal and state laws, including laws that prohibit\\nannual limits on “essential health benefits,” laws that mandate minimum payments\\nfor certain emergency services, and laws that require adequate provider networks.\\nThese laws do not provide a private cause of action, however, so Air Evac has chosen\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for\\nthe Eastern District of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fto seek relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974\\n(“ERISA”), the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”), and contract\\nlaw. We address each set of claims in turn.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review\\n\\n We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n12(b)(6) de novo, “accept[ing] the well-pled allegations in the complaint as true and\\ndraw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Meiners v. Wells Fargo\\n& Co., 898 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2018). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a\\ncomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to\\nrelief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n B. ERISA\\n\\n Under ERISA, Air Evac seeks equitable relief, namely an injunction and\\nreformation of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plan terms “so that they do not include\\nlimits on benefits for emergency air ambulance transportation.” The district court\\nconcluded that Air Evac did not have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA.\\n\\n The primary remedy for challenging plan terms under ERISA is found in 29\\nU.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That section permits suit by a participant or beneficiary “to\\nrecover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the\\nterms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the\\nplan.” Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In addition to allowing suit for recovery of benefits,\\nERISA allows suit for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2) and equitable relief\\nunder § 1132(a)(3). Section 1132(a)(3) provides for suit “by a participant,\\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable\\nrelief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter\\nor the terms of the plan.”\\n\\n Thus, to have the right to seek equitable relief under ERISA, a party must\\neither be a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, or the assignee of a participant,\\nbeneficiary, or fiduciary. Air Evac concedes that it is not a participant, beneficiary,\\nor fiduciary. Air Evac argues, however, that it still has the right to sue Arkansas Blue\\nfor equitable relief under ERISA because Arkansas Blue plan members with ERISA-\\ngoverned plans have assigned it that right. Accordingly, we must determine whether\\nAir Evac’s assignment actually conveys the right to sue for equitable relief.\\n\\n The relevant language from the assignment2 reads:\\n\\n [Patient] completely assigns to [Air Evac] all rights to (and related or\\n associated with) any benefit claims and/or payments due from any third-\\n party payor as reimbursement or payment for the Services, including but\\n not limited to the rights to pursue administrative claims, request\\n documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain\\n payment.\\n\\nThe district court concluded that the assignment “only convey[ed] patients’ benefits\\nand rights to bring related litigation in order to obtain payment” and that “[n]othing\\n. . . appear[ed] to convey the right to sue for clarification or reformation of plan terms,\\nwhich are extraordinary equitable remedies that extend far beyond litigation for\\npayment on claims.”\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Air Evac’s assignment language has changed over the years. Before the\\ndistrict court, Air Evac cited six versions of its assignment. On appeal, Air Evac only\\ncites three versions, all of which are essentially identical.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f On appeal, Air Evac argues that ERISA assignments should be liberally\\nconstrued and, accordingly, the language regarding rights “related or associated with\\n. . . benefit claims” should be interpreted to include the right to pursue equitable\\nremedies. Arkansas Blue counters that ERISA assignments should be construed\\nnarrowly and, accordingly, the assignment should be interpreted to convey only the\\nright to sue for “payment of benefits.” See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324\\n(Am. Law. Inst. 1981) (“It is essential to an assignment of a right that the obligee\\nmanifest an intention to transfer the right to another person without further action or\\nmanifestation of intention by the obligee.”); see also Sanctuary Surgical Ctr., Inc. v.\\nAetna Inc., 546 F. App’x 846, 851 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Assignment\\nagreements are generally interpreted narrowly. For that reason, the right to bring suit\\nunder 29 U.S.C. § 1132 cannot be assigned by ‘implication or by operation of law.’”\\n(citation omitted)).\\n\\n More important than general statements as to liberal or narrow constructions,\\nhowever, is the fact that our job is to interpret the express language of the assignment\\nin the context in which it was made. When Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\\ntheir rights to Air Evac, they did so in the context of facilitating payment for Air\\nEvac’s past provision of services. Thus, when Arkansas Blue plan members assigned\\n“all rights to (and related or associated with) any benefit claims” to Air Evac, its\\nseems clear, at a minimum, that they assigned Air Evac the right to recover benefits\\nunder § 1132(a)(1)(B). Given the context of the assignment, however, it does not\\nautomatically follow that such language also conveyed the right to sue for\\nreformation of plan terms and other equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). Indeed, the\\nassignment does not specifically mention the right to sue for equitable relief; rather\\nit limits the rights conveyed to those “related or associated with . . . benefit claims\\nand/or payments due from any third-party payor.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the\\nrights that are specifically mentioned—“the rights to pursue administrative claims,\\nrequest documents, receive payment and pursue litigation in order to obtain payment”\\n(emphasis added)—all suggest that Air Evac sought assignment of ERISA rights\\n\\n -5-\\n\\frelated to obtaining payment, not equitable relief. Accordingly, we conclude that Air\\nEvac’s assignment does not convey the right to sue for equitable relief under\\n§ 1132(a)(3).\\n\\n The limited case law supports our conclusion. For example, in Spinedex\\nPhysical Therapy USA Inc. v. United Healthcare of Arizona, Inc., the Ninth Circuit\\nconsidered whether an assignment conveyed the right to sue for breach of fiduciary\\nduty under § 1132(a)(2). 770 F.3d 1282, 1292 (9th Cir. 2014). According to the\\nNinth Circuit, the assignment “provided that the Plans would make payments directly\\nto Spinedex for services rendered.” Id. The assignment read that such payments\\nwould be considered\\n\\n payment toward the total charges for the professional services rendered.\\n THIS IS A DIRECT ASSIGNMENT OF MY RIGHTS AND\\n BENEFITS UNDER THIS POLICY. This payment, will not exceed my\\n indebtedness to the above mentioned assignee, and I have agreed to pay,\\n in a current manner, any balance of said professional service charges\\n over and above this insurance payment.\\n\\nId. The plaintiff argued that the word “benefits” referred to the right to payment and\\nthat the word “rights” referred to “rights to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty.”\\nId. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s argument was “divorced\\nfrom context” and that “[t]he entire focus of the Assignment [was] payment for\\nmedical services.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that “[t]he Assignment nowhere\\nindicate[d] that . . . patients were assigning to [plaintiff] rights to bring claims for\\nbreach of fiduciary duty.” Id. Similarly, in the present case, context suggests that the\\nfocus of the assignment is payment, and there is no indication that Arkansas Blue\\nplan members were assigning their right to bring claims for equitable relief.\\n\\n Air Evac points to several cases involving assignments that conveyed the right\\nto sue for equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3). But in all of those cases, the breadth\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fof the assignments was not at issue and the courts’ analyses were largely conclusory.\\nMoreover, the assignments in those cases appear to have been broader than the\\nassignment in this case. See Grasso Entrs., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d\\n1033, 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding assignment “authorizing the pharmacy ‘to\\npursue any and all remedies to which [the beneficiaries] may be entitled, including\\nthe use of legal action in any court’” conveyed the right to sue under § 1132(a)(3))\\n(alteration in original) (emphasis added)); Podiatric OR of Midtown Manhattan, P.C.\\nv. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 15-3234(DSD/HB), 2016 WL 126362, at *1, *3–4 (D.\\nMinn. Jan. 11, 2016) (finding assignment of “all of [beneficiary’s] rights, claims, and\\nother interests—including the right to file an ERISA suit” conveyed the right to sue\\nunder § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)); Riverview Health Inst. v. UnitedHealth Grp.\\nInc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1034, 1036 (D. Minn. 2015) (finding assignment of “any\\ncauses of action against the Health Insurer or Insurers arising from [the beneficiary’s]\\ncontractual rights arising out of the procedure” conveyed the right to sue under\\n§ 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added)), aff’d on another ground, Peterson ex rel. E v.\\nUnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 913 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S.\\nMay, 30, 2019) (No. 18-1498). The assignment in this case is simply not as broad as\\nthe assignments in the cases cited by Air Evac.\\n\\n C. Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act\\n\\n The ADTPA makes it unlawful to, among other things, “[k]nowingly mak[e]\\na false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations,\\nsource, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.” Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 4-88-107(a)(1). The ADTPA also makes it unlawful to “[e]ngag[e] in any other\\nunconscionable, false, or deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade.”\\nId. § 4-88-107(a)(10). Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue violated the ADTPA in\\ntwo ways. First, as an assignee of Arkansas Blue plan members with plans not\\ngoverned by ERISA, Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue misled those plan members.\\nSpecifically, Air Evac argues that while Arkansas Blue did not provide any in-\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fnetwork coverage of air ambulance services, its plans indicated “Emergency or\\nImperative Care Services” provided by an out-of-network provider would always be\\nreimbursed as if they were provided by an in-network provider. According to Air\\nEvac, Arkansas Blue’s plans therefore led plan members to believe “they c[ould]\\navoid substantial out-of-pocket expense for emergency air ambulance transportation\\nwhen it [was], in fact, . . . impossible for them to do so.” Second, Air Evac alleges\\non its own behalf that Arkansas Blue engaged in the unconscionable practice of\\nrefusing to provide in-network coverage of air ambulance transportation. This\\npractice, Air Evac argues, allowed Arkansas Blue to accept Air Evac’s “valuable\\nservices,” while paying only “a small fraction of the value of those services,” thereby\\ncreating a windfall.\\n\\n The district court concluded Arkansas Blue’s conduct was not actionable\\nbecause it fell within the ADTPA’s safe harbor for “[a]ctions or transactions\\npermitted under laws administered by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017). In Arkansas, there are two approaches to\\napplying statutory safe harbors: the specific-conduct rule and the general-activity\\nrule. The specific-conduct rule “looks to whether state law permits or prohibits the\\nconduct at issue,” whereas the general-activity rule “looks to whether a state agency\\nregulates the conduct.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. USAble Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.3d\\n572, 574 (Ark. 2017). Prior to determining that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\\nADTPA’s safe harbor, the district court certified the following question to the\\nArkansas Supreme Court: “Should the ADTPA’s safe-harbor provision be applied\\naccording to the specific-conduct rule or the general-activity rule?” Id. at 573\\n(citation omitted). The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the specific-conduct rule,\\nholding that the ADTPA’s safe harbor protects only actions or transactions that “have\\nbeen specifically permitted or authorized under laws administered by a state or federal\\nregulatory body or officer.” Id. at 575–76. In light of that ruling from the Arkansas\\nSupreme Court, the district court determined that Arkansas Blue qualified for the\\nADTPA safe harbor because Air Evac’s claims were based on the terms and rates of\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fArkansas Blue’s insurance plans, which pursuant to Arkansas law, are “filed with and\\napproved by the Insurance Commissioner.” Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-109(a)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n On appeal, Air Evac does not suggest that the Insurance Commissioner failed\\nto approve the terms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Rather, Air Evac\\nargues that the safe harbor does not apply because its claims are based on Arkansas\\nBlue’s “unfair and unconscionable” actions, which “have never been approved by the\\nInsurance Commissioner.” We reject Air Evac’s characterization of the basis for its\\nADTPA claims. The overall driving force behind Air Evac’s claims is the allegation\\nthat Arkansas Blue inadequately reimbursed air ambulance services and misled its\\nplan members about the nature of that reimbursement. But, the limits that Arkansas\\nBlue imposes on reimbursement for air ambulance services are expressly stated in\\nArkansas Blue’s insurance plans. Indeed, as Air Evac notes in its Amended\\nComplaint, “[a] typical limit is $5,000, but some plans include limits of $1,000 or\\npossibly less.”3 Consequently, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are, in fact, based on the\\nterms and rates of Arkansas Blue’s plans. Thus, for the reasons discussed by the\\ndistrict court, Air Evac’s ADTPA claims are precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor\\nfor “[a]ctions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the Insurance\\nCommissioner.”4 Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101(3) (2016) (amended 2017).\\n\\n 3\\n For example, Arkansas Blue’s “Gold Plan” specifically states under “Benefits\\nand Specific Limitations In Your Plan,” that reimbursement for air ambulance\\nservices “may not exceed $5,000 per trip.”\\n 4\\n Air Evac also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Advocate Health\\nCare Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) at least requires remand to\\ndetermine whether its “ADPTA claims on behalf of church-affiliated hospital self-\\nfunded plans can proceed.” According to Air Evac, such plans are now neither\\ngoverned by ERISA, see Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1656, nor subject to the Insurance\\nCommissioner’s approval, which means Air Evac’s ADTPA claims on behalf of\\npatients with such plans are not precluded by the ADTPA’s safe harbor. We do not\\nconsider this argument, however, because Air Evac failed to alert the district court to\\nthe significance of Stapleton, which was decided well before the district court issued\\n -9-\\n\\f D. Contract Law\\n\\n Air Evac seeks damages under contract law for breach of implied contract or,\\nin the alternative, unjust enrichment. The district court concluded that Air Evac did\\nnot plausibly allege either the existence of an implied contract or unjust enrichment.\\n\\n i. Implied Contract\\n\\n Under Arkansas law, implied contracts are “inferred from the acts of the\\nparties.” Steed v. Busby, 593 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Ark. 1980). Thus, they can be “proven\\nby circumstances showing the parties intended to contract or by circumstances\\nshowing the general course of dealing between the parties.” Id. The elements of an\\nimplied contract, however, are the same as an express contract. K.C. Props. of N.W.\\nArk., Inc. v. Lowell Inv. Partners, LLC, 280 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Ark. 2008). “[T]here must\\nbe: (a) competent parties; (b) subject matter; (c) legal consideration; (d) mutual\\nagreement; (e) mutual obligations.” Berry v. Cherokee Village Sewer, Inc., 155\\nS.W.3d 35, 38 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004). The difference, therefore, between an express\\ncontract and an implied contract “is merely in the mode of manifesting assent and in\\nthe mode of proof.” K.C. Props., 280 S.W.3d at 13 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Air Evac alleges that its general course of dealing with Arkansas Blue\\nestablished an implied contract. Specifically, Air Evac argues that: (1) it routinely\\nprovides air ambulance services to Arkansas Blue plan members; (2) Arkansas Blue\\n“routinely receives and pays claims for [those services]”; and (3) “[a]t all relevant\\n\\nits decision in 2018, and additional factual development would be required. See\\nUnited States v. Hirani, 824 F.3d 741, 751 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Ordinarily, we will not\\nconsider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. However, we may consider\\na newly raised argument ‘if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual\\ndevelopment, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.’” (citations omitted)).\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\ftimes, Arkansas Blue was fully aware of the rates charged by Air Evac.” Air Evac\\nfurther alleges that the implied contract is for “payment in full” because “Arkansas\\nBlue was fully aware that Air Evac expected to be paid its set rates when patients\\ncovered by Arkansas Blue’s plans required emergency air ambulance transport.”\\n\\n Even assuming that an implied contract existed, Air Evac alleges no facts to\\nsupport its assertion that such a contract was for payment in full. As Air Evac notes\\nin its Amended Complaint, Arkansas Blue has consistently refused to contract with\\nproviders of air ambulance services, meaning it does not provide the favorable\\nreimbursement associated with in-network coverage. Instead, Arkansas Blue’s\\ninsurance plans expressly limit reimbursement for air ambulance services, typically\\nto $5,000 per trip, though in some cases to $1,000 or less. Thus, Air Evac knew that\\nit was an out-of-network provider and that reimbursement for its services would be\\nlimited accordingly. See Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula v. Aetna Life Ins.\\nCo., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding “it would have been\\nunreasonable for [a health care provider] to expect that [an insurer’s] authorization\\nconstituted a promise to pay 100 percent of billed charges” in light of the “standard\\npractice in the industry” and the fact that the provider knew it “would be paid at an\\nout-of-network” level). Consequently, Air Evac’s implied contract claim for payment\\nin full is not plausible on its face because any implied contract between Air Evac and\\nArkansas Blue would only be for the amount paid in their course of dealings—the\\namount stated in Arkansas Blue’s insurance plans.\\n\\n ii. Unjust Enrichment\\n\\n To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something\\n of value, to which he or she is not entitled and which he or she must\\n restore. There must also be some operative act, intent, or situation to\\n make the enrichment unjust and compensable. One who is free from\\n fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he or she has\\n chosen to exercise a legal or contractual right. In short, an action based\\n -11-\\n\\f on unjust enrichment is maintainable where a person has received\\n money or its equivalent under such circumstances that, in equity and\\n good conscience, he or she ought not to retain.\\n\\nCampbell v. Asbury Auto., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 (Ark. 2011) (citations omitted).\\n\\n Air Evac alleges that Arkansas Blue has been unjustly enriched because it has\\n“willingly accepted Air Evac’s valuable services,” yet “has paid Air Evac a small\\nfraction of the value of those services.” The unjust enrichment, according to Air\\nEvac, is the “windfall” that Arkansas Blue received “[b]y wrongfully withholding\\npayments to Air Evac . . . while at the same time retaining the amounts its members\\npaid for air ambulance services (through premium payments).” Air Evac alleges\\nunjust enrichment in the alternative to breach of implied contract because “[t]here can\\nbe no ‘unjust enrichment’ in contract cases.” Campbell, 381 S.W.3d at 36 (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n Arkansas Blue was not unjustly enriched because it was acting in accordance\\nwith its “contractual right[s].” Id. In return for their premium payments, Arkansas\\nBlue provided its plan members with health insurance, including the expressly limited\\nreimbursement for air ambulance services. Thus, as long as Arkansas Blue provided\\nthat limited reimbursement (and Air Evac does not allege otherwise), the premium\\npayments Arkansas Blue received in exchange did not constitute money that it “ought\\nnot to retain.” Id.; cf. 32nd Street Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Right Choice Managed Care,\\n820 F.3d 950, 957 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a health care provider’s claim of unjust\\nenrichment against health insurance companies because the insurers’ policies\\n“‘clearly intend[ed] to govern’ the amounts the insurers were obligated to pay on\\nbehalf of their insureds”). Consequently, Air Evac fails to state a claim of unjust\\nenrichment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f IV. Conclusion\\n\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3282,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642280,"string":"4,642,280"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Jon D. HIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jon Higgins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1902"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Melloy, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1902\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jon D. Higgins\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Union Pacific Railroad Co.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jon Higgins has chronic back pain. He asked his employer, Union Pacific\\nRailroad (“Union Pacific”), to accommodate his back pain by allowing him to take\\ntime off “as necessary” and receive “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).”\\nUnion Pacific denied his request. Higgins then sued Union Pacific for, among other\\nthings, disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the Americans with\\n\\fDisabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of\\nUnion Pacific. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Higgins began working for Union Pacific in 1976 as a Locomotive Engineer.\\nHe was based out of North Platte, Nebraska, and typically worked on trains routed\\nfrom North Platte to Council Bluffs, Iowa. Higgins’s responsibilities included\\nregulating the speed of the trains and ensuring compliance with safety protocols.\\nBetween 1989 and 1992, Higgins suffered two spine-related injuries while\\nperforming his job responsibilities. In 1992, Higgins entered into a settlement\\nagreement with Union Pacific in which he released his personal injury claims against\\nUnion Pacific in exchange for payment and “the right to lay off whenever his back\\nbother[ed] him.”2\\n\\n On March 12, 1992, Dr. Brittan, Higgins’s physician at the time, wrote a letter\\nto Union Pacific stating that Higgins was cleared to work “with the only restriction\\nbeing that he should not go out more often than every 24 hours.” On June 29, 1992,\\nUnion Pacific’s Assistant Medical Director, Dr. Richard Peters, wrote to Union\\nPacific’s Superintendent, John Holm that “[t]he medical director’s office supports the\\nrestriction that on occasion Jon Higgins should not go out on a job assignment more\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, then Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the District of Nebraska.\\n 2\\n Higgins no longer has a copy of the settlement agreement. Union Pacific\\ntherefore claims that any discussion of the agreement’s terms is “speculative.” An\\nemail from a Union Pacific manager in 1998, however, indicates that such an\\nagreement existed and one of its terms was that Higgins could lay off whenever his\\nback bothered him. The email states: “This individual has been given t[he] right to\\nlay off whenever his back bothers him . . . as part of a settlement to a law suit\\ninvolving a personal injury.”\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthan once every 24 hours.” On April 7, 1993, Union Pacific’s new Superintendent,\\nM.E. Ring, wrote a letter to Higgins stating, “[t]his letter serves as an\\nacknowledgment of the agreement between you and former Superintendent[,] . . .\\nJohn Holm, with regard to allowable lay-offs.” Ring further wrote that while “I have\\nno problem with you laying off when medically necessary[,] . . . lost work periods\\nwill be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way exempt you from\\ndiscipline if abused.”\\n\\n Several years later, on January 25, 1999, Dr. Brittan wrote another letter to\\nUnion Pacific confirming that Higgins’s work restrictions were still necessary. The\\nletter stated, “Mr. Higgins has a long standing back injury and his restrictions . . .\\nhave been permanent up till now. As far as I know, nothing has changed medically\\nthat would require those restrictions to be changed . . . .” On October 26, 1999,\\nUnion Pacific agreed that Higgins would continue “not [to] be disciplined as the\\nresult of him being absent from service.”\\n\\n In 2004, Michael Humpherys started as Union Pacific’s Manager of Training\\nand Attendance for the North Platte Service Unit. Her job focused on improving job\\nattendance. According to Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description,\\n“[a]ttendance in compliance with the applicable attendance policy is an essential\\nfunction of [the] position.” Union Pacific’s Attendance Policy states that Union\\nPacific employees are expected to work “on a full-time basis,” which means “being\\navailable to work your assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” While the\\npolicy allows employees to lay off for “personal or family issues,” documentation “is\\nexpected” and employees can be held in violation of the policy “regardless of the\\nexplanation offered if [they] are unable to work full time and protect all employment\\nobligations.”\\n\\n One way for Union Pacific to improve attendance was to reduce “lay-offs.”\\nUnion Pacific’s Locomotive Engineers are assigned to “pool turns,” which are groups\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof engineers that work on predetermined train routes. Each time a train is ready for\\ndeparture, the Locomotive Engineer scheduled to work receives an automated call\\nasking whether the engineer wants to accept the shift or “lay off.” If the engineer\\ndecides to lay off, he must provide an explanation. In the event of a lay-off, Union\\nPacific turns to the “extra board,” a group of engineers who fill short-notice\\nvacancies. If none of those engineers can take the shift, the next engineer in the pool\\nturn is called.\\n\\n To reduce lay-offs, Humpherys collected attendance data to identify poor\\nperformers. Higgins, who had a high number of lay-offs due to his chronic back pain,\\nquickly drew Humpherys’s attention. In October 2004, Humpherys called Higgins’s\\nattendance “[v]ery borderline.” In October 2005, Humpherys found that Higgins\\nranked last in attendance among his pool turn. In 2007, Humpherys noted that\\nHiggins had been listed on five different “snapshots” (monthly attendance reports)\\nas an employee with poor attendance. In 2008, Humpherys sent a letter to Higgins\\nstating that Higgins’s “recent level of job protection [was] unsatisfactory and must\\nbe improved,” and that “further failure . . . w[ould] subject [him] to disciplinary\\naction.” Several other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers received a similar letter.\\nIn 2010, 2011, and 2012, Humpherys continued to monitor Higgins’s poor attendance\\nand noted that Higgins appeared on several snapshots each year. In both 2012 and\\n2013, Higgins laid off 24% of the shifts that he was called to work.\\n\\n Around 2013 or 2014, Union Pacific began experiencing a manpower shortage\\nin North Platte due to increasing business. Consequently, John Alberry, Union\\nPacific’s Director of Road Operations, directed Humpherys to “start holding people\\naccountable” for attendance. In 2013, Humpherys began sending out warning letters\\nto North Platte employees with poor attendance. On April 11, 2013, Humpherys sent\\nHiggins a letter that said Higgins’s “attendance may be trending in the wrong\\ndirection or may already be placing [him] in violation of Union Pacific’s Attendance\\nPolicy.” Higgins continued to lay off shifts due to his chronic back pain. On April\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f2, 2014, Humpherys sent Higgins an Attendance Alert and Advisory letter that said\\nHiggins’s “attendance [was] not satisfactory.” Five other North Platte Service Unit\\nemployees received the same letter. Higgins’s attendance did not improve—between\\nMay 11, 2014, and August 9, 2014, Higgins missed 26% of his scheduled shifts.\\n\\n On August 14, 2014, Union Pacific sent Higgins a Notice of Investigation letter\\n“in connection with [his] alleged violation of the Union Pacific Railroad . . .\\nAttendance Policy, as a result of [his] alleged failure to protect [his] employment on\\na full time basis by excessively absenting [him]self.” Higgins was directed to attend\\na hearing at which he could present documentation supporting his need for the lay-\\noffs. Prior to the hearing date, Higgins filed an occupational injury report stating that\\nhe had experienced an anxiety attack caused by “stress [and] depression due to\\nharassment” regarding his lay-offs. Union Pacific then requested that Higgins\\nundergo a fitness-for-duty (“FFD”) evaluation.\\n\\n On September 24, 2014, as a part of the FFD evaluation, Union Pacific asked\\nHiggins’s physician at the time, Dr. Citta, whether Higgins had any physical\\nlimitations. On October 2, 2014, Dr. Citta responded that he “consider[ed] Mr.\\nHiggins[’s] back condition the same [then] as it was at the time that he returned to\\nwork in 1990.” In addition, he recommended that Union Pacific “[c]ontinue\\nproviding at least 24 hours off between shifts or trips” and “[c]ontinue allowing him\\nto layoff as needed secondary to his back pain as per the agreement from 1999.”\\nAfter seeing Dr. Citta’s recommendations, Higgins told Dr. Citta that he\\n“inadvertently” left out the word “occasionally” in his discussion of the 24 hours off\\nbetween shifts or trips. Higgins, however, never requested that Dr. Citta correct the\\nerror or follow-up with Union Pacific.\\n\\n On November 20, 2014, Union Pacific’s Medical Department determined,\\nbased in part on Dr. Citta’s letter, that Higgins needed several permanent job\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\frestrictions, including “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).” In a phone call\\nwith Rhonda Ross, a Union Pacific FFD Nurse, Higgins confirmed that the\\nrestrictions were appropriate but requested that they be updated to also “continu[e]\\nallowing him to lay off as needed secondary to his back pain as per agreement from\\n1999.” Higgins’s requested change was never made. On December 3, 2014, Union\\nPacific determined that Higgins’s restrictions “interfere[d] with [his] essential job\\nfunctions” and could not be reasonably accommodated. Specifically, Union Pacific\\nfound that 24 hours of rest between every shift, rather than occasional shifts, was not\\nfeasible because nearly 90% of Higgins’s calls required him to work on less than 24\\nhours’ rest. On December 4, 2014, Union Pacific notified Higgins that his\\n“supervising department ha[d] been unable to identify a reasonable accommodation\\nthat [would] permit [him] to safely return to work in [his] assigned position.” Higgins\\nhas not been permitted to return to work since the end of 2014.\\n\\n On December 9, 2016, Higgins filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the ADA,\\nthe Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and the Family and Medical Leave\\nAct. The district court granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment on all\\nof Higgins’s claims. Higgins appeals only the grant of summary judgment on his\\nADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nLibel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n“Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue\\nof material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III. Discussion\\n\\n Because Higgins’s disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims are\\nbased on circumstantial evidence, we consider them under the burden-shifting\\nframework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\\nSee Cody v. Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 763 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2014) (disparate\\ntreatment); Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 817 F.3d 624, 631 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(failure to accommodate). Under McDonnell Douglas, “[Higgins] must first present\\na prima facie case of intentional discrimination.” Cody, 763 F.3d at 996 (citation\\nomitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Higgins “must\\ndemonstrate that ‘(1) he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA, (2) he is\\nqualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable\\naccommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his\\ndisability.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the district court found that Higgins failed to establish a prima facie case\\nof discrimination. Specifically, the district court found that job attendance is an\\nessential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and that Higgins is unable\\nto perform that essential function with or without a reasonable accommodation.3\\nHiggins disputes whether attendance is an essential function of his job and argues, in\\nthe alternative, that he could still perform the essential function of job attendance\\nwith a reasonable accommodation.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The district court did not address whether Higgins is a disabled person as\\ndefined by the ADA or whether Higgins suffered an adverse employment action\\nbecause of his disability. Neither do we.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f A. Essential Function\\n\\n We first address Higgins’s argument that job attendance is not an essential\\nfunction of his job. “Essential functions of the job are ‘fundamental job duties,’ and\\nthe employer’s judgment in this regard is considered ‘highly probative.’”\\nKammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation\\nomitted). The following evidence is relevant in determining whether a job duty is an\\nessential function:\\n\\n (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2)\\n written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing\\n applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job\\n performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the\\n incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the current work experience\\n of incumbents in similar jobs.\\n\\nId. (citation omitted). We have “consistently stated that ‘regular and reliable\\nattendance is a necessary element of most jobs.’” Lipp v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,\\n911 F.3d 537, 544 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\\n\\n Here, job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\\nEngineer. First, Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description lists\\nattendance in accordance with Union Pacific’s attendance policy as an essential job\\nfunction. And, Union Pacific’s attendance policy requires that employees be\\n“available to work [their] assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” See\\nBuckles v. First Data Res., Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[Employer]\\nconsiders attendance to be an ‘essential function,’ as illustrated by the detailed\\nattendance policies and procedures.”). The fact that the attendance policy allows for\\n“personal lay-offs” under certain circumstances does not create a material question\\nof fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function. See Pickens v. Soo\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fLine R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even though the railroad’s system\\nof scheduling appears quite flexible, the railroad’s policy requires regular, reliable\\nattendance, and Pickens’ conductor’s job was full-time.”); see also Buckles, 176 F.3d\\nat 1101 (“[Employee] . . . disputes that attendance is essential to [his employer] since\\nthere are numerous employees and the company accounts for possible absences. We\\nare not persuaded by such a conclusory argument . . . .” (footnote omitted)).\\n\\n Second, Union Pacific’s repeated warnings to Higgins that his poor attendance\\nwas unacceptable further indicate that Union Pacific considered job attendance to be\\nan essential function of its Locomotive Engineers. See Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm,\\nInc., 245 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he seriousness with which [employer]\\ntreated [employee’s] absences (e.g., numerous warnings, meetings, and discussions),\\nindicate[d] that dependability and attendance are essential . . . .”), partly superseded\\nby statute as recognized in Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 889 & n.8\\n(8th Cir. 2013). The fact that Union Pacific previously accommodated Higgins’s\\nback pain by allowing him to miss a large percentage of his shifts also does not create\\na material question of fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function.\\nSee Schierhoff v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 444 F.3d 961, 966\\n(8th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n employee who cannot attend work cannot perform the essential\\nfunctions of his job. This is true even when the absences are with the employer’s\\npermission.”).\\n\\n Higgins’s best counter to the above analysis is that his 1992 settlement\\nagreement with Union Pacific, which allows him to lay off as necessary, supersedes\\nUnion Pacific’s attendance policy for its Locomotive Engineers, at least as applied\\nto him. But that agreement is best characterized as an agreement to accommodate\\nHiggins’s chronic back pain rather than an admission that job attendance is not an\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fessential function.4 Indeed, “[a]n employer does not concede that a job function is\\n‘non-essential’ simply by voluntarily assuming the limited burden associated with a\\ntemporary accommodation, nor thereby acknowledge that the burden associated with\\na permanent accommodation would not be unduly onerous.” Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486\\nF.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). While Union\\nPacific’s accommodation of Higgins’s back pain may not have been temporary, Rehrs\\nstill counsels that it does not alter our essential function analysis in this case.\\n\\n B. Reasonable Accommodation\\n\\n Because job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\\nEngineer and Higgins is unable to perform that function without a reasonable\\naccommodation, we next address Higgins’s argument that he could perform the\\nessential function of job attendance with a reasonable accommodation. “An\\nindividual requesting an accommodation must ‘make a facial showing that reasonable\\naccommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow [him] to perform\\nthe essential functions of the job.’” Lipp, 911 F.3d at 546 (citation omitted). An\\naccommodation is not reasonable if it requires an employer to “reallocate or eliminate\\nthe essential functions of a job.” Faulkner v. Douglas Cty. Neb., 906 F.3d 728, 733\\n(8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n As UP’s Superintendent wrote to Higgins in 1993 regarding the agreement:\\n“I have no problem with you laying off when medically necessary. . . . [However,]\\nthese lost work periods will be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way\\nexempt you from discipline if abused.”\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Here, Higgins’s newly requested accommodation—“laying off as necessary”\\nand receiving “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts)”5—is unreasonable. First,\\nHiggins’s requested accommodation is unreasonable because it would require Union\\nPacific to reassign other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers to shifts that they\\nwould not have otherwise been scheduled to work. See Knutson v. Schwan’s Home\\nServ., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that an accommodation is\\nunreasonable if it requires an employer to “reassign existing workers to assist [the\\nemployee] in his essential duties.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Second,\\nand more importantly, Higgins’s requested accommodation essentially amounts to an\\n“unlimited absentee policy,” which is unreasonable as a matter of law. Lipp, 911\\nF.3d at 546; see also Pickens, 264 F.3d at 778 (finding employee’s request to “work\\nonly when he feels like working . . . unreasonable as a matter of law”); Buckles, 176\\nF.3d at 1101 (finding employee’s request for the “[u]nfettered ability to leave work\\nat any time” to be an unreasonable accommodation). The fact that Union Pacific\\npreviously accommodated Higgins’s back pain by allowing him to miss a large\\npercentage of his shifts does not create a material question of fact regarding the\\nreasonableness of his newly requested accommodation to lay off as necessary and\\nreceive 24 hours off between every shift. See Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,\\nInc., 889 F.3d 933, 943 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“If an employer ‘bends over\\nbackwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . it must not be punished for its\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Higgins argues that Union Pacific misunderstood his requested\\naccommodation and that he only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts, not\\nall shifts. But when Union Pacific FFD Nurse Rhonda Ross asked Higgins about his\\nrequested accommodations, including the 24 hours off between shifts, he never\\nclarified that he actually only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts. See\\nRussell v. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that “it was\\nincumbent upon [the employee] to correct [the employer’s] assumption” about the\\nemployee’s requested accommodation).\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fgenerosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching\\nan accommodation.’” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Job\\nattendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and\\nHiggins cannot perform that function with or without a reasonable accommodation.\\nHe therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419533/\", \"author_raw\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642280/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jon D. HIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1902\n ___________________________\n\n Jon D. Higgins\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Union Pacific Railroad Co.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 16, 2019\n Filed: July 24, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\n\n Jon Higgins has chronic back pain. He asked his employer, Union Pacific\nRailroad (“Union Pacific”), to accommodate his back pain by allowing him to take\ntime off “as necessary” and receive “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).”\nUnion Pacific denied his request. Higgins then sued Union Pacific for, among other\nthings, disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the Americans with\n\fDisabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of\nUnion Pacific. We affirm.\n\n I. Background\n\n Higgins began working for Union Pacific in 1976 as a Locomotive Engineer.\nHe was based out of North Platte, Nebraska, and typically worked on trains routed\nfrom North Platte to Council Bluffs, Iowa. Higgins’s responsibilities included\nregulating the speed of the trains and ensuring compliance with safety protocols.\nBetween 1989 and 1992, Higgins suffered two spine-related injuries while\nperforming his job responsibilities. In 1992, Higgins entered into a settlement\nagreement with Union Pacific in which he released his personal injury claims against\nUnion Pacific in exchange for payment and “the right to lay off whenever his back\nbother[ed] him.”2\n\n On March 12, 1992, Dr. Brittan, Higgins’s physician at the time, wrote a letter\nto Union Pacific stating that Higgins was cleared to work “with the only restriction\nbeing that he should not go out more often than every 24 hours.” On June 29, 1992,\nUnion Pacific’s Assistant Medical Director, Dr. Richard Peters, wrote to Union\nPacific’s Superintendent, John Holm that “[t]he medical director’s office supports the\nrestriction that on occasion Jon Higgins should not go out on a job assignment more\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, then Chief Judge, United States District\nCourt for the District of Nebraska.\n 2\n Higgins no longer has a copy of the settlement agreement. Union Pacific\ntherefore claims that any discussion of the agreement’s terms is “speculative.” An\nemail from a Union Pacific manager in 1998, however, indicates that such an\nagreement existed and one of its terms was that Higgins could lay off whenever his\nback bothered him. The email states: “This individual has been given t[he] right to\nlay off whenever his back bothers him . . . as part of a settlement to a law suit\ninvolving a personal injury.”\n\n -2-\n\fthan once every 24 hours.” On April 7, 1993, Union Pacific’s new Superintendent,\nM.E. Ring, wrote a letter to Higgins stating, “[t]his letter serves as an\nacknowledgment of the agreement between you and former Superintendent[,] . . .\nJohn Holm, with regard to allowable lay-offs.” Ring further wrote that while “I have\nno problem with you laying off when medically necessary[,] . . . lost work periods\nwill be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way exempt you from\ndiscipline if abused.”\n\n Several years later, on January 25, 1999, Dr. Brittan wrote another letter to\nUnion Pacific confirming that Higgins’s work restrictions were still necessary. The\nletter stated, “Mr. Higgins has a long standing back injury and his restrictions . . .\nhave been permanent up till now. As far as I know, nothing has changed medically\nthat would require those restrictions to be changed . . . .” On October 26, 1999,\nUnion Pacific agreed that Higgins would continue “not [to] be disciplined as the\nresult of him being absent from service.”\n\n In 2004, Michael Humpherys started as Union Pacific’s Manager of Training\nand Attendance for the North Platte Service Unit. Her job focused on improving job\nattendance. According to Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description,\n“[a]ttendance in compliance with the applicable attendance policy is an essential\nfunction of [the] position.” Union Pacific’s Attendance Policy states that Union\nPacific employees are expected to work “on a full-time basis,” which means “being\navailable to work your assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” While the\npolicy allows employees to lay off for “personal or family issues,” documentation “is\nexpected” and employees can be held in violation of the policy “regardless of the\nexplanation offered if [they] are unable to work full time and protect all employment\nobligations.”\n\n One way for Union Pacific to improve attendance was to reduce “lay-offs.”\nUnion Pacific’s Locomotive Engineers are assigned to “pool turns,” which are groups\n\n -3-\n\fof engineers that work on predetermined train routes. Each time a train is ready for\ndeparture, the Locomotive Engineer scheduled to work receives an automated call\nasking whether the engineer wants to accept the shift or “lay off.” If the engineer\ndecides to lay off, he must provide an explanation. In the event of a lay-off, Union\nPacific turns to the “extra board,” a group of engineers who fill short-notice\nvacancies. If none of those engineers can take the shift, the next engineer in the pool\nturn is called.\n\n To reduce lay-offs, Humpherys collected attendance data to identify poor\nperformers. Higgins, who had a high number of lay-offs due to his chronic back pain,\nquickly drew Humpherys’s attention. In October 2004, Humpherys called Higgins’s\nattendance “[v]ery borderline.” In October 2005, Humpherys found that Higgins\nranked last in attendance among his pool turn. In 2007, Humpherys noted that\nHiggins had been listed on five different “snapshots” (monthly attendance reports)\nas an employee with poor attendance. In 2008, Humpherys sent a letter to Higgins\nstating that Higgins’s “recent level of job protection [was] unsatisfactory and must\nbe improved,” and that “further failure . . . w[ould] subject [him] to disciplinary\naction.” Several other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers received a similar letter.\nIn 2010, 2011, and 2012, Humpherys continued to monitor Higgins’s poor attendance\nand noted that Higgins appeared on several snapshots each year. In both 2012 and\n2013, Higgins laid off 24% of the shifts that he was called to work.\n\n Around 2013 or 2014, Union Pacific began experiencing a manpower shortage\nin North Platte due to increasing business. Consequently, John Alberry, Union\nPacific’s Director of Road Operations, directed Humpherys to “start holding people\naccountable” for attendance. In 2013, Humpherys began sending out warning letters\nto North Platte employees with poor attendance. On April 11, 2013, Humpherys sent\nHiggins a letter that said Higgins’s “attendance may be trending in the wrong\ndirection or may already be placing [him] in violation of Union Pacific’s Attendance\nPolicy.” Higgins continued to lay off shifts due to his chronic back pain. On April\n\n -4-\n\f2, 2014, Humpherys sent Higgins an Attendance Alert and Advisory letter that said\nHiggins’s “attendance [was] not satisfactory.” Five other North Platte Service Unit\nemployees received the same letter. Higgins’s attendance did not improve—between\nMay 11, 2014, and August 9, 2014, Higgins missed 26% of his scheduled shifts.\n\n On August 14, 2014, Union Pacific sent Higgins a Notice of Investigation letter\n“in connection with [his] alleged violation of the Union Pacific Railroad . . .\nAttendance Policy, as a result of [his] alleged failure to protect [his] employment on\na full time basis by excessively absenting [him]self.” Higgins was directed to attend\na hearing at which he could present documentation supporting his need for the lay-\noffs. Prior to the hearing date, Higgins filed an occupational injury report stating that\nhe had experienced an anxiety attack caused by “stress [and] depression due to\nharassment” regarding his lay-offs. Union Pacific then requested that Higgins\nundergo a fitness-for-duty (“FFD”) evaluation.\n\n On September 24, 2014, as a part of the FFD evaluation, Union Pacific asked\nHiggins’s physician at the time, Dr. Citta, whether Higgins had any physical\nlimitations. On October 2, 2014, Dr. Citta responded that he “consider[ed] Mr.\nHiggins[’s] back condition the same [then] as it was at the time that he returned to\nwork in 1990.” In addition, he recommended that Union Pacific “[c]ontinue\nproviding at least 24 hours off between shifts or trips” and “[c]ontinue allowing him\nto layoff as needed secondary to his back pain as per the agreement from 1999.”\nAfter seeing Dr. Citta’s recommendations, Higgins told Dr. Citta that he\n“inadvertently” left out the word “occasionally” in his discussion of the 24 hours off\nbetween shifts or trips. Higgins, however, never requested that Dr. Citta correct the\nerror or follow-up with Union Pacific.\n\n On November 20, 2014, Union Pacific’s Medical Department determined,\nbased in part on Dr. Citta’s letter, that Higgins needed several permanent job\n\n\n\n -5-\n\frestrictions, including “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).” In a phone call\nwith Rhonda Ross, a Union Pacific FFD Nurse, Higgins confirmed that the\nrestrictions were appropriate but requested that they be updated to also “continu[e]\nallowing him to lay off as needed secondary to his back pain as per agreement from\n1999.” Higgins’s requested change was never made. On December 3, 2014, Union\nPacific determined that Higgins’s restrictions “interfere[d] with [his] essential job\nfunctions” and could not be reasonably accommodated. Specifically, Union Pacific\nfound that 24 hours of rest between every shift, rather than occasional shifts, was not\nfeasible because nearly 90% of Higgins’s calls required him to work on less than 24\nhours’ rest. On December 4, 2014, Union Pacific notified Higgins that his\n“supervising department ha[d] been unable to identify a reasonable accommodation\nthat [would] permit [him] to safely return to work in [his] assigned position.” Higgins\nhas not been permitted to return to work since the end of 2014.\n\n On December 9, 2016, Higgins filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the ADA,\nthe Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and the Family and Medical Leave\nAct. The district court granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment on all\nof Higgins’s claims. Higgins appeals only the grant of summary judgment on his\nADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.\n\n II. Standard of Review\n\n This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.\nLibel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007).\n“Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue\nof material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f III. Discussion\n\n Because Higgins’s disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims are\nbased on circumstantial evidence, we consider them under the burden-shifting\nframework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\nSee Cody v. Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 763 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2014) (disparate\ntreatment); Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 817 F.3d 624, 631 (8th Cir. 2016)\n(failure to accommodate). Under McDonnell Douglas, “[Higgins] must first present\na prima facie case of intentional discrimination.” Cody, 763 F.3d at 996 (citation\nomitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Higgins “must\ndemonstrate that ‘(1) he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA, (2) he is\nqualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable\naccommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his\ndisability.’” Id. (citation omitted).\n\n Here, the district court found that Higgins failed to establish a prima facie case\nof discrimination. Specifically, the district court found that job attendance is an\nessential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and that Higgins is unable\nto perform that essential function with or without a reasonable accommodation.3\nHiggins disputes whether attendance is an essential function of his job and argues, in\nthe alternative, that he could still perform the essential function of job attendance\nwith a reasonable accommodation.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n The district court did not address whether Higgins is a disabled person as\ndefined by the ADA or whether Higgins suffered an adverse employment action\nbecause of his disability. Neither do we.\n\n\n -7-\n\f A. Essential Function\n\n We first address Higgins’s argument that job attendance is not an essential\nfunction of his job. “Essential functions of the job are ‘fundamental job duties,’ and\nthe employer’s judgment in this regard is considered ‘highly probative.’”\nKammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation\nomitted). The following evidence is relevant in determining whether a job duty is an\nessential function:\n\n (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2)\n written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing\n applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job\n performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the\n incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the current work experience\n of incumbents in similar jobs.\n\nId. (citation omitted). We have “consistently stated that ‘regular and reliable\nattendance is a necessary element of most jobs.’” Lipp v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,\n911 F.3d 537, 544 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\n\n Here, job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\nEngineer. First, Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description lists\nattendance in accordance with Union Pacific’s attendance policy as an essential job\nfunction. And, Union Pacific’s attendance policy requires that employees be\n“available to work [their] assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” See\nBuckles v. First Data Res., Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[Employer]\nconsiders attendance to be an ‘essential function,’ as illustrated by the detailed\nattendance policies and procedures.”). The fact that the attendance policy allows for\n“personal lay-offs” under certain circumstances does not create a material question\nof fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function. See Pickens v. Soo\n\n\n\n -8-\n\fLine R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even though the railroad’s system\nof scheduling appears quite flexible, the railroad’s policy requires regular, reliable\nattendance, and Pickens’ conductor’s job was full-time.”); see also Buckles, 176 F.3d\nat 1101 (“[Employee] . . . disputes that attendance is essential to [his employer] since\nthere are numerous employees and the company accounts for possible absences. We\nare not persuaded by such a conclusory argument . . . .” (footnote omitted)).\n\n Second, Union Pacific’s repeated warnings to Higgins that his poor attendance\nwas unacceptable further indicate that Union Pacific considered job attendance to be\nan essential function of its Locomotive Engineers. See Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm,\nInc., 245 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he seriousness with which [employer]\ntreated [employee’s] absences (e.g., numerous warnings, meetings, and discussions),\nindicate[d] that dependability and attendance are essential . . . .”), partly superseded\nby statute as recognized in Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 889 & n.8\n(8th Cir. 2013). The fact that Union Pacific previously accommodated Higgins’s\nback pain by allowing him to miss a large percentage of his shifts also does not create\na material question of fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function.\nSee Schierhoff v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 444 F.3d 961, 966\n(8th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n employee who cannot attend work cannot perform the essential\nfunctions of his job. This is true even when the absences are with the employer’s\npermission.”).\n\n Higgins’s best counter to the above analysis is that his 1992 settlement\nagreement with Union Pacific, which allows him to lay off as necessary, supersedes\nUnion Pacific’s attendance policy for its Locomotive Engineers, at least as applied\nto him. But that agreement is best characterized as an agreement to accommodate\nHiggins’s chronic back pain rather than an admission that job attendance is not an\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\fessential function.4 Indeed, “[a]n employer does not concede that a job function is\n‘non-essential’ simply by voluntarily assuming the limited burden associated with a\ntemporary accommodation, nor thereby acknowledge that the burden associated with\na permanent accommodation would not be unduly onerous.” Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486\nF.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). While Union\nPacific’s accommodation of Higgins’s back pain may not have been temporary, Rehrs\nstill counsels that it does not alter our essential function analysis in this case.\n\n B. Reasonable Accommodation\n\n Because job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\nEngineer and Higgins is unable to perform that function without a reasonable\naccommodation, we next address Higgins’s argument that he could perform the\nessential function of job attendance with a reasonable accommodation. “An\nindividual requesting an accommodation must ‘make a facial showing that reasonable\naccommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow [him] to perform\nthe essential functions of the job.’” Lipp, 911 F.3d at 546 (citation omitted). An\naccommodation is not reasonable if it requires an employer to “reallocate or eliminate\nthe essential functions of a job.” Faulkner v. Douglas Cty. Neb., 906 F.3d 728, 733\n(8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\n\n\n\n\n 4\n As UP’s Superintendent wrote to Higgins in 1993 regarding the agreement:\n“I have no problem with you laying off when medically necessary. . . . [However,]\nthese lost work periods will be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way\nexempt you from discipline if abused.”\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f Here, Higgins’s newly requested accommodation—“laying off as necessary”\nand receiving “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts)”5—is unreasonable. First,\nHiggins’s requested accommodation is unreasonable because it would require Union\nPacific to reassign other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers to shifts that they\nwould not have otherwise been scheduled to work. See Knutson v. Schwan’s Home\nServ., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that an accommodation is\nunreasonable if it requires an employer to “reassign existing workers to assist [the\nemployee] in his essential duties.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Second,\nand more importantly, Higgins’s requested accommodation essentially amounts to an\n“unlimited absentee policy,” which is unreasonable as a matter of law. Lipp, 911\nF.3d at 546; see also Pickens, 264 F.3d at 778 (finding employee’s request to “work\nonly when he feels like working . . . unreasonable as a matter of law”); Buckles, 176\nF.3d at 1101 (finding employee’s request for the “[u]nfettered ability to leave work\nat any time” to be an unreasonable accommodation). The fact that Union Pacific\npreviously accommodated Higgins’s back pain by allowing him to miss a large\npercentage of his shifts does not create a material question of fact regarding the\nreasonableness of his newly requested accommodation to lay off as necessary and\nreceive 24 hours off between every shift. See Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,\nInc., 889 F.3d 933, 943 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“If an employer ‘bends over\nbackwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . it must not be punished for its\n\n\n\n 5\n Higgins argues that Union Pacific misunderstood his requested\naccommodation and that he only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts, not\nall shifts. But when Union Pacific FFD Nurse Rhonda Ross asked Higgins about his\nrequested accommodations, including the 24 hours off between shifts, he never\nclarified that he actually only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts. See\nRussell v. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that “it was\nincumbent upon [the employee] to correct [the employer’s] assumption” about the\nemployee’s requested accommodation).\n\n\n\n -11-\n\fgenerosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching\nan accommodation.’” (citation omitted)).\n\n IV. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Job\nattendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and\nHiggins cannot perform that function with or without a reasonable accommodation.\nHe therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.\n\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jon D. HIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1902\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Jon D. Higgins\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Union Pacific Railroad Co.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Nebraska - Omaha\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Jon Higgins has chronic back pain. He asked his employer, Union Pacific\\nRailroad (“Union Pacific”), to accommodate his back pain by allowing him to take\\ntime off “as necessary” and receive “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).”\\nUnion Pacific denied his request. Higgins then sued Union Pacific for, among other\\nthings, disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the Americans with\\n\\fDisabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court1 granted summary judgment in favor of\\nUnion Pacific. We affirm.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n Higgins began working for Union Pacific in 1976 as a Locomotive Engineer.\\nHe was based out of North Platte, Nebraska, and typically worked on trains routed\\nfrom North Platte to Council Bluffs, Iowa. Higgins’s responsibilities included\\nregulating the speed of the trains and ensuring compliance with safety protocols.\\nBetween 1989 and 1992, Higgins suffered two spine-related injuries while\\nperforming his job responsibilities. In 1992, Higgins entered into a settlement\\nagreement with Union Pacific in which he released his personal injury claims against\\nUnion Pacific in exchange for payment and “the right to lay off whenever his back\\nbother[ed] him.”2\\n\\n On March 12, 1992, Dr. Brittan, Higgins’s physician at the time, wrote a letter\\nto Union Pacific stating that Higgins was cleared to work “with the only restriction\\nbeing that he should not go out more often than every 24 hours.” On June 29, 1992,\\nUnion Pacific’s Assistant Medical Director, Dr. Richard Peters, wrote to Union\\nPacific’s Superintendent, John Holm that “[t]he medical director’s office supports the\\nrestriction that on occasion Jon Higgins should not go out on a job assignment more\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, then Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the District of Nebraska.\\n 2\\n Higgins no longer has a copy of the settlement agreement. Union Pacific\\ntherefore claims that any discussion of the agreement’s terms is “speculative.” An\\nemail from a Union Pacific manager in 1998, however, indicates that such an\\nagreement existed and one of its terms was that Higgins could lay off whenever his\\nback bothered him. The email states: “This individual has been given t[he] right to\\nlay off whenever his back bothers him . . . as part of a settlement to a law suit\\ninvolving a personal injury.”\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthan once every 24 hours.” On April 7, 1993, Union Pacific’s new Superintendent,\\nM.E. Ring, wrote a letter to Higgins stating, “[t]his letter serves as an\\nacknowledgment of the agreement between you and former Superintendent[,] . . .\\nJohn Holm, with regard to allowable lay-offs.” Ring further wrote that while “I have\\nno problem with you laying off when medically necessary[,] . . . lost work periods\\nwill be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way exempt you from\\ndiscipline if abused.”\\n\\n Several years later, on January 25, 1999, Dr. Brittan wrote another letter to\\nUnion Pacific confirming that Higgins’s work restrictions were still necessary. The\\nletter stated, “Mr. Higgins has a long standing back injury and his restrictions . . .\\nhave been permanent up till now. As far as I know, nothing has changed medically\\nthat would require those restrictions to be changed . . . .” On October 26, 1999,\\nUnion Pacific agreed that Higgins would continue “not [to] be disciplined as the\\nresult of him being absent from service.”\\n\\n In 2004, Michael Humpherys started as Union Pacific’s Manager of Training\\nand Attendance for the North Platte Service Unit. Her job focused on improving job\\nattendance. According to Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description,\\n“[a]ttendance in compliance with the applicable attendance policy is an essential\\nfunction of [the] position.” Union Pacific’s Attendance Policy states that Union\\nPacific employees are expected to work “on a full-time basis,” which means “being\\navailable to work your assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” While the\\npolicy allows employees to lay off for “personal or family issues,” documentation “is\\nexpected” and employees can be held in violation of the policy “regardless of the\\nexplanation offered if [they] are unable to work full time and protect all employment\\nobligations.”\\n\\n One way for Union Pacific to improve attendance was to reduce “lay-offs.”\\nUnion Pacific’s Locomotive Engineers are assigned to “pool turns,” which are groups\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fof engineers that work on predetermined train routes. Each time a train is ready for\\ndeparture, the Locomotive Engineer scheduled to work receives an automated call\\nasking whether the engineer wants to accept the shift or “lay off.” If the engineer\\ndecides to lay off, he must provide an explanation. In the event of a lay-off, Union\\nPacific turns to the “extra board,” a group of engineers who fill short-notice\\nvacancies. If none of those engineers can take the shift, the next engineer in the pool\\nturn is called.\\n\\n To reduce lay-offs, Humpherys collected attendance data to identify poor\\nperformers. Higgins, who had a high number of lay-offs due to his chronic back pain,\\nquickly drew Humpherys’s attention. In October 2004, Humpherys called Higgins’s\\nattendance “[v]ery borderline.” In October 2005, Humpherys found that Higgins\\nranked last in attendance among his pool turn. In 2007, Humpherys noted that\\nHiggins had been listed on five different “snapshots” (monthly attendance reports)\\nas an employee with poor attendance. In 2008, Humpherys sent a letter to Higgins\\nstating that Higgins’s “recent level of job protection [was] unsatisfactory and must\\nbe improved,” and that “further failure . . . w[ould] subject [him] to disciplinary\\naction.” Several other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers received a similar letter.\\nIn 2010, 2011, and 2012, Humpherys continued to monitor Higgins’s poor attendance\\nand noted that Higgins appeared on several snapshots each year. In both 2012 and\\n2013, Higgins laid off 24% of the shifts that he was called to work.\\n\\n Around 2013 or 2014, Union Pacific began experiencing a manpower shortage\\nin North Platte due to increasing business. Consequently, John Alberry, Union\\nPacific’s Director of Road Operations, directed Humpherys to “start holding people\\naccountable” for attendance. In 2013, Humpherys began sending out warning letters\\nto North Platte employees with poor attendance. On April 11, 2013, Humpherys sent\\nHiggins a letter that said Higgins’s “attendance may be trending in the wrong\\ndirection or may already be placing [him] in violation of Union Pacific’s Attendance\\nPolicy.” Higgins continued to lay off shifts due to his chronic back pain. On April\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f2, 2014, Humpherys sent Higgins an Attendance Alert and Advisory letter that said\\nHiggins’s “attendance [was] not satisfactory.” Five other North Platte Service Unit\\nemployees received the same letter. Higgins’s attendance did not improve—between\\nMay 11, 2014, and August 9, 2014, Higgins missed 26% of his scheduled shifts.\\n\\n On August 14, 2014, Union Pacific sent Higgins a Notice of Investigation letter\\n“in connection with [his] alleged violation of the Union Pacific Railroad . . .\\nAttendance Policy, as a result of [his] alleged failure to protect [his] employment on\\na full time basis by excessively absenting [him]self.” Higgins was directed to attend\\na hearing at which he could present documentation supporting his need for the lay-\\noffs. Prior to the hearing date, Higgins filed an occupational injury report stating that\\nhe had experienced an anxiety attack caused by “stress [and] depression due to\\nharassment” regarding his lay-offs. Union Pacific then requested that Higgins\\nundergo a fitness-for-duty (“FFD”) evaluation.\\n\\n On September 24, 2014, as a part of the FFD evaluation, Union Pacific asked\\nHiggins’s physician at the time, Dr. Citta, whether Higgins had any physical\\nlimitations. On October 2, 2014, Dr. Citta responded that he “consider[ed] Mr.\\nHiggins[’s] back condition the same [then] as it was at the time that he returned to\\nwork in 1990.” In addition, he recommended that Union Pacific “[c]ontinue\\nproviding at least 24 hours off between shifts or trips” and “[c]ontinue allowing him\\nto layoff as needed secondary to his back pain as per the agreement from 1999.”\\nAfter seeing Dr. Citta’s recommendations, Higgins told Dr. Citta that he\\n“inadvertently” left out the word “occasionally” in his discussion of the 24 hours off\\nbetween shifts or trips. Higgins, however, never requested that Dr. Citta correct the\\nerror or follow-up with Union Pacific.\\n\\n On November 20, 2014, Union Pacific’s Medical Department determined,\\nbased in part on Dr. Citta’s letter, that Higgins needed several permanent job\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\frestrictions, including “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).” In a phone call\\nwith Rhonda Ross, a Union Pacific FFD Nurse, Higgins confirmed that the\\nrestrictions were appropriate but requested that they be updated to also “continu[e]\\nallowing him to lay off as needed secondary to his back pain as per agreement from\\n1999.” Higgins’s requested change was never made. On December 3, 2014, Union\\nPacific determined that Higgins’s restrictions “interfere[d] with [his] essential job\\nfunctions” and could not be reasonably accommodated. Specifically, Union Pacific\\nfound that 24 hours of rest between every shift, rather than occasional shifts, was not\\nfeasible because nearly 90% of Higgins’s calls required him to work on less than 24\\nhours’ rest. On December 4, 2014, Union Pacific notified Higgins that his\\n“supervising department ha[d] been unable to identify a reasonable accommodation\\nthat [would] permit [him] to safely return to work in [his] assigned position.” Higgins\\nhas not been permitted to return to work since the end of 2014.\\n\\n On December 9, 2016, Higgins filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the ADA,\\nthe Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and the Family and Medical Leave\\nAct. The district court granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment on all\\nof Higgins’s claims. Higgins appeals only the grant of summary judgment on his\\nADA claims for disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.\\n\\n II. Standard of Review\\n\\n This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.\\nLibel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n“Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue\\nof material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f III. Discussion\\n\\n Because Higgins’s disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims are\\nbased on circumstantial evidence, we consider them under the burden-shifting\\nframework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).\\nSee Cody v. Prairie Ethanol, LLC, 763 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2014) (disparate\\ntreatment); Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 817 F.3d 624, 631 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(failure to accommodate). Under McDonnell Douglas, “[Higgins] must first present\\na prima facie case of intentional discrimination.” Cody, 763 F.3d at 996 (citation\\nomitted). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Higgins “must\\ndemonstrate that ‘(1) he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA, (2) he is\\nqualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable\\naccommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his\\ndisability.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n Here, the district court found that Higgins failed to establish a prima facie case\\nof discrimination. Specifically, the district court found that job attendance is an\\nessential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and that Higgins is unable\\nto perform that essential function with or without a reasonable accommodation.3\\nHiggins disputes whether attendance is an essential function of his job and argues, in\\nthe alternative, that he could still perform the essential function of job attendance\\nwith a reasonable accommodation.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The district court did not address whether Higgins is a disabled person as\\ndefined by the ADA or whether Higgins suffered an adverse employment action\\nbecause of his disability. Neither do we.\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f A. Essential Function\\n\\n We first address Higgins’s argument that job attendance is not an essential\\nfunction of his job. “Essential functions of the job are ‘fundamental job duties,’ and\\nthe employer’s judgment in this regard is considered ‘highly probative.’”\\nKammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation\\nomitted). The following evidence is relevant in determining whether a job duty is an\\nessential function:\\n\\n (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2)\\n written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing\\n applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job\\n performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the\\n incumbent to perform the function; and (5) the current work experience\\n of incumbents in similar jobs.\\n\\nId. (citation omitted). We have “consistently stated that ‘regular and reliable\\nattendance is a necessary element of most jobs.’” Lipp v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,\\n911 F.3d 537, 544 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\\n\\n Here, job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\\nEngineer. First, Union Pacific’s Locomotive Engineer Job Description lists\\nattendance in accordance with Union Pacific’s attendance policy as an essential job\\nfunction. And, Union Pacific’s attendance policy requires that employees be\\n“available to work [their] assignment . . . whenever it is scheduled to work.” See\\nBuckles v. First Data Res., Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[Employer]\\nconsiders attendance to be an ‘essential function,’ as illustrated by the detailed\\nattendance policies and procedures.”). The fact that the attendance policy allows for\\n“personal lay-offs” under certain circumstances does not create a material question\\nof fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function. See Pickens v. Soo\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fLine R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Even though the railroad’s system\\nof scheduling appears quite flexible, the railroad’s policy requires regular, reliable\\nattendance, and Pickens’ conductor’s job was full-time.”); see also Buckles, 176 F.3d\\nat 1101 (“[Employee] . . . disputes that attendance is essential to [his employer] since\\nthere are numerous employees and the company accounts for possible absences. We\\nare not persuaded by such a conclusory argument . . . .” (footnote omitted)).\\n\\n Second, Union Pacific’s repeated warnings to Higgins that his poor attendance\\nwas unacceptable further indicate that Union Pacific considered job attendance to be\\nan essential function of its Locomotive Engineers. See Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm,\\nInc., 245 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he seriousness with which [employer]\\ntreated [employee’s] absences (e.g., numerous warnings, meetings, and discussions),\\nindicate[d] that dependability and attendance are essential . . . .”), partly superseded\\nby statute as recognized in Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 889 & n.8\\n(8th Cir. 2013). The fact that Union Pacific previously accommodated Higgins’s\\nback pain by allowing him to miss a large percentage of his shifts also does not create\\na material question of fact regarding whether job attendance is an essential function.\\nSee Schierhoff v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 444 F.3d 961, 966\\n(8th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n employee who cannot attend work cannot perform the essential\\nfunctions of his job. This is true even when the absences are with the employer’s\\npermission.”).\\n\\n Higgins’s best counter to the above analysis is that his 1992 settlement\\nagreement with Union Pacific, which allows him to lay off as necessary, supersedes\\nUnion Pacific’s attendance policy for its Locomotive Engineers, at least as applied\\nto him. But that agreement is best characterized as an agreement to accommodate\\nHiggins’s chronic back pain rather than an admission that job attendance is not an\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fessential function.4 Indeed, “[a]n employer does not concede that a job function is\\n‘non-essential’ simply by voluntarily assuming the limited burden associated with a\\ntemporary accommodation, nor thereby acknowledge that the burden associated with\\na permanent accommodation would not be unduly onerous.” Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486\\nF.3d 353, 358 (8th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). While Union\\nPacific’s accommodation of Higgins’s back pain may not have been temporary, Rehrs\\nstill counsels that it does not alter our essential function analysis in this case.\\n\\n B. Reasonable Accommodation\\n\\n Because job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive\\nEngineer and Higgins is unable to perform that function without a reasonable\\naccommodation, we next address Higgins’s argument that he could perform the\\nessential function of job attendance with a reasonable accommodation. “An\\nindividual requesting an accommodation must ‘make a facial showing that reasonable\\naccommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow [him] to perform\\nthe essential functions of the job.’” Lipp, 911 F.3d at 546 (citation omitted). An\\naccommodation is not reasonable if it requires an employer to “reallocate or eliminate\\nthe essential functions of a job.” Faulkner v. Douglas Cty. Neb., 906 F.3d 728, 733\\n(8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n As UP’s Superintendent wrote to Higgins in 1993 regarding the agreement:\\n“I have no problem with you laying off when medically necessary. . . . [However,]\\nthese lost work periods will be monitored for frequency and timing, and in no way\\nexempt you from discipline if abused.”\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f Here, Higgins’s newly requested accommodation—“laying off as necessary”\\nand receiving “24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts)”5—is unreasonable. First,\\nHiggins’s requested accommodation is unreasonable because it would require Union\\nPacific to reassign other Union Pacific Locomotive Engineers to shifts that they\\nwould not have otherwise been scheduled to work. See Knutson v. Schwan’s Home\\nServ., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that an accommodation is\\nunreasonable if it requires an employer to “reassign existing workers to assist [the\\nemployee] in his essential duties.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Second,\\nand more importantly, Higgins’s requested accommodation essentially amounts to an\\n“unlimited absentee policy,” which is unreasonable as a matter of law. Lipp, 911\\nF.3d at 546; see also Pickens, 264 F.3d at 778 (finding employee’s request to “work\\nonly when he feels like working . . . unreasonable as a matter of law”); Buckles, 176\\nF.3d at 1101 (finding employee’s request for the “[u]nfettered ability to leave work\\nat any time” to be an unreasonable accommodation). The fact that Union Pacific\\npreviously accommodated Higgins’s back pain by allowing him to miss a large\\npercentage of his shifts does not create a material question of fact regarding the\\nreasonableness of his newly requested accommodation to lay off as necessary and\\nreceive 24 hours off between every shift. See Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,\\nInc., 889 F.3d 933, 943 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“If an employer ‘bends over\\nbackwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . it must not be punished for its\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Higgins argues that Union Pacific misunderstood his requested\\naccommodation and that he only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts, not\\nall shifts. But when Union Pacific FFD Nurse Rhonda Ross asked Higgins about his\\nrequested accommodations, including the 24 hours off between shifts, he never\\nclarified that he actually only wanted 24 hours off between occasional shifts. See\\nRussell v. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that “it was\\nincumbent upon [the employee] to correct [the employer’s] assumption” about the\\nemployee’s requested accommodation).\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fgenerosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching\\nan accommodation.’” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Job\\nattendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and\\nHiggins cannot perform that function with or without a reasonable accommodation.\\nHe therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.\\n\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3283,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642281,"string":"4,642,281"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Fallou N'DIAYE, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Fallou Ndiaye v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1135"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Melloy, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1135\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Fallou N’Diaye\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States1\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2005, Petitioner Fallou N’Diaye was placed in removal proceedings for\\noverstaying his visa. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\n\\n\\n 1\\n William P. Barr has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United\\nStates, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate\\nProcedure 43(c).\\n\\funder the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied his\\napplication, finding that he had not met his burden of proof on the merits and\\nordering him removed. The BIA affirmed. Thereafter, N’Diaye filed a motion to\\nreopen with the BIA because he had married a United States citizen after the\\nimmigration judge issued the removal order. The BIA granted the motion, and\\nN’Diaye was placed in another round of removal proceedings.\\n\\n In the second round of removal proceedings, a second immigration judge\\nordered N’Diaye removed. The second immigration judge concluded that N’Diaye\\nwas ineligible to adjust his status because he had previously provided material\\nsupport to a terrorist organization. The BIA ultimately affirmed on the same grounds.\\nN’Diaye filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision with this Court. We deny\\nthe petition.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n A. The First Round of Proceedings\\n\\n N’Diaye is originally from Tindody, Senegal. He was legally admitted to the\\nUnited States in September 2003 as a non-immigrant visitor with authorization to\\nremain in the country for no more than six months. He overstayed his visa. In 2005,\\nhe was placed in removal proceedings.\\n\\n N’Diaye applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In\\nOctober 2008, the immigration judge held a hearing on his application. Relevant to\\nthis appeal, N’Diaye said that he had been raised in Senegal for most of his childhood\\nyears. His mother was dead, but his father was alive. They had both been members\\nof the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (“MFDC”), serving as\\n“representatives of the MFDC in the town where they used to live.” N’Diaye\\nexplained that “[e]verything [a person] needed to know about the movement MFDC”\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcould be learned from his parents, and “if [the person] wanted to become a member\\nof the MFDC, they were the contacts.”\\n\\n N’Diaye testified that he joined the MFDC around September 1998. He\\n“belong[ed] to . . . a particular section of the MFDC,” the goal of which was “to\\nrecruit new members.” According to N’Diaye, the goal of the MFDC when he joined\\nwas to achieve “independence from Senegal” for the Casamance region. He\\nexplained how the MFDC had “started . . . in the political arena, trying to get\\nindependent.” However, because “the president didn’t keep up with his promise,”\\nmembers of the MFDC “started using force” sometime in the 1980s.\\n\\n N’Diaye explained that he never advocated the use of force against the\\ngovernment, nor did he ever take any action to harm another person in furtherance of\\nthe MFDC’s goals. However, on cross-examination, he explained that when he\\njoined the MFDC, he was aware that it was “an armed separatist movement” that\\nfought with the Senegalese government. He claimed that the MFDC only fought\\nsoldiers; it did not kill Senegalese civilians. Reports to the contrary, he explained,\\nwere fabricated by the Senegalese government to make the MFDC look bad.\\nNevertheless, N’Diaye knew when he joined the MFDC that its members had\\nweapons and used them against Senegalese soldiers.\\n\\n N’Diaye did much to support the MFDC. He claimed that he helped recruit\\napproximately 50 people to the MFDC by “tell[ing] them about the . . . movement,\\nhelp[ing] them finance wise and giv[ing]them the information about the MFDC.” He\\nexplained that he had been giving money to the MFDC on a monthly basis since he\\nentered the United States in 2003. He also sent clothes and other supplies to leaders\\nof the MFDC. He estimated that he had given approximately $700 or $800 of his\\nown money to the MFDC.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f N’Diaye’s testimony caused the government to argue at closing that he should\\nbe statutorily barred from receiving relief because he had materially supported a\\nterrorist organization. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (rendering an alien who\\nhas “commit[ted] an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords\\nmaterial support” to a terrorist organization inadmissible). In the interest of fairness,\\nthe immigration judge continued the hearing to allow N’Diaye to respond to the\\ngovernment’s newly raised argument. The parties submitted supplemental\\ndocumentation about the MFDC, and the government submitted a brief arguing in\\nfavor of applying the bar. The immigration judge then held a final merits hearing.\\n\\n At the final hearing, N’Diaye testified about the structure of the MFDC. He\\nexplained that the MFDC is comprised of two factions: (1) the armed rebels who\\nfought with the government and (2) the “other wings,” led by “Abbe Diamacoune,”\\nthat negotiated with the government in a peaceful way. N’Diaye later clarified that\\nAbbe was a title that meant priest; Diamacoune’s first name was really Augustin.\\nN’Diaye stated that both factions had their own chief and that members of different\\nethnic backgrounds made up the different factions—the peaceful faction was\\npredominantly composed of people from his and one other background, whereas\\npeople from a variety of ethnic groups who spoke different dialects made up the rebel\\nfaction. Critically, however, on cross-examination, N’Diaye said that despite having\\n“their own leader[s],” the two factions were “the same organization.” N’Diaye further\\ntestified that he never possessed or used a weapon while he was a member of the\\nMFDC, nor did he ever have contact with or associate with the rebel faction. The\\nimmigration judge heard closing arguments on the matter and permitted the parties\\nto submit further briefing one more time before she rendered her decision.\\n\\n The immigration judge orally announced her decision to deny N’Diaye’s\\napplication for relief on September 29, 2009. Regarding asylum, the immigration\\njudge said that N’Diaye failed to offer evidence of extraordinary or changed\\ncircumstances to excuse his failure to file an application for asylum within one year\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fof his arrival date; therefore, she declined to treat it as an asylum application. She\\nconcluded that the government had met its burden of showing that the material-\\nsupport bar “may apply.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). However, she also concluded\\nthat N’Diaye met his burden of “proving that the terrorism bar d[id] not apply”\\nbecause N’Diaye’s testimony and documentary evidence established that the MFDC\\nwas made up of two factions and N’Diaye only supported the peaceful faction. She\\nfound that N’Diaye’s testimony regarding his fear of returning to Senegal was not\\ncredible. She also found that his other evidence was insufficient to establish a\\ncredible fear of returning. She thus determined that N’Diaye was ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal and CAT relief. Both N’Diaye and the government appealed.\\n\\n The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision in April 2012. The BIA\\nheld that there was “no clear error in [the] Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility\\nassessment” or her factual findings. Moreover, the BIA concluded that “the record\\nsimply d[id] not contain enough credible evidence for [N’Diaye] to meet his burden\\nof proof for withholding of removal” and CAT protection. The BIA declined to\\naddress the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\\n\\n B. The Second Round of Proceedings\\n\\n The BIA reopened N’Diaye’s case in September 2012 because he had married\\na U.S. citizen during the pendency of his appeal to the BIA and his wife had filed an\\nalien-relative visa petition on his behalf. The BIA concluded N’Diaye had submitted\\nnew evidence that “would likely change the result in the case.” The BIA, however,\\ndid not address the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\\nInstead, the BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge “for further\\nproceedings.”\\n\\n N’Diaye had his case transferred to a second immigration judge in Kansas City,\\nMissouri, and applied to adjust his status. At a merits hearing before the second\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fimmigration judge, N’Diaye and his wife testified about their marriage, and N’Diaye\\ntestified about his involvement with the MFDC. He claimed that when he was a\\nmember of the MFDC, he would “attend meetings” and “go door to door with the\\nneighbors, try[ing] to inform them and have them join the movement.” His actions\\nwere solely limited to recruiting others. He explained that the MFDC “was a non-\\nviolent organization” but that “there were other organizations at that time, multiple\\norganizations that were fighting for independence, but in a violent way.” He did not\\nknow much about those groups because he had “never been [a] member of those\\ngroups.” He stated that the violent groups were “separate and different from [the]\\nMFDC,” with “their own leaders” and “their own agenda.”\\n\\n On cross-examination, the government questioned N’Diaye about his testimony\\nbefore the first immigration judge. N’Diaye contradicted that earlier testimony,\\nstating that the MFDC was not an armed separatist movement. In a confusing manner\\nhe explained that, to his knowledge, the political wing and the more militant wings\\nof the MFDC were “not involved.” There were “several groups that would engage\\nin” physical fighting, but his “was a non-violent group.” It “would not engage in\\nfight[s],” just “political negotiations.” When asked why he had earlier stated that his\\norganization had weapons and fought against government soldiers, N’Diaye\\nsuggested that the court-appointed interpreter may not have accurately translated what\\nhe said at earlier proceedings. The second immigration judge heard closing\\narguments and took the matter under advisement.\\n\\n In October 2014, the second immigration judge issued a written decision. He\\nheld that the material-support bar applied and denied N’Diaye’s adjustment-of-status\\napplication. The second immigration judge explained that the documents both parties\\nsubmitted established that the MFDC, even the peaceful wing N’Diaye claimed he\\nbelonged to, engaged in various acts of violence that qualified it as a terrorist\\norganization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (“Tier III”). The second\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fimmigration judge concluded that N’Diaye’s provision of “nearly $1,000.00” to the\\nMFDC and his recruitment of “approximately 50 people” for the organization\\nconstituted material support. The second immigration judge credited N’Diaye’s\\ntestimony regarding his membership in, and support of, the MFDC because it had\\nbeen consistent with the testimony N’Diaye had given to the first immigration judge.\\nHowever, the second immigration judge found that N’Diaye’s “testimony regarding\\nhis knowledge of the activities of the MFDC was not credible.” (Emphasis omitted).\\nThe second immigration judge thus concluded that N’Diaye could not carry his\\nburden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and\\nshould not reasonably have known, that the [MFDC] was a terrorist organization.”\\nThe second immigration judge ordered N’Diaye removed.\\n\\n The BIA ultimately affirmed the second immigration judge’s decision. The BIA\\nconcluded that there was no legal impediment barring the second immigration judge\\nfrom reexamining the issue of whether the material-support bar applied. The BIA\\nagreed with the second immigration judge’s holding that the MFDC is a Tier-III\\nterrorist organization. The BIA explained that “the statutory definition of ‘terrorist\\norganization’ is broad” and stated that even “a subgroup engaging in terrorist\\nactivities renders the whole group a terrorist organization.” The BIA also agreed with\\nthe second immigration judge’s conclusion that N’Diaye did not establish by clear\\nand convincing evidence that he did not know and should not reasonably have known\\nthat the MFDC was a terrorist organization. The BIA concluded that the second\\nimmigration judge did not clearly err in making his credibility determination. The\\nBIA cited N’Diaye’s conflicting testimony and pointed out that “the documentary\\nevidence does not demonstrate that the political wing of the MFDC is separate and\\ndistinct from the militant wing.” N’Diaye timely petitioned this Court to review and\\nreverse the BIA’s decision.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review and Statutory Background\\n\\n When reviewing a decision from the BIA, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal\\ndeterminations de novo, but we accord ‘substantial deference to the BIA’s\\ninterpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.’” Godfrey v. Lynch, 811\\nF.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538 (8th\\nCir. 2012)). We overturn the BIA’s findings of fact only when “they are unsupported\\nby substantial evidence.” Id. A factual finding is unsupported by substantial\\nevidence when we, after reviewing the record as a whole, “determine that it would not\\nbe possible for a reasonable fact-finder to adopt the BIA’s position.” Juarez-\\nCoronado v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eusebio v. Ashcroft,\\n361 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2004)). Where, as here, the BIA has “adopted the\\nfindings or the reasoning of the [immigration judge], we also review the [immigration\\njudge’s] decision as part of the final agency action.” Godfrey, 811 F.3d at 1017\\n(quoting Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a nonimmigrant alien\\nseeking to adjust status must, among other things, be “admissible to the United States\\nfor permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien is inadmissible if he “has\\nengaged in a terrorist activity.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). The INA defines the term\\n“engage in terrorist activity” to mean, among other things:\\n\\n to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,\\n affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,\\n communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial\\n benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including\\n chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training\\n . . . (dd) to a [Tier-III] terrorist organization . . . unless the actor can\\n demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was\\n a terrorist organization.\\n\\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). A Tier-III terrorist organization is an organization “that\\nis a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in,\\nor has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\\nA terrorist activity, in turn, is:\\n\\n any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is\\n committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States,\\n would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and\\n which involves any of the following:\\n\\n (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an\\n aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).\\n\\n (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or\\n continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third\\n person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain\\n from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the\\n release of the individual seized or detained.\\n\\n (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as\\n defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of\\n such a person.\\n\\n (IV) An assassination.\\n\\n (V) The use of any—\\n\\n (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or\\n device, or\\n\\n (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous\\n device (other than for mere personal monetary gain),\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or\\n more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.\\n\\n (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.\\n\\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). In removal proceedings, the burden is on the alien to\\nestablish that he is eligible to adjust status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). If the evidence\\nindicates that the alien may have materially supported a terrorist organization, he\\nmust also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the material-support bar to\\nadmissibility does not apply. See id.\\n\\n B. Analysis\\n\\n N’Diaye essentially argues that the MFDC he supported was not a terrorist\\norganization. Alternatively, he argues that he did not know and should not\\nreasonably have known the MFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it.\\nWe hold that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proof on both issues.\\n\\n The evidence before the second immigration judge indicated that the material-\\nsupport bar may have applied. N’Diaye recruited approximately 50 people for the\\norganization and gave it nearly $1,000. Moreover, documentary evidence submitted\\nby both parties indicated that the MFDC was a terrorist organization when N’Diaye\\nsupported it. During the relevant periods, the MFDC reportedly killed, wounded, and\\nmutilated citizens, committed assassinations, and engaged in other violence using\\nfirearms and “other weapon[s] or dangerous device[s] . . . with intent to endanger . . .\\nthe safety of one or more individuals” and to substantially damage property. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). The burden was thus on N’Diaye to prove the material-\\nsupport bar did not apply.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f The BIA correctly concluded that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proving\\nthat the MFDC did not qualify as a Tier-III terrorist organization at the time he\\nsupported it. At all relevant times, the MFDC easily fit within the statutory definition\\nof a Tier-III terrorist organization. It was an organized “group of two or more\\nindividuals,” and it engaged in terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\\nSpecifically, documents submitted by both parties show that the MFDC: “shelled\\ncivilian targets,” in some instances to deter people from voting in elections that the\\nMFDC viewed as illegitimate; violently attacked and robbed civilians; killed civilians\\nwho were suspected of being government supporters; planted landmines on public\\nroadways; brutalized and raped women; stole property; mutilated and tortured\\nindividuals in attempts to gain information about government forces; and assassinated\\nat least one government official.\\n\\n N’Diaye argues that the second immigration judge and the BIA erred in failing\\nto make a “particularized factual finding” that the militant wing of the MFDC was a\\n“‘subgroup’ of the MFDC.” He argues that case law from the Third and Seventh\\nCircuits treats the BIA’s failure to make such a finding as reversible error. See Uddin\\nv. Attorney Gen. United States, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2017); Khan v. Holder,\\n766 F.3d 689, 699–702 (7th Cir. 2014). We need not decide whether to adopt a\\nsimilar rule. In this case, N’Diaye testified that the group he supported was an\\n“armed separatist” group that used weapons to fight against government forces.\\nNevertheless, N’Diaye now argues that he belonged to an MFDC that was wholly\\nindependent from the violent groups that committed the atrocities listed above. That\\nargument, however, is unsupported by the record. Like the BIA before us, we\\nacknowledge evidence in the record that suggests “the MFDC ha[d] multiple factions\\nthat . . . varied across geographic and ideological lines.” However, nothing in the\\nrecord convinces us that N’Diaye recruited members for and gave money to a\\ncompletely peaceful faction. To the contrary, N’Diaye said he supported an “armed\\nseparatist” group. He said that his group was led by Abbe Diamacoune, who the\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fdocumentary evidence reveals helped found and lead the more violent Southern Front\\nof the MFDC’s militant wing in addition to the organization’s political wing.\\nDiamacoune later served as president of the entire MFDC. Given the lack of\\nevidence that N’Diaye supported an entirely peaceful faction of the MFDC, coupled\\nwith the substantial evidence to the contrary, we reject N’Diaye’s argument that he\\nsupported a wholly independent, peaceful MFDC.2\\n\\n The BIA likewise was correct in concluding that N’Diaye failed to meet his\\nburden of proving that he did not know or should not have had reason to know the\\nMFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it. Substantial evidence\\nsupports the BIA’s finding that N’Diaye’s testimony was not credible as to this issue.\\nFurthermore, N’Diaye failed to put forth any other evidence, let alone the kind that\\nis clear and convincing, to show that he did not know or should not have had reason\\nto know that the MFDC engaged in terrorist activities.\\n\\n Finally, N’Diaye essentially argues that collateral estoppel and the law-of-the-\\ncase doctrine should have prevented the second immigration judge from\\nreconsidering whether N’Diaye materially supported a terrorist organization. We\\ndisagree. Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the issue was not\\npreviously determined by a valid and final judgment. Rather, it “was determined at\\nan earlier stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of\\nthe action.” Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(emphasis omitted); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983) (“It is\\nclear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We acknowledge, as did both immigration judges who heard him, that\\nN’Diaye’s testimony suffers from significant credibility issues. However, in at least\\nthe instances just cited, N’Diaye’s testimony comports with what we have found in\\nthe documents. We, therefore, cannot fault the BIA for taking him at his word in\\nthese limited circumstances.\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\frendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.”). Nor did\\nthe second immigration judge abuse his discretion by reconsidering the issue. See\\nEstrada-Rodriguez, 825 F.3d at 403 (holding that an immigration judge did not abuse\\ndiscretion by reconsidering an issue on remand); see also In re Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec.\\n600, 601 (BIA 1978) (holding that unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose,\\na “remand is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all\\nmatters” that the immigration judge deems appropriate).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny N’Diaye’s petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4419534/\", \"author_raw\": \"MELLOY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642281/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Fallou N'DIAYE, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1135\n ___________________________\n\n Fallou N’Diaye\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\n\n v.\n\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States1\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\n ____________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\n Filed: July 24, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\n\n In 2005, Petitioner Fallou N’Diaye was placed in removal proceedings for\noverstaying his visa. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\n\n\n 1\n William P. Barr has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United\nStates, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate\nProcedure 43(c).\n\funder the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied his\napplication, finding that he had not met his burden of proof on the merits and\nordering him removed. The BIA affirmed. Thereafter, N’Diaye filed a motion to\nreopen with the BIA because he had married a United States citizen after the\nimmigration judge issued the removal order. The BIA granted the motion, and\nN’Diaye was placed in another round of removal proceedings.\n\n In the second round of removal proceedings, a second immigration judge\nordered N’Diaye removed. The second immigration judge concluded that N’Diaye\nwas ineligible to adjust his status because he had previously provided material\nsupport to a terrorist organization. The BIA ultimately affirmed on the same grounds.\nN’Diaye filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision with this Court. We deny\nthe petition.\n\n I. Background\n\n A. The First Round of Proceedings\n\n N’Diaye is originally from Tindody, Senegal. He was legally admitted to the\nUnited States in September 2003 as a non-immigrant visitor with authorization to\nremain in the country for no more than six months. He overstayed his visa. In 2005,\nhe was placed in removal proceedings.\n\n N’Diaye applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In\nOctober 2008, the immigration judge held a hearing on his application. Relevant to\nthis appeal, N’Diaye said that he had been raised in Senegal for most of his childhood\nyears. His mother was dead, but his father was alive. They had both been members\nof the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (“MFDC”), serving as\n“representatives of the MFDC in the town where they used to live.” N’Diaye\nexplained that “[e]verything [a person] needed to know about the movement MFDC”\n\n -2-\n\fcould be learned from his parents, and “if [the person] wanted to become a member\nof the MFDC, they were the contacts.”\n\n N’Diaye testified that he joined the MFDC around September 1998. He\n“belong[ed] to . . . a particular section of the MFDC,” the goal of which was “to\nrecruit new members.” According to N’Diaye, the goal of the MFDC when he joined\nwas to achieve “independence from Senegal” for the Casamance region. He\nexplained how the MFDC had “started . . . in the political arena, trying to get\nindependent.” However, because “the president didn’t keep up with his promise,”\nmembers of the MFDC “started using force” sometime in the 1980s.\n\n N’Diaye explained that he never advocated the use of force against the\ngovernment, nor did he ever take any action to harm another person in furtherance of\nthe MFDC’s goals. However, on cross-examination, he explained that when he\njoined the MFDC, he was aware that it was “an armed separatist movement” that\nfought with the Senegalese government. He claimed that the MFDC only fought\nsoldiers; it did not kill Senegalese civilians. Reports to the contrary, he explained,\nwere fabricated by the Senegalese government to make the MFDC look bad.\nNevertheless, N’Diaye knew when he joined the MFDC that its members had\nweapons and used them against Senegalese soldiers.\n\n N’Diaye did much to support the MFDC. He claimed that he helped recruit\napproximately 50 people to the MFDC by “tell[ing] them about the . . . movement,\nhelp[ing] them finance wise and giv[ing]them the information about the MFDC.” He\nexplained that he had been giving money to the MFDC on a monthly basis since he\nentered the United States in 2003. He also sent clothes and other supplies to leaders\nof the MFDC. He estimated that he had given approximately $700 or $800 of his\nown money to the MFDC.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f N’Diaye’s testimony caused the government to argue at closing that he should\nbe statutorily barred from receiving relief because he had materially supported a\nterrorist organization. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (rendering an alien who\nhas “commit[ted] an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords\nmaterial support” to a terrorist organization inadmissible). In the interest of fairness,\nthe immigration judge continued the hearing to allow N’Diaye to respond to the\ngovernment’s newly raised argument. The parties submitted supplemental\ndocumentation about the MFDC, and the government submitted a brief arguing in\nfavor of applying the bar. The immigration judge then held a final merits hearing.\n\n At the final hearing, N’Diaye testified about the structure of the MFDC. He\nexplained that the MFDC is comprised of two factions: (1) the armed rebels who\nfought with the government and (2) the “other wings,” led by “Abbe Diamacoune,”\nthat negotiated with the government in a peaceful way. N’Diaye later clarified that\nAbbe was a title that meant priest; Diamacoune’s first name was really Augustin.\nN’Diaye stated that both factions had their own chief and that members of different\nethnic backgrounds made up the different factions—the peaceful faction was\npredominantly composed of people from his and one other background, whereas\npeople from a variety of ethnic groups who spoke different dialects made up the rebel\nfaction. Critically, however, on cross-examination, N’Diaye said that despite having\n“their own leader[s],” the two factions were “the same organization.” N’Diaye further\ntestified that he never possessed or used a weapon while he was a member of the\nMFDC, nor did he ever have contact with or associate with the rebel faction. The\nimmigration judge heard closing arguments on the matter and permitted the parties\nto submit further briefing one more time before she rendered her decision.\n\n The immigration judge orally announced her decision to deny N’Diaye’s\napplication for relief on September 29, 2009. Regarding asylum, the immigration\njudge said that N’Diaye failed to offer evidence of extraordinary or changed\ncircumstances to excuse his failure to file an application for asylum within one year\n\n -4-\n\fof his arrival date; therefore, she declined to treat it as an asylum application. She\nconcluded that the government had met its burden of showing that the material-\nsupport bar “may apply.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). However, she also concluded\nthat N’Diaye met his burden of “proving that the terrorism bar d[id] not apply”\nbecause N’Diaye’s testimony and documentary evidence established that the MFDC\nwas made up of two factions and N’Diaye only supported the peaceful faction. She\nfound that N’Diaye’s testimony regarding his fear of returning to Senegal was not\ncredible. She also found that his other evidence was insufficient to establish a\ncredible fear of returning. She thus determined that N’Diaye was ineligible for\nwithholding of removal and CAT relief. Both N’Diaye and the government appealed.\n\n The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision in April 2012. The BIA\nheld that there was “no clear error in [the] Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility\nassessment” or her factual findings. Moreover, the BIA concluded that “the record\nsimply d[id] not contain enough credible evidence for [N’Diaye] to meet his burden\nof proof for withholding of removal” and CAT protection. The BIA declined to\naddress the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\n\n B. The Second Round of Proceedings\n\n The BIA reopened N’Diaye’s case in September 2012 because he had married\na U.S. citizen during the pendency of his appeal to the BIA and his wife had filed an\nalien-relative visa petition on his behalf. The BIA concluded N’Diaye had submitted\nnew evidence that “would likely change the result in the case.” The BIA, however,\ndid not address the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\nInstead, the BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge “for further\nproceedings.”\n\n N’Diaye had his case transferred to a second immigration judge in Kansas City,\nMissouri, and applied to adjust his status. At a merits hearing before the second\n\n -5-\n\fimmigration judge, N’Diaye and his wife testified about their marriage, and N’Diaye\ntestified about his involvement with the MFDC. He claimed that when he was a\nmember of the MFDC, he would “attend meetings” and “go door to door with the\nneighbors, try[ing] to inform them and have them join the movement.” His actions\nwere solely limited to recruiting others. He explained that the MFDC “was a non-\nviolent organization” but that “there were other organizations at that time, multiple\norganizations that were fighting for independence, but in a violent way.” He did not\nknow much about those groups because he had “never been [a] member of those\ngroups.” He stated that the violent groups were “separate and different from [the]\nMFDC,” with “their own leaders” and “their own agenda.”\n\n On cross-examination, the government questioned N’Diaye about his testimony\nbefore the first immigration judge. N’Diaye contradicted that earlier testimony,\nstating that the MFDC was not an armed separatist movement. In a confusing manner\nhe explained that, to his knowledge, the political wing and the more militant wings\nof the MFDC were “not involved.” There were “several groups that would engage\nin” physical fighting, but his “was a non-violent group.” It “would not engage in\nfight[s],” just “political negotiations.” When asked why he had earlier stated that his\norganization had weapons and fought against government soldiers, N’Diaye\nsuggested that the court-appointed interpreter may not have accurately translated what\nhe said at earlier proceedings. The second immigration judge heard closing\narguments and took the matter under advisement.\n\n In October 2014, the second immigration judge issued a written decision. He\nheld that the material-support bar applied and denied N’Diaye’s adjustment-of-status\napplication. The second immigration judge explained that the documents both parties\nsubmitted established that the MFDC, even the peaceful wing N’Diaye claimed he\nbelonged to, engaged in various acts of violence that qualified it as a terrorist\norganization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (“Tier III”). The second\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fimmigration judge concluded that N’Diaye’s provision of “nearly $1,000.00” to the\nMFDC and his recruitment of “approximately 50 people” for the organization\nconstituted material support. The second immigration judge credited N’Diaye’s\ntestimony regarding his membership in, and support of, the MFDC because it had\nbeen consistent with the testimony N’Diaye had given to the first immigration judge.\nHowever, the second immigration judge found that N’Diaye’s “testimony regarding\nhis knowledge of the activities of the MFDC was not credible.” (Emphasis omitted).\nThe second immigration judge thus concluded that N’Diaye could not carry his\nburden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and\nshould not reasonably have known, that the [MFDC] was a terrorist organization.”\nThe second immigration judge ordered N’Diaye removed.\n\n The BIA ultimately affirmed the second immigration judge’s decision. The BIA\nconcluded that there was no legal impediment barring the second immigration judge\nfrom reexamining the issue of whether the material-support bar applied. The BIA\nagreed with the second immigration judge’s holding that the MFDC is a Tier-III\nterrorist organization. The BIA explained that “the statutory definition of ‘terrorist\norganization’ is broad” and stated that even “a subgroup engaging in terrorist\nactivities renders the whole group a terrorist organization.” The BIA also agreed with\nthe second immigration judge’s conclusion that N’Diaye did not establish by clear\nand convincing evidence that he did not know and should not reasonably have known\nthat the MFDC was a terrorist organization. The BIA concluded that the second\nimmigration judge did not clearly err in making his credibility determination. The\nBIA cited N’Diaye’s conflicting testimony and pointed out that “the documentary\nevidence does not demonstrate that the political wing of the MFDC is separate and\ndistinct from the militant wing.” N’Diaye timely petitioned this Court to review and\nreverse the BIA’s decision.\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f II. Discussion\n\n A. Standard of Review and Statutory Background\n\n When reviewing a decision from the BIA, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal\ndeterminations de novo, but we accord ‘substantial deference to the BIA’s\ninterpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.’” Godfrey v. Lynch, 811\nF.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538 (8th\nCir. 2012)). We overturn the BIA’s findings of fact only when “they are unsupported\nby substantial evidence.” Id. A factual finding is unsupported by substantial\nevidence when we, after reviewing the record as a whole, “determine that it would not\nbe possible for a reasonable fact-finder to adopt the BIA’s position.” Juarez-\nCoronado v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eusebio v. Ashcroft,\n361 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2004)). Where, as here, the BIA has “adopted the\nfindings or the reasoning of the [immigration judge], we also review the [immigration\njudge’s] decision as part of the final agency action.” Godfrey, 811 F.3d at 1017\n(quoting Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 2013)).\n\n Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a nonimmigrant alien\nseeking to adjust status must, among other things, be “admissible to the United States\nfor permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien is inadmissible if he “has\nengaged in a terrorist activity.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). The INA defines the term\n“engage in terrorist activity” to mean, among other things:\n\n to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,\n affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,\n communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial\n benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including\n chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training\n . . . (dd) to a [Tier-III] terrorist organization . . . unless the actor can\n demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not\n\n\n -8-\n\f know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was\n a terrorist organization.\n\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). A Tier-III terrorist organization is an organization “that\nis a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in,\nor has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\nA terrorist activity, in turn, is:\n\n any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is\n committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States,\n would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and\n which involves any of the following:\n\n (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an\n aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).\n\n (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or\n continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third\n person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain\n from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the\n release of the individual seized or detained.\n\n (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as\n defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of\n such a person.\n\n (IV) An assassination.\n\n (V) The use of any—\n\n (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or\n device, or\n\n (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous\n device (other than for mere personal monetary gain),\n\n\n -9-\n\f with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or\n more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.\n\n (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.\n\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). In removal proceedings, the burden is on the alien to\nestablish that he is eligible to adjust status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). If the evidence\nindicates that the alien may have materially supported a terrorist organization, he\nmust also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the material-support bar to\nadmissibility does not apply. See id.\n\n B. Analysis\n\n N’Diaye essentially argues that the MFDC he supported was not a terrorist\norganization. Alternatively, he argues that he did not know and should not\nreasonably have known the MFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it.\nWe hold that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proof on both issues.\n\n The evidence before the second immigration judge indicated that the material-\nsupport bar may have applied. N’Diaye recruited approximately 50 people for the\norganization and gave it nearly $1,000. Moreover, documentary evidence submitted\nby both parties indicated that the MFDC was a terrorist organization when N’Diaye\nsupported it. During the relevant periods, the MFDC reportedly killed, wounded, and\nmutilated citizens, committed assassinations, and engaged in other violence using\nfirearms and “other weapon[s] or dangerous device[s] . . . with intent to endanger . . .\nthe safety of one or more individuals” and to substantially damage property. 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). The burden was thus on N’Diaye to prove the material-\nsupport bar did not apply.\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n\f The BIA correctly concluded that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proving\nthat the MFDC did not qualify as a Tier-III terrorist organization at the time he\nsupported it. At all relevant times, the MFDC easily fit within the statutory definition\nof a Tier-III terrorist organization. It was an organized “group of two or more\nindividuals,” and it engaged in terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\nSpecifically, documents submitted by both parties show that the MFDC: “shelled\ncivilian targets,” in some instances to deter people from voting in elections that the\nMFDC viewed as illegitimate; violently attacked and robbed civilians; killed civilians\nwho were suspected of being government supporters; planted landmines on public\nroadways; brutalized and raped women; stole property; mutilated and tortured\nindividuals in attempts to gain information about government forces; and assassinated\nat least one government official.\n\n N’Diaye argues that the second immigration judge and the BIA erred in failing\nto make a “particularized factual finding” that the militant wing of the MFDC was a\n“‘subgroup’ of the MFDC.” He argues that case law from the Third and Seventh\nCircuits treats the BIA’s failure to make such a finding as reversible error. See Uddin\nv. Attorney Gen. United States, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2017); Khan v. Holder,\n766 F.3d 689, 699–702 (7th Cir. 2014). We need not decide whether to adopt a\nsimilar rule. In this case, N’Diaye testified that the group he supported was an\n“armed separatist” group that used weapons to fight against government forces.\nNevertheless, N’Diaye now argues that he belonged to an MFDC that was wholly\nindependent from the violent groups that committed the atrocities listed above. That\nargument, however, is unsupported by the record. Like the BIA before us, we\nacknowledge evidence in the record that suggests “the MFDC ha[d] multiple factions\nthat . . . varied across geographic and ideological lines.” However, nothing in the\nrecord convinces us that N’Diaye recruited members for and gave money to a\ncompletely peaceful faction. To the contrary, N’Diaye said he supported an “armed\nseparatist” group. He said that his group was led by Abbe Diamacoune, who the\n\n\n\n -11-\n\fdocumentary evidence reveals helped found and lead the more violent Southern Front\nof the MFDC’s militant wing in addition to the organization’s political wing.\nDiamacoune later served as president of the entire MFDC. Given the lack of\nevidence that N’Diaye supported an entirely peaceful faction of the MFDC, coupled\nwith the substantial evidence to the contrary, we reject N’Diaye’s argument that he\nsupported a wholly independent, peaceful MFDC.2\n\n The BIA likewise was correct in concluding that N’Diaye failed to meet his\nburden of proving that he did not know or should not have had reason to know the\nMFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it. Substantial evidence\nsupports the BIA’s finding that N’Diaye’s testimony was not credible as to this issue.\nFurthermore, N’Diaye failed to put forth any other evidence, let alone the kind that\nis clear and convincing, to show that he did not know or should not have had reason\nto know that the MFDC engaged in terrorist activities.\n\n Finally, N’Diaye essentially argues that collateral estoppel and the law-of-the-\ncase doctrine should have prevented the second immigration judge from\nreconsidering whether N’Diaye materially supported a terrorist organization. We\ndisagree. Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the issue was not\npreviously determined by a valid and final judgment. Rather, it “was determined at\nan earlier stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of\nthe action.” Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 2016)\n(emphasis omitted); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983) (“It is\nclear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the\n\n\n 2\n We acknowledge, as did both immigration judges who heard him, that\nN’Diaye’s testimony suffers from significant credibility issues. However, in at least\nthe instances just cited, N’Diaye’s testimony comports with what we have found in\nthe documents. We, therefore, cannot fault the BIA for taking him at his word in\nthese limited circumstances.\n\n\n -12-\n\frendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.”). Nor did\nthe second immigration judge abuse his discretion by reconsidering the issue. See\nEstrada-Rodriguez, 825 F.3d at 403 (holding that an immigration judge did not abuse\ndiscretion by reconsidering an issue on remand); see also In re Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec.\n600, 601 (BIA 1978) (holding that unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose,\na “remand is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all\nmatters” that the immigration judge deems appropriate).\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny N’Diaye’s petition for review.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -13-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Fallou N'DIAYE, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1135\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Fallou N’Diaye\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States1\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 24, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nMELLOY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2005, Petitioner Fallou N’Diaye was placed in removal proceedings for\\noverstaying his visa. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection\\n\\n\\n 1\\n William P. Barr has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United\\nStates, and is substituted as respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate\\nProcedure 43(c).\\n\\funder the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). An immigration judge denied his\\napplication, finding that he had not met his burden of proof on the merits and\\nordering him removed. The BIA affirmed. Thereafter, N’Diaye filed a motion to\\nreopen with the BIA because he had married a United States citizen after the\\nimmigration judge issued the removal order. The BIA granted the motion, and\\nN’Diaye was placed in another round of removal proceedings.\\n\\n In the second round of removal proceedings, a second immigration judge\\nordered N’Diaye removed. The second immigration judge concluded that N’Diaye\\nwas ineligible to adjust his status because he had previously provided material\\nsupport to a terrorist organization. The BIA ultimately affirmed on the same grounds.\\nN’Diaye filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision with this Court. We deny\\nthe petition.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n A. The First Round of Proceedings\\n\\n N’Diaye is originally from Tindody, Senegal. He was legally admitted to the\\nUnited States in September 2003 as a non-immigrant visitor with authorization to\\nremain in the country for no more than six months. He overstayed his visa. In 2005,\\nhe was placed in removal proceedings.\\n\\n N’Diaye applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In\\nOctober 2008, the immigration judge held a hearing on his application. Relevant to\\nthis appeal, N’Diaye said that he had been raised in Senegal for most of his childhood\\nyears. His mother was dead, but his father was alive. They had both been members\\nof the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (“MFDC”), serving as\\n“representatives of the MFDC in the town where they used to live.” N’Diaye\\nexplained that “[e]verything [a person] needed to know about the movement MFDC”\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fcould be learned from his parents, and “if [the person] wanted to become a member\\nof the MFDC, they were the contacts.”\\n\\n N’Diaye testified that he joined the MFDC around September 1998. He\\n“belong[ed] to . . . a particular section of the MFDC,” the goal of which was “to\\nrecruit new members.” According to N’Diaye, the goal of the MFDC when he joined\\nwas to achieve “independence from Senegal” for the Casamance region. He\\nexplained how the MFDC had “started . . . in the political arena, trying to get\\nindependent.” However, because “the president didn’t keep up with his promise,”\\nmembers of the MFDC “started using force” sometime in the 1980s.\\n\\n N’Diaye explained that he never advocated the use of force against the\\ngovernment, nor did he ever take any action to harm another person in furtherance of\\nthe MFDC’s goals. However, on cross-examination, he explained that when he\\njoined the MFDC, he was aware that it was “an armed separatist movement” that\\nfought with the Senegalese government. He claimed that the MFDC only fought\\nsoldiers; it did not kill Senegalese civilians. Reports to the contrary, he explained,\\nwere fabricated by the Senegalese government to make the MFDC look bad.\\nNevertheless, N’Diaye knew when he joined the MFDC that its members had\\nweapons and used them against Senegalese soldiers.\\n\\n N’Diaye did much to support the MFDC. He claimed that he helped recruit\\napproximately 50 people to the MFDC by “tell[ing] them about the . . . movement,\\nhelp[ing] them finance wise and giv[ing]them the information about the MFDC.” He\\nexplained that he had been giving money to the MFDC on a monthly basis since he\\nentered the United States in 2003. He also sent clothes and other supplies to leaders\\nof the MFDC. He estimated that he had given approximately $700 or $800 of his\\nown money to the MFDC.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f N’Diaye’s testimony caused the government to argue at closing that he should\\nbe statutorily barred from receiving relief because he had materially supported a\\nterrorist organization. See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (rendering an alien who\\nhas “commit[ted] an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords\\nmaterial support” to a terrorist organization inadmissible). In the interest of fairness,\\nthe immigration judge continued the hearing to allow N’Diaye to respond to the\\ngovernment’s newly raised argument. The parties submitted supplemental\\ndocumentation about the MFDC, and the government submitted a brief arguing in\\nfavor of applying the bar. The immigration judge then held a final merits hearing.\\n\\n At the final hearing, N’Diaye testified about the structure of the MFDC. He\\nexplained that the MFDC is comprised of two factions: (1) the armed rebels who\\nfought with the government and (2) the “other wings,” led by “Abbe Diamacoune,”\\nthat negotiated with the government in a peaceful way. N’Diaye later clarified that\\nAbbe was a title that meant priest; Diamacoune’s first name was really Augustin.\\nN’Diaye stated that both factions had their own chief and that members of different\\nethnic backgrounds made up the different factions—the peaceful faction was\\npredominantly composed of people from his and one other background, whereas\\npeople from a variety of ethnic groups who spoke different dialects made up the rebel\\nfaction. Critically, however, on cross-examination, N’Diaye said that despite having\\n“their own leader[s],” the two factions were “the same organization.” N’Diaye further\\ntestified that he never possessed or used a weapon while he was a member of the\\nMFDC, nor did he ever have contact with or associate with the rebel faction. The\\nimmigration judge heard closing arguments on the matter and permitted the parties\\nto submit further briefing one more time before she rendered her decision.\\n\\n The immigration judge orally announced her decision to deny N’Diaye’s\\napplication for relief on September 29, 2009. Regarding asylum, the immigration\\njudge said that N’Diaye failed to offer evidence of extraordinary or changed\\ncircumstances to excuse his failure to file an application for asylum within one year\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fof his arrival date; therefore, she declined to treat it as an asylum application. She\\nconcluded that the government had met its burden of showing that the material-\\nsupport bar “may apply.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). However, she also concluded\\nthat N’Diaye met his burden of “proving that the terrorism bar d[id] not apply”\\nbecause N’Diaye’s testimony and documentary evidence established that the MFDC\\nwas made up of two factions and N’Diaye only supported the peaceful faction. She\\nfound that N’Diaye’s testimony regarding his fear of returning to Senegal was not\\ncredible. She also found that his other evidence was insufficient to establish a\\ncredible fear of returning. She thus determined that N’Diaye was ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal and CAT relief. Both N’Diaye and the government appealed.\\n\\n The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision in April 2012. The BIA\\nheld that there was “no clear error in [the] Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility\\nassessment” or her factual findings. Moreover, the BIA concluded that “the record\\nsimply d[id] not contain enough credible evidence for [N’Diaye] to meet his burden\\nof proof for withholding of removal” and CAT protection. The BIA declined to\\naddress the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\\n\\n B. The Second Round of Proceedings\\n\\n The BIA reopened N’Diaye’s case in September 2012 because he had married\\na U.S. citizen during the pendency of his appeal to the BIA and his wife had filed an\\nalien-relative visa petition on his behalf. The BIA concluded N’Diaye had submitted\\nnew evidence that “would likely change the result in the case.” The BIA, however,\\ndid not address the government’s argument regarding the material-support bar.\\nInstead, the BIA remanded the case to the immigration judge “for further\\nproceedings.”\\n\\n N’Diaye had his case transferred to a second immigration judge in Kansas City,\\nMissouri, and applied to adjust his status. At a merits hearing before the second\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fimmigration judge, N’Diaye and his wife testified about their marriage, and N’Diaye\\ntestified about his involvement with the MFDC. He claimed that when he was a\\nmember of the MFDC, he would “attend meetings” and “go door to door with the\\nneighbors, try[ing] to inform them and have them join the movement.” His actions\\nwere solely limited to recruiting others. He explained that the MFDC “was a non-\\nviolent organization” but that “there were other organizations at that time, multiple\\norganizations that were fighting for independence, but in a violent way.” He did not\\nknow much about those groups because he had “never been [a] member of those\\ngroups.” He stated that the violent groups were “separate and different from [the]\\nMFDC,” with “their own leaders” and “their own agenda.”\\n\\n On cross-examination, the government questioned N’Diaye about his testimony\\nbefore the first immigration judge. N’Diaye contradicted that earlier testimony,\\nstating that the MFDC was not an armed separatist movement. In a confusing manner\\nhe explained that, to his knowledge, the political wing and the more militant wings\\nof the MFDC were “not involved.” There were “several groups that would engage\\nin” physical fighting, but his “was a non-violent group.” It “would not engage in\\nfight[s],” just “political negotiations.” When asked why he had earlier stated that his\\norganization had weapons and fought against government soldiers, N’Diaye\\nsuggested that the court-appointed interpreter may not have accurately translated what\\nhe said at earlier proceedings. The second immigration judge heard closing\\narguments and took the matter under advisement.\\n\\n In October 2014, the second immigration judge issued a written decision. He\\nheld that the material-support bar applied and denied N’Diaye’s adjustment-of-status\\napplication. The second immigration judge explained that the documents both parties\\nsubmitted established that the MFDC, even the peaceful wing N’Diaye claimed he\\nbelonged to, engaged in various acts of violence that qualified it as a terrorist\\norganization under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (“Tier III”). The second\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fimmigration judge concluded that N’Diaye’s provision of “nearly $1,000.00” to the\\nMFDC and his recruitment of “approximately 50 people” for the organization\\nconstituted material support. The second immigration judge credited N’Diaye’s\\ntestimony regarding his membership in, and support of, the MFDC because it had\\nbeen consistent with the testimony N’Diaye had given to the first immigration judge.\\nHowever, the second immigration judge found that N’Diaye’s “testimony regarding\\nhis knowledge of the activities of the MFDC was not credible.” (Emphasis omitted).\\nThe second immigration judge thus concluded that N’Diaye could not carry his\\nburden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and\\nshould not reasonably have known, that the [MFDC] was a terrorist organization.”\\nThe second immigration judge ordered N’Diaye removed.\\n\\n The BIA ultimately affirmed the second immigration judge’s decision. The BIA\\nconcluded that there was no legal impediment barring the second immigration judge\\nfrom reexamining the issue of whether the material-support bar applied. The BIA\\nagreed with the second immigration judge’s holding that the MFDC is a Tier-III\\nterrorist organization. The BIA explained that “the statutory definition of ‘terrorist\\norganization’ is broad” and stated that even “a subgroup engaging in terrorist\\nactivities renders the whole group a terrorist organization.” The BIA also agreed with\\nthe second immigration judge’s conclusion that N’Diaye did not establish by clear\\nand convincing evidence that he did not know and should not reasonably have known\\nthat the MFDC was a terrorist organization. The BIA concluded that the second\\nimmigration judge did not clearly err in making his credibility determination. The\\nBIA cited N’Diaye’s conflicting testimony and pointed out that “the documentary\\nevidence does not demonstrate that the political wing of the MFDC is separate and\\ndistinct from the militant wing.” N’Diaye timely petitioned this Court to review and\\nreverse the BIA’s decision.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f II. Discussion\\n\\n A. Standard of Review and Statutory Background\\n\\n When reviewing a decision from the BIA, “[w]e review the BIA’s legal\\ndeterminations de novo, but we accord ‘substantial deference to the BIA’s\\ninterpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers.’” Godfrey v. Lynch, 811\\nF.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Spacek v. Holder, 688 F.3d 536, 538 (8th\\nCir. 2012)). We overturn the BIA’s findings of fact only when “they are unsupported\\nby substantial evidence.” Id. A factual finding is unsupported by substantial\\nevidence when we, after reviewing the record as a whole, “determine that it would not\\nbe possible for a reasonable fact-finder to adopt the BIA’s position.” Juarez-\\nCoronado v. Barr, 919 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Eusebio v. Ashcroft,\\n361 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2004)). Where, as here, the BIA has “adopted the\\nfindings or the reasoning of the [immigration judge], we also review the [immigration\\njudge’s] decision as part of the final agency action.” Godfrey, 811 F.3d at 1017\\n(quoting Garcia-Gonzalez v. Holder, 737 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a nonimmigrant alien\\nseeking to adjust status must, among other things, be “admissible to the United States\\nfor permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). An alien is inadmissible if he “has\\nengaged in a terrorist activity.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). The INA defines the term\\n“engage in terrorist activity” to mean, among other things:\\n\\n to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,\\n affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,\\n communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial\\n benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including\\n chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training\\n . . . (dd) to a [Tier-III] terrorist organization . . . unless the actor can\\n demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was\\n a terrorist organization.\\n\\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). A Tier-III terrorist organization is an organization “that\\nis a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in,\\nor has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\\nA terrorist activity, in turn, is:\\n\\n any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is\\n committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States,\\n would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and\\n which involves any of the following:\\n\\n (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an\\n aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).\\n\\n (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or\\n continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third\\n person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain\\n from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the\\n release of the individual seized or detained.\\n\\n (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as\\n defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of\\n such a person.\\n\\n (IV) An assassination.\\n\\n (V) The use of any—\\n\\n (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or\\n device, or\\n\\n (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous\\n device (other than for mere personal monetary gain),\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or\\n more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.\\n\\n (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.\\n\\nId. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). In removal proceedings, the burden is on the alien to\\nestablish that he is eligible to adjust status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). If the evidence\\nindicates that the alien may have materially supported a terrorist organization, he\\nmust also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the material-support bar to\\nadmissibility does not apply. See id.\\n\\n B. Analysis\\n\\n N’Diaye essentially argues that the MFDC he supported was not a terrorist\\norganization. Alternatively, he argues that he did not know and should not\\nreasonably have known the MFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it.\\nWe hold that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proof on both issues.\\n\\n The evidence before the second immigration judge indicated that the material-\\nsupport bar may have applied. N’Diaye recruited approximately 50 people for the\\norganization and gave it nearly $1,000. Moreover, documentary evidence submitted\\nby both parties indicated that the MFDC was a terrorist organization when N’Diaye\\nsupported it. During the relevant periods, the MFDC reportedly killed, wounded, and\\nmutilated citizens, committed assassinations, and engaged in other violence using\\nfirearms and “other weapon[s] or dangerous device[s] . . . with intent to endanger . . .\\nthe safety of one or more individuals” and to substantially damage property. 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b). The burden was thus on N’Diaye to prove the material-\\nsupport bar did not apply.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f The BIA correctly concluded that N’Diaye failed to meet his burden of proving\\nthat the MFDC did not qualify as a Tier-III terrorist organization at the time he\\nsupported it. At all relevant times, the MFDC easily fit within the statutory definition\\nof a Tier-III terrorist organization. It was an organized “group of two or more\\nindividuals,” and it engaged in terrorist activities. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).\\nSpecifically, documents submitted by both parties show that the MFDC: “shelled\\ncivilian targets,” in some instances to deter people from voting in elections that the\\nMFDC viewed as illegitimate; violently attacked and robbed civilians; killed civilians\\nwho were suspected of being government supporters; planted landmines on public\\nroadways; brutalized and raped women; stole property; mutilated and tortured\\nindividuals in attempts to gain information about government forces; and assassinated\\nat least one government official.\\n\\n N’Diaye argues that the second immigration judge and the BIA erred in failing\\nto make a “particularized factual finding” that the militant wing of the MFDC was a\\n“‘subgroup’ of the MFDC.” He argues that case law from the Third and Seventh\\nCircuits treats the BIA’s failure to make such a finding as reversible error. See Uddin\\nv. Attorney Gen. United States, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2017); Khan v. Holder,\\n766 F.3d 689, 699–702 (7th Cir. 2014). We need not decide whether to adopt a\\nsimilar rule. In this case, N’Diaye testified that the group he supported was an\\n“armed separatist” group that used weapons to fight against government forces.\\nNevertheless, N’Diaye now argues that he belonged to an MFDC that was wholly\\nindependent from the violent groups that committed the atrocities listed above. That\\nargument, however, is unsupported by the record. Like the BIA before us, we\\nacknowledge evidence in the record that suggests “the MFDC ha[d] multiple factions\\nthat . . . varied across geographic and ideological lines.” However, nothing in the\\nrecord convinces us that N’Diaye recruited members for and gave money to a\\ncompletely peaceful faction. To the contrary, N’Diaye said he supported an “armed\\nseparatist” group. He said that his group was led by Abbe Diamacoune, who the\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fdocumentary evidence reveals helped found and lead the more violent Southern Front\\nof the MFDC’s militant wing in addition to the organization’s political wing.\\nDiamacoune later served as president of the entire MFDC. Given the lack of\\nevidence that N’Diaye supported an entirely peaceful faction of the MFDC, coupled\\nwith the substantial evidence to the contrary, we reject N’Diaye’s argument that he\\nsupported a wholly independent, peaceful MFDC.2\\n\\n The BIA likewise was correct in concluding that N’Diaye failed to meet his\\nburden of proving that he did not know or should not have had reason to know the\\nMFDC was a terrorist organization when he supported it. Substantial evidence\\nsupports the BIA’s finding that N’Diaye’s testimony was not credible as to this issue.\\nFurthermore, N’Diaye failed to put forth any other evidence, let alone the kind that\\nis clear and convincing, to show that he did not know or should not have had reason\\nto know that the MFDC engaged in terrorist activities.\\n\\n Finally, N’Diaye essentially argues that collateral estoppel and the law-of-the-\\ncase doctrine should have prevented the second immigration judge from\\nreconsidering whether N’Diaye materially supported a terrorist organization. We\\ndisagree. Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the issue was not\\npreviously determined by a valid and final judgment. Rather, it “was determined at\\nan earlier stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the reopening of\\nthe action.” Estrada-Rodriguez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(emphasis omitted); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983) (“It is\\nclear that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply if a party moves the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We acknowledge, as did both immigration judges who heard him, that\\nN’Diaye’s testimony suffers from significant credibility issues. However, in at least\\nthe instances just cited, N’Diaye’s testimony comports with what we have found in\\nthe documents. We, therefore, cannot fault the BIA for taking him at his word in\\nthese limited circumstances.\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\frendering court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.”). Nor did\\nthe second immigration judge abuse his discretion by reconsidering the issue. See\\nEstrada-Rodriguez, 825 F.3d at 403 (holding that an immigration judge did not abuse\\ndiscretion by reconsidering an issue on remand); see also In re Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec.\\n600, 601 (BIA 1978) (holding that unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose,\\na “remand is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all\\nmatters” that the immigration judge deems appropriate).\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny N’Diaye’s petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3284,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642838,"string":"4,642,838"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Z.J., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH Her Next Friend, Je'tuan JONES, Plaintiff - Appellee v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Through Its Members: Alvin Brooks, Michael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric Enderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; And Venasa Ray, in Their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants - Appellants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Z. J. v. Kansas City Brd of Police Comm"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3365"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Kelly, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889002/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889003/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889004/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3365\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Z.J., a minor, by and through her next friend, Je’tuan Jones\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nKansas City Board of Police Commissioners, through its members: Alvin Brooks,\\nMichael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason\\n Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric\\nEnderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; and Venasa Ray,\\n in their individual and official capacities\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Detectives with the Kansas City Police Department (“KCPD”) obtained a\\nsearch warrant for what they mistakenly believed was a homicide suspect’s residence.\\n\\nAfter the suspect was apprehended and arrested at another location, the detectives,\\nhoping to find the homicide victim’s cell phone and other evidence, had a SWAT\\nteam execute the search warrant. When the SWAT team knocked on the door, a\\nyoung woman opened the inside front door and held up her keys to indicate she was\\ngoing to unlock the screen door. Even though the SWAT team knew the suspect was\\nalready in custody, they broke open the screen and threw a flash-bang grenade into\\nthe living room of the home before the young woman could open the door.\\n\\n As it turned out, the suspect had not lived at the residence for some time and\\nthe only people inside were three women (two of them elderly) and a two-year old\\ngirl. The two-year old girl suffered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) from\\nthe blast of the flash-bang grenade. She sued the SWAT team officers, the detectives,\\nand the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners (“the Board”) under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and\\nthe defendants appealed. We affirm as to the SWAT team officers, reverse as to the\\ndetectives, and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the Board.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In October 2010, three homicide detectives with the KCPD, Barbara Eckert,\\nMichael Jones, and Venasa Ray (“the detectives”), began investigating a homicide.\\nAs the victim’s cell phone was missing, the detectives obtained call records for the\\nphone after the time of the murder, as well as the GPS coordinates for those calls.\\nThe victim’s phone had been used after the murder to call a residence on Bristol\\nAvenue (“the Bristol residence”) in Kansas City, Missouri. Using a database\\ncontaining criminal history information from regional law enforcement agencies and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nmotor vehicle records, the detectives learned that an individual named Lee Charles1\\nresided at the Bristol residence.\\n\\n The next morning, the detectives learned the victim’s phone was turned on and\\nwas within 80 meters of a particular intersection, an area including both the Bristol\\nresidence and two apartment buildings on Winchester Avenue (“the Winchester\\napartments”). Eckert and another detective arrived at the area to locate the phone.\\nWhile standing between the two Winchester apartments, the detectives could hear a\\nphone ringing when a third officer called the victim’s phone number, although they\\ncould not pinpoint its exact location. When more officers arrived, they again tried to\\nlocate the phone, but it appeared the battery had died or the phone had been turned\\noff.\\n\\n That evening, police learned the victim’s phone was in the area of a particular\\nintersection in Grandview, Missouri. A detective called the phone. Someone\\nanswered the call, but did not respond. The detective heard background noises that\\nsounded like a restaurant kitchen. The detectives sought the names of employees\\nworking that evening from five restaurants in the area. Charles was working at one\\nof those restaurants that evening.\\n\\n Records from the victim’s phone also showed it had been used after the murder\\nto call a Family Dollar store. The detectives obtained a list of employees and contact\\ninformation from the store manager. Charles was listed as an employee and his\\naddress was listed as the Bristol residence.\\n\\n Charles was arrested in the afternoon of November 3. The same day, Detective\\nJones applied for a search warrant for what was believed to be Charles’s residence on\\n\\n\\n 1\\n While he was initially a suspect, it was eventually discovered that another\\nindividual — not Charles — had committed the homicide.\\n -3-\\n\\nBristol Avenue. The warrant application omitted the fact the detectives had heard the\\nvictim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments — not at the Bristol residence.\\nAt 3:00 p.m., the warrant was issued, authorizing police to search for and seize cell\\nphones (including cell phones matching the description of the victim’s phone),\\nclothing or shoes with blood, knives with trace evidence, items that could be used for\\nstrangulation such as cords, wire, or rope with trace evidence, and the victim’s keys.\\n\\n Detective Jones contacted Sergeant Rusley of the KCPD Tactical Response\\nTeam about executing the search warrant at the Bristol residence. At 6:15 p.m.,\\nRusley conducted a briefing with the detectives, as well as Tactical Response Team\\nmembers Robert Jorgenson, Caleb Lenz, William Nauyok, Robert McLaughlin, Eric\\nEnderlin, and Charles Evans (“the SWAT team”). The SWAT team was informed\\nthat Charles had already been taken into custody. After the briefing, officers drove\\nby the Bristol residence to confirm the address. No other surveillance of the house\\nwas done to learn who resided there.\\n\\n At 7:00 p.m., the SWAT team, dressed in tactical gear with weapons drawn,\\napproached the front door of the Bristol residence. The front entrance had both an\\ninside wooden door and an outside metal screen door, each of which were “double-\\nkeyed,” meaning they required a key to open from both the inside and the outside.\\nBecause the warrant did not authorize a “no knock” entry, the SWAT team knocked\\non the door and announced: “Police, search warrant!” At the time, there were four\\npeople inside the residence: the plaintiff, Z.J., a two year old girl; Laverne Charles,\\nage 84; Leona Smith, age 68; and Carla Brown, age 24. Carla grabbed the keys to the\\ndoor and opened the inside door.\\n\\n What happened next is disputed. According to Carla, when she opened the\\ninner door, she saw through the screen door a lot of people outside, yelling, which\\nstartled her. She later said she didn’t know whether she backed away from the screen\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ndoor when she first saw the officers. She then held up the keys to the door in her\\nhand and jingled them for the SWAT team to see in order to indicate that she was\\ngoing to open up the door.2 Before she had the opportunity to open it, the SWAT\\nteam knocked out the screen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over Carla’s head into\\nthe living room of the house. Carla testified that she would have opened the screen\\ndoor had she been given the opportunity to do so.\\n\\n According to Sgt. Rusley, the SWAT team waited five to ten seconds after\\nknocking the first time before beginning to knock again. As they began knocking on\\nthe door the second time, the team was preparing to pry open the screen door with a\\ndevice. At the same time, Carla opened the inside door. Rusley claimed that “she\\nrefused [to open the screen door] and walked away,” after which they breached the\\nscreen door and threw in the flash-bang grenade. He explained that the flash-bang\\ngrenade was deployed because the SWAT team was “compromised,” meaning “that\\noccupants of the residence knew we were there and that we no longer had the element\\nof surprise.”\\n\\n Officer Jorgenson gave a slightly different account to the KCPD’s Internal\\nAffairs Unit, confirming part of Carla’s account and stating that she only “took a\\ncouple of steps back” before she “froze there” and then “waived a set of keys”:\\n\\n [As the SWAT team knocked on the door a second time,] we were\\n getting ready to set the hooligan tool into the doorframe and then the\\n front door was open[ed] from the inside of the house and the lady was\\n standing there. As soon as she saw us, she took a couple of steps back.\\n\\n 2\\n Carla’s testimony is corroborated by statements made by Leona in an interview\\nwith KCPD Internal Affairs. On summary judgment, the defendants objected to the\\nplaintiff’s use of these statements by Leona, who is now deceased, as hearsay. The\\ndistrict court does not appear to have ruled on the hearsay objection. We do not\\nconsider Leona’s statements in reaching our decision.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n I’m sure she was in fear of what was going on. I told her to open the\\n door and she just kind of froze there. At one point she began to turn\\n away as we were still yelling at her to open the door. She waived a set\\n of keys. At the time, I had no idea what that meant. The sergeant\\n announced “hit it,” which means make entry into the residence. The\\n officer that had the hooligan tool took a swipe at the door attempting to\\n punch a hole in it so that we could access it with our hand and then\\n unlock it. After producing a hole in the door, the point-man reached in,\\n in an attempt to unlock it, only to find out it was a keyed lock. So then\\n we set the hool[igan tool] into the side of the door, hit it with the ram\\n and pr[i]ed the door open. Due to the fact it took us a longer than the\\n normal amount of time to get into the residence, the sergeant deployed\\n a noise flash diversionary device into the living room of the structure.\\n\\n The flash-bang grenade caught the living room drapes on fire. The SWAT\\nteam had to remove the drapes from the house and place them in the front yard before\\ncontinuing through the rest of the house. The SWAT team found two-year old Z.J.\\nin the living room. One officer acknowledged Z.J. was “very shaken from the whole\\nsituation.” The team placed Carla and Leona in zip tie restraints, but was unable to\\nplace restraints on Laverne because of her advanced age and physical condition.\\n\\n After the SWAT team cleared the house, the detectives, who had been waiting\\na block away, took control of the house. The detectives had Carla and Leona released\\nfrom the restraints. They also learned that Charles no longer resided there and had\\nbeen kicked out several months earlier. Charles was living a block away in an\\napartment with another individual and did not have any property at the Bristol\\nresidence.\\n\\n After the SWAT team raid, Z.J. suffered significant developmental regression\\nand was diagnosed with PTSD. In August 2015, Z.J., through her next friend Je’taun\\nJones, sued the detectives, the SWAT team members, and the Board (through its\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nmembers)3 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983. As to the detectives, Z.J. alleged they omitted information on the warrant\\napplication about hearing the victim’s phone ringing inside the Winchester\\napartments. She also alleged they failed to conduct a sufficient investigation prior to\\nexecuting the warrant and then unjustifiably chose to have the SWAT team execute\\nthe search. As to the members of the SWAT team, she alleged they used excessive\\nforce by throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. And as to the Board, she\\nalleged its policies and practices were deliberately indifferent to the\\nunconstitutionally excessive use4 of flash-bang grenades by the KCPD.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n In their arguments, the parties categorize the several defendants into these\\nthree groups. The Appellants have not argued the claims against any individual\\ndefendant should be treated differently from other defendants in the same group (e.g.,\\nthe SWAT team officers who did not authorize or throw the flash-bang grenade may\\nnot be liable even if those who did are liable). Following the parties’ lead for\\npurposes of this appeal, we analyze the claims against the detectives, the SWAT team,\\nand the Board as they relate to those groups, rather than each individual defendant\\nseparately.\\n 4\\n On summary judgment, the plaintiff presented evidence to support what was\\nalleged to be excessive use of SWAT teams to execute search warrants and excessive\\nuse of flash-bang grenades by those SWAT teams. KCPD policy provided that\\n“Uniformed/tactical entry personnel will be used for making entry during the\\nexecution of all search warrants,” but also stated that “[n]ot every search warrant will\\nrequire the presence of uniformed/tactical entry personnel, e.g., warrants served on\\na safe deposit box or an impounded vehicle.” As the district court noted, the Board\\ndid not have any policy about the use of flash-bang grenades — such as when their\\nuse is appropriate and how to use them safely. One officer estimated that in\\nexecuting search warrants, flash-bang grenades were used 80-90% of the time;\\nanother officer estimated that in his experience they were used about 50% of the time;\\nand a third officer estimated they were used about 75% of the time.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\n The defendants moved for summary judgment, with the individual defendants’\\nmotions based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions and the\\ndefendants timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred in denying their motion for\\nsummary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment where it “shows that\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and . . . is entitled to judgment as\\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In an appeal from a denial of summary\\njudgment based on qualified immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction to review the\\ndecision “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.\\n511, 530 (1985). We do not review the “district court’s determination about what\\nfactual issues are ‘genuine.’” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Rather,\\nour review “is limited to the purely legal issue of whether the facts alleged support\\na claim of violation of clearly established law.” Berry v. Doss, 900 F.3d 1017, 1021\\n(8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Mallak v. City of Baxter, 823 F.3d 441, 445–46\\n(8th Cir. 2016)). However, “[t]here is one exception to such a jurisdictional\\nlimitation on our review: we may reject the district court’s factual findings to the\\nextent that they are ‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’” Wallace v. City of\\nAlexander, 843 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d\\n1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n A. The SWAT Team\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying summary judgment to\\nthe SWAT team officers because they did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and in\\nany event, are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nestablished law. We disagree. Any reasonable officer would have known the use a\\nflash-bang grenade under these circumstances constituted excessive force.\\n\\n Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to\\n“establish[ a] cause[] of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from\\nGovernment officers who violated federal law.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,\\n1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Though\\nthe text of § 1983 contains no provision of immunity, the Supreme Court has\\nrecognized a qualified immunity which “protects government officials ‘from liability\\nfor civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established\\nstatutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”\\nPearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457\\nU.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity entails a two step analysis: first,\\ndetermining whether “the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation\\nof a constitutional right,” and second, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly\\nestablished’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (quoting\\nSaucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).\\n\\n We first address the initial step of the qualified immunity analysis, which in\\nthis procedural context is: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable\\nto Z.J., the SWAT team officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\n\\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown v. City of Golden\\nValley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497,\\n502 (8th Cir. 2006)). This evaluation “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and\\nquality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\ncountervailing governmental interests at stake,” and must be done “from the\\nperspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of\\nhindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).\\n\\n The reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades depends upon the\\ncircumstances. See generally Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nCertainly, they can be an important tool for law enforcement officers to gain an\\nelement of surprise while entering a dangerous environment and can at times obviate\\nthe need for officers to use deadly force. See Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779\\n(9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e recognize that less-than-lethal alternatives are intended to\\navoid unnecessary fatalities.”).\\n\\n But these weapons also carry serious risks. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30.\\nThe record evidence shows the flash-bang grenade used here is four times louder than\\na 12-gauge shotgun blast and emits a light 107 times brighter than the brightest high-\\nbeam vehicle headlight. It has a powerful enough concussive effect to break windows\\nand put holes in walls. The flash-bang burns at around 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit,\\ncreating an obvious and serious risk of burning individuals, damaging property, and\\nstarting fires (as occurred here). In some cases, they can even be lethal. And as this\\ncase illustrates well, they pose a risk of traumatizing unsuspecting\\noccupants — particularly small children like two-year old Z.J.\\n\\n While the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades while executing a\\nwarrant is not reducible to a simple and categorical rule, several considerations guide\\nour analysis. Most importantly, we consider whether officers had reason to believe\\nthey would encounter a dangerous, violent suspect. See Estate of Escobedo v.\\nBender, 600 F.3d 770, 784–86 (7th Cir. 2010). Their use is more likely to be\\nreasonable if the officers expect to encounter an individual who is known to be armed\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nand dangerous or who has a history of violence. Their use is also more likely to be\\nreasonable if the situation presents a need for the element of surprise in order to\\nprotect the safety of officers or others. See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d\\n963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding use of flash-bang grenade was reasonable in part\\nbecause “the officers had ample reason to be concerned about their personal safety”);\\nBoyd, 374 F.3d at 779 (“There are likely circumstances in which a risk to officers’\\nsafety would make the use of a flash-bang device appropriate.”). On the other hand,\\ntheir use is less likely to be reasonable if officers unreasonably fail to ascertain\\nwhether innocent bystanders will be present in the area the flash-bang grenade is\\ndeployed. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779; United States v.\\nJones, 214 F.3d 836, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n Whether the use of the flash-bang grenade here was reasonable is not a close\\nquestion. The SWAT team knew the suspect, Charles, was already in custody. Any\\npotential justification based on the fact Charles was (at the time) suspected of murder\\nis eliminated by the fact the SWAT team knew they would not encounter Charles\\nthere. Nor did they have any indication that other people at the residence would pose\\nany threat. In fact, they had no idea who was inside the house because they failed to\\ndo any investigation into that question beyond a quick drive-by to check the address.\\nThe use of a flash-bang grenade under these facts was not reasonable. “The use of\\na [flash-bang] grenade must be justified by the particular risk posed in the execution\\nof the warrant.” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 239 (2d Cir. 2014). Nor was the\\nmanner of use reasonable. They threw the flash-bang grenade into the house blindly\\nwithout knowing whether children, elderly, or other innocent individuals were inside.\\n\\n The Appellants argue the use of the flash-bang was reasonable because the\\nSWAT team may have still faced danger in spite of Charles already being in custody.\\nAfter all, they posit in their brief, the murder “could have been part of a robbery by\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\na group of criminals,” and Charles’s arrest “could have tipped the others off that a\\nsearch or arrest was imminent.” Of course, they had no actual information to support\\nthis after-the-fact speculation. More to the point, however, this argument relies on\\na dangerously flawed premise. The argument that the SWAT team was justified in\\nusing a flash-bang grenade because they did not know for certain it was unnecessary\\nis precisely backwards; it makes using that dangerous level of force the default. This\\ntype of “flash-bang first, ask questions later” approach runs headlong into the Fourth\\nAmendment. Law enforcement officers like the SWAT team members here need an\\nactual justification for using a flash-bang grenade; the mere hypothetical possibility\\nthat someone dangerous could be in a house they are entering — without any actual\\nfacts to indicate that is true or likely to be true — is not sufficient. See Milan, 795\\nF.3d at 730; Terebesi, 764 F.3d at 236–239; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779.\\n\\n Nor was the use of the flash-bang grenade justified by anything Carla did when\\nopening the door. Some of the factual details on what happened when she opened the\\ninside door are in dispute, and the facts must be read in the light most favorable to the\\nplaintiff. Carla held up her keys to indicate to the SWAT team her intention to unlock\\nthe screen door. But before she could get the door open, the officers broke open the\\nscreen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over her head. The explanation that the\\nflash-bang was used because the SWAT team believed it was “compromised,”\\nmeaning “that occupants of the residence knew [the SWAT team officers] were there\\nand that [the officers] no longer had the element of surprise,” is unpersuasive. The\\nsearch warrant did not authorize the SWAT team to conduct a “no-knock” warrant,\\nand so they knocked on the front door and announced their presence, which obviously\\ndefeated the element of surprise. After all, the purpose of the constitutional knock-\\nand-announce requirement is to allow a citizen the chance to come to the door and\\nallow entrance to an officer who is legally entitled to enter. See Wilson v. Arkansas,\\n514 U.S. 927, 931–36 (1995). Even assuming, as Officer Jorgenson stated, that Carla\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\ntook a couple of steps backwards and then “froze there,” the officers were not\\njustified in blindly throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. They had no\\nreason to believe Carla or anyone else inside posed any danger to them. The SWAT\\nteam’s use of the flash-bang grenade was unreasonable and violated the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n As the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, we address “whether the\\nright at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. In making this determination, “the focus is on whether the\\nofficer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful . . . .” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.\\nCt. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per\\ncuriam)). Thus, the Supreme Court has said that “[a]s the qualified immunity defense\\nhas evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those\\nwho knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To\\nsatisfy this fair notice requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently\\nclear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that\\nright.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). It is not required that there\\nbe “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or\\nconstitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741\\n(2011). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for\\ntransgressing bright lines.” Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004)).\\n\\n The “clearly established” requirement of qualified immunity provides officers\\nwith ample room for honest mistakes, but the SWAT team officers’ conduct falls\\noutside even this generous standard. First, the use of the flash-bang grenade was\\nunreasonable under all of the relevant case law. Second, it would have been obvious\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\nto any reasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under those\\ncircumstances was unreasonable.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has established that, broadly speaking, “[i]n executing a\\nsearch warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to\\nensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.” Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele,\\n550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007). At a narrower level, see al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742\\n(instructing courts not to “define clearly established law at a high level of\\ngenerality”), the relevant case law clearly established that the use of flash-bang\\ngrenades is unreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the\\nthreat of violence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any\\ninnocent bystanders in the area it is deployed. It is true this court has not yet\\naddressed the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades, but many other courts\\nhave.5 See Bender, 600 F.3d at 784–86 (stating “the use of a flash bang device is\\njustified when ‘potentially violent people [can] be found in [a] house,’ as opposed to\\nindividuals who pose no threat to the police or others” (quoting United States v.\\nFolks, 236 F.3d 384, 388 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829,\\n836 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering such factors as whether the defendant had a history\\nof violent crime and was armed and the need for the element of surprise); Boyd, 374\\nF.3d at 779 (stating that “it cannot be a reasonable use of force under the Fourth\\nAmendment to throw [a flash-bang grenade] ‘blind’ into a room occupied by innocent\\nbystanders absent a strong governmental interest, careful consideration of alternatives\\n\\n 5\\n The Appellants apparently argue the “clearly established” analysis must\\ninvolve only looking to cases from the relevant circuit and the Supreme Court. It is\\ntrue plaintiffs can show a right is clearly established by pointing to “cases of\\ncontrolling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident,” but they may\\nalso do so by pointing to “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority” — including\\ncases from other jurisdictions. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (emphasis\\nadded); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 541 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\nand appropriate measures to reduce the risk of injury”); Molina, 325 F.3d at 973\\n(concluding the use of a flash-bang grenade was reasonable because suspect had a\\nviolent criminal record and it was not used around the suspect’s wife and children).\\n\\n The dissent on this issue relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Dukes v.\\nDeaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2017), to conclude the SWAT team here did\\nnot violate clearly established law, post at 25–27. But in Dukes, the defendant officer\\nwas executing a “no-knock” search warrant in a house in which drug trafficking was\\nknown to occur and at which a drug dealer resided who was known to carry a\\nhandgun. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that there was no violation of clearly\\nestablished law was based, at least in part, on its consideration of that danger faced\\nby the officer. See Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1044. Our conclusion is wholly consistent\\nwith Dukes. Similarly, the cases from other circuits cited by the dissent that found\\na constitutional violation but no violation of clearly established law are not\\ninconsistent with our conclusion. Each of those cases, like Dukes, involved a\\nsituation where officers faced the threat of a potentially armed and dangerous\\nindividual. See Dukes, 852 F.3d 1039–40; Bing, 456 F.3d at 559–62 (involving an\\narmed and intoxicated individual who had already fired his weapon causing police\\nto fear for their lives); Boyd, 374 F.3d at 777 (noting that officers knew armed\\ncriminals could be inside the apartment). Those cases can be read as inconsistent\\nwith our conclusion only by defining the right at issue at a very broad level of\\ngenerality. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. We do not hold that every unreasonable use\\nof a flash-bang grenade is a violation of clearly established law. Rather, we hold only\\nthat it was clearly established in 2010 that the use of flash-bang grenades is\\nunreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the threat of\\nviolence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any innocent\\nbystanders in the area it is deployed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\n The Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited by the dissent not only had differing\\nfacts but were addressing the clarity of the law as it existed in different times. See\\ngenerally Bing, 456 F.3d 555 (involving a violation occurring in 2002); Boyd, 374\\nF.3d 773 (involving a violation occurring in 1997). Each case contributed to the\\ngrowing clarity of the law on when the use of flash-bang grenades is appropriate. But\\nmore importantly, disagreement about whether the law was clearly established does\\nnot equate to disagreement about the law itself. Under all of the relevant case law,\\nthe SWAT team officers’ use of a flash-bang grenade in this situation would be\\nunconstitutional. The court is not aware of, and neither the parties nor the dissent\\nhave pointed to, any case law in existence in 2010 under which the SWAT team’s\\nconduct would be constitutional.\\n\\n Even aside from the consensus in persuasive case law at the time, the SWAT\\nteam officers violated clearly established law because it would be obvious to any\\nreasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under these circumstances\\nwas unreasonable. For a right to be clearly established, it is not required that there\\nbe “a case directly on point.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. An officer may have fair\\nnotice based on the fact his conduct is obviously unlawful, even in the absence of a\\ncase addressing the particular violation. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741\\n(2002); see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (“Of course, in an obvious case, [the\\nFourth Amendment reasonableness standard articulated at a high level of generality]\\ncan ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.”);\\nRokusek v. Jansen, 899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018). The only potential threat of\\nwhich the SWAT team was aware was Charles, then a suspect in a murder\\ninvestigation. But they knew Charles was in custody. They had no reason to believe\\nany accomplices were involved in the murder and present in the residence. Nor did\\nthey take any precautions to avoid harming innocent bystanders. And the rationale\\nthat they were “compromised” is nonsense because it is undisputed they knocked and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\nannounced their presence. Only the plainly incompetent officer announces his\\npresence at a house with no known dangerous people and then decides to throw in a\\nflash-bang grenade because the occupants know he is there. Nor does the fact it took\\nlonger than normal for the SWAT team to gain entry provide any support for their\\ndecision. They could not have reasonably believed that “safety concerns necessitated\\nan expedited entry by using a flash-bang grenade” based on the delay, as the dissent\\nposits, post at 29, because they had no reason to believe anyone inside posed any\\ndanger to them and the young woman who answered the door was unarmed and gave\\nno indication she posed any threat. Even though they were investigating a homicide,\\nthey knew the sole suspect was already in custody and they had no reason to believe\\nthe residence harbored other dangerous individuals. Blindly throwing a flash-bang\\ngrenade into the residence under these circumstances was obviously unconstitutional.\\n\\n The cases cited by the dissent do not lend any support to the position the\\nSWAT team’s use of the flash-bang grenade was not obviously unconstitutional. As\\ndiscussed above, those cases each involved circumstances where officers knew or had\\nreason to believe the residence in which the flash-bang grenade was used contained\\na potentially violent individual. Under the facts of this case, where the SWAT team\\nhad no basis to believe they would face the threat of violence and unreasonably failed\\nto ascertain whether there were any innocent bystanders in the area the flash-bang\\ngrenade was deployed, their violation was obvious.\\n\\n The SWAT team officers violated clearly established law when they used the\\nflash-bang grenade. The district court did not err by denying summary judgment on\\nqualified immunity to the SWAT team.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n\\n B. The Detectives\\n\\n The Appellants argue the detectives were entitled to summary judgment\\nbecause (1) the information they omitted from the search warrant application was not\\nmaterial; and (2) their decision to use a SWAT team to execute the search warrant\\nwas not unreasonable or did not violate clearly established law. We agree the\\ndetectives are entitled to summary judgment because there was probable cause to\\nsupport the search warrant, even considering the omitted information, and because\\ntheir decision to use a SWAT team, regardless of whether it was reasonable, did not\\nviolate clearly established law.\\n\\n 1. Search Warrant\\n\\n Z.J. argues the detectives unreasonably omitted from the search warrant\\naffidavit that they had heard the victim’s cell phone ringing in the Winchester\\napartments and argues that if that fact had been included, the affidavit would lack\\nprobable cause. We disagree.\\n\\n The U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and\\nrequires that warrants shall be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV.\\n“A warrant based upon an affidavit containing ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless\\ndisregard for the truth’” — including, as alleged here, material omissions of\\nfact — “violates the Fourth Amendment.” Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098\\n(8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); see also\\nMorris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402–04 (8th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a Franks claim\\ninvolving alleged falsehoods and omissions).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -18-\\n\\n To prove a Franks violation based on the omission of material from a search\\nwarrant application, a plaintiff must show “1) that facts were omitted with the intent\\nto make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby make, the affidavit\\nmisleading, and 2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information,\\ncould not support a finding of probable cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772\\nF.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Box, 193 F.3d 1032, 1035\\n(8th Cir. 1999)). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists if, in light of the\\ntotality of the circumstances, there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence\\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d\\n1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Donnell, 726 F.3d 1054, 1056\\n(8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n The district court identified what it concluded was an inaccuracy and also a\\nmaterial omission in the search warrant affidavit. However, we conclude the affidavit\\nwas not inaccurate and, even considering the omitted information, there was probable\\ncause to support the search warrant. Thus, there was no Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendment Franks violation.\\n\\n The district court stated that the search warrant affidavit inaccurately\\n“indicated . . . that some independent verification had been made that . . . Charles\\nactually lived at [the Bristol residence], when in fact there had been no independent\\nverification.” “[T]he only ‘check’ that the detectives performed was by looking at a\\ncomputerized database,” the court said. This conclusion is erroneous for two reasons.\\nFirst, the affidavit never claimed “that some independent verification had been made”\\nthat Charles lived at the Bristol residence. It truthfully stated that “a check” showed\\nhe lived there. A check of the law enforcement database showed just that. Second,\\nthe court’s assertion that no independent verification of Charles’s residence was made\\nis “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Wallace, 843 F.3d at 767 (quoting Walton,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\n752 F.3d at 1116). The record shows the detectives also obtained a list of employees\\nand their addresses from the Family Dollar store at which Charles worked, which\\nlisted his address at the Bristol residence.\\n\\n The omission correctly identified by the district court is the fact the detectives\\nheard the victim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments. While we do not\\ncondone the selective omission of this fact, the affidavit would support probable\\ncause even with its addition. The affidavit established: (1) the phone was traced to\\nan area that included both the Bristol residence and the Winchester apartments; (2)\\nthe phone had been used to call the Bristol residence; (3) the phone had been used to\\ncall Charles’s employer, Family Dollar; and (4) the phone had been answered in what\\nsounded to be a restaurant and traced to an area that included the restaurant at which\\nCharles was working at the time. Moreover, two separate sources indicated Charles\\nlived at the Bristol residence. These facts provided probable cause to believe Charles\\nhad the victim’s phone in his possession and lived at the Bristol residence. The fact\\nthe phone was heard in a nearby residence could have meant Charles took the phone\\nwith him when visiting someone there; cell phones are inherently mobile, after all.\\nEven considering that the phone had been heard in the Winchester apartments at one\\npoint, there was still a “fair probability” to believe the phone and other evidence\\nwould be found at what was reasonably believed to be Charles’s residence. See\\nShockley, 816 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Donnell, 726 F.3d at 1056). Because the search\\nwarrant would be supported by probable cause even with the addition of the omitted\\ninformation, the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the detectives\\non this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -20-\\n\\n 2. The Decision to use the SWAT Team\\n\\n Z.J. argues the detectives’ authorization to use the SWAT team for executing\\nthe search warrant was unreasonable because they conducted no pre-search\\ninvestigation other than a brief drive by the house to confirm the address and had no\\nreason to believe a SWAT team was necessary. We do not decide whether the\\ndetectives’ decision violated the Fourth Amendment but instead conclude they are\\nentitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\\n\\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496\\n(quoting Henderson, 439 F.3d at 502).\\n\\n An official may be held liable under § 1983 only if the official, “through [his\\nor her] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556\\nU.S. 662, 676 (2009). This court has said that “[i]n a § 1983 case an official is only\\nliable for his own misconduct . . . .” Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011\\n(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 534–35 (8th Cir.\\n2009)). “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct\\nresponsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962,\\n967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.\\n2006)). Thus, the detectives only violated the Fourth Amendment if their own actions\\nwere directly responsible for a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. They are not\\nautomatically responsible for all of the actions of the SWAT team officers.\\n\\n An officer’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in\\nsome cases, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. See Holland ex rel. Overdorff\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -21-\\n\\nv. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1189–92 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving search and arrest\\nwarrants). It is clear the decision to send a SWAT team into a residence must be\\nreasonable. See id.\\n\\n We do not, however, decide whether the detectives’ decision here was\\nreasonable. On the one hand, they had no information that would have supported the\\nneed to send the SWAT team to execute the search warrant. They also performed\\nvirtually no investigation that would have provided them with more information\\nabout whether the use of the SWAT team was appropriate. But on the other hand, the\\ndetectives are only responsible for their own decisions. Importantly here, we must\\njudge their conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather\\nthan with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While the\\ndetectives likely knew the use of a flash-bang grenade was possible, no evidence\\nsuggests they directed or were involved in planning its use. The warrant was also not\\na “no-knock” warrant. Thus, the detectives would have expected the SWAT team\\nofficers to knock and announce their presence — and presumably not use a flash-\\nbang grenade without justification. This is a much different situation from one where\\nan officer is involved in the planning of a surprise, “no-knock” raid by a SWAT team\\nand knows a significant amount of force will be used. The detectives would not have\\nnecessarily anticipated the SWAT team would throw a flash-bang grenade into the\\nhouse blindly without knowing who was inside and without any indication that\\nanyone inside posed any danger to them.\\n\\n Without deciding the close question of whether the detectives’ decision to use\\nthe SWAT team to execute the search warrant in this case violated the Fourth\\nAmendment, we conclude the detectives did not violate clearly established law. Z.J.\\nhas pointed to no cases in this circuit, or a consensus of cases from other circuits, that\\nwould have put the detectives on notice that using a SWAT team to execute a search\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -22-\\n\\nwarrant under these circumstances violated the Constitution. Nor was the decision\\nobviously unconstitutional. The detectives are entitled to qualified immunity for what\\nmay have been a “bad guess[] in [a] gray area[].” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (quoting\\nDavis, 375 F.3d at 712).\\n\\n C. The Board\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying the Board’s motion for\\nsummary judgment. The district court concluded there was a genuine dispute of\\nmaterial fact “regarding whether there was a continuing, widespread, persistent\\npattern of routine use of the [flash-bang grenades] by the [SWAT] Team without any\\nregard for the safety of the occupants of the residence,” and “whether the Board was\\ndeliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized this custom and whether this custom\\nwas responsible for plaintiff’s injuries.”\\n\\n We conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s\\ndenial of summary judgment to the Board. “Ordinarily, this court lacks jurisdiction\\nover a denial of summary judgment ‘because such an order is not a final decision.’”\\nMorgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Division\\nof Emp’t Sec. v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017)). As\\ndiscussed above, we have limited jurisdiction to review denials of summary judgment\\nbased on qualified immunity to the extent they turn on an issue of law. See Mitchell,\\n472 U.S. at 530. But the Board, as a municipal entity, is not protected by qualified\\nimmunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Szabla v.\\nCity of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus, we lack appellate\\njurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment to the Board.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -23-\\n\\n Nor can we review the Board’s appeal under pendent appellate jurisdiction.\\nWe may review certain claims to the extent they are “inextricably intertwined” with\\nan issue we already have jurisdiction to review. See Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723\\nF.3d 966, 975 (8th Cir. 2013). In this context, we may review the denial of the\\nBoard’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent our resolution of the claim\\nagainst the SWAT team “necessarily resolves” the Board’s liability. See id.; Muir v.\\nDecatur Cty., 917 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n To establish liability against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom, a\\nplaintiff must show, among other things, “that [he or she] was injured by acts\\npursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force\\nbehind the constitutional violation.” Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d\\n1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436\\nU.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). Our conclusion that the SWAT team violated the plaintiff’s\\nconstitutional rights is relevant to the Board’s liability, but it does not “necessarily\\nresolve” it. Showing a constitutional violation is but one of several requirements to\\nestablish municipal liability. As a result, we do not have pendent appellate\\njurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of the Board’s summary judgment\\nmotion. We dismiss this portion of the appeal.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the SWAT\\nteam, reverse as to the detectives, and dismiss the appeal as to the Board.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -24-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420091/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n While I agree with much of the court’s analysis, I take issue with two\\npoints—that the use of the flash-bang grenade violated clearly established law and\\nthat the decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a search warrant can constitute\\nexcessive force.\\n\\n First, I disagree that the use of the flash-bang grenade violated clearly\\nestablished law. Evaluating a claim of qualified immunity requires us to consider\\nwhether the violated constitutional right “was clearly established at the time of the\\ndefendant’s alleged misconduct.” Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 731 (8th Cir.\\n2012). Thus, we consider the law as it existed in November 2010, at the time of the\\nsearch at issue here.\\n\\n To avoid qualified immunity, Z.J. may present “a robust consensus of cases of\\npersuasive authority.” De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017). The\\ncourt claims that “many other courts” have addressed the reasonableness of the use\\nof flash-bang grenades, ante, at 14, but it cites opinions from only the Ninth and\\nSeventh Circuits. Agreement between two other circuits does not constitute a robust\\nconsensus of cases of persuasive authority. While some additional circuits have\\nfound Fourth Amendment violations involving flash-bang grenades, their decisions\\ncame after November 2010. See Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nTerebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held in 2017 that a July 2010 search\\ninvolving a flash-bang grenade did not violate clearly established law. Dukes, 852\\nF.3d at 1044. In Dukes, after a SWAT team deployed two flash-bang grenades, an\\nofficer threw another flash-bang grenade “into a dark room in which the occupants\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -25-\\n\\nwere asleep.” Id. at 1040, 1042. There was “minimal need” for the officer to throw\\nthe third flash-bang grenade, and he did not inspect the room for bystanders. Id. at\\n1042. Though, as the court notes, the SWAT team was searching a house at which\\na drug dealer who carried a handgun resided, the Eleventh Circuit explained that\\ndeploying a third flash-bang grenade was “gratuitous” despite the fact that “drug\\ndealers are known to be violent.” Id. at 1042-43. Citing Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth\\nCircuit cases, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the officer violated the Fourth\\nAmendment. Id.\\n\\n But the Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the officer did not violate clearly\\nestablished law as it existed in 2010. It pointed to Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773\\n(9th Cir. 2004), a decision upon which the court in this case relies. Ante, at 14.\\nThough the Ninth Circuit found in Boyd that throwing a flash-bang grenade into a\\nroom with up to eight people without first inspecting the room violated the Fourth\\namendment, it concluded that the right was not clearly established. Boyd, 374 F.3d\\nat 779, 784. The Eleventh Circuit also considered Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of\\nWhitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2006). In Bing, the Sixth Circuit similarly\\nfound that the 2002 use of a second flash-bang grenade violated the Fourth\\nAmendment but that the right was not clearly established by the Supreme Court, the\\nSixth Circuit, or any other circuit. 456 F.3d at 570. As evidenced by its citations to\\nthe Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit in Dukes understood the\\nlaw as it existed in 2010 but nevertheless concluded that it was not clearly\\nestablished. Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1044.\\n\\n Though the court correctly notes that the Seventh Circuit held that the July\\n2005 use of a flash-bang grenade violated clearly established law, Estate of Escobedo\\nv. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 786 (7th Cir. 2010), the reasoning of the Sixth, Ninth, and\\nTenth circuits demonstrates that the law was not clearly established. And Bender\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -26-\\n\\nconsidered the use of flash-bang grenades in the context of a seizure rather than a\\nsearch, as here. Id. at 780. Determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure\\nrequires “weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth\\nAmendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to\\njustify the intrusion,” Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017)\\n(internal quotation marks omitted), and searches and seizures implicate different\\nFourth Amendment interests, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984). See\\nalso Mountain Pure, LLC v. Roberts, 814 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining\\nthat unreasonable seizure cases do not apply to unreasonable search cases because the\\n“Search Clause of the Fourth Amendment is wholly distinct from the Seizure Clause,\\nsuch that courts applying these clauses must understand they provide different\\nprotections against government conduct”).\\n\\n In sum, Z.J. has not shown a “robust consensus of cases” that resolve “a fact-\\nintensive Fourth Amendment issue under a governing standard that requires judges\\nto ‘allow[] officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make\\ninferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them\\nthat might well elude an untrained person.’” De La Rosa 852 F.3d at 747 (alteration\\nin original). Further, Dukes, though different in some respects, illustrates that the law\\nwas not clearly established in Novermber 2010.\\n\\n I similarly disagree that the use of the flash-bang grenade violated law clearly\\nestablished by a “general constitutional rule” that applied “with obvious clarity.” See\\nUnited States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). “The principles of qualified\\nimmunity shield an officer from personal liability when an officer reasonably believes\\nthat his or her conduct complies with the law.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,\\n244 (2009). We must ask whether the constitutional question was “beyond debate.”\\nCity & Cty. of S.F., Cal. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015). “This exacting\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -27-\\n\\nstandard ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken\\njudgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly\\nviolate the law.’” Id. (alterations in original). As discussed above, the Sixth, Ninth,\\nand Tenth Circuit opinions indicate that a “general constitutional rule” did not apply\\n“with obvious clarity.”\\n\\n The facts of the case also demonstrate that a general constitutional rule did not\\napply with obvious clarity. Although we view the facts in the light most favorable\\nto Z.J., we “consider[] only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.”\\nWhite v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam). The record shows that the\\nhome’s lights were turned on when Carla Brown opened the door, and Rusley could\\nsee to the “back wall” of the room from where he was positioned at the door.\\nAccording to Brown, Rusley threw the flash-bang grenade over her head. Rusley\\ntestified that he was trained to throw flash-bang grenades away from people and that\\nhe threw the flash-bang grenade “approximately 20 feet” into the living room.\\n\\n Rusley took reasonable precautions to minimize the flash-bang grenade’s\\npotential impact on bystanders. He threw the flash-bang grenade away from Brown\\nwhen nobody else was visible in the living room, and the only way he could have\\ninspected the living room more thoroughly was by entering. But the very purpose of\\nusing the flash-bang was to allow the SWAT team to enter the home with minimal\\nrisk of confrontation. See L.A. Cty., Cal. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616 (2017) (per\\ncuriam) (“When officers execute a valid search warrant and act in a reasonable\\nmanner to protect themselves from harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not\\nviolated.”).\\n\\n The court correctly notes that we must assume that Brown held up the keys to\\nopen the door for the SWAT team and that the SWAT team had already knocked and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -28-\\n\\nannounced its presence. Ante, at 12. It concludes that there was no need to use the\\nflash-bang grenade because the occupants already knew, after the knock and\\nannounce, that the SWAT team was there. Ante, at 16-17. But though the occupants\\nmay have already known the SWAT team was at the door due to the knock and\\nannounce, a SWAT officer still could have reasonably believed—even though\\nultimately mistaken—that safety concerns necessitated an expedited entry by using\\na flash-bang grenade because, as Detective Robert Jorgenson noted, it was taking\\n“longer than the normal amount of time to get into the residence.” And even though\\nthe suspect was already in custody, the team was investigating a serious and violent\\ncrime—murder. I would thus conclude that the law was not clearly established in\\nNovember 2010.\\n\\n Second, the court’s conclusion that the decision to authorize a SWAT team to\\nexecute a search warrant can constitute excessive force and therefore an unreasonable\\nsearch is unnecessary. Ante, at 21-22. Thus, I only would decide, and agree with the\\ncourt, that authorizing the SWAT team did not violate clearly established law. See\\nFortunati v. Vermont, 503 F. App’x 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to decide\\nwhether deploying a SWAT team can amount to a Fourth Amendment violation\\nbecause the Second Circuit had not addressed the question and concluding instead\\nthat the right was not clearly established).\\n\\n To be sure, the use of a SWAT team may involve a show of overwhelming\\nforce and may be unreasonable in a particular context, but whether the use of a\\nSWAT team constitutes an unreasonable use of force necessarily depends on the\\nSWAT team’s actions in executing the warrant. An officer making the general\\ndecision to deploy a SWAT team may not be responsible for the tactical decisions the\\nteam makes in carrying out the search. Here, there is no evidence that the SWAT\\nteam always applies excessive force. Cf. Mountain Pure, 814 F.3d at 933 (noting that\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -29-\\n\\nnone of the cases the appellant cited indicated “that the presence of armed officers,\\nwithout more, is objectively unreasonable during the execution of a search warrant”).\\nThe mere decision to use a SWAT team does not “determine[] the degree of force\\ninitially to be applied in effecting the seizure itself.” Contra Holland ex rel.\\nOverdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Holland also involved whether the decision to\\nuse a SWAT team could constitute excessive force in executing a seizure rather than\\na search. The Eighth Circuit “scrutinize[s] only the seizure itself, not the events\\nleading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Cole v.\\nBone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993). Indeed, “[t]he Fourth Amendment\\nprohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct in general.”\\nId. Ultimately, as explained above, I would not decide this issue because it is not\\nnecessary to resolution of the case.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420091/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n I join the court’s opinion except for the latter half of Part II.B.2. The opinion\\nacknowledges that an officer’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a\\nsearch warrant can violate the Fourth Amendment under certain circumstances, yet\\nit declines to opine on whether there was a constitutional violation here. The district\\ncourt concluded that there are material factual disputes about whether the detectives\\nviolated Z.J.’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by failing to conduct an\\nadequate investigation and by summoning a SWAT team without justification. I\\nwould affirm that conclusion for two reasons.\\n\\n First, the detectives’ brief investigation uncovered “no information” supporting\\nthe need for a SWAT team in this case. Supra at 22. The primary suspect, Charles,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -30-\\n\\nwas already in custody and available for questioning for several hours before\\ndetectives even contacted the SWAT team to assist with the search. No effort was\\nmade to interview him to determine whether he lived at the Bristol residence or\\nwhether the object of the search (the victim’s cell phone) was located there. The\\ndetectives conducted virtually no surveillance on the Bristol residence to determine\\nif there were other occupants present before asking the SWAT team to carry out the\\nsearch. This contrasts with how the detectives conducted other searches in this case.\\nOnce detectives learned that Charles actually lived around the corner in the\\nWinchester apartments, they immediately went to search for the phone at that\\nlocation. Instead of using a SWAT team or uniformed officers, detectives simply\\napproached Charles’s residence and obtained consent to search. A year later, when\\nit came time to search the residence of the actual culprit, the detectives again used\\nuniformed officers instead of a SWAT team and performed the search only after\\ninforming a member of the suspect’s family that a search was imminent.\\n\\n Second, the district court concluded that there are genuine disputes of material\\nfact regarding whether (1) the KCPD SWAT team has a continuing, widespread, and\\npersistent pattern of routinely using flash-bang grenades without any regard for the\\nsafety of the occupants of a residence and (2) the Board is deliberately indifferent to\\nthis practice. The court’s opinion nonetheless asserts that the detectives “would have\\nexpected” the SWAT team officers to operate within the confines of the Fourth\\nAmendment when conducting a search. Supra at 22. But why would the detectives\\nhave that expectation if the evidence shows that KCPD’s SWAT team routinely uses\\nflash-bang grenades in reckless violation of the Constitution? The summary-\\njudgment standard requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Z.J., not\\nthe other way around. Bradford v. Palmer, 855 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -31-\\n\\n Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Z.J., a reasonable jury could\\nconclude that using the SWAT team under these circumstances violated her clearly\\nestablished Fourth Amendment rights. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202\\n(2001). The bounds of the Fourth Amendment “may apply with obvious clarity to the\\nspecific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has not\\npreviously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (cleaned\\nup). At the time of the search, multiple circuits had recognized that the unwarranted\\nuse of a SWAT team can violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v.\\nMarasco, 430 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2005); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington,\\n268 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2001).6 This much should have been obvious to any\\nreasonable detective, because a SWAT team is “an overwhelming show of\\nforce—force far greater than that normally applied in police encounters with\\ncitizens,” making the decision to deploy a SWAT team “largely determin[ative]” of\\nhow the search will be conducted and “the extent of the intrusion on the individual’s\\nFourth Amendment interests.” Holland, 268 F.3d at 1190. Use of such force requires\\nadequate justification. Cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 108 (2005) (Stevens, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment) (“When officers undertake a dangerous assignment to\\n\\n 6\\n Although Holland analyzed a seizure, not a search, I respectfully disagree with\\nthe suggestion that this makes the case inapplicable to the search context. See supra\\nat 26–27, 30 (Gruender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The quote in\\nMountain Pure traces back to Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984),\\nwhich recognized that searches and seizures of property implicate different interests:\\n“A seizure affects only the person’s possessory interests; a search affects a person’s\\nprivacy interests.” Therefore, a seizure is usually “less intrusive” than a search and\\nis more likely to be permissible absent a warrant. Id. This distinction has no\\nrelevance to excessive force cases, which are subject to the same analysis regardless\\nof whether the case is about a search or a seizure. “The operative question in\\nexcessive force cases is whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular\\nsort of search or seizure.” Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546\\n(2017) (cleaned up).\\n\\n\\n\\n -32-\\n\\nexecute a warrant to search property that is presumably occupied by violence-prone\\ngang members, it may well be appropriate to use both overwhelming force and\\nsurprise in order to secure the premises as promptly as possible.”).\\n\\n Because there was no justification for calling a SWAT team and there is\\nevidence that this particular SWAT team may have a widespread practice of using\\nexcessive force, I cannot conclude that the detectives were entitled to qualified\\nimmunity for their decision to employ the SWAT team in this case.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -33-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420091/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642838/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Z.J., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH Her Next Friend, Je'tuan JONES, Plaintiff - Appellee v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Through Its Members: Alvin Brooks, Michael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric Enderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; And Venasa Ray, in Their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants - Appellants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3365\n ___________________________\n\n Z.J., a minor, by and through her next friend, Je’tuan Jones\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\nKansas City Board of Police Commissioners, through its members: Alvin Brooks,\nMichael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason\n Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric\nEnderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; and Venasa Ray,\n in their individual and official capacities\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Detectives with the Kansas City Police Department (“KCPD”) obtained a\nsearch warrant for what they mistakenly believed was a homicide suspect’s residence.\n\nAfter the suspect was apprehended and arrested at another location, the detectives,\nhoping to find the homicide victim’s cell phone and other evidence, had a SWAT\nteam execute the search warrant. When the SWAT team knocked on the door, a\nyoung woman opened the inside front door and held up her keys to indicate she was\ngoing to unlock the screen door. Even though the SWAT team knew the suspect was\nalready in custody, they broke open the screen and threw a flash-bang grenade into\nthe living room of the home before the young woman could open the door.\n\n As it turned out, the suspect had not lived at the residence for some time and\nthe only people inside were three women (two of them elderly) and a two-year old\ngirl. The two-year old girl suffered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) from\nthe blast of the flash-bang grenade. She sued the SWAT team officers, the detectives,\nand the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners (“the Board”) under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and\nthe defendants appealed. We affirm as to the SWAT team officers, reverse as to the\ndetectives, and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the Board.\n\n I. Background\n\n In October 2010, three homicide detectives with the KCPD, Barbara Eckert,\nMichael Jones, and Venasa Ray (“the detectives”), began investigating a homicide.\nAs the victim’s cell phone was missing, the detectives obtained call records for the\nphone after the time of the murder, as well as the GPS coordinates for those calls.\nThe victim’s phone had been used after the murder to call a residence on Bristol\nAvenue (“the Bristol residence”) in Kansas City, Missouri. Using a database\ncontaining criminal history information from regional law enforcement agencies and\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\nmotor vehicle records, the detectives learned that an individual named Lee Charles1\nresided at the Bristol residence.\n\n The next morning, the detectives learned the victim’s phone was turned on and\nwas within 80 meters of a particular intersection, an area including both the Bristol\nresidence and two apartment buildings on Winchester Avenue (“the Winchester\napartments”). Eckert and another detective arrived at the area to locate the phone.\nWhile standing between the two Winchester apartments, the detectives could hear a\nphone ringing when a third officer called the victim’s phone number, although they\ncould not pinpoint its exact location. When more officers arrived, they again tried to\nlocate the phone, but it appeared the battery had died or the phone had been turned\noff.\n\n That evening, police learned the victim’s phone was in the area of a particular\nintersection in Grandview, Missouri. A detective called the phone. Someone\nanswered the call, but did not respond. The detective heard background noises that\nsounded like a restaurant kitchen. The detectives sought the names of employees\nworking that evening from five restaurants in the area. Charles was working at one\nof those restaurants that evening.\n\n Records from the victim’s phone also showed it had been used after the murder\nto call a Family Dollar store. The detectives obtained a list of employees and contact\ninformation from the store manager. Charles was listed as an employee and his\naddress was listed as the Bristol residence.\n\n Charles was arrested in the afternoon of November 3. The same day, Detective\nJones applied for a search warrant for what was believed to be Charles’s residence on\n\n\n 1\n While he was initially a suspect, it was eventually discovered that another\nindividual — not Charles — had committed the homicide.\n -3-\n\nBristol Avenue. The warrant application omitted the fact the detectives had heard the\nvictim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments — not at the Bristol residence.\nAt 3:00 p.m., the warrant was issued, authorizing police to search for and seize cell\nphones (including cell phones matching the description of the victim’s phone),\nclothing or shoes with blood, knives with trace evidence, items that could be used for\nstrangulation such as cords, wire, or rope with trace evidence, and the victim’s keys.\n\n Detective Jones contacted Sergeant Rusley of the KCPD Tactical Response\nTeam about executing the search warrant at the Bristol residence. At 6:15 p.m.,\nRusley conducted a briefing with the detectives, as well as Tactical Response Team\nmembers Robert Jorgenson, Caleb Lenz, William Nauyok, Robert McLaughlin, Eric\nEnderlin, and Charles Evans (“the SWAT team”). The SWAT team was informed\nthat Charles had already been taken into custody. After the briefing, officers drove\nby the Bristol residence to confirm the address. No other surveillance of the house\nwas done to learn who resided there.\n\n At 7:00 p.m., the SWAT team, dressed in tactical gear with weapons drawn,\napproached the front door of the Bristol residence. The front entrance had both an\ninside wooden door and an outside metal screen door, each of which were “double-\nkeyed,” meaning they required a key to open from both the inside and the outside.\nBecause the warrant did not authorize a “no knock” entry, the SWAT team knocked\non the door and announced: “Police, search warrant!” At the time, there were four\npeople inside the residence: the plaintiff, Z.J., a two year old girl; Laverne Charles,\nage 84; Leona Smith, age 68; and Carla Brown, age 24. Carla grabbed the keys to the\ndoor and opened the inside door.\n\n What happened next is disputed. According to Carla, when she opened the\ninner door, she saw through the screen door a lot of people outside, yelling, which\nstartled her. She later said she didn’t know whether she backed away from the screen\n\n\n\n -4-\n\ndoor when she first saw the officers. She then held up the keys to the door in her\nhand and jingled them for the SWAT team to see in order to indicate that she was\ngoing to open up the door.2 Before she had the opportunity to open it, the SWAT\nteam knocked out the screen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over Carla’s head into\nthe living room of the house. Carla testified that she would have opened the screen\ndoor had she been given the opportunity to do so.\n\n According to Sgt. Rusley, the SWAT team waited five to ten seconds after\nknocking the first time before beginning to knock again. As they began knocking on\nthe door the second time, the team was preparing to pry open the screen door with a\ndevice. At the same time, Carla opened the inside door. Rusley claimed that “she\nrefused [to open the screen door] and walked away,” after which they breached the\nscreen door and threw in the flash-bang grenade. He explained that the flash-bang\ngrenade was deployed because the SWAT team was “compromised,” meaning “that\noccupants of the residence knew we were there and that we no longer had the element\nof surprise.”\n\n Officer Jorgenson gave a slightly different account to the KCPD’s Internal\nAffairs Unit, confirming part of Carla’s account and stating that she only “took a\ncouple of steps back” before she “froze there” and then “waived a set of keys”:\n\n [As the SWAT team knocked on the door a second time,] we were\n getting ready to set the hooligan tool into the doorframe and then the\n front door was open[ed] from the inside of the house and the lady was\n standing there. As soon as she saw us, she took a couple of steps back.\n\n 2\n Carla’s testimony is corroborated by statements made by Leona in an interview\nwith KCPD Internal Affairs. On summary judgment, the defendants objected to the\nplaintiff’s use of these statements by Leona, who is now deceased, as hearsay. The\ndistrict court does not appear to have ruled on the hearsay objection. We do not\nconsider Leona’s statements in reaching our decision.\n\n -5-\n\n I’m sure she was in fear of what was going on. I told her to open the\n door and she just kind of froze there. At one point she began to turn\n away as we were still yelling at her to open the door. She waived a set\n of keys. At the time, I had no idea what that meant. The sergeant\n announced “hit it,” which means make entry into the residence. The\n officer that had the hooligan tool took a swipe at the door attempting to\n punch a hole in it so that we could access it with our hand and then\n unlock it. After producing a hole in the door, the point-man reached in,\n in an attempt to unlock it, only to find out it was a keyed lock. So then\n we set the hool[igan tool] into the side of the door, hit it with the ram\n and pr[i]ed the door open. Due to the fact it took us a longer than the\n normal amount of time to get into the residence, the sergeant deployed\n a noise flash diversionary device into the living room of the structure.\n\n The flash-bang grenade caught the living room drapes on fire. The SWAT\nteam had to remove the drapes from the house and place them in the front yard before\ncontinuing through the rest of the house. The SWAT team found two-year old Z.J.\nin the living room. One officer acknowledged Z.J. was “very shaken from the whole\nsituation.” The team placed Carla and Leona in zip tie restraints, but was unable to\nplace restraints on Laverne because of her advanced age and physical condition.\n\n After the SWAT team cleared the house, the detectives, who had been waiting\na block away, took control of the house. The detectives had Carla and Leona released\nfrom the restraints. They also learned that Charles no longer resided there and had\nbeen kicked out several months earlier. Charles was living a block away in an\napartment with another individual and did not have any property at the Bristol\nresidence.\n\n After the SWAT team raid, Z.J. suffered significant developmental regression\nand was diagnosed with PTSD. In August 2015, Z.J., through her next friend Je’taun\nJones, sued the detectives, the SWAT team members, and the Board (through its\n\n\n\n -6-\n\nmembers)3 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C.\n§ 1983. As to the detectives, Z.J. alleged they omitted information on the warrant\napplication about hearing the victim’s phone ringing inside the Winchester\napartments. She also alleged they failed to conduct a sufficient investigation prior to\nexecuting the warrant and then unjustifiably chose to have the SWAT team execute\nthe search. As to the members of the SWAT team, she alleged they used excessive\nforce by throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. And as to the Board, she\nalleged its policies and practices were deliberately indifferent to the\nunconstitutionally excessive use4 of flash-bang grenades by the KCPD.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n In their arguments, the parties categorize the several defendants into these\nthree groups. The Appellants have not argued the claims against any individual\ndefendant should be treated differently from other defendants in the same group (e.g.,\nthe SWAT team officers who did not authorize or throw the flash-bang grenade may\nnot be liable even if those who did are liable). Following the parties’ lead for\npurposes of this appeal, we analyze the claims against the detectives, the SWAT team,\nand the Board as they relate to those groups, rather than each individual defendant\nseparately.\n 4\n On summary judgment, the plaintiff presented evidence to support what was\nalleged to be excessive use of SWAT teams to execute search warrants and excessive\nuse of flash-bang grenades by those SWAT teams. KCPD policy provided that\n“Uniformed/tactical entry personnel will be used for making entry during the\nexecution of all search warrants,” but also stated that “[n]ot every search warrant will\nrequire the presence of uniformed/tactical entry personnel, e.g., warrants served on\na safe deposit box or an impounded vehicle.” As the district court noted, the Board\ndid not have any policy about the use of flash-bang grenades — such as when their\nuse is appropriate and how to use them safely. One officer estimated that in\nexecuting search warrants, flash-bang grenades were used 80-90% of the time;\nanother officer estimated that in his experience they were used about 50% of the time;\nand a third officer estimated they were used about 75% of the time.\n\n\n\n -7-\n\n The defendants moved for summary judgment, with the individual defendants’\nmotions based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions and the\ndefendants timely appealed.\n\n II. Analysis\n\n The Appellants argue the district court erred in denying their motion for\nsummary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment where it “shows that\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and . . . is entitled to judgment as\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In an appeal from a denial of summary\njudgment based on qualified immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction to review the\ndecision “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.\n511, 530 (1985). We do not review the “district court’s determination about what\nfactual issues are ‘genuine.’” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Rather,\nour review “is limited to the purely legal issue of whether the facts alleged support\na claim of violation of clearly established law.” Berry v. Doss, 900 F.3d 1017, 1021\n(8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Mallak v. City of Baxter, 823 F.3d 441, 445–46\n(8th Cir. 2016)). However, “[t]here is one exception to such a jurisdictional\nlimitation on our review: we may reject the district court’s factual findings to the\nextent that they are ‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’” Wallace v. City of\nAlexander, 843 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d\n1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014)).\n\n A. The SWAT Team\n\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying summary judgment to\nthe SWAT team officers because they did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and in\nany event, are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\nestablished law. We disagree. Any reasonable officer would have known the use a\nflash-bang grenade under these circumstances constituted excessive force.\n\n Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to\n“establish[ a] cause[] of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from\nGovernment officers who violated federal law.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,\n1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Though\nthe text of § 1983 contains no provision of immunity, the Supreme Court has\nrecognized a qualified immunity which “protects government officials ‘from liability\nfor civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established\nstatutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”\nPearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457\nU.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity entails a two step analysis: first,\ndetermining whether “the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation\nof a constitutional right,” and second, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly\nestablished’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (quoting\nSaucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).\n\n We first address the initial step of the qualified immunity analysis, which in\nthis procedural context is: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable\nto Z.J., the SWAT team officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\n\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown v. City of Golden\nValley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497,\n502 (8th Cir. 2006)). This evaluation “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and\nquality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\ncountervailing governmental interests at stake,” and must be done “from the\nperspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of\nhindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).\n\n The reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades depends upon the\ncircumstances. See generally Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2015).\nCertainly, they can be an important tool for law enforcement officers to gain an\nelement of surprise while entering a dangerous environment and can at times obviate\nthe need for officers to use deadly force. See Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779\n(9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e recognize that less-than-lethal alternatives are intended to\navoid unnecessary fatalities.”).\n\n But these weapons also carry serious risks. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30.\nThe record evidence shows the flash-bang grenade used here is four times louder than\na 12-gauge shotgun blast and emits a light 107 times brighter than the brightest high-\nbeam vehicle headlight. It has a powerful enough concussive effect to break windows\nand put holes in walls. The flash-bang burns at around 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit,\ncreating an obvious and serious risk of burning individuals, damaging property, and\nstarting fires (as occurred here). In some cases, they can even be lethal. And as this\ncase illustrates well, they pose a risk of traumatizing unsuspecting\noccupants — particularly small children like two-year old Z.J.\n\n While the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades while executing a\nwarrant is not reducible to a simple and categorical rule, several considerations guide\nour analysis. Most importantly, we consider whether officers had reason to believe\nthey would encounter a dangerous, violent suspect. See Estate of Escobedo v.\nBender, 600 F.3d 770, 784–86 (7th Cir. 2010). Their use is more likely to be\nreasonable if the officers expect to encounter an individual who is known to be armed\n\n\n\n\n -10-\n\nand dangerous or who has a history of violence. Their use is also more likely to be\nreasonable if the situation presents a need for the element of surprise in order to\nprotect the safety of officers or others. See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d\n963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding use of flash-bang grenade was reasonable in part\nbecause “the officers had ample reason to be concerned about their personal safety”);\nBoyd, 374 F.3d at 779 (“There are likely circumstances in which a risk to officers’\nsafety would make the use of a flash-bang device appropriate.”). On the other hand,\ntheir use is less likely to be reasonable if officers unreasonably fail to ascertain\nwhether innocent bystanders will be present in the area the flash-bang grenade is\ndeployed. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779; United States v.\nJones, 214 F.3d 836, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2000).\n\n Whether the use of the flash-bang grenade here was reasonable is not a close\nquestion. The SWAT team knew the suspect, Charles, was already in custody. Any\npotential justification based on the fact Charles was (at the time) suspected of murder\nis eliminated by the fact the SWAT team knew they would not encounter Charles\nthere. Nor did they have any indication that other people at the residence would pose\nany threat. In fact, they had no idea who was inside the house because they failed to\ndo any investigation into that question beyond a quick drive-by to check the address.\nThe use of a flash-bang grenade under these facts was not reasonable. “The use of\na [flash-bang] grenade must be justified by the particular risk posed in the execution\nof the warrant.” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 239 (2d Cir. 2014). Nor was the\nmanner of use reasonable. They threw the flash-bang grenade into the house blindly\nwithout knowing whether children, elderly, or other innocent individuals were inside.\n\n The Appellants argue the use of the flash-bang was reasonable because the\nSWAT team may have still faced danger in spite of Charles already being in custody.\nAfter all, they posit in their brief, the murder “could have been part of a robbery by\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\na group of criminals,” and Charles’s arrest “could have tipped the others off that a\nsearch or arrest was imminent.” Of course, they had no actual information to support\nthis after-the-fact speculation. More to the point, however, this argument relies on\na dangerously flawed premise. The argument that the SWAT team was justified in\nusing a flash-bang grenade because they did not know for certain it was unnecessary\nis precisely backwards; it makes using that dangerous level of force the default. This\ntype of “flash-bang first, ask questions later” approach runs headlong into the Fourth\nAmendment. Law enforcement officers like the SWAT team members here need an\nactual justification for using a flash-bang grenade; the mere hypothetical possibility\nthat someone dangerous could be in a house they are entering — without any actual\nfacts to indicate that is true or likely to be true — is not sufficient. See Milan, 795\nF.3d at 730; Terebesi, 764 F.3d at 236–239; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779.\n\n Nor was the use of the flash-bang grenade justified by anything Carla did when\nopening the door. Some of the factual details on what happened when she opened the\ninside door are in dispute, and the facts must be read in the light most favorable to the\nplaintiff. Carla held up her keys to indicate to the SWAT team her intention to unlock\nthe screen door. But before she could get the door open, the officers broke open the\nscreen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over her head. The explanation that the\nflash-bang was used because the SWAT team believed it was “compromised,”\nmeaning “that occupants of the residence knew [the SWAT team officers] were there\nand that [the officers] no longer had the element of surprise,” is unpersuasive. The\nsearch warrant did not authorize the SWAT team to conduct a “no-knock” warrant,\nand so they knocked on the front door and announced their presence, which obviously\ndefeated the element of surprise. After all, the purpose of the constitutional knock-\nand-announce requirement is to allow a citizen the chance to come to the door and\nallow entrance to an officer who is legally entitled to enter. See Wilson v. Arkansas,\n514 U.S. 927, 931–36 (1995). Even assuming, as Officer Jorgenson stated, that Carla\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n\ntook a couple of steps backwards and then “froze there,” the officers were not\njustified in blindly throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. They had no\nreason to believe Carla or anyone else inside posed any danger to them. The SWAT\nteam’s use of the flash-bang grenade was unreasonable and violated the Fourth\nAmendment.\n\n As the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, we address “whether the\nright at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. In making this determination, “the focus is on whether the\nofficer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful . . . .” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.\nCt. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per\ncuriam)). Thus, the Supreme Court has said that “[a]s the qualified immunity defense\nhas evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those\nwho knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To\nsatisfy this fair notice requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently\nclear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that\nright.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). It is not required that there\nbe “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or\nconstitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741\n(2011). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for\ntransgressing bright lines.” Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013)\n(quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004)).\n\n The “clearly established” requirement of qualified immunity provides officers\nwith ample room for honest mistakes, but the SWAT team officers’ conduct falls\noutside even this generous standard. First, the use of the flash-bang grenade was\nunreasonable under all of the relevant case law. Second, it would have been obvious\n\n\n\n\n -13-\n\nto any reasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under those\ncircumstances was unreasonable.\n\n The Supreme Court has established that, broadly speaking, “[i]n executing a\nsearch warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to\nensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.” Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele,\n550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007). At a narrower level, see al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742\n(instructing courts not to “define clearly established law at a high level of\ngenerality”), the relevant case law clearly established that the use of flash-bang\ngrenades is unreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the\nthreat of violence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any\ninnocent bystanders in the area it is deployed. It is true this court has not yet\naddressed the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades, but many other courts\nhave.5 See Bender, 600 F.3d at 784–86 (stating “the use of a flash bang device is\njustified when ‘potentially violent people [can] be found in [a] house,’ as opposed to\nindividuals who pose no threat to the police or others” (quoting United States v.\nFolks, 236 F.3d 384, 388 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829,\n836 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering such factors as whether the defendant had a history\nof violent crime and was armed and the need for the element of surprise); Boyd, 374\nF.3d at 779 (stating that “it cannot be a reasonable use of force under the Fourth\nAmendment to throw [a flash-bang grenade] ‘blind’ into a room occupied by innocent\nbystanders absent a strong governmental interest, careful consideration of alternatives\n\n 5\n The Appellants apparently argue the “clearly established” analysis must\ninvolve only looking to cases from the relevant circuit and the Supreme Court. It is\ntrue plaintiffs can show a right is clearly established by pointing to “cases of\ncontrolling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident,” but they may\nalso do so by pointing to “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority” — including\ncases from other jurisdictions. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (emphasis\nadded); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 541 (8th Cir. 2016).\n\n\n\n -14-\n\nand appropriate measures to reduce the risk of injury”); Molina, 325 F.3d at 973\n(concluding the use of a flash-bang grenade was reasonable because suspect had a\nviolent criminal record and it was not used around the suspect’s wife and children).\n\n The dissent on this issue relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Dukes v.\nDeaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2017), to conclude the SWAT team here did\nnot violate clearly established law, post at 25–27. But in Dukes, the defendant officer\nwas executing a “no-knock” search warrant in a house in which drug trafficking was\nknown to occur and at which a drug dealer resided who was known to carry a\nhandgun. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that there was no violation of clearly\nestablished law was based, at least in part, on its consideration of that danger faced\nby the officer. See Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1044. Our conclusion is wholly consistent\nwith Dukes. Similarly, the cases from other circuits cited by the dissent that found\na constitutional violation but no violation of clearly established law are not\ninconsistent with our conclusion. Each of those cases, like Dukes, involved a\nsituation where officers faced the threat of a potentially armed and dangerous\nindividual. See Dukes, 852 F.3d 1039–40; Bing, 456 F.3d at 559–62 (involving an\narmed and intoxicated individual who had already fired his weapon causing police\nto fear for their lives); Boyd, 374 F.3d at 777 (noting that officers knew armed\ncriminals could be inside the apartment). Those cases can be read as inconsistent\nwith our conclusion only by defining the right at issue at a very broad level of\ngenerality. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. We do not hold that every unreasonable use\nof a flash-bang grenade is a violation of clearly established law. Rather, we hold only\nthat it was clearly established in 2010 that the use of flash-bang grenades is\nunreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the threat of\nviolence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any innocent\nbystanders in the area it is deployed.\n\n\n\n\n -15-\n\n The Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited by the dissent not only had differing\nfacts but were addressing the clarity of the law as it existed in different times. See\ngenerally Bing, 456 F.3d 555 (involving a violation occurring in 2002); Boyd, 374\nF.3d 773 (involving a violation occurring in 1997). Each case contributed to the\ngrowing clarity of the law on when the use of flash-bang grenades is appropriate. But\nmore importantly, disagreement about whether the law was clearly established does\nnot equate to disagreement about the law itself. Under all of the relevant case law,\nthe SWAT team officers’ use of a flash-bang grenade in this situation would be\nunconstitutional. The court is not aware of, and neither the parties nor the dissent\nhave pointed to, any case law in existence in 2010 under which the SWAT team’s\nconduct would be constitutional.\n\n Even aside from the consensus in persuasive case law at the time, the SWAT\nteam officers violated clearly established law because it would be obvious to any\nreasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under these circumstances\nwas unreasonable. For a right to be clearly established, it is not required that there\nbe “a case directly on point.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. An officer may have fair\nnotice based on the fact his conduct is obviously unlawful, even in the absence of a\ncase addressing the particular violation. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741\n(2002); see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (“Of course, in an obvious case, [the\nFourth Amendment reasonableness standard articulated at a high level of generality]\ncan ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.”);\nRokusek v. Jansen, 899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018). The only potential threat of\nwhich the SWAT team was aware was Charles, then a suspect in a murder\ninvestigation. But they knew Charles was in custody. They had no reason to believe\nany accomplices were involved in the murder and present in the residence. Nor did\nthey take any precautions to avoid harming innocent bystanders. And the rationale\nthat they were “compromised” is nonsense because it is undisputed they knocked and\n\n\n\n\n -16-\n\nannounced their presence. Only the plainly incompetent officer announces his\npresence at a house with no known dangerous people and then decides to throw in a\nflash-bang grenade because the occupants know he is there. Nor does the fact it took\nlonger than normal for the SWAT team to gain entry provide any support for their\ndecision. They could not have reasonably believed that “safety concerns necessitated\nan expedited entry by using a flash-bang grenade” based on the delay, as the dissent\nposits, post at 29, because they had no reason to believe anyone inside posed any\ndanger to them and the young woman who answered the door was unarmed and gave\nno indication she posed any threat. Even though they were investigating a homicide,\nthey knew the sole suspect was already in custody and they had no reason to believe\nthe residence harbored other dangerous individuals. Blindly throwing a flash-bang\ngrenade into the residence under these circumstances was obviously unconstitutional.\n\n The cases cited by the dissent do not lend any support to the position the\nSWAT team’s use of the flash-bang grenade was not obviously unconstitutional. As\ndiscussed above, those cases each involved circumstances where officers knew or had\nreason to believe the residence in which the flash-bang grenade was used contained\na potentially violent individual. Under the facts of this case, where the SWAT team\nhad no basis to believe they would face the threat of violence and unreasonably failed\nto ascertain whether there were any innocent bystanders in the area the flash-bang\ngrenade was deployed, their violation was obvious.\n\n The SWAT team officers violated clearly established law when they used the\nflash-bang grenade. The district court did not err by denying summary judgment on\nqualified immunity to the SWAT team.\n\n\n\n\n -17-\n\n B. The Detectives\n\n The Appellants argue the detectives were entitled to summary judgment\nbecause (1) the information they omitted from the search warrant application was not\nmaterial; and (2) their decision to use a SWAT team to execute the search warrant\nwas not unreasonable or did not violate clearly established law. We agree the\ndetectives are entitled to summary judgment because there was probable cause to\nsupport the search warrant, even considering the omitted information, and because\ntheir decision to use a SWAT team, regardless of whether it was reasonable, did not\nviolate clearly established law.\n\n 1. Search Warrant\n\n Z.J. argues the detectives unreasonably omitted from the search warrant\naffidavit that they had heard the victim’s cell phone ringing in the Winchester\napartments and argues that if that fact had been included, the affidavit would lack\nprobable cause. We disagree.\n\n The U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and\nrequires that warrants shall be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV.\n“A warrant based upon an affidavit containing ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless\ndisregard for the truth’” — including, as alleged here, material omissions of\nfact — “violates the Fourth Amendment.” Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098\n(8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); see also\nMorris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402–04 (8th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a Franks claim\ninvolving alleged falsehoods and omissions).\n\n\n\n\n -18-\n\n To prove a Franks violation based on the omission of material from a search\nwarrant application, a plaintiff must show “1) that facts were omitted with the intent\nto make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby make, the affidavit\nmisleading, and 2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information,\ncould not support a finding of probable cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772\nF.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Box, 193 F.3d 1032, 1035\n(8th Cir. 1999)). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists if, in light of the\ntotality of the circumstances, there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d\n1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Donnell, 726 F.3d 1054, 1056\n(8th Cir. 2013)).\n\n The district court identified what it concluded was an inaccuracy and also a\nmaterial omission in the search warrant affidavit. However, we conclude the affidavit\nwas not inaccurate and, even considering the omitted information, there was probable\ncause to support the search warrant. Thus, there was no Fourth and Fourteenth\nAmendment Franks violation.\n\n The district court stated that the search warrant affidavit inaccurately\n“indicated . . . that some independent verification had been made that . . . Charles\nactually lived at [the Bristol residence], when in fact there had been no independent\nverification.” “[T]he only ‘check’ that the detectives performed was by looking at a\ncomputerized database,” the court said. This conclusion is erroneous for two reasons.\nFirst, the affidavit never claimed “that some independent verification had been made”\nthat Charles lived at the Bristol residence. It truthfully stated that “a check” showed\nhe lived there. A check of the law enforcement database showed just that. Second,\nthe court’s assertion that no independent verification of Charles’s residence was made\nis “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Wallace, 843 F.3d at 767 (quoting Walton,\n\n\n\n\n -19-\n\n752 F.3d at 1116). The record shows the detectives also obtained a list of employees\nand their addresses from the Family Dollar store at which Charles worked, which\nlisted his address at the Bristol residence.\n\n The omission correctly identified by the district court is the fact the detectives\nheard the victim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments. While we do not\ncondone the selective omission of this fact, the affidavit would support probable\ncause even with its addition. The affidavit established: (1) the phone was traced to\nan area that included both the Bristol residence and the Winchester apartments; (2)\nthe phone had been used to call the Bristol residence; (3) the phone had been used to\ncall Charles’s employer, Family Dollar; and (4) the phone had been answered in what\nsounded to be a restaurant and traced to an area that included the restaurant at which\nCharles was working at the time. Moreover, two separate sources indicated Charles\nlived at the Bristol residence. These facts provided probable cause to believe Charles\nhad the victim’s phone in his possession and lived at the Bristol residence. The fact\nthe phone was heard in a nearby residence could have meant Charles took the phone\nwith him when visiting someone there; cell phones are inherently mobile, after all.\nEven considering that the phone had been heard in the Winchester apartments at one\npoint, there was still a “fair probability” to believe the phone and other evidence\nwould be found at what was reasonably believed to be Charles’s residence. See\nShockley, 816 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Donnell, 726 F.3d at 1056). Because the search\nwarrant would be supported by probable cause even with the addition of the omitted\ninformation, the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the detectives\non this claim.\n\n\n\n\n -20-\n\n 2. The Decision to use the SWAT Team\n\n Z.J. argues the detectives’ authorization to use the SWAT team for executing\nthe search warrant was unreasonable because they conducted no pre-search\ninvestigation other than a brief drive by the house to confirm the address and had no\nreason to believe a SWAT team was necessary. We do not decide whether the\ndetectives’ decision violated the Fourth Amendment but instead conclude they are\nentitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\n\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496\n(quoting Henderson, 439 F.3d at 502).\n\n An official may be held liable under § 1983 only if the official, “through [his\nor her] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556\nU.S. 662, 676 (2009). This court has said that “[i]n a § 1983 case an official is only\nliable for his own misconduct . . . .” Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011\n(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 534–35 (8th Cir.\n2009)). “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct\nresponsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962,\n967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.\n2006)). Thus, the detectives only violated the Fourth Amendment if their own actions\nwere directly responsible for a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. They are not\nautomatically responsible for all of the actions of the SWAT team officers.\n\n An officer’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in\nsome cases, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. See Holland ex rel. Overdorff\n\n\n\n\n -21-\n\nv. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1189–92 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving search and arrest\nwarrants). It is clear the decision to send a SWAT team into a residence must be\nreasonable. See id.\n\n We do not, however, decide whether the detectives’ decision here was\nreasonable. On the one hand, they had no information that would have supported the\nneed to send the SWAT team to execute the search warrant. They also performed\nvirtually no investigation that would have provided them with more information\nabout whether the use of the SWAT team was appropriate. But on the other hand, the\ndetectives are only responsible for their own decisions. Importantly here, we must\njudge their conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather\nthan with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While the\ndetectives likely knew the use of a flash-bang grenade was possible, no evidence\nsuggests they directed or were involved in planning its use. The warrant was also not\na “no-knock” warrant. Thus, the detectives would have expected the SWAT team\nofficers to knock and announce their presence — and presumably not use a flash-\nbang grenade without justification. This is a much different situation from one where\nan officer is involved in the planning of a surprise, “no-knock” raid by a SWAT team\nand knows a significant amount of force will be used. The detectives would not have\nnecessarily anticipated the SWAT team would throw a flash-bang grenade into the\nhouse blindly without knowing who was inside and without any indication that\nanyone inside posed any danger to them.\n\n Without deciding the close question of whether the detectives’ decision to use\nthe SWAT team to execute the search warrant in this case violated the Fourth\nAmendment, we conclude the detectives did not violate clearly established law. Z.J.\nhas pointed to no cases in this circuit, or a consensus of cases from other circuits, that\nwould have put the detectives on notice that using a SWAT team to execute a search\n\n\n\n\n -22-\n\nwarrant under these circumstances violated the Constitution. Nor was the decision\nobviously unconstitutional. The detectives are entitled to qualified immunity for what\nmay have been a “bad guess[] in [a] gray area[].” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (quoting\nDavis, 375 F.3d at 712).\n\n C. The Board\n\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying the Board’s motion for\nsummary judgment. The district court concluded there was a genuine dispute of\nmaterial fact “regarding whether there was a continuing, widespread, persistent\npattern of routine use of the [flash-bang grenades] by the [SWAT] Team without any\nregard for the safety of the occupants of the residence,” and “whether the Board was\ndeliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized this custom and whether this custom\nwas responsible for plaintiff’s injuries.”\n\n We conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s\ndenial of summary judgment to the Board. “Ordinarily, this court lacks jurisdiction\nover a denial of summary judgment ‘because such an order is not a final decision.’”\nMorgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Division\nof Emp’t Sec. v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017)). As\ndiscussed above, we have limited jurisdiction to review denials of summary judgment\nbased on qualified immunity to the extent they turn on an issue of law. See Mitchell,\n472 U.S. at 530. But the Board, as a municipal entity, is not protected by qualified\nimmunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Szabla v.\nCity of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus, we lack appellate\njurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment to the Board.\n\n\n\n\n -23-\n\n Nor can we review the Board’s appeal under pendent appellate jurisdiction.\nWe may review certain claims to the extent they are “inextricably intertwined” with\nan issue we already have jurisdiction to review. See Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723\nF.3d 966, 975 (8th Cir. 2013). In this context, we may review the denial of the\nBoard’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent our resolution of the claim\nagainst the SWAT team “necessarily resolves” the Board’s liability. See id.; Muir v.\nDecatur Cty., 917 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2019).\n\n To establish liability against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom, a\nplaintiff must show, among other things, “that [he or she] was injured by acts\npursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force\nbehind the constitutional violation.” Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d\n1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436\nU.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). Our conclusion that the SWAT team violated the plaintiff’s\nconstitutional rights is relevant to the Board’s liability, but it does not “necessarily\nresolve” it. Showing a constitutional violation is but one of several requirements to\nestablish municipal liability. As a result, we do not have pendent appellate\njurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of the Board’s summary judgment\nmotion. We dismiss this portion of the appeal.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the SWAT\nteam, reverse as to the detectives, and dismiss the appeal as to the Board.\n\n\n\n\n -24-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Z.J., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH Her Next Friend, Je'tuan JONES, Plaintiff - Appellee v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Through Its Members: Alvin Brooks, Michael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric Enderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; And Venasa Ray, in Their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants - Appellants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3365\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Z.J., a minor, by and through her next friend, Je’tuan Jones\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nKansas City Board of Police Commissioners, through its members: Alvin Brooks,\\nMichael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason\\n Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric\\nEnderlin; Charles Evans; Robert Jorgenson; Robert McLaughlin; and Venasa Ray,\\n in their individual and official capacities\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 13, 2018\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Detectives with the Kansas City Police Department (“KCPD”) obtained a\\nsearch warrant for what they mistakenly believed was a homicide suspect’s residence.\\n\\nAfter the suspect was apprehended and arrested at another location, the detectives,\\nhoping to find the homicide victim’s cell phone and other evidence, had a SWAT\\nteam execute the search warrant. When the SWAT team knocked on the door, a\\nyoung woman opened the inside front door and held up her keys to indicate she was\\ngoing to unlock the screen door. Even though the SWAT team knew the suspect was\\nalready in custody, they broke open the screen and threw a flash-bang grenade into\\nthe living room of the home before the young woman could open the door.\\n\\n As it turned out, the suspect had not lived at the residence for some time and\\nthe only people inside were three women (two of them elderly) and a two-year old\\ngirl. The two-year old girl suffered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) from\\nthe blast of the flash-bang grenade. She sued the SWAT team officers, the detectives,\\nand the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners (“the Board”) under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and\\nthe defendants appealed. We affirm as to the SWAT team officers, reverse as to the\\ndetectives, and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the Board.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n In October 2010, three homicide detectives with the KCPD, Barbara Eckert,\\nMichael Jones, and Venasa Ray (“the detectives”), began investigating a homicide.\\nAs the victim’s cell phone was missing, the detectives obtained call records for the\\nphone after the time of the murder, as well as the GPS coordinates for those calls.\\nThe victim’s phone had been used after the murder to call a residence on Bristol\\nAvenue (“the Bristol residence”) in Kansas City, Missouri. Using a database\\ncontaining criminal history information from regional law enforcement agencies and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\nmotor vehicle records, the detectives learned that an individual named Lee Charles1\\nresided at the Bristol residence.\\n\\n The next morning, the detectives learned the victim’s phone was turned on and\\nwas within 80 meters of a particular intersection, an area including both the Bristol\\nresidence and two apartment buildings on Winchester Avenue (“the Winchester\\napartments”). Eckert and another detective arrived at the area to locate the phone.\\nWhile standing between the two Winchester apartments, the detectives could hear a\\nphone ringing when a third officer called the victim’s phone number, although they\\ncould not pinpoint its exact location. When more officers arrived, they again tried to\\nlocate the phone, but it appeared the battery had died or the phone had been turned\\noff.\\n\\n That evening, police learned the victim’s phone was in the area of a particular\\nintersection in Grandview, Missouri. A detective called the phone. Someone\\nanswered the call, but did not respond. The detective heard background noises that\\nsounded like a restaurant kitchen. The detectives sought the names of employees\\nworking that evening from five restaurants in the area. Charles was working at one\\nof those restaurants that evening.\\n\\n Records from the victim’s phone also showed it had been used after the murder\\nto call a Family Dollar store. The detectives obtained a list of employees and contact\\ninformation from the store manager. Charles was listed as an employee and his\\naddress was listed as the Bristol residence.\\n\\n Charles was arrested in the afternoon of November 3. The same day, Detective\\nJones applied for a search warrant for what was believed to be Charles’s residence on\\n\\n\\n 1\\n While he was initially a suspect, it was eventually discovered that another\\nindividual — not Charles — had committed the homicide.\\n -3-\\n\\nBristol Avenue. The warrant application omitted the fact the detectives had heard the\\nvictim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments — not at the Bristol residence.\\nAt 3:00 p.m., the warrant was issued, authorizing police to search for and seize cell\\nphones (including cell phones matching the description of the victim’s phone),\\nclothing or shoes with blood, knives with trace evidence, items that could be used for\\nstrangulation such as cords, wire, or rope with trace evidence, and the victim’s keys.\\n\\n Detective Jones contacted Sergeant Rusley of the KCPD Tactical Response\\nTeam about executing the search warrant at the Bristol residence. At 6:15 p.m.,\\nRusley conducted a briefing with the detectives, as well as Tactical Response Team\\nmembers Robert Jorgenson, Caleb Lenz, William Nauyok, Robert McLaughlin, Eric\\nEnderlin, and Charles Evans (“the SWAT team”). The SWAT team was informed\\nthat Charles had already been taken into custody. After the briefing, officers drove\\nby the Bristol residence to confirm the address. No other surveillance of the house\\nwas done to learn who resided there.\\n\\n At 7:00 p.m., the SWAT team, dressed in tactical gear with weapons drawn,\\napproached the front door of the Bristol residence. The front entrance had both an\\ninside wooden door and an outside metal screen door, each of which were “double-\\nkeyed,” meaning they required a key to open from both the inside and the outside.\\nBecause the warrant did not authorize a “no knock” entry, the SWAT team knocked\\non the door and announced: “Police, search warrant!” At the time, there were four\\npeople inside the residence: the plaintiff, Z.J., a two year old girl; Laverne Charles,\\nage 84; Leona Smith, age 68; and Carla Brown, age 24. Carla grabbed the keys to the\\ndoor and opened the inside door.\\n\\n What happened next is disputed. According to Carla, when she opened the\\ninner door, she saw through the screen door a lot of people outside, yelling, which\\nstartled her. She later said she didn’t know whether she backed away from the screen\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ndoor when she first saw the officers. She then held up the keys to the door in her\\nhand and jingled them for the SWAT team to see in order to indicate that she was\\ngoing to open up the door.2 Before she had the opportunity to open it, the SWAT\\nteam knocked out the screen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over Carla’s head into\\nthe living room of the house. Carla testified that she would have opened the screen\\ndoor had she been given the opportunity to do so.\\n\\n According to Sgt. Rusley, the SWAT team waited five to ten seconds after\\nknocking the first time before beginning to knock again. As they began knocking on\\nthe door the second time, the team was preparing to pry open the screen door with a\\ndevice. At the same time, Carla opened the inside door. Rusley claimed that “she\\nrefused [to open the screen door] and walked away,” after which they breached the\\nscreen door and threw in the flash-bang grenade. He explained that the flash-bang\\ngrenade was deployed because the SWAT team was “compromised,” meaning “that\\noccupants of the residence knew we were there and that we no longer had the element\\nof surprise.”\\n\\n Officer Jorgenson gave a slightly different account to the KCPD’s Internal\\nAffairs Unit, confirming part of Carla’s account and stating that she only “took a\\ncouple of steps back” before she “froze there” and then “waived a set of keys”:\\n\\n [As the SWAT team knocked on the door a second time,] we were\\n getting ready to set the hooligan tool into the doorframe and then the\\n front door was open[ed] from the inside of the house and the lady was\\n standing there. As soon as she saw us, she took a couple of steps back.\\n\\n 2\\n Carla’s testimony is corroborated by statements made by Leona in an interview\\nwith KCPD Internal Affairs. On summary judgment, the defendants objected to the\\nplaintiff’s use of these statements by Leona, who is now deceased, as hearsay. The\\ndistrict court does not appear to have ruled on the hearsay objection. We do not\\nconsider Leona’s statements in reaching our decision.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\n I’m sure she was in fear of what was going on. I told her to open the\\n door and she just kind of froze there. At one point she began to turn\\n away as we were still yelling at her to open the door. She waived a set\\n of keys. At the time, I had no idea what that meant. The sergeant\\n announced “hit it,” which means make entry into the residence. The\\n officer that had the hooligan tool took a swipe at the door attempting to\\n punch a hole in it so that we could access it with our hand and then\\n unlock it. After producing a hole in the door, the point-man reached in,\\n in an attempt to unlock it, only to find out it was a keyed lock. So then\\n we set the hool[igan tool] into the side of the door, hit it with the ram\\n and pr[i]ed the door open. Due to the fact it took us a longer than the\\n normal amount of time to get into the residence, the sergeant deployed\\n a noise flash diversionary device into the living room of the structure.\\n\\n The flash-bang grenade caught the living room drapes on fire. The SWAT\\nteam had to remove the drapes from the house and place them in the front yard before\\ncontinuing through the rest of the house. The SWAT team found two-year old Z.J.\\nin the living room. One officer acknowledged Z.J. was “very shaken from the whole\\nsituation.” The team placed Carla and Leona in zip tie restraints, but was unable to\\nplace restraints on Laverne because of her advanced age and physical condition.\\n\\n After the SWAT team cleared the house, the detectives, who had been waiting\\na block away, took control of the house. The detectives had Carla and Leona released\\nfrom the restraints. They also learned that Charles no longer resided there and had\\nbeen kicked out several months earlier. Charles was living a block away in an\\napartment with another individual and did not have any property at the Bristol\\nresidence.\\n\\n After the SWAT team raid, Z.J. suffered significant developmental regression\\nand was diagnosed with PTSD. In August 2015, Z.J., through her next friend Je’taun\\nJones, sued the detectives, the SWAT team members, and the Board (through its\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\nmembers)3 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 1983. As to the detectives, Z.J. alleged they omitted information on the warrant\\napplication about hearing the victim’s phone ringing inside the Winchester\\napartments. She also alleged they failed to conduct a sufficient investigation prior to\\nexecuting the warrant and then unjustifiably chose to have the SWAT team execute\\nthe search. As to the members of the SWAT team, she alleged they used excessive\\nforce by throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. And as to the Board, she\\nalleged its policies and practices were deliberately indifferent to the\\nunconstitutionally excessive use4 of flash-bang grenades by the KCPD.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n In their arguments, the parties categorize the several defendants into these\\nthree groups. The Appellants have not argued the claims against any individual\\ndefendant should be treated differently from other defendants in the same group (e.g.,\\nthe SWAT team officers who did not authorize or throw the flash-bang grenade may\\nnot be liable even if those who did are liable). Following the parties’ lead for\\npurposes of this appeal, we analyze the claims against the detectives, the SWAT team,\\nand the Board as they relate to those groups, rather than each individual defendant\\nseparately.\\n 4\\n On summary judgment, the plaintiff presented evidence to support what was\\nalleged to be excessive use of SWAT teams to execute search warrants and excessive\\nuse of flash-bang grenades by those SWAT teams. KCPD policy provided that\\n“Uniformed/tactical entry personnel will be used for making entry during the\\nexecution of all search warrants,” but also stated that “[n]ot every search warrant will\\nrequire the presence of uniformed/tactical entry personnel, e.g., warrants served on\\na safe deposit box or an impounded vehicle.” As the district court noted, the Board\\ndid not have any policy about the use of flash-bang grenades — such as when their\\nuse is appropriate and how to use them safely. One officer estimated that in\\nexecuting search warrants, flash-bang grenades were used 80-90% of the time;\\nanother officer estimated that in his experience they were used about 50% of the time;\\nand a third officer estimated they were used about 75% of the time.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\n The defendants moved for summary judgment, with the individual defendants’\\nmotions based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions and the\\ndefendants timely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred in denying their motion for\\nsummary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment where it “shows that\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and . . . is entitled to judgment as\\na matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In an appeal from a denial of summary\\njudgment based on qualified immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction to review the\\ndecision “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.\\n511, 530 (1985). We do not review the “district court’s determination about what\\nfactual issues are ‘genuine.’” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Rather,\\nour review “is limited to the purely legal issue of whether the facts alleged support\\na claim of violation of clearly established law.” Berry v. Doss, 900 F.3d 1017, 1021\\n(8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Mallak v. City of Baxter, 823 F.3d 441, 445–46\\n(8th Cir. 2016)). However, “[t]here is one exception to such a jurisdictional\\nlimitation on our review: we may reject the district court’s factual findings to the\\nextent that they are ‘blatantly contradicted by the record.’” Wallace v. City of\\nAlexander, 843 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d\\n1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014)).\\n\\n A. The SWAT Team\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying summary judgment to\\nthe SWAT team officers because they did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and in\\nany event, are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\nestablished law. We disagree. Any reasonable officer would have known the use a\\nflash-bang grenade under these circumstances constituted excessive force.\\n\\n Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to\\n“establish[ a] cause[] of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from\\nGovernment officers who violated federal law.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,\\n1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Though\\nthe text of § 1983 contains no provision of immunity, the Supreme Court has\\nrecognized a qualified immunity which “protects government officials ‘from liability\\nfor civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established\\nstatutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”\\nPearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457\\nU.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity entails a two step analysis: first,\\ndetermining whether “the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation\\nof a constitutional right,” and second, “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly\\nestablished’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232 (quoting\\nSaucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).\\n\\n We first address the initial step of the qualified immunity analysis, which in\\nthis procedural context is: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable\\nto Z.J., the SWAT team officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\n\\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown v. City of Golden\\nValley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497,\\n502 (8th Cir. 2006)). This evaluation “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and\\nquality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\ncountervailing governmental interests at stake,” and must be done “from the\\nperspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of\\nhindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).\\n\\n The reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades depends upon the\\ncircumstances. See generally Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2015).\\nCertainly, they can be an important tool for law enforcement officers to gain an\\nelement of surprise while entering a dangerous environment and can at times obviate\\nthe need for officers to use deadly force. See Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779\\n(9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e recognize that less-than-lethal alternatives are intended to\\navoid unnecessary fatalities.”).\\n\\n But these weapons also carry serious risks. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30.\\nThe record evidence shows the flash-bang grenade used here is four times louder than\\na 12-gauge shotgun blast and emits a light 107 times brighter than the brightest high-\\nbeam vehicle headlight. It has a powerful enough concussive effect to break windows\\nand put holes in walls. The flash-bang burns at around 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit,\\ncreating an obvious and serious risk of burning individuals, damaging property, and\\nstarting fires (as occurred here). In some cases, they can even be lethal. And as this\\ncase illustrates well, they pose a risk of traumatizing unsuspecting\\noccupants — particularly small children like two-year old Z.J.\\n\\n While the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades while executing a\\nwarrant is not reducible to a simple and categorical rule, several considerations guide\\nour analysis. Most importantly, we consider whether officers had reason to believe\\nthey would encounter a dangerous, violent suspect. See Estate of Escobedo v.\\nBender, 600 F.3d 770, 784–86 (7th Cir. 2010). Their use is more likely to be\\nreasonable if the officers expect to encounter an individual who is known to be armed\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nand dangerous or who has a history of violence. Their use is also more likely to be\\nreasonable if the situation presents a need for the element of surprise in order to\\nprotect the safety of officers or others. See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d\\n963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding use of flash-bang grenade was reasonable in part\\nbecause “the officers had ample reason to be concerned about their personal safety”);\\nBoyd, 374 F.3d at 779 (“There are likely circumstances in which a risk to officers’\\nsafety would make the use of a flash-bang device appropriate.”). On the other hand,\\ntheir use is less likely to be reasonable if officers unreasonably fail to ascertain\\nwhether innocent bystanders will be present in the area the flash-bang grenade is\\ndeployed. See Milan, 795 F.3d at 729–30; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779; United States v.\\nJones, 214 F.3d 836, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n Whether the use of the flash-bang grenade here was reasonable is not a close\\nquestion. The SWAT team knew the suspect, Charles, was already in custody. Any\\npotential justification based on the fact Charles was (at the time) suspected of murder\\nis eliminated by the fact the SWAT team knew they would not encounter Charles\\nthere. Nor did they have any indication that other people at the residence would pose\\nany threat. In fact, they had no idea who was inside the house because they failed to\\ndo any investigation into that question beyond a quick drive-by to check the address.\\nThe use of a flash-bang grenade under these facts was not reasonable. “The use of\\na [flash-bang] grenade must be justified by the particular risk posed in the execution\\nof the warrant.” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 239 (2d Cir. 2014). Nor was the\\nmanner of use reasonable. They threw the flash-bang grenade into the house blindly\\nwithout knowing whether children, elderly, or other innocent individuals were inside.\\n\\n The Appellants argue the use of the flash-bang was reasonable because the\\nSWAT team may have still faced danger in spite of Charles already being in custody.\\nAfter all, they posit in their brief, the murder “could have been part of a robbery by\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\na group of criminals,” and Charles’s arrest “could have tipped the others off that a\\nsearch or arrest was imminent.” Of course, they had no actual information to support\\nthis after-the-fact speculation. More to the point, however, this argument relies on\\na dangerously flawed premise. The argument that the SWAT team was justified in\\nusing a flash-bang grenade because they did not know for certain it was unnecessary\\nis precisely backwards; it makes using that dangerous level of force the default. This\\ntype of “flash-bang first, ask questions later” approach runs headlong into the Fourth\\nAmendment. Law enforcement officers like the SWAT team members here need an\\nactual justification for using a flash-bang grenade; the mere hypothetical possibility\\nthat someone dangerous could be in a house they are entering — without any actual\\nfacts to indicate that is true or likely to be true — is not sufficient. See Milan, 795\\nF.3d at 730; Terebesi, 764 F.3d at 236–239; Boyd, 374 F.3d at 779.\\n\\n Nor was the use of the flash-bang grenade justified by anything Carla did when\\nopening the door. Some of the factual details on what happened when she opened the\\ninside door are in dispute, and the facts must be read in the light most favorable to the\\nplaintiff. Carla held up her keys to indicate to the SWAT team her intention to unlock\\nthe screen door. But before she could get the door open, the officers broke open the\\nscreen and threw in a flash-bang grenade over her head. The explanation that the\\nflash-bang was used because the SWAT team believed it was “compromised,”\\nmeaning “that occupants of the residence knew [the SWAT team officers] were there\\nand that [the officers] no longer had the element of surprise,” is unpersuasive. The\\nsearch warrant did not authorize the SWAT team to conduct a “no-knock” warrant,\\nand so they knocked on the front door and announced their presence, which obviously\\ndefeated the element of surprise. After all, the purpose of the constitutional knock-\\nand-announce requirement is to allow a citizen the chance to come to the door and\\nallow entrance to an officer who is legally entitled to enter. See Wilson v. Arkansas,\\n514 U.S. 927, 931–36 (1995). Even assuming, as Officer Jorgenson stated, that Carla\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\ntook a couple of steps backwards and then “froze there,” the officers were not\\njustified in blindly throwing a flash-bang grenade into the residence. They had no\\nreason to believe Carla or anyone else inside posed any danger to them. The SWAT\\nteam’s use of the flash-bang grenade was unreasonable and violated the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n As the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, we address “whether the\\nright at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 232. In making this determination, “the focus is on whether the\\nofficer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful . . . .” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.\\nCt. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per\\ncuriam)). Thus, the Supreme Court has said that “[a]s the qualified immunity defense\\nhas evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those\\nwho knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). To\\nsatisfy this fair notice requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently\\nclear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that\\nright.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). It is not required that there\\nbe “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or\\nconstitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741\\n(2011). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for\\ntransgressing bright lines.” Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013)\\n(quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir. 2004)).\\n\\n The “clearly established” requirement of qualified immunity provides officers\\nwith ample room for honest mistakes, but the SWAT team officers’ conduct falls\\noutside even this generous standard. First, the use of the flash-bang grenade was\\nunreasonable under all of the relevant case law. Second, it would have been obvious\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\nto any reasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under those\\ncircumstances was unreasonable.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has established that, broadly speaking, “[i]n executing a\\nsearch warrant officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to\\nensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.” Los Angeles Cty. v. Rettele,\\n550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007). At a narrower level, see al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742\\n(instructing courts not to “define clearly established law at a high level of\\ngenerality”), the relevant case law clearly established that the use of flash-bang\\ngrenades is unreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the\\nthreat of violence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any\\ninnocent bystanders in the area it is deployed. It is true this court has not yet\\naddressed the reasonableness of the use of flash-bang grenades, but many other courts\\nhave.5 See Bender, 600 F.3d at 784–86 (stating “the use of a flash bang device is\\njustified when ‘potentially violent people [can] be found in [a] house,’ as opposed to\\nindividuals who pose no threat to the police or others” (quoting United States v.\\nFolks, 236 F.3d 384, 388 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829,\\n836 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering such factors as whether the defendant had a history\\nof violent crime and was armed and the need for the element of surprise); Boyd, 374\\nF.3d at 779 (stating that “it cannot be a reasonable use of force under the Fourth\\nAmendment to throw [a flash-bang grenade] ‘blind’ into a room occupied by innocent\\nbystanders absent a strong governmental interest, careful consideration of alternatives\\n\\n 5\\n The Appellants apparently argue the “clearly established” analysis must\\ninvolve only looking to cases from the relevant circuit and the Supreme Court. It is\\ntrue plaintiffs can show a right is clearly established by pointing to “cases of\\ncontrolling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident,” but they may\\nalso do so by pointing to “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority” — including\\ncases from other jurisdictions. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (emphasis\\nadded); Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 541 (8th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\nand appropriate measures to reduce the risk of injury”); Molina, 325 F.3d at 973\\n(concluding the use of a flash-bang grenade was reasonable because suspect had a\\nviolent criminal record and it was not used around the suspect’s wife and children).\\n\\n The dissent on this issue relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Dukes v.\\nDeaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2017), to conclude the SWAT team here did\\nnot violate clearly established law, post at 25–27. But in Dukes, the defendant officer\\nwas executing a “no-knock” search warrant in a house in which drug trafficking was\\nknown to occur and at which a drug dealer resided who was known to carry a\\nhandgun. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that there was no violation of clearly\\nestablished law was based, at least in part, on its consideration of that danger faced\\nby the officer. See Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1044. Our conclusion is wholly consistent\\nwith Dukes. Similarly, the cases from other circuits cited by the dissent that found\\na constitutional violation but no violation of clearly established law are not\\ninconsistent with our conclusion. Each of those cases, like Dukes, involved a\\nsituation where officers faced the threat of a potentially armed and dangerous\\nindividual. See Dukes, 852 F.3d 1039–40; Bing, 456 F.3d at 559–62 (involving an\\narmed and intoxicated individual who had already fired his weapon causing police\\nto fear for their lives); Boyd, 374 F.3d at 777 (noting that officers knew armed\\ncriminals could be inside the apartment). Those cases can be read as inconsistent\\nwith our conclusion only by defining the right at issue at a very broad level of\\ngenerality. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. We do not hold that every unreasonable use\\nof a flash-bang grenade is a violation of clearly established law. Rather, we hold only\\nthat it was clearly established in 2010 that the use of flash-bang grenades is\\nunreasonable where officers have no basis to believe they will face the threat of\\nviolence and they unreasonably fail to ascertain whether there are any innocent\\nbystanders in the area it is deployed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\n The Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited by the dissent not only had differing\\nfacts but were addressing the clarity of the law as it existed in different times. See\\ngenerally Bing, 456 F.3d 555 (involving a violation occurring in 2002); Boyd, 374\\nF.3d 773 (involving a violation occurring in 1997). Each case contributed to the\\ngrowing clarity of the law on when the use of flash-bang grenades is appropriate. But\\nmore importantly, disagreement about whether the law was clearly established does\\nnot equate to disagreement about the law itself. Under all of the relevant case law,\\nthe SWAT team officers’ use of a flash-bang grenade in this situation would be\\nunconstitutional. The court is not aware of, and neither the parties nor the dissent\\nhave pointed to, any case law in existence in 2010 under which the SWAT team’s\\nconduct would be constitutional.\\n\\n Even aside from the consensus in persuasive case law at the time, the SWAT\\nteam officers violated clearly established law because it would be obvious to any\\nreasonable officer that the use of the flash-bang grenade under these circumstances\\nwas unreasonable. For a right to be clearly established, it is not required that there\\nbe “a case directly on point.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. An officer may have fair\\nnotice based on the fact his conduct is obviously unlawful, even in the absence of a\\ncase addressing the particular violation. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741\\n(2002); see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (“Of course, in an obvious case, [the\\nFourth Amendment reasonableness standard articulated at a high level of generality]\\ncan ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.”);\\nRokusek v. Jansen, 899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018). The only potential threat of\\nwhich the SWAT team was aware was Charles, then a suspect in a murder\\ninvestigation. But they knew Charles was in custody. They had no reason to believe\\nany accomplices were involved in the murder and present in the residence. Nor did\\nthey take any precautions to avoid harming innocent bystanders. And the rationale\\nthat they were “compromised” is nonsense because it is undisputed they knocked and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\nannounced their presence. Only the plainly incompetent officer announces his\\npresence at a house with no known dangerous people and then decides to throw in a\\nflash-bang grenade because the occupants know he is there. Nor does the fact it took\\nlonger than normal for the SWAT team to gain entry provide any support for their\\ndecision. They could not have reasonably believed that “safety concerns necessitated\\nan expedited entry by using a flash-bang grenade” based on the delay, as the dissent\\nposits, post at 29, because they had no reason to believe anyone inside posed any\\ndanger to them and the young woman who answered the door was unarmed and gave\\nno indication she posed any threat. Even though they were investigating a homicide,\\nthey knew the sole suspect was already in custody and they had no reason to believe\\nthe residence harbored other dangerous individuals. Blindly throwing a flash-bang\\ngrenade into the residence under these circumstances was obviously unconstitutional.\\n\\n The cases cited by the dissent do not lend any support to the position the\\nSWAT team’s use of the flash-bang grenade was not obviously unconstitutional. As\\ndiscussed above, those cases each involved circumstances where officers knew or had\\nreason to believe the residence in which the flash-bang grenade was used contained\\na potentially violent individual. Under the facts of this case, where the SWAT team\\nhad no basis to believe they would face the threat of violence and unreasonably failed\\nto ascertain whether there were any innocent bystanders in the area the flash-bang\\ngrenade was deployed, their violation was obvious.\\n\\n The SWAT team officers violated clearly established law when they used the\\nflash-bang grenade. The district court did not err by denying summary judgment on\\nqualified immunity to the SWAT team.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n\\n B. The Detectives\\n\\n The Appellants argue the detectives were entitled to summary judgment\\nbecause (1) the information they omitted from the search warrant application was not\\nmaterial; and (2) their decision to use a SWAT team to execute the search warrant\\nwas not unreasonable or did not violate clearly established law. We agree the\\ndetectives are entitled to summary judgment because there was probable cause to\\nsupport the search warrant, even considering the omitted information, and because\\ntheir decision to use a SWAT team, regardless of whether it was reasonable, did not\\nviolate clearly established law.\\n\\n 1. Search Warrant\\n\\n Z.J. argues the detectives unreasonably omitted from the search warrant\\naffidavit that they had heard the victim’s cell phone ringing in the Winchester\\napartments and argues that if that fact had been included, the affidavit would lack\\nprobable cause. We disagree.\\n\\n The U.S. Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their\\npersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and\\nrequires that warrants shall be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV.\\n“A warrant based upon an affidavit containing ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless\\ndisregard for the truth’” — including, as alleged here, material omissions of\\nfact — “violates the Fourth Amendment.” Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098\\n(8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); see also\\nMorris v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402–04 (8th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a Franks claim\\ninvolving alleged falsehoods and omissions).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -18-\\n\\n To prove a Franks violation based on the omission of material from a search\\nwarrant application, a plaintiff must show “1) that facts were omitted with the intent\\nto make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby make, the affidavit\\nmisleading, and 2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information,\\ncould not support a finding of probable cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772\\nF.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Box, 193 F.3d 1032, 1035\\n(8th Cir. 1999)). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists if, in light of the\\ntotality of the circumstances, there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence\\nof a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d\\n1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Donnell, 726 F.3d 1054, 1056\\n(8th Cir. 2013)).\\n\\n The district court identified what it concluded was an inaccuracy and also a\\nmaterial omission in the search warrant affidavit. However, we conclude the affidavit\\nwas not inaccurate and, even considering the omitted information, there was probable\\ncause to support the search warrant. Thus, there was no Fourth and Fourteenth\\nAmendment Franks violation.\\n\\n The district court stated that the search warrant affidavit inaccurately\\n“indicated . . . that some independent verification had been made that . . . Charles\\nactually lived at [the Bristol residence], when in fact there had been no independent\\nverification.” “[T]he only ‘check’ that the detectives performed was by looking at a\\ncomputerized database,” the court said. This conclusion is erroneous for two reasons.\\nFirst, the affidavit never claimed “that some independent verification had been made”\\nthat Charles lived at the Bristol residence. It truthfully stated that “a check” showed\\nhe lived there. A check of the law enforcement database showed just that. Second,\\nthe court’s assertion that no independent verification of Charles’s residence was made\\nis “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Wallace, 843 F.3d at 767 (quoting Walton,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -19-\\n\\n752 F.3d at 1116). The record shows the detectives also obtained a list of employees\\nand their addresses from the Family Dollar store at which Charles worked, which\\nlisted his address at the Bristol residence.\\n\\n The omission correctly identified by the district court is the fact the detectives\\nheard the victim’s phone ringing in the Winchester apartments. While we do not\\ncondone the selective omission of this fact, the affidavit would support probable\\ncause even with its addition. The affidavit established: (1) the phone was traced to\\nan area that included both the Bristol residence and the Winchester apartments; (2)\\nthe phone had been used to call the Bristol residence; (3) the phone had been used to\\ncall Charles’s employer, Family Dollar; and (4) the phone had been answered in what\\nsounded to be a restaurant and traced to an area that included the restaurant at which\\nCharles was working at the time. Moreover, two separate sources indicated Charles\\nlived at the Bristol residence. These facts provided probable cause to believe Charles\\nhad the victim’s phone in his possession and lived at the Bristol residence. The fact\\nthe phone was heard in a nearby residence could have meant Charles took the phone\\nwith him when visiting someone there; cell phones are inherently mobile, after all.\\nEven considering that the phone had been heard in the Winchester apartments at one\\npoint, there was still a “fair probability” to believe the phone and other evidence\\nwould be found at what was reasonably believed to be Charles’s residence. See\\nShockley, 816 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Donnell, 726 F.3d at 1056). Because the search\\nwarrant would be supported by probable cause even with the addition of the omitted\\ninformation, the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the detectives\\non this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -20-\\n\\n 2. The Decision to use the SWAT Team\\n\\n Z.J. argues the detectives’ authorization to use the SWAT team for executing\\nthe search warrant was unreasonable because they conducted no pre-search\\ninvestigation other than a brief drive by the house to confirm the address and had no\\nreason to believe a SWAT team was necessary. We do not decide whether the\\ndetectives’ decision violated the Fourth Amendment but instead conclude they are\\nentitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\\n\\n “To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right\\nto be free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was\\nobjectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496\\n(quoting Henderson, 439 F.3d at 502).\\n\\n An official may be held liable under § 1983 only if the official, “through [his\\nor her] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556\\nU.S. 662, 676 (2009). This court has said that “[i]n a § 1983 case an official is only\\nliable for his own misconduct . . . .” Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011\\n(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 534–35 (8th Cir.\\n2009)). “Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct\\nresponsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962,\\n967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.\\n2006)). Thus, the detectives only violated the Fourth Amendment if their own actions\\nwere directly responsible for a deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. They are not\\nautomatically responsible for all of the actions of the SWAT team officers.\\n\\n An officer’s decision to authorize a SWAT team to execute a warrant can, in\\nsome cases, constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. See Holland ex rel. Overdorff\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -21-\\n\\nv. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1189–92 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving search and arrest\\nwarrants). It is clear the decision to send a SWAT team into a residence must be\\nreasonable. See id.\\n\\n We do not, however, decide whether the detectives’ decision here was\\nreasonable. On the one hand, they had no information that would have supported the\\nneed to send the SWAT team to execute the search warrant. They also performed\\nvirtually no investigation that would have provided them with more information\\nabout whether the use of the SWAT team was appropriate. But on the other hand, the\\ndetectives are only responsible for their own decisions. Importantly here, we must\\njudge their conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather\\nthan with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While the\\ndetectives likely knew the use of a flash-bang grenade was possible, no evidence\\nsuggests they directed or were involved in planning its use. The warrant was also not\\na “no-knock” warrant. Thus, the detectives would have expected the SWAT team\\nofficers to knock and announce their presence — and presumably not use a flash-\\nbang grenade without justification. This is a much different situation from one where\\nan officer is involved in the planning of a surprise, “no-knock” raid by a SWAT team\\nand knows a significant amount of force will be used. The detectives would not have\\nnecessarily anticipated the SWAT team would throw a flash-bang grenade into the\\nhouse blindly without knowing who was inside and without any indication that\\nanyone inside posed any danger to them.\\n\\n Without deciding the close question of whether the detectives’ decision to use\\nthe SWAT team to execute the search warrant in this case violated the Fourth\\nAmendment, we conclude the detectives did not violate clearly established law. Z.J.\\nhas pointed to no cases in this circuit, or a consensus of cases from other circuits, that\\nwould have put the detectives on notice that using a SWAT team to execute a search\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -22-\\n\\nwarrant under these circumstances violated the Constitution. Nor was the decision\\nobviously unconstitutional. The detectives are entitled to qualified immunity for what\\nmay have been a “bad guess[] in [a] gray area[].” Scott, 720 F.3d at 1036 (quoting\\nDavis, 375 F.3d at 712).\\n\\n C. The Board\\n\\n The Appellants argue the district court erred by denying the Board’s motion for\\nsummary judgment. The district court concluded there was a genuine dispute of\\nmaterial fact “regarding whether there was a continuing, widespread, persistent\\npattern of routine use of the [flash-bang grenades] by the [SWAT] Team without any\\nregard for the safety of the occupants of the residence,” and “whether the Board was\\ndeliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized this custom and whether this custom\\nwas responsible for plaintiff’s injuries.”\\n\\n We conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s\\ndenial of summary judgment to the Board. “Ordinarily, this court lacks jurisdiction\\nover a denial of summary judgment ‘because such an order is not a final decision.’”\\nMorgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Division\\nof Emp’t Sec. v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017)). As\\ndiscussed above, we have limited jurisdiction to review denials of summary judgment\\nbased on qualified immunity to the extent they turn on an issue of law. See Mitchell,\\n472 U.S. at 530. But the Board, as a municipal entity, is not protected by qualified\\nimmunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Szabla v.\\nCity of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus, we lack appellate\\njurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment to the Board.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -23-\\n\\n Nor can we review the Board’s appeal under pendent appellate jurisdiction.\\nWe may review certain claims to the extent they are “inextricably intertwined” with\\nan issue we already have jurisdiction to review. See Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723\\nF.3d 966, 975 (8th Cir. 2013). In this context, we may review the denial of the\\nBoard’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent our resolution of the claim\\nagainst the SWAT team “necessarily resolves” the Board’s liability. See id.; Muir v.\\nDecatur Cty., 917 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n To establish liability against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom, a\\nplaintiff must show, among other things, “that [he or she] was injured by acts\\npursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force\\nbehind the constitutional violation.” Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d\\n1149, 1160 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436\\nU.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). Our conclusion that the SWAT team violated the plaintiff’s\\nconstitutional rights is relevant to the Board’s liability, but it does not “necessarily\\nresolve” it. Showing a constitutional violation is but one of several requirements to\\nestablish municipal liability. As a result, we do not have pendent appellate\\njurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of the Board’s summary judgment\\nmotion. We dismiss this portion of the appeal.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the SWAT\\nteam, reverse as to the detectives, and dismiss the appeal as to the Board.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -24-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3285,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642839,"string":"4,642,839"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Wesley Paul COONCE, Jr. Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Wesley Coonce, Jr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"14-2800"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Grasz, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 14-2800\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr. appeals the district court’s1 judgment sentencing him\\nto death for his role in the murder of Victor Castro-Rodriguez (“Castro”). We affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Coonce and Castro were inmates in a locked ward that housed mental health\\npatients at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri\\n(“FMC Springfield”). Coonce was serving a life sentence for kidnapping and\\ncarjacking, while Castro was committed due to his mental health and had no projected\\nrelease date.\\n\\n Prison officials found Castro dead in his cell on January 26, 2010. The\\nresponding staff found Castro unconscious, with his hands tied behind his back with\\nmedical tape, feet bound at his ankles with shoelaces, and a brown cloth wrapped\\naround his neck. Medical staff tried to resuscitate him to no avail. Dr. Carl Stacy, the\\ngovernment’s expert pathologist, testified that Castro died from asphyxiation due to\\na compressed larynx. He opined that the strangulation occurred from a “larger\\nobject,” not hands, because of blunt force trauma to the neck and the lack of any\\nbroken hyoid rings. He also noted blunt force trauma to the chin and injuries to the\\nupper chest, lower neck, and back of the head. He estimated Castro died within three\\nto five minutes.\\n\\n Physical evidence supported the conclusion that Coonce and another inmate,\\nCharles Hall, had killed Castro by standing on his neck. Both Coonce’s right boot\\nand Hall’s shoes tested positive for a substance containing Castro’s DNA. Coonce\\nhad two pairs of shoes in his cell that were missing their shoelaces. Coonce also\\nshowed Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Rick McLain where he had\\nplaced his hand on the wall to balance while standing on Castro’s neck.\\n\\n A camera provided additional circumstantial evidence that Coonce and Hall\\nkilled Castro. The prison did not have cameras that could see inside Castro’s cell or\\nthe door to his cell at the time of the murder. Nevertheless, a camera showed the only\\npeople that approached Castro’s cell during the time of the murder were Coonce and\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fHall. After a few minutes, Coonce left the cell for about a minute to talk to another\\ninmate. He rejoined Hall in Castro’s cell, and both of them were there for about nine\\nadditional minutes. Coonce left again, made a throat-slashing sign to another inmate\\nand then returned to the cell. Both Coonce and Hall left the cell a couple minutes\\nlater.\\n\\n Coonce repeatedly claimed responsibility for Castro’s murder. His first\\nadmissions came shortly after FMC Springfield officials discovered Castro’s body.\\nHe particularly described that he tied up Castro’s hands and feet and stomped on\\nCastro’s neck. He explained Castro was a snitch. That same night, he told an\\ninvestigating FBI agent that he kicked Castro in the neck and stood on his throat until\\nhe stopped breathing. Coonce also claimed both he and another person, which other\\nevidence showed to be Hall, stood on Castro’s neck until Castro stopped breathing.\\nCoonce explained that interactions with other inmates had upset him and that he\\ndecided to retaliate against Castro for previously telling prison staff about a minor\\noffense. The next day, he told a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) psychologist that he\\nkilled a man and that it was by his choice. He told the FBI in a subsequent interview\\nthat he had no regrets about killing Castro. Coonce also bragged about the murder\\nto inmates and admitted it in letters and calls to friends and family.\\n\\n In July 2011, a grand jury indicted Coonce on one count of murder in the first\\ndegree within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 2, and one count of murder by a federal prisoner\\nserving a life sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1118. The indictment included\\nspecial findings of the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3591 and aggravating\\nfactors under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) that made the charged offenses eligible for the\\ndeath penalty.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Coonce filed a motion for a separate trial from co-defendant Hall. The district\\ncourt denied the motion. It concluded that redacting statements with Bruton2 risks\\nand properly instructing the jury would resolve any potential prejudice.\\n\\n During pre-trial disclosures, the government asked for discovery on Coonce’s\\nmental health evidence and for an Atkins3 hearing on whether Coonce was “mentally\\nretarded.”4 Coonce responded that “the defense will not be asserting Mr. Coonce is\\nmentally retarded” and “no Atkins hearing is necessary.”\\n\\n After an eight-day trial in April and May of 2014, the jury found Coonce guilty\\non both counts in the indictment. The district court then retained the same jury for\\nthe capital sentencing proceeding, where the jury would decide whether to impose the\\ndeath penalty.\\n\\n The government alleged Coonce was eligible for the death penalty based on his\\ncrime satisfying the required mental state for the death penalty and based on his\\nconduct satisfying eight aggravating factors.5 Four of the aggravating factors were\\nfrom the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”): (1) causing death during the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–37 (1968) (concluding there is a\\nConfrontation Clause violation when one co-defendant’s prior statements implicate\\nanother co-defendant’s guilt but the first co-defendant does not testify at trial).\\n 3\\n Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the Eighth Amendment\\nbans imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded).\\n 4\\n We recognize the use of the term “mentally retarded” may be offensive to\\nsome. However, this terminology reflects the statutory language. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3596(c) (“A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is\\nmentally retarded.”)\\n 5\\n The government withdrew reliance on a ninth factor before the start of the\\ncapital sentencing proceeding.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcommission of another crime; (2) having two or more prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies; (3) committing murder “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner\\nin that it involved torture or serious physical abuse;” and (4) committing murder\\n“after substantial planning and premeditation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1), (c)(4), (c)(6),\\n(c)(9). The other four aggravating factors were “non-statutory” as they are not listed\\nin the FDPA: (1) future dangerousness, (2) conduct suggesting a grave indifference\\nto human life, (3) lack of remorse about Castro’s death, and (4) obstructing justice by\\nretaliating against Castro for reporting misconduct.\\n\\n Coonce alleged that thirty-three mitigating factors weighed against the death\\npenalty being an appropriate punishment for him, twenty-six of which were submitted\\nto the jury. The first ten of these factors focused extensively on his chaotic and\\nabusive childhood. Two factors sought to rebut the government’s factors. They\\nalleged Coonce showed remorse for Castro’s death and that he would have help from\\nloving family and foster family relationships. Six factors focused on his mental state\\nand on injuries that may have caused traumatic brain injuries. Three factors alleged\\nhe had a lesser role in the murder. One of these factors suggested he killed Castro out\\nof a desire to escape abuse from other inmates due to the sexual offenses in his\\nhistory. Another noted Coonce’s repeated attempts at suicide. Two factors alleged\\nhe had improved in the two years prior to trial. Finally, one catch-all factor allowed\\nthe jury to acknowledge “other reasons that weigh against the imposition of a\\nsentence of death for Defendant Coonce.”\\n\\n After hearing all of the penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously decided\\nthe death penalty should be imposed on Coonce. They found the government proved\\nall eight aggravating factors. The entire jury found one mitigating factor: “Defendant\\nCoonce’s childhood was marked by chaos, abuse (both physical and sexual), as well\\nas neglect and abandonment.” Individual jurors found other mitigating factors.\\nEleven jurors found “[t]he chaotic and abusive life that Defendant Coonce endured\\nas a young child increased his risk for emotional and mental disturbances in his adult\\n\\n -5-\\n\\flife.” Eight jurors found “[d]efendant Coonce has suffered from mental and\\nemotional impairments from a very young age.” One juror found “[d]efendant\\nCoonce’s mother, Linda Coonce, was addicted to illegal drugs and alcohol.” In light\\nof those findings, all of the jurors weighed the aggravating factors against the\\nmitigating factors and agreed the death penalty was appropriate.\\n\\n The district court imposed the death penalty as determined by the jury. Coonce\\ntimely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n The FDPA requires this court to perform three tasks on review: (1) “address all\\nsubstantive and procedural issues raised on appeal,” (2) “consider whether the\\nsentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other\\narbitrary factor,” and (3) assess “whether the evidence supports the special finding\\nof the existence of an aggravating factor . . . under section 3592.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3595(c)(1). The court may “not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account\\nof any error which can be harmless,” and the government bears the burden of proving\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Id. § 3595(c)(2).\\n\\n Coonce raises sixteen arguments on appeal. We address them in order.\\n\\n A. Eligibility for the Death Penalty\\n\\n Coonce first argues that he meets the “mentally retarded” exception to the\\nFDPA and is not eligible for the death penalty. The FDPA states “[a] sentence of\\ndeath shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3596(c). “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only [1]\\nsubaverage intellectual functioning, but also [2] significant limitations in adaptive\\nskills . . . that [3] became manifest before age 18.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f318 (2002). Both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly noted the\\nconsensus that mental retardation must, as a definitional matter, onset before age\\neighteen. See, e.g., id.; Ortiz v. United States, 664 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 2011).\\nCoonce conceded below, and concedes on appeal, that his intellectual deficits were\\nonset at age twenty. Thus, his argument relies on changing the prevailing\\nunderstanding of the statutory exception to encompass an age of onset after eighteen.\\n\\n In response to the government’s request for discovery of mental health\\nevidence, Coonce stated he would not be asserting that he is “mentally retarded” and\\nthat no Atkins hearing was necessary. Then, on day fourteen of the capital sentencing\\nproceeding, Coonce filed a motion requesting an order barring the government from\\nseeking the death penalty, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision against a firm\\nIQ score cutoff in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) also supported eliminating\\nthe firm age cutoff in the definition of intellectual disability. The motion conceded\\nCoonce did not meet the medical community’s definition of age of onset but argued\\nfor a fluid definition anyway.\\n\\n We assume, without deciding, Coonce preserved his argument and we hold the\\nage of onset requirement remains before the age of eighteen. Coonce’s main\\nargument to evade the precedent construing the FDPA is to assert that the age of\\nonset requirement is not rigid or will change in the near future. This argument\\ndisregards “a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that words generally\\nshould be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress\\nenacted the statute.’” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (ellipses\\nin original) (quoting Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074\\n(2018)). Both the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) and the American\\nAssociation on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”) agreed at the\\ntime Congress enacted the FDPA’s “mentally retarded” exception that the impairment\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fmust onset by definition before eighteen.6 Thus, as a matter of statutory construction,\\nCoonce’s argument is meritless.\\n\\n Coonce cites two other sources to persuade us to interpret the FDPA as having\\nhis preferred age of onset requirement: the text of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and\\na rule promulgated by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). We find neither\\npersuasive.\\n\\n The Rehabilitation Act evidence is unhelpful because it involves a policy\\ncontext that compels no legal conclusion. Coonce is correct that Congress amended\\nthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to expand eligibility for disability benefits from those\\nwith a disability onset before eighteen to those with a disability onset before twenty-\\ntwo. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities\\nAmendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 3004–05 (1978). He does not\\nexplain how this policy choice defining eligibility for benefits for physical and mental\\ndisabilities constitutes a medical judgment about mental disability. Because\\ndevelopmental disability is inherently a legal term, not a medical one, see Tennessee\\n\\n 6\\n In fact, both the APA and the AAIDD agreed on this definition at the time the\\noriginal “mentally retarded” exception was enacted, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,\\nPub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4390 (1988), and at the time the FDPA was enacted\\nwith the same exception. Compare Am. Assn. on Mental Deficiency, Classification\\nin Mental Retardation 1 (Grossman ed. 1983) (defining mental retardation as\\noccurring during “the period of time between conception and the 18th birthday”), and\\nAm. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 36\\n(Third Ed. 1980) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an “essential feature”),\\nwith Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition,\\nClassification, and Systems of Supports 1 (9th ed. 1992) (defining mental retardation\\nas occurring “before age 18”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical\\nManual of Mental Disorders 39 (Fourth Ed. 1994) (“The onset must occur before age\\n18 years.”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\\nDisorders 29 (Third Ed. Rev. 1987) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an\\n“essential feature”).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fProt. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 349 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004), Congress\\ncould redefine the term when it wanted as a matter of policy. We see no indication\\nin the FDPA that Congress intended to adopt its policy judgments in other areas in\\nlieu of the definition that prevailed at the time, especially when it did not specify that\\nsame policy judgment here.\\n\\n Coonce is correct that the Social Security Administration defines intellectual\\ndisability as onset before age twenty-two. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §\\n12.05. The SSA’s rule is unhelpful because it cites no basis at all for its definition.\\nThere is no discussion in the Federal Register of why that rule was adopted. See\\nFederal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance; Listing of\\nImpairments—Mental Disorders, 50 Fed. Reg. 35038, 35049–50 (Aug. 28, 1985).\\nThirty-one years later, the SSA did posit a reason for its age of onset: that it obtained\\nthat definition from the American Psychological Association (as opposed to the\\nAmerican Psychiatric Association). See Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating\\nMental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66155 n.16 (Sept. 26, 2016). This explanation\\nis implausible on its face because it cites a 1996 manual to justify a 1985 definition.\\nSee id.7 This does not necessarily harm the SSA’s rule because the agency could\\nadopt a minority view with its rulemaking authority even when the APA and AAIDD\\ndo not agree. This does harm Coonce’s argument, though, because this court does not\\npromulgate administrative rules and because Coonce still lacks evidence of experts\\ndefining the age of onset as before age twenty-two at the time Congress adopted the\\nFDPA. Neither this court nor any professional association or administrative body has\\nbeen delegated the legislative authority to redefine a term adopted by Congress.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n A review of the underlying manual also shows that it was attempting to change\\nthe prevailing definition in 1996, further undermining any value it would offer to\\nshow the meaning of the term “mentally retarded” at the time Congress passed the\\nFDPA. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Manual of Diagnosis and Prof’l Practice in\\nMental Retardation 36–37 (John W. Jacobson and James A. Mulick, eds., 1996).\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Coonce alternatively raises this argument as an Eighth Amendment challenge.\\nHe tells us about recent changes in the debate over defining disabilities, describing\\nhow the APA has recently changed its definition for the age of onset from before\\neighteen to “during the developmental period,” defined as “during childhood or\\nadolescence.” In Coonce’s view, this change leaves open the question of whether the\\nAPA still believes the developmental period is before eighteen. He also tells us about\\nliterature suggesting the AAIDD, which still defines the age of onset as before\\neighteen, will eventually shift to a more vague standard. Both of these arguments are\\npredictions that medical experts will agree with Coonce’s view in the future. Such\\nevidence is not sufficient for us to divine any current Eighth Amendment limitation\\non the statute.8\\n\\n Because we agree with the district court that the age of onset is eighteen, we\\naffirm its decision not to hold an Atkins hearing and not to consider whether Coonce\\nsatisfies the other factors for intellectual disability, regardless of whether he waived\\nhis arguments here.\\n\\n B. Evidence Regarding Coonce’s Refusal to Submit to IQ Testing\\n\\n Coonce next argues that admitting evidence at trial of his refusal to submit to\\nan IQ test violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by analogizing to the right\\nto remain silent recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is true the\\nmagistrate judge at his initial appearance gave a Miranda warning. The refusal to\\ntake an IQ test occurred at a competency examination over a year later. There is no\\nindication in the record the competency examination was still subject to the same\\nMiranda protections. The doctor at the competency examination only generally\\nadvised Coonce that statements are not confidential and that Coonce was free not to\\ntell anything he wanted kept confidential. This warning is closer to the officer’s\\n\\n\\n 8\\n We find no merit to his Fifth Amendment claim on the same ground.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fadvice in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), about declining a blood\\nalcohol test than a full Miranda warning because it warns of consequences without\\ngiving any substantive protections. And Coonce does not cite any authority stating\\na competency examination must be under Miranda protections. Accordingly, we do\\nnot agree the district court committed any Miranda error here.\\n\\n In conjunction with his Miranda argument, Coonce also argues there was\\nprosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments when the government suggested that\\nIQ testing is unreliable, by contrasting it to the reliability of a blood test. “To obtain\\nreversal for prosecutorial misconduct [in capital sentencing closing arguments], a\\ndefendant must show the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and that such remarks\\nprejudiced the defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v.\\nRodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 798 (8th Cir. 2009). The government’s arguments about\\nthe unreliability of IQ testing may have been somewhat aggressive, as they suggested\\nsuch testing is never very reliable by comparing it to the precision of a blood test. We\\nsee no basis to conclude their arguments crossed the line into misconduct.\\n\\n C. Jury Instruction on Brain Damage Mitigating Factor\\n\\n Coonce next argues he was prejudiced by the denial of a requested jury\\ninstruction on his brain damage mitigating factor. He requested an instruction that\\nsaid “if any of you find the factual existence of a mitigating factor you may not ignore\\nthat factor or give it zero weight.” His argument and instruction both rely on the false\\npremise that juries assess mitigating factors only for factual accuracy rather than for\\nvalue as a mitigator. We are aware of no statute or case law that “require[s] a capital\\njury to give mitigating effect or weight to any particular evidence,” and “[t]here is\\nonly a constitutional violation if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors\\nbelieved themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.”\\nUnited States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2000). In Paul, the jury\\ndeclined to find the mitigating factor that Paul’s co-defendant received only a life\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fsentence even though that statement was factually true. See id. This court found it\\nsufficient that the jurors were allowed to consider the evidence regarding his co-\\ndefendant’s life sentence before several jurors declined to find the mitigating factor.\\nId. at 1000. In fact, this court has repeatedly said a jury may give mitigating evidence\\nno weight as long as they actually considered it. See Rodriguez, 581 F.3d at 799;\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 966 (8th Cir. 2007). Coonce’s argument is\\na form-over-function argument because his ultimate complaint is that he wanted the\\njury to write down what they found factually true before evaluating the weight. There\\nis no reason to believe the jury would have weighed the factors any differently if they\\nhad recorded factual accuracy separately from weight. Thus, because the jury\\nconsidered the relevant mitigating evidence, the district court did not err in refusing\\nan instruction requiring factual findings.\\n\\n Coonce’s further argument that the government impermissibly minimized the\\nvalue of his mental damage at closing is an attempt to expand existing case law\\nbanning a “nexus” requirement for mental damage mitigation. It is true that the\\ngovernment cannot argue the defendant needs to prove a nexus between the\\nmitigating factors and the crime at issue. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.\\n233, 245–46 (2007). Here, the government conceded Coonce’s mental damage from\\nincidents earlier in his life but argued the damage should not be a mitigating factor\\nbecause he may have been at fault in those incidents. This is not a nexus argument\\nbut rather an attempt to devalue the mitigating factor. Coonce tries to argue at a high\\nlevel of generality that this was an invitation for the jury to screen out a mitigating\\nfactor. His argument relies on his minimization of the government’s concession of\\nmental damage and maximization of the government’s argument about the lack of\\nweight the jury should give mental damage when deciding whether the death penalty\\nwas proper. None of the precedent forbidding a nexus requirement forbids the\\nargument that was made here. Because the government conceded mental damage, it\\nwas not precluded from making arguments about weight as long as it avoided the\\nimpermissible nexus arguments.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f D. Coonce’s Incriminating Statements to Dr. Park Dietz\\n\\n Coonce next argues he should not have been compelled to discuss the relevant\\ncrime during his examination by the government’s psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz. The\\nFifth Amendment generally protects defendants against the government’s use of\\ncompelled statements to a psychiatrist. Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87, 93 (2013).\\nWhen a defendant introduces psychiatric evidence for a mental-status defense,\\nthough, the prosecution may then present its own psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. Id.\\nat 93–94. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implement several protections\\nto support the Fifth Amendment restrictions here. The rules limit the government\\nfrom seeing any results or reports of its compelled examination until the defendant\\nis found guilty and confirms his intent to offer expert evidence on his mental\\ncondition at sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(2). The rules also prohibit the\\ngovernment from using any statement made by the defendant in the course of the\\ngovernment’s examination, or any opinion based on such a statement, unless the\\ndefendant has introduced evidence on that particular issue. Id. 12.2(c)(4). The rules\\neven prohibit using fruits of any statement by the defendant unless in rebuttal. See\\nid. These protections limit the admissibility, not the scope, of the interview.\\n\\n The district court’s order on the scope of the interview complied with Fed. R.\\nCrim. P. 12.2. It permitted a recorded interview by counsel firewalled apart from the\\ngovernment. It also required advance notice before any portion of the interview was\\nusable in court. Coonce also does not dispute that he put his mental state during the\\ncrime at issue. Thus, the district court’s order properly addressed the permissive\\nscope while delaying any ruling on admissibility.\\n\\n Coonce’s argument that his statements should not have been admitted is\\nforeclosed by the doctrine of invited error. Coonce objected to allowing offense-\\nspecific questions during Dietz’s examination of Coonce but did not object to\\nadmitting those answers into evidence. In fact, counsel represented they had agreed\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fon what the government could offer into evidence. When counsel affirmatively\\napproves of an evidentiary ruling, the invited error doctrine generally estops any\\nargument that the ruling was errant. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th\\nCir. 2010). We are not persuaded by Coonce’s argument that any objection would\\nhave been futile because the district court only ruled on the scope of the examination,\\nnot admissibility. Thus, we conclude any error in admitting the evidence was invited,\\nand we will not reverse on that basis.\\n\\n E. Footprint Evidence and Forensic Blood Evidence\\n\\n Coonce next argues that a police officer’s testimony about whether a footprint\\non Castro’s chest matched Coonce’s footprint violated the Federal Rules of Evidence.\\nAlthough the evidence was admitted at trial, Coonce is only appealing his capital\\nsentencing proceeding, and those proceedings do not follow the rules of evidence.\\n“Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing\\nadmission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if\\nits probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,\\nconfusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review a\\ndistrict court’s decision to admit evidence during the sentencing hearing under an\\nabuse of discretion standard. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir.\\n2005). The footprint evidence had little prejudice because showing that Coonce\\nstomped on Castro’s chest would add almost nothing to satisfying the aggravating\\nfactors at issue beyond the other conduct already in the record. Thus, we affirm the\\ndistrict court’s decision to admit this evidence during the capital sentencing\\nproceeding.\\n\\n Coonce’s argument about admitting evidence that Castro’s blood was on\\nCoonce’s shoe has little probative value to sentencing. The FBI’s expert testified at\\ntrial that the initial presumptive test on Coonce’s right boot and on Hall’s right shoe\\nfound blood, while the confirmatory test on both was inconclusive. This evidence\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fappears relevant to guilt, but Coonce does not appeal his murder conviction. Coonce\\nalso does not cite any point of the sentencing proceeding where the evidence was\\nreferenced. Presuming the evidence was even used in the sentencing proceeding, we\\nsee no abuse of discretion in its admission of this guilt evidence because we do not\\nbelieve its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\\n\\n F. Jury Instruction on Future Dangerousness\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court inappropriately summarized the\\ngovernment’s evidence in its future dangerousness instruction. “[A] death penalty\\nphase jury must have ‘clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed\\nguidance.’” United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 903 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lewis\\nv. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)). Coonce argues that stating the allegations\\nsupporting future dangerousness amounts to improper “marshaling the evidence,”\\nciting United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008). Regardless of\\nwhether marshaling of evidence is generally proper, some summary of the allegations\\nsupporting future dangerousness is necessary in capital sentencing proceedings in\\norder to prevent an open-ended inquiry on the jury’s perception of future\\ndangerousness rather than an inquiry on the government’s evidence. See Ortiz, 315\\nF.3d at 903. We are also not convinced that the district court’s vague references here,\\nsuch as “a continuing pattern of violent conduct,” amount to a summation of evidence\\nrather than a summation of the bare allegations.\\n\\n Coonce’s further argument that the district court made a mistake in its\\ndeviation from the model instruction on future dangerousness is correct, but any error\\nwas not plain. “A district court has ‘wide discretion’ in formulating a jury\\ninstruction.” United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1541 (8th Cir. 1995)). “If the instructions,\\ntaken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury, we will\\naffirm.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fBecause Coonce’s only objection below was giving this instruction without his\\nproposed additional instruction, he raises this particular objection for the first time\\non appeal. We review unpreserved errors for plain error. Jones v. United States, 527\\nU.S. 373, 388–89 (1999). Under plain error review, “relief is not warranted unless\\nthere has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id.\\n\\n The district court gave the following instruction:\\n\\n The first non-statutory aggravating factor alleged by the Government for\\n each count is that Defendant Coonce presents a future danger to others\\n based upon the probability that Defendant Coonce would commit\\n criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to the\\n lives and safety of others. Defendant Coonce has engaged in a\\n continuing pattern of violent conduct, has threatened others with\\n violence, has demonstrated lack of remorse, and/or has demonstrated a\\n low rehabilitative potential.\\n\\nPenalty Phase Jury Instrs., 17, ECF No. 807. The Eighth Circuit Model Jury\\nInstructions relevantly state: “The [first] non-statutory factor alleged by the\\ngovernment is that . . . [The defendant] would be a danger in the future to the lives\\nand safety of other persons, as evidenced by [describe pertinent facts].” Model Death\\nPenalty Jury Instructions, Eighth Circuit, No. 12.08 (brackets in original).\\n\\n The district court’s deviation from the model instruction here is unfortunate,\\nbut not reversible error. The district court’s edit changed a statement of the\\ngovernment’s allegation into an apparent statement of fact, replacing the phrase “as\\nevidenced by” with a sentence break. By removing “as evidenced by,” the instruction\\nread in isolation could imply that the jury should assume it was proven Coonce had\\nengaged in a pattern of violent and threatening conduct. In context, though, a\\nreasonable juror could still infer that the second sentence was part of the\\ngovernment’s allegations, especially since the instructions otherwise fairly reflected\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fthat it was the government’s burden to establish the aggravating factors. The\\nparagraph preceding this disputed instruction even describes the subsequent\\nparagraphs as the government’s allegations. Thus, while the district court’s edit is not\\na best practice for jury instructions, we cannot say it amounts to a plain error in\\ncontext.\\n\\n Giving this aggravating-factor instruction without Coonce’s proposed\\nmitigating-factor instruction was also within the district court’s discretion. Coonce\\nproposed a jury instruction that said, as a mitigating factor, that “[t]he Federal Bureau\\nof Prisons is capable of imposing conditions of confinement that will control\\nWesley’s future behavior.” The district court admitted evidence about whether the\\nBOP could control Coonce, but did not instruct the jury on how to handle that\\nevidence. Nonetheless, we do not find its decision to be an abuse of discretion\\nbecause Coonce was entitled to rebut allegations of future dangerousness in prison.\\nSee United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court\\nneed not — and should not — instruct juries that sufficient control in prison is a\\nmitigating factor. We are not certain this evidence is individualized enough to qualify\\nas a mitigating factor because some BOP evidence is common to many BOP\\ndefendants. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983) (requiring an\\nindividualized determination). Also, as our sister circuit has observed, allowing\\ncontrol in prison as a mitigating factor is illogical because it results in rewarding the\\nmost dangerous defendants for their dangerousness simply because they (unlike less\\ndangerous defendants) would be placed in maximum security. See Johnson, 223 F.3d\\nat 674–75. The district court correctly exercised its discretion when it refused to\\ninstruct the jury that Coonce’s rebuttal evidence was a mitigating factor.\\n\\n G. Admitting BOP Administration and Costs for Future Dangerousness\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of the BOP’s\\nadministrative policies and costs as part of the government’s case on future\\n\\n -17-\\n\\fdangerousness. Our review is once again for an abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428\\nF.3d at 756. In support of his appeal, Coonce cites a Fourth Circuit case that\\nundermines most of his argument. The Fourth Circuit expressed that it was troubled\\nby remarks from the government during a death penalty hearing that the BOP could\\nnot adequately control the defendant. United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 626 (4th\\nCir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit found no reversible error for four reasons: (1) the\\nchallenged “comments about the jury’s role were isolated and not extensive,” (2) the\\ndefendant invited the argument by presenting evidence about how the BOP would\\ncontrol him, (3) the district court’s instructions about individualized judgment and\\nabout attorney arguments not being evidence “counterbalanced any improper\\ncomments” during the argument, and (4) the non-statutory aggravating factors (and\\nfuture dangerousness in particular) were otherwise well-supported by the record. Id.\\nWe think the Fourth Circuit’s analysis applies equally well in this case. Coonce\\nintroduced evidence about whether the BOP could control him, inviting rebuttal. The\\ndistrict court also gave the same standard instructions as the court in Caro. The\\nfuture dangerousness factor was also well-supported by evidence of numerous\\nassaults in Coonce’s past. Thus, because we agree with the analysis in Caro, we\\nconclude Coonce did not suffer prejudicial error.\\n\\n The one novel issue faced here but not in Caro is whether the government\\npermissibly used Coonce’s mental illness to show the BOP could not control him.\\nThe Supreme Court has suggested that mental illness cannot be used against a\\ndefendant as an aggravating factor. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885. The government’s\\nargument shows the problem it was facing here: mental illness questions and evidence\\nwere needed to rebut some of Coonce’s evidence. For example, mental illness could\\nmake Coonce ineligible for certain programs and placements his experts said would\\ncontrol him in the BOP. As another example, Coonce’s expert, Stacey Wood,\\ntestified about how Coonce’s brain injuries might mitigate his role in the offense, but\\nshe has previously written articles admitting the same injuries could also make him\\n“increasingly aggressive, agitated, and dangerous.” Coonce is correct that the\\n\\n -18-\\n\\fgovernment’s use of mental health evidence could imply future dangerousness, but\\nthe government is also correct that it only used mental health in cross-examinations\\nand rebuttals to counter Coonce’s evidence. We cannot see how the district court\\nerred in admitting this evidence because the government did not advance mental\\nhealth issues as an aggravating factor in its case in chief, and excluding such evidence\\nhere risked barring any fair rebuttal. Thus, we affirm the district court’s evidentiary\\nruling on mental health rebuttal evidence.\\n\\n H. Right to be Present\\n\\n Coonce next argues that his court-imposed absence during certain instructions\\nto the jury violated his right to be present. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal\\nProcedure, “the defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage.” Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n43. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments also protect that right, but Rule 43 incorporates\\nthe most expansive common law understanding of the right, making it broader than\\nthe constitutional right. United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n“[C]ommunications between judge and jury in the absence of the defendant and his\\ncounsel are presumptively prejudicial.” United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125\\n(8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).\\n\\n The issue in this case arises from the district court’s removal of the defendants\\nbefore instructing the jury on protestors outside the courthouse and on confidentiality\\nof juror information. At the beginning of the day, the district court told counsel it was\\nsealing the names of the jurors and that the defendants were not allowed to write\\ndown the names of the jurors. It also told counsel it intended to tell the jury about the\\nprotestors and allow them the option of staying inside and having lunch delivered\\nduring the break from trial. It stated the defendants would not be present for that\\ndiscussion, and Coonce’s counsel objected. At the lunch break, the district court had\\nthe jury exit solely so the marshals could remove the defendants. It had the jury\\nimmediately return. Then, it told them about the protesters and the precautions the\\n\\n -19-\\n\\fdistrict court was taking, adding it was sealing the jury’s names and addresses to\\nprotect them. The district court then recessed for lunch.\\n\\n We conclude this discussion with the jury was a ministerial act and not a “trial\\nstage” for purposes of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. The discussion with the jury and counsel\\nwithout the defendants was proper for seeking honest answers from the jury about any\\nsafety concerns they had. Regardless of whether a significant protest actually\\noccurred, the district court is entitled to ensure its jury is free from external pressures.\\nThere is also no presumption of prejudice from excluding defendants from ministerial\\nacts, especially when counsel remains present. Accordingly, we see no error here.\\n\\n I. BOP Records of Coonce’s Misconduct\\n\\n Coonce next argues the admission of his BOP records violated the\\nConfrontation Clause of the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.9 This\\ncourt reviews Confrontation Clause objections to the admission of evidence de novo.\\nUnited States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 955 (8th Cir. 2010). This court has previously\\nheld “the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings” but left\\nopen the question of whether it applies in capital sentencing proceedings. See\\nJohnson, 495 F.3d at 976 n.23 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046,\\n1048 (8th Cir. 2005)). Numerous circuits have found that the Confrontation Clause\\ndoes not apply in capital sentencing proceedings, citing the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See, e.g., United States v. Umana, 750\\nF.3d 320, 346 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 327–28 (5th Cir.\\n2007).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be\\nconfronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\f While Coonce advances arguments about whether Williams is still good law,\\nit is not our role to decide the continuing validity of a Supreme Court decision even\\nif it appears suspect. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court\\nhas direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other\\nline of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,\\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de\\nQuijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Williams did\\naddress the scope of the Confrontation Clause in capital sentencing proceedings, and\\nthe case provides useful guidance to this court. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 250–52.\\nThis court en banc has also previously applied Williams as controlling on\\nconfrontation rights in non-capital sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Wise,\\n976 F.2d 393, 398 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The district court was as bound\\nby Williams as we are.\\n\\n Coonce’s related argument that the BOP records were too unreliable to admit\\nis also unpersuasive. Neither party cites a case from this circuit stating that the\\n“indicia of reliability” standard for typical sentencing proceedings also applies to\\ncapital sentencing proceedings, although the Fifth Circuit has said as much. See\\nFields, 483 F.3d at 337–38. We see no reason to depart from that standard in capital\\nsentencing proceedings either. Accordingly, we review the decision this evidence\\nhad sufficient indicia of reliability for abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\\n\\n Coonce does not explain why the BOP’s adversarial administrative process\\nwould lack indicia of reliability, and it appears his challenge is to unadjudicated\\nconduct in BOP reports. In particular, he points to a report where a prisoner alleged\\nCoonce attempted sexual assault when the adjudication only led to a conviction for\\npunching that person. In the analogous situation of police reports, we have been\\nsuspicious of their reliability: “While police reports may be demonstrably reliable\\nevidence of the fact that an arrest was made they are significantly less reliable\\nevidence of whether the allegations of criminal conduct they contain are true.”\\n\\n -21-\\n\\fUnited States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States\\nv. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986)). We assess reliability “case-by-case.” Id.\\n\\n We are convinced the BOP reports were sufficiently reliable here for two\\nreasons. First, the government also introduced the evidence showing that some of the\\ncharges did not lead to adjudications against Coonce. Second, any excessive charges\\nfrom other inmates in the reports were consistent with Coonce’s description of\\nunreasonably hostile treatment by other inmates. Thus, we do not believe the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting BOP reports in this case.\\n\\n J. Using Coonce’s Prior Offense for Multiple Aggravating Factors\\n\\n Coonce next argues the government’s repetitive use of his 2002 conviction for\\nkidnapping and the related rape was unfairly prejudicial. However, he cites no\\nauthority barring this type of repetitive use. “Where the evidence is at most ‘an extra\\nhelping of what the jury had heard before,’ the evidence is merely cumulative and its\\nadmission does not result in reversible error.” United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375\\nF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 29\\n(1st Cir. 2001)). “There could be circumstances, however, where that ‘extra helping’\\nof evidence ‘can be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.’” Id. at 804 (quoting\\nsame). Ramos-Caraballo was under the standard rules of evidence, not the FDPA,\\nbut we assess for unfair prejudice under either rule. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review\\nfor abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\\n\\n As both parties acknowledge, the government used multiple witnesses to\\nrecount the kidnapping and rape in order to satisfy different aggravating factors. The\\nonly case Coonce cites where a court erred by admitting new but cumulative evidence\\nwas a Third Circuit case on child pornography. See United States v. Cunningham,\\n694 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit’s analysis is not on point here\\nbecause the Third Circuit was addressing a trial where the government introduced\\n\\n -22-\\n\\fmultiple child pornography video clips to establish guilt of a child pornography\\noffense. See id. The evidence at issue here is testimony, not video evidence, and it\\nis being introduced to establish character for sentencing, not to bias a jury’s\\ndetermination on guilt. Coonce cites no case where we have ever required excluding\\ncumulative evidence of past crimes in a capital sentencing proceeding, and we are not\\nconvinced that allowing multiple forms of evidence was unfairly prejudicial here.\\nThus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting different\\nversions of Coonce’s prior kidnapping and rape offenses.\\n\\n Coonce’s other objection about using the same offense for multiple aggravating\\nfactors is foreclosed by precedent. We have stated there is no constitutional infirmity\\nin duplicative factors because the jury weighs factors; it does not tally them for\\nnumbers. See Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762. As a result, the jury can account for the\\nduplication in its weighing of the factors. See id. So, even assuming Coonce is\\ncorrect that any of the factors were duplicative rather than merely similar, Purkey\\nforecloses Coonce’s argument for error based on duplication.\\n\\n K. Future Dangerousness as an Aggravating Factor\\n\\n Coonce makes three primary arguments about why future dangerousness is not\\na valid aggravating factor. First, he argues that a probability-based factor like future\\ndangerousness is not capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he argues\\nthat future dangerousness for a person under a sentence of life imprisonment should\\nbe narrowed to future dangerousness in prison. Third, he argues that an unreliable\\nprediction cannot impose unalterable consequences like the death penalty. This court\\nreviews challenges to the validity of an aggravating factor de novo. United States v.\\nAllen, 247 F.3d 741, 786 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953\\n(2002).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -23-\\n\\f Coonce’s first argument is foreclosed by precedent. As he concedes, a plurality\\nopinion in Jurek states that probability-based factors are permissible. See Jurek v.\\nTexas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–76 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,\\nJJ.); see also id. at 278–79 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger,\\nC.J., and Rehnquist, J.). The government argues that Jurek forecloses this challenge\\nbecause this particular argument was presented to the court in Jurek. We see no\\nexplicit response to that argument in the plurality opinion in Jurek. Nevertheless, we\\nagree the question is implicitly foreclosed by Jurek. If a probability-based factor is\\nconstitutionally permissible in a criminal case, as Jurek states, then such a factor\\nnecessarily must be provable beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Jurek prevents us\\nfrom questioning the premise, it also prevents us from questioning the conclusion.\\n\\n Coonce’s second argument is an argument we have previously rejected. See\\nAllen. 247 F.3d at 788–89, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). In Allen,\\nthis court noted the possibility of escape and danger to other inmates and prison\\nofficials, and it also noted that the jury could appropriately assess the evidence of\\nfuture dangerousness when it also knew the defendant was serving a life sentence\\nwithout the possibility of parole. See id. Seven Supreme Court justices have\\nsimilarly suggested a reversible error would exist with this factor only when the jury\\nwas prevented from learning that the defendant had no possibility of parole. See\\nSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166 n.5 (1994) (opinion of Blackmun, J.,\\njoined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); see also id. at 178 (O’Connor, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.). Although\\nwe are not bound by Allen due to its being vacated, we see no reason the district court\\nerred, as the jury in this case knew about Coonce’s existing prison sentence when\\nassessing his future dangerousness.\\n\\n Coonce’s third argument has a false premise. Under Jurek, the prediction of\\nfuture dangerousness is reliable. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275–76, 278–79. Coonce cites\\ntwo cases about life sentences for juveniles to support his argument: Montgomery v.\\n\\n -24-\\n\\fLouisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).\\nNeither of these cases says anything about appropriate considerations for adult\\noffenders like Coonce. The opinion in Montgomery even distinguishes cases\\nconcerning factors making the death penalty more likely for a particular offender\\nfrom factors imposing an unconstitutionally excessive penalty on a category of\\noffenders. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735–36. Coonce’s argument presumes his own\\nconclusions about future dangerousness and is unsupported by the authority he cites.\\nThe district court did not err in submitting future dangerousness to the jury.\\n\\n L. Voir Dire on Bias\\n\\n Coonce next argues that the district court improperly restricted voir dire on\\nareas of bias that he claims were critical to his case. In particular, he argues the\\ndistrict court improperly restricted inquiry into (1) connections to officials at FMC\\nSpringfield, (2) sexual abuse, and (3) and attitudes toward mental health evidence and\\nrelated expert testimony.\\n\\n “The Sixth Amendment guarantees ‘the criminally accused a fair trial by a\\npanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,\\n366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Voir dire helps protect this right. Id. Similarly, in a\\ndeath penalty case, due process entitles a defendant to an impartial jury. See Morgan\\nv. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729–32 (1992).10 “Trial judges have broad discretion in\\ndetermining how best to conduct voir dire, though this discretion is not without\\nboundaries.” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888. While we have supervisory power in federal\\ndeath penalty cases that extends beyond enforcing constitutional limits, Mu’Min v.\\nVirginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991), we will reverse only for abuse of discretion\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Morgan concerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not\\nthe Fifth Amendment, but Coonce argues and the government does not contest that\\nthe same standard applies to death penalty cases under either clause.\\n\\n -25-\\n\\f“[b]ecause the trial judge is in the best position to analyze the demeanor and\\ncredibility of a venireman,” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888.\\n\\n The district court’s inquiry regarding friends and relatives of jurors working\\nat FMC Springfield was not an abuse of discretion. The government agreed to a\\nmodified version of the question Coonce wanted, and it is unclear why the district\\ncourt rejected it. Several questions covered many related issues, though, as the\\ndistrict court asked about spouses or significant others who were correctional officers,\\nasked about family or friends in the mental health and medical fields, and asked about\\nwhether the jurors had ever applied for a job with a governmental agency. There is\\nsome potential for gaps in the responses, such as friends or family other than spouses\\nworking as correctional officers, or family or friends working at FMC Springfield in\\nan administrative capacity. Because the existing questions covered such a large\\npotential swath of people working at FMC Springfield, though, we cannot say the\\nfailure to ask a more exacting question was an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The district court adequately inquired about juror attitudes regarding sexual\\nabuse. Coonce argues the inquiries as to juror experience with crime were\\ninsufficient, citing a district court case where a juror did not respond to a general\\nquestion about being a victim of crime because the juror did not perceive an\\nunreported sexual assault as responsive to the question. See United States v. Fell,\\nNo. 2:01CR12, 2014 WL 3697810 at *6–7 (D. Vt., July 24, 2014). Regardless of\\nwhether that juror in Fell was an outlier or within the mainstream of jury\\nunderstanding, a similar omission could not have occurred during voir dire in this\\ncase. The district court orally asked about attitudes toward possible evidence of the\\ndefendant’s past rape or sexual assault. The district court also received responses on\\npoint from prospective jurors about personal knowledge of sexual abuse. Thus,\\nCoonce could not show any potential prejudice even if he could demonstrate there\\nwas an error.\\n\\n\\n\\n -26-\\n\\f Finally, the district court adequately inquired regarding juror attitudes toward\\nmental health issues. Coonce argues the district court should have asked prospective\\njurors more targeted questions about attitudes toward mental health defenses. He\\npoints to a Ninth Circuit case that references other authority stating that a defendant\\nis entitled to voir dire about attitudes toward an insanity defense. United States v.\\nJones, 722 F.2d 528, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1983). No such defense was at issue here.\\nInstead, Coonce claimed mental health issues as a mitigating factor in a death penalty\\nhearing. The main mental health questions Coonce wanted in the questionnaire were\\nasked at voir dire, and it was only the wording of some of the questions that changed\\nin the final result. In particular, the district court asked potential jurors whether they\\nor immediate family or close friends had experience with mental illness or mental\\nimpairment, and it asked whether they had any negative attitudes toward mental\\nhealth professionals. We are not persuaded that all mental health evidence carries the\\nsame stigma as the insanity defense, and we believe these questions adequately\\ninquired as to biases here. Thus, even if we were to agree with the Ninth Circuit on\\nthe insanity defense requiring a voir dire question, we would see no abuse of\\ndiscretion in the district court’s voir dire on mental health issues.\\n\\n M. Lack of Individualized Voir Dire\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court should have conducted individualized\\nvoir dire privately and away from other prospective jurors. The Supreme Court has\\nonce observed that the “psychological impact” of answering before other potential\\njurors can diminish candor. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. It has also observed that when\\ndiscussing voir dire practices, “[t]he fact that a particular rule may be thought to be\\nthe ‘better’ view does not mean that it is incorporated into the Fourteenth\\nAmendment.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 430–31. Without a constitutional violation here,\\nwhich we do not find, Coonce’s argument is only a request to use our supervisory\\npower. Coonce cites no circuit court that has used its supervisory power to require\\ndistrict courts to conduct individualized voir dire. The record here also shows\\n\\n -27-\\n\\fmultiple candid answers by potential jurors in the voir dire, suggesting that group voir\\ndire was adequate in this case. Facing no constitutional violation or problematic\\nrecord, we decline Coonce’s invitation to adopt his perception of best practices for\\nour district courts.\\n\\n N. Separate Capital Sentencing Proceedings\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court abused its discretion by denying him a\\nseparate capital sentencing proceeding from Hall. In Kansas v. Carr, the Supreme\\nCourt reversed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court finding that the Eighth\\nAmendment required separate sentencing proceedings. 136 S. Ct. 633, 646 (2016).\\nThe Court emphasized: “[t]o forbid joinder in capital-sentencing proceedings would,\\nperversely, increase the odds of ‘wanto[n] and freakis[h]’ imposition of death\\nsentences.” Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–207 (1976) (joint\\nopinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Coonce suggests some factual\\ndistinctions, but none are a basis for disregarding the broad holding in Carr. He does\\nnot demonstrate possible prejudice from the jury failing to separately consider him\\nand Hall or from instructions which commingled evidence and law not applicable to\\nhim with otherwise proper law and evidence. See id. at 645. The sentencing verdict\\nforms also separately treated the two co-defendants. Thus, we see no error in the\\ndistrict court’s refusal to sever the capital sentencing proceedings.\\n\\n O. Standard for Weighing Factors\\n\\n Coonce next argues that a jury must weigh factors in capital sentencing\\nproceedings using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We have stated that the\\nweighing component of the FDPA is not an elemental fact. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750.\\nPurkey only addressed whether a grand jury needed to charge the weighing\\ncomponent in an indictment, but our conclusion that weighing is not an element also\\n\\n\\n\\n -28-\\n\\fmeans that a capital sentencing jury does not need to perform the weighing beyond\\na reasonable doubt. The district court correctly followed our precedent.\\n\\n P. Arbitrariness Arguments\\n\\n Coonce finally argues he was arbitrarily sentenced based on geography because\\nthe Western District of Missouri has more death penalty cases than the average\\ndistrict court. This argument is fundamentally a policy argument, not a legal one.\\nThe statute governing our review requires this court to assess whether “the sentence\\nof death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary\\nfactor.” 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). The implication in this statute is that the court must\\nassess whether the jury decided the sentence should be imposed based on any of those\\nfactors. Coonce makes no attempt to argue the jury here sentenced him based on\\ngeography.\\n\\n Even if the statute were not narrowed to the jury, Coonce makes no showing\\nthat he personally received a sentence of death based on geography. While he cites\\ngeneralized statistics about other districts and defendants, he does not show that his\\nparticular chance of receiving the death penalty changed because of the district. He\\ninfers from those generalized statistics that his sentence is arbitrary. But even if we\\nagreed with his inference, which we do not, it is equally plausible that his sentence\\nis deserved but some other cases in the district involved arbitrary use of the death\\npenalty. Coonce offers no basis to reach an inference in his favor aside from his\\npresumption that imposition of the death penalty is always improper.\\n\\n Coonce’s alternative argument that the FDPA itself is arbitrary has no legal\\nmerit. This court has previously rejected the arguments he advances. Allen, 247 F.3d\\nat 760–61, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002) (stating that “the FDPA\\nadequately narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and sufficiently\\nchannels a jury’s sentencing discretion” and that “proportionality review is not\\n\\n -29-\\n\\frequired in order for the FDPA to pass constitutional muster”). Even if we\\nreconsidered that view, Coonce makes no showing that he personally received a\\nsentence of death based on some arbitrariness inherent in the FDPA. This alternative\\nargument is nothing more than a list of grievances about the FDPA with no causal\\nconnection to Coonce’s case.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n After addressing each of Coonce’s arguments on appeal, we are satisfied that\\nthe district court’s rulings on voir dire, jury instructions, evidence, presence of the\\ndefendant, and the aggravating and mitigating factors were correct. We also hold that\\nCoonce does not satisfy the age of onset requirement for the “mentally retarded”\\nexception to the death penalty.\\n\\n Our other review tasks under the FDPA show no reason for reversal here. We\\nfound no merit to Coonce’s constitutional challenge to the FDPA and see no other\\nindication that passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor resulted in his death\\nsentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). In addition, our review of the record shows\\nsufficient evidence to find a statutory aggravating factor. See id. Accordingly, we\\naffirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -30-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420092/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642839/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Wesley Paul COONCE, Jr. Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 14-2800\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr. appeals the district court’s1 judgment sentencing him\nto death for his role in the murder of Victor Castro-Rodriguez (“Castro”). We affirm.\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\f I. Background\n\n Coonce and Castro were inmates in a locked ward that housed mental health\npatients at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri\n(“FMC Springfield”). Coonce was serving a life sentence for kidnapping and\ncarjacking, while Castro was committed due to his mental health and had no projected\nrelease date.\n\n Prison officials found Castro dead in his cell on January 26, 2010. The\nresponding staff found Castro unconscious, with his hands tied behind his back with\nmedical tape, feet bound at his ankles with shoelaces, and a brown cloth wrapped\naround his neck. Medical staff tried to resuscitate him to no avail. Dr. Carl Stacy, the\ngovernment’s expert pathologist, testified that Castro died from asphyxiation due to\na compressed larynx. He opined that the strangulation occurred from a “larger\nobject,” not hands, because of blunt force trauma to the neck and the lack of any\nbroken hyoid rings. He also noted blunt force trauma to the chin and injuries to the\nupper chest, lower neck, and back of the head. He estimated Castro died within three\nto five minutes.\n\n Physical evidence supported the conclusion that Coonce and another inmate,\nCharles Hall, had killed Castro by standing on his neck. Both Coonce’s right boot\nand Hall’s shoes tested positive for a substance containing Castro’s DNA. Coonce\nhad two pairs of shoes in his cell that were missing their shoelaces. Coonce also\nshowed Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Rick McLain where he had\nplaced his hand on the wall to balance while standing on Castro’s neck.\n\n A camera provided additional circumstantial evidence that Coonce and Hall\nkilled Castro. The prison did not have cameras that could see inside Castro’s cell or\nthe door to his cell at the time of the murder. Nevertheless, a camera showed the only\npeople that approached Castro’s cell during the time of the murder were Coonce and\n\n -2-\n\fHall. After a few minutes, Coonce left the cell for about a minute to talk to another\ninmate. He rejoined Hall in Castro’s cell, and both of them were there for about nine\nadditional minutes. Coonce left again, made a throat-slashing sign to another inmate\nand then returned to the cell. Both Coonce and Hall left the cell a couple minutes\nlater.\n\n Coonce repeatedly claimed responsibility for Castro’s murder. His first\nadmissions came shortly after FMC Springfield officials discovered Castro’s body.\nHe particularly described that he tied up Castro’s hands and feet and stomped on\nCastro’s neck. He explained Castro was a snitch. That same night, he told an\ninvestigating FBI agent that he kicked Castro in the neck and stood on his throat until\nhe stopped breathing. Coonce also claimed both he and another person, which other\nevidence showed to be Hall, stood on Castro’s neck until Castro stopped breathing.\nCoonce explained that interactions with other inmates had upset him and that he\ndecided to retaliate against Castro for previously telling prison staff about a minor\noffense. The next day, he told a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) psychologist that he\nkilled a man and that it was by his choice. He told the FBI in a subsequent interview\nthat he had no regrets about killing Castro. Coonce also bragged about the murder\nto inmates and admitted it in letters and calls to friends and family.\n\n In July 2011, a grand jury indicted Coonce on one count of murder in the first\ndegree within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 2, and one count of murder by a federal prisoner\nserving a life sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1118. The indictment included\nspecial findings of the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3591 and aggravating\nfactors under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) that made the charged offenses eligible for the\ndeath penalty.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f Coonce filed a motion for a separate trial from co-defendant Hall. The district\ncourt denied the motion. It concluded that redacting statements with Bruton2 risks\nand properly instructing the jury would resolve any potential prejudice.\n\n During pre-trial disclosures, the government asked for discovery on Coonce’s\nmental health evidence and for an Atkins3 hearing on whether Coonce was “mentally\nretarded.”4 Coonce responded that “the defense will not be asserting Mr. Coonce is\nmentally retarded” and “no Atkins hearing is necessary.”\n\n After an eight-day trial in April and May of 2014, the jury found Coonce guilty\non both counts in the indictment. The district court then retained the same jury for\nthe capital sentencing proceeding, where the jury would decide whether to impose the\ndeath penalty.\n\n The government alleged Coonce was eligible for the death penalty based on his\ncrime satisfying the required mental state for the death penalty and based on his\nconduct satisfying eight aggravating factors.5 Four of the aggravating factors were\nfrom the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”): (1) causing death during the\n\n\n 2\n Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–37 (1968) (concluding there is a\nConfrontation Clause violation when one co-defendant’s prior statements implicate\nanother co-defendant’s guilt but the first co-defendant does not testify at trial).\n 3\n Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the Eighth Amendment\nbans imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded).\n 4\n We recognize the use of the term “mentally retarded” may be offensive to\nsome. However, this terminology reflects the statutory language. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3596(c) (“A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is\nmentally retarded.”)\n 5\n The government withdrew reliance on a ninth factor before the start of the\ncapital sentencing proceeding.\n\n -4-\n\fcommission of another crime; (2) having two or more prior convictions for violent\nfelonies; (3) committing murder “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner\nin that it involved torture or serious physical abuse;” and (4) committing murder\n“after substantial planning and premeditation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1), (c)(4), (c)(6),\n(c)(9). The other four aggravating factors were “non-statutory” as they are not listed\nin the FDPA: (1) future dangerousness, (2) conduct suggesting a grave indifference\nto human life, (3) lack of remorse about Castro’s death, and (4) obstructing justice by\nretaliating against Castro for reporting misconduct.\n\n Coonce alleged that thirty-three mitigating factors weighed against the death\npenalty being an appropriate punishment for him, twenty-six of which were submitted\nto the jury. The first ten of these factors focused extensively on his chaotic and\nabusive childhood. Two factors sought to rebut the government’s factors. They\nalleged Coonce showed remorse for Castro’s death and that he would have help from\nloving family and foster family relationships. Six factors focused on his mental state\nand on injuries that may have caused traumatic brain injuries. Three factors alleged\nhe had a lesser role in the murder. One of these factors suggested he killed Castro out\nof a desire to escape abuse from other inmates due to the sexual offenses in his\nhistory. Another noted Coonce’s repeated attempts at suicide. Two factors alleged\nhe had improved in the two years prior to trial. Finally, one catch-all factor allowed\nthe jury to acknowledge “other reasons that weigh against the imposition of a\nsentence of death for Defendant Coonce.”\n\n After hearing all of the penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously decided\nthe death penalty should be imposed on Coonce. They found the government proved\nall eight aggravating factors. The entire jury found one mitigating factor: “Defendant\nCoonce’s childhood was marked by chaos, abuse (both physical and sexual), as well\nas neglect and abandonment.” Individual jurors found other mitigating factors.\nEleven jurors found “[t]he chaotic and abusive life that Defendant Coonce endured\nas a young child increased his risk for emotional and mental disturbances in his adult\n\n -5-\n\flife.” Eight jurors found “[d]efendant Coonce has suffered from mental and\nemotional impairments from a very young age.” One juror found “[d]efendant\nCoonce’s mother, Linda Coonce, was addicted to illegal drugs and alcohol.” In light\nof those findings, all of the jurors weighed the aggravating factors against the\nmitigating factors and agreed the death penalty was appropriate.\n\n The district court imposed the death penalty as determined by the jury. Coonce\ntimely appealed.\n\n II. Analysis\n\n The FDPA requires this court to perform three tasks on review: (1) “address all\nsubstantive and procedural issues raised on appeal,” (2) “consider whether the\nsentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other\narbitrary factor,” and (3) assess “whether the evidence supports the special finding\nof the existence of an aggravating factor . . . under section 3592.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3595(c)(1). The court may “not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account\nof any error which can be harmless,” and the government bears the burden of proving\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Id. § 3595(c)(2).\n\n Coonce raises sixteen arguments on appeal. We address them in order.\n\n A. Eligibility for the Death Penalty\n\n Coonce first argues that he meets the “mentally retarded” exception to the\nFDPA and is not eligible for the death penalty. The FDPA states “[a] sentence of\ndeath shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded.” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3596(c). “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only [1]\nsubaverage intellectual functioning, but also [2] significant limitations in adaptive\nskills . . . that [3] became manifest before age 18.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,\n\n -6-\n\f318 (2002). Both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly noted the\nconsensus that mental retardation must, as a definitional matter, onset before age\neighteen. See, e.g., id.; Ortiz v. United States, 664 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 2011).\nCoonce conceded below, and concedes on appeal, that his intellectual deficits were\nonset at age twenty. Thus, his argument relies on changing the prevailing\nunderstanding of the statutory exception to encompass an age of onset after eighteen.\n\n In response to the government’s request for discovery of mental health\nevidence, Coonce stated he would not be asserting that he is “mentally retarded” and\nthat no Atkins hearing was necessary. Then, on day fourteen of the capital sentencing\nproceeding, Coonce filed a motion requesting an order barring the government from\nseeking the death penalty, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision against a firm\nIQ score cutoff in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) also supported eliminating\nthe firm age cutoff in the definition of intellectual disability. The motion conceded\nCoonce did not meet the medical community’s definition of age of onset but argued\nfor a fluid definition anyway.\n\n We assume, without deciding, Coonce preserved his argument and we hold the\nage of onset requirement remains before the age of eighteen. Coonce’s main\nargument to evade the precedent construing the FDPA is to assert that the age of\nonset requirement is not rigid or will change in the near future. This argument\ndisregards “a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that words generally\nshould be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress\nenacted the statute.’” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (ellipses\nin original) (quoting Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074\n(2018)). Both the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) and the American\nAssociation on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”) agreed at the\ntime Congress enacted the FDPA’s “mentally retarded” exception that the impairment\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n\fmust onset by definition before eighteen.6 Thus, as a matter of statutory construction,\nCoonce’s argument is meritless.\n\n Coonce cites two other sources to persuade us to interpret the FDPA as having\nhis preferred age of onset requirement: the text of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and\na rule promulgated by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). We find neither\npersuasive.\n\n The Rehabilitation Act evidence is unhelpful because it involves a policy\ncontext that compels no legal conclusion. Coonce is correct that Congress amended\nthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to expand eligibility for disability benefits from those\nwith a disability onset before eighteen to those with a disability onset before twenty-\ntwo. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities\nAmendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 3004–05 (1978). He does not\nexplain how this policy choice defining eligibility for benefits for physical and mental\ndisabilities constitutes a medical judgment about mental disability. Because\ndevelopmental disability is inherently a legal term, not a medical one, see Tennessee\n\n 6\n In fact, both the APA and the AAIDD agreed on this definition at the time the\noriginal “mentally retarded” exception was enacted, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,\nPub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4390 (1988), and at the time the FDPA was enacted\nwith the same exception. Compare Am. Assn. on Mental Deficiency, Classification\nin Mental Retardation 1 (Grossman ed. 1983) (defining mental retardation as\noccurring during “the period of time between conception and the 18th birthday”), and\nAm. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 36\n(Third Ed. 1980) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an “essential feature”),\nwith Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition,\nClassification, and Systems of Supports 1 (9th ed. 1992) (defining mental retardation\nas occurring “before age 18”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical\nManual of Mental Disorders 39 (Fourth Ed. 1994) (“The onset must occur before age\n18 years.”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\nDisorders 29 (Third Ed. Rev. 1987) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an\n“essential feature”).\n\n -8-\n\fProt. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 349 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004), Congress\ncould redefine the term when it wanted as a matter of policy. We see no indication\nin the FDPA that Congress intended to adopt its policy judgments in other areas in\nlieu of the definition that prevailed at the time, especially when it did not specify that\nsame policy judgment here.\n\n Coonce is correct that the Social Security Administration defines intellectual\ndisability as onset before age twenty-two. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §\n12.05. The SSA’s rule is unhelpful because it cites no basis at all for its definition.\nThere is no discussion in the Federal Register of why that rule was adopted. See\nFederal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance; Listing of\nImpairments—Mental Disorders, 50 Fed. Reg. 35038, 35049–50 (Aug. 28, 1985).\nThirty-one years later, the SSA did posit a reason for its age of onset: that it obtained\nthat definition from the American Psychological Association (as opposed to the\nAmerican Psychiatric Association). See Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating\nMental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66155 n.16 (Sept. 26, 2016). This explanation\nis implausible on its face because it cites a 1996 manual to justify a 1985 definition.\nSee id.7 This does not necessarily harm the SSA’s rule because the agency could\nadopt a minority view with its rulemaking authority even when the APA and AAIDD\ndo not agree. This does harm Coonce’s argument, though, because this court does not\npromulgate administrative rules and because Coonce still lacks evidence of experts\ndefining the age of onset as before age twenty-two at the time Congress adopted the\nFDPA. Neither this court nor any professional association or administrative body has\nbeen delegated the legislative authority to redefine a term adopted by Congress.\n\n\n\n 7\n A review of the underlying manual also shows that it was attempting to change\nthe prevailing definition in 1996, further undermining any value it would offer to\nshow the meaning of the term “mentally retarded” at the time Congress passed the\nFDPA. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Manual of Diagnosis and Prof’l Practice in\nMental Retardation 36–37 (John W. Jacobson and James A. Mulick, eds., 1996).\n\n -9-\n\f Coonce alternatively raises this argument as an Eighth Amendment challenge.\nHe tells us about recent changes in the debate over defining disabilities, describing\nhow the APA has recently changed its definition for the age of onset from before\neighteen to “during the developmental period,” defined as “during childhood or\nadolescence.” In Coonce’s view, this change leaves open the question of whether the\nAPA still believes the developmental period is before eighteen. He also tells us about\nliterature suggesting the AAIDD, which still defines the age of onset as before\neighteen, will eventually shift to a more vague standard. Both of these arguments are\npredictions that medical experts will agree with Coonce’s view in the future. Such\nevidence is not sufficient for us to divine any current Eighth Amendment limitation\non the statute.8\n\n Because we agree with the district court that the age of onset is eighteen, we\naffirm its decision not to hold an Atkins hearing and not to consider whether Coonce\nsatisfies the other factors for intellectual disability, regardless of whether he waived\nhis arguments here.\n\n B. Evidence Regarding Coonce’s Refusal to Submit to IQ Testing\n\n Coonce next argues that admitting evidence at trial of his refusal to submit to\nan IQ test violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by analogizing to the right\nto remain silent recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is true the\nmagistrate judge at his initial appearance gave a Miranda warning. The refusal to\ntake an IQ test occurred at a competency examination over a year later. There is no\nindication in the record the competency examination was still subject to the same\nMiranda protections. The doctor at the competency examination only generally\nadvised Coonce that statements are not confidential and that Coonce was free not to\ntell anything he wanted kept confidential. This warning is closer to the officer’s\n\n\n 8\n We find no merit to his Fifth Amendment claim on the same ground.\n\n -10-\n\fadvice in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), about declining a blood\nalcohol test than a full Miranda warning because it warns of consequences without\ngiving any substantive protections. And Coonce does not cite any authority stating\na competency examination must be under Miranda protections. Accordingly, we do\nnot agree the district court committed any Miranda error here.\n\n In conjunction with his Miranda argument, Coonce also argues there was\nprosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments when the government suggested that\nIQ testing is unreliable, by contrasting it to the reliability of a blood test. “To obtain\nreversal for prosecutorial misconduct [in capital sentencing closing arguments], a\ndefendant must show the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and that such remarks\nprejudiced the defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v.\nRodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 798 (8th Cir. 2009). The government’s arguments about\nthe unreliability of IQ testing may have been somewhat aggressive, as they suggested\nsuch testing is never very reliable by comparing it to the precision of a blood test. We\nsee no basis to conclude their arguments crossed the line into misconduct.\n\n C. Jury Instruction on Brain Damage Mitigating Factor\n\n Coonce next argues he was prejudiced by the denial of a requested jury\ninstruction on his brain damage mitigating factor. He requested an instruction that\nsaid “if any of you find the factual existence of a mitigating factor you may not ignore\nthat factor or give it zero weight.” His argument and instruction both rely on the false\npremise that juries assess mitigating factors only for factual accuracy rather than for\nvalue as a mitigator. We are aware of no statute or case law that “require[s] a capital\njury to give mitigating effect or weight to any particular evidence,” and “[t]here is\nonly a constitutional violation if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors\nbelieved themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.”\nUnited States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2000). In Paul, the jury\ndeclined to find the mitigating factor that Paul’s co-defendant received only a life\n\n -11-\n\fsentence even though that statement was factually true. See id. This court found it\nsufficient that the jurors were allowed to consider the evidence regarding his co-\ndefendant’s life sentence before several jurors declined to find the mitigating factor.\nId. at 1000. In fact, this court has repeatedly said a jury may give mitigating evidence\nno weight as long as they actually considered it. See Rodriguez, 581 F.3d at 799;\nUnited States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 966 (8th Cir. 2007). Coonce’s argument is\na form-over-function argument because his ultimate complaint is that he wanted the\njury to write down what they found factually true before evaluating the weight. There\nis no reason to believe the jury would have weighed the factors any differently if they\nhad recorded factual accuracy separately from weight. Thus, because the jury\nconsidered the relevant mitigating evidence, the district court did not err in refusing\nan instruction requiring factual findings.\n\n Coonce’s further argument that the government impermissibly minimized the\nvalue of his mental damage at closing is an attempt to expand existing case law\nbanning a “nexus” requirement for mental damage mitigation. It is true that the\ngovernment cannot argue the defendant needs to prove a nexus between the\nmitigating factors and the crime at issue. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.\n233, 245–46 (2007). Here, the government conceded Coonce’s mental damage from\nincidents earlier in his life but argued the damage should not be a mitigating factor\nbecause he may have been at fault in those incidents. This is not a nexus argument\nbut rather an attempt to devalue the mitigating factor. Coonce tries to argue at a high\nlevel of generality that this was an invitation for the jury to screen out a mitigating\nfactor. His argument relies on his minimization of the government’s concession of\nmental damage and maximization of the government’s argument about the lack of\nweight the jury should give mental damage when deciding whether the death penalty\nwas proper. None of the precedent forbidding a nexus requirement forbids the\nargument that was made here. Because the government conceded mental damage, it\nwas not precluded from making arguments about weight as long as it avoided the\nimpermissible nexus arguments.\n\n -12-\n\f D. Coonce’s Incriminating Statements to Dr. Park Dietz\n\n Coonce next argues he should not have been compelled to discuss the relevant\ncrime during his examination by the government’s psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz. The\nFifth Amendment generally protects defendants against the government’s use of\ncompelled statements to a psychiatrist. Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87, 93 (2013).\nWhen a defendant introduces psychiatric evidence for a mental-status defense,\nthough, the prosecution may then present its own psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. Id.\nat 93–94. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implement several protections\nto support the Fifth Amendment restrictions here. The rules limit the government\nfrom seeing any results or reports of its compelled examination until the defendant\nis found guilty and confirms his intent to offer expert evidence on his mental\ncondition at sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(2). The rules also prohibit the\ngovernment from using any statement made by the defendant in the course of the\ngovernment’s examination, or any opinion based on such a statement, unless the\ndefendant has introduced evidence on that particular issue. Id. 12.2(c)(4). The rules\neven prohibit using fruits of any statement by the defendant unless in rebuttal. See\nid. These protections limit the admissibility, not the scope, of the interview.\n\n The district court’s order on the scope of the interview complied with Fed. R.\nCrim. P. 12.2. It permitted a recorded interview by counsel firewalled apart from the\ngovernment. It also required advance notice before any portion of the interview was\nusable in court. Coonce also does not dispute that he put his mental state during the\ncrime at issue. Thus, the district court’s order properly addressed the permissive\nscope while delaying any ruling on admissibility.\n\n Coonce’s argument that his statements should not have been admitted is\nforeclosed by the doctrine of invited error. Coonce objected to allowing offense-\nspecific questions during Dietz’s examination of Coonce but did not object to\nadmitting those answers into evidence. In fact, counsel represented they had agreed\n\n -13-\n\fon what the government could offer into evidence. When counsel affirmatively\napproves of an evidentiary ruling, the invited error doctrine generally estops any\nargument that the ruling was errant. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th\nCir. 2010). We are not persuaded by Coonce’s argument that any objection would\nhave been futile because the district court only ruled on the scope of the examination,\nnot admissibility. Thus, we conclude any error in admitting the evidence was invited,\nand we will not reverse on that basis.\n\n E. Footprint Evidence and Forensic Blood Evidence\n\n Coonce next argues that a police officer’s testimony about whether a footprint\non Castro’s chest matched Coonce’s footprint violated the Federal Rules of Evidence.\nAlthough the evidence was admitted at trial, Coonce is only appealing his capital\nsentencing proceeding, and those proceedings do not follow the rules of evidence.\n“Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing\nadmission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if\nits probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,\nconfusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review a\ndistrict court’s decision to admit evidence during the sentencing hearing under an\nabuse of discretion standard. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir.\n2005). The footprint evidence had little prejudice because showing that Coonce\nstomped on Castro’s chest would add almost nothing to satisfying the aggravating\nfactors at issue beyond the other conduct already in the record. Thus, we affirm the\ndistrict court’s decision to admit this evidence during the capital sentencing\nproceeding.\n\n Coonce’s argument about admitting evidence that Castro’s blood was on\nCoonce’s shoe has little probative value to sentencing. The FBI’s expert testified at\ntrial that the initial presumptive test on Coonce’s right boot and on Hall’s right shoe\nfound blood, while the confirmatory test on both was inconclusive. This evidence\n\n -14-\n\fappears relevant to guilt, but Coonce does not appeal his murder conviction. Coonce\nalso does not cite any point of the sentencing proceeding where the evidence was\nreferenced. Presuming the evidence was even used in the sentencing proceeding, we\nsee no abuse of discretion in its admission of this guilt evidence because we do not\nbelieve its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n\n F. Jury Instruction on Future Dangerousness\n\n Coonce next argues the district court inappropriately summarized the\ngovernment’s evidence in its future dangerousness instruction. “[A] death penalty\nphase jury must have ‘clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed\nguidance.’” United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 903 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lewis\nv. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)). Coonce argues that stating the allegations\nsupporting future dangerousness amounts to improper “marshaling the evidence,”\nciting United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008). Regardless of\nwhether marshaling of evidence is generally proper, some summary of the allegations\nsupporting future dangerousness is necessary in capital sentencing proceedings in\norder to prevent an open-ended inquiry on the jury’s perception of future\ndangerousness rather than an inquiry on the government’s evidence. See Ortiz, 315\nF.3d at 903. We are also not convinced that the district court’s vague references here,\nsuch as “a continuing pattern of violent conduct,” amount to a summation of evidence\nrather than a summation of the bare allegations.\n\n Coonce’s further argument that the district court made a mistake in its\ndeviation from the model instruction on future dangerousness is correct, but any error\nwas not plain. “A district court has ‘wide discretion’ in formulating a jury\ninstruction.” United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting\nUnited States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1541 (8th Cir. 1995)). “If the instructions,\ntaken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury, we will\naffirm.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001)).\n\n -15-\n\fBecause Coonce’s only objection below was giving this instruction without his\nproposed additional instruction, he raises this particular objection for the first time\non appeal. We review unpreserved errors for plain error. Jones v. United States, 527\nU.S. 373, 388–89 (1999). Under plain error review, “relief is not warranted unless\nthere has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id.\n\n The district court gave the following instruction:\n\n The first non-statutory aggravating factor alleged by the Government for\n each count is that Defendant Coonce presents a future danger to others\n based upon the probability that Defendant Coonce would commit\n criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to the\n lives and safety of others. Defendant Coonce has engaged in a\n continuing pattern of violent conduct, has threatened others with\n violence, has demonstrated lack of remorse, and/or has demonstrated a\n low rehabilitative potential.\n\nPenalty Phase Jury Instrs., 17, ECF No. 807. The Eighth Circuit Model Jury\nInstructions relevantly state: “The [first] non-statutory factor alleged by the\ngovernment is that . . . [The defendant] would be a danger in the future to the lives\nand safety of other persons, as evidenced by [describe pertinent facts].” Model Death\nPenalty Jury Instructions, Eighth Circuit, No. 12.08 (brackets in original).\n\n The district court’s deviation from the model instruction here is unfortunate,\nbut not reversible error. The district court’s edit changed a statement of the\ngovernment’s allegation into an apparent statement of fact, replacing the phrase “as\nevidenced by” with a sentence break. By removing “as evidenced by,” the instruction\nread in isolation could imply that the jury should assume it was proven Coonce had\nengaged in a pattern of violent and threatening conduct. In context, though, a\nreasonable juror could still infer that the second sentence was part of the\ngovernment’s allegations, especially since the instructions otherwise fairly reflected\n\n\n -16-\n\fthat it was the government’s burden to establish the aggravating factors. The\nparagraph preceding this disputed instruction even describes the subsequent\nparagraphs as the government’s allegations. Thus, while the district court’s edit is not\na best practice for jury instructions, we cannot say it amounts to a plain error in\ncontext.\n\n Giving this aggravating-factor instruction without Coonce’s proposed\nmitigating-factor instruction was also within the district court’s discretion. Coonce\nproposed a jury instruction that said, as a mitigating factor, that “[t]he Federal Bureau\nof Prisons is capable of imposing conditions of confinement that will control\nWesley’s future behavior.” The district court admitted evidence about whether the\nBOP could control Coonce, but did not instruct the jury on how to handle that\nevidence. Nonetheless, we do not find its decision to be an abuse of discretion\nbecause Coonce was entitled to rebut allegations of future dangerousness in prison.\nSee United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court\nneed not — and should not — instruct juries that sufficient control in prison is a\nmitigating factor. We are not certain this evidence is individualized enough to qualify\nas a mitigating factor because some BOP evidence is common to many BOP\ndefendants. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983) (requiring an\nindividualized determination). Also, as our sister circuit has observed, allowing\ncontrol in prison as a mitigating factor is illogical because it results in rewarding the\nmost dangerous defendants for their dangerousness simply because they (unlike less\ndangerous defendants) would be placed in maximum security. See Johnson, 223 F.3d\nat 674–75. The district court correctly exercised its discretion when it refused to\ninstruct the jury that Coonce’s rebuttal evidence was a mitigating factor.\n\n G. Admitting BOP Administration and Costs for Future Dangerousness\n\n Coonce next argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of the BOP’s\nadministrative policies and costs as part of the government’s case on future\n\n -17-\n\fdangerousness. Our review is once again for an abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428\nF.3d at 756. In support of his appeal, Coonce cites a Fourth Circuit case that\nundermines most of his argument. The Fourth Circuit expressed that it was troubled\nby remarks from the government during a death penalty hearing that the BOP could\nnot adequately control the defendant. United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 626 (4th\nCir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit found no reversible error for four reasons: (1) the\nchallenged “comments about the jury’s role were isolated and not extensive,” (2) the\ndefendant invited the argument by presenting evidence about how the BOP would\ncontrol him, (3) the district court’s instructions about individualized judgment and\nabout attorney arguments not being evidence “counterbalanced any improper\ncomments” during the argument, and (4) the non-statutory aggravating factors (and\nfuture dangerousness in particular) were otherwise well-supported by the record. Id.\nWe think the Fourth Circuit’s analysis applies equally well in this case. Coonce\nintroduced evidence about whether the BOP could control him, inviting rebuttal. The\ndistrict court also gave the same standard instructions as the court in Caro. The\nfuture dangerousness factor was also well-supported by evidence of numerous\nassaults in Coonce’s past. Thus, because we agree with the analysis in Caro, we\nconclude Coonce did not suffer prejudicial error.\n\n The one novel issue faced here but not in Caro is whether the government\npermissibly used Coonce’s mental illness to show the BOP could not control him.\nThe Supreme Court has suggested that mental illness cannot be used against a\ndefendant as an aggravating factor. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885. The government’s\nargument shows the problem it was facing here: mental illness questions and evidence\nwere needed to rebut some of Coonce’s evidence. For example, mental illness could\nmake Coonce ineligible for certain programs and placements his experts said would\ncontrol him in the BOP. As another example, Coonce’s expert, Stacey Wood,\ntestified about how Coonce’s brain injuries might mitigate his role in the offense, but\nshe has previously written articles admitting the same injuries could also make him\n“increasingly aggressive, agitated, and dangerous.” Coonce is correct that the\n\n -18-\n\fgovernment’s use of mental health evidence could imply future dangerousness, but\nthe government is also correct that it only used mental health in cross-examinations\nand rebuttals to counter Coonce’s evidence. We cannot see how the district court\nerred in admitting this evidence because the government did not advance mental\nhealth issues as an aggravating factor in its case in chief, and excluding such evidence\nhere risked barring any fair rebuttal. Thus, we affirm the district court’s evidentiary\nruling on mental health rebuttal evidence.\n\n H. Right to be Present\n\n Coonce next argues that his court-imposed absence during certain instructions\nto the jury violated his right to be present. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure, “the defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage.” Fed. R. Crim. P.\n43. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments also protect that right, but Rule 43 incorporates\nthe most expansive common law understanding of the right, making it broader than\nthe constitutional right. United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2015).\n“[C]ommunications between judge and jury in the absence of the defendant and his\ncounsel are presumptively prejudicial.” United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125\n(8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).\n\n The issue in this case arises from the district court’s removal of the defendants\nbefore instructing the jury on protestors outside the courthouse and on confidentiality\nof juror information. At the beginning of the day, the district court told counsel it was\nsealing the names of the jurors and that the defendants were not allowed to write\ndown the names of the jurors. It also told counsel it intended to tell the jury about the\nprotestors and allow them the option of staying inside and having lunch delivered\nduring the break from trial. It stated the defendants would not be present for that\ndiscussion, and Coonce’s counsel objected. At the lunch break, the district court had\nthe jury exit solely so the marshals could remove the defendants. It had the jury\nimmediately return. Then, it told them about the protesters and the precautions the\n\n -19-\n\fdistrict court was taking, adding it was sealing the jury’s names and addresses to\nprotect them. The district court then recessed for lunch.\n\n We conclude this discussion with the jury was a ministerial act and not a “trial\nstage” for purposes of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. The discussion with the jury and counsel\nwithout the defendants was proper for seeking honest answers from the jury about any\nsafety concerns they had. Regardless of whether a significant protest actually\noccurred, the district court is entitled to ensure its jury is free from external pressures.\nThere is also no presumption of prejudice from excluding defendants from ministerial\nacts, especially when counsel remains present. Accordingly, we see no error here.\n\n I. BOP Records of Coonce’s Misconduct\n\n Coonce next argues the admission of his BOP records violated the\nConfrontation Clause of the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.9 This\ncourt reviews Confrontation Clause objections to the admission of evidence de novo.\nUnited States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 955 (8th Cir. 2010). This court has previously\nheld “the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings” but left\nopen the question of whether it applies in capital sentencing proceedings. See\nJohnson, 495 F.3d at 976 n.23 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046,\n1048 (8th Cir. 2005)). Numerous circuits have found that the Confrontation Clause\ndoes not apply in capital sentencing proceedings, citing the Supreme Court’s decision\nin Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See, e.g., United States v. Umana, 750\nF.3d 320, 346 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 327–28 (5th Cir.\n2007).\n\n\n\n\n 9\n “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be\nconfronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.\n\n -20-\n\f While Coonce advances arguments about whether Williams is still good law,\nit is not our role to decide the continuing validity of a Supreme Court decision even\nif it appears suspect. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court\nhas direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other\nline of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de\nQuijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Williams did\naddress the scope of the Confrontation Clause in capital sentencing proceedings, and\nthe case provides useful guidance to this court. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 250–52.\nThis court en banc has also previously applied Williams as controlling on\nconfrontation rights in non-capital sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Wise,\n976 F.2d 393, 398 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The district court was as bound\nby Williams as we are.\n\n Coonce’s related argument that the BOP records were too unreliable to admit\nis also unpersuasive. Neither party cites a case from this circuit stating that the\n“indicia of reliability” standard for typical sentencing proceedings also applies to\ncapital sentencing proceedings, although the Fifth Circuit has said as much. See\nFields, 483 F.3d at 337–38. We see no reason to depart from that standard in capital\nsentencing proceedings either. Accordingly, we review the decision this evidence\nhad sufficient indicia of reliability for abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\n\n Coonce does not explain why the BOP’s adversarial administrative process\nwould lack indicia of reliability, and it appears his challenge is to unadjudicated\nconduct in BOP reports. In particular, he points to a report where a prisoner alleged\nCoonce attempted sexual assault when the adjudication only led to a conviction for\npunching that person. In the analogous situation of police reports, we have been\nsuspicious of their reliability: “While police reports may be demonstrably reliable\nevidence of the fact that an arrest was made they are significantly less reliable\nevidence of whether the allegations of criminal conduct they contain are true.”\n\n -21-\n\fUnited States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States\nv. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986)). We assess reliability “case-by-case.” Id.\n\n We are convinced the BOP reports were sufficiently reliable here for two\nreasons. First, the government also introduced the evidence showing that some of the\ncharges did not lead to adjudications against Coonce. Second, any excessive charges\nfrom other inmates in the reports were consistent with Coonce’s description of\nunreasonably hostile treatment by other inmates. Thus, we do not believe the district\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting BOP reports in this case.\n\n J. Using Coonce’s Prior Offense for Multiple Aggravating Factors\n\n Coonce next argues the government’s repetitive use of his 2002 conviction for\nkidnapping and the related rape was unfairly prejudicial. However, he cites no\nauthority barring this type of repetitive use. “Where the evidence is at most ‘an extra\nhelping of what the jury had heard before,’ the evidence is merely cumulative and its\nadmission does not result in reversible error.” United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375\nF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 29\n(1st Cir. 2001)). “There could be circumstances, however, where that ‘extra helping’\nof evidence ‘can be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.’” Id. at 804 (quoting\nsame). Ramos-Caraballo was under the standard rules of evidence, not the FDPA,\nbut we assess for unfair prejudice under either rule. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review\nfor abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\n\n As both parties acknowledge, the government used multiple witnesses to\nrecount the kidnapping and rape in order to satisfy different aggravating factors. The\nonly case Coonce cites where a court erred by admitting new but cumulative evidence\nwas a Third Circuit case on child pornography. See United States v. Cunningham,\n694 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit’s analysis is not on point here\nbecause the Third Circuit was addressing a trial where the government introduced\n\n -22-\n\fmultiple child pornography video clips to establish guilt of a child pornography\noffense. See id. The evidence at issue here is testimony, not video evidence, and it\nis being introduced to establish character for sentencing, not to bias a jury’s\ndetermination on guilt. Coonce cites no case where we have ever required excluding\ncumulative evidence of past crimes in a capital sentencing proceeding, and we are not\nconvinced that allowing multiple forms of evidence was unfairly prejudicial here.\nThus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting different\nversions of Coonce’s prior kidnapping and rape offenses.\n\n Coonce’s other objection about using the same offense for multiple aggravating\nfactors is foreclosed by precedent. We have stated there is no constitutional infirmity\nin duplicative factors because the jury weighs factors; it does not tally them for\nnumbers. See Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762. As a result, the jury can account for the\nduplication in its weighing of the factors. See id. So, even assuming Coonce is\ncorrect that any of the factors were duplicative rather than merely similar, Purkey\nforecloses Coonce’s argument for error based on duplication.\n\n K. Future Dangerousness as an Aggravating Factor\n\n Coonce makes three primary arguments about why future dangerousness is not\na valid aggravating factor. First, he argues that a probability-based factor like future\ndangerousness is not capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he argues\nthat future dangerousness for a person under a sentence of life imprisonment should\nbe narrowed to future dangerousness in prison. Third, he argues that an unreliable\nprediction cannot impose unalterable consequences like the death penalty. This court\nreviews challenges to the validity of an aggravating factor de novo. United States v.\nAllen, 247 F.3d 741, 786 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953\n(2002).\n\n\n\n\n -23-\n\f Coonce’s first argument is foreclosed by precedent. As he concedes, a plurality\nopinion in Jurek states that probability-based factors are permissible. See Jurek v.\nTexas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–76 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,\nJJ.); see also id. at 278–79 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger,\nC.J., and Rehnquist, J.). The government argues that Jurek forecloses this challenge\nbecause this particular argument was presented to the court in Jurek. We see no\nexplicit response to that argument in the plurality opinion in Jurek. Nevertheless, we\nagree the question is implicitly foreclosed by Jurek. If a probability-based factor is\nconstitutionally permissible in a criminal case, as Jurek states, then such a factor\nnecessarily must be provable beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Jurek prevents us\nfrom questioning the premise, it also prevents us from questioning the conclusion.\n\n Coonce’s second argument is an argument we have previously rejected. See\nAllen. 247 F.3d at 788–89, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). In Allen,\nthis court noted the possibility of escape and danger to other inmates and prison\nofficials, and it also noted that the jury could appropriately assess the evidence of\nfuture dangerousness when it also knew the defendant was serving a life sentence\nwithout the possibility of parole. See id. Seven Supreme Court justices have\nsimilarly suggested a reversible error would exist with this factor only when the jury\nwas prevented from learning that the defendant had no possibility of parole. See\nSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166 n.5 (1994) (opinion of Blackmun, J.,\njoined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); see also id. at 178 (O’Connor, J.,\nconcurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.). Although\nwe are not bound by Allen due to its being vacated, we see no reason the district court\nerred, as the jury in this case knew about Coonce’s existing prison sentence when\nassessing his future dangerousness.\n\n Coonce’s third argument has a false premise. Under Jurek, the prediction of\nfuture dangerousness is reliable. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275–76, 278–79. Coonce cites\ntwo cases about life sentences for juveniles to support his argument: Montgomery v.\n\n -24-\n\fLouisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).\nNeither of these cases says anything about appropriate considerations for adult\noffenders like Coonce. The opinion in Montgomery even distinguishes cases\nconcerning factors making the death penalty more likely for a particular offender\nfrom factors imposing an unconstitutionally excessive penalty on a category of\noffenders. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735–36. Coonce’s argument presumes his own\nconclusions about future dangerousness and is unsupported by the authority he cites.\nThe district court did not err in submitting future dangerousness to the jury.\n\n L. Voir Dire on Bias\n\n Coonce next argues that the district court improperly restricted voir dire on\nareas of bias that he claims were critical to his case. In particular, he argues the\ndistrict court improperly restricted inquiry into (1) connections to officials at FMC\nSpringfield, (2) sexual abuse, and (3) and attitudes toward mental health evidence and\nrelated expert testimony.\n\n “The Sixth Amendment guarantees ‘the criminally accused a fair trial by a\npanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,\n366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Voir dire helps protect this right. Id. Similarly, in a\ndeath penalty case, due process entitles a defendant to an impartial jury. See Morgan\nv. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729–32 (1992).10 “Trial judges have broad discretion in\ndetermining how best to conduct voir dire, though this discretion is not without\nboundaries.” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888. While we have supervisory power in federal\ndeath penalty cases that extends beyond enforcing constitutional limits, Mu’Min v.\nVirginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991), we will reverse only for abuse of discretion\n\n\n 10\n Morgan concerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not\nthe Fifth Amendment, but Coonce argues and the government does not contest that\nthe same standard applies to death penalty cases under either clause.\n\n -25-\n\f“[b]ecause the trial judge is in the best position to analyze the demeanor and\ncredibility of a venireman,” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888.\n\n The district court’s inquiry regarding friends and relatives of jurors working\nat FMC Springfield was not an abuse of discretion. The government agreed to a\nmodified version of the question Coonce wanted, and it is unclear why the district\ncourt rejected it. Several questions covered many related issues, though, as the\ndistrict court asked about spouses or significant others who were correctional officers,\nasked about family or friends in the mental health and medical fields, and asked about\nwhether the jurors had ever applied for a job with a governmental agency. There is\nsome potential for gaps in the responses, such as friends or family other than spouses\nworking as correctional officers, or family or friends working at FMC Springfield in\nan administrative capacity. Because the existing questions covered such a large\npotential swath of people working at FMC Springfield, though, we cannot say the\nfailure to ask a more exacting question was an abuse of discretion.\n\n The district court adequately inquired about juror attitudes regarding sexual\nabuse. Coonce argues the inquiries as to juror experience with crime were\ninsufficient, citing a district court case where a juror did not respond to a general\nquestion about being a victim of crime because the juror did not perceive an\nunreported sexual assault as responsive to the question. See United States v. Fell,\nNo. 2:01CR12, 2014 WL 3697810 at *6–7 (D. Vt., July 24, 2014). Regardless of\nwhether that juror in Fell was an outlier or within the mainstream of jury\nunderstanding, a similar omission could not have occurred during voir dire in this\ncase. The district court orally asked about attitudes toward possible evidence of the\ndefendant’s past rape or sexual assault. The district court also received responses on\npoint from prospective jurors about personal knowledge of sexual abuse. Thus,\nCoonce could not show any potential prejudice even if he could demonstrate there\nwas an error.\n\n\n\n -26-\n\f Finally, the district court adequately inquired regarding juror attitudes toward\nmental health issues. Coonce argues the district court should have asked prospective\njurors more targeted questions about attitudes toward mental health defenses. He\npoints to a Ninth Circuit case that references other authority stating that a defendant\nis entitled to voir dire about attitudes toward an insanity defense. United States v.\nJones, 722 F.2d 528, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1983). No such defense was at issue here.\nInstead, Coonce claimed mental health issues as a mitigating factor in a death penalty\nhearing. The main mental health questions Coonce wanted in the questionnaire were\nasked at voir dire, and it was only the wording of some of the questions that changed\nin the final result. In particular, the district court asked potential jurors whether they\nor immediate family or close friends had experience with mental illness or mental\nimpairment, and it asked whether they had any negative attitudes toward mental\nhealth professionals. We are not persuaded that all mental health evidence carries the\nsame stigma as the insanity defense, and we believe these questions adequately\ninquired as to biases here. Thus, even if we were to agree with the Ninth Circuit on\nthe insanity defense requiring a voir dire question, we would see no abuse of\ndiscretion in the district court’s voir dire on mental health issues.\n\n M. Lack of Individualized Voir Dire\n\n Coonce next argues the district court should have conducted individualized\nvoir dire privately and away from other prospective jurors. The Supreme Court has\nonce observed that the “psychological impact” of answering before other potential\njurors can diminish candor. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. It has also observed that when\ndiscussing voir dire practices, “[t]he fact that a particular rule may be thought to be\nthe ‘better’ view does not mean that it is incorporated into the Fourteenth\nAmendment.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 430–31. Without a constitutional violation here,\nwhich we do not find, Coonce’s argument is only a request to use our supervisory\npower. Coonce cites no circuit court that has used its supervisory power to require\ndistrict courts to conduct individualized voir dire. The record here also shows\n\n -27-\n\fmultiple candid answers by potential jurors in the voir dire, suggesting that group voir\ndire was adequate in this case. Facing no constitutional violation or problematic\nrecord, we decline Coonce’s invitation to adopt his perception of best practices for\nour district courts.\n\n N. Separate Capital Sentencing Proceedings\n\n Coonce next argues the district court abused its discretion by denying him a\nseparate capital sentencing proceeding from Hall. In Kansas v. Carr, the Supreme\nCourt reversed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court finding that the Eighth\nAmendment required separate sentencing proceedings. 136 S. Ct. 633, 646 (2016).\nThe Court emphasized: “[t]o forbid joinder in capital-sentencing proceedings would,\nperversely, increase the odds of ‘wanto[n] and freakis[h]’ imposition of death\nsentences.” Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–207 (1976) (joint\nopinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Coonce suggests some factual\ndistinctions, but none are a basis for disregarding the broad holding in Carr. He does\nnot demonstrate possible prejudice from the jury failing to separately consider him\nand Hall or from instructions which commingled evidence and law not applicable to\nhim with otherwise proper law and evidence. See id. at 645. The sentencing verdict\nforms also separately treated the two co-defendants. Thus, we see no error in the\ndistrict court’s refusal to sever the capital sentencing proceedings.\n\n O. Standard for Weighing Factors\n\n Coonce next argues that a jury must weigh factors in capital sentencing\nproceedings using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We have stated that the\nweighing component of the FDPA is not an elemental fact. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750.\nPurkey only addressed whether a grand jury needed to charge the weighing\ncomponent in an indictment, but our conclusion that weighing is not an element also\n\n\n\n -28-\n\fmeans that a capital sentencing jury does not need to perform the weighing beyond\na reasonable doubt. The district court correctly followed our precedent.\n\n P. Arbitrariness Arguments\n\n Coonce finally argues he was arbitrarily sentenced based on geography because\nthe Western District of Missouri has more death penalty cases than the average\ndistrict court. This argument is fundamentally a policy argument, not a legal one.\nThe statute governing our review requires this court to assess whether “the sentence\nof death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary\nfactor.” 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). The implication in this statute is that the court must\nassess whether the jury decided the sentence should be imposed based on any of those\nfactors. Coonce makes no attempt to argue the jury here sentenced him based on\ngeography.\n\n Even if the statute were not narrowed to the jury, Coonce makes no showing\nthat he personally received a sentence of death based on geography. While he cites\ngeneralized statistics about other districts and defendants, he does not show that his\nparticular chance of receiving the death penalty changed because of the district. He\ninfers from those generalized statistics that his sentence is arbitrary. But even if we\nagreed with his inference, which we do not, it is equally plausible that his sentence\nis deserved but some other cases in the district involved arbitrary use of the death\npenalty. Coonce offers no basis to reach an inference in his favor aside from his\npresumption that imposition of the death penalty is always improper.\n\n Coonce’s alternative argument that the FDPA itself is arbitrary has no legal\nmerit. This court has previously rejected the arguments he advances. Allen, 247 F.3d\nat 760–61, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002) (stating that “the FDPA\nadequately narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and sufficiently\nchannels a jury’s sentencing discretion” and that “proportionality review is not\n\n -29-\n\frequired in order for the FDPA to pass constitutional muster”). Even if we\nreconsidered that view, Coonce makes no showing that he personally received a\nsentence of death based on some arbitrariness inherent in the FDPA. This alternative\nargument is nothing more than a list of grievances about the FDPA with no causal\nconnection to Coonce’s case.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n After addressing each of Coonce’s arguments on appeal, we are satisfied that\nthe district court’s rulings on voir dire, jury instructions, evidence, presence of the\ndefendant, and the aggravating and mitigating factors were correct. We also hold that\nCoonce does not satisfy the age of onset requirement for the “mentally retarded”\nexception to the death penalty.\n\n Our other review tasks under the FDPA show no reason for reversal here. We\nfound no merit to Coonce’s constitutional challenge to the FDPA and see no other\nindication that passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor resulted in his death\nsentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). In addition, our review of the record shows\nsufficient evidence to find a statutory aggravating factor. See id. Accordingly, we\naffirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -30-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Wesley Paul COONCE, Jr. Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 14-2800\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Southern Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Wesley Paul Coonce, Jr. appeals the district court’s1 judgment sentencing him\\nto death for his role in the murder of Victor Castro-Rodriguez (“Castro”). We affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Coonce and Castro were inmates in a locked ward that housed mental health\\npatients at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri\\n(“FMC Springfield”). Coonce was serving a life sentence for kidnapping and\\ncarjacking, while Castro was committed due to his mental health and had no projected\\nrelease date.\\n\\n Prison officials found Castro dead in his cell on January 26, 2010. The\\nresponding staff found Castro unconscious, with his hands tied behind his back with\\nmedical tape, feet bound at his ankles with shoelaces, and a brown cloth wrapped\\naround his neck. Medical staff tried to resuscitate him to no avail. Dr. Carl Stacy, the\\ngovernment’s expert pathologist, testified that Castro died from asphyxiation due to\\na compressed larynx. He opined that the strangulation occurred from a “larger\\nobject,” not hands, because of blunt force trauma to the neck and the lack of any\\nbroken hyoid rings. He also noted blunt force trauma to the chin and injuries to the\\nupper chest, lower neck, and back of the head. He estimated Castro died within three\\nto five minutes.\\n\\n Physical evidence supported the conclusion that Coonce and another inmate,\\nCharles Hall, had killed Castro by standing on his neck. Both Coonce’s right boot\\nand Hall’s shoes tested positive for a substance containing Castro’s DNA. Coonce\\nhad two pairs of shoes in his cell that were missing their shoelaces. Coonce also\\nshowed Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Rick McLain where he had\\nplaced his hand on the wall to balance while standing on Castro’s neck.\\n\\n A camera provided additional circumstantial evidence that Coonce and Hall\\nkilled Castro. The prison did not have cameras that could see inside Castro’s cell or\\nthe door to his cell at the time of the murder. Nevertheless, a camera showed the only\\npeople that approached Castro’s cell during the time of the murder were Coonce and\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fHall. After a few minutes, Coonce left the cell for about a minute to talk to another\\ninmate. He rejoined Hall in Castro’s cell, and both of them were there for about nine\\nadditional minutes. Coonce left again, made a throat-slashing sign to another inmate\\nand then returned to the cell. Both Coonce and Hall left the cell a couple minutes\\nlater.\\n\\n Coonce repeatedly claimed responsibility for Castro’s murder. His first\\nadmissions came shortly after FMC Springfield officials discovered Castro’s body.\\nHe particularly described that he tied up Castro’s hands and feet and stomped on\\nCastro’s neck. He explained Castro was a snitch. That same night, he told an\\ninvestigating FBI agent that he kicked Castro in the neck and stood on his throat until\\nhe stopped breathing. Coonce also claimed both he and another person, which other\\nevidence showed to be Hall, stood on Castro’s neck until Castro stopped breathing.\\nCoonce explained that interactions with other inmates had upset him and that he\\ndecided to retaliate against Castro for previously telling prison staff about a minor\\noffense. The next day, he told a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) psychologist that he\\nkilled a man and that it was by his choice. He told the FBI in a subsequent interview\\nthat he had no regrets about killing Castro. Coonce also bragged about the murder\\nto inmates and admitted it in letters and calls to friends and family.\\n\\n In July 2011, a grand jury indicted Coonce on one count of murder in the first\\ndegree within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 2, and one count of murder by a federal prisoner\\nserving a life sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1118. The indictment included\\nspecial findings of the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3591 and aggravating\\nfactors under 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) that made the charged offenses eligible for the\\ndeath penalty.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f Coonce filed a motion for a separate trial from co-defendant Hall. The district\\ncourt denied the motion. It concluded that redacting statements with Bruton2 risks\\nand properly instructing the jury would resolve any potential prejudice.\\n\\n During pre-trial disclosures, the government asked for discovery on Coonce’s\\nmental health evidence and for an Atkins3 hearing on whether Coonce was “mentally\\nretarded.”4 Coonce responded that “the defense will not be asserting Mr. Coonce is\\nmentally retarded” and “no Atkins hearing is necessary.”\\n\\n After an eight-day trial in April and May of 2014, the jury found Coonce guilty\\non both counts in the indictment. The district court then retained the same jury for\\nthe capital sentencing proceeding, where the jury would decide whether to impose the\\ndeath penalty.\\n\\n The government alleged Coonce was eligible for the death penalty based on his\\ncrime satisfying the required mental state for the death penalty and based on his\\nconduct satisfying eight aggravating factors.5 Four of the aggravating factors were\\nfrom the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”): (1) causing death during the\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–37 (1968) (concluding there is a\\nConfrontation Clause violation when one co-defendant’s prior statements implicate\\nanother co-defendant’s guilt but the first co-defendant does not testify at trial).\\n 3\\n Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the Eighth Amendment\\nbans imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded).\\n 4\\n We recognize the use of the term “mentally retarded” may be offensive to\\nsome. However, this terminology reflects the statutory language. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3596(c) (“A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is\\nmentally retarded.”)\\n 5\\n The government withdrew reliance on a ninth factor before the start of the\\ncapital sentencing proceeding.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fcommission of another crime; (2) having two or more prior convictions for violent\\nfelonies; (3) committing murder “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner\\nin that it involved torture or serious physical abuse;” and (4) committing murder\\n“after substantial planning and premeditation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1), (c)(4), (c)(6),\\n(c)(9). The other four aggravating factors were “non-statutory” as they are not listed\\nin the FDPA: (1) future dangerousness, (2) conduct suggesting a grave indifference\\nto human life, (3) lack of remorse about Castro’s death, and (4) obstructing justice by\\nretaliating against Castro for reporting misconduct.\\n\\n Coonce alleged that thirty-three mitigating factors weighed against the death\\npenalty being an appropriate punishment for him, twenty-six of which were submitted\\nto the jury. The first ten of these factors focused extensively on his chaotic and\\nabusive childhood. Two factors sought to rebut the government’s factors. They\\nalleged Coonce showed remorse for Castro’s death and that he would have help from\\nloving family and foster family relationships. Six factors focused on his mental state\\nand on injuries that may have caused traumatic brain injuries. Three factors alleged\\nhe had a lesser role in the murder. One of these factors suggested he killed Castro out\\nof a desire to escape abuse from other inmates due to the sexual offenses in his\\nhistory. Another noted Coonce’s repeated attempts at suicide. Two factors alleged\\nhe had improved in the two years prior to trial. Finally, one catch-all factor allowed\\nthe jury to acknowledge “other reasons that weigh against the imposition of a\\nsentence of death for Defendant Coonce.”\\n\\n After hearing all of the penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously decided\\nthe death penalty should be imposed on Coonce. They found the government proved\\nall eight aggravating factors. The entire jury found one mitigating factor: “Defendant\\nCoonce’s childhood was marked by chaos, abuse (both physical and sexual), as well\\nas neglect and abandonment.” Individual jurors found other mitigating factors.\\nEleven jurors found “[t]he chaotic and abusive life that Defendant Coonce endured\\nas a young child increased his risk for emotional and mental disturbances in his adult\\n\\n -5-\\n\\flife.” Eight jurors found “[d]efendant Coonce has suffered from mental and\\nemotional impairments from a very young age.” One juror found “[d]efendant\\nCoonce’s mother, Linda Coonce, was addicted to illegal drugs and alcohol.” In light\\nof those findings, all of the jurors weighed the aggravating factors against the\\nmitigating factors and agreed the death penalty was appropriate.\\n\\n The district court imposed the death penalty as determined by the jury. Coonce\\ntimely appealed.\\n\\n II. Analysis\\n\\n The FDPA requires this court to perform three tasks on review: (1) “address all\\nsubstantive and procedural issues raised on appeal,” (2) “consider whether the\\nsentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other\\narbitrary factor,” and (3) assess “whether the evidence supports the special finding\\nof the existence of an aggravating factor . . . under section 3592.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3595(c)(1). The court may “not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account\\nof any error which can be harmless,” and the government bears the burden of proving\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. Id. § 3595(c)(2).\\n\\n Coonce raises sixteen arguments on appeal. We address them in order.\\n\\n A. Eligibility for the Death Penalty\\n\\n Coonce first argues that he meets the “mentally retarded” exception to the\\nFDPA and is not eligible for the death penalty. The FDPA states “[a] sentence of\\ndeath shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3596(c). “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only [1]\\nsubaverage intellectual functioning, but also [2] significant limitations in adaptive\\nskills . . . that [3] became manifest before age 18.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f318 (2002). Both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly noted the\\nconsensus that mental retardation must, as a definitional matter, onset before age\\neighteen. See, e.g., id.; Ortiz v. United States, 664 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 2011).\\nCoonce conceded below, and concedes on appeal, that his intellectual deficits were\\nonset at age twenty. Thus, his argument relies on changing the prevailing\\nunderstanding of the statutory exception to encompass an age of onset after eighteen.\\n\\n In response to the government’s request for discovery of mental health\\nevidence, Coonce stated he would not be asserting that he is “mentally retarded” and\\nthat no Atkins hearing was necessary. Then, on day fourteen of the capital sentencing\\nproceeding, Coonce filed a motion requesting an order barring the government from\\nseeking the death penalty, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision against a firm\\nIQ score cutoff in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) also supported eliminating\\nthe firm age cutoff in the definition of intellectual disability. The motion conceded\\nCoonce did not meet the medical community’s definition of age of onset but argued\\nfor a fluid definition anyway.\\n\\n We assume, without deciding, Coonce preserved his argument and we hold the\\nage of onset requirement remains before the age of eighteen. Coonce’s main\\nargument to evade the precedent construing the FDPA is to assert that the age of\\nonset requirement is not rigid or will change in the near future. This argument\\ndisregards “a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that words generally\\nshould be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress\\nenacted the statute.’” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (ellipses\\nin original) (quoting Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074\\n(2018)). Both the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) and the American\\nAssociation on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”) agreed at the\\ntime Congress enacted the FDPA’s “mentally retarded” exception that the impairment\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\fmust onset by definition before eighteen.6 Thus, as a matter of statutory construction,\\nCoonce’s argument is meritless.\\n\\n Coonce cites two other sources to persuade us to interpret the FDPA as having\\nhis preferred age of onset requirement: the text of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and\\na rule promulgated by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). We find neither\\npersuasive.\\n\\n The Rehabilitation Act evidence is unhelpful because it involves a policy\\ncontext that compels no legal conclusion. Coonce is correct that Congress amended\\nthe Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to expand eligibility for disability benefits from those\\nwith a disability onset before eighteen to those with a disability onset before twenty-\\ntwo. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities\\nAmendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 3004–05 (1978). He does not\\nexplain how this policy choice defining eligibility for benefits for physical and mental\\ndisabilities constitutes a medical judgment about mental disability. Because\\ndevelopmental disability is inherently a legal term, not a medical one, see Tennessee\\n\\n 6\\n In fact, both the APA and the AAIDD agreed on this definition at the time the\\noriginal “mentally retarded” exception was enacted, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,\\nPub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4390 (1988), and at the time the FDPA was enacted\\nwith the same exception. Compare Am. Assn. on Mental Deficiency, Classification\\nin Mental Retardation 1 (Grossman ed. 1983) (defining mental retardation as\\noccurring during “the period of time between conception and the 18th birthday”), and\\nAm. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 36\\n(Third Ed. 1980) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an “essential feature”),\\nwith Am. Ass’n on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition,\\nClassification, and Systems of Supports 1 (9th ed. 1992) (defining mental retardation\\nas occurring “before age 18”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical\\nManual of Mental Disorders 39 (Fourth Ed. 1994) (“The onset must occur before age\\n18 years.”), and Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\\nDisorders 29 (Third Ed. Rev. 1987) (defining “onset before the age of 18” as an\\n“essential feature”).\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fProt. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 349 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004), Congress\\ncould redefine the term when it wanted as a matter of policy. We see no indication\\nin the FDPA that Congress intended to adopt its policy judgments in other areas in\\nlieu of the definition that prevailed at the time, especially when it did not specify that\\nsame policy judgment here.\\n\\n Coonce is correct that the Social Security Administration defines intellectual\\ndisability as onset before age twenty-two. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §\\n12.05. The SSA’s rule is unhelpful because it cites no basis at all for its definition.\\nThere is no discussion in the Federal Register of why that rule was adopted. See\\nFederal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance; Listing of\\nImpairments—Mental Disorders, 50 Fed. Reg. 35038, 35049–50 (Aug. 28, 1985).\\nThirty-one years later, the SSA did posit a reason for its age of onset: that it obtained\\nthat definition from the American Psychological Association (as opposed to the\\nAmerican Psychiatric Association). See Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating\\nMental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66155 n.16 (Sept. 26, 2016). This explanation\\nis implausible on its face because it cites a 1996 manual to justify a 1985 definition.\\nSee id.7 This does not necessarily harm the SSA’s rule because the agency could\\nadopt a minority view with its rulemaking authority even when the APA and AAIDD\\ndo not agree. This does harm Coonce’s argument, though, because this court does not\\npromulgate administrative rules and because Coonce still lacks evidence of experts\\ndefining the age of onset as before age twenty-two at the time Congress adopted the\\nFDPA. Neither this court nor any professional association or administrative body has\\nbeen delegated the legislative authority to redefine a term adopted by Congress.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n A review of the underlying manual also shows that it was attempting to change\\nthe prevailing definition in 1996, further undermining any value it would offer to\\nshow the meaning of the term “mentally retarded” at the time Congress passed the\\nFDPA. See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Manual of Diagnosis and Prof’l Practice in\\nMental Retardation 36–37 (John W. Jacobson and James A. Mulick, eds., 1996).\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Coonce alternatively raises this argument as an Eighth Amendment challenge.\\nHe tells us about recent changes in the debate over defining disabilities, describing\\nhow the APA has recently changed its definition for the age of onset from before\\neighteen to “during the developmental period,” defined as “during childhood or\\nadolescence.” In Coonce’s view, this change leaves open the question of whether the\\nAPA still believes the developmental period is before eighteen. He also tells us about\\nliterature suggesting the AAIDD, which still defines the age of onset as before\\neighteen, will eventually shift to a more vague standard. Both of these arguments are\\npredictions that medical experts will agree with Coonce’s view in the future. Such\\nevidence is not sufficient for us to divine any current Eighth Amendment limitation\\non the statute.8\\n\\n Because we agree with the district court that the age of onset is eighteen, we\\naffirm its decision not to hold an Atkins hearing and not to consider whether Coonce\\nsatisfies the other factors for intellectual disability, regardless of whether he waived\\nhis arguments here.\\n\\n B. Evidence Regarding Coonce’s Refusal to Submit to IQ Testing\\n\\n Coonce next argues that admitting evidence at trial of his refusal to submit to\\nan IQ test violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by analogizing to the right\\nto remain silent recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is true the\\nmagistrate judge at his initial appearance gave a Miranda warning. The refusal to\\ntake an IQ test occurred at a competency examination over a year later. There is no\\nindication in the record the competency examination was still subject to the same\\nMiranda protections. The doctor at the competency examination only generally\\nadvised Coonce that statements are not confidential and that Coonce was free not to\\ntell anything he wanted kept confidential. This warning is closer to the officer’s\\n\\n\\n 8\\n We find no merit to his Fifth Amendment claim on the same ground.\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fadvice in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), about declining a blood\\nalcohol test than a full Miranda warning because it warns of consequences without\\ngiving any substantive protections. And Coonce does not cite any authority stating\\na competency examination must be under Miranda protections. Accordingly, we do\\nnot agree the district court committed any Miranda error here.\\n\\n In conjunction with his Miranda argument, Coonce also argues there was\\nprosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments when the government suggested that\\nIQ testing is unreliable, by contrasting it to the reliability of a blood test. “To obtain\\nreversal for prosecutorial misconduct [in capital sentencing closing arguments], a\\ndefendant must show the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and that such remarks\\nprejudiced the defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v.\\nRodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 798 (8th Cir. 2009). The government’s arguments about\\nthe unreliability of IQ testing may have been somewhat aggressive, as they suggested\\nsuch testing is never very reliable by comparing it to the precision of a blood test. We\\nsee no basis to conclude their arguments crossed the line into misconduct.\\n\\n C. Jury Instruction on Brain Damage Mitigating Factor\\n\\n Coonce next argues he was prejudiced by the denial of a requested jury\\ninstruction on his brain damage mitigating factor. He requested an instruction that\\nsaid “if any of you find the factual existence of a mitigating factor you may not ignore\\nthat factor or give it zero weight.” His argument and instruction both rely on the false\\npremise that juries assess mitigating factors only for factual accuracy rather than for\\nvalue as a mitigator. We are aware of no statute or case law that “require[s] a capital\\njury to give mitigating effect or weight to any particular evidence,” and “[t]here is\\nonly a constitutional violation if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors\\nbelieved themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.”\\nUnited States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2000). In Paul, the jury\\ndeclined to find the mitigating factor that Paul’s co-defendant received only a life\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fsentence even though that statement was factually true. See id. This court found it\\nsufficient that the jurors were allowed to consider the evidence regarding his co-\\ndefendant’s life sentence before several jurors declined to find the mitigating factor.\\nId. at 1000. In fact, this court has repeatedly said a jury may give mitigating evidence\\nno weight as long as they actually considered it. See Rodriguez, 581 F.3d at 799;\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 966 (8th Cir. 2007). Coonce’s argument is\\na form-over-function argument because his ultimate complaint is that he wanted the\\njury to write down what they found factually true before evaluating the weight. There\\nis no reason to believe the jury would have weighed the factors any differently if they\\nhad recorded factual accuracy separately from weight. Thus, because the jury\\nconsidered the relevant mitigating evidence, the district court did not err in refusing\\nan instruction requiring factual findings.\\n\\n Coonce’s further argument that the government impermissibly minimized the\\nvalue of his mental damage at closing is an attempt to expand existing case law\\nbanning a “nexus” requirement for mental damage mitigation. It is true that the\\ngovernment cannot argue the defendant needs to prove a nexus between the\\nmitigating factors and the crime at issue. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.\\n233, 245–46 (2007). Here, the government conceded Coonce’s mental damage from\\nincidents earlier in his life but argued the damage should not be a mitigating factor\\nbecause he may have been at fault in those incidents. This is not a nexus argument\\nbut rather an attempt to devalue the mitigating factor. Coonce tries to argue at a high\\nlevel of generality that this was an invitation for the jury to screen out a mitigating\\nfactor. His argument relies on his minimization of the government’s concession of\\nmental damage and maximization of the government’s argument about the lack of\\nweight the jury should give mental damage when deciding whether the death penalty\\nwas proper. None of the precedent forbidding a nexus requirement forbids the\\nargument that was made here. Because the government conceded mental damage, it\\nwas not precluded from making arguments about weight as long as it avoided the\\nimpermissible nexus arguments.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f D. Coonce’s Incriminating Statements to Dr. Park Dietz\\n\\n Coonce next argues he should not have been compelled to discuss the relevant\\ncrime during his examination by the government’s psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz. The\\nFifth Amendment generally protects defendants against the government’s use of\\ncompelled statements to a psychiatrist. Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87, 93 (2013).\\nWhen a defendant introduces psychiatric evidence for a mental-status defense,\\nthough, the prosecution may then present its own psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. Id.\\nat 93–94. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure implement several protections\\nto support the Fifth Amendment restrictions here. The rules limit the government\\nfrom seeing any results or reports of its compelled examination until the defendant\\nis found guilty and confirms his intent to offer expert evidence on his mental\\ncondition at sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(2). The rules also prohibit the\\ngovernment from using any statement made by the defendant in the course of the\\ngovernment’s examination, or any opinion based on such a statement, unless the\\ndefendant has introduced evidence on that particular issue. Id. 12.2(c)(4). The rules\\neven prohibit using fruits of any statement by the defendant unless in rebuttal. See\\nid. These protections limit the admissibility, not the scope, of the interview.\\n\\n The district court’s order on the scope of the interview complied with Fed. R.\\nCrim. P. 12.2. It permitted a recorded interview by counsel firewalled apart from the\\ngovernment. It also required advance notice before any portion of the interview was\\nusable in court. Coonce also does not dispute that he put his mental state during the\\ncrime at issue. Thus, the district court’s order properly addressed the permissive\\nscope while delaying any ruling on admissibility.\\n\\n Coonce’s argument that his statements should not have been admitted is\\nforeclosed by the doctrine of invited error. Coonce objected to allowing offense-\\nspecific questions during Dietz’s examination of Coonce but did not object to\\nadmitting those answers into evidence. In fact, counsel represented they had agreed\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fon what the government could offer into evidence. When counsel affirmatively\\napproves of an evidentiary ruling, the invited error doctrine generally estops any\\nargument that the ruling was errant. United States v. Jewell, 614 F.3d 911, 920 (8th\\nCir. 2010). We are not persuaded by Coonce’s argument that any objection would\\nhave been futile because the district court only ruled on the scope of the examination,\\nnot admissibility. Thus, we conclude any error in admitting the evidence was invited,\\nand we will not reverse on that basis.\\n\\n E. Footprint Evidence and Forensic Blood Evidence\\n\\n Coonce next argues that a police officer’s testimony about whether a footprint\\non Castro’s chest matched Coonce’s footprint violated the Federal Rules of Evidence.\\nAlthough the evidence was admitted at trial, Coonce is only appealing his capital\\nsentencing proceeding, and those proceedings do not follow the rules of evidence.\\n“Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing\\nadmission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if\\nits probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,\\nconfusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review a\\ndistrict court’s decision to admit evidence during the sentencing hearing under an\\nabuse of discretion standard. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir.\\n2005). The footprint evidence had little prejudice because showing that Coonce\\nstomped on Castro’s chest would add almost nothing to satisfying the aggravating\\nfactors at issue beyond the other conduct already in the record. Thus, we affirm the\\ndistrict court’s decision to admit this evidence during the capital sentencing\\nproceeding.\\n\\n Coonce’s argument about admitting evidence that Castro’s blood was on\\nCoonce’s shoe has little probative value to sentencing. The FBI’s expert testified at\\ntrial that the initial presumptive test on Coonce’s right boot and on Hall’s right shoe\\nfound blood, while the confirmatory test on both was inconclusive. This evidence\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fappears relevant to guilt, but Coonce does not appeal his murder conviction. Coonce\\nalso does not cite any point of the sentencing proceeding where the evidence was\\nreferenced. Presuming the evidence was even used in the sentencing proceeding, we\\nsee no abuse of discretion in its admission of this guilt evidence because we do not\\nbelieve its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\\n\\n F. Jury Instruction on Future Dangerousness\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court inappropriately summarized the\\ngovernment’s evidence in its future dangerousness instruction. “[A] death penalty\\nphase jury must have ‘clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed\\nguidance.’” United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 903 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lewis\\nv. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)). Coonce argues that stating the allegations\\nsupporting future dangerousness amounts to improper “marshaling the evidence,”\\nciting United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2008). Regardless of\\nwhether marshaling of evidence is generally proper, some summary of the allegations\\nsupporting future dangerousness is necessary in capital sentencing proceedings in\\norder to prevent an open-ended inquiry on the jury’s perception of future\\ndangerousness rather than an inquiry on the government’s evidence. See Ortiz, 315\\nF.3d at 903. We are also not convinced that the district court’s vague references here,\\nsuch as “a continuing pattern of violent conduct,” amount to a summation of evidence\\nrather than a summation of the bare allegations.\\n\\n Coonce’s further argument that the district court made a mistake in its\\ndeviation from the model instruction on future dangerousness is correct, but any error\\nwas not plain. “A district court has ‘wide discretion’ in formulating a jury\\ninstruction.” United States v. Frank, 354 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1541 (8th Cir. 1995)). “If the instructions,\\ntaken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury, we will\\naffirm.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001)).\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fBecause Coonce’s only objection below was giving this instruction without his\\nproposed additional instruction, he raises this particular objection for the first time\\non appeal. We review unpreserved errors for plain error. Jones v. United States, 527\\nU.S. 373, 388–89 (1999). Under plain error review, “relief is not warranted unless\\nthere has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id.\\n\\n The district court gave the following instruction:\\n\\n The first non-statutory aggravating factor alleged by the Government for\\n each count is that Defendant Coonce presents a future danger to others\\n based upon the probability that Defendant Coonce would commit\\n criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to the\\n lives and safety of others. Defendant Coonce has engaged in a\\n continuing pattern of violent conduct, has threatened others with\\n violence, has demonstrated lack of remorse, and/or has demonstrated a\\n low rehabilitative potential.\\n\\nPenalty Phase Jury Instrs., 17, ECF No. 807. The Eighth Circuit Model Jury\\nInstructions relevantly state: “The [first] non-statutory factor alleged by the\\ngovernment is that . . . [The defendant] would be a danger in the future to the lives\\nand safety of other persons, as evidenced by [describe pertinent facts].” Model Death\\nPenalty Jury Instructions, Eighth Circuit, No. 12.08 (brackets in original).\\n\\n The district court’s deviation from the model instruction here is unfortunate,\\nbut not reversible error. The district court’s edit changed a statement of the\\ngovernment’s allegation into an apparent statement of fact, replacing the phrase “as\\nevidenced by” with a sentence break. By removing “as evidenced by,” the instruction\\nread in isolation could imply that the jury should assume it was proven Coonce had\\nengaged in a pattern of violent and threatening conduct. In context, though, a\\nreasonable juror could still infer that the second sentence was part of the\\ngovernment’s allegations, especially since the instructions otherwise fairly reflected\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fthat it was the government’s burden to establish the aggravating factors. The\\nparagraph preceding this disputed instruction even describes the subsequent\\nparagraphs as the government’s allegations. Thus, while the district court’s edit is not\\na best practice for jury instructions, we cannot say it amounts to a plain error in\\ncontext.\\n\\n Giving this aggravating-factor instruction without Coonce’s proposed\\nmitigating-factor instruction was also within the district court’s discretion. Coonce\\nproposed a jury instruction that said, as a mitigating factor, that “[t]he Federal Bureau\\nof Prisons is capable of imposing conditions of confinement that will control\\nWesley’s future behavior.” The district court admitted evidence about whether the\\nBOP could control Coonce, but did not instruct the jury on how to handle that\\nevidence. Nonetheless, we do not find its decision to be an abuse of discretion\\nbecause Coonce was entitled to rebut allegations of future dangerousness in prison.\\nSee United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court\\nneed not — and should not — instruct juries that sufficient control in prison is a\\nmitigating factor. We are not certain this evidence is individualized enough to qualify\\nas a mitigating factor because some BOP evidence is common to many BOP\\ndefendants. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878–79 (1983) (requiring an\\nindividualized determination). Also, as our sister circuit has observed, allowing\\ncontrol in prison as a mitigating factor is illogical because it results in rewarding the\\nmost dangerous defendants for their dangerousness simply because they (unlike less\\ndangerous defendants) would be placed in maximum security. See Johnson, 223 F.3d\\nat 674–75. The district court correctly exercised its discretion when it refused to\\ninstruct the jury that Coonce’s rebuttal evidence was a mitigating factor.\\n\\n G. Admitting BOP Administration and Costs for Future Dangerousness\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of the BOP’s\\nadministrative policies and costs as part of the government’s case on future\\n\\n -17-\\n\\fdangerousness. Our review is once again for an abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428\\nF.3d at 756. In support of his appeal, Coonce cites a Fourth Circuit case that\\nundermines most of his argument. The Fourth Circuit expressed that it was troubled\\nby remarks from the government during a death penalty hearing that the BOP could\\nnot adequately control the defendant. United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 626 (4th\\nCir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit found no reversible error for four reasons: (1) the\\nchallenged “comments about the jury’s role were isolated and not extensive,” (2) the\\ndefendant invited the argument by presenting evidence about how the BOP would\\ncontrol him, (3) the district court’s instructions about individualized judgment and\\nabout attorney arguments not being evidence “counterbalanced any improper\\ncomments” during the argument, and (4) the non-statutory aggravating factors (and\\nfuture dangerousness in particular) were otherwise well-supported by the record. Id.\\nWe think the Fourth Circuit’s analysis applies equally well in this case. Coonce\\nintroduced evidence about whether the BOP could control him, inviting rebuttal. The\\ndistrict court also gave the same standard instructions as the court in Caro. The\\nfuture dangerousness factor was also well-supported by evidence of numerous\\nassaults in Coonce’s past. Thus, because we agree with the analysis in Caro, we\\nconclude Coonce did not suffer prejudicial error.\\n\\n The one novel issue faced here but not in Caro is whether the government\\npermissibly used Coonce’s mental illness to show the BOP could not control him.\\nThe Supreme Court has suggested that mental illness cannot be used against a\\ndefendant as an aggravating factor. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 885. The government’s\\nargument shows the problem it was facing here: mental illness questions and evidence\\nwere needed to rebut some of Coonce’s evidence. For example, mental illness could\\nmake Coonce ineligible for certain programs and placements his experts said would\\ncontrol him in the BOP. As another example, Coonce’s expert, Stacey Wood,\\ntestified about how Coonce’s brain injuries might mitigate his role in the offense, but\\nshe has previously written articles admitting the same injuries could also make him\\n“increasingly aggressive, agitated, and dangerous.” Coonce is correct that the\\n\\n -18-\\n\\fgovernment’s use of mental health evidence could imply future dangerousness, but\\nthe government is also correct that it only used mental health in cross-examinations\\nand rebuttals to counter Coonce’s evidence. We cannot see how the district court\\nerred in admitting this evidence because the government did not advance mental\\nhealth issues as an aggravating factor in its case in chief, and excluding such evidence\\nhere risked barring any fair rebuttal. Thus, we affirm the district court’s evidentiary\\nruling on mental health rebuttal evidence.\\n\\n H. Right to be Present\\n\\n Coonce next argues that his court-imposed absence during certain instructions\\nto the jury violated his right to be present. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal\\nProcedure, “the defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage.” Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n43. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments also protect that right, but Rule 43 incorporates\\nthe most expansive common law understanding of the right, making it broader than\\nthe constitutional right. United States v. Martin, 777 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n“[C]ommunications between judge and jury in the absence of the defendant and his\\ncounsel are presumptively prejudicial.” United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125\\n(8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).\\n\\n The issue in this case arises from the district court’s removal of the defendants\\nbefore instructing the jury on protestors outside the courthouse and on confidentiality\\nof juror information. At the beginning of the day, the district court told counsel it was\\nsealing the names of the jurors and that the defendants were not allowed to write\\ndown the names of the jurors. It also told counsel it intended to tell the jury about the\\nprotestors and allow them the option of staying inside and having lunch delivered\\nduring the break from trial. It stated the defendants would not be present for that\\ndiscussion, and Coonce’s counsel objected. At the lunch break, the district court had\\nthe jury exit solely so the marshals could remove the defendants. It had the jury\\nimmediately return. Then, it told them about the protesters and the precautions the\\n\\n -19-\\n\\fdistrict court was taking, adding it was sealing the jury’s names and addresses to\\nprotect them. The district court then recessed for lunch.\\n\\n We conclude this discussion with the jury was a ministerial act and not a “trial\\nstage” for purposes of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. The discussion with the jury and counsel\\nwithout the defendants was proper for seeking honest answers from the jury about any\\nsafety concerns they had. Regardless of whether a significant protest actually\\noccurred, the district court is entitled to ensure its jury is free from external pressures.\\nThere is also no presumption of prejudice from excluding defendants from ministerial\\nacts, especially when counsel remains present. Accordingly, we see no error here.\\n\\n I. BOP Records of Coonce’s Misconduct\\n\\n Coonce next argues the admission of his BOP records violated the\\nConfrontation Clause of the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.9 This\\ncourt reviews Confrontation Clause objections to the admission of evidence de novo.\\nUnited States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 955 (8th Cir. 2010). This court has previously\\nheld “the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings” but left\\nopen the question of whether it applies in capital sentencing proceedings. See\\nJohnson, 495 F.3d at 976 n.23 (quoting United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046,\\n1048 (8th Cir. 2005)). Numerous circuits have found that the Confrontation Clause\\ndoes not apply in capital sentencing proceedings, citing the Supreme Court’s decision\\nin Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See, e.g., United States v. Umana, 750\\nF.3d 320, 346 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 327–28 (5th Cir.\\n2007).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be\\nconfronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.\\n\\n -20-\\n\\f While Coonce advances arguments about whether Williams is still good law,\\nit is not our role to decide the continuing validity of a Supreme Court decision even\\nif it appears suspect. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court\\nhas direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other\\nline of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,\\nleaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de\\nQuijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Williams did\\naddress the scope of the Confrontation Clause in capital sentencing proceedings, and\\nthe case provides useful guidance to this court. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 250–52.\\nThis court en banc has also previously applied Williams as controlling on\\nconfrontation rights in non-capital sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Wise,\\n976 F.2d 393, 398 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The district court was as bound\\nby Williams as we are.\\n\\n Coonce’s related argument that the BOP records were too unreliable to admit\\nis also unpersuasive. Neither party cites a case from this circuit stating that the\\n“indicia of reliability” standard for typical sentencing proceedings also applies to\\ncapital sentencing proceedings, although the Fifth Circuit has said as much. See\\nFields, 483 F.3d at 337–38. We see no reason to depart from that standard in capital\\nsentencing proceedings either. Accordingly, we review the decision this evidence\\nhad sufficient indicia of reliability for abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\\n\\n Coonce does not explain why the BOP’s adversarial administrative process\\nwould lack indicia of reliability, and it appears his challenge is to unadjudicated\\nconduct in BOP reports. In particular, he points to a report where a prisoner alleged\\nCoonce attempted sexual assault when the adjudication only led to a conviction for\\npunching that person. In the analogous situation of police reports, we have been\\nsuspicious of their reliability: “While police reports may be demonstrably reliable\\nevidence of the fact that an arrest was made they are significantly less reliable\\nevidence of whether the allegations of criminal conduct they contain are true.”\\n\\n -21-\\n\\fUnited States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States\\nv. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1986)). We assess reliability “case-by-case.” Id.\\n\\n We are convinced the BOP reports were sufficiently reliable here for two\\nreasons. First, the government also introduced the evidence showing that some of the\\ncharges did not lead to adjudications against Coonce. Second, any excessive charges\\nfrom other inmates in the reports were consistent with Coonce’s description of\\nunreasonably hostile treatment by other inmates. Thus, we do not believe the district\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting BOP reports in this case.\\n\\n J. Using Coonce’s Prior Offense for Multiple Aggravating Factors\\n\\n Coonce next argues the government’s repetitive use of his 2002 conviction for\\nkidnapping and the related rape was unfairly prejudicial. However, he cites no\\nauthority barring this type of repetitive use. “Where the evidence is at most ‘an extra\\nhelping of what the jury had heard before,’ the evidence is merely cumulative and its\\nadmission does not result in reversible error.” United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375\\nF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 29\\n(1st Cir. 2001)). “There could be circumstances, however, where that ‘extra helping’\\nof evidence ‘can be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.’” Id. at 804 (quoting\\nsame). Ramos-Caraballo was under the standard rules of evidence, not the FDPA,\\nbut we assess for unfair prejudice under either rule. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). We review\\nfor abuse of discretion. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756.\\n\\n As both parties acknowledge, the government used multiple witnesses to\\nrecount the kidnapping and rape in order to satisfy different aggravating factors. The\\nonly case Coonce cites where a court erred by admitting new but cumulative evidence\\nwas a Third Circuit case on child pornography. See United States v. Cunningham,\\n694 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit’s analysis is not on point here\\nbecause the Third Circuit was addressing a trial where the government introduced\\n\\n -22-\\n\\fmultiple child pornography video clips to establish guilt of a child pornography\\noffense. See id. The evidence at issue here is testimony, not video evidence, and it\\nis being introduced to establish character for sentencing, not to bias a jury’s\\ndetermination on guilt. Coonce cites no case where we have ever required excluding\\ncumulative evidence of past crimes in a capital sentencing proceeding, and we are not\\nconvinced that allowing multiple forms of evidence was unfairly prejudicial here.\\nThus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting different\\nversions of Coonce’s prior kidnapping and rape offenses.\\n\\n Coonce’s other objection about using the same offense for multiple aggravating\\nfactors is foreclosed by precedent. We have stated there is no constitutional infirmity\\nin duplicative factors because the jury weighs factors; it does not tally them for\\nnumbers. See Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762. As a result, the jury can account for the\\nduplication in its weighing of the factors. See id. So, even assuming Coonce is\\ncorrect that any of the factors were duplicative rather than merely similar, Purkey\\nforecloses Coonce’s argument for error based on duplication.\\n\\n K. Future Dangerousness as an Aggravating Factor\\n\\n Coonce makes three primary arguments about why future dangerousness is not\\na valid aggravating factor. First, he argues that a probability-based factor like future\\ndangerousness is not capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he argues\\nthat future dangerousness for a person under a sentence of life imprisonment should\\nbe narrowed to future dangerousness in prison. Third, he argues that an unreliable\\nprediction cannot impose unalterable consequences like the death penalty. This court\\nreviews challenges to the validity of an aggravating factor de novo. United States v.\\nAllen, 247 F.3d 741, 786 (8th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953\\n(2002).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -23-\\n\\f Coonce’s first argument is foreclosed by precedent. As he concedes, a plurality\\nopinion in Jurek states that probability-based factors are permissible. See Jurek v.\\nTexas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–76 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,\\nJJ.); see also id. at 278–79 (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger,\\nC.J., and Rehnquist, J.). The government argues that Jurek forecloses this challenge\\nbecause this particular argument was presented to the court in Jurek. We see no\\nexplicit response to that argument in the plurality opinion in Jurek. Nevertheless, we\\nagree the question is implicitly foreclosed by Jurek. If a probability-based factor is\\nconstitutionally permissible in a criminal case, as Jurek states, then such a factor\\nnecessarily must be provable beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Jurek prevents us\\nfrom questioning the premise, it also prevents us from questioning the conclusion.\\n\\n Coonce’s second argument is an argument we have previously rejected. See\\nAllen. 247 F.3d at 788–89, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). In Allen,\\nthis court noted the possibility of escape and danger to other inmates and prison\\nofficials, and it also noted that the jury could appropriately assess the evidence of\\nfuture dangerousness when it also knew the defendant was serving a life sentence\\nwithout the possibility of parole. See id. Seven Supreme Court justices have\\nsimilarly suggested a reversible error would exist with this factor only when the jury\\nwas prevented from learning that the defendant had no possibility of parole. See\\nSimmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166 n.5 (1994) (opinion of Blackmun, J.,\\njoined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.); see also id. at 178 (O’Connor, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.). Although\\nwe are not bound by Allen due to its being vacated, we see no reason the district court\\nerred, as the jury in this case knew about Coonce’s existing prison sentence when\\nassessing his future dangerousness.\\n\\n Coonce’s third argument has a false premise. Under Jurek, the prediction of\\nfuture dangerousness is reliable. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275–76, 278–79. Coonce cites\\ntwo cases about life sentences for juveniles to support his argument: Montgomery v.\\n\\n -24-\\n\\fLouisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).\\nNeither of these cases says anything about appropriate considerations for adult\\noffenders like Coonce. The opinion in Montgomery even distinguishes cases\\nconcerning factors making the death penalty more likely for a particular offender\\nfrom factors imposing an unconstitutionally excessive penalty on a category of\\noffenders. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735–36. Coonce’s argument presumes his own\\nconclusions about future dangerousness and is unsupported by the authority he cites.\\nThe district court did not err in submitting future dangerousness to the jury.\\n\\n L. Voir Dire on Bias\\n\\n Coonce next argues that the district court improperly restricted voir dire on\\nareas of bias that he claims were critical to his case. In particular, he argues the\\ndistrict court improperly restricted inquiry into (1) connections to officials at FMC\\nSpringfield, (2) sexual abuse, and (3) and attitudes toward mental health evidence and\\nrelated expert testimony.\\n\\n “The Sixth Amendment guarantees ‘the criminally accused a fair trial by a\\npanel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,\\n366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Voir dire helps protect this right. Id. Similarly, in a\\ndeath penalty case, due process entitles a defendant to an impartial jury. See Morgan\\nv. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729–32 (1992).10 “Trial judges have broad discretion in\\ndetermining how best to conduct voir dire, though this discretion is not without\\nboundaries.” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888. While we have supervisory power in federal\\ndeath penalty cases that extends beyond enforcing constitutional limits, Mu’Min v.\\nVirginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991), we will reverse only for abuse of discretion\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Morgan concerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not\\nthe Fifth Amendment, but Coonce argues and the government does not contest that\\nthe same standard applies to death penalty cases under either clause.\\n\\n -25-\\n\\f“[b]ecause the trial judge is in the best position to analyze the demeanor and\\ncredibility of a venireman,” Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 888.\\n\\n The district court’s inquiry regarding friends and relatives of jurors working\\nat FMC Springfield was not an abuse of discretion. The government agreed to a\\nmodified version of the question Coonce wanted, and it is unclear why the district\\ncourt rejected it. Several questions covered many related issues, though, as the\\ndistrict court asked about spouses or significant others who were correctional officers,\\nasked about family or friends in the mental health and medical fields, and asked about\\nwhether the jurors had ever applied for a job with a governmental agency. There is\\nsome potential for gaps in the responses, such as friends or family other than spouses\\nworking as correctional officers, or family or friends working at FMC Springfield in\\nan administrative capacity. Because the existing questions covered such a large\\npotential swath of people working at FMC Springfield, though, we cannot say the\\nfailure to ask a more exacting question was an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n The district court adequately inquired about juror attitudes regarding sexual\\nabuse. Coonce argues the inquiries as to juror experience with crime were\\ninsufficient, citing a district court case where a juror did not respond to a general\\nquestion about being a victim of crime because the juror did not perceive an\\nunreported sexual assault as responsive to the question. See United States v. Fell,\\nNo. 2:01CR12, 2014 WL 3697810 at *6–7 (D. Vt., July 24, 2014). Regardless of\\nwhether that juror in Fell was an outlier or within the mainstream of jury\\nunderstanding, a similar omission could not have occurred during voir dire in this\\ncase. The district court orally asked about attitudes toward possible evidence of the\\ndefendant’s past rape or sexual assault. The district court also received responses on\\npoint from prospective jurors about personal knowledge of sexual abuse. Thus,\\nCoonce could not show any potential prejudice even if he could demonstrate there\\nwas an error.\\n\\n\\n\\n -26-\\n\\f Finally, the district court adequately inquired regarding juror attitudes toward\\nmental health issues. Coonce argues the district court should have asked prospective\\njurors more targeted questions about attitudes toward mental health defenses. He\\npoints to a Ninth Circuit case that references other authority stating that a defendant\\nis entitled to voir dire about attitudes toward an insanity defense. United States v.\\nJones, 722 F.2d 528, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1983). No such defense was at issue here.\\nInstead, Coonce claimed mental health issues as a mitigating factor in a death penalty\\nhearing. The main mental health questions Coonce wanted in the questionnaire were\\nasked at voir dire, and it was only the wording of some of the questions that changed\\nin the final result. In particular, the district court asked potential jurors whether they\\nor immediate family or close friends had experience with mental illness or mental\\nimpairment, and it asked whether they had any negative attitudes toward mental\\nhealth professionals. We are not persuaded that all mental health evidence carries the\\nsame stigma as the insanity defense, and we believe these questions adequately\\ninquired as to biases here. Thus, even if we were to agree with the Ninth Circuit on\\nthe insanity defense requiring a voir dire question, we would see no abuse of\\ndiscretion in the district court’s voir dire on mental health issues.\\n\\n M. Lack of Individualized Voir Dire\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court should have conducted individualized\\nvoir dire privately and away from other prospective jurors. The Supreme Court has\\nonce observed that the “psychological impact” of answering before other potential\\njurors can diminish candor. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. It has also observed that when\\ndiscussing voir dire practices, “[t]he fact that a particular rule may be thought to be\\nthe ‘better’ view does not mean that it is incorporated into the Fourteenth\\nAmendment.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 430–31. Without a constitutional violation here,\\nwhich we do not find, Coonce’s argument is only a request to use our supervisory\\npower. Coonce cites no circuit court that has used its supervisory power to require\\ndistrict courts to conduct individualized voir dire. The record here also shows\\n\\n -27-\\n\\fmultiple candid answers by potential jurors in the voir dire, suggesting that group voir\\ndire was adequate in this case. Facing no constitutional violation or problematic\\nrecord, we decline Coonce’s invitation to adopt his perception of best practices for\\nour district courts.\\n\\n N. Separate Capital Sentencing Proceedings\\n\\n Coonce next argues the district court abused its discretion by denying him a\\nseparate capital sentencing proceeding from Hall. In Kansas v. Carr, the Supreme\\nCourt reversed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court finding that the Eighth\\nAmendment required separate sentencing proceedings. 136 S. Ct. 633, 646 (2016).\\nThe Court emphasized: “[t]o forbid joinder in capital-sentencing proceedings would,\\nperversely, increase the odds of ‘wanto[n] and freakis[h]’ imposition of death\\nsentences.” Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–207 (1976) (joint\\nopinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Coonce suggests some factual\\ndistinctions, but none are a basis for disregarding the broad holding in Carr. He does\\nnot demonstrate possible prejudice from the jury failing to separately consider him\\nand Hall or from instructions which commingled evidence and law not applicable to\\nhim with otherwise proper law and evidence. See id. at 645. The sentencing verdict\\nforms also separately treated the two co-defendants. Thus, we see no error in the\\ndistrict court’s refusal to sever the capital sentencing proceedings.\\n\\n O. Standard for Weighing Factors\\n\\n Coonce next argues that a jury must weigh factors in capital sentencing\\nproceedings using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. We have stated that the\\nweighing component of the FDPA is not an elemental fact. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750.\\nPurkey only addressed whether a grand jury needed to charge the weighing\\ncomponent in an indictment, but our conclusion that weighing is not an element also\\n\\n\\n\\n -28-\\n\\fmeans that a capital sentencing jury does not need to perform the weighing beyond\\na reasonable doubt. The district court correctly followed our precedent.\\n\\n P. Arbitrariness Arguments\\n\\n Coonce finally argues he was arbitrarily sentenced based on geography because\\nthe Western District of Missouri has more death penalty cases than the average\\ndistrict court. This argument is fundamentally a policy argument, not a legal one.\\nThe statute governing our review requires this court to assess whether “the sentence\\nof death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary\\nfactor.” 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). The implication in this statute is that the court must\\nassess whether the jury decided the sentence should be imposed based on any of those\\nfactors. Coonce makes no attempt to argue the jury here sentenced him based on\\ngeography.\\n\\n Even if the statute were not narrowed to the jury, Coonce makes no showing\\nthat he personally received a sentence of death based on geography. While he cites\\ngeneralized statistics about other districts and defendants, he does not show that his\\nparticular chance of receiving the death penalty changed because of the district. He\\ninfers from those generalized statistics that his sentence is arbitrary. But even if we\\nagreed with his inference, which we do not, it is equally plausible that his sentence\\nis deserved but some other cases in the district involved arbitrary use of the death\\npenalty. Coonce offers no basis to reach an inference in his favor aside from his\\npresumption that imposition of the death penalty is always improper.\\n\\n Coonce’s alternative argument that the FDPA itself is arbitrary has no legal\\nmerit. This court has previously rejected the arguments he advances. Allen, 247 F.3d\\nat 760–61, vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002) (stating that “the FDPA\\nadequately narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and sufficiently\\nchannels a jury’s sentencing discretion” and that “proportionality review is not\\n\\n -29-\\n\\frequired in order for the FDPA to pass constitutional muster”). Even if we\\nreconsidered that view, Coonce makes no showing that he personally received a\\nsentence of death based on some arbitrariness inherent in the FDPA. This alternative\\nargument is nothing more than a list of grievances about the FDPA with no causal\\nconnection to Coonce’s case.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n After addressing each of Coonce’s arguments on appeal, we are satisfied that\\nthe district court’s rulings on voir dire, jury instructions, evidence, presence of the\\ndefendant, and the aggravating and mitigating factors were correct. We also hold that\\nCoonce does not satisfy the age of onset requirement for the “mentally retarded”\\nexception to the death penalty.\\n\\n Our other review tasks under the FDPA show no reason for reversal here. We\\nfound no merit to Coonce’s constitutional challenge to the FDPA and see no other\\nindication that passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor resulted in his death\\nsentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(1). In addition, our review of the record shows\\nsufficient evidence to find a statutory aggravating factor. See id. Accordingly, we\\naffirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -30-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3286,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642841,"string":"4,642,841"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Marcus FLOYD, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Marcus Floyd"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2178"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Wollman, Stras\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2178\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Marcus Floyd\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Marcus Floyd pleaded guilty in March 2014 to one count of possession of\\nmethamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As\\nrelevant here, Paragraph 7 of the Plea Agreement provided that Floyd:\\n\\n knowingly and voluntarily agrees and understands the following\\n appellate and post-conviction terms of this agreement:\\n\\f a. the defendant waives the right to directly appeal the\\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291\\n and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a);\\n\\n b. the defendant reserves the right to appeal from a\\n sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum;\\n\\n d. the defendant waives the right to collaterally attack the\\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,\\n except for claims based on Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\\n waiver.\\n\\nAt sentencing, the district court1 determined that Floyd’s advisory guidelines\\nsentencing range was 151 to 188 months in prison. Varying downwards, the court\\nimposed a 140-month sentence. Floyd did not appeal the conviction or sentence.\\n\\n In February 2015, Floyd filed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney\\nfailed to appeal the original judgment as Floyd directed. Floyd’s trial counsel passed\\naway before a scheduled evidentiary hearing on this claim. In February 2018, the\\ndistrict court concluded that an evidentiary hearing without counsel present “would\\nwaste judicial resources,” granted the § 2255 motion on the ground that trial counsel\\n“failed to file a notice of appeal as directed,” and ordered that Floyd “be resentenced\\nso as to allow him the opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal.”\\n\\n At the May 2018 resentencing, the district court noted that, “when a defendant\\nhas been unconstitutionally deprived of an appellate review due to defense counsel’s\\nfailure to file an appeal, the prescribed remedy is for the court to vacate the\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdefendant’s sentence and then reimpose it, allowing him to appeal the new sentence.”\\nSee United States v. Prado, 204 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court declined to consider new objections to the initial Presentence\\nInvestigation Report, denied Floyd’s request for de novo resentencing, and reimposed\\nthe original 140-month sentence, concluding it was appropriate in light of the 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) factors considered at the original sentencing hearing. Floyd\\nappeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for de\\nnovo resentencing. We conclude that Floyd’s appeal waivers control this issue and\\ndismiss the appeal.\\n\\n “As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights,” United\\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), which includes the right\\nto waive “section 2255 collateral-attack rights.” DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d\\n919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000). When reviewing a claim of appeal waiver, “we must\\nconfirm that the [issue raised on] appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that\\nboth the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily.\\nEven when these conditions are met, however, we will not enforce a waiver where to\\ndo so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Andis, 333 F.3d at 889-90; see United\\nStates v. Fonseca, 790 F.3d 852, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n In this case, Floyd waived the right to directly appeal but “reserve[d] the right\\nto appeal from a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum,” and he waived the\\nright to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence “except for claims based on\\nIneffective assistance of counsel which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\\nwaiver.” Plea Agreement par. 7 (emphasis added). This limited ineffective assistance\\nexception reflected our decision in DeRoo and other cases:\\n\\n A decision to enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing and\\n voluntary when the plea agreement itself is the result of advice outside\\n the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . .\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A defendant’s plea agreement waiver of the right to seek section 2255\\n post-conviction relief does not waive defendant’s right to argue,\\n pursuant to that section, that the decision to enter into the plea was not\\n knowing and voluntary because it was the result of ineffective assistance\\n of counsel.\\n\\n223 F.3d at 923-24 (citations and quotation omitted), cited in Andis, 333 F.3d at 890.\\nAbsent a broader exception, the merits of other ineffective assistance arguments were\\nwithin the scope of Floyd’s § 2255 waiver. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d\\n911, 916 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n In the district court and on appeal, Floyd did not contend that his Plea\\nAgreement or the Paragraph 7 appeal waivers were not knowing and voluntary. Thus,\\nhis claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice\\nof appeal fell squarely within the terms of his knowing and voluntary § 2255 appeal\\nwaiver. There is no finding that “counsel’s deficient performance deprive[d Floyd]\\nof an appeal he otherwise would have taken.” Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 747\\n(2019) (quotation omitted). Any appeal from the district court’s failure to conduct\\nde novo resentencing is precluded by his § 2255 appeal waiver. And there can be no\\nclaim that enforcing this waiver against the de novo resentencing claim will result in\\na miscarriage of justice: the direct appeal that counsel failed to file would have been\\nsquarely precluded by Floyd’s direct appeal waiver, which reserved only the right to\\nappeal from a sentence which exceeded the statutory maximum. For these reasons,\\nthe Paragraph 7 appeal waivers foreclose this appeal.\\n\\n In responding to the government’s appeal waiver argument on appeal, Floyd\\nargued a different ineffective assistance theory -- “his attorney failed to object to\\napplication of the [Guidelines] career-offender enhancement at sentencing.” But the\\n§ 2255 appeal waiver forecloses this argument as well. This claim does not allege\\nineffective assistance that challenges “the validity of the guilty plea or this waiver.”\\nAnd a claim of ineffective assistance alleging that counsel failed to challenge a\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fguidelines enhancement is foreclosed by Paragraph 7. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 892\\n(allegation that sentencing judge misapplied the Guidelines is subject to a valid\\nappeal waiver if the resulting sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for the\\noffense of conviction).\\n\\n Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 894.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420094/\", \"author_raw\": \"LOKEN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"STRAS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642841/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Marcus FLOYD, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2178\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Marcus Floyd\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Marcus Floyd pleaded guilty in March 2014 to one count of possession of\nmethamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As\nrelevant here, Paragraph 7 of the Plea Agreement provided that Floyd:\n\n knowingly and voluntarily agrees and understands the following\n appellate and post-conviction terms of this agreement:\n\f a. the defendant waives the right to directly appeal the\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291\n and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a);\n\n b. the defendant reserves the right to appeal from a\n sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum;\n\n d. the defendant waives the right to collaterally attack the\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,\n except for claims based on Ineffective assistance of counsel\n which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\n waiver.\n\nAt sentencing, the district court1 determined that Floyd’s advisory guidelines\nsentencing range was 151 to 188 months in prison. Varying downwards, the court\nimposed a 140-month sentence. Floyd did not appeal the conviction or sentence.\n\n In February 2015, Floyd filed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence under 28\nU.S.C. § 2255, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney\nfailed to appeal the original judgment as Floyd directed. Floyd’s trial counsel passed\naway before a scheduled evidentiary hearing on this claim. In February 2018, the\ndistrict court concluded that an evidentiary hearing without counsel present “would\nwaste judicial resources,” granted the § 2255 motion on the ground that trial counsel\n“failed to file a notice of appeal as directed,” and ordered that Floyd “be resentenced\nso as to allow him the opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal.”\n\n At the May 2018 resentencing, the district court noted that, “when a defendant\nhas been unconstitutionally deprived of an appellate review due to defense counsel’s\nfailure to file an appeal, the prescribed remedy is for the court to vacate the\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western\nDistrict of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\fdefendant’s sentence and then reimpose it, allowing him to appeal the new sentence.”\nSee United States v. Prado, 204 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the\ndistrict court declined to consider new objections to the initial Presentence\nInvestigation Report, denied Floyd’s request for de novo resentencing, and reimposed\nthe original 140-month sentence, concluding it was appropriate in light of the 18\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) factors considered at the original sentencing hearing. Floyd\nappeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for de\nnovo resentencing. We conclude that Floyd’s appeal waivers control this issue and\ndismiss the appeal.\n\n “As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights,” United\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), which includes the right\nto waive “section 2255 collateral-attack rights.” DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d\n919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000). When reviewing a claim of appeal waiver, “we must\nconfirm that the [issue raised on] appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that\nboth the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily.\nEven when these conditions are met, however, we will not enforce a waiver where to\ndo so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Andis, 333 F.3d at 889-90; see United\nStates v. Fonseca, 790 F.3d 852, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n In this case, Floyd waived the right to directly appeal but “reserve[d] the right\nto appeal from a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum,” and he waived the\nright to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence “except for claims based on\nIneffective assistance of counsel which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\nwaiver.” Plea Agreement par. 7 (emphasis added). This limited ineffective assistance\nexception reflected our decision in DeRoo and other cases:\n\n A decision to enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing and\n voluntary when the plea agreement itself is the result of advice outside\n the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . .\n\n\n -3-\n\f A defendant’s plea agreement waiver of the right to seek section 2255\n post-conviction relief does not waive defendant’s right to argue,\n pursuant to that section, that the decision to enter into the plea was not\n knowing and voluntary because it was the result of ineffective assistance\n of counsel.\n\n223 F.3d at 923-24 (citations and quotation omitted), cited in Andis, 333 F.3d at 890.\nAbsent a broader exception, the merits of other ineffective assistance arguments were\nwithin the scope of Floyd’s § 2255 waiver. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d\n911, 916 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2001).\n\n In the district court and on appeal, Floyd did not contend that his Plea\nAgreement or the Paragraph 7 appeal waivers were not knowing and voluntary. Thus,\nhis claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice\nof appeal fell squarely within the terms of his knowing and voluntary § 2255 appeal\nwaiver. There is no finding that “counsel’s deficient performance deprive[d Floyd]\nof an appeal he otherwise would have taken.” Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 747\n(2019) (quotation omitted). Any appeal from the district court’s failure to conduct\nde novo resentencing is precluded by his § 2255 appeal waiver. And there can be no\nclaim that enforcing this waiver against the de novo resentencing claim will result in\na miscarriage of justice: the direct appeal that counsel failed to file would have been\nsquarely precluded by Floyd’s direct appeal waiver, which reserved only the right to\nappeal from a sentence which exceeded the statutory maximum. For these reasons,\nthe Paragraph 7 appeal waivers foreclose this appeal.\n\n In responding to the government’s appeal waiver argument on appeal, Floyd\nargued a different ineffective assistance theory -- “his attorney failed to object to\napplication of the [Guidelines] career-offender enhancement at sentencing.” But the\n§ 2255 appeal waiver forecloses this argument as well. This claim does not allege\nineffective assistance that challenges “the validity of the guilty plea or this waiver.”\nAnd a claim of ineffective assistance alleging that counsel failed to challenge a\n\n -4-\n\fguidelines enhancement is foreclosed by Paragraph 7. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 892\n(allegation that sentencing judge misapplied the Guidelines is subject to a valid\nappeal waiver if the resulting sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for the\noffense of conviction).\n\n Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 894.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Marcus FLOYD, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2178\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Marcus Floyd\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nLOKEN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Marcus Floyd pleaded guilty in March 2014 to one count of possession of\\nmethamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As\\nrelevant here, Paragraph 7 of the Plea Agreement provided that Floyd:\\n\\n knowingly and voluntarily agrees and understands the following\\n appellate and post-conviction terms of this agreement:\\n\\f a. the defendant waives the right to directly appeal the\\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291\\n and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a);\\n\\n b. the defendant reserves the right to appeal from a\\n sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum;\\n\\n d. the defendant waives the right to collaterally attack the\\n conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,\\n except for claims based on Ineffective assistance of counsel\\n which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\\n waiver.\\n\\nAt sentencing, the district court1 determined that Floyd’s advisory guidelines\\nsentencing range was 151 to 188 months in prison. Varying downwards, the court\\nimposed a 140-month sentence. Floyd did not appeal the conviction or sentence.\\n\\n In February 2015, Floyd filed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence under 28\\nU.S.C. § 2255, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney\\nfailed to appeal the original judgment as Floyd directed. Floyd’s trial counsel passed\\naway before a scheduled evidentiary hearing on this claim. In February 2018, the\\ndistrict court concluded that an evidentiary hearing without counsel present “would\\nwaste judicial resources,” granted the § 2255 motion on the ground that trial counsel\\n“failed to file a notice of appeal as directed,” and ordered that Floyd “be resentenced\\nso as to allow him the opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal.”\\n\\n At the May 2018 resentencing, the district court noted that, “when a defendant\\nhas been unconstitutionally deprived of an appellate review due to defense counsel’s\\nfailure to file an appeal, the prescribed remedy is for the court to vacate the\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fdefendant’s sentence and then reimpose it, allowing him to appeal the new sentence.”\\nSee United States v. Prado, 204 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the\\ndistrict court declined to consider new objections to the initial Presentence\\nInvestigation Report, denied Floyd’s request for de novo resentencing, and reimposed\\nthe original 140-month sentence, concluding it was appropriate in light of the 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a) factors considered at the original sentencing hearing. Floyd\\nappeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for de\\nnovo resentencing. We conclude that Floyd’s appeal waivers control this issue and\\ndismiss the appeal.\\n\\n “As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights,” United\\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), which includes the right\\nto waive “section 2255 collateral-attack rights.” DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d\\n919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000). When reviewing a claim of appeal waiver, “we must\\nconfirm that the [issue raised on] appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that\\nboth the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily.\\nEven when these conditions are met, however, we will not enforce a waiver where to\\ndo so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Andis, 333 F.3d at 889-90; see United\\nStates v. Fonseca, 790 F.3d 852, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n In this case, Floyd waived the right to directly appeal but “reserve[d] the right\\nto appeal from a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum,” and he waived the\\nright to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence “except for claims based on\\nIneffective assistance of counsel which challenge the validity of the guilty plea or this\\nwaiver.” Plea Agreement par. 7 (emphasis added). This limited ineffective assistance\\nexception reflected our decision in DeRoo and other cases:\\n\\n A decision to enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing and\\n voluntary when the plea agreement itself is the result of advice outside\\n the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . .\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f A defendant’s plea agreement waiver of the right to seek section 2255\\n post-conviction relief does not waive defendant’s right to argue,\\n pursuant to that section, that the decision to enter into the plea was not\\n knowing and voluntary because it was the result of ineffective assistance\\n of counsel.\\n\\n223 F.3d at 923-24 (citations and quotation omitted), cited in Andis, 333 F.3d at 890.\\nAbsent a broader exception, the merits of other ineffective assistance arguments were\\nwithin the scope of Floyd’s § 2255 waiver. See United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d\\n911, 916 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n\\n In the district court and on appeal, Floyd did not contend that his Plea\\nAgreement or the Paragraph 7 appeal waivers were not knowing and voluntary. Thus,\\nhis claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice\\nof appeal fell squarely within the terms of his knowing and voluntary § 2255 appeal\\nwaiver. There is no finding that “counsel’s deficient performance deprive[d Floyd]\\nof an appeal he otherwise would have taken.” Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 747\\n(2019) (quotation omitted). Any appeal from the district court’s failure to conduct\\nde novo resentencing is precluded by his § 2255 appeal waiver. And there can be no\\nclaim that enforcing this waiver against the de novo resentencing claim will result in\\na miscarriage of justice: the direct appeal that counsel failed to file would have been\\nsquarely precluded by Floyd’s direct appeal waiver, which reserved only the right to\\nappeal from a sentence which exceeded the statutory maximum. For these reasons,\\nthe Paragraph 7 appeal waivers foreclose this appeal.\\n\\n In responding to the government’s appeal waiver argument on appeal, Floyd\\nargued a different ineffective assistance theory -- “his attorney failed to object to\\napplication of the [Guidelines] career-offender enhancement at sentencing.” But the\\n§ 2255 appeal waiver forecloses this argument as well. This claim does not allege\\nineffective assistance that challenges “the validity of the guilty plea or this waiver.”\\nAnd a claim of ineffective assistance alleging that counsel failed to challenge a\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fguidelines enhancement is foreclosed by Paragraph 7. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 892\\n(allegation that sentencing judge misapplied the Guidelines is subject to a valid\\nappeal waiver if the resulting sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for the\\noffense of conviction).\\n\\n Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 894.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3287,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642842,"string":"4,642,842"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lee HALL, III, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lee Hall, III"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3663"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gruender, Kelly, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3663\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lee Hall, III\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Lee Hall, III, appeals the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment imposed for\\nhis uncontested violation of one of his supervised release conditions. Hall argues the\\ndistrict court’s1 decision to vary upward from the recommended range in the U.S.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, then Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the Western District of Arkansas, now United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Arkansas.\\n\\fSentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) was reversible error. We disagree and\\naffirm.\\n\\n After serving 27 months of imprisonment for failure to register as a sex\\noffender, Hall was released from custody to five years of supervised release in late\\n2015. Beginning in July 2017, police in Fayetteville, Arkansas, began investigating\\na pimp who they ultimately determined to be Hall. This led to his arrest in August\\n2017. Hall’s federal probation officer then petitioned for a hearing, alleging Hall had\\nviolated his supervised release condition that prohibited commission of another\\nfederal, state, or local crime. At his hearing, Hall pled no contest to the allegation\\nthat he violated the law by promoting prostitution. Because this was a Grade B\\nviolation, the Guidelines recommended a revocation sentence of 8 to 14 months of\\nimprisonment. Both Hall and the Government recommended a sentence of 14\\nmonths. The district court rejected the joint recommendation and varied upward to\\n21 months of imprisonment, followed by no further supervised release.\\n\\n On appeal, Hall raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he argues the\\ndistrict court considered improper factors in determining his sentence. This argument\\nis premised on the requirement that when deciding whether to revoke a term of\\nsupervised release and require the defendant to serve all or part of the term in prison,\\nthe court is to consider those factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are listed in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e). Hall invites this court to pick his preferred side in a purported\\ncircuit split over whether a district court may also consider the remaining factors from\\n§ 3553(a) that are not listed in § 3583(e).2 Specifically, he argues the district court\\nimproperly considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Second, Hall argues\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) references all of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) with\\nthe exception of § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect\\nthe seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just\\npunishment for the offense”) and § 3553(a)(3) (“the kinds of sentences available”).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe district court failed to consider that this was his first violation of his supervised\\nrelease. Finally, he argues the district court erred in weighing the remaining factors.\\n\\n We review revocation sentences under the same deferential abuse of discretion\\nstandard that we apply to initial sentencing proceedings. United States v. Richey, 758\\nF.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014). Although revocation sentences are determined under\\nthe policy statements in Guidelines § 7 rather than the typical criminal Guidelines, we\\nhave given the same deference to sentences imposed under either regime. See, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Valure, 835 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2016); see also 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a)(4)(B) (requiring that courts consider “the applicable guidelines or policy\\nstatements” in any revocation sentence).\\n\\n Our analysis is performed in two steps: “first, [we review] for significant\\nprocedural error; and if there is none, for substantive reasonableness.” United States\\nv. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Williams, 624\\nF.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2010)). If an alleged procedural error was not raised in the\\ndistrict court, we review it for plain error. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\\n916 (8th Cir. 2009). If there is no procedural error, we then review a sentence for\\nreasonableness in relation to the advisory sentencing range and the factors from\\n§ 3553(a) that are cited in § 3583(e). See United States v. Nelson, 453 F.3d 1004,\\n1006 (8th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n Hall’s first argument invites us to follow what he characterizes as other\\ncircuits’ views on the use of the § 3553(a) factors not cited in § 3583(e). While it is\\ntrue this court once referenced a split among the circuits as to this issue, Martin, 757\\nF.3d at 780 n.2, it appears from recent clarifications in the Second and Fifth Circuits\\nthat the split may be ending.3 Like those circuits, we have found no error where the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Second Circuit recently clarified its position on this issue. It previously\\nsuggested in dicta that it would allow any use of the excluded factors in sentencing\\ndeterminations, but it has now clarified it would not apply such an approach when it\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdistrict court’s use of the excluded factors was “immaterial” and where it “focused\\nprimarily on [the defendant’s] history and characteristics.” Id. at 780.\\n\\n We note this issue could be raised either as the procedural error of considering\\nan improper factor or as the substantive error of giving significant weight to an\\nimproper factor in imposing a sentence. This court en banc has stated “[a] district\\ncourt abuses its discretion when it . . . ‘gives significant weight to an improper or\\nirrelevant factor.’” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d on\\nother grounds, 562 U.S. 1267 (2011)). We have treated the district court’s giving\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor as a substantive reasonableness\\nissue. See, e.g., United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1099 (8th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 2014). We leave for another\\nday the question of whether this error is better addressed as a procedural or\\nsubstantive error. See United States v. Dull, 641 F. App’x 669 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(unpublished); Martin, 757 F.3d at 780. Because Hall only raises the issue of\\nsubstantive reasonableness, and because the Government agrees with that\\ncharacterization of his appeal and with his assertion that abuse of discretion review\\napplies, we only review for substantive error.\\n\\n\\n\\nis dispositive in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45, 56–57 (2d\\nCir. 2017) (distinguishing United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2006)\\nby characterizing it as addressing whether a district court primarily relied on an\\nexcluded factor). This clarification is consistent with the statutory canon of expressio\\nunius est exclusio alterius. The statute’s express listing of all but two of the\\n§ 3553(a) factors necessarily excludes the omitted factors. See N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen.,\\nInc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (discussing expressio unius canon).\\n The Fifth Circuit also clarified it is not part of any circuit split on this issue.\\nIt previously suggested in dicta that it would prohibit any use of the excluded factors,\\nbut its more recent case law clarified it did not apply such a per se rule under the\\nstandard of review for sentencing appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 742\\nF.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Hall is correct that the district court sentenced him in part based on the need\\nto promote respect for the law, which is not a factor included for revocation\\nsentences. However, on abuse of discretion review for substantive reasonableness,\\nwe examine for whether the district court “g[ave] significant weight to an improper\\nor irrelevant factor.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (emphasis added). The district court\\nextensively discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense as compared to the\\ndefendant’s criminal history, both of which are permissible factors for revocation\\nsentences. Then, it mentioned the need to protect the public from further crimes and\\nthe need to promote respect for the law as additional reasons supporting its sentence.\\nConsequently, this is an instance of using an excluded factor only as an insignificant\\njustification. We see no substantive error in giving insignificant weight to the\\nexcluded factor. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n Hall’s second argument is mere disagreement with the weight the district court\\ngave to Hall’s record on supervised release. The district court noted Hall had been\\non supervised release for a year and a half before committing the instant violation.\\nThen, it weighed the fact this was Hall’s first offense since his release against the\\ncountervailing fact that this violation was another sex offense in a criminal history\\nincluding multiple sex offenses. While we have repeatedly stated that variances are\\nappropriate based on repeated violations of supervised release, see, for example,\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), we have never held that\\nvariances are prohibited on the first violation of supervised release. We also see no\\nreason to consider such a rule here because Hall’s criminal history included a prior\\ncount of promoting prostitution, and we agree with the district court that\\n“incarceration has not changed his conduct once he was released.” Thus, we see no\\nerror in the district court’s weighing of Hall’s record on supervised release.\\n\\n Finally, Hall’s argument about the weight assigned to appropriate factors in the\\nsentence has no merit. He is correct that the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment\\nwas a significant variance above the Guidelines range and was close to his original\\nsentence of 27 months. But he omits the countervailing fact that the district court\\n\\n -5-\\n\\falso ended supervised release, eliminating over three years of supervised release left\\nin his original sentence in favor of the 21 months of imprisonment. The district court\\nexplained its concerns with Hall’s repeated promotion of prostitution and related sex\\noffenses. Its conclusion that a sentence of further imprisonment would better reflect\\nHall’s record of intransigence than a sentence of further supervised release would is\\nreasonable. We see no error in the district court’s weighing of the factors.\\n\\n Because we see no error in the district court’s revocation sentence, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420095/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642842/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lee HALL, III, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3663\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Lee Hall, III\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n Lee Hall, III, appeals the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment imposed for\nhis uncontested violation of one of his supervised release conditions. Hall argues the\ndistrict court’s1 decision to vary upward from the recommended range in the U.S.\n\n 1\n The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, then Chief Judge, United States District\nCourt for the Western District of Arkansas, now United States District Judge for the\nWestern District of Arkansas.\n\fSentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) was reversible error. We disagree and\naffirm.\n\n After serving 27 months of imprisonment for failure to register as a sex\noffender, Hall was released from custody to five years of supervised release in late\n2015. Beginning in July 2017, police in Fayetteville, Arkansas, began investigating\na pimp who they ultimately determined to be Hall. This led to his arrest in August\n2017. Hall’s federal probation officer then petitioned for a hearing, alleging Hall had\nviolated his supervised release condition that prohibited commission of another\nfederal, state, or local crime. At his hearing, Hall pled no contest to the allegation\nthat he violated the law by promoting prostitution. Because this was a Grade B\nviolation, the Guidelines recommended a revocation sentence of 8 to 14 months of\nimprisonment. Both Hall and the Government recommended a sentence of 14\nmonths. The district court rejected the joint recommendation and varied upward to\n21 months of imprisonment, followed by no further supervised release.\n\n On appeal, Hall raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he argues the\ndistrict court considered improper factors in determining his sentence. This argument\nis premised on the requirement that when deciding whether to revoke a term of\nsupervised release and require the defendant to serve all or part of the term in prison,\nthe court is to consider those factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are listed in 18\nU.S.C. § 3583(e). Hall invites this court to pick his preferred side in a purported\ncircuit split over whether a district court may also consider the remaining factors from\n§ 3553(a) that are not listed in § 3583(e).2 Specifically, he argues the district court\nimproperly considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Second, Hall argues\n\n\n\n 2\n 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) references all of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) with\nthe exception of § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect\nthe seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just\npunishment for the offense”) and § 3553(a)(3) (“the kinds of sentences available”).\n\n -2-\n\fthe district court failed to consider that this was his first violation of his supervised\nrelease. Finally, he argues the district court erred in weighing the remaining factors.\n\n We review revocation sentences under the same deferential abuse of discretion\nstandard that we apply to initial sentencing proceedings. United States v. Richey, 758\nF.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014). Although revocation sentences are determined under\nthe policy statements in Guidelines § 7 rather than the typical criminal Guidelines, we\nhave given the same deference to sentences imposed under either regime. See, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Valure, 835 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2016); see also 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a)(4)(B) (requiring that courts consider “the applicable guidelines or policy\nstatements” in any revocation sentence).\n\n Our analysis is performed in two steps: “first, [we review] for significant\nprocedural error; and if there is none, for substantive reasonableness.” United States\nv. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Williams, 624\nF.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2010)). If an alleged procedural error was not raised in the\ndistrict court, we review it for plain error. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\n916 (8th Cir. 2009). If there is no procedural error, we then review a sentence for\nreasonableness in relation to the advisory sentencing range and the factors from\n§ 3553(a) that are cited in § 3583(e). See United States v. Nelson, 453 F.3d 1004,\n1006 (8th Cir. 2006).\n\n Hall’s first argument invites us to follow what he characterizes as other\ncircuits’ views on the use of the § 3553(a) factors not cited in § 3583(e). While it is\ntrue this court once referenced a split among the circuits as to this issue, Martin, 757\nF.3d at 780 n.2, it appears from recent clarifications in the Second and Fifth Circuits\nthat the split may be ending.3 Like those circuits, we have found no error where the\n\n\n 3\n The Second Circuit recently clarified its position on this issue. It previously\nsuggested in dicta that it would allow any use of the excluded factors in sentencing\ndeterminations, but it has now clarified it would not apply such an approach when it\n\n -3-\n\fdistrict court’s use of the excluded factors was “immaterial” and where it “focused\nprimarily on [the defendant’s] history and characteristics.” Id. at 780.\n\n We note this issue could be raised either as the procedural error of considering\nan improper factor or as the substantive error of giving significant weight to an\nimproper factor in imposing a sentence. This court en banc has stated “[a] district\ncourt abuses its discretion when it . . . ‘gives significant weight to an improper or\nirrelevant factor.’” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d on\nother grounds, 562 U.S. 1267 (2011)). We have treated the district court’s giving\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor as a substantive reasonableness\nissue. See, e.g., United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1099 (8th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 2014). We leave for another\nday the question of whether this error is better addressed as a procedural or\nsubstantive error. See United States v. Dull, 641 F. App’x 669 (8th Cir. 2016)\n(unpublished); Martin, 757 F.3d at 780. Because Hall only raises the issue of\nsubstantive reasonableness, and because the Government agrees with that\ncharacterization of his appeal and with his assertion that abuse of discretion review\napplies, we only review for substantive error.\n\n\n\nis dispositive in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45, 56–57 (2d\nCir. 2017) (distinguishing United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2006)\nby characterizing it as addressing whether a district court primarily relied on an\nexcluded factor). This clarification is consistent with the statutory canon of expressio\nunius est exclusio alterius. The statute’s express listing of all but two of the\n§ 3553(a) factors necessarily excludes the omitted factors. See N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen.,\nInc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (discussing expressio unius canon).\n The Fifth Circuit also clarified it is not part of any circuit split on this issue.\nIt previously suggested in dicta that it would prohibit any use of the excluded factors,\nbut its more recent case law clarified it did not apply such a per se rule under the\nstandard of review for sentencing appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 742\nF.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2015).\n\n -4-\n\f Hall is correct that the district court sentenced him in part based on the need\nto promote respect for the law, which is not a factor included for revocation\nsentences. However, on abuse of discretion review for substantive reasonableness,\nwe examine for whether the district court “g[ave] significant weight to an improper\nor irrelevant factor.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (emphasis added). The district court\nextensively discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense as compared to the\ndefendant’s criminal history, both of which are permissible factors for revocation\nsentences. Then, it mentioned the need to protect the public from further crimes and\nthe need to promote respect for the law as additional reasons supporting its sentence.\nConsequently, this is an instance of using an excluded factor only as an insignificant\njustification. We see no substantive error in giving insignificant weight to the\nexcluded factor. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.\n\n Hall’s second argument is mere disagreement with the weight the district court\ngave to Hall’s record on supervised release. The district court noted Hall had been\non supervised release for a year and a half before committing the instant violation.\nThen, it weighed the fact this was Hall’s first offense since his release against the\ncountervailing fact that this violation was another sex offense in a criminal history\nincluding multiple sex offenses. While we have repeatedly stated that variances are\nappropriate based on repeated violations of supervised release, see, for example,\nUnited States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), we have never held that\nvariances are prohibited on the first violation of supervised release. We also see no\nreason to consider such a rule here because Hall’s criminal history included a prior\ncount of promoting prostitution, and we agree with the district court that\n“incarceration has not changed his conduct once he was released.” Thus, we see no\nerror in the district court’s weighing of Hall’s record on supervised release.\n\n Finally, Hall’s argument about the weight assigned to appropriate factors in the\nsentence has no merit. He is correct that the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment\nwas a significant variance above the Guidelines range and was close to his original\nsentence of 27 months. But he omits the countervailing fact that the district court\n\n -5-\n\falso ended supervised release, eliminating over three years of supervised release left\nin his original sentence in favor of the 21 months of imprisonment. The district court\nexplained its concerns with Hall’s repeated promotion of prostitution and related sex\noffenses. Its conclusion that a sentence of further imprisonment would better reflect\nHall’s record of intransigence than a sentence of further supervised release would is\nreasonable. We see no error in the district court’s weighing of the factors.\n\n Because we see no error in the district court’s revocation sentence, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lee HALL, III, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3663\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lee Hall, III\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: November 12, 2018\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Lee Hall, III, appeals the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment imposed for\\nhis uncontested violation of one of his supervised release conditions. Hall argues the\\ndistrict court’s1 decision to vary upward from the recommended range in the U.S.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, then Chief Judge, United States District\\nCourt for the Western District of Arkansas, now United States District Judge for the\\nWestern District of Arkansas.\\n\\fSentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) was reversible error. We disagree and\\naffirm.\\n\\n After serving 27 months of imprisonment for failure to register as a sex\\noffender, Hall was released from custody to five years of supervised release in late\\n2015. Beginning in July 2017, police in Fayetteville, Arkansas, began investigating\\na pimp who they ultimately determined to be Hall. This led to his arrest in August\\n2017. Hall’s federal probation officer then petitioned for a hearing, alleging Hall had\\nviolated his supervised release condition that prohibited commission of another\\nfederal, state, or local crime. At his hearing, Hall pled no contest to the allegation\\nthat he violated the law by promoting prostitution. Because this was a Grade B\\nviolation, the Guidelines recommended a revocation sentence of 8 to 14 months of\\nimprisonment. Both Hall and the Government recommended a sentence of 14\\nmonths. The district court rejected the joint recommendation and varied upward to\\n21 months of imprisonment, followed by no further supervised release.\\n\\n On appeal, Hall raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he argues the\\ndistrict court considered improper factors in determining his sentence. This argument\\nis premised on the requirement that when deciding whether to revoke a term of\\nsupervised release and require the defendant to serve all or part of the term in prison,\\nthe court is to consider those factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are listed in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3583(e). Hall invites this court to pick his preferred side in a purported\\ncircuit split over whether a district court may also consider the remaining factors from\\n§ 3553(a) that are not listed in § 3583(e).2 Specifically, he argues the district court\\nimproperly considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A). Second, Hall argues\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) references all of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) with\\nthe exception of § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect\\nthe seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just\\npunishment for the offense”) and § 3553(a)(3) (“the kinds of sentences available”).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fthe district court failed to consider that this was his first violation of his supervised\\nrelease. Finally, he argues the district court erred in weighing the remaining factors.\\n\\n We review revocation sentences under the same deferential abuse of discretion\\nstandard that we apply to initial sentencing proceedings. United States v. Richey, 758\\nF.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2014). Although revocation sentences are determined under\\nthe policy statements in Guidelines § 7 rather than the typical criminal Guidelines, we\\nhave given the same deference to sentences imposed under either regime. See, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Valure, 835 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2016); see also 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3553(a)(4)(B) (requiring that courts consider “the applicable guidelines or policy\\nstatements” in any revocation sentence).\\n\\n Our analysis is performed in two steps: “first, [we review] for significant\\nprocedural error; and if there is none, for substantive reasonableness.” United States\\nv. Martin, 757 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Williams, 624\\nF.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2010)). If an alleged procedural error was not raised in the\\ndistrict court, we review it for plain error. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910,\\n916 (8th Cir. 2009). If there is no procedural error, we then review a sentence for\\nreasonableness in relation to the advisory sentencing range and the factors from\\n§ 3553(a) that are cited in § 3583(e). See United States v. Nelson, 453 F.3d 1004,\\n1006 (8th Cir. 2006).\\n\\n Hall’s first argument invites us to follow what he characterizes as other\\ncircuits’ views on the use of the § 3553(a) factors not cited in § 3583(e). While it is\\ntrue this court once referenced a split among the circuits as to this issue, Martin, 757\\nF.3d at 780 n.2, it appears from recent clarifications in the Second and Fifth Circuits\\nthat the split may be ending.3 Like those circuits, we have found no error where the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Second Circuit recently clarified its position on this issue. It previously\\nsuggested in dicta that it would allow any use of the excluded factors in sentencing\\ndeterminations, but it has now clarified it would not apply such an approach when it\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fdistrict court’s use of the excluded factors was “immaterial” and where it “focused\\nprimarily on [the defendant’s] history and characteristics.” Id. at 780.\\n\\n We note this issue could be raised either as the procedural error of considering\\nan improper factor or as the substantive error of giving significant weight to an\\nimproper factor in imposing a sentence. This court en banc has stated “[a] district\\ncourt abuses its discretion when it . . . ‘gives significant weight to an improper or\\nirrelevant factor.’” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en\\nbanc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d on\\nother grounds, 562 U.S. 1267 (2011)). We have treated the district court’s giving\\nsignificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor as a substantive reasonableness\\nissue. See, e.g., United States v. Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1099 (8th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 2014). We leave for another\\nday the question of whether this error is better addressed as a procedural or\\nsubstantive error. See United States v. Dull, 641 F. App’x 669 (8th Cir. 2016)\\n(unpublished); Martin, 757 F.3d at 780. Because Hall only raises the issue of\\nsubstantive reasonableness, and because the Government agrees with that\\ncharacterization of his appeal and with his assertion that abuse of discretion review\\napplies, we only review for substantive error.\\n\\n\\n\\nis dispositive in the case. See, e.g., United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45, 56–57 (2d\\nCir. 2017) (distinguishing United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2006)\\nby characterizing it as addressing whether a district court primarily relied on an\\nexcluded factor). This clarification is consistent with the statutory canon of expressio\\nunius est exclusio alterius. The statute’s express listing of all but two of the\\n§ 3553(a) factors necessarily excludes the omitted factors. See N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen.,\\nInc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (discussing expressio unius canon).\\n The Fifth Circuit also clarified it is not part of any circuit split on this issue.\\nIt previously suggested in dicta that it would prohibit any use of the excluded factors,\\nbut its more recent case law clarified it did not apply such a per se rule under the\\nstandard of review for sentencing appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 742\\nF.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f Hall is correct that the district court sentenced him in part based on the need\\nto promote respect for the law, which is not a factor included for revocation\\nsentences. However, on abuse of discretion review for substantive reasonableness,\\nwe examine for whether the district court “g[ave] significant weight to an improper\\nor irrelevant factor.” Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (emphasis added). The district court\\nextensively discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense as compared to the\\ndefendant’s criminal history, both of which are permissible factors for revocation\\nsentences. Then, it mentioned the need to protect the public from further crimes and\\nthe need to promote respect for the law as additional reasons supporting its sentence.\\nConsequently, this is an instance of using an excluded factor only as an insignificant\\njustification. We see no substantive error in giving insignificant weight to the\\nexcluded factor. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n Hall’s second argument is mere disagreement with the weight the district court\\ngave to Hall’s record on supervised release. The district court noted Hall had been\\non supervised release for a year and a half before committing the instant violation.\\nThen, it weighed the fact this was Hall’s first offense since his release against the\\ncountervailing fact that this violation was another sex offense in a criminal history\\nincluding multiple sex offenses. While we have repeatedly stated that variances are\\nappropriate based on repeated violations of supervised release, see, for example,\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), we have never held that\\nvariances are prohibited on the first violation of supervised release. We also see no\\nreason to consider such a rule here because Hall’s criminal history included a prior\\ncount of promoting prostitution, and we agree with the district court that\\n“incarceration has not changed his conduct once he was released.” Thus, we see no\\nerror in the district court’s weighing of Hall’s record on supervised release.\\n\\n Finally, Hall’s argument about the weight assigned to appropriate factors in the\\nsentence has no merit. He is correct that the sentence of 21 months of imprisonment\\nwas a significant variance above the Guidelines range and was close to his original\\nsentence of 27 months. But he omits the countervailing fact that the district court\\n\\n -5-\\n\\falso ended supervised release, eliminating over three years of supervised release left\\nin his original sentence in favor of the 21 months of imprisonment. The district court\\nexplained its concerns with Hall’s repeated promotion of prostitution and related sex\\noffenses. Its conclusion that a sentence of further imprisonment would better reflect\\nHall’s record of intransigence than a sentence of further supervised release would is\\nreasonable. We see no error in the district court’s weighing of the factors.\\n\\n Because we see no error in the district court’s revocation sentence, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3288,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642844,"string":"4,642,844"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Sandra LOVELACE ; Stephen Lovelace, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sandra Lovelace v. Washington Univ. School of Med"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3673"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Arnold, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3673\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Sandra Lovelace; Stephen Lovelace\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Washington University School of Medicine; Barnes-Jewish Hospital\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Sandra Lovelace sued her employers, Washington University School of\\nMedicine (WUSM) and Barnes Jewish Hospital (BJH), claiming they unlawfully\\nterminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical\\nLeave Act (FMLA) and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Lovelace’s\\n\\fhusband, Stephen, also sued for loss of consortium. The district court1 granted\\nsummary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH. We affirm.2\\n\\n I. Background\\n WUSM employed Lovelace as a Medical Assistant (MA) from November 2003\\nto August 5, 2015. MAs assist doctors’ clinical teams by performing non-medical\\ntasks such as scheduling, answering phones, and placing orders. Lovelace worked for\\none doctor’s team from November 2003 to 2007 and for a different doctor’s team\\nfrom 2007 to December 2014. Clinical Nurse Manager Paula Goldberg, a BJH\\nemployee, began supervising Lovelace in 2007, and MA Supervisor Dee Brinkley,\\na WUSM employee, also began supervising her in September 2014. In 2009,\\nLovelace applied for and received FMLA leave without incident. Both Goldberg and\\nBrinkley supervised Lovelace when the instant dispute arose.\\n\\n Beginning in December 2014, Lovelace stopped working for a single doctor’s\\nteam and started “floating” among different teams. Lovelace began to experience\\nproblems at work shortly after the switch from a single, permanent team placement\\nto several, temporary placements. On December 10, Lovelace was assigned to work\\nwith Dr. Douglas Adkins’s team. That same day, Lovelace left early due to back pain.\\nA few days later, after Lovelace had not returned to work, Goldberg e-mailed\\nLovelace advising her of the potential need to complete FMLA paperwork. Lovelace\\nsubsequently applied for and was granted FMLA leave.\\n\\n Initially, Lovelace planned to return from leave on February 9, 2015. That very\\nmorning, however, Lovelace e-mailed Goldberg that she would not be returning that\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\\n 2\\n Lovelace filed a motion to supplement the record after the instant case had\\nbeen appealed. We deny the motion, finding the record before us sufficient.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fday. Goldberg forwarded Lovelace’s e-mail to Brinkley. The two supervisors\\nexpressed frustration at the timing of Lovelace’s notice. In one e-mail, Goldberg\\nsuggested to Brinkley that she could hire someone else if Lovelace did not return in\\na month.\\n\\n Lovelace had back surgery on February 20. Though the surgery was successful,\\nLovelace required certain minor work accommodations, such as taking breaks to\\nstand, stretch, or walk. Lovelace returned to work on March 4, and Brinkley assigned\\nher back to Dr. Adkins’s team. However, Dr. Adkins’s team had recently hired an MA\\nnamed Angela Butcher, and once Butcher was trained, Lovelace began “floating”\\namong teams again.\\n\\n From April to July, Lovelace worked with Dr. Manik Amin and nurse Deb Orf.\\nLovelace apparently worked well with Dr. Amin’s team initially, but Orf soon began\\nreporting issues with Lovelace. Orf stated that Lovelace “would refuse to do tasks,\\nsometimes stating that she did not know how to do them.” Statement of Material\\nFacts, Decl. of Debbie Orf at 2, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-\\ncv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-10. Orf reported her concerns\\nto Brinkley, explaining “that it was more challenging to get the work done with Ms.\\nLovelace than without an MA at all,” and in July, she also reported her concerns to\\nGoldberg. Id. at 3.\\n\\n During Lovelace’s annual performance review in April 2015, Goldberg\\ndiscussed Lovelace’s performance following her return from FMLA leave. Goldberg\\nmentioned Lovelace’s frequent absences from her work station, but Lovelace\\nreminded Goldberg about her need to stand, stretch, and walk post-surgery. After\\ntheir meeting, Goldberg invited Lovelace to revise her evaluation to reflect more\\npositively on her performance, and Lovelace did so. Shortly thereafter, Lovelace met\\nwith Bob Barczewski, WUSM Director of Business Operations, to complain about\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fGoldberg’s treatment of her since her return. She also met with Human Resources\\nConsultant Sandra Sledge.\\n\\n In July 2015, Goldberg and Brinkley discussed Lovelace’s performance with\\nseveral of the hospital’s doctors and nurses. During one of these discussions, Dr.\\nBrian Van Tine reported that Lovelace, who is white, allegedly commented that a\\nblack coworker, Angela Butcher, did not like working with white people (“the\\nButcher comment”). On July 10, Goldberg e-mailed Sledge summarizing her concerns\\nabout Lovelace. Goldberg expressed her opinion that Lovelace was “not prepared for\\nthe demands of the [MA] position,” as the position’s requirements had “evolved” over\\ntime. Resp. to Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 7 at 1, Lovelace v. Washington Univ.\\nSch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017), ECF No. 51-8. She\\nexplained that Lovelace’s lack of readiness “cause[d] her to avoid work, push work\\noff and have others do the work” and suggested that Lovelace would be more\\neffective in “a less stressful, demanding position in another department.” Id. Finally,\\nGoldberg noted that she had “enough to fire [Lovelace],” and while she believed she\\ncould issue a written warning, she planned on issuing a verbal warning instead. Id.\\nSledge advised “pointing out to [Lovelace] the needs of the position and where she\\nis and is not meeting” expectations instead of suggesting a different position, and she\\nencouraged Goldberg to continue accommodating Lovelace’s “need for rest times\\n(within reason).” Id.\\n\\n On July 13, Goldberg, Brinkley, and Lovelace met to discuss Lovelace’s\\nperformance and conduct, and Goldberg specifically inquired about the Butcher\\ncomment. Lovelace denied making the comment and claimed her supervisors were\\naccusing her of racism. At her deposition, Lovelace admitted that no one had called\\nher a racist and that no “negative comments [were] ever made about [her] race or\\nethnicity in the workplace.” Statement of Material Facts, Dep. of Sandra Lovelace at\\n20, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fApr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-1. When asked how she had been a victim of racial\\ndiscrimination, she explained that she “was labeled a racist.” Id. at 14.\\n\\n Following the July 13 meeting, Lovelace met with Sledge to complain about\\nher supervisors allegedly labeling her a racist. She also claimed her supervisors were\\nretaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. Sledge began investigating Lovelace’s\\nclaims, but Lovelace, dissatisfied with Sledge’s review process, presented her\\ncomplaints directly to Human Resources Manager Leanne Stewart on July 21 and 24.\\nStewart ultimately concluded there had been no retaliation.\\n\\n Brinkley and Sledge scheduled a follow-up meeting with Lovelace for July 31\\nto again discuss her performance. Goldberg was not present. Brinkley presented\\nLovelace with a checklist of her duties to guide the discussion and reiterated the\\ncomplaints they had received from different teams. The criticism upset Lovelace, and\\nshe was unable to discuss the matters with Brinkley or Sledge. She was particularly\\nupset by Brinkley’s attempt to discuss performance issues with her after she had filed\\nan FMLA retaliation complaint. Lovelace asked to go home, and Sledge agreed.\\n\\n Shortly thereafter, Brinkley went to check on Lovelace at her work station.\\nAccording to Brinkley, when Lovelace saw her, she jumped, yelled at Brinkley not\\nto touch her and to get away from her, and called her “evil.” Lovelace v. Washington\\nUniv. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS, 2017 WL 5278118, at *2 (E.D. Mo.\\nNov. 13, 2017). A coworker also reported hearing Lovelace repeatedly yell “get away\\nfrom me” at Brinkley. Statement of Material Facts, Decl. of Natalie Taylor at 2,\\nLovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr.\\n14, 2017), ECF No. 38-9. This coworker described Lovelace’s behavior as “very\\nunprofessional and disruptive” and “out of control.” Id. By contrast, Lovelace\\nmaintained that she did not shout or scream during the incident. And, another witness,\\na nurse, told human resources (HR) that no one was shouting but that Lovelace was\\ncrying. Following the incident, Brinkley informed Sledge about the confrontation,\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fand Sledge sent Lovelace home. Lovelace asked whether she was being fired. Sledge\\nsaid no.\\n\\n That evening, Sledge e-mailed Barczewski to describe developments with\\nLovelace and to recommend placing Lovelace on leave. Barczewski notified Lovelace\\non August 2 that she was being placed on administrative leave. On August 4, Sledge,\\nStewart, Brinkley, and Goldberg met to discuss Lovelace’s status. The group\\nultimately decided to recommend Lovelace’s termination. The next day, Barczewski\\nterminated Lovelace. In his discharge letter, Barczewski said Lovelace’s July 31\\noffice behavior caused her termination. In his deposition, Barczewski explained that\\nwhile he had considered input from Stewart, Sledge, Brinkley, and Goldberg, it was\\nhis decision to terminate Lovelace and that he had written her discharge letter.\\n\\n Lovelace sued both WUSM and BJH following her termination, alleging\\nviolations of the FMLA and MHRA. Specifically, she alleged that WUSM and BJH\\nviolated the FMLA by retaliating against her for taking leave and violated the MHRA\\nby retaliating against her for making complaints about racial and disability\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n The district court treated WUSM and BJH as Lovelace’s joint employers and\\ngranted summary judgment in their favor. The court determined that Lovelace had\\nfailed to state a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, as she had not met her burden\\nof proving a causal connection between her termination and her FMLA leave. The\\ncourt noted that “[c]onsidering the record as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that\\nLovelace was terminated for unrelated intervening non-retaliatory reasons.” Lovelace,\\n2017 WL 5278118, at *5. The court also determined that Lovelace had failed to\\nestablish a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating retaliation based on a\\ncomplaint of racial or disability discrimination. The district court also denied\\nStephen’s loss of consortium claim on the basis that such a claim is “a derivative\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fclaim that arises out of the original injury to the spouse.” Id. at *7 (internal quotation\\nomitted).\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.\\n Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no\\n genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\n judgment as a matter of law. We consider the facts in the light most\\n favorable to [Lovelace] and give her the benefit of all reasonable\\n inferences in the record. There is no discrimination-case exception to a\\n district court’s power to grant summary judgment.\\n\\nEbersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).\\n\\n A. FMLA Discrimination Claim\\n On appeal, Lovelace renews her claims that WUSM and BJH terminated her\\nin retaliation for taking FMLA leave.\\n\\n The FMLA provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of\\n12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period” if the employee satisfies certain\\nstatutory requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA “makes it unlawful for an\\nemployer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to\\nexercise’ rights provided under the FMLA.” Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers,\\nInc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). One type\\nof FMLA claim that we have recognized\\n\\n arises when an employer takes adverse action against an employee\\n because the employee exercises rights to which he is entitled under the\\n FMLA. In this scenario, the employer does not prevent the employee\\n from receiving FMLA benefits. Rather, it is alleged that after the\\n employee exercised his statutory rights, the employer discriminated\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f against him in the terms and conditions of employment. An employee\\n making this type of claim must prove that the employer was motivated\\n by the employee’s exercise of rights under the FMLA. The textual basis\\n for such a claim is not well developed in our cases, but the claim likely\\n arises under the rule of § 2615(a)(1) that an employer may not interfere\\n with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise rights\\n defined by the FMLA.\\n\\nId. at 1006 (cleaned up).\\n\\n While the parties and district court refer to this type of claim as a retaliation\\nclaim, it is “more properly characterized as [a] discrimination claim.” Jackson v. City\\nof Hot Springs, 751 F.3d 855, 858 n.1 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at\\n1006). We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to FMLA\\ndiscrimination claims. Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1007. “To establish a prima facie case\\nof FMLA discrimination, an employee must show: (1) that he engaged in activity\\nprotected under the Act, (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action,\\nand (3) that a causal connection existed between the employee’s action and the\\nadverse employment action.” Id. The “employee must prove that [her] exercise of\\nFMLA rights ‘played a part’ in the employer’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n To establish causation, an employee must present “evidence that gives rise to\\nan inference of . . . a [discriminatory] motive.” Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp.\\nComm’n., 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002). Though temporal proximity between the\\nuse of leave and termination may establish a causal link between the two events, such\\nproximity is “rarely” sufficient by itself, id., unless the time relation is “extremely\\nclose.” Ebersole, 758 F.3d at 925. Furthermore, an employee’s use of FMLA does not\\ninsulate her from employment decisions that are based on grounds other than FMLA\\nusage. Id. at 923.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f Lovelace argues that the timing of her termination suggests retaliation. We\\ndisagree. The opposite is true. About nine months elapsed from the beginning of\\nLovelace’s FMLA leave and her termination and about five months between her\\nreturn from leave and her termination. “[W]e have [previously] determined that a\\none-month or two-month lag is too long [to establish a causal connection] absent\\nother evidence.” Id. at 925. Given the time span in this case, Lovelace was required\\nto present “something more” than temporal proximity. Sisk v. Picture People, Inc.,\\n669 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2012). Lovelace’s use of FMLA leave some half-year\\nprior to her termination is insufficient to show her termination was an act of\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n As additional evidence, Lovelace alleges that her supervisors conspired against\\nher to “create” performance issues justifying her termination. Appellants’ Br. at 28.\\nAs proof, Lovelace notes that she received positive evaluations during her prior years\\nof employment with WUSM and BJH. However, an employee’s prior satisfactory\\nservice does not insulate her from adverse consequences following a later lapse in\\nperformance. And, Lovelace presents no evidence that the performance and\\nbehavioral complaints voiced by her colleagues—in particular, Orf and Dr. Van\\nTine—were not genuine. These complaints, whether true or false, provided a\\nnondiscriminatory basis for Lovelace’s supervisors to discuss her work performance.\\nLovelace’s supervisors offered her the opportunity to revise her initially negative\\nperformance review. The events that followed the July 31 meeting have not been\\nshown to be related to Lovelace’s use of FMLA or any animus towards that use. The\\ndecision to terminate Lovelace based on the office incident may have been mistaken\\nor imprudent, but in order to be actionable, it must be shown to be connected to\\nLovelace’s use of FMLA leave. The record in this case simply does not establish this\\nconnection.\\n\\n Lovelace admits that she was unwilling to discuss her performance with Sledge\\nand Brinkley on July 31 and that she asked to be excused from the meeting.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fBarczewski’s August 5 termination letter identified Lovelace’s July 31post-meeting\\nbehavior as the cause for her termination. Lovelace does not dispute that Barczewski\\nwould have had the right to terminate her for the reported outburst.3\\n\\n Lovelace’s “intervening unprotected conduct”— i.e., her refusal to engage with\\nBrinkley and Sledge on July 31 and her subsequent outburst—ended any connection\\nthere might have between her FMLA leave and her eventual termination. See Kiel v.\\nSelect Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Although\\ncontesting an unlawful employment practice is protected conduct, the\\nanti-discrimination statutes do not insulate an employee from discipline for violating\\nthe employer’s rules or disrupting the workplace.”).\\n\\n The district court did not err in granting WUSM and BJH summary judgment\\non Lovelace’s FMLA discrimination claim.\\n\\n B. MHRA Retaliation Claim\\n The MHRA\\n\\n makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to retaliate or discriminate\\n in any manner against any other person because such person has\\n\\n 3\\n Lovelace argues “cat’s paw” retaliation in an attempt to establish the requisite\\nconnection between her FMLA leave and Barczewski’s decision to terminate her,\\nessentially arguing that Goldberg and Brinkley duped Barczewski into terminating\\nLovelace based on their “disgust” at her having taken FMLA leave. Appellants’ Br.\\nat 25. However, “cat’s paw” liability “requires that there be a person possessing both\\n(1) the necessary [discriminatory] animus and (2) influence, leverage or control over\\nthe decisionmaker, such that it could be said the decisionmaker was acting at the\\nperson’s bidding.” Edwards v. Lynch, 111 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 2015).\\nHere, among other things, there is no evidence that Barczewski did not terminate\\nLovelace of his own volition, based on the July 31 incident. In fact, Goldberg was not\\neven present at the July 31 meeting that precipitated Lovelace’s termination.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter. To establish a prima\\n facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)\\n he complained of discrimination; (2) the employer took adverse action\\n against him; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the complaint\\n and the adverse action.\\n\\nMcCrainey v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 752–53 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n2011) (internal quotation omitted). While “[a] retaliation claim is not conditioned on\\nthe success of the underlying discrimination or harassment claim,” the complaining\\nemployee must have “had a reasonable good faith belief that there were grounds for\\nthe claim of discrimination or harassment.” Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502\\nS.W.3d 38, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Minze v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 437\\nS.W.3d 271, 275–76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)). “[T]he success or failure of a retaliation\\nclaim is analytically divorced from the merits of the underlying discrimination or\\nharassment claim” “as long as” the employee had a reasonable good faith belief that\\nthere were grounds to bring the claim. McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d at 753 (quoting\\nWallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en\\nbanc)).\\n\\n Lovelace argues the district court erred by analyzing both her racial and\\ndisability discrimination claims on the basis of their underlying success. Lovelace\\nmisinterprets the district court’s analysis. Though Missouri law does not require an\\nemployee bringing an MHRA retaliation claim to be certain on the claim’s success,\\nit does require the employee to have “a reasonable good faith belief” that there are\\ngrounds for making the underlying discrimination claim. Soto, 502 S.W.3d at 48\\n(quoting Minze, 437 S.W.3d at 276). Determining whether such a belief existed\\nnecessarily requires some reference to the elements of the type of discrimination\\nalleged.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Lovelace claims that WUSM and BJH retaliated against her for complaining\\nof racial discrimination to HR. She explains that because “race [was] involved” in the\\nButcher comment, her complaint to HR about Brinkley’s questions related to the\\nButcher comment constituted a complaint about racial discrimination. Appellants’ Br.\\nat 33. Lovelace misunderstands what qualifies as racial discrimination by equating\\naccusations of racist behavior with racist behavior itself. However, “Missouri\\nprecedent interpreting discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ are confined to evaluating\\nwhether an employer’s conduct constituted discrimination of an employee because\\nof the color of [her] skin, as opposed to the substance of the employee’s beliefs\\n(accurate or inaccurate) on issues relating to ‘race.’” Shore v. Children’s Mercy\\nHosp., 477 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (second emphasis added). While\\n“falsely accusing someone of being a racist is morally wrong,” such accusations\\ncannot form the basis of an MHRA racial discrimination claim. Id. at 734. For\\npurposes of the MHRA, accusing an employee of racism does not constitute racial\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n Here, Lovelace does not claim that she was discriminated against “because of\\nthe color of [her] skin.” Id. at 735. Lovelace had no legitimate basis for believing\\nBrinkley was discriminating against her on the basis of her race when Brinkley asked\\nher whether she had made a comment based on Butcher’s race; therefore, Lovelace\\nalso had no legitimate basis for believing she had complained of racial discrimination\\nto HR. Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\\nconduct she opposed had constituted racial discrimination in violation of the MHRA,\\nher MHRA racial discrimination retaliation claim fails. See McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d\\nat 754.\\n\\n Lovelace’s disability discrimination retaliation claim similarly fails. We have\\nexplained that “[e]vidence of general temporary work restrictions, without more, is\\ninsufficient to constitute a disability,” Samuels v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\fF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2006),4 and Lovelace admits that she “complained to HR that\\nshe was being harassed by Goldberg regarding work place restrictions following a\\nsurgery.” Appellants’ Br. at 35 (emphasis added). Lovelace also admits that she was\\nnot disabled, and she does not allege that Goldberg regarded her as disabled.\\n\\n Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\\nconduct she opposed had constituted disability discrimination in violation of the\\nMHRA, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of\\nWUSM and BJH on Lovelace’s MHRA retaliation claim. See McCrainey, 337\\nS.W.3d at 754.\\n\\n C. Loss of Consortium\\n As Lovelace correctly notes, “[t]he District Court was required to dismiss the\\nloss of consortium claim brought by Ste[ph]en Lovelace because, under Missouri law,\\nit is a derivative spousal claim.” Appellants’ Br. at 36. Because we affirm the district\\ncourt’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH on the\\nretaliation claims, we likewise affirm its decision to dismiss Stephen’s loss of\\nconsortium claim.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Though Samuels is an ADA case, “[t]o the extent Missouri rulings have stated\\na test for determining disability from working, actual or perceived, they cite and\\nfollow Federal decisions.” Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 716\\n(W.D. Mo. 2018).\\n -13-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420097/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642844/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Sandra LOVELACE ; Stephen Lovelace, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3673\n ___________________________\n\n Sandra Lovelace; Stephen Lovelace\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n v.\n\n Washington University School of Medicine; Barnes-Jewish Hospital\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n Sandra Lovelace sued her employers, Washington University School of\nMedicine (WUSM) and Barnes Jewish Hospital (BJH), claiming they unlawfully\nterminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical\nLeave Act (FMLA) and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Lovelace’s\n\fhusband, Stephen, also sued for loss of consortium. The district court1 granted\nsummary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH. We affirm.2\n\n I. Background\n WUSM employed Lovelace as a Medical Assistant (MA) from November 2003\nto August 5, 2015. MAs assist doctors’ clinical teams by performing non-medical\ntasks such as scheduling, answering phones, and placing orders. Lovelace worked for\none doctor’s team from November 2003 to 2007 and for a different doctor’s team\nfrom 2007 to December 2014. Clinical Nurse Manager Paula Goldberg, a BJH\nemployee, began supervising Lovelace in 2007, and MA Supervisor Dee Brinkley,\na WUSM employee, also began supervising her in September 2014. In 2009,\nLovelace applied for and received FMLA leave without incident. Both Goldberg and\nBrinkley supervised Lovelace when the instant dispute arose.\n\n Beginning in December 2014, Lovelace stopped working for a single doctor’s\nteam and started “floating” among different teams. Lovelace began to experience\nproblems at work shortly after the switch from a single, permanent team placement\nto several, temporary placements. On December 10, Lovelace was assigned to work\nwith Dr. Douglas Adkins’s team. That same day, Lovelace left early due to back pain.\nA few days later, after Lovelace had not returned to work, Goldberg e-mailed\nLovelace advising her of the potential need to complete FMLA paperwork. Lovelace\nsubsequently applied for and was granted FMLA leave.\n\n Initially, Lovelace planned to return from leave on February 9, 2015. That very\nmorning, however, Lovelace e-mailed Goldberg that she would not be returning that\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\n 2\n Lovelace filed a motion to supplement the record after the instant case had\nbeen appealed. We deny the motion, finding the record before us sufficient.\n\n -2-\n\fday. Goldberg forwarded Lovelace’s e-mail to Brinkley. The two supervisors\nexpressed frustration at the timing of Lovelace’s notice. In one e-mail, Goldberg\nsuggested to Brinkley that she could hire someone else if Lovelace did not return in\na month.\n\n Lovelace had back surgery on February 20. Though the surgery was successful,\nLovelace required certain minor work accommodations, such as taking breaks to\nstand, stretch, or walk. Lovelace returned to work on March 4, and Brinkley assigned\nher back to Dr. Adkins’s team. However, Dr. Adkins’s team had recently hired an MA\nnamed Angela Butcher, and once Butcher was trained, Lovelace began “floating”\namong teams again.\n\n From April to July, Lovelace worked with Dr. Manik Amin and nurse Deb Orf.\nLovelace apparently worked well with Dr. Amin’s team initially, but Orf soon began\nreporting issues with Lovelace. Orf stated that Lovelace “would refuse to do tasks,\nsometimes stating that she did not know how to do them.” Statement of Material\nFacts, Decl. of Debbie Orf at 2, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-\ncv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-10. Orf reported her concerns\nto Brinkley, explaining “that it was more challenging to get the work done with Ms.\nLovelace than without an MA at all,” and in July, she also reported her concerns to\nGoldberg. Id. at 3.\n\n During Lovelace’s annual performance review in April 2015, Goldberg\ndiscussed Lovelace’s performance following her return from FMLA leave. Goldberg\nmentioned Lovelace’s frequent absences from her work station, but Lovelace\nreminded Goldberg about her need to stand, stretch, and walk post-surgery. After\ntheir meeting, Goldberg invited Lovelace to revise her evaluation to reflect more\npositively on her performance, and Lovelace did so. Shortly thereafter, Lovelace met\nwith Bob Barczewski, WUSM Director of Business Operations, to complain about\n\n\n\n -3-\n\fGoldberg’s treatment of her since her return. She also met with Human Resources\nConsultant Sandra Sledge.\n\n In July 2015, Goldberg and Brinkley discussed Lovelace’s performance with\nseveral of the hospital’s doctors and nurses. During one of these discussions, Dr.\nBrian Van Tine reported that Lovelace, who is white, allegedly commented that a\nblack coworker, Angela Butcher, did not like working with white people (“the\nButcher comment”). On July 10, Goldberg e-mailed Sledge summarizing her concerns\nabout Lovelace. Goldberg expressed her opinion that Lovelace was “not prepared for\nthe demands of the [MA] position,” as the position’s requirements had “evolved” over\ntime. Resp. to Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 7 at 1, Lovelace v. Washington Univ.\nSch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017), ECF No. 51-8. She\nexplained that Lovelace’s lack of readiness “cause[d] her to avoid work, push work\noff and have others do the work” and suggested that Lovelace would be more\neffective in “a less stressful, demanding position in another department.” Id. Finally,\nGoldberg noted that she had “enough to fire [Lovelace],” and while she believed she\ncould issue a written warning, she planned on issuing a verbal warning instead. Id.\nSledge advised “pointing out to [Lovelace] the needs of the position and where she\nis and is not meeting” expectations instead of suggesting a different position, and she\nencouraged Goldberg to continue accommodating Lovelace’s “need for rest times\n(within reason).” Id.\n\n On July 13, Goldberg, Brinkley, and Lovelace met to discuss Lovelace’s\nperformance and conduct, and Goldberg specifically inquired about the Butcher\ncomment. Lovelace denied making the comment and claimed her supervisors were\naccusing her of racism. At her deposition, Lovelace admitted that no one had called\nher a racist and that no “negative comments [were] ever made about [her] race or\nethnicity in the workplace.” Statement of Material Facts, Dep. of Sandra Lovelace at\n20, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo.\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fApr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-1. When asked how she had been a victim of racial\ndiscrimination, she explained that she “was labeled a racist.” Id. at 14.\n\n Following the July 13 meeting, Lovelace met with Sledge to complain about\nher supervisors allegedly labeling her a racist. She also claimed her supervisors were\nretaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. Sledge began investigating Lovelace’s\nclaims, but Lovelace, dissatisfied with Sledge’s review process, presented her\ncomplaints directly to Human Resources Manager Leanne Stewart on July 21 and 24.\nStewart ultimately concluded there had been no retaliation.\n\n Brinkley and Sledge scheduled a follow-up meeting with Lovelace for July 31\nto again discuss her performance. Goldberg was not present. Brinkley presented\nLovelace with a checklist of her duties to guide the discussion and reiterated the\ncomplaints they had received from different teams. The criticism upset Lovelace, and\nshe was unable to discuss the matters with Brinkley or Sledge. She was particularly\nupset by Brinkley’s attempt to discuss performance issues with her after she had filed\nan FMLA retaliation complaint. Lovelace asked to go home, and Sledge agreed.\n\n Shortly thereafter, Brinkley went to check on Lovelace at her work station.\nAccording to Brinkley, when Lovelace saw her, she jumped, yelled at Brinkley not\nto touch her and to get away from her, and called her “evil.” Lovelace v. Washington\nUniv. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS, 2017 WL 5278118, at *2 (E.D. Mo.\nNov. 13, 2017). A coworker also reported hearing Lovelace repeatedly yell “get away\nfrom me” at Brinkley. Statement of Material Facts, Decl. of Natalie Taylor at 2,\nLovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr.\n14, 2017), ECF No. 38-9. This coworker described Lovelace’s behavior as “very\nunprofessional and disruptive” and “out of control.” Id. By contrast, Lovelace\nmaintained that she did not shout or scream during the incident. And, another witness,\na nurse, told human resources (HR) that no one was shouting but that Lovelace was\ncrying. Following the incident, Brinkley informed Sledge about the confrontation,\n\n -5-\n\fand Sledge sent Lovelace home. Lovelace asked whether she was being fired. Sledge\nsaid no.\n\n That evening, Sledge e-mailed Barczewski to describe developments with\nLovelace and to recommend placing Lovelace on leave. Barczewski notified Lovelace\non August 2 that she was being placed on administrative leave. On August 4, Sledge,\nStewart, Brinkley, and Goldberg met to discuss Lovelace’s status. The group\nultimately decided to recommend Lovelace’s termination. The next day, Barczewski\nterminated Lovelace. In his discharge letter, Barczewski said Lovelace’s July 31\noffice behavior caused her termination. In his deposition, Barczewski explained that\nwhile he had considered input from Stewart, Sledge, Brinkley, and Goldberg, it was\nhis decision to terminate Lovelace and that he had written her discharge letter.\n\n Lovelace sued both WUSM and BJH following her termination, alleging\nviolations of the FMLA and MHRA. Specifically, she alleged that WUSM and BJH\nviolated the FMLA by retaliating against her for taking leave and violated the MHRA\nby retaliating against her for making complaints about racial and disability\ndiscrimination.\n\n The district court treated WUSM and BJH as Lovelace’s joint employers and\ngranted summary judgment in their favor. The court determined that Lovelace had\nfailed to state a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, as she had not met her burden\nof proving a causal connection between her termination and her FMLA leave. The\ncourt noted that “[c]onsidering the record as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that\nLovelace was terminated for unrelated intervening non-retaliatory reasons.” Lovelace,\n2017 WL 5278118, at *5. The court also determined that Lovelace had failed to\nestablish a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating retaliation based on a\ncomplaint of racial or disability discrimination. The district court also denied\nStephen’s loss of consortium claim on the basis that such a claim is “a derivative\n\n\n\n -6-\n\fclaim that arises out of the original injury to the spouse.” Id. at *7 (internal quotation\nomitted).\n\n II. Discussion\n\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.\n Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no\n genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\n judgment as a matter of law. We consider the facts in the light most\n favorable to [Lovelace] and give her the benefit of all reasonable\n inferences in the record. There is no discrimination-case exception to a\n district court’s power to grant summary judgment.\n\nEbersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).\n\n A. FMLA Discrimination Claim\n On appeal, Lovelace renews her claims that WUSM and BJH terminated her\nin retaliation for taking FMLA leave.\n\n The FMLA provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of\n12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period” if the employee satisfies certain\nstatutory requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA “makes it unlawful for an\nemployer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to\nexercise’ rights provided under the FMLA.” Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers,\nInc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). One type\nof FMLA claim that we have recognized\n\n arises when an employer takes adverse action against an employee\n because the employee exercises rights to which he is entitled under the\n FMLA. In this scenario, the employer does not prevent the employee\n from receiving FMLA benefits. Rather, it is alleged that after the\n employee exercised his statutory rights, the employer discriminated\n\n -7-\n\f against him in the terms and conditions of employment. An employee\n making this type of claim must prove that the employer was motivated\n by the employee’s exercise of rights under the FMLA. The textual basis\n for such a claim is not well developed in our cases, but the claim likely\n arises under the rule of § 2615(a)(1) that an employer may not interfere\n with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise rights\n defined by the FMLA.\n\nId. at 1006 (cleaned up).\n\n While the parties and district court refer to this type of claim as a retaliation\nclaim, it is “more properly characterized as [a] discrimination claim.” Jackson v. City\nof Hot Springs, 751 F.3d 855, 858 n.1 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at\n1006). We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to FMLA\ndiscrimination claims. Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1007. “To establish a prima facie case\nof FMLA discrimination, an employee must show: (1) that he engaged in activity\nprotected under the Act, (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action,\nand (3) that a causal connection existed between the employee’s action and the\nadverse employment action.” Id. The “employee must prove that [her] exercise of\nFMLA rights ‘played a part’ in the employer’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted).\n\n To establish causation, an employee must present “evidence that gives rise to\nan inference of . . . a [discriminatory] motive.” Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp.\nComm’n., 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002). Though temporal proximity between the\nuse of leave and termination may establish a causal link between the two events, such\nproximity is “rarely” sufficient by itself, id., unless the time relation is “extremely\nclose.” Ebersole, 758 F.3d at 925. Furthermore, an employee’s use of FMLA does not\ninsulate her from employment decisions that are based on grounds other than FMLA\nusage. Id. at 923.\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f Lovelace argues that the timing of her termination suggests retaliation. We\ndisagree. The opposite is true. About nine months elapsed from the beginning of\nLovelace’s FMLA leave and her termination and about five months between her\nreturn from leave and her termination. “[W]e have [previously] determined that a\none-month or two-month lag is too long [to establish a causal connection] absent\nother evidence.” Id. at 925. Given the time span in this case, Lovelace was required\nto present “something more” than temporal proximity. Sisk v. Picture People, Inc.,\n669 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2012). Lovelace’s use of FMLA leave some half-year\nprior to her termination is insufficient to show her termination was an act of\ndiscrimination.\n\n As additional evidence, Lovelace alleges that her supervisors conspired against\nher to “create” performance issues justifying her termination. Appellants’ Br. at 28.\nAs proof, Lovelace notes that she received positive evaluations during her prior years\nof employment with WUSM and BJH. However, an employee’s prior satisfactory\nservice does not insulate her from adverse consequences following a later lapse in\nperformance. And, Lovelace presents no evidence that the performance and\nbehavioral complaints voiced by her colleagues—in particular, Orf and Dr. Van\nTine—were not genuine. These complaints, whether true or false, provided a\nnondiscriminatory basis for Lovelace’s supervisors to discuss her work performance.\nLovelace’s supervisors offered her the opportunity to revise her initially negative\nperformance review. The events that followed the July 31 meeting have not been\nshown to be related to Lovelace’s use of FMLA or any animus towards that use. The\ndecision to terminate Lovelace based on the office incident may have been mistaken\nor imprudent, but in order to be actionable, it must be shown to be connected to\nLovelace’s use of FMLA leave. The record in this case simply does not establish this\nconnection.\n\n Lovelace admits that she was unwilling to discuss her performance with Sledge\nand Brinkley on July 31 and that she asked to be excused from the meeting.\n\n -9-\n\fBarczewski’s August 5 termination letter identified Lovelace’s July 31post-meeting\nbehavior as the cause for her termination. Lovelace does not dispute that Barczewski\nwould have had the right to terminate her for the reported outburst.3\n\n Lovelace’s “intervening unprotected conduct”— i.e., her refusal to engage with\nBrinkley and Sledge on July 31 and her subsequent outburst—ended any connection\nthere might have between her FMLA leave and her eventual termination. See Kiel v.\nSelect Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Although\ncontesting an unlawful employment practice is protected conduct, the\nanti-discrimination statutes do not insulate an employee from discipline for violating\nthe employer’s rules or disrupting the workplace.”).\n\n The district court did not err in granting WUSM and BJH summary judgment\non Lovelace’s FMLA discrimination claim.\n\n B. MHRA Retaliation Claim\n The MHRA\n\n makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to retaliate or discriminate\n in any manner against any other person because such person has\n\n 3\n Lovelace argues “cat’s paw” retaliation in an attempt to establish the requisite\nconnection between her FMLA leave and Barczewski’s decision to terminate her,\nessentially arguing that Goldberg and Brinkley duped Barczewski into terminating\nLovelace based on their “disgust” at her having taken FMLA leave. Appellants’ Br.\nat 25. However, “cat’s paw” liability “requires that there be a person possessing both\n(1) the necessary [discriminatory] animus and (2) influence, leverage or control over\nthe decisionmaker, such that it could be said the decisionmaker was acting at the\nperson’s bidding.” Edwards v. Lynch, 111 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 2015).\nHere, among other things, there is no evidence that Barczewski did not terminate\nLovelace of his own volition, based on the July 31 incident. In fact, Goldberg was not\neven present at the July 31 meeting that precipitated Lovelace’s termination.\n\n\n -10-\n\f opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter. To establish a prima\n facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)\n he complained of discrimination; (2) the employer took adverse action\n against him; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the complaint\n and the adverse action.\n\nMcCrainey v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 752–53 (Mo. Ct. App.\n2011) (internal quotation omitted). While “[a] retaliation claim is not conditioned on\nthe success of the underlying discrimination or harassment claim,” the complaining\nemployee must have “had a reasonable good faith belief that there were grounds for\nthe claim of discrimination or harassment.” Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502\nS.W.3d 38, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Minze v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 437\nS.W.3d 271, 275–76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)). “[T]he success or failure of a retaliation\nclaim is analytically divorced from the merits of the underlying discrimination or\nharassment claim” “as long as” the employee had a reasonable good faith belief that\nthere were grounds to bring the claim. McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d at 753 (quoting\nWallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2006), overruled on\nother grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en\nbanc)).\n\n Lovelace argues the district court erred by analyzing both her racial and\ndisability discrimination claims on the basis of their underlying success. Lovelace\nmisinterprets the district court’s analysis. Though Missouri law does not require an\nemployee bringing an MHRA retaliation claim to be certain on the claim’s success,\nit does require the employee to have “a reasonable good faith belief” that there are\ngrounds for making the underlying discrimination claim. Soto, 502 S.W.3d at 48\n(quoting Minze, 437 S.W.3d at 276). Determining whether such a belief existed\nnecessarily requires some reference to the elements of the type of discrimination\nalleged.\n\n\n\n\n -11-\n\f Lovelace claims that WUSM and BJH retaliated against her for complaining\nof racial discrimination to HR. She explains that because “race [was] involved” in the\nButcher comment, her complaint to HR about Brinkley’s questions related to the\nButcher comment constituted a complaint about racial discrimination. Appellants’ Br.\nat 33. Lovelace misunderstands what qualifies as racial discrimination by equating\naccusations of racist behavior with racist behavior itself. However, “Missouri\nprecedent interpreting discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ are confined to evaluating\nwhether an employer’s conduct constituted discrimination of an employee because\nof the color of [her] skin, as opposed to the substance of the employee’s beliefs\n(accurate or inaccurate) on issues relating to ‘race.’” Shore v. Children’s Mercy\nHosp., 477 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (second emphasis added). While\n“falsely accusing someone of being a racist is morally wrong,” such accusations\ncannot form the basis of an MHRA racial discrimination claim. Id. at 734. For\npurposes of the MHRA, accusing an employee of racism does not constitute racial\ndiscrimination.\n\n Here, Lovelace does not claim that she was discriminated against “because of\nthe color of [her] skin.” Id. at 735. Lovelace had no legitimate basis for believing\nBrinkley was discriminating against her on the basis of her race when Brinkley asked\nher whether she had made a comment based on Butcher’s race; therefore, Lovelace\nalso had no legitimate basis for believing she had complained of racial discrimination\nto HR. Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\nconduct she opposed had constituted racial discrimination in violation of the MHRA,\nher MHRA racial discrimination retaliation claim fails. See McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d\nat 754.\n\n Lovelace’s disability discrimination retaliation claim similarly fails. We have\nexplained that “[e]vidence of general temporary work restrictions, without more, is\ninsufficient to constitute a disability,” Samuels v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437\n\n\n\n -12-\n\fF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2006),4 and Lovelace admits that she “complained to HR that\nshe was being harassed by Goldberg regarding work place restrictions following a\nsurgery.” Appellants’ Br. at 35 (emphasis added). Lovelace also admits that she was\nnot disabled, and she does not allege that Goldberg regarded her as disabled.\n\n Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\nconduct she opposed had constituted disability discrimination in violation of the\nMHRA, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of\nWUSM and BJH on Lovelace’s MHRA retaliation claim. See McCrainey, 337\nS.W.3d at 754.\n\n C. Loss of Consortium\n As Lovelace correctly notes, “[t]he District Court was required to dismiss the\nloss of consortium claim brought by Ste[ph]en Lovelace because, under Missouri law,\nit is a derivative spousal claim.” Appellants’ Br. at 36. Because we affirm the district\ncourt’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH on the\nretaliation claims, we likewise affirm its decision to dismiss Stephen’s loss of\nconsortium claim.\n\n III. Conclusion\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Though Samuels is an ADA case, “[t]o the extent Missouri rulings have stated\na test for determining disability from working, actual or perceived, they cite and\nfollow Federal decisions.” Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 716\n(W.D. Mo. 2018).\n -13-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Sandra LOVELACE ; Stephen Lovelace, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3673\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Sandra Lovelace; Stephen Lovelace\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Washington University School of Medicine; Barnes-Jewish Hospital\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n Sandra Lovelace sued her employers, Washington University School of\\nMedicine (WUSM) and Barnes Jewish Hospital (BJH), claiming they unlawfully\\nterminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical\\nLeave Act (FMLA) and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Lovelace’s\\n\\fhusband, Stephen, also sued for loss of consortium. The district court1 granted\\nsummary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH. We affirm.2\\n\\n I. Background\\n WUSM employed Lovelace as a Medical Assistant (MA) from November 2003\\nto August 5, 2015. MAs assist doctors’ clinical teams by performing non-medical\\ntasks such as scheduling, answering phones, and placing orders. Lovelace worked for\\none doctor’s team from November 2003 to 2007 and for a different doctor’s team\\nfrom 2007 to December 2014. Clinical Nurse Manager Paula Goldberg, a BJH\\nemployee, began supervising Lovelace in 2007, and MA Supervisor Dee Brinkley,\\na WUSM employee, also began supervising her in September 2014. In 2009,\\nLovelace applied for and received FMLA leave without incident. Both Goldberg and\\nBrinkley supervised Lovelace when the instant dispute arose.\\n\\n Beginning in December 2014, Lovelace stopped working for a single doctor’s\\nteam and started “floating” among different teams. Lovelace began to experience\\nproblems at work shortly after the switch from a single, permanent team placement\\nto several, temporary placements. On December 10, Lovelace was assigned to work\\nwith Dr. Douglas Adkins’s team. That same day, Lovelace left early due to back pain.\\nA few days later, after Lovelace had not returned to work, Goldberg e-mailed\\nLovelace advising her of the potential need to complete FMLA paperwork. Lovelace\\nsubsequently applied for and was granted FMLA leave.\\n\\n Initially, Lovelace planned to return from leave on February 9, 2015. That very\\nmorning, however, Lovelace e-mailed Goldberg that she would not be returning that\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the Eastern District of Missouri.\\n 2\\n Lovelace filed a motion to supplement the record after the instant case had\\nbeen appealed. We deny the motion, finding the record before us sufficient.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fday. Goldberg forwarded Lovelace’s e-mail to Brinkley. The two supervisors\\nexpressed frustration at the timing of Lovelace’s notice. In one e-mail, Goldberg\\nsuggested to Brinkley that she could hire someone else if Lovelace did not return in\\na month.\\n\\n Lovelace had back surgery on February 20. Though the surgery was successful,\\nLovelace required certain minor work accommodations, such as taking breaks to\\nstand, stretch, or walk. Lovelace returned to work on March 4, and Brinkley assigned\\nher back to Dr. Adkins’s team. However, Dr. Adkins’s team had recently hired an MA\\nnamed Angela Butcher, and once Butcher was trained, Lovelace began “floating”\\namong teams again.\\n\\n From April to July, Lovelace worked with Dr. Manik Amin and nurse Deb Orf.\\nLovelace apparently worked well with Dr. Amin’s team initially, but Orf soon began\\nreporting issues with Lovelace. Orf stated that Lovelace “would refuse to do tasks,\\nsometimes stating that she did not know how to do them.” Statement of Material\\nFacts, Decl. of Debbie Orf at 2, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-\\ncv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-10. Orf reported her concerns\\nto Brinkley, explaining “that it was more challenging to get the work done with Ms.\\nLovelace than without an MA at all,” and in July, she also reported her concerns to\\nGoldberg. Id. at 3.\\n\\n During Lovelace’s annual performance review in April 2015, Goldberg\\ndiscussed Lovelace’s performance following her return from FMLA leave. Goldberg\\nmentioned Lovelace’s frequent absences from her work station, but Lovelace\\nreminded Goldberg about her need to stand, stretch, and walk post-surgery. After\\ntheir meeting, Goldberg invited Lovelace to revise her evaluation to reflect more\\npositively on her performance, and Lovelace did so. Shortly thereafter, Lovelace met\\nwith Bob Barczewski, WUSM Director of Business Operations, to complain about\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fGoldberg’s treatment of her since her return. She also met with Human Resources\\nConsultant Sandra Sledge.\\n\\n In July 2015, Goldberg and Brinkley discussed Lovelace’s performance with\\nseveral of the hospital’s doctors and nurses. During one of these discussions, Dr.\\nBrian Van Tine reported that Lovelace, who is white, allegedly commented that a\\nblack coworker, Angela Butcher, did not like working with white people (“the\\nButcher comment”). On July 10, Goldberg e-mailed Sledge summarizing her concerns\\nabout Lovelace. Goldberg expressed her opinion that Lovelace was “not prepared for\\nthe demands of the [MA] position,” as the position’s requirements had “evolved” over\\ntime. Resp. to Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 7 at 1, Lovelace v. Washington Univ.\\nSch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017), ECF No. 51-8. She\\nexplained that Lovelace’s lack of readiness “cause[d] her to avoid work, push work\\noff and have others do the work” and suggested that Lovelace would be more\\neffective in “a less stressful, demanding position in another department.” Id. Finally,\\nGoldberg noted that she had “enough to fire [Lovelace],” and while she believed she\\ncould issue a written warning, she planned on issuing a verbal warning instead. Id.\\nSledge advised “pointing out to [Lovelace] the needs of the position and where she\\nis and is not meeting” expectations instead of suggesting a different position, and she\\nencouraged Goldberg to continue accommodating Lovelace’s “need for rest times\\n(within reason).” Id.\\n\\n On July 13, Goldberg, Brinkley, and Lovelace met to discuss Lovelace’s\\nperformance and conduct, and Goldberg specifically inquired about the Butcher\\ncomment. Lovelace denied making the comment and claimed her supervisors were\\naccusing her of racism. At her deposition, Lovelace admitted that no one had called\\nher a racist and that no “negative comments [were] ever made about [her] race or\\nethnicity in the workplace.” Statement of Material Facts, Dep. of Sandra Lovelace at\\n20, Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo.\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fApr. 14, 2017), ECF No. 38-1. When asked how she had been a victim of racial\\ndiscrimination, she explained that she “was labeled a racist.” Id. at 14.\\n\\n Following the July 13 meeting, Lovelace met with Sledge to complain about\\nher supervisors allegedly labeling her a racist. She also claimed her supervisors were\\nretaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. Sledge began investigating Lovelace’s\\nclaims, but Lovelace, dissatisfied with Sledge’s review process, presented her\\ncomplaints directly to Human Resources Manager Leanne Stewart on July 21 and 24.\\nStewart ultimately concluded there had been no retaliation.\\n\\n Brinkley and Sledge scheduled a follow-up meeting with Lovelace for July 31\\nto again discuss her performance. Goldberg was not present. Brinkley presented\\nLovelace with a checklist of her duties to guide the discussion and reiterated the\\ncomplaints they had received from different teams. The criticism upset Lovelace, and\\nshe was unable to discuss the matters with Brinkley or Sledge. She was particularly\\nupset by Brinkley’s attempt to discuss performance issues with her after she had filed\\nan FMLA retaliation complaint. Lovelace asked to go home, and Sledge agreed.\\n\\n Shortly thereafter, Brinkley went to check on Lovelace at her work station.\\nAccording to Brinkley, when Lovelace saw her, she jumped, yelled at Brinkley not\\nto touch her and to get away from her, and called her “evil.” Lovelace v. Washington\\nUniv. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS, 2017 WL 5278118, at *2 (E.D. Mo.\\nNov. 13, 2017). A coworker also reported hearing Lovelace repeatedly yell “get away\\nfrom me” at Brinkley. Statement of Material Facts, Decl. of Natalie Taylor at 2,\\nLovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 4:15-cv-01694-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr.\\n14, 2017), ECF No. 38-9. This coworker described Lovelace’s behavior as “very\\nunprofessional and disruptive” and “out of control.” Id. By contrast, Lovelace\\nmaintained that she did not shout or scream during the incident. And, another witness,\\na nurse, told human resources (HR) that no one was shouting but that Lovelace was\\ncrying. Following the incident, Brinkley informed Sledge about the confrontation,\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fand Sledge sent Lovelace home. Lovelace asked whether she was being fired. Sledge\\nsaid no.\\n\\n That evening, Sledge e-mailed Barczewski to describe developments with\\nLovelace and to recommend placing Lovelace on leave. Barczewski notified Lovelace\\non August 2 that she was being placed on administrative leave. On August 4, Sledge,\\nStewart, Brinkley, and Goldberg met to discuss Lovelace’s status. The group\\nultimately decided to recommend Lovelace’s termination. The next day, Barczewski\\nterminated Lovelace. In his discharge letter, Barczewski said Lovelace’s July 31\\noffice behavior caused her termination. In his deposition, Barczewski explained that\\nwhile he had considered input from Stewart, Sledge, Brinkley, and Goldberg, it was\\nhis decision to terminate Lovelace and that he had written her discharge letter.\\n\\n Lovelace sued both WUSM and BJH following her termination, alleging\\nviolations of the FMLA and MHRA. Specifically, she alleged that WUSM and BJH\\nviolated the FMLA by retaliating against her for taking leave and violated the MHRA\\nby retaliating against her for making complaints about racial and disability\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n The district court treated WUSM and BJH as Lovelace’s joint employers and\\ngranted summary judgment in their favor. The court determined that Lovelace had\\nfailed to state a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, as she had not met her burden\\nof proving a causal connection between her termination and her FMLA leave. The\\ncourt noted that “[c]onsidering the record as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that\\nLovelace was terminated for unrelated intervening non-retaliatory reasons.” Lovelace,\\n2017 WL 5278118, at *5. The court also determined that Lovelace had failed to\\nestablish a genuine issue of material fact demonstrating retaliation based on a\\ncomplaint of racial or disability discrimination. The district court also denied\\nStephen’s loss of consortium claim on the basis that such a claim is “a derivative\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fclaim that arises out of the original injury to the spouse.” Id. at *7 (internal quotation\\nomitted).\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.\\n Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no\\n genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\n judgment as a matter of law. We consider the facts in the light most\\n favorable to [Lovelace] and give her the benefit of all reasonable\\n inferences in the record. There is no discrimination-case exception to a\\n district court’s power to grant summary judgment.\\n\\nEbersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).\\n\\n A. FMLA Discrimination Claim\\n On appeal, Lovelace renews her claims that WUSM and BJH terminated her\\nin retaliation for taking FMLA leave.\\n\\n The FMLA provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of\\n12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period” if the employee satisfies certain\\nstatutory requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA “makes it unlawful for an\\nemployer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to\\nexercise’ rights provided under the FMLA.” Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers,\\nInc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). One type\\nof FMLA claim that we have recognized\\n\\n arises when an employer takes adverse action against an employee\\n because the employee exercises rights to which he is entitled under the\\n FMLA. In this scenario, the employer does not prevent the employee\\n from receiving FMLA benefits. Rather, it is alleged that after the\\n employee exercised his statutory rights, the employer discriminated\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f against him in the terms and conditions of employment. An employee\\n making this type of claim must prove that the employer was motivated\\n by the employee’s exercise of rights under the FMLA. The textual basis\\n for such a claim is not well developed in our cases, but the claim likely\\n arises under the rule of § 2615(a)(1) that an employer may not interfere\\n with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise rights\\n defined by the FMLA.\\n\\nId. at 1006 (cleaned up).\\n\\n While the parties and district court refer to this type of claim as a retaliation\\nclaim, it is “more properly characterized as [a] discrimination claim.” Jackson v. City\\nof Hot Springs, 751 F.3d 855, 858 n.1 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at\\n1006). We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to FMLA\\ndiscrimination claims. Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1007. “To establish a prima facie case\\nof FMLA discrimination, an employee must show: (1) that he engaged in activity\\nprotected under the Act, (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action,\\nand (3) that a causal connection existed between the employee’s action and the\\nadverse employment action.” Id. The “employee must prove that [her] exercise of\\nFMLA rights ‘played a part’ in the employer’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n To establish causation, an employee must present “evidence that gives rise to\\nan inference of . . . a [discriminatory] motive.” Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp.\\nComm’n., 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002). Though temporal proximity between the\\nuse of leave and termination may establish a causal link between the two events, such\\nproximity is “rarely” sufficient by itself, id., unless the time relation is “extremely\\nclose.” Ebersole, 758 F.3d at 925. Furthermore, an employee’s use of FMLA does not\\ninsulate her from employment decisions that are based on grounds other than FMLA\\nusage. Id. at 923.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f Lovelace argues that the timing of her termination suggests retaliation. We\\ndisagree. The opposite is true. About nine months elapsed from the beginning of\\nLovelace’s FMLA leave and her termination and about five months between her\\nreturn from leave and her termination. “[W]e have [previously] determined that a\\none-month or two-month lag is too long [to establish a causal connection] absent\\nother evidence.” Id. at 925. Given the time span in this case, Lovelace was required\\nto present “something more” than temporal proximity. Sisk v. Picture People, Inc.,\\n669 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2012). Lovelace’s use of FMLA leave some half-year\\nprior to her termination is insufficient to show her termination was an act of\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n As additional evidence, Lovelace alleges that her supervisors conspired against\\nher to “create” performance issues justifying her termination. Appellants’ Br. at 28.\\nAs proof, Lovelace notes that she received positive evaluations during her prior years\\nof employment with WUSM and BJH. However, an employee’s prior satisfactory\\nservice does not insulate her from adverse consequences following a later lapse in\\nperformance. And, Lovelace presents no evidence that the performance and\\nbehavioral complaints voiced by her colleagues—in particular, Orf and Dr. Van\\nTine—were not genuine. These complaints, whether true or false, provided a\\nnondiscriminatory basis for Lovelace’s supervisors to discuss her work performance.\\nLovelace’s supervisors offered her the opportunity to revise her initially negative\\nperformance review. The events that followed the July 31 meeting have not been\\nshown to be related to Lovelace’s use of FMLA or any animus towards that use. The\\ndecision to terminate Lovelace based on the office incident may have been mistaken\\nor imprudent, but in order to be actionable, it must be shown to be connected to\\nLovelace’s use of FMLA leave. The record in this case simply does not establish this\\nconnection.\\n\\n Lovelace admits that she was unwilling to discuss her performance with Sledge\\nand Brinkley on July 31 and that she asked to be excused from the meeting.\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fBarczewski’s August 5 termination letter identified Lovelace’s July 31post-meeting\\nbehavior as the cause for her termination. Lovelace does not dispute that Barczewski\\nwould have had the right to terminate her for the reported outburst.3\\n\\n Lovelace’s “intervening unprotected conduct”— i.e., her refusal to engage with\\nBrinkley and Sledge on July 31 and her subsequent outburst—ended any connection\\nthere might have between her FMLA leave and her eventual termination. See Kiel v.\\nSelect Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Although\\ncontesting an unlawful employment practice is protected conduct, the\\nanti-discrimination statutes do not insulate an employee from discipline for violating\\nthe employer’s rules or disrupting the workplace.”).\\n\\n The district court did not err in granting WUSM and BJH summary judgment\\non Lovelace’s FMLA discrimination claim.\\n\\n B. MHRA Retaliation Claim\\n The MHRA\\n\\n makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice to retaliate or discriminate\\n in any manner against any other person because such person has\\n\\n 3\\n Lovelace argues “cat’s paw” retaliation in an attempt to establish the requisite\\nconnection between her FMLA leave and Barczewski’s decision to terminate her,\\nessentially arguing that Goldberg and Brinkley duped Barczewski into terminating\\nLovelace based on their “disgust” at her having taken FMLA leave. Appellants’ Br.\\nat 25. However, “cat’s paw” liability “requires that there be a person possessing both\\n(1) the necessary [discriminatory] animus and (2) influence, leverage or control over\\nthe decisionmaker, such that it could be said the decisionmaker was acting at the\\nperson’s bidding.” Edwards v. Lynch, 111 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 2015).\\nHere, among other things, there is no evidence that Barczewski did not terminate\\nLovelace of his own volition, based on the July 31 incident. In fact, Goldberg was not\\neven present at the July 31 meeting that precipitated Lovelace’s termination.\\n\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter. To establish a prima\\n facie case of retaliation under the MHRA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)\\n he complained of discrimination; (2) the employer took adverse action\\n against him; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the complaint\\n and the adverse action.\\n\\nMcCrainey v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 337 S.W.3d 746, 752–53 (Mo. Ct. App.\\n2011) (internal quotation omitted). While “[a] retaliation claim is not conditioned on\\nthe success of the underlying discrimination or harassment claim,” the complaining\\nemployee must have “had a reasonable good faith belief that there were grounds for\\nthe claim of discrimination or harassment.” Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502\\nS.W.3d 38, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Minze v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 437\\nS.W.3d 271, 275–76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)). “[T]he success or failure of a retaliation\\nclaim is analytically divorced from the merits of the underlying discrimination or\\nharassment claim” “as long as” the employee had a reasonable good faith belief that\\nthere were grounds to bring the claim. McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d at 753 (quoting\\nWallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 2006), overruled on\\nother grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en\\nbanc)).\\n\\n Lovelace argues the district court erred by analyzing both her racial and\\ndisability discrimination claims on the basis of their underlying success. Lovelace\\nmisinterprets the district court’s analysis. Though Missouri law does not require an\\nemployee bringing an MHRA retaliation claim to be certain on the claim’s success,\\nit does require the employee to have “a reasonable good faith belief” that there are\\ngrounds for making the underlying discrimination claim. Soto, 502 S.W.3d at 48\\n(quoting Minze, 437 S.W.3d at 276). Determining whether such a belief existed\\nnecessarily requires some reference to the elements of the type of discrimination\\nalleged.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Lovelace claims that WUSM and BJH retaliated against her for complaining\\nof racial discrimination to HR. She explains that because “race [was] involved” in the\\nButcher comment, her complaint to HR about Brinkley’s questions related to the\\nButcher comment constituted a complaint about racial discrimination. Appellants’ Br.\\nat 33. Lovelace misunderstands what qualifies as racial discrimination by equating\\naccusations of racist behavior with racist behavior itself. However, “Missouri\\nprecedent interpreting discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ are confined to evaluating\\nwhether an employer’s conduct constituted discrimination of an employee because\\nof the color of [her] skin, as opposed to the substance of the employee’s beliefs\\n(accurate or inaccurate) on issues relating to ‘race.’” Shore v. Children’s Mercy\\nHosp., 477 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (second emphasis added). While\\n“falsely accusing someone of being a racist is morally wrong,” such accusations\\ncannot form the basis of an MHRA racial discrimination claim. Id. at 734. For\\npurposes of the MHRA, accusing an employee of racism does not constitute racial\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n Here, Lovelace does not claim that she was discriminated against “because of\\nthe color of [her] skin.” Id. at 735. Lovelace had no legitimate basis for believing\\nBrinkley was discriminating against her on the basis of her race when Brinkley asked\\nher whether she had made a comment based on Butcher’s race; therefore, Lovelace\\nalso had no legitimate basis for believing she had complained of racial discrimination\\nto HR. Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\\nconduct she opposed had constituted racial discrimination in violation of the MHRA,\\nher MHRA racial discrimination retaliation claim fails. See McCrainey, 337 S.W.3d\\nat 754.\\n\\n Lovelace’s disability discrimination retaliation claim similarly fails. We have\\nexplained that “[e]vidence of general temporary work restrictions, without more, is\\ninsufficient to constitute a disability,” Samuels v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\fF.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2006),4 and Lovelace admits that she “complained to HR that\\nshe was being harassed by Goldberg regarding work place restrictions following a\\nsurgery.” Appellants’ Br. at 35 (emphasis added). Lovelace also admits that she was\\nnot disabled, and she does not allege that Goldberg regarded her as disabled.\\n\\n Because Lovelace could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the\\nconduct she opposed had constituted disability discrimination in violation of the\\nMHRA, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of\\nWUSM and BJH on Lovelace’s MHRA retaliation claim. See McCrainey, 337\\nS.W.3d at 754.\\n\\n C. Loss of Consortium\\n As Lovelace correctly notes, “[t]he District Court was required to dismiss the\\nloss of consortium claim brought by Ste[ph]en Lovelace because, under Missouri law,\\nit is a derivative spousal claim.” Appellants’ Br. at 36. Because we affirm the district\\ncourt’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of WUSM and BJH on the\\nretaliation claims, we likewise affirm its decision to dismiss Stephen’s loss of\\nconsortium claim.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Though Samuels is an ADA case, “[t]o the extent Missouri rulings have stated\\na test for determining disability from working, actual or perceived, they cite and\\nfollow Federal decisions.” Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 716\\n(W.D. Mo. 2018).\\n -13-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3289,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642848,"string":"4,642,848"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Arthur Wayne BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. KANSAS CITY LIVE, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC, Doing Business as the Dubliner; First Response, Inc.; Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa, Defendants-Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Arthur Brown v. Kansas City Live, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2527"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2527\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Arthur Wayne Brown\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kansas City Live, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC;\\nDowntown Irish Pub, LLC, doing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc.;\\n Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The district court1 dismissed Arthur Brown’s lawsuit after concluding it was\\nbarred under the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Brown’s lawsuit stems from events that occurred at the Power and Light\\nDistrict in Kansas City, Missouri. After purchasing a few drinks at an outdoor bar,\\nBrown sought to enter the bar’s associated restaurant to use the bathroom. When he\\ncame out, three men told him he was trespassing and needed to leave. Brown alleges\\nthe men cursed at him, using racial slurs, and pushed Brown out of the restaurant.\\nBrown then walked directly to two nearby police officers and stated he wanted to file\\na complaint. The officers detained Brown at a security guard office and eventually\\nlet him go, after giving him a ticket for trespassing.\\n\\n Brown then filed a claim in Missouri state court against Kansas City Live,\\nLLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC,\\ndoing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc., Security Officer Rosenberger;\\nSecurity Officer Springer; and Mike Sosa (collectively “K.C. Live”) for assault,\\nbattery, false imprisonment, negligence, and malicious prosecution. After Brown’s\\nattorney did not timely respond to discovery requests, did not respond to a motion to\\ncompel, and violated that court’s order directing him to respond to the discovery\\nrequest, the state court sanctioned Brown. After continued failure by Brown’s\\nattorney to provide responses and to comply with court orders, the state court\\ndismissed the case with prejudice. Brown hired a new attorney and filed a motion to\\nreconsider, which was denied.\\n\\n Brown then filed this suit in federal court. The complaint alleged identical\\nfactual allegations, but sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. K.C. Live filed a joint\\nmotion to dismiss, which the district court granted after finding the claim was barred\\nby res judicata in light of the state court’s prior dismissal with prejudice. Brown filed\\na timely appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f II. Analysis\\n\\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\\nto state a claim based on res judicata . . . [and] accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations\\nas true.” Schwartz v. Bogen, 913 F.3d 777, 780–81 (8th Cir. 2019) (italics removed,\\nalteration in original) (quoting Laase v. Cnty. of Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir.\\n2011)). Res judicata operates so that “a final judgment on the merits of an action\\nprecludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have\\nbeen raised in that action.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Motie, 452 U.S. 394, 398\\n(1981). Federal courts are required “to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments\\nwhenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”\\nAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).\\n\\n As the judgment was issued by a Missouri court, Missouri res judicata law\\napplies. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 692 F.2d 393, 395–96 (8th Cir. 1982);\\nsee also Laase, 638 F.3d at 856 (“[T]he law of the forum that rendered the first\\njudgment controls the res judicata analysis.”). Under Missouri law “res judicata\\napplies where (1) ‘the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent\\njurisdiction, (2) the decision was the final judgment on the merits, and (3) the same\\ncause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases.’”\\nBannum, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting\\nBiermann v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 1999)). Res judicata\\nbars relitigation from the same “operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for\\nsuing” and applies “to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of\\nlitigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought\\nforward at that time.” Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d\\n315, 318 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting King Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized\\nChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. 1991) (en\\nbanc)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f There is no real dispute that the first two elements of res judicata are met. The\\nstate court had jurisdiction. The state court’s decision — which dismissed Brown’s\\ncase with prejudice — was a final judgment. In Missouri, a dismissal with prejudice\\nis considered a judgment “on the merits.” Greasel Conversion, Inc. v. Massa, 399\\nS.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 67.01 (stating “[a]\\ndismissal with prejudice bars the assertion of the same cause of action or claim\\nagainst the same party”); Williams v. Rape, 990 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);\\nMissouri ex rel. Willens v. Gray, 757 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).\\n\\n As to the third element, there is no dispute that the parties are the same in both\\ncases, but Brown does argue the present case arises from a different cause of action.\\nWe disagree. “Separate legal theories are not to be considered as separate claims,\\neven if ‘the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would\\nemphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of\\nliability or different kinds of relief.’” King Gen. Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 501\\n(quoting Siesta Manor, Inc. v. Cmty Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 835, 839\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319–20\\n(stating courts look to the “factual bases for the claims, not the legal theories” and\\nthat “[c]laim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim even though additional\\nor different evidence or legal theories might be advanced to support it”).\\n\\n Brown asserted in federal court the factual allegations verbatim from his state\\ncourt complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice. Brown argues the § 1981 claim\\nis a different cause of action from the state tort law claims because it has different\\nelements. While Brown is correct that the two claims have different elements, for the\\npurposes of res judicata “a court looks to the factual bases for the claims, not the legal\\ntheories.” Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319. No new facts were added to\\nthe federal claim and the allegations in both lawsuits arise from the same incident.\\n“In order for a subsequent claim on the same transaction to be considered [a] separate\\n[cause of action] . . . there must be new ultimate facts, as opposed to evidentiary\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fdetails, that form a new claim for relief.” Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,\\n242 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).\\n\\n Brown has asserted the same cause of action against the same party in federal\\ncourt that he did in the state court, which had jurisdiction and entered a final\\njudgment. Therefore, this suit is barred by res judicata.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420101/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRASZ, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MELLOY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642848/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Arthur Wayne BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. KANSAS CITY LIVE, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC, Doing Business as the Dubliner; First Response, Inc.; Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa, Defendants-Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2527\n ___________________________\n\n Arthur Wayne Brown\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Kansas City Live, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC;\nDowntown Irish Pub, LLC, doing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc.;\n Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\n\n The district court1 dismissed Arthur Brown’s lawsuit after concluding it was\nbarred under the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.\n\n 1\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\nDistrict of Missouri.\n\f I. Background\n\n Brown’s lawsuit stems from events that occurred at the Power and Light\nDistrict in Kansas City, Missouri. After purchasing a few drinks at an outdoor bar,\nBrown sought to enter the bar’s associated restaurant to use the bathroom. When he\ncame out, three men told him he was trespassing and needed to leave. Brown alleges\nthe men cursed at him, using racial slurs, and pushed Brown out of the restaurant.\nBrown then walked directly to two nearby police officers and stated he wanted to file\na complaint. The officers detained Brown at a security guard office and eventually\nlet him go, after giving him a ticket for trespassing.\n\n Brown then filed a claim in Missouri state court against Kansas City Live,\nLLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC,\ndoing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc., Security Officer Rosenberger;\nSecurity Officer Springer; and Mike Sosa (collectively “K.C. Live”) for assault,\nbattery, false imprisonment, negligence, and malicious prosecution. After Brown’s\nattorney did not timely respond to discovery requests, did not respond to a motion to\ncompel, and violated that court’s order directing him to respond to the discovery\nrequest, the state court sanctioned Brown. After continued failure by Brown’s\nattorney to provide responses and to comply with court orders, the state court\ndismissed the case with prejudice. Brown hired a new attorney and filed a motion to\nreconsider, which was denied.\n\n Brown then filed this suit in federal court. The complaint alleged identical\nfactual allegations, but sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. K.C. Live filed a joint\nmotion to dismiss, which the district court granted after finding the claim was barred\nby res judicata in light of the state court’s prior dismissal with prejudice. Brown filed\na timely appeal.\n\n\n\n\n -2-\n\f II. Analysis\n\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\nto state a claim based on res judicata . . . [and] accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations\nas true.” Schwartz v. Bogen, 913 F.3d 777, 780–81 (8th Cir. 2019) (italics removed,\nalteration in original) (quoting Laase v. Cnty. of Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir.\n2011)). Res judicata operates so that “a final judgment on the merits of an action\nprecludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have\nbeen raised in that action.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Motie, 452 U.S. 394, 398\n(1981). Federal courts are required “to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments\nwhenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”\nAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).\n\n As the judgment was issued by a Missouri court, Missouri res judicata law\napplies. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 692 F.2d 393, 395–96 (8th Cir. 1982);\nsee also Laase, 638 F.3d at 856 (“[T]he law of the forum that rendered the first\njudgment controls the res judicata analysis.”). Under Missouri law “res judicata\napplies where (1) ‘the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent\njurisdiction, (2) the decision was the final judgment on the merits, and (3) the same\ncause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases.’”\nBannum, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting\nBiermann v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 1999)). Res judicata\nbars relitigation from the same “operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for\nsuing” and applies “to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of\nlitigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought\nforward at that time.” Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d\n315, 318 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting King Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized\nChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. 1991) (en\nbanc)).\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f There is no real dispute that the first two elements of res judicata are met. The\nstate court had jurisdiction. The state court’s decision — which dismissed Brown’s\ncase with prejudice — was a final judgment. In Missouri, a dismissal with prejudice\nis considered a judgment “on the merits.” Greasel Conversion, Inc. v. Massa, 399\nS.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 67.01 (stating “[a]\ndismissal with prejudice bars the assertion of the same cause of action or claim\nagainst the same party”); Williams v. Rape, 990 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);\nMissouri ex rel. Willens v. Gray, 757 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).\n\n As to the third element, there is no dispute that the parties are the same in both\ncases, but Brown does argue the present case arises from a different cause of action.\nWe disagree. “Separate legal theories are not to be considered as separate claims,\neven if ‘the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would\nemphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of\nliability or different kinds of relief.’” King Gen. Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 501\n(quoting Siesta Manor, Inc. v. Cmty Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 835, 839\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319–20\n(stating courts look to the “factual bases for the claims, not the legal theories” and\nthat “[c]laim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim even though additional\nor different evidence or legal theories might be advanced to support it”).\n\n Brown asserted in federal court the factual allegations verbatim from his state\ncourt complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice. Brown argues the § 1981 claim\nis a different cause of action from the state tort law claims because it has different\nelements. While Brown is correct that the two claims have different elements, for the\npurposes of res judicata “a court looks to the factual bases for the claims, not the legal\ntheories.” Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319. No new facts were added to\nthe federal claim and the allegations in both lawsuits arise from the same incident.\n“In order for a subsequent claim on the same transaction to be considered [a] separate\n[cause of action] . . . there must be new ultimate facts, as opposed to evidentiary\n\n -4-\n\fdetails, that form a new claim for relief.” Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,\n242 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).\n\n Brown has asserted the same cause of action against the same party in federal\ncourt that he did in the state court, which had jurisdiction and entered a final\njudgment. Therefore, this suit is barred by res judicata.\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Arthur Wayne BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. KANSAS CITY LIVE, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC, Doing Business as the Dubliner; First Response, Inc.; Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa, Defendants-Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2527\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Arthur Wayne Brown\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Kansas City Live, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC;\\nDowntown Irish Pub, LLC, doing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc.;\\n Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Missouri - Western Division\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRASZ, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The district court1 dismissed Arthur Brown’s lawsuit after concluding it was\\nbarred under the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western\\nDistrict of Missouri.\\n\\f I. Background\\n\\n Brown’s lawsuit stems from events that occurred at the Power and Light\\nDistrict in Kansas City, Missouri. After purchasing a few drinks at an outdoor bar,\\nBrown sought to enter the bar’s associated restaurant to use the bathroom. When he\\ncame out, three men told him he was trespassing and needed to leave. Brown alleges\\nthe men cursed at him, using racial slurs, and pushed Brown out of the restaurant.\\nBrown then walked directly to two nearby police officers and stated he wanted to file\\na complaint. The officers detained Brown at a security guard office and eventually\\nlet him go, after giving him a ticket for trespassing.\\n\\n Brown then filed a claim in Missouri state court against Kansas City Live,\\nLLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC,\\ndoing business as The Dubliner; First Response, Inc., Security Officer Rosenberger;\\nSecurity Officer Springer; and Mike Sosa (collectively “K.C. Live”) for assault,\\nbattery, false imprisonment, negligence, and malicious prosecution. After Brown’s\\nattorney did not timely respond to discovery requests, did not respond to a motion to\\ncompel, and violated that court’s order directing him to respond to the discovery\\nrequest, the state court sanctioned Brown. After continued failure by Brown’s\\nattorney to provide responses and to comply with court orders, the state court\\ndismissed the case with prejudice. Brown hired a new attorney and filed a motion to\\nreconsider, which was denied.\\n\\n Brown then filed this suit in federal court. The complaint alleged identical\\nfactual allegations, but sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. K.C. Live filed a joint\\nmotion to dismiss, which the district court granted after finding the claim was barred\\nby res judicata in light of the state court’s prior dismissal with prejudice. Brown filed\\na timely appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f II. Analysis\\n\\n “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\\nto state a claim based on res judicata . . . [and] accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations\\nas true.” Schwartz v. Bogen, 913 F.3d 777, 780–81 (8th Cir. 2019) (italics removed,\\nalteration in original) (quoting Laase v. Cnty. of Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir.\\n2011)). Res judicata operates so that “a final judgment on the merits of an action\\nprecludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have\\nbeen raised in that action.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Motie, 452 U.S. 394, 398\\n(1981). Federal courts are required “to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments\\nwhenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”\\nAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).\\n\\n As the judgment was issued by a Missouri court, Missouri res judicata law\\napplies. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 692 F.2d 393, 395–96 (8th Cir. 1982);\\nsee also Laase, 638 F.3d at 856 (“[T]he law of the forum that rendered the first\\njudgment controls the res judicata analysis.”). Under Missouri law “res judicata\\napplies where (1) ‘the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent\\njurisdiction, (2) the decision was the final judgment on the merits, and (3) the same\\ncause of action and the same parties or their privies were involved in both cases.’”\\nBannum, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 195 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting\\nBiermann v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1056 (E.D. Mo. 1999)). Res judicata\\nbars relitigation from the same “operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for\\nsuing” and applies “to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of\\nlitigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought\\nforward at that time.” Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d\\n315, 318 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting King Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized\\nChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. 1991) (en\\nbanc)).\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f There is no real dispute that the first two elements of res judicata are met. The\\nstate court had jurisdiction. The state court’s decision — which dismissed Brown’s\\ncase with prejudice — was a final judgment. In Missouri, a dismissal with prejudice\\nis considered a judgment “on the merits.” Greasel Conversion, Inc. v. Massa, 399\\nS.W.3d 456, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 67.01 (stating “[a]\\ndismissal with prejudice bars the assertion of the same cause of action or claim\\nagainst the same party”); Williams v. Rape, 990 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);\\nMissouri ex rel. Willens v. Gray, 757 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).\\n\\n As to the third element, there is no dispute that the parties are the same in both\\ncases, but Brown does argue the present case arises from a different cause of action.\\nWe disagree. “Separate legal theories are not to be considered as separate claims,\\neven if ‘the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would\\nemphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of\\nliability or different kinds of relief.’” King Gen. Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 501\\n(quoting Siesta Manor, Inc. v. Cmty Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 835, 839\\n(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319–20\\n(stating courts look to the “factual bases for the claims, not the legal theories” and\\nthat “[c]laim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim even though additional\\nor different evidence or legal theories might be advanced to support it”).\\n\\n Brown asserted in federal court the factual allegations verbatim from his state\\ncourt complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice. Brown argues the § 1981 claim\\nis a different cause of action from the state tort law claims because it has different\\nelements. While Brown is correct that the two claims have different elements, for the\\npurposes of res judicata “a court looks to the factual bases for the claims, not the legal\\ntheories.” Chesterfield Village, Inc., 64 S.W.3d at 319. No new facts were added to\\nthe federal claim and the allegations in both lawsuits arise from the same incident.\\n“In order for a subsequent claim on the same transaction to be considered [a] separate\\n[cause of action] . . . there must be new ultimate facts, as opposed to evidentiary\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fdetails, that form a new claim for relief.” Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,\\n242 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).\\n\\n Brown has asserted the same cause of action against the same party in federal\\ncourt that he did in the state court, which had jurisdiction and entered a final\\njudgment. Therefore, this suit is barred by res judicata.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3290,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4642849,"string":"4,642,849"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"ADVANCE CONVEYING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Cross Claimant - Appellee v. LEMARTEC CORPORATION Cross Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Advance Conveying Technologies v. Lemartec Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2345"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Benton, Wollman, Grasz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2345\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Claimant - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lemartec Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, WOLLMAN, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following a four-day bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment in favor\\nof Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC (ACT), on ACT’s breach of contract\\nclaim against Lemartec Corporation (Lemartec). On appeal, Lemartec argues that the\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fdistrict court erred in concluding that Lemartec’s bid package was incorporated into\\nthe parties’ contract (the purchase order). Although we conclude that the bid package\\nwas not so incorporated in so many words, we nonetheless affirm the judgment,\\nbecause when the contract is considered in light of the usage-of-trade evidence that\\nthe district court found credible, there is no error in the determination that Lemartec\\nbreached the purchase order.\\n\\n Lemartec served as the general contractor for the construction of a chlor-alkali\\nproduction plant in Eddyville, Iowa. Chlor-alkali is an industrial process that uses\\nsalt and water for the production of chlorine, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, and\\nsodium hypochlorite. The Eddyville plant required a conveyor system that would\\ntransport salt from rail cars and semi-trucks into a storage facility and to the\\nproduction floor. BRPH Companies (BRPH) served as the architect for the project.\\n\\n Lemartec published a bid package to solicit bids for the conveyor system. The\\nbid package set forth certain responsibilities for the conveyor-system subcontractor.\\nIt required the submission of “engineering design drawings and shop detail drawings”\\nto the owner or the owner’s representative and disallowed the subcontractor from\\nstarting fabrication until it “received drawings marked ‘APPROVED’ or\\n‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” The bid package also required that the subcontractor\\nfollow certain design and construction codes, including the American Institute of\\nSteel Construction Code of Standard Practice for Steel Buildings and Bridges (AISC\\ncode). Lemartec accepted the revised bid proposal that ACT submitted pursuant to\\nthe bid package.\\n\\n Lemartec and ACT entered into the purchase order on December 18, 2013.\\nAttached to the purchase order and “forming a part of this Subcontract” were a\\n“Scope of Work Clarification” document and ACT’s bid proposal. The scope of work\\ndocument required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements” and “the\\nreasonable intent of the Architect/Engineer.” With respect to the delivery schedule,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fACT’s bid proposal provided four to six weeks for general arrangement “approval\\ndrawings,” two to three weeks for certified drawings, and sixteen to twenty weeks for\\nfabrication.\\n\\n ACT submitted its general arrangement drawings to Lemartec for approval on\\nJanuary 27, 2014. Lemartec stamped the drawings on January 28, 2014, as\\n“Reviewed by G.C.” and “Final Review pending AE of Record,” but neither Lemartec\\nnor the architect/engineer of record approved the drawings. The project was delayed\\nbased on the changes in boundary conditions that Lemartec communicated to ACT\\nthroughout the summer of 2014.2\\n\\n Lemartec directed ACT in September 2014 to immediately deliver components\\nfor installation. ACT protested that it had not yet received final approval of its\\ndesigns. ACT warned that expedited fabrication and delivery was not reasonable and\\nwould ultimately result in delays and the need for rework. Lemartec nonetheless\\n“required ACT to fabricate and ship product before the design was complete.” D. Ct.\\nOrder of May 21, 2018, at 3. After a delayed and problematic installation, the\\ncompany that Lemartec had hired to install the conveyor system filed suit against\\nLemartec and ACT, seeking payment for the additional work it was required to\\ncomplete. Lemartec and ACT filed cross-claims, which were amended or restated\\nafter Lemartec and the installer settled.\\n\\n With respect to its breach of contract claim, ACT argued that the purchase\\norder required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements,” which ACT\\nargued included the AISC code. Dr. George Wandling, a professional engineer\\nlicensed in Iowa, testified that the AISC code was the industry standard and that it\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Boundary conditions are the interfaces of the ACT system to other parts of the\\nplant, including the rail unload station, the salt building, the concrete piers, and the\\nfoundation.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\frequired Lemartec to approve ACT’s designs. Wandling explained that although\\nLemartec had reviewed ACT’s drawings in January 2014, neither Lemartec nor the\\narchitect had approved the drawings. Lemartec responded that the AISC code did not\\napply because the purchase order did not incorporate the bid package (which required\\nthe subcontractor to comply with the AISC code). Lemartec’s senior project manager\\nconceded that the purchase order required Lemartec to approve the general\\narrangement drawings, but asserted that Lemartec had done so in January 2014. The\\nproject manager testified that the purchase order delegated the role of\\narchitect/engineer to ACT and thus the parties’ contract did not contemplate approval\\nfrom BRPH.\\n\\n ACT presented evidence that fabrication and delivery of the conveyor system\\nwere delayed because the owner did not specify until June 2014 the exact location of\\nthe rail and the rail unload station or the contour of the slope between the rail station\\nand the salt building. ACT also established that Lemartec had implemented a fast-\\ntrack delivery methodology, arguing that Lemartec thus bore the risk of cost overruns\\nunder the AISC code. Lemartec reiterated that the AISC code did not apply because\\nit was not incorporated into the parties’ contract. According to Lemartec, it never\\nimplemented a fast-track delivery methodology, but merely pressured ACT to timely\\ndeliver the components.\\n\\n The district court concluded that “ACT proved that it had completed the work\\ncalled for by the purchase order of December 18, 2013; that it did not breach any\\nprovision of the contract; and that it had not been paid the amount of $317,467.07\\nLemartec owed it under the purchase order, as revised.” D. Ct. Order of May 21,\\n2018, at 4. The court found that “[t]he delays and need for onsite modifications were\\nthe direct result of Lemartec’s inadequate supervision and management of the\\nproject.” Id. at 3-4. The court ultimately concluded that ACT had acted reasonably\\nwhen it withheld fabrication pending Lemartec approval and that Lemartec had\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fimplemented a fast-track project delivery methodology when it insisted “that ACT\\nship fabricate[d] parts before the designs were finished.” Id. at 5.\\n\\n The central dispute on appeal is whether the district court determined that the\\nbid package was incorporated by reference into the purchase order or whether it\\ndetermined that the AISC code constituted a usage of trade that explained or\\nsupplemented the purchase order. The district court’s opinion indicates that it relied\\nupon Lemartec’s bid package in deciding that Lemartec’s approval was required\\nbefore fabrication could begin. In its findings of fact, the court employed the bid\\npackage’s language in explaining that “Lemartec neither marked the drawings\\n‘APPROVED’ or ‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” Id. at 3. In its conclusions of law, the\\ncourt stated:\\n\\n ACT was reasonable in expecting Lemartec to follow the procedure it\\n had specifically laid out in soliciting project bids and on which ACT had\\n relied in preparing its bid. Lemartec is bound by the words it used when\\n it made subcontractor fabrication dependent on Lemartec approval and\\n when it expressly stated that the terms of the bid package were included\\n in any subsequent subcontract.\\n\\nId. at 5. With the finding that Wandling’s testimony was “fully credible and\\npersuasive,” id. at 5-6, the opinion also indicates that the court credited Wandling’s\\ntestimony that the AISC code is a usage of trade that explained the term “applicable\\ncode requirements” or otherwise supplemented the purchase order. The parties agree\\nthat Iowa law applies to this diversity action. Whether a contract incorporates\\nextrinsic material is a legal question, Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 154\\n(Iowa 2007), that we review de novo, Acciona Windpower N. Am., LLC v. City of\\nWest Branch, 847 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2017). The existence and scope of a usage\\nof trade must be proved as facts. Iowa Code § 554.1303(3). We review factual\\nfindings for clear error. Acciona Windpower, 847 F.3d at 966.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Lemartec argues that the district court erred in holding that the bid package was\\nincorporated into the contract between Lemartec and ACT. “Under the doctrine of\\nincorporation, an extrinsic document becomes part of the contract by reference to that\\ndocument in the contract.” Longfellow, 737 N.W.2d at 154 (citing Hofmeyer v. Iowa\\nDist. Ct., 640 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Iowa 2001)). The contract must “make a clear and\\nspecific reference to an extrinsic document to incorporate the document into the\\ncontract.” Id. (citing In re Estate of Kokjohn, 531 N.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Iowa 1995)\\n(per curiam)). The purchase order here contains no clear and specific reference to the\\nbid package. ACT argues that the purchase-order terms “contract documents” and\\n“scope of work clarification” refer to the general requirements section of the bid\\npackage, but those terms are not sufficiently specific to establish that the parties\\nintended to include the bid package as a part of their contract. Moreover, it is\\nundisputed that the bid package was not included in the documents that the parties\\nattached to the purchase order and that “form[ed] part of this Subcontract.” We thus\\nconclude that the purchase order did not incorporate by reference the bid package.\\n\\n ACT argues that we should nonetheless affirm because it proved that the AISC\\ncode constituted a usage of trade that explained or supplemented the purchase order.\\nUnder Iowa law, terms of a contract “may not be contradicted by evidence of any\\nprior agreement” but they may be “explained or supplemented” by usage of trade.\\nIowa Code § 554.2202(1). “Usage of trade” is defined as “any practice or method of\\ndealing having such regularity of observance in a . . . trade as to justify an expectation\\nthat it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.” Id.\\n§ 554.1303(3). Accordingly, any “usage of trade” which the parties “are or should\\nbe aware” may supplement their agreement. Id. § 554.1303(4); C-Thru Container\\nCorp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1995).\\n\\n We conclude that the district court’s decision to credit Wandling’s testimony,\\ncoupled with its application of the AISC code, constituted a finding that the AISC\\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade. Wandling\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexplained that the AISC code applied to the construction of the conveyor system\\nbecause it was “a trade practice and . . . a standard and custom in the industry.”\\nAccording to Wandling, that code required Lemartec or the owner “to give their\\napproval that the design drawings [were] acceptable and [met] the specifications.”\\nWandling testified that Lemartec’s stamp of review did not constitute approval of\\nACT’s drawings:\\n\\n It is not a final review, and it is not an indication that the design has\\n been accepted by the owner and, in fact . . . the last sentence in the\\n stamp says, Final review pending by A/E of record. That’s the\\n architect/engineer of record, and in this case that would be BRPH.\\n\\nWandling further testified that when Lemartec in September 2014 ordered ACT to\\ncommence fabrication and to deliver parts to the site immediately, it implemented a\\nfast-track project delivery method, under which formal approval procedures were set\\naside to expedite the design, fabrication, and erection of the system. Wandling\\ntestified that the risk of field rework then falls to the owner under the AISC code.\\nThe district court cited the AISC code in support of its conclusion that Lemartec\\nassumed the cost overruns after it “implemented a fast-track project delivery\\nmethodology.” D. Ct. Order of May 21, 2018, at 5. The determination that the AISC\\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade is not clearly\\nerroneous, and we conclude that the court did not err in applying it to the facts of this\\ncase. Cf. Lesch v. United States, 612 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that\\na district court’s decision following a bench trial must “set forth its reasoning with\\nenough clarity that the appellate court may understand the basis of the decision”\\n(quoting Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 2009))).\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420102/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BENTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WOLLMAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRASZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642849/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: ADVANCE CONVEYING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Cross Claimant - Appellee v. LEMARTEC CORPORATION Cross Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2345\n ___________________________\n\n Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Claimant - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Lemartec Corporation\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Defendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\n ____________\n\n Submitted: May 15, 2019\n Filed: July 25, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore BENTON, WOLLMAN, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\n\n Following a four-day bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment in favor\nof Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC (ACT), on ACT’s breach of contract\nclaim against Lemartec Corporation (Lemartec). On appeal, Lemartec argues that the\n\n 1\n The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern\nDistrict of Iowa.\n\fdistrict court erred in concluding that Lemartec’s bid package was incorporated into\nthe parties’ contract (the purchase order). Although we conclude that the bid package\nwas not so incorporated in so many words, we nonetheless affirm the judgment,\nbecause when the contract is considered in light of the usage-of-trade evidence that\nthe district court found credible, there is no error in the determination that Lemartec\nbreached the purchase order.\n\n Lemartec served as the general contractor for the construction of a chlor-alkali\nproduction plant in Eddyville, Iowa. Chlor-alkali is an industrial process that uses\nsalt and water for the production of chlorine, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, and\nsodium hypochlorite. The Eddyville plant required a conveyor system that would\ntransport salt from rail cars and semi-trucks into a storage facility and to the\nproduction floor. BRPH Companies (BRPH) served as the architect for the project.\n\n Lemartec published a bid package to solicit bids for the conveyor system. The\nbid package set forth certain responsibilities for the conveyor-system subcontractor.\nIt required the submission of “engineering design drawings and shop detail drawings”\nto the owner or the owner’s representative and disallowed the subcontractor from\nstarting fabrication until it “received drawings marked ‘APPROVED’ or\n‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” The bid package also required that the subcontractor\nfollow certain design and construction codes, including the American Institute of\nSteel Construction Code of Standard Practice for Steel Buildings and Bridges (AISC\ncode). Lemartec accepted the revised bid proposal that ACT submitted pursuant to\nthe bid package.\n\n Lemartec and ACT entered into the purchase order on December 18, 2013.\nAttached to the purchase order and “forming a part of this Subcontract” were a\n“Scope of Work Clarification” document and ACT’s bid proposal. The scope of work\ndocument required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements” and “the\nreasonable intent of the Architect/Engineer.” With respect to the delivery schedule,\n\n -2-\n\fACT’s bid proposal provided four to six weeks for general arrangement “approval\ndrawings,” two to three weeks for certified drawings, and sixteen to twenty weeks for\nfabrication.\n\n ACT submitted its general arrangement drawings to Lemartec for approval on\nJanuary 27, 2014. Lemartec stamped the drawings on January 28, 2014, as\n“Reviewed by G.C.” and “Final Review pending AE of Record,” but neither Lemartec\nnor the architect/engineer of record approved the drawings. The project was delayed\nbased on the changes in boundary conditions that Lemartec communicated to ACT\nthroughout the summer of 2014.2\n\n Lemartec directed ACT in September 2014 to immediately deliver components\nfor installation. ACT protested that it had not yet received final approval of its\ndesigns. ACT warned that expedited fabrication and delivery was not reasonable and\nwould ultimately result in delays and the need for rework. Lemartec nonetheless\n“required ACT to fabricate and ship product before the design was complete.” D. Ct.\nOrder of May 21, 2018, at 3. After a delayed and problematic installation, the\ncompany that Lemartec had hired to install the conveyor system filed suit against\nLemartec and ACT, seeking payment for the additional work it was required to\ncomplete. Lemartec and ACT filed cross-claims, which were amended or restated\nafter Lemartec and the installer settled.\n\n With respect to its breach of contract claim, ACT argued that the purchase\norder required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements,” which ACT\nargued included the AISC code. Dr. George Wandling, a professional engineer\nlicensed in Iowa, testified that the AISC code was the industry standard and that it\n\n\n 2\n Boundary conditions are the interfaces of the ACT system to other parts of the\nplant, including the rail unload station, the salt building, the concrete piers, and the\nfoundation.\n\n -3-\n\frequired Lemartec to approve ACT’s designs. Wandling explained that although\nLemartec had reviewed ACT’s drawings in January 2014, neither Lemartec nor the\narchitect had approved the drawings. Lemartec responded that the AISC code did not\napply because the purchase order did not incorporate the bid package (which required\nthe subcontractor to comply with the AISC code). Lemartec’s senior project manager\nconceded that the purchase order required Lemartec to approve the general\narrangement drawings, but asserted that Lemartec had done so in January 2014. The\nproject manager testified that the purchase order delegated the role of\narchitect/engineer to ACT and thus the parties’ contract did not contemplate approval\nfrom BRPH.\n\n ACT presented evidence that fabrication and delivery of the conveyor system\nwere delayed because the owner did not specify until June 2014 the exact location of\nthe rail and the rail unload station or the contour of the slope between the rail station\nand the salt building. ACT also established that Lemartec had implemented a fast-\ntrack delivery methodology, arguing that Lemartec thus bore the risk of cost overruns\nunder the AISC code. Lemartec reiterated that the AISC code did not apply because\nit was not incorporated into the parties’ contract. According to Lemartec, it never\nimplemented a fast-track delivery methodology, but merely pressured ACT to timely\ndeliver the components.\n\n The district court concluded that “ACT proved that it had completed the work\ncalled for by the purchase order of December 18, 2013; that it did not breach any\nprovision of the contract; and that it had not been paid the amount of $317,467.07\nLemartec owed it under the purchase order, as revised.” D. Ct. Order of May 21,\n2018, at 4. The court found that “[t]he delays and need for onsite modifications were\nthe direct result of Lemartec’s inadequate supervision and management of the\nproject.” Id. at 3-4. The court ultimately concluded that ACT had acted reasonably\nwhen it withheld fabrication pending Lemartec approval and that Lemartec had\n\n\n\n -4-\n\fimplemented a fast-track project delivery methodology when it insisted “that ACT\nship fabricate[d] parts before the designs were finished.” Id. at 5.\n\n The central dispute on appeal is whether the district court determined that the\nbid package was incorporated by reference into the purchase order or whether it\ndetermined that the AISC code constituted a usage of trade that explained or\nsupplemented the purchase order. The district court’s opinion indicates that it relied\nupon Lemartec’s bid package in deciding that Lemartec’s approval was required\nbefore fabrication could begin. In its findings of fact, the court employed the bid\npackage’s language in explaining that “Lemartec neither marked the drawings\n‘APPROVED’ or ‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” Id. at 3. In its conclusions of law, the\ncourt stated:\n\n ACT was reasonable in expecting Lemartec to follow the procedure it\n had specifically laid out in soliciting project bids and on which ACT had\n relied in preparing its bid. Lemartec is bound by the words it used when\n it made subcontractor fabrication dependent on Lemartec approval and\n when it expressly stated that the terms of the bid package were included\n in any subsequent subcontract.\n\nId. at 5. With the finding that Wandling’s testimony was “fully credible and\npersuasive,” id. at 5-6, the opinion also indicates that the court credited Wandling’s\ntestimony that the AISC code is a usage of trade that explained the term “applicable\ncode requirements” or otherwise supplemented the purchase order. The parties agree\nthat Iowa law applies to this diversity action. Whether a contract incorporates\nextrinsic material is a legal question, Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 154\n(Iowa 2007), that we review de novo, Acciona Windpower N. Am., LLC v. City of\nWest Branch, 847 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2017). The existence and scope of a usage\nof trade must be proved as facts. Iowa Code § 554.1303(3). We review factual\nfindings for clear error. Acciona Windpower, 847 F.3d at 966.\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f Lemartec argues that the district court erred in holding that the bid package was\nincorporated into the contract between Lemartec and ACT. “Under the doctrine of\nincorporation, an extrinsic document becomes part of the contract by reference to that\ndocument in the contract.” Longfellow, 737 N.W.2d at 154 (citing Hofmeyer v. Iowa\nDist. Ct., 640 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Iowa 2001)). The contract must “make a clear and\nspecific reference to an extrinsic document to incorporate the document into the\ncontract.” Id. (citing In re Estate of Kokjohn, 531 N.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Iowa 1995)\n(per curiam)). The purchase order here contains no clear and specific reference to the\nbid package. ACT argues that the purchase-order terms “contract documents” and\n“scope of work clarification” refer to the general requirements section of the bid\npackage, but those terms are not sufficiently specific to establish that the parties\nintended to include the bid package as a part of their contract. Moreover, it is\nundisputed that the bid package was not included in the documents that the parties\nattached to the purchase order and that “form[ed] part of this Subcontract.” We thus\nconclude that the purchase order did not incorporate by reference the bid package.\n\n ACT argues that we should nonetheless affirm because it proved that the AISC\ncode constituted a usage of trade that explained or supplemented the purchase order.\nUnder Iowa law, terms of a contract “may not be contradicted by evidence of any\nprior agreement” but they may be “explained or supplemented” by usage of trade.\nIowa Code § 554.2202(1). “Usage of trade” is defined as “any practice or method of\ndealing having such regularity of observance in a . . . trade as to justify an expectation\nthat it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.” Id.\n§ 554.1303(3). Accordingly, any “usage of trade” which the parties “are or should\nbe aware” may supplement their agreement. Id. § 554.1303(4); C-Thru Container\nCorp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1995).\n\n We conclude that the district court’s decision to credit Wandling’s testimony,\ncoupled with its application of the AISC code, constituted a finding that the AISC\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade. Wandling\n\n -6-\n\fexplained that the AISC code applied to the construction of the conveyor system\nbecause it was “a trade practice and . . . a standard and custom in the industry.”\nAccording to Wandling, that code required Lemartec or the owner “to give their\napproval that the design drawings [were] acceptable and [met] the specifications.”\nWandling testified that Lemartec’s stamp of review did not constitute approval of\nACT’s drawings:\n\n It is not a final review, and it is not an indication that the design has\n been accepted by the owner and, in fact . . . the last sentence in the\n stamp says, Final review pending by A/E of record. That’s the\n architect/engineer of record, and in this case that would be BRPH.\n\nWandling further testified that when Lemartec in September 2014 ordered ACT to\ncommence fabrication and to deliver parts to the site immediately, it implemented a\nfast-track project delivery method, under which formal approval procedures were set\naside to expedite the design, fabrication, and erection of the system. Wandling\ntestified that the risk of field rework then falls to the owner under the AISC code.\nThe district court cited the AISC code in support of its conclusion that Lemartec\nassumed the cost overruns after it “implemented a fast-track project delivery\nmethodology.” D. Ct. Order of May 21, 2018, at 5. The determination that the AISC\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade is not clearly\nerroneous, and we conclude that the court did not err in applying it to the facts of this\ncase. Cf. Lesch v. United States, 612 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that\na district court’s decision following a bench trial must “set forth its reasoning with\nenough clarity that the appellate court may understand the basis of the decision”\n(quoting Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 2009))).\n\n The judgment is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: ADVANCE CONVEYING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Cross Claimant - Appellee v. LEMARTEC CORPORATION Cross Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2345\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Claimant - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Lemartec Corporation\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllCross Defendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: May 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 25, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore BENTON, WOLLMAN, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nWOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Following a four-day bench trial, the district court1 entered judgment in favor\\nof Advance Conveying Technologies, LLC (ACT), on ACT’s breach of contract\\nclaim against Lemartec Corporation (Lemartec). On appeal, Lemartec argues that the\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern\\nDistrict of Iowa.\\n\\fdistrict court erred in concluding that Lemartec’s bid package was incorporated into\\nthe parties’ contract (the purchase order). Although we conclude that the bid package\\nwas not so incorporated in so many words, we nonetheless affirm the judgment,\\nbecause when the contract is considered in light of the usage-of-trade evidence that\\nthe district court found credible, there is no error in the determination that Lemartec\\nbreached the purchase order.\\n\\n Lemartec served as the general contractor for the construction of a chlor-alkali\\nproduction plant in Eddyville, Iowa. Chlor-alkali is an industrial process that uses\\nsalt and water for the production of chlorine, caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, and\\nsodium hypochlorite. The Eddyville plant required a conveyor system that would\\ntransport salt from rail cars and semi-trucks into a storage facility and to the\\nproduction floor. BRPH Companies (BRPH) served as the architect for the project.\\n\\n Lemartec published a bid package to solicit bids for the conveyor system. The\\nbid package set forth certain responsibilities for the conveyor-system subcontractor.\\nIt required the submission of “engineering design drawings and shop detail drawings”\\nto the owner or the owner’s representative and disallowed the subcontractor from\\nstarting fabrication until it “received drawings marked ‘APPROVED’ or\\n‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” The bid package also required that the subcontractor\\nfollow certain design and construction codes, including the American Institute of\\nSteel Construction Code of Standard Practice for Steel Buildings and Bridges (AISC\\ncode). Lemartec accepted the revised bid proposal that ACT submitted pursuant to\\nthe bid package.\\n\\n Lemartec and ACT entered into the purchase order on December 18, 2013.\\nAttached to the purchase order and “forming a part of this Subcontract” were a\\n“Scope of Work Clarification” document and ACT’s bid proposal. The scope of work\\ndocument required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements” and “the\\nreasonable intent of the Architect/Engineer.” With respect to the delivery schedule,\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fACT’s bid proposal provided four to six weeks for general arrangement “approval\\ndrawings,” two to three weeks for certified drawings, and sixteen to twenty weeks for\\nfabrication.\\n\\n ACT submitted its general arrangement drawings to Lemartec for approval on\\nJanuary 27, 2014. Lemartec stamped the drawings on January 28, 2014, as\\n“Reviewed by G.C.” and “Final Review pending AE of Record,” but neither Lemartec\\nnor the architect/engineer of record approved the drawings. The project was delayed\\nbased on the changes in boundary conditions that Lemartec communicated to ACT\\nthroughout the summer of 2014.2\\n\\n Lemartec directed ACT in September 2014 to immediately deliver components\\nfor installation. ACT protested that it had not yet received final approval of its\\ndesigns. ACT warned that expedited fabrication and delivery was not reasonable and\\nwould ultimately result in delays and the need for rework. Lemartec nonetheless\\n“required ACT to fabricate and ship product before the design was complete.” D. Ct.\\nOrder of May 21, 2018, at 3. After a delayed and problematic installation, the\\ncompany that Lemartec had hired to install the conveyor system filed suit against\\nLemartec and ACT, seeking payment for the additional work it was required to\\ncomplete. Lemartec and ACT filed cross-claims, which were amended or restated\\nafter Lemartec and the installer settled.\\n\\n With respect to its breach of contract claim, ACT argued that the purchase\\norder required ACT to comply with “applicable code requirements,” which ACT\\nargued included the AISC code. Dr. George Wandling, a professional engineer\\nlicensed in Iowa, testified that the AISC code was the industry standard and that it\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Boundary conditions are the interfaces of the ACT system to other parts of the\\nplant, including the rail unload station, the salt building, the concrete piers, and the\\nfoundation.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\frequired Lemartec to approve ACT’s designs. Wandling explained that although\\nLemartec had reviewed ACT’s drawings in January 2014, neither Lemartec nor the\\narchitect had approved the drawings. Lemartec responded that the AISC code did not\\napply because the purchase order did not incorporate the bid package (which required\\nthe subcontractor to comply with the AISC code). Lemartec’s senior project manager\\nconceded that the purchase order required Lemartec to approve the general\\narrangement drawings, but asserted that Lemartec had done so in January 2014. The\\nproject manager testified that the purchase order delegated the role of\\narchitect/engineer to ACT and thus the parties’ contract did not contemplate approval\\nfrom BRPH.\\n\\n ACT presented evidence that fabrication and delivery of the conveyor system\\nwere delayed because the owner did not specify until June 2014 the exact location of\\nthe rail and the rail unload station or the contour of the slope between the rail station\\nand the salt building. ACT also established that Lemartec had implemented a fast-\\ntrack delivery methodology, arguing that Lemartec thus bore the risk of cost overruns\\nunder the AISC code. Lemartec reiterated that the AISC code did not apply because\\nit was not incorporated into the parties’ contract. According to Lemartec, it never\\nimplemented a fast-track delivery methodology, but merely pressured ACT to timely\\ndeliver the components.\\n\\n The district court concluded that “ACT proved that it had completed the work\\ncalled for by the purchase order of December 18, 2013; that it did not breach any\\nprovision of the contract; and that it had not been paid the amount of $317,467.07\\nLemartec owed it under the purchase order, as revised.” D. Ct. Order of May 21,\\n2018, at 4. The court found that “[t]he delays and need for onsite modifications were\\nthe direct result of Lemartec’s inadequate supervision and management of the\\nproject.” Id. at 3-4. The court ultimately concluded that ACT had acted reasonably\\nwhen it withheld fabrication pending Lemartec approval and that Lemartec had\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fimplemented a fast-track project delivery methodology when it insisted “that ACT\\nship fabricate[d] parts before the designs were finished.” Id. at 5.\\n\\n The central dispute on appeal is whether the district court determined that the\\nbid package was incorporated by reference into the purchase order or whether it\\ndetermined that the AISC code constituted a usage of trade that explained or\\nsupplemented the purchase order. The district court’s opinion indicates that it relied\\nupon Lemartec’s bid package in deciding that Lemartec’s approval was required\\nbefore fabrication could begin. In its findings of fact, the court employed the bid\\npackage’s language in explaining that “Lemartec neither marked the drawings\\n‘APPROVED’ or ‘APPROVED AS NOTED.’” Id. at 3. In its conclusions of law, the\\ncourt stated:\\n\\n ACT was reasonable in expecting Lemartec to follow the procedure it\\n had specifically laid out in soliciting project bids and on which ACT had\\n relied in preparing its bid. Lemartec is bound by the words it used when\\n it made subcontractor fabrication dependent on Lemartec approval and\\n when it expressly stated that the terms of the bid package were included\\n in any subsequent subcontract.\\n\\nId. at 5. With the finding that Wandling’s testimony was “fully credible and\\npersuasive,” id. at 5-6, the opinion also indicates that the court credited Wandling’s\\ntestimony that the AISC code is a usage of trade that explained the term “applicable\\ncode requirements” or otherwise supplemented the purchase order. The parties agree\\nthat Iowa law applies to this diversity action. Whether a contract incorporates\\nextrinsic material is a legal question, Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 154\\n(Iowa 2007), that we review de novo, Acciona Windpower N. Am., LLC v. City of\\nWest Branch, 847 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2017). The existence and scope of a usage\\nof trade must be proved as facts. Iowa Code § 554.1303(3). We review factual\\nfindings for clear error. Acciona Windpower, 847 F.3d at 966.\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Lemartec argues that the district court erred in holding that the bid package was\\nincorporated into the contract between Lemartec and ACT. “Under the doctrine of\\nincorporation, an extrinsic document becomes part of the contract by reference to that\\ndocument in the contract.” Longfellow, 737 N.W.2d at 154 (citing Hofmeyer v. Iowa\\nDist. Ct., 640 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Iowa 2001)). The contract must “make a clear and\\nspecific reference to an extrinsic document to incorporate the document into the\\ncontract.” Id. (citing In re Estate of Kokjohn, 531 N.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Iowa 1995)\\n(per curiam)). The purchase order here contains no clear and specific reference to the\\nbid package. ACT argues that the purchase-order terms “contract documents” and\\n“scope of work clarification” refer to the general requirements section of the bid\\npackage, but those terms are not sufficiently specific to establish that the parties\\nintended to include the bid package as a part of their contract. Moreover, it is\\nundisputed that the bid package was not included in the documents that the parties\\nattached to the purchase order and that “form[ed] part of this Subcontract.” We thus\\nconclude that the purchase order did not incorporate by reference the bid package.\\n\\n ACT argues that we should nonetheless affirm because it proved that the AISC\\ncode constituted a usage of trade that explained or supplemented the purchase order.\\nUnder Iowa law, terms of a contract “may not be contradicted by evidence of any\\nprior agreement” but they may be “explained or supplemented” by usage of trade.\\nIowa Code § 554.2202(1). “Usage of trade” is defined as “any practice or method of\\ndealing having such regularity of observance in a . . . trade as to justify an expectation\\nthat it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.” Id.\\n§ 554.1303(3). Accordingly, any “usage of trade” which the parties “are or should\\nbe aware” may supplement their agreement. Id. § 554.1303(4); C-Thru Container\\nCorp. v. Midland Mfg. Co., 533 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1995).\\n\\n We conclude that the district court’s decision to credit Wandling’s testimony,\\ncoupled with its application of the AISC code, constituted a finding that the AISC\\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade. Wandling\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexplained that the AISC code applied to the construction of the conveyor system\\nbecause it was “a trade practice and . . . a standard and custom in the industry.”\\nAccording to Wandling, that code required Lemartec or the owner “to give their\\napproval that the design drawings [were] acceptable and [met] the specifications.”\\nWandling testified that Lemartec’s stamp of review did not constitute approval of\\nACT’s drawings:\\n\\n It is not a final review, and it is not an indication that the design has\\n been accepted by the owner and, in fact . . . the last sentence in the\\n stamp says, Final review pending by A/E of record. That’s the\\n architect/engineer of record, and in this case that would be BRPH.\\n\\nWandling further testified that when Lemartec in September 2014 ordered ACT to\\ncommence fabrication and to deliver parts to the site immediately, it implemented a\\nfast-track project delivery method, under which formal approval procedures were set\\naside to expedite the design, fabrication, and erection of the system. Wandling\\ntestified that the risk of field rework then falls to the owner under the AISC code.\\nThe district court cited the AISC code in support of its conclusion that Lemartec\\nassumed the cost overruns after it “implemented a fast-track project delivery\\nmethodology.” D. Ct. Order of May 21, 2018, at 5. The determination that the AISC\\ncode explained or supplemented the purchase order as a usage of trade is not clearly\\nerroneous, and we conclude that the court did not err in applying it to the facts of this\\ncase. Cf. Lesch v. United States, 612 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that\\na district court’s decision following a bench trial must “set forth its reasoning with\\nenough clarity that the appellate court may understand the basis of the decision”\\n(quoting Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 2009))).\\n\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3291,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643330,"string":"4,643,330"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SHELDON TREE TOP, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Sheldon Tree Top"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1816"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Colloton, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1816\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sheldon Tree Top\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Pierre\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 14, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2014, Sheldon Tree Top sold a single bald eagle feather to a confidential\\ninformant for $50. A week later, he sold 63 eagle feathers and several hawk feathers\\nto the same informant for $80. Based on these purchases, the government charged\\nTree Top with two counts of selling eagle feathers, in violation of the Bald and\\nGolden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), and one count of knowingly\\ntransporting, selling, or receiving protected birds, in violation of the Lacey Act, 16\\n\\fU.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) and 3373(d)(2). Tree Top pleaded guilty to selling eagle\\nfeathers; the Lacey Act count was dismissed. The district court sentenced him to six\\nmonths of imprisonment and one year of supervised release. It ordered, as a special\\ncondition of supervision, that Tree Top pay $5,000 in restitution to the National Fish\\nand Wildlife Foundation. On appeal, Tree Top challenges the restitution order.\\n\\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a court may order restitution as a special condition\\nof supervision in accordance with the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. See United\\nStates v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015); see also United States v.\\nBatson, 608 F.3d 630, 634–36 (9th Cir. 2010). These statutes, in turn, require that a\\nrestitution award be “limited to the victim’s provable actual loss,” which the\\ngovernment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.\\nAdejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Chalupnik, 514\\nF.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008)). We review the district court’s order of restitution, like\\nthe imposition of any special condition of supervision, for abuse of discretion,\\nreviewing legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United\\nStates v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Fonder, 719\\nF.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n In settling on a loss amount of $5,000—an amount proposed by neither Tree\\nTop nor the government—the district court cited Bertucci, where we held that the\\nsentencing court erred in relying on an unreliable affidavit to determine the market\\nvalue of the birds rather than a valuation table that had been adopted by the sentencing\\ncourt “to establish the replacement values of various types of birds.” Bertucci, 794\\nF.3d at 928. Following Bertucci’s lead, the district court relied on its own standing\\norder on “forfeiture of collateral in lieu of appearance on cases of petty offenses,”\\nwhich includes a “bond schedule” listing the value of a whole or mounted bald or\\ngolden eagle as “5K/10K.” Based on expert testimony that four of the feathers sold\\nby Tree Top must have been harvested from a dead juvenile eagle and the\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fgovernment’s representation that the “5K” notation in the bond schedule was for a\\njuvenile eagle, the district court found an actual loss amount of $5,000.\\n\\n But unlike Bertucci, where the defendant pleaded guilty to killing a bald eagle\\nand a rough-legged hawk, Tree Top was only convicted of selling eagle feathers.\\n“[D]istrict courts may only order restitution for the offense to which the defendants\\nhave pled guilty, not for other charged or suspected conduct.” United States v.\\nHoward, 759 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 432\\nF.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2005), and relying on Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,\\n413 (1990)). As a result, based on the existing record, the actual loss caused by Tree\\nTop’s offense of conviction is limited to the amount of money that the government\\nexpended to buy the eagle feathers.1\\n\\n As a result, we reverse the order of restitution and modify the judgment to\\ndecrease the restitution amount to $130.2 Because the district court initially denied\\n\\n 1\\n Tree Top argues that the district court also erred in ordering restitution paid to\\nthe National Fish and Wildlife Foundation because the Foundation is not a victim\\nunder the restitution statutes. Tree Top did not raise this argument before the district\\ncourt, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923,\\n930 (8th Cir. 2016). We have “repeatedly affirmed restitution orders payable to\\nvarious government agencies.” United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865\\n(8th Cir. 2006). At sentencing, Tree Top conceded that the government was directly\\nand proximately harmed by his sale of eagle feathers and therefore would be the\\nproper recipient of the restitution award here. The government indicated that any\\nrestitution that it received would be routed to the Foundation. But even though the\\nFoundation was established by federal law, it technically isn’t a government agency.\\nSee 16 U.S.C. § 3701(a). Tree Top cites to no legal authority that makes the answer\\nto this question—whether a foundation established by federal law can properly be\\nawarded restitution—clear. As a result, any asserted error by the district court was not\\nplain. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013).\\n 2\\n Tree Top concedes that $130 was the amount the government expended to\\npurchase the 64 eagle feathers.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fthe government’s request to impose a fine based on the sizeable restitution award, we\\nremand for the limited purpose of giving the district court the opportunity to consider\\nin the first instance whether, based on the existing record, a fine is warranted in light\\nof the reduced restitution award.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420583/\", \"author_raw\": \"KELLY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643330/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SHELDON TREE TOP, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1816\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Sheldon Tree Top\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of South Dakota - Pierre\n ____________\n\n Submitted: February 14, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\n\n In 2014, Sheldon Tree Top sold a single bald eagle feather to a confidential\ninformant for $50. A week later, he sold 63 eagle feathers and several hawk feathers\nto the same informant for $80. Based on these purchases, the government charged\nTree Top with two counts of selling eagle feathers, in violation of the Bald and\nGolden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), and one count of knowingly\ntransporting, selling, or receiving protected birds, in violation of the Lacey Act, 16\n\fU.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) and 3373(d)(2). Tree Top pleaded guilty to selling eagle\nfeathers; the Lacey Act count was dismissed. The district court sentenced him to six\nmonths of imprisonment and one year of supervised release. It ordered, as a special\ncondition of supervision, that Tree Top pay $5,000 in restitution to the National Fish\nand Wildlife Foundation. On appeal, Tree Top challenges the restitution order.\n\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a court may order restitution as a special condition\nof supervision in accordance with the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. See United\nStates v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015); see also United States v.\nBatson, 608 F.3d 630, 634–36 (9th Cir. 2010). These statutes, in turn, require that a\nrestitution award be “limited to the victim’s provable actual loss,” which the\ngovernment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.\nAdejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Chalupnik, 514\nF.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008)). We review the district court’s order of restitution, like\nthe imposition of any special condition of supervision, for abuse of discretion,\nreviewing legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United\nStates v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Fonder, 719\nF.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013).\n\n In settling on a loss amount of $5,000—an amount proposed by neither Tree\nTop nor the government—the district court cited Bertucci, where we held that the\nsentencing court erred in relying on an unreliable affidavit to determine the market\nvalue of the birds rather than a valuation table that had been adopted by the sentencing\ncourt “to establish the replacement values of various types of birds.” Bertucci, 794\nF.3d at 928. Following Bertucci’s lead, the district court relied on its own standing\norder on “forfeiture of collateral in lieu of appearance on cases of petty offenses,”\nwhich includes a “bond schedule” listing the value of a whole or mounted bald or\ngolden eagle as “5K/10K.” Based on expert testimony that four of the feathers sold\nby Tree Top must have been harvested from a dead juvenile eagle and the\n\n -2-\n\fgovernment’s representation that the “5K” notation in the bond schedule was for a\njuvenile eagle, the district court found an actual loss amount of $5,000.\n\n But unlike Bertucci, where the defendant pleaded guilty to killing a bald eagle\nand a rough-legged hawk, Tree Top was only convicted of selling eagle feathers.\n“[D]istrict courts may only order restitution for the offense to which the defendants\nhave pled guilty, not for other charged or suspected conduct.” United States v.\nHoward, 759 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 432\nF.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2005), and relying on Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,\n413 (1990)). As a result, based on the existing record, the actual loss caused by Tree\nTop’s offense of conviction is limited to the amount of money that the government\nexpended to buy the eagle feathers.1\n\n As a result, we reverse the order of restitution and modify the judgment to\ndecrease the restitution amount to $130.2 Because the district court initially denied\n\n 1\n Tree Top argues that the district court also erred in ordering restitution paid to\nthe National Fish and Wildlife Foundation because the Foundation is not a victim\nunder the restitution statutes. Tree Top did not raise this argument before the district\ncourt, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923,\n930 (8th Cir. 2016). We have “repeatedly affirmed restitution orders payable to\nvarious government agencies.” United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865\n(8th Cir. 2006). At sentencing, Tree Top conceded that the government was directly\nand proximately harmed by his sale of eagle feathers and therefore would be the\nproper recipient of the restitution award here. The government indicated that any\nrestitution that it received would be routed to the Foundation. But even though the\nFoundation was established by federal law, it technically isn’t a government agency.\nSee 16 U.S.C. § 3701(a). Tree Top cites to no legal authority that makes the answer\nto this question—whether a foundation established by federal law can properly be\nawarded restitution—clear. As a result, any asserted error by the district court was not\nplain. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013).\n 2\n Tree Top concedes that $130 was the amount the government expended to\npurchase the 64 eagle feathers.\n\n -3-\n\fthe government’s request to impose a fine based on the sizeable restitution award, we\nremand for the limited purpose of giving the district court the opportunity to consider\nin the first instance whether, based on the existing record, a fine is warranted in light\nof the reduced restitution award.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SHELDON TREE TOP, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1816\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Sheldon Tree Top\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of South Dakota - Pierre\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: February 14, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nKELLY, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n In 2014, Sheldon Tree Top sold a single bald eagle feather to a confidential\\ninformant for $50. A week later, he sold 63 eagle feathers and several hawk feathers\\nto the same informant for $80. Based on these purchases, the government charged\\nTree Top with two counts of selling eagle feathers, in violation of the Bald and\\nGolden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), and one count of knowingly\\ntransporting, selling, or receiving protected birds, in violation of the Lacey Act, 16\\n\\fU.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) and 3373(d)(2). Tree Top pleaded guilty to selling eagle\\nfeathers; the Lacey Act count was dismissed. The district court sentenced him to six\\nmonths of imprisonment and one year of supervised release. It ordered, as a special\\ncondition of supervision, that Tree Top pay $5,000 in restitution to the National Fish\\nand Wildlife Foundation. On appeal, Tree Top challenges the restitution order.\\n\\n Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a court may order restitution as a special condition\\nof supervision in accordance with the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. See United\\nStates v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015); see also United States v.\\nBatson, 608 F.3d 630, 634–36 (9th Cir. 2010). These statutes, in turn, require that a\\nrestitution award be “limited to the victim’s provable actual loss,” which the\\ngovernment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.\\nAdejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Chalupnik, 514\\nF.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008)). We review the district court’s order of restitution, like\\nthe imposition of any special condition of supervision, for abuse of discretion,\\nreviewing legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United\\nStates v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Fonder, 719\\nF.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n In settling on a loss amount of $5,000—an amount proposed by neither Tree\\nTop nor the government—the district court cited Bertucci, where we held that the\\nsentencing court erred in relying on an unreliable affidavit to determine the market\\nvalue of the birds rather than a valuation table that had been adopted by the sentencing\\ncourt “to establish the replacement values of various types of birds.” Bertucci, 794\\nF.3d at 928. Following Bertucci’s lead, the district court relied on its own standing\\norder on “forfeiture of collateral in lieu of appearance on cases of petty offenses,”\\nwhich includes a “bond schedule” listing the value of a whole or mounted bald or\\ngolden eagle as “5K/10K.” Based on expert testimony that four of the feathers sold\\nby Tree Top must have been harvested from a dead juvenile eagle and the\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fgovernment’s representation that the “5K” notation in the bond schedule was for a\\njuvenile eagle, the district court found an actual loss amount of $5,000.\\n\\n But unlike Bertucci, where the defendant pleaded guilty to killing a bald eagle\\nand a rough-legged hawk, Tree Top was only convicted of selling eagle feathers.\\n“[D]istrict courts may only order restitution for the offense to which the defendants\\nhave pled guilty, not for other charged or suspected conduct.” United States v.\\nHoward, 759 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 432\\nF.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2005), and relying on Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,\\n413 (1990)). As a result, based on the existing record, the actual loss caused by Tree\\nTop’s offense of conviction is limited to the amount of money that the government\\nexpended to buy the eagle feathers.1\\n\\n As a result, we reverse the order of restitution and modify the judgment to\\ndecrease the restitution amount to $130.2 Because the district court initially denied\\n\\n 1\\n Tree Top argues that the district court also erred in ordering restitution paid to\\nthe National Fish and Wildlife Foundation because the Foundation is not a victim\\nunder the restitution statutes. Tree Top did not raise this argument before the district\\ncourt, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923,\\n930 (8th Cir. 2016). We have “repeatedly affirmed restitution orders payable to\\nvarious government agencies.” United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865\\n(8th Cir. 2006). At sentencing, Tree Top conceded that the government was directly\\nand proximately harmed by his sale of eagle feathers and therefore would be the\\nproper recipient of the restitution award here. The government indicated that any\\nrestitution that it received would be routed to the Foundation. But even though the\\nFoundation was established by federal law, it technically isn’t a government agency.\\nSee 16 U.S.C. § 3701(a). Tree Top cites to no legal authority that makes the answer\\nto this question—whether a foundation established by federal law can properly be\\nawarded restitution—clear. As a result, any asserted error by the district court was not\\nplain. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013).\\n 2\\n Tree Top concedes that $130 was the amount the government expended to\\npurchase the 64 eagle feathers.\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fthe government’s request to impose a fine based on the sizeable restitution award, we\\nremand for the limited purpose of giving the district court the opportunity to consider\\nin the first instance whether, based on the existing record, a fine is warranted in light\\nof the reduced restitution award.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3292,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643333,"string":"4,643,333"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Carlos Joe GRADY, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Carlos Grady"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1728"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Arnold, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1728\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Carlos Joe Grady\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Pursuant to a written agreement containing an appeal waiver, Carlos Joe Grady\\npleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more\\nof a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). At sentencing, and over Grady’s objection, the\\n\\fdistrict court1 found that Grady had two prior felony convictions for a controlled\\nsubstance offense and applied the career offender enhancement under United States\\nSentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a) (2016), resulting in a Guidelines range of 188 to\\n235 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Grady to 188 months, and he now\\nappeals his sentence on various grounds.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Grady asserts that the district court committed three sentencing errors: (1)\\nfinding that two of his prior felony convictions “counted separately” for the purposes\\nof his Criminal History under the Guidelines, triggering the career offender\\nenhancement; (2) failing to adequately explain the reasons for its chosen sentence and\\nits rejection of Grady’s request for a downward variance; and (3) failing to consider\\nany of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, thereby imposing a substantively unreasonable\\nsentence. The government argues that other than Grady’s challenge to the career\\noffender enhancement, Grady’s claims are barred by the appeal waiver in his plea\\nagreement. We first analyze whether the appeal waiver bars Grady’s second and third\\nclaims and then address the merits of his challenge to his career offender status.\\n\\n Grady’s plea agreement provides, “[i]n the event the Court accepts the plea,\\nand after determining the appropriate Total Offense Level, sentences the defendant\\nwithin or below the corresponding range, then, as a part of this agreement, the\\ndefendant hereby waives all rights to appeal all sentencing issues other than Criminal\\nHistory.” We will enforce the waiver of rights to appeal when the government\\ndemonstrates that the issues raised on appeal are “within the scope of the waiver,” the\\nplea agreement and waiver were entered into “knowingly and voluntarily,” and\\nenforcement of the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.’” United\\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). As the government\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n -2-\\n\\fcontends, Grady’s claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and that the\\ndistrict court failed to adequately explain its chosen sentence and its rejection of his\\nrequest for a variance are “sentencing issues other than Criminal History.” They thus\\nfall within the scope of Grady’s waiver. The career offender issue, on the other hand,\\ndoes not.\\n\\n We also conclude that Grady’s plea and waiver were entered into knowingly\\nand voluntarily. At the change of plea hearing, the district court confirmed that\\nGrady had read his plea agreement, reviewed it “in detail” with his counsel, and\\nunderstood its contents. The court also asked Grady if his guilty plea was the product\\nof force, coercion, or threats, to which Grady replied, “No.” The court then addressed\\nthe appeal waiver, explaining to Grady that if the court imposed a sentence within or\\nbelow the Guidelines range, Grady waived his right to appeal his sentence, subject\\nto only one exception: Grady could appeal “the determination about [his] criminal\\nhistory,” that is, “[his] criminal record [] and nothing else.” Grady replied that he\\nagreed. Based on this record, we are satisfied that Grady entered into his plea and\\nwaived his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. See Andis, 333 F.3d at\\n890–91 (“One important way a district court can help ensure that a plea agreement\\nand corresponding waiver are entered into knowingly and voluntarily is to properly\\nquestion a defendant about his or her decision to enter that agreement and waive the\\nright to appeal.”); see also United States v. Guzman, 707 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (concluding that plea agreement and waiver were knowing and voluntary where\\ndistrict court confirmed that defendant had read plea agreement with counsel and\\nunderstood the appeal waiver). Furthermore, we conclude that enforcement of the\\nwaiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891–92.\\nWe thus enforce Grady’s appeal waiver as to his second and third claims, and we\\nturn to his challenge to the Criminal History determinations supporting the district\\ncourt’s application of the career offender enhancement.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f II\\n\\n A defendant may be classified as a career offender if, among other things, he\\n“has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). The district court determined that Grady’s\\n2007 and 2010 Missouri convictions for distribution of a controlled substance each\\nqualified as a prior felony conviction for a controlled substance offense. Like he did\\nbefore the district court, Grady argues on appeal that these two convictions should\\ncount as just one qualifying conviction, not two. “We review the district court’s\\ninterpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and review its\\napplication of the Guidelines to the facts for clear error.” United States v. Armstrong,\\n782 F.3d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Under the Guidelines, “[t]he term ‘two prior felony convictions’ means (1) the\\ndefendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at\\nleast two felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense . . . , and (2) the\\nsentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted\\nseparately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).” § 4B1.2(c). Section\\n4A1.2(a)(2), in turn, specifies that to apply § 4A1.1(a)–(c), “[p]rior sentences always\\nare counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated\\nby an intervening arrest.” Here, Grady’s 2007 and 2010 convictions were separated\\nby an intervening arrest and thus were properly counted separately. As set forth in\\nthe Presentence Investigation Report, Grady’s 2007 conviction resulted from a\\nFebruary 2007 arrest. Almost three years later, Grady was arrested again, leading to\\nhis 2010 conviction. Accordingly, the district court correctly counted each conviction\\nas a predicate offense and properly applied the career offender enhancement. See\\nArmstrong, 782 F.3d at 1036–37 (holding that two convictions counted as predicate\\ncontrolled substance offenses because the convictions were separated by an\\nintervening arrest).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm Grady’s sentence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -4-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420586/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643333/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Carlos Joe GRADY, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1728\n ___________________________\n\n United States of America\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n Carlos Joe Grady\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n [Published]\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nPER CURIAM.\n\n Pursuant to a written agreement containing an appeal waiver, Carlos Joe Grady\npleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more\nof a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). At sentencing, and over Grady’s objection, the\n\fdistrict court1 found that Grady had two prior felony convictions for a controlled\nsubstance offense and applied the career offender enhancement under United States\nSentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a) (2016), resulting in a Guidelines range of 188 to\n235 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Grady to 188 months, and he now\nappeals his sentence on various grounds.\n\n I\n\n Grady asserts that the district court committed three sentencing errors: (1)\nfinding that two of his prior felony convictions “counted separately” for the purposes\nof his Criminal History under the Guidelines, triggering the career offender\nenhancement; (2) failing to adequately explain the reasons for its chosen sentence and\nits rejection of Grady’s request for a downward variance; and (3) failing to consider\nany of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, thereby imposing a substantively unreasonable\nsentence. The government argues that other than Grady’s challenge to the career\noffender enhancement, Grady’s claims are barred by the appeal waiver in his plea\nagreement. We first analyze whether the appeal waiver bars Grady’s second and third\nclaims and then address the merits of his challenge to his career offender status.\n\n Grady’s plea agreement provides, “[i]n the event the Court accepts the plea,\nand after determining the appropriate Total Offense Level, sentences the defendant\nwithin or below the corresponding range, then, as a part of this agreement, the\ndefendant hereby waives all rights to appeal all sentencing issues other than Criminal\nHistory.” We will enforce the waiver of rights to appeal when the government\ndemonstrates that the issues raised on appeal are “within the scope of the waiver,” the\nplea agreement and waiver were entered into “knowingly and voluntarily,” and\nenforcement of the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.’” United\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). As the government\n\n 1\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Missouri.\n -2-\n\fcontends, Grady’s claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and that the\ndistrict court failed to adequately explain its chosen sentence and its rejection of his\nrequest for a variance are “sentencing issues other than Criminal History.” They thus\nfall within the scope of Grady’s waiver. The career offender issue, on the other hand,\ndoes not.\n\n We also conclude that Grady’s plea and waiver were entered into knowingly\nand voluntarily. At the change of plea hearing, the district court confirmed that\nGrady had read his plea agreement, reviewed it “in detail” with his counsel, and\nunderstood its contents. The court also asked Grady if his guilty plea was the product\nof force, coercion, or threats, to which Grady replied, “No.” The court then addressed\nthe appeal waiver, explaining to Grady that if the court imposed a sentence within or\nbelow the Guidelines range, Grady waived his right to appeal his sentence, subject\nto only one exception: Grady could appeal “the determination about [his] criminal\nhistory,” that is, “[his] criminal record [] and nothing else.” Grady replied that he\nagreed. Based on this record, we are satisfied that Grady entered into his plea and\nwaived his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. See Andis, 333 F.3d at\n890–91 (“One important way a district court can help ensure that a plea agreement\nand corresponding waiver are entered into knowingly and voluntarily is to properly\nquestion a defendant about his or her decision to enter that agreement and waive the\nright to appeal.”); see also United States v. Guzman, 707 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir.\n2013) (concluding that plea agreement and waiver were knowing and voluntary where\ndistrict court confirmed that defendant had read plea agreement with counsel and\nunderstood the appeal waiver). Furthermore, we conclude that enforcement of the\nwaiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891–92.\nWe thus enforce Grady’s appeal waiver as to his second and third claims, and we\nturn to his challenge to the Criminal History determinations supporting the district\ncourt’s application of the career offender enhancement.\n\n\n\n\n -3-\n\f II\n\n A defendant may be classified as a career offender if, among other things, he\n“has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). The district court determined that Grady’s\n2007 and 2010 Missouri convictions for distribution of a controlled substance each\nqualified as a prior felony conviction for a controlled substance offense. Like he did\nbefore the district court, Grady argues on appeal that these two convictions should\ncount as just one qualifying conviction, not two. “We review the district court’s\ninterpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and review its\napplication of the Guidelines to the facts for clear error.” United States v. Armstrong,\n782 F.3d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n Under the Guidelines, “[t]he term ‘two prior felony convictions’ means (1) the\ndefendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at\nleast two felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense . . . , and (2) the\nsentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted\nseparately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).” § 4B1.2(c). Section\n4A1.2(a)(2), in turn, specifies that to apply § 4A1.1(a)–(c), “[p]rior sentences always\nare counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated\nby an intervening arrest.” Here, Grady’s 2007 and 2010 convictions were separated\nby an intervening arrest and thus were properly counted separately. As set forth in\nthe Presentence Investigation Report, Grady’s 2007 conviction resulted from a\nFebruary 2007 arrest. Almost three years later, Grady was arrested again, leading to\nhis 2010 conviction. Accordingly, the district court correctly counted each conviction\nas a predicate offense and properly applied the career offender enhancement. See\nArmstrong, 782 F.3d at 1036–37 (holding that two convictions counted as predicate\ncontrolled substance offenses because the convictions were separated by an\nintervening arrest).\n\n Accordingly, we affirm Grady’s sentence.\n ______________________________\n\n -4-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Carlos Joe GRADY, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1728\\n ___________________________\\n\\n United States of America\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Carlos Joe Grady\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 15, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n [Published]\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nPER CURIAM.\\n\\n Pursuant to a written agreement containing an appeal waiver, Carlos Joe Grady\\npleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more\\nof a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). At sentencing, and over Grady’s objection, the\\n\\fdistrict court1 found that Grady had two prior felony convictions for a controlled\\nsubstance offense and applied the career offender enhancement under United States\\nSentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a) (2016), resulting in a Guidelines range of 188 to\\n235 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Grady to 188 months, and he now\\nappeals his sentence on various grounds.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Grady asserts that the district court committed three sentencing errors: (1)\\nfinding that two of his prior felony convictions “counted separately” for the purposes\\nof his Criminal History under the Guidelines, triggering the career offender\\nenhancement; (2) failing to adequately explain the reasons for its chosen sentence and\\nits rejection of Grady’s request for a downward variance; and (3) failing to consider\\nany of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, thereby imposing a substantively unreasonable\\nsentence. The government argues that other than Grady’s challenge to the career\\noffender enhancement, Grady’s claims are barred by the appeal waiver in his plea\\nagreement. We first analyze whether the appeal waiver bars Grady’s second and third\\nclaims and then address the merits of his challenge to his career offender status.\\n\\n Grady’s plea agreement provides, “[i]n the event the Court accepts the plea,\\nand after determining the appropriate Total Offense Level, sentences the defendant\\nwithin or below the corresponding range, then, as a part of this agreement, the\\ndefendant hereby waives all rights to appeal all sentencing issues other than Criminal\\nHistory.” We will enforce the waiver of rights to appeal when the government\\ndemonstrates that the issues raised on appeal are “within the scope of the waiver,” the\\nplea agreement and waiver were entered into “knowingly and voluntarily,” and\\nenforcement of the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.’” United\\nStates v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). As the government\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n -2-\\n\\fcontends, Grady’s claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and that the\\ndistrict court failed to adequately explain its chosen sentence and its rejection of his\\nrequest for a variance are “sentencing issues other than Criminal History.” They thus\\nfall within the scope of Grady’s waiver. The career offender issue, on the other hand,\\ndoes not.\\n\\n We also conclude that Grady’s plea and waiver were entered into knowingly\\nand voluntarily. At the change of plea hearing, the district court confirmed that\\nGrady had read his plea agreement, reviewed it “in detail” with his counsel, and\\nunderstood its contents. The court also asked Grady if his guilty plea was the product\\nof force, coercion, or threats, to which Grady replied, “No.” The court then addressed\\nthe appeal waiver, explaining to Grady that if the court imposed a sentence within or\\nbelow the Guidelines range, Grady waived his right to appeal his sentence, subject\\nto only one exception: Grady could appeal “the determination about [his] criminal\\nhistory,” that is, “[his] criminal record [] and nothing else.” Grady replied that he\\nagreed. Based on this record, we are satisfied that Grady entered into his plea and\\nwaived his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. See Andis, 333 F.3d at\\n890–91 (“One important way a district court can help ensure that a plea agreement\\nand corresponding waiver are entered into knowingly and voluntarily is to properly\\nquestion a defendant about his or her decision to enter that agreement and waive the\\nright to appeal.”); see also United States v. Guzman, 707 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir.\\n2013) (concluding that plea agreement and waiver were knowing and voluntary where\\ndistrict court confirmed that defendant had read plea agreement with counsel and\\nunderstood the appeal waiver). Furthermore, we conclude that enforcement of the\\nwaiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. See Andis, 333 F.3d at 891–92.\\nWe thus enforce Grady’s appeal waiver as to his second and third claims, and we\\nturn to his challenge to the Criminal History determinations supporting the district\\ncourt’s application of the career offender enhancement.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f II\\n\\n A defendant may be classified as a career offender if, among other things, he\\n“has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled\\nsubstance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). The district court determined that Grady’s\\n2007 and 2010 Missouri convictions for distribution of a controlled substance each\\nqualified as a prior felony conviction for a controlled substance offense. Like he did\\nbefore the district court, Grady argues on appeal that these two convictions should\\ncount as just one qualifying conviction, not two. “We review the district court’s\\ninterpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and review its\\napplication of the Guidelines to the facts for clear error.” United States v. Armstrong,\\n782 F.3d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n Under the Guidelines, “[t]he term ‘two prior felony convictions’ means (1) the\\ndefendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at\\nleast two felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense . . . , and (2) the\\nsentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony convictions are counted\\nseparately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).” § 4B1.2(c). Section\\n4A1.2(a)(2), in turn, specifies that to apply § 4A1.1(a)–(c), “[p]rior sentences always\\nare counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated\\nby an intervening arrest.” Here, Grady’s 2007 and 2010 convictions were separated\\nby an intervening arrest and thus were properly counted separately. As set forth in\\nthe Presentence Investigation Report, Grady’s 2007 conviction resulted from a\\nFebruary 2007 arrest. Almost three years later, Grady was arrested again, leading to\\nhis 2010 conviction. Accordingly, the district court correctly counted each conviction\\nas a predicate offense and properly applied the career offender enhancement. See\\nArmstrong, 782 F.3d at 1036–37 (holding that two convictions counted as predicate\\ncontrolled substance offenses because the convictions were separated by an\\nintervening arrest).\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm Grady’s sentence.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n -4-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3293,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643334,"string":"4,643,334"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Shuli MARAMBO Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States Respondent"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Shuli Marambo v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2331"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Arnold, Kobes, Shepherd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2331\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Shuli Marambo\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Shuli Marambo, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo\\n(DRC), petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)\\nupholding the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) concluding that Marambo was\\nremovable; denying his applications for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of\\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and ordering\\n\\fremoval to the DRC. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the\\npetition.\\n\\n After fleeing the DRC due to an ongoing war, Marambo was admitted to the\\nUnited States in 2007 as a refugee, settling with family in Minnesota. In 2013,\\nMarambo pled guilty to two counts of second-degree burglary, in violation of Minn.\\nStat. § 609.582. In 2014, while he was still serving probation related to his burglary\\nconvictions, he was arrested and charged with one count of being a prohibited person\\nin possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713. He was\\nsubsequently found guilty, his probation for the burglary offenses was revoked, and\\nhe was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 60 months.\\n\\n Based on Marambo’s convictions, the Department of Homeland Security\\ncharged Marambo with being removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as\\nan alien “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude”; 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony”; and 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(C), as an alien convicted of an offense for unlawfully possessing a\\nfirearm. Marambo conceded removability based on two convictions for crimes\\ninvolving moral turpitude, but challenged the other two bases for removal. Marambo\\nalso filed an application for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, and\\nrelief under CAT.\\n\\n After a hearing during which the IJ heard testimony from Marambo, his cousin,\\nand his uncle, the IJ determined that Marambo was removable and denied his various\\nrequests for relief. The IJ first noted that Marambo had conceded removability based\\non his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude before concluding that, while\\nMarambo was not removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(C) for unlawful possession of\\na firearm, he was additionally removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his\\nburglary convictions qualified as aggravated felonies. The IJ then determined that\\nMarambo was not eligible for withholding of removal because his conviction for\\n\\n -2-\\n\\funlawful possession of a firearm was a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and was thus a disqualifying offense. The IJ also denied\\nMarambo’s request for relief under CAT, concluding that, despite the credibility of\\nMarambo and his family members, Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\\nthan not be tortured if he returned to the DRC. The IJ ordered Marambo removed\\nfrom the United States to the DRC. Marambo appealed to the BIA. The BIA\\nreversed the IJ’s determination with respect to removability under\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), but because Marambo had conceded\\nremovability as an alien with two or more convictions for crimes involving moral\\nturpitude, it found Marambo removable, regardless of its determinations as to the\\nother bases for removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Marambo was\\nnot entitled to withholding of removal, agreeing that Marambo’s conviction for\\npossession of a firearm was a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal and that Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\\nthan not be tortured in the DRC if he returned, rendering him ineligible for relief\\nunder CAT.\\n\\n Marambo now petitions this Court for review, asserting that the IJ and BIA\\nerred in concluding that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a\\nparticularly serious crime, and in concluding that he was ineligible for CAT relief\\nbecause the BIA applied an improper legal standard and, under either standard, he\\nhad shown entitlement to relief. Where, as here, the petitioner “is removable as a\\n‘criminal alien,’ our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of\\nlaw.” Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). “We review questions of law de novo but accord\\nsubstantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes and\\nregulations.” Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n With respect to the determination that his firearm offense was a particularly\\nserious crime, Marambo challenges, for the first time before this Court, the BIA’s\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fprior interpretations of the particularly serious crime bar, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), asserting that the BIA’s prior decisions, specifically, In re N-A-\\nM-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), are contrary to law and are not entitled to\\ndeference. However, Marambo’s failure to raise this issue before the BIA means he\\nhas not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we are unable to review his claim\\nfor the first time on a petition for review. Although our prior decisions have been\\ninconsistent as to whether a failure to exhaust is a jurisdictional defect or falls within\\nthe doctrine of administrative exhaustion, Zine v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 535, 539-40\\n(8th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), “[r]egardless of whether § 1252(d)(1) precludes us\\nfrom addressing unexhausted issues, a court-imposed exhaustion requirement is\\nappropriate” where the proceedings before the IJ and the BIA were adversarial in\\nnature and the petitioner was represented by counsel. Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d\\n726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006). As Marambo does not dispute that he was represented or\\nthat the proceedings were adversarial, we apply the court-imposed doctrine of\\nadministrative exhaustion. Marambo argues that raising the issue before the BIA\\nwould have been futile because the BIA has adhered to the same framework for over\\n10 years, but we are cognizant that the BIA “can reexamine, and if it wants, overrule,\\na precedent,” Marguilis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2013), and that our\\nCourt has consistently recognized the preference “to allow the agency an opportunity\\nto correct its own mistakes[.]” Agha, 743 F.3d at 616 (alteration in original) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). Marambo’s argument regarding the purported futility of\\nraising the issue to the BIA is unpersuasive.\\n\\n Marambo also argues that the IJ and BIA impermissibly relied on facts related\\nto Marambo’s purported commission of an uncharged crime, attempted burglary, to\\ndetermine that his possession of a firearm conviction was a particularly serious crime.\\nAn alien is not entitled to withholding of removal “if the Attorney General decides\\nthat . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious\\ncrime is a danger to the community of the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). A particularly serious crime includes “an aggravated felony . .\\n. for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fleast 5 years,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(B), but classification as a particularly serious crime\\nis not limited to aggravated felonies. In Re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338-39.\\nAlthough there is no more detailed statutory definition of a particularly serious crime,\\n“the BIA has generally examined a variety of factors and found that the consideration\\nof the individual facts and circumstances [of the conviction] is appropriate” to\\ndetermine whether a conviction is for a particularly serious crime. Tian v. Holder,\\n576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). These factors\\ninclude “the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the\\nconviction, the type of sentence imposed, and most importantly whether the type and\\ncircumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”\\nId. (quoting In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)). After\\ndetermining that the elements of the offense potentially state a particularly serious\\ncrime, “all reliable information may be considered in making a particularly serious\\ncrime determination, including the conviction records and sentencing information, as\\nwell as other information outside the confines of a record of conviction.” In Re\\nN-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.\\n\\n Marambo asserts that the IJ erred by considering uncorroborated and unproven\\nconduct in the criminal complaint, which amounted to unreliable information, and\\ncompounded the error by extrapolating from the facts in the criminal complaint that\\nMarambo attempted to commit a separate, uncharged crime of burglary before he was\\nfound to be unlawfully in possession of a firearm. As to his challenge to the\\nreliability of the criminal complaint, our Court has previously held that an IJ acted\\nwithin its authority by considering a criminal complaint to determine whether a\\nconviction for aggravated robbery qualified as an offense involving a firearm, making\\nthe alien deportable, particularly where the portions of the criminal complaint were\\nintegral to the elements of the crime and not surplusage. Vue v. INS, 92 F.3d 696,\\n700 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the IJ acted within this same authority by considering the\\nfacts and circumstances set forth in the criminal complaint, including law\\nenforcement officers’ observation of two males attempting to enter a locked building\\nlate at night, which provided the factual context in which Marambo was observed in\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fpossession of a firearm and contributed to the probable cause that he committed the\\noffense. The IJ did not, as Marambo suggests, attempt to determine Marambo’s guilt\\nor innocence as to an uncharged offense of attempted burglary. Rather, the IJ relied\\non the facts and circumstances that were directly related to the unlawful-possession-\\nof-a-firearm charge; the IJ did not rely on Marambo’s purported guilt of attempted\\nburglary as the basis to conclude the unlawful possession offense was a particularly\\nserious crime.\\n\\n Finally, to the extent that Marambo challenges the inferences the IJ or BIA\\ndrew from the stipulated facts of his conviction, he challenges only how the IJ or BIA\\nweighed the relevant factors to determine whether Marambo committed a particularly\\nserious crime. “[Marambo]’s allegations . . . amount to nothing more than challenges\\nto factual determinations, which we lack jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Constanza, 647 F.3d at 754; see also Garcia-Aguillon v. Mukasey,\\n524 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner]’s first argument fails to state a\\ncolorable legal claim because it amounts to nothing more than a challenge to the IJ’s\\ndiscretionary and fact-finding exercises cloaked as a question of law.”). We thus find\\nno error in the IJ’s or BIA’s determination that his unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm\\noffense qualified as a particularly serious crime and barred withholding of removal.\\n\\n With respect to his claims regarding the IJ’s and BIA’s denials of his request\\nfor relief under CAT, Marambo first asserts that the BIA should have applied a de\\nnovo standard of review instead of clear error because the facts were established and\\nundisputed and required only application of the correct legal framework. See Njong\\nv. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying de novo standard of review\\nto question of whether undisputed facts satisfied legal definition). Again, Marambo\\ndid not raise this issue before the BIA; instead, Marambo argued that the BIA should\\napply a clear error standard. Because Marambo did not raise this issue before the\\nBIA, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Frango, 437 F.3d at 728.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Marambo finally asserts that the denial of relief under CAT was erroneous\\nunder either a clear error or de novo standard of review. But despite his efforts to\\ncase his arguments as legal in nature, Marambo offers no legal argument; he merely\\nchallenges factual findings. “Factual determinations lie outside our scope of review\\nand . . . we lack the jurisdiction to reweigh the evidence before the BIA.” Cherichel\\nv. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010). We thus conclude that there was no\\nreviewable error in the denial of Marambo’s request for relief pursuant to CAT.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420587/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KOBES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SHEPHERD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643334/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Shuli MARAMBO Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States Respondent\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2331\n ___________________________\n\n Shuli Marambo\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\n\n v.\n\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\n ____________\n\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\n Board of Immigration Appeals\n ____________\n\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\n\n Shuli Marambo, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo\n(DRC), petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)\nupholding the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) concluding that Marambo was\nremovable; denying his applications for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and ordering\n\fremoval to the DRC. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the\npetition.\n\n After fleeing the DRC due to an ongoing war, Marambo was admitted to the\nUnited States in 2007 as a refugee, settling with family in Minnesota. In 2013,\nMarambo pled guilty to two counts of second-degree burglary, in violation of Minn.\nStat. § 609.582. In 2014, while he was still serving probation related to his burglary\nconvictions, he was arrested and charged with one count of being a prohibited person\nin possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713. He was\nsubsequently found guilty, his probation for the burglary offenses was revoked, and\nhe was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 60 months.\n\n Based on Marambo’s convictions, the Department of Homeland Security\ncharged Marambo with being removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as\nan alien “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude”; 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony”; and 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1227(a)(2)(C), as an alien convicted of an offense for unlawfully possessing a\nfirearm. Marambo conceded removability based on two convictions for crimes\ninvolving moral turpitude, but challenged the other two bases for removal. Marambo\nalso filed an application for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, and\nrelief under CAT.\n\n After a hearing during which the IJ heard testimony from Marambo, his cousin,\nand his uncle, the IJ determined that Marambo was removable and denied his various\nrequests for relief. The IJ first noted that Marambo had conceded removability based\non his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude before concluding that, while\nMarambo was not removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(C) for unlawful possession of\na firearm, he was additionally removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his\nburglary convictions qualified as aggravated felonies. The IJ then determined that\nMarambo was not eligible for withholding of removal because his conviction for\n\n -2-\n\funlawful possession of a firearm was a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and was thus a disqualifying offense. The IJ also denied\nMarambo’s request for relief under CAT, concluding that, despite the credibility of\nMarambo and his family members, Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\nthan not be tortured if he returned to the DRC. The IJ ordered Marambo removed\nfrom the United States to the DRC. Marambo appealed to the BIA. The BIA\nreversed the IJ’s determination with respect to removability under\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), but because Marambo had conceded\nremovability as an alien with two or more convictions for crimes involving moral\nturpitude, it found Marambo removable, regardless of its determinations as to the\nother bases for removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Marambo was\nnot entitled to withholding of removal, agreeing that Marambo’s conviction for\npossession of a firearm was a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for\nwithholding of removal and that Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\nthan not be tortured in the DRC if he returned, rendering him ineligible for relief\nunder CAT.\n\n Marambo now petitions this Court for review, asserting that the IJ and BIA\nerred in concluding that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a\nparticularly serious crime, and in concluding that he was ineligible for CAT relief\nbecause the BIA applied an improper legal standard and, under either standard, he\nhad shown entitlement to relief. Where, as here, the petitioner “is removable as a\n‘criminal alien,’ our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of\nlaw.” Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal\nquotation marks omitted). “We review questions of law de novo but accord\nsubstantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes and\nregulations.” Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2010).\n\n With respect to the determination that his firearm offense was a particularly\nserious crime, Marambo challenges, for the first time before this Court, the BIA’s\n\n -3-\n\fprior interpretations of the particularly serious crime bar, 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), asserting that the BIA’s prior decisions, specifically, In re N-A-\nM-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), are contrary to law and are not entitled to\ndeference. However, Marambo’s failure to raise this issue before the BIA means he\nhas not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we are unable to review his claim\nfor the first time on a petition for review. Although our prior decisions have been\ninconsistent as to whether a failure to exhaust is a jurisdictional defect or falls within\nthe doctrine of administrative exhaustion, Zine v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 535, 539-40\n(8th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), “[r]egardless of whether § 1252(d)(1) precludes us\nfrom addressing unexhausted issues, a court-imposed exhaustion requirement is\nappropriate” where the proceedings before the IJ and the BIA were adversarial in\nnature and the petitioner was represented by counsel. Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d\n726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006). As Marambo does not dispute that he was represented or\nthat the proceedings were adversarial, we apply the court-imposed doctrine of\nadministrative exhaustion. Marambo argues that raising the issue before the BIA\nwould have been futile because the BIA has adhered to the same framework for over\n10 years, but we are cognizant that the BIA “can reexamine, and if it wants, overrule,\na precedent,” Marguilis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2013), and that our\nCourt has consistently recognized the preference “to allow the agency an opportunity\nto correct its own mistakes[.]” Agha, 743 F.3d at 616 (alteration in original) (internal\nquotation marks omitted). Marambo’s argument regarding the purported futility of\nraising the issue to the BIA is unpersuasive.\n\n Marambo also argues that the IJ and BIA impermissibly relied on facts related\nto Marambo’s purported commission of an uncharged crime, attempted burglary, to\ndetermine that his possession of a firearm conviction was a particularly serious crime.\nAn alien is not entitled to withholding of removal “if the Attorney General decides\nthat . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious\ncrime is a danger to the community of the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). A particularly serious crime includes “an aggravated felony . .\n. for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at\n\n -4-\n\fleast 5 years,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(B), but classification as a particularly serious crime\nis not limited to aggravated felonies. In Re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338-39.\nAlthough there is no more detailed statutory definition of a particularly serious crime,\n“the BIA has generally examined a variety of factors and found that the consideration\nof the individual facts and circumstances [of the conviction] is appropriate” to\ndetermine whether a conviction is for a particularly serious crime. Tian v. Holder,\n576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). These factors\ninclude “the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the\nconviction, the type of sentence imposed, and most importantly whether the type and\ncircumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”\nId. (quoting In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)). After\ndetermining that the elements of the offense potentially state a particularly serious\ncrime, “all reliable information may be considered in making a particularly serious\ncrime determination, including the conviction records and sentencing information, as\nwell as other information outside the confines of a record of conviction.” In Re\nN-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.\n\n Marambo asserts that the IJ erred by considering uncorroborated and unproven\nconduct in the criminal complaint, which amounted to unreliable information, and\ncompounded the error by extrapolating from the facts in the criminal complaint that\nMarambo attempted to commit a separate, uncharged crime of burglary before he was\nfound to be unlawfully in possession of a firearm. As to his challenge to the\nreliability of the criminal complaint, our Court has previously held that an IJ acted\nwithin its authority by considering a criminal complaint to determine whether a\nconviction for aggravated robbery qualified as an offense involving a firearm, making\nthe alien deportable, particularly where the portions of the criminal complaint were\nintegral to the elements of the crime and not surplusage. Vue v. INS, 92 F.3d 696,\n700 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the IJ acted within this same authority by considering the\nfacts and circumstances set forth in the criminal complaint, including law\nenforcement officers’ observation of two males attempting to enter a locked building\nlate at night, which provided the factual context in which Marambo was observed in\n\n -5-\n\fpossession of a firearm and contributed to the probable cause that he committed the\noffense. The IJ did not, as Marambo suggests, attempt to determine Marambo’s guilt\nor innocence as to an uncharged offense of attempted burglary. Rather, the IJ relied\non the facts and circumstances that were directly related to the unlawful-possession-\nof-a-firearm charge; the IJ did not rely on Marambo’s purported guilt of attempted\nburglary as the basis to conclude the unlawful possession offense was a particularly\nserious crime.\n\n Finally, to the extent that Marambo challenges the inferences the IJ or BIA\ndrew from the stipulated facts of his conviction, he challenges only how the IJ or BIA\nweighed the relevant factors to determine whether Marambo committed a particularly\nserious crime. “[Marambo]’s allegations . . . amount to nothing more than challenges\nto factual determinations, which we lack jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C.\n§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Constanza, 647 F.3d at 754; see also Garcia-Aguillon v. Mukasey,\n524 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner]’s first argument fails to state a\ncolorable legal claim because it amounts to nothing more than a challenge to the IJ’s\ndiscretionary and fact-finding exercises cloaked as a question of law.”). We thus find\nno error in the IJ’s or BIA’s determination that his unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm\noffense qualified as a particularly serious crime and barred withholding of removal.\n\n With respect to his claims regarding the IJ’s and BIA’s denials of his request\nfor relief under CAT, Marambo first asserts that the BIA should have applied a de\nnovo standard of review instead of clear error because the facts were established and\nundisputed and required only application of the correct legal framework. See Njong\nv. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying de novo standard of review\nto question of whether undisputed facts satisfied legal definition). Again, Marambo\ndid not raise this issue before the BIA; instead, Marambo argued that the BIA should\napply a clear error standard. Because Marambo did not raise this issue before the\nBIA, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Frango, 437 F.3d at 728.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f Marambo finally asserts that the denial of relief under CAT was erroneous\nunder either a clear error or de novo standard of review. But despite his efforts to\ncase his arguments as legal in nature, Marambo offers no legal argument; he merely\nchallenges factual findings. “Factual determinations lie outside our scope of review\nand . . . we lack the jurisdiction to reweigh the evidence before the BIA.” Cherichel\nv. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010). We thus conclude that there was no\nreviewable error in the denial of Marambo’s request for relief pursuant to CAT.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Shuli MARAMBO Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States Respondent\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2331\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Shuli Marambo\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner\\n\\n v.\\n\\n William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent\\n ____________\\n\\n Petition for Review of an Order of the\\n Board of Immigration Appeals\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: March 12, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SHEPHERD, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nSHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Shuli Marambo, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo\\n(DRC), petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)\\nupholding the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) concluding that Marambo was\\nremovable; denying his applications for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of\\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); and ordering\\n\\fremoval to the DRC. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the\\npetition.\\n\\n After fleeing the DRC due to an ongoing war, Marambo was admitted to the\\nUnited States in 2007 as a refugee, settling with family in Minnesota. In 2013,\\nMarambo pled guilty to two counts of second-degree burglary, in violation of Minn.\\nStat. § 609.582. In 2014, while he was still serving probation related to his burglary\\nconvictions, he was arrested and charged with one count of being a prohibited person\\nin possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713. He was\\nsubsequently found guilty, his probation for the burglary offenses was revoked, and\\nhe was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 60 months.\\n\\n Based on Marambo’s convictions, the Department of Homeland Security\\ncharged Marambo with being removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as\\nan alien “convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude”; 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as “an alien convicted of an aggravated felony”; and 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(C), as an alien convicted of an offense for unlawfully possessing a\\nfirearm. Marambo conceded removability based on two convictions for crimes\\ninvolving moral turpitude, but challenged the other two bases for removal. Marambo\\nalso filed an application for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, and\\nrelief under CAT.\\n\\n After a hearing during which the IJ heard testimony from Marambo, his cousin,\\nand his uncle, the IJ determined that Marambo was removable and denied his various\\nrequests for relief. The IJ first noted that Marambo had conceded removability based\\non his convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude before concluding that, while\\nMarambo was not removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(C) for unlawful possession of\\na firearm, he was additionally removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his\\nburglary convictions qualified as aggravated felonies. The IJ then determined that\\nMarambo was not eligible for withholding of removal because his conviction for\\n\\n -2-\\n\\funlawful possession of a firearm was a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and was thus a disqualifying offense. The IJ also denied\\nMarambo’s request for relief under CAT, concluding that, despite the credibility of\\nMarambo and his family members, Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\\nthan not be tortured if he returned to the DRC. The IJ ordered Marambo removed\\nfrom the United States to the DRC. Marambo appealed to the BIA. The BIA\\nreversed the IJ’s determination with respect to removability under\\n§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony), but because Marambo had conceded\\nremovability as an alien with two or more convictions for crimes involving moral\\nturpitude, it found Marambo removable, regardless of its determinations as to the\\nother bases for removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Marambo was\\nnot entitled to withholding of removal, agreeing that Marambo’s conviction for\\npossession of a firearm was a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for\\nwithholding of removal and that Marambo failed to show that he would more likely\\nthan not be tortured in the DRC if he returned, rendering him ineligible for relief\\nunder CAT.\\n\\n Marambo now petitions this Court for review, asserting that the IJ and BIA\\nerred in concluding that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a\\nparticularly serious crime, and in concluding that he was ineligible for CAT relief\\nbecause the BIA applied an improper legal standard and, under either standard, he\\nhad shown entitlement to relief. Where, as here, the petitioner “is removable as a\\n‘criminal alien,’ our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of\\nlaw.” Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). “We review questions of law de novo but accord\\nsubstantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes and\\nregulations.” Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n With respect to the determination that his firearm offense was a particularly\\nserious crime, Marambo challenges, for the first time before this Court, the BIA’s\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fprior interpretations of the particularly serious crime bar, 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), asserting that the BIA’s prior decisions, specifically, In re N-A-\\nM-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), are contrary to law and are not entitled to\\ndeference. However, Marambo’s failure to raise this issue before the BIA means he\\nhas not exhausted his administrative remedies, and we are unable to review his claim\\nfor the first time on a petition for review. Although our prior decisions have been\\ninconsistent as to whether a failure to exhaust is a jurisdictional defect or falls within\\nthe doctrine of administrative exhaustion, Zine v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 535, 539-40\\n(8th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), “[r]egardless of whether § 1252(d)(1) precludes us\\nfrom addressing unexhausted issues, a court-imposed exhaustion requirement is\\nappropriate” where the proceedings before the IJ and the BIA were adversarial in\\nnature and the petitioner was represented by counsel. Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d\\n726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006). As Marambo does not dispute that he was represented or\\nthat the proceedings were adversarial, we apply the court-imposed doctrine of\\nadministrative exhaustion. Marambo argues that raising the issue before the BIA\\nwould have been futile because the BIA has adhered to the same framework for over\\n10 years, but we are cognizant that the BIA “can reexamine, and if it wants, overrule,\\na precedent,” Marguilis v. Holder, 725 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2013), and that our\\nCourt has consistently recognized the preference “to allow the agency an opportunity\\nto correct its own mistakes[.]” Agha, 743 F.3d at 616 (alteration in original) (internal\\nquotation marks omitted). Marambo’s argument regarding the purported futility of\\nraising the issue to the BIA is unpersuasive.\\n\\n Marambo also argues that the IJ and BIA impermissibly relied on facts related\\nto Marambo’s purported commission of an uncharged crime, attempted burglary, to\\ndetermine that his possession of a firearm conviction was a particularly serious crime.\\nAn alien is not entitled to withholding of removal “if the Attorney General decides\\nthat . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious\\ncrime is a danger to the community of the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). A particularly serious crime includes “an aggravated felony . .\\n. for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fleast 5 years,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(B), but classification as a particularly serious crime\\nis not limited to aggravated felonies. In Re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338-39.\\nAlthough there is no more detailed statutory definition of a particularly serious crime,\\n“the BIA has generally examined a variety of factors and found that the consideration\\nof the individual facts and circumstances [of the conviction] is appropriate” to\\ndetermine whether a conviction is for a particularly serious crime. Tian v. Holder,\\n576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). These factors\\ninclude “the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the\\nconviction, the type of sentence imposed, and most importantly whether the type and\\ncircumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.”\\nId. (quoting In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)). After\\ndetermining that the elements of the offense potentially state a particularly serious\\ncrime, “all reliable information may be considered in making a particularly serious\\ncrime determination, including the conviction records and sentencing information, as\\nwell as other information outside the confines of a record of conviction.” In Re\\nN-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.\\n\\n Marambo asserts that the IJ erred by considering uncorroborated and unproven\\nconduct in the criminal complaint, which amounted to unreliable information, and\\ncompounded the error by extrapolating from the facts in the criminal complaint that\\nMarambo attempted to commit a separate, uncharged crime of burglary before he was\\nfound to be unlawfully in possession of a firearm. As to his challenge to the\\nreliability of the criminal complaint, our Court has previously held that an IJ acted\\nwithin its authority by considering a criminal complaint to determine whether a\\nconviction for aggravated robbery qualified as an offense involving a firearm, making\\nthe alien deportable, particularly where the portions of the criminal complaint were\\nintegral to the elements of the crime and not surplusage. Vue v. INS, 92 F.3d 696,\\n700 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the IJ acted within this same authority by considering the\\nfacts and circumstances set forth in the criminal complaint, including law\\nenforcement officers’ observation of two males attempting to enter a locked building\\nlate at night, which provided the factual context in which Marambo was observed in\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fpossession of a firearm and contributed to the probable cause that he committed the\\noffense. The IJ did not, as Marambo suggests, attempt to determine Marambo’s guilt\\nor innocence as to an uncharged offense of attempted burglary. Rather, the IJ relied\\non the facts and circumstances that were directly related to the unlawful-possession-\\nof-a-firearm charge; the IJ did not rely on Marambo’s purported guilt of attempted\\nburglary as the basis to conclude the unlawful possession offense was a particularly\\nserious crime.\\n\\n Finally, to the extent that Marambo challenges the inferences the IJ or BIA\\ndrew from the stipulated facts of his conviction, he challenges only how the IJ or BIA\\nweighed the relevant factors to determine whether Marambo committed a particularly\\nserious crime. “[Marambo]’s allegations . . . amount to nothing more than challenges\\nto factual determinations, which we lack jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C.\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Constanza, 647 F.3d at 754; see also Garcia-Aguillon v. Mukasey,\\n524 F.3d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[Petitioner]’s first argument fails to state a\\ncolorable legal claim because it amounts to nothing more than a challenge to the IJ’s\\ndiscretionary and fact-finding exercises cloaked as a question of law.”). We thus find\\nno error in the IJ’s or BIA’s determination that his unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm\\noffense qualified as a particularly serious crime and barred withholding of removal.\\n\\n With respect to his claims regarding the IJ’s and BIA’s denials of his request\\nfor relief under CAT, Marambo first asserts that the BIA should have applied a de\\nnovo standard of review instead of clear error because the facts were established and\\nundisputed and required only application of the correct legal framework. See Njong\\nv. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2018) (applying de novo standard of review\\nto question of whether undisputed facts satisfied legal definition). Again, Marambo\\ndid not raise this issue before the BIA; instead, Marambo argued that the BIA should\\napply a clear error standard. Because Marambo did not raise this issue before the\\nBIA, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Frango, 437 F.3d at 728.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f Marambo finally asserts that the denial of relief under CAT was erroneous\\nunder either a clear error or de novo standard of review. But despite his efforts to\\ncase his arguments as legal in nature, Marambo offers no legal argument; he merely\\nchallenges factual findings. “Factual determinations lie outside our scope of review\\nand . . . we lack the jurisdiction to reweigh the evidence before the BIA.” Cherichel\\nv. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010). We thus conclude that there was no\\nreviewable error in the denial of Marambo’s request for relief pursuant to CAT.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3294,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643335,"string":"4,643,335"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronald CALZONE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Eric T. OLSON, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, Defendant - Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ronald Calzone v. Eric T. Olson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1674"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1674\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ronald Calzone,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Eric T. Olson, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State\\n Highway Patrol,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.1\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ___________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Ronald Calzone seeks a ruling that the Missouri State Highway Patrol is\\nforbidden to stop and inspect his 54,000-pound dump truck, used in furtherance of\\n\\n 1\\n Eric T. Olson is automatically substituted for his predecessor under Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\\n\\fhis private commercial venture, without probable cause. The district court2 denied\\nhis request for declaratory and injunctive relief. We likewise conclude that Calzone\\nis a member of the closely regulated commercial trucking industry, and that the\\npatrol’s random stops and inspections of his truck would comport with the Fourth and\\nFourteenth Amendments. We therefore affirm the judgment.\\n\\n Calzone operates a dump truck in support of his horse and cattle ranch, Eagle\\nWings Ranch. He holds a Missouri-issued commercial driver’s license, and his truck\\nhas Missouri-licensed plates marking it as a 54,000-pound vehicle for “local”\\ncommercial use. A “local commercial motor vehicle” includes “a commercial motor\\nvehicle whose property-carrying operations are confined solely to the transportation\\nof property owned by any person who is the owner or operator of such vehicle to or\\nfrom a farm owned by such person . . .; provided that any such property transported\\nto any such farm is for use in the operation of such farm.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 301.010(27). The license plate on Calzone’s truck is marked with the letter “F,”\\ndesignating it as a vehicle used for farm or farming transportation operations. See id.\\n§ 301.030(3).\\n\\n A Missouri state trooper stopped Calzone in June 2013 to inspect his dump\\ntruck under a Missouri statute that authorizes random roadside inspections of\\ncommercial motor vehicles. See id. § 304.230. Calzone objected to the stop and\\nrefused to allow the inspection. He later filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nseeking, among other things, to enjoin the superintendent of the highway patrol from\\nauthorizing and directing patrol officers to stop and inspect his dump truck without\\nindividualized suspicion that he failed to comply with state law. After an earlier\\ndecision of this court, Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), and a remand\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ffor further proceedings, the only claim remaining on this appeal is one for declaratory\\nand injunctive relief against the superintendent.\\n\\n The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the State to conduct\\nunreasonable searches and seizures. The traditional standard of reasonableness in the\\ncontext of a criminal investigation requires a warrant and probable cause to believe\\nthat a search will discover evidence of unlawful activity. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J\\nv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995). But in the case of commercial property that\\nis involved in a “closely regulated” industry whose operation “poses a clear and\\nsignificant risk to the public welfare,” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443,\\n2454 (2015), the property owner has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a\\nwarrantless seizure and inspection may be reasonable without an individualized\\nshowing of probable cause. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987).\\n\\n To invoke this authority based on a state scheme governing a closely regulated\\nindustry, the State must satisfy three criteria: (1) the regulatory scheme advances a\\nsubstantial government interest; (2) warrantless inspections are necessary to further\\nthe regulatory scheme; and (3) the rules governing the inspections are a\\nconstitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, i.e., the rules must provide notice\\nthat the property may be searched for a specific purpose and must limit the discretion\\nof the inspecting officers. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871. Missouri law authorizes the\\nstate patrol to conduct “random roadside examinations or inspections” of commercial\\nmotor vehicles. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1. We have held that commercial trucking\\nis a “closely regulated” industry, United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355, 356-57 (8th Cir.\\n2009); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), and\\nthat Missouri’s regulatory scheme for the inspection of commercial vehicles is\\nconstitutional on its face:\\n\\n Missouri has a substantial interest in ensuring the safety of the motorists\\n on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways from\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f overweight vehicles. Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357 (citing cases); State v.\\n Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. 1994). Given the transitory\\n nature of commercial trucks, United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 481\\n (5th Cir. 2001), and the difficulty of detecting violations of the\\n regulatory scheme by routine observation, effective enforcement would\\n be nearly impossible without impromptu, warrantless searches. United\\n States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2004). The challenged\\n subsections are also a permissible substitute for a warrant. They provide\\n notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility of roadside\\n inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\\n scope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\\n compliance. See Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357.\\n\\nCalzone, 866 F.3d at 871.\\n\\n The Missouri regime regulates commercial motor vehicles operating on state\\nhighways. Any “motor vehicle designed or regularly used for carrying freight and\\nmerchandise” must be registered as a commercial motor vehicle, and the owner must\\npay an annual fee based on the vehicle’s weight. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.010(9); see\\nid. § 301.030.3, 301.058.1. A commercial motor vehicle may not be operated on\\ncertain streets, see id. § 300.550, is subject to height, weight, and length restrictions,\\nsee id. §§ 304.170-304.230, and must undergo biennial safety inspections. See id.\\n§ 307.350.1. Missouri also has incorporated a subset of the Federal Motor Carrier\\nSafety Regulations into its statutory scheme for any vehicle that is defined as a\\n“commercial motor vehicle” under federal law. See id. § 307.400.1. The applicable\\nregulations govern licensing, safety, required parts and accessories, and transportation\\nof hazardous materials. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391-397. Missouri patrol officers have\\nauthority to conduct random roadside examinations or inspections to determine\\ncompliance with the governing rules. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1, .2, .7.\\n\\n Calzone asserts that he is exempt from the lion’s share of these regulations, so\\nhe is not part of the “closely regulated” industry, and the Missouri inspection scheme\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fis therefore unconstitutional as applied to him. He contends that his truck is exempt\\nfrom all of the federal regulations, because he operates his truck only within\\nMissouri, while the federal definition of “commercial motor vehicle” is a vehicle over\\n10,000 pounds that is “used on a highway in interstate commerce.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5\\n(emphasis added). The Missouri statute, however, makes it unlawful to operate any\\n“commercial motor vehicle,” unless the vehicle complies with the federal regulations,\\n“whether intrastate transportation or interstate transportation.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 307.400.1 (emphasis added). The state statute thus expands the federal definition\\nof “commercial motor vehicle” to encompass vehicles that are engaged only in\\n“intrastate transportation” and thus only in intrastate commerce. Calzone’s proposed\\ninterpretation cannot be squared with the structure of the state statute. Section\\n307.400.5 creates an exception to application of the federal regulations for certain\\ncommercial motor vehicles that are “operated in intrastate commerce to transport\\nproperty” and weigh 26,000 pounds or less. If Calzone were correct that § 307.400.1\\nalready excepted all vehicles that are operated in intrastate commerce, then the\\nnarrower exception of § 307.400.5 would be unnecessary.\\n\\n Calzone also argues that he is exempt from complying with the federal\\nregulations because he is not a “motor carrier” within the meaning of the regulations.\\nCiting a definition from an inapplicable federal statute, he contends that the meaning\\nof “motor carrier” is limited to persons who provide transportation for compensation,\\nsee 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14), and does not extend to one who transports his own\\ncommercial property. But the definition of “motor carrier,” for purposes of the\\nfederal safety regulations that are incorporated by the Missouri statute, is “a for-hire\\nmotor carrier or a private motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (emphasis added); see 49\\nU.S.C. §§ 13102(15), 31502(b). A “private motor carrier” includes a person like\\nCalzone who provides transportation of property by commercial motor vehicle and\\nis not a for-hire motor carrier. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f It is true that Calzone is not subject to the full panoply of regulations that\\ngovern commercial motor vehicles in Missouri. Because Calzone normally uses his\\ndump truck in association with his ranch and has license plates marked with a farm\\nvehicle designation, he is exempt from some of the rules that apply to operators of\\nother commercial motor vehicles. He is not required to acquire a commercial driver’s\\nlicense to operate his truck unless he uses it to transport hazardous materials. See\\nMo. Rev. Stat. §§ 302.700.2(23), 302.700.2(29), 302.775(1). He is a “private carrier”\\nunder Missouri law, so he is not subject to the state regulations that govern operators\\nwho are “motor carriers” under Missouri law. See id. §§ 390.020(23), 390.030.3.\\nAnd his truck qualifies as a “covered farm vehicle” under the federal regulations,\\nwhich exempts him from Missouri’s application of some of the federal standards: he\\nis exempt from all driver qualification regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.2(c)-(d), and\\nhe is excepted from regulations governing hours for drivers, see id. § 395.1(s), and\\nthose imposing a duty on motor carriers to inspect, repair, and maintain commercial\\nmotor vehicles within their control. See id. § 396.1(c).\\n\\n But unlike the vehicles at issue in United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238,\\n1245 (10th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir.\\n1993), Calzone’s truck is subject to regulation under the applicable state regulatory\\nscheme. That Missouri tailors its system to fit different types of commercial motor\\nvehicles does not mean that Calzone is outside of the “closely regulated” industry of\\ncommercial trucking. He operates a 54,000-pound dump truck on Missouri highways\\nin support of a commercial enterprise—his horse and cattle ranch. Although Calzone\\ndoes not operate his commercial vehicle for hire, he is still subject to a broad range\\nof regulations that include height, weight, and length restrictions, licensing standards,\\nstate-conducted inspection requirements, and safety standards. See Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§§ 300.550, 301.030.3, 301.058.1, 304.170-.230, 307.400; 49 C.F.R. §§ 390, 392-93.\\n\\n By choosing to operate a heavy truck in furtherance of a commercial venture,\\nCalzone subjects himself to a pervasive regulatory scheme and has a reduced\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexpectation of privacy. Missouri maintains a “substantial interest in ensuring the\\nsafety of the motorists on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways\\nfrom overweight vehicles,” Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871, and that interest does not\\ndissipate simply because Calzone’s commercial activity is on behalf of his own ranch\\nrather than for hire. We therefore conclude that Missouri’s regulatory scheme\\nadvances a substantial government interest as applied to Calzone, and that warrantless\\ninspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme.\\n\\n Calzone argues that even if he is a member of the closely regulated commercial\\ntrucking industry, the statute authorizing random inspections is an impermissible\\nsubstitute for a warrant. He complains that § 304.230 does not properly define the\\nscope of the authorized searches, adequately notify citizens that they could be subject\\nto warrantless stops, or appropriately limit the discretion of the investigating officer.\\nBut we rejected these same arguments in considering Calzone’s facial challenge, and\\nnothing about the nature of his as-applied challenge changes the answer. The\\ndisputed subsections of the Missouri statutes are a permissible substitute for a\\nwarrant, because “[t]hey provide notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility\\nof roadside inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\\nscope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\\ncompliance.” Id.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420588/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643335/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ronald CALZONE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Eric T. OLSON, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, Defendant - Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1674\n ___________________________\n\n Ronald Calzone,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\n Eric T. Olson, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State\n Highway Patrol,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.1\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ___________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n Ronald Calzone seeks a ruling that the Missouri State Highway Patrol is\nforbidden to stop and inspect his 54,000-pound dump truck, used in furtherance of\n\n 1\n Eric T. Olson is automatically substituted for his predecessor under Federal\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\n\fhis private commercial venture, without probable cause. The district court2 denied\nhis request for declaratory and injunctive relief. We likewise conclude that Calzone\nis a member of the closely regulated commercial trucking industry, and that the\npatrol’s random stops and inspections of his truck would comport with the Fourth and\nFourteenth Amendments. We therefore affirm the judgment.\n\n Calzone operates a dump truck in support of his horse and cattle ranch, Eagle\nWings Ranch. He holds a Missouri-issued commercial driver’s license, and his truck\nhas Missouri-licensed plates marking it as a 54,000-pound vehicle for “local”\ncommercial use. A “local commercial motor vehicle” includes “a commercial motor\nvehicle whose property-carrying operations are confined solely to the transportation\nof property owned by any person who is the owner or operator of such vehicle to or\nfrom a farm owned by such person . . .; provided that any such property transported\nto any such farm is for use in the operation of such farm.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\n§ 301.010(27). The license plate on Calzone’s truck is marked with the letter “F,”\ndesignating it as a vehicle used for farm or farming transportation operations. See id.\n§ 301.030(3).\n\n A Missouri state trooper stopped Calzone in June 2013 to inspect his dump\ntruck under a Missouri statute that authorizes random roadside inspections of\ncommercial motor vehicles. See id. § 304.230. Calzone objected to the stop and\nrefused to allow the inspection. He later filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\nseeking, among other things, to enjoin the superintendent of the highway patrol from\nauthorizing and directing patrol officers to stop and inspect his dump truck without\nindividualized suspicion that he failed to comply with state law. After an earlier\ndecision of this court, Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), and a remand\n\n\n\n 2\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Missouri.\n\n -2-\n\ffor further proceedings, the only claim remaining on this appeal is one for declaratory\nand injunctive relief against the superintendent.\n\n The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the State to conduct\nunreasonable searches and seizures. The traditional standard of reasonableness in the\ncontext of a criminal investigation requires a warrant and probable cause to believe\nthat a search will discover evidence of unlawful activity. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J\nv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995). But in the case of commercial property that\nis involved in a “closely regulated” industry whose operation “poses a clear and\nsignificant risk to the public welfare,” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443,\n2454 (2015), the property owner has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a\nwarrantless seizure and inspection may be reasonable without an individualized\nshowing of probable cause. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987).\n\n To invoke this authority based on a state scheme governing a closely regulated\nindustry, the State must satisfy three criteria: (1) the regulatory scheme advances a\nsubstantial government interest; (2) warrantless inspections are necessary to further\nthe regulatory scheme; and (3) the rules governing the inspections are a\nconstitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, i.e., the rules must provide notice\nthat the property may be searched for a specific purpose and must limit the discretion\nof the inspecting officers. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871. Missouri law authorizes the\nstate patrol to conduct “random roadside examinations or inspections” of commercial\nmotor vehicles. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1. We have held that commercial trucking\nis a “closely regulated” industry, United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355, 356-57 (8th Cir.\n2009); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), and\nthat Missouri’s regulatory scheme for the inspection of commercial vehicles is\nconstitutional on its face:\n\n Missouri has a substantial interest in ensuring the safety of the motorists\n on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways from\n\n -3-\n\f overweight vehicles. Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357 (citing cases); State v.\n Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. 1994). Given the transitory\n nature of commercial trucks, United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 481\n (5th Cir. 2001), and the difficulty of detecting violations of the\n regulatory scheme by routine observation, effective enforcement would\n be nearly impossible without impromptu, warrantless searches. United\n States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2004). The challenged\n subsections are also a permissible substitute for a warrant. They provide\n notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility of roadside\n inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\n scope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\n compliance. See Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357.\n\nCalzone, 866 F.3d at 871.\n\n The Missouri regime regulates commercial motor vehicles operating on state\nhighways. Any “motor vehicle designed or regularly used for carrying freight and\nmerchandise” must be registered as a commercial motor vehicle, and the owner must\npay an annual fee based on the vehicle’s weight. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.010(9); see\nid. § 301.030.3, 301.058.1. A commercial motor vehicle may not be operated on\ncertain streets, see id. § 300.550, is subject to height, weight, and length restrictions,\nsee id. §§ 304.170-304.230, and must undergo biennial safety inspections. See id.\n§ 307.350.1. Missouri also has incorporated a subset of the Federal Motor Carrier\nSafety Regulations into its statutory scheme for any vehicle that is defined as a\n“commercial motor vehicle” under federal law. See id. § 307.400.1. The applicable\nregulations govern licensing, safety, required parts and accessories, and transportation\nof hazardous materials. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391-397. Missouri patrol officers have\nauthority to conduct random roadside examinations or inspections to determine\ncompliance with the governing rules. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1, .2, .7.\n\n Calzone asserts that he is exempt from the lion’s share of these regulations, so\nhe is not part of the “closely regulated” industry, and the Missouri inspection scheme\n\n -4-\n\fis therefore unconstitutional as applied to him. He contends that his truck is exempt\nfrom all of the federal regulations, because he operates his truck only within\nMissouri, while the federal definition of “commercial motor vehicle” is a vehicle over\n10,000 pounds that is “used on a highway in interstate commerce.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5\n(emphasis added). The Missouri statute, however, makes it unlawful to operate any\n“commercial motor vehicle,” unless the vehicle complies with the federal regulations,\n“whether intrastate transportation or interstate transportation.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\n§ 307.400.1 (emphasis added). The state statute thus expands the federal definition\nof “commercial motor vehicle” to encompass vehicles that are engaged only in\n“intrastate transportation” and thus only in intrastate commerce. Calzone’s proposed\ninterpretation cannot be squared with the structure of the state statute. Section\n307.400.5 creates an exception to application of the federal regulations for certain\ncommercial motor vehicles that are “operated in intrastate commerce to transport\nproperty” and weigh 26,000 pounds or less. If Calzone were correct that § 307.400.1\nalready excepted all vehicles that are operated in intrastate commerce, then the\nnarrower exception of § 307.400.5 would be unnecessary.\n\n Calzone also argues that he is exempt from complying with the federal\nregulations because he is not a “motor carrier” within the meaning of the regulations.\nCiting a definition from an inapplicable federal statute, he contends that the meaning\nof “motor carrier” is limited to persons who provide transportation for compensation,\nsee 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14), and does not extend to one who transports his own\ncommercial property. But the definition of “motor carrier,” for purposes of the\nfederal safety regulations that are incorporated by the Missouri statute, is “a for-hire\nmotor carrier or a private motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (emphasis added); see 49\nU.S.C. §§ 13102(15), 31502(b). A “private motor carrier” includes a person like\nCalzone who provides transportation of property by commercial motor vehicle and\nis not a for-hire motor carrier. Id.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f It is true that Calzone is not subject to the full panoply of regulations that\ngovern commercial motor vehicles in Missouri. Because Calzone normally uses his\ndump truck in association with his ranch and has license plates marked with a farm\nvehicle designation, he is exempt from some of the rules that apply to operators of\nother commercial motor vehicles. He is not required to acquire a commercial driver’s\nlicense to operate his truck unless he uses it to transport hazardous materials. See\nMo. Rev. Stat. §§ 302.700.2(23), 302.700.2(29), 302.775(1). He is a “private carrier”\nunder Missouri law, so he is not subject to the state regulations that govern operators\nwho are “motor carriers” under Missouri law. See id. §§ 390.020(23), 390.030.3.\nAnd his truck qualifies as a “covered farm vehicle” under the federal regulations,\nwhich exempts him from Missouri’s application of some of the federal standards: he\nis exempt from all driver qualification regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.2(c)-(d), and\nhe is excepted from regulations governing hours for drivers, see id. § 395.1(s), and\nthose imposing a duty on motor carriers to inspect, repair, and maintain commercial\nmotor vehicles within their control. See id. § 396.1(c).\n\n But unlike the vehicles at issue in United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238,\n1245 (10th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir.\n1993), Calzone’s truck is subject to regulation under the applicable state regulatory\nscheme. That Missouri tailors its system to fit different types of commercial motor\nvehicles does not mean that Calzone is outside of the “closely regulated” industry of\ncommercial trucking. He operates a 54,000-pound dump truck on Missouri highways\nin support of a commercial enterprise—his horse and cattle ranch. Although Calzone\ndoes not operate his commercial vehicle for hire, he is still subject to a broad range\nof regulations that include height, weight, and length restrictions, licensing standards,\nstate-conducted inspection requirements, and safety standards. See Mo. Rev. Stat.\n§§ 300.550, 301.030.3, 301.058.1, 304.170-.230, 307.400; 49 C.F.R. §§ 390, 392-93.\n\n By choosing to operate a heavy truck in furtherance of a commercial venture,\nCalzone subjects himself to a pervasive regulatory scheme and has a reduced\n\n -6-\n\fexpectation of privacy. Missouri maintains a “substantial interest in ensuring the\nsafety of the motorists on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways\nfrom overweight vehicles,” Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871, and that interest does not\ndissipate simply because Calzone’s commercial activity is on behalf of his own ranch\nrather than for hire. We therefore conclude that Missouri’s regulatory scheme\nadvances a substantial government interest as applied to Calzone, and that warrantless\ninspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme.\n\n Calzone argues that even if he is a member of the closely regulated commercial\ntrucking industry, the statute authorizing random inspections is an impermissible\nsubstitute for a warrant. He complains that § 304.230 does not properly define the\nscope of the authorized searches, adequately notify citizens that they could be subject\nto warrantless stops, or appropriately limit the discretion of the investigating officer.\nBut we rejected these same arguments in considering Calzone’s facial challenge, and\nnothing about the nature of his as-applied challenge changes the answer. The\ndisputed subsections of the Missouri statutes are a permissible substitute for a\nwarrant, because “[t]hey provide notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility\nof roadside inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\nscope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\ncompliance.” Id.\n\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -7-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ronald CALZONE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Eric T. OLSON, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, Defendant - Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1674\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Ronald Calzone,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Eric T. Olson, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State\\n Highway Patrol,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.1\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ___________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Ronald Calzone seeks a ruling that the Missouri State Highway Patrol is\\nforbidden to stop and inspect his 54,000-pound dump truck, used in furtherance of\\n\\n 1\\n Eric T. Olson is automatically substituted for his predecessor under Federal\\nRule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\\n\\fhis private commercial venture, without probable cause. The district court2 denied\\nhis request for declaratory and injunctive relief. We likewise conclude that Calzone\\nis a member of the closely regulated commercial trucking industry, and that the\\npatrol’s random stops and inspections of his truck would comport with the Fourth and\\nFourteenth Amendments. We therefore affirm the judgment.\\n\\n Calzone operates a dump truck in support of his horse and cattle ranch, Eagle\\nWings Ranch. He holds a Missouri-issued commercial driver’s license, and his truck\\nhas Missouri-licensed plates marking it as a 54,000-pound vehicle for “local”\\ncommercial use. A “local commercial motor vehicle” includes “a commercial motor\\nvehicle whose property-carrying operations are confined solely to the transportation\\nof property owned by any person who is the owner or operator of such vehicle to or\\nfrom a farm owned by such person . . .; provided that any such property transported\\nto any such farm is for use in the operation of such farm.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 301.010(27). The license plate on Calzone’s truck is marked with the letter “F,”\\ndesignating it as a vehicle used for farm or farming transportation operations. See id.\\n§ 301.030(3).\\n\\n A Missouri state trooper stopped Calzone in June 2013 to inspect his dump\\ntruck under a Missouri statute that authorizes random roadside inspections of\\ncommercial motor vehicles. See id. § 304.230. Calzone objected to the stop and\\nrefused to allow the inspection. He later filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nseeking, among other things, to enjoin the superintendent of the highway patrol from\\nauthorizing and directing patrol officers to stop and inspect his dump truck without\\nindividualized suspicion that he failed to comply with state law. After an earlier\\ndecision of this court, Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), and a remand\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Missouri.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\ffor further proceedings, the only claim remaining on this appeal is one for declaratory\\nand injunctive relief against the superintendent.\\n\\n The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the State to conduct\\nunreasonable searches and seizures. The traditional standard of reasonableness in the\\ncontext of a criminal investigation requires a warrant and probable cause to believe\\nthat a search will discover evidence of unlawful activity. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J\\nv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995). But in the case of commercial property that\\nis involved in a “closely regulated” industry whose operation “poses a clear and\\nsignificant risk to the public welfare,” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443,\\n2454 (2015), the property owner has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a\\nwarrantless seizure and inspection may be reasonable without an individualized\\nshowing of probable cause. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1987).\\n\\n To invoke this authority based on a state scheme governing a closely regulated\\nindustry, the State must satisfy three criteria: (1) the regulatory scheme advances a\\nsubstantial government interest; (2) warrantless inspections are necessary to further\\nthe regulatory scheme; and (3) the rules governing the inspections are a\\nconstitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, i.e., the rules must provide notice\\nthat the property may be searched for a specific purpose and must limit the discretion\\nof the inspecting officers. Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871. Missouri law authorizes the\\nstate patrol to conduct “random roadside examinations or inspections” of commercial\\nmotor vehicles. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1. We have held that commercial trucking\\nis a “closely regulated” industry, United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355, 356-57 (8th Cir.\\n2009); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), and\\nthat Missouri’s regulatory scheme for the inspection of commercial vehicles is\\nconstitutional on its face:\\n\\n Missouri has a substantial interest in ensuring the safety of the motorists\\n on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways from\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f overweight vehicles. Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357 (citing cases); State v.\\n Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. 1994). Given the transitory\\n nature of commercial trucks, United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 481\\n (5th Cir. 2001), and the difficulty of detecting violations of the\\n regulatory scheme by routine observation, effective enforcement would\\n be nearly impossible without impromptu, warrantless searches. United\\n States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130, 136 (1st Cir. 2004). The challenged\\n subsections are also a permissible substitute for a warrant. They provide\\n notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility of roadside\\n inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\\n scope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\\n compliance. See Ruiz, 569 F.3d at 357.\\n\\nCalzone, 866 F.3d at 871.\\n\\n The Missouri regime regulates commercial motor vehicles operating on state\\nhighways. Any “motor vehicle designed or regularly used for carrying freight and\\nmerchandise” must be registered as a commercial motor vehicle, and the owner must\\npay an annual fee based on the vehicle’s weight. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.010(9); see\\nid. § 301.030.3, 301.058.1. A commercial motor vehicle may not be operated on\\ncertain streets, see id. § 300.550, is subject to height, weight, and length restrictions,\\nsee id. §§ 304.170-304.230, and must undergo biennial safety inspections. See id.\\n§ 307.350.1. Missouri also has incorporated a subset of the Federal Motor Carrier\\nSafety Regulations into its statutory scheme for any vehicle that is defined as a\\n“commercial motor vehicle” under federal law. See id. § 307.400.1. The applicable\\nregulations govern licensing, safety, required parts and accessories, and transportation\\nof hazardous materials. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391-397. Missouri patrol officers have\\nauthority to conduct random roadside examinations or inspections to determine\\ncompliance with the governing rules. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.230.1, .2, .7.\\n\\n Calzone asserts that he is exempt from the lion’s share of these regulations, so\\nhe is not part of the “closely regulated” industry, and the Missouri inspection scheme\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fis therefore unconstitutional as applied to him. He contends that his truck is exempt\\nfrom all of the federal regulations, because he operates his truck only within\\nMissouri, while the federal definition of “commercial motor vehicle” is a vehicle over\\n10,000 pounds that is “used on a highway in interstate commerce.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5\\n(emphasis added). The Missouri statute, however, makes it unlawful to operate any\\n“commercial motor vehicle,” unless the vehicle complies with the federal regulations,\\n“whether intrastate transportation or interstate transportation.” Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§ 307.400.1 (emphasis added). The state statute thus expands the federal definition\\nof “commercial motor vehicle” to encompass vehicles that are engaged only in\\n“intrastate transportation” and thus only in intrastate commerce. Calzone’s proposed\\ninterpretation cannot be squared with the structure of the state statute. Section\\n307.400.5 creates an exception to application of the federal regulations for certain\\ncommercial motor vehicles that are “operated in intrastate commerce to transport\\nproperty” and weigh 26,000 pounds or less. If Calzone were correct that § 307.400.1\\nalready excepted all vehicles that are operated in intrastate commerce, then the\\nnarrower exception of § 307.400.5 would be unnecessary.\\n\\n Calzone also argues that he is exempt from complying with the federal\\nregulations because he is not a “motor carrier” within the meaning of the regulations.\\nCiting a definition from an inapplicable federal statute, he contends that the meaning\\nof “motor carrier” is limited to persons who provide transportation for compensation,\\nsee 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14), and does not extend to one who transports his own\\ncommercial property. But the definition of “motor carrier,” for purposes of the\\nfederal safety regulations that are incorporated by the Missouri statute, is “a for-hire\\nmotor carrier or a private motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (emphasis added); see 49\\nU.S.C. §§ 13102(15), 31502(b). A “private motor carrier” includes a person like\\nCalzone who provides transportation of property by commercial motor vehicle and\\nis not a for-hire motor carrier. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f It is true that Calzone is not subject to the full panoply of regulations that\\ngovern commercial motor vehicles in Missouri. Because Calzone normally uses his\\ndump truck in association with his ranch and has license plates marked with a farm\\nvehicle designation, he is exempt from some of the rules that apply to operators of\\nother commercial motor vehicles. He is not required to acquire a commercial driver’s\\nlicense to operate his truck unless he uses it to transport hazardous materials. See\\nMo. Rev. Stat. §§ 302.700.2(23), 302.700.2(29), 302.775(1). He is a “private carrier”\\nunder Missouri law, so he is not subject to the state regulations that govern operators\\nwho are “motor carriers” under Missouri law. See id. §§ 390.020(23), 390.030.3.\\nAnd his truck qualifies as a “covered farm vehicle” under the federal regulations,\\nwhich exempts him from Missouri’s application of some of the federal standards: he\\nis exempt from all driver qualification regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.2(c)-(d), and\\nhe is excepted from regulations governing hours for drivers, see id. § 395.1(s), and\\nthose imposing a duty on motor carriers to inspect, repair, and maintain commercial\\nmotor vehicles within their control. See id. § 396.1(c).\\n\\n But unlike the vehicles at issue in United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238,\\n1245 (10th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir.\\n1993), Calzone’s truck is subject to regulation under the applicable state regulatory\\nscheme. That Missouri tailors its system to fit different types of commercial motor\\nvehicles does not mean that Calzone is outside of the “closely regulated” industry of\\ncommercial trucking. He operates a 54,000-pound dump truck on Missouri highways\\nin support of a commercial enterprise—his horse and cattle ranch. Although Calzone\\ndoes not operate his commercial vehicle for hire, he is still subject to a broad range\\nof regulations that include height, weight, and length restrictions, licensing standards,\\nstate-conducted inspection requirements, and safety standards. See Mo. Rev. Stat.\\n§§ 300.550, 301.030.3, 301.058.1, 304.170-.230, 307.400; 49 C.F.R. §§ 390, 392-93.\\n\\n By choosing to operate a heavy truck in furtherance of a commercial venture,\\nCalzone subjects himself to a pervasive regulatory scheme and has a reduced\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fexpectation of privacy. Missouri maintains a “substantial interest in ensuring the\\nsafety of the motorists on its highways and in minimizing damage to the highways\\nfrom overweight vehicles,” Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871, and that interest does not\\ndissipate simply because Calzone’s commercial activity is on behalf of his own ranch\\nrather than for hire. We therefore conclude that Missouri’s regulatory scheme\\nadvances a substantial government interest as applied to Calzone, and that warrantless\\ninspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme.\\n\\n Calzone argues that even if he is a member of the closely regulated commercial\\ntrucking industry, the statute authorizing random inspections is an impermissible\\nsubstitute for a warrant. He complains that § 304.230 does not properly define the\\nscope of the authorized searches, adequately notify citizens that they could be subject\\nto warrantless stops, or appropriately limit the discretion of the investigating officer.\\nBut we rejected these same arguments in considering Calzone’s facial challenge, and\\nnothing about the nature of his as-applied challenge changes the answer. The\\ndisputed subsections of the Missouri statutes are a permissible substitute for a\\nwarrant, because “[t]hey provide notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility\\nof roadside inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and they limit the\\nscope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory\\ncompliance.” Id.\\n\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3295,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643336,"string":"4,643,336"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Robert Paul DOLS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Robert Paul Dols v. Andrew M. Saul"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1910"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Colloton, Gruender, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889014/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889015/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1910\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Robert Paul Dols\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Andrew Saul,1 Commissioner, Social Security Administration\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The Social Security Commissioner denied Robert Dols’s application for\\nsupplemental security income. After the Commissioner issued a final decision, Dols\\n\\n 1\\n Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019\\nand has been automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\\n\\nfiled a complaint in the district court,2 which granted the Commissioner’s motion for\\nsummary judgment. We affirm.\\n\\n Dols applied for supplemental security income in September 2013. After the\\nclaim was initially denied and denied again upon reconsideration, an administrative\\nlaw judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Dols; Dr. Michael Lace, a psychological expert;\\nNancy Kaley, Dols’s counselor; and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. The\\nALJ issued a decision on September 2, 2015 using the five-step process outlined by\\n20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) for evaluating disability. At step two, the ALJ determined\\nthat Dols “has the following severe impairments: anxiety, depression, Asperger’s\\ndisorder, cerebral dysfunction, obsessive compulsive disorder and [a] history of\\nsubstance abuse/dependence.” At step three, the ALJ concluded that Dols’s\\nimpairments did not meet or medically equal “the severity of one of the listed\\nimpairments.” The ALJ denied Dols benefits, giving great weight to Dr. Lace’s\\nopinion and no weight to Kaley’s opinion. The Appeals Council denied Dols’s\\nrequest for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.\\n\\n In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that substantial\\nevidence supported both the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols did not meet or equal a listed\\nimpairment and the ALJ’s decision to give great weight to Dr. Lace’s opinion. On\\nappeal, Dols argues that his severe impairments meet listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and\\n12.10. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1 (2013). He also argues that the ALJ\\nimproperly “accorded great weight” to Dr. Lace’s opinion and that Kaley’s opinion\\nshould have been given more weight than Dr. Lace’s.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Tony N. Leung, Magistrate Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred by consent of the parties\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n -2-\\n\\n “We review the district court’s determination de novo, affirming the ALJ’s\\ndecision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Scott v.\\nBerryhill, 855 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We\\nmust consider “the evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well as the\\nevidence that detracts from it. That we would have come to a different conclusion,\\nhowever, is not a sufficient basis for reversal.” Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935\\n(8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it\\nis possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those\\npositions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”\\nGoff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005). “In conducting our limited and\\ndeferential review of the final agency determination under the substantial-evidence\\nstandard, we must view the record in the light most favorable to that determination.”\\nChismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\n\\n At step two of the five-step process, the ALJ considers “the medical severity\\nof [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, “[i]f\\nthe impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments [in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,\\nsubpt. P, app. 1], the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v.\\nYuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “To meet a listing, a claimant must show that he\\nor she meets all of the criteria for the listed impairment.” Blackburn v. Colvin, 761\\nF.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n At the time of the ALJ’s decision, listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.06 required that\\na claimant meet the paragraph A and B criteria or the paragraph A and C criteria. 20\\nC.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (2013). Listing 12.10 required that a claimant\\nmeet both the paragraph A and paragraph B criteria. Id. § 12.10. We assume, without\\ndeciding, that the paragraph A criteria have been satisfied for all the listings at issue.\\nThus, Dols may meet one of the listings by satisfying the paragraph B or the\\nparagraph C criteria. We consider paragraph B first.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n All four listings have the same paragraph B, which is satisfied when the\\nclaimant proves two of four criteria. See Id. §§ 12.02(B), 12.04(B), 12.06(B),\\n12.10(B) (2013). The ALJ determined that Dols did not prove any of the four.\\nBecause Dols appeals the ALJ’s determination as to only the first two criteria, Dols\\nmust succeed on both arguments. Thus, Dols must first show that substantial\\nevidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that Dols failed to prove the first\\ncriteria because he has a moderate rather than a marked restriction on his activities\\nof daily living (“ADLs”). Id.\\n\\n ADLs “include adaptive activities such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking\\npublic transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for\\n. . . grooming and hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office.”\\nId. § 12.00(C)(1) (2013). The Code of Federal Regulations requires an assessment\\nof “the quality of these activities by their independence, appropriateness,\\neffectiveness and sustainability” and a determination of “the extent to which [the\\nclaimant is] capable of initiating and participating in activities independent of\\nsupervision or direction.” Id.\\n\\n In support of its determination, the ALJ noted that the testifying psychological\\nexpert, Dr. Lace, “opined moderate limits.” It also noted that Dols “indicated in his\\nNovember 2013 function report that he had no problems performing personal cares\\nsuch as bathing or dressing himself”; that “[h]e performs yard work around the sober\\nhouse he resides at”; “prepares meals and cleans his house”; rakes and mows the\\nlawn; washes laundry; “shops for groceries and some personal items”; that he “can\\ncount change, pay bills, use a checkbook or money orders and a savings account”;\\nand that he was working part-time.\\n\\n Dols argues that the ALJ should not have relied on Dols’s statements in his\\nfunction report because accepting the “statements at face value in the paragraph B\\nanalysis was at odds with the ALJ’s own credibility determination.” During the\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nALJ’s step three analysis, it was required to determine Dols’s residual functional\\ncapacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). In doing so, the ALJ must assess the\\nclaimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of\\nwork.” Id. § 416.945(a)(4). The ALJ noted that Dols’s and Kaley’s statements\\n“concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Dols’s] symptoms\\n[were] not credible to the extent they [were] not consistent with the objective medical\\nevidence and other evidence.” Dols claims that the ALJ cannot “have it both ways.”\\nHe argues that the ALJ could not base its paragraph B findings on Dols’s statements\\nwhile simultaneously finding his statements not credible for the RFC assessment.\\n\\n But the RFC assessment requires consideration of “all of the relevant medical\\nand other evidence.” Id. § 416.945(a)(3). In contrast, the ALJ looked to the function\\nreport for an account of Dols’s daily life. The ALJ found Dols’s statements not\\ncredible for the RFC assessment only to the extent that they conflicted with medical\\nevidence and other evidence. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Dols\\ncould reliably describe his daily life but that Dols’s opinion about “physical and\\nmental limitations” that would affect what work he could do in a work setting was not\\ncredible. Id. § 416.945(a)(1).\\n\\n In addition, Dols argues that the ALJ’s finding is not supported by substantial\\nevidence because Kaley’s testimony demonstrates that he “has serious difficulties in\\nperforming his ADLs without the significant supervision and oversight of the Five\\nStars residential facility where he lives.” Kaley testified before the ALJ that Dols\\ncould drive and grocery shop but that he “would need help with his money.” She\\nexplained that staff at the residential facility review his grocery list every two weeks\\nand make sure that he does not run out of his medications. Dols also points to the fact\\nthat the staff at the residential facility meet with him three times a week.\\n\\n While Dols has some help with managing money and grocery shopping, he also\\nappears to have done those tasks on his own at times. Further, Dols testified that he\\n\\n -5-\\n\\ncleans dishes and bathrooms, sweeps and vacuums the house, and reads the\\nnewspaper and magazines. A licensed psychologist who examined Dols noted that\\nhe arrived early for their meeting and that he had “arranged a ride.” She also\\nobserved that he was “casually dressed and adequately groomed.” At the time of the\\nhearing before the ALJ, Dols had recently worked as a janitor. And Kaley testified\\nthat Dols had biked to a movie.\\n\\n Given that Dols bears the burden of proving a disability at step three, we\\nconclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols has\\nonly a moderate restriction on his ADLs. See Blackburn, 761 F.3d at 858 (explaining\\nthat the claimant “bears the burden of establishing that he meets all the criteria”). “It\\nis not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ or to try the\\nissue in this case de novo.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus,\\nsubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Dols does not meet the\\nparagraph B requirements, and he therefore does not meet listing 12.10, which\\nrequires claimants to satisfy both the paragraph A and the paragraph B criteria, or\\nlistings 12.02, 12.04, or 12.06 on the basis of paragraph B. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt.\\nP, app. 1, §§ 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, 12.10 (2013).\\n\\n While Dols has not shown that he meets paragraph B, he may still meet listings\\n12.02 and 12.043 if he shows that he meets paragraph C. Id. § 12.00 (2013). He\\nargues that he satisfies paragraph C’s third criterion, which requires him to show that\\na “chronic organic mental disorder” (§ 12.02) or a “chronic affective disorder”\\n(§ 12.04) caused a “[c]urrent history of 1 or more years’ inability to function outside\\na highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued need for such\\nan arrangement.” Id. §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013). “The regulations define highly\\n\\n\\n 3\\n While Dols argues on appeal that he satisfies the 12.02 and 12.04 paragraph\\nC requirements, he concedes that he does not meet listing 12.06’s different paragraph\\nC criteria.\\n -6-\\n\\nsupportive settings to include hospitals, halfway houses, care facilities, and personal\\nhome settings that greatly reduce the mental demands placed on [the claimant].”\\nMyers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original and internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n The ALJ concluded that Dols failed to meet the paragraph C criteria. It\\nacknowledged that Dols “currently resides in sober housing” and that he had\\npreviously “resided with his parents.” But the ALJ pointed out that the record “shows\\nthat [Dols] was the primary caretaker for his mother after his father passed away.”\\nIt determined that the “record does not support a finding that [Dols] is required to live\\nin residential housing due to his mental impairments when not using mood-altering\\nsubstances.”\\n\\n At the hearing, Kaley testified that Dols had been living at Five Stars for three\\nyears. Dols argues that he has met the paragraph C criteria because the support he\\nreceives at Five Stars “includes group and individual therapy sessions, facilitated\\nattendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, oversight of [his] budget,\\nmedications, and grocery delivery order, and general oversight of [his] daily affairs.”\\n\\n The district court concluded that the evidence indicates Dols may need a\\nsupportive living arrangement, but it emphasized that paragraph C requires Dols to\\ndemonstrate his need for a highly supportive living arrangement. We agree with the\\ndistrict court that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols has\\nnot made such a showing here. Though one psychologist stated that Dols “could be\\nconsidered for future placement in a semi-independent or shared-living facility with\\non-site supports,” his recommendation did not indicate that Dols needs a highly\\nsupportive living arrangement. Indeed, as outlined above, Dols has worked part-time,\\ncompletes a number of chores around Five Stars, prepares food for himself, and\\nsometimes shops for his own groceries. The record also indicates that Dols lived on\\nhis own after moving out of his parents’ home before he began living at Five Stars.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\n Further, Dols began living at Five Stars to participate in a relapse recovery\\nprogram for his drug and alcohol addictions. He has maintained his sobriety since\\n2012. Five Stars was not intended to have permanent residents, but Five Stars\\nallowed Dols to stay because he did not “have anywhere else to go and he can’t\\nwork.” But paragraph C requires that a chronic organic mental disorder or a chronic\\naffective disorder caused the “inability to function outside a highly supportive living\\narrangement.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013).\\nDols’s alcohol and drug addictions caused his initial residence at Five Stars. And\\nwhile Dols attends three meetings a week at Five Stars, the meetings are for his\\nalcohol addiction, not for mental health treatment. Kaley testified that nobody at Five\\nStars is trained “to deal with populations that have the problems that [Dols] has.”\\nEven were we to assume that Five Stars is a highly supportive living environment,\\nsubstantial evidence supports a conclusion that Dols has not shown that a chronic\\norganic mental disorder or a chronic affective disorder caused his alleged need to stay\\nat Five Stars. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols\\ndoes not satisfy the paragraph C criteria.\\n\\n Finally, Dols contests the weight the ALJ gave to Kaley’s and Dr. Lace’s\\nopinions. He argues that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to give no weight to\\nKaley’s opinion, that Dr. Lace’s opinion should not have been given “great weight,”\\nand that Kaley’s opinion should outweigh Dr. Lace’s given her greater familiarity and\\nrelationship with Dols. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Dols challenged the\\nALJ’s decision to give no weight to Kaley’s opinion in the district court. See Nasser\\nv. Astrue, 248 F. App’x 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (declining to consider\\narguments raised for the first time on appeal). But even if we assume that Dols raised\\nthis argument, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.\\n\\n According to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, Kaley\\nis a non-medical, “other” source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d) (2013); Sloan v. Astrue,\\n499 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that non-medical, “other sources”\\n\\n -8-\\n\\ninclude rehabilitation counselors). The regulations classify Dr. Lace, a psychological\\nexpert, as a medical source. The SSA provides similar factors for weighing both\\nKaley’s and Dr. Lace’s opinions, including the examining and treatment relationships,\\nthe length of the treatment, the nature and extent of the relationship, supportability,\\nconsistency with the record, specialization, and other factors that support or refute the\\nopinion. See SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining the\\nfactors for non-medical, other sources); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (2013) (explaining\\nthe factors for medical sources).\\n\\n Kaley began counseling Dols in March 2012 and testified about Dols’s life at\\nFive Stars. She explained that Dols has Asperger’s, that he “appears angry” when\\nrelating to others, does not make eye contact, “grunts when he gets tense,” and “at\\ntimes” gets Tourette’s. She was “afraid” that his symptoms “would happen at a job\\nsite.” It is not surprising that there is some evidence in a lengthy administrative\\nrecord “which detracts from the Commissioner’s determination” about what weight\\nto give Kaley’s opinion. See Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir.\\n2017). For example, Kaley knew and counseled Dols for a number of years, and\\nothers who interacted with Dols supported her observation that Dols has trouble\\ncommunicating.\\n\\n But we consider only whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial\\nevidence, not whether we would have made the same decision. See Travis v. Astrue,\\n477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007). And some of Kaley’s testimony is contradicted\\nor not supported by the record. While Kaley said Dols “got Tourette’s,” Dols does\\nnot cite anything in the record indicating that he was diagnosed with such a condition.\\nFurther, while Kaley testified that Dols could not hold a job, he had recently worked\\nas a janitor with no performance problems. In general, Kaley presented little to no\\nevidence other than her personal observations. Instead, she based her opinion about\\nDols’s ability to work on her observations as a licensed alcohol and drug counselor,\\nnot as an expert with experience in making disability determinations. “[W]e must\\n\\n -9-\\n\\nview the record in the light most favorable to [the ALJ’s] determination.”\\nChismarich, 888 F.3d at 980.\\n\\n By contrast, Dr. Lace testified as an expert in mental health, was familiar with\\nthe disability review process, and reviewed all of the evidence in the case. He\\ntestified that Dols’s mental health problems did not meet or equal any of the listings.\\nHe said that certain work restrictions, like “no public contact at all,” should apply to\\nDols. He explained that Dols should be “limited to very simple,” routine, repetitive\\ntasks and that he was best suited to low-stress work that does not include high-speed\\nproduction tasks.\\n\\n A review of the record as a whole supports Dr. Lace’s testimony. After a\\nphone interview with Dols in October 2013, an SSA employee indicated that Dols\\nhad no difficulty with understanding, coherency, concentrating, talking, or answering\\nquestions. Though one psychologist observed “poor communication skills, [a] lack\\nof social relationships, poor eye contact, and [a] vocal tic” in February 2014, a\\ndifferent psychologist noted that Dols was “relaxed, casual, cooperative, [and]\\nappropriate,” and that Dols was “not depressed” and “not anxious” after four\\nmeetings from July 2014 to April 2015. The psychologist additionally observed that\\nDols’s speech was coherent with a normal rate and tone and that Dols’s judgment and\\ninsight were intact. The psychologist made the same observations following July and\\nOctober 2015 meetings with Dols.\\n\\n This evidence supports Dr. Lace’s opinion and contradicts Kaley’s opinion.\\nSee SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 (explaining that evidence from a non-\\nmedical, other source could outweigh evidence from a medical source when the non-\\nmedical source “has seen the individual more often and has greater knowledge of the\\nindividual’s functioning over time” and if the opinion “has better supporting\\nevidence and is more consistent with the evidence as a whole” (emphasis added)).\\nTo the extent that the Vineland II test measuring adaptive skills and other evidence\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nin the record conflicts with Dr. Lace’s opinion, we agree with the district court that\\nthe ALJ’s decision was within the “zone of choice.”4 See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d\\nat 1042.\\n\\n In sum, while the ALJ could have weighed the evidence differently, substantial\\nevidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Lace’s review of all the evidence\\nshould be credited over Kaley’s observations as a non-medical, other source. “It is\\nthe function of the ALJ to weigh conflicting evidence.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d\\n705, 709 (8th Cir. 2007). We “will not reverse merely because evidence also points\\nto an alternate outcome.” Travis, 477 F.3d at 1042.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420589/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.\\n\\n The parent of a disabled child who goes to any length to support and assist the\\nchild in ways that allow the child to be as fully integrated in society as possible\\nrejoices in the child’s success. That same parent worries about what will happen to\\nthe child after he or she is gone, fearful that the system will fail the child and leave\\nhim or her mostly defenseless in a world that little recognizes mental illness and the\\nhurdles it lays before those who suffer. This case is a case in which those parental\\nfears have been realized. And I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Dols further argues that the ALJ should not have given Dr. Lace’s opinion\\ngreat weight because Dr. Lace testified that his opinion was based on the record and\\nthat he did not consider Kaley’s testimony. Dols claims that the SSA’s Hearings,\\nAppeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”) required Dr. Lace to have\\nconsidered Kaley’s testimony. Even if HALLEX did impose such a requirement, it\\n“is not a regulation. It has no legal force, and it does not bind the SSA.” See\\nSchweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981) (per curiam).\\n\\n Robert Dols faces many significant mental health challenges. He is 62 years\\nold and suffers from, among other things, depression, anxiety, alcohol dependence,\\nand autism-spectrum disorder. His intellectual functioning falls in the low-average\\nrange, but his memory is not as good as one would expect of a person with his IQ.\\nAs a result of his mental health issues, Robert struggles to interact appropriately with\\nothers. He is easily frustrated and engages in conduct that is generally considered by\\nothers to be unusual and avoidant. He lacks sufficient insight to see most, if any, of\\nthese limitations in himself. The record reflects that, while in conversation with\\nothers, Robert scowls, grunts, squeals, avoids eye contact, is unable to track the\\nconversation, and is unable to appropriately answer questions put to him. Robert\\nsometimes shouts out vulgarities or makes odd guttural noises when anxious,\\nparticularly in group settings. Robert reports that he is sometimes asked to leave a\\njob after a single day. No one has been able to identify that Robert has ever had a\\nclose friend. Robert lived with his parents until he was nearly fifty years old—only\\nbecoming independent when his mother was placed in a nursing home.\\n\\n While living at home with both of his parents, Robert was able to maintain\\nsustained full-time employment with the assistance and support of his parents. When\\nhis father died in 2004, Robert quit his job to assist his mother. In 2006, Robert’s\\nmother was placed in a nursing home, and he moved into an apartment. Since then,\\nRobert has been unable to hold a job, has suffered from alcoholism, and was homeless\\nfor a time. He now lives in an alcohol-related group home, even though he no longer\\nmeets the requirements to reside there.\\n\\n I recognize that some conflict exists in the record as to the nature and extent\\nof Robert’s social limitations. But, because the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons”\\nfor rejecting Robert’s primary counselor’s opinion, I would reverse and remand to the\\ndistrict court with instructions to remand to the ALJ for reconsideration of Robert’s\\napplication after giving the counselor’s opinion proper weight.\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n\\n The ALJ assigned “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Lace, who conducted\\na review of the record and testified as a consulting physician. The ALJ, however,\\ngave “no weight” to the opinion of Robert’s “primary counselor” in the intensive\\noutpatient program, Nancy Kaley. The ALJ found Kaley’s testimony about the\\n“intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Robert’s] symptoms” to be “not\\ncredible” because of the inconsistency with (1) Dr. Lace’s opinion, (2) “observations\\nby medical providers,” and (3) Robert’s activities of daily living (ADLs). The record\\ndoes not support the ALJ’s credibility assessment.\\n\\n In assessing whether a claimant is disabled for the purposes of Social Security\\nbenefits eligibility, an ALJ must consider evidence provided by “other sources” like\\nKaley. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2015). When an ALJ\\ndiscounts evidence based on a perceived lack of credibility, “[w]e ‘do not reweigh the\\nevidence presented to the ALJ’” but rather defer to the ALJ’s credibility\\ndeterminations “as long as those determinations are supported by good reasons and\\nsubstantial evidence.” Midgyett v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 727 F. App’x 228,\\n229 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 2015)).\\nKaley’s opinion is neither inconsistent with medical provider observations nor\\nRobert’s ADLs.\\n\\n Kaley testified that Robert does not know how to interact with or relate to\\nothers and needs help to communicate with others. She testified that he gets “agitated\\nand nervous” when required to interact with others, “does not respond appropriately\\nto conversation,” and “does everything by himself.” She described “his pattern of\\nrelating to others” to include angry facial expressions, avoidance of eye contact,\\nsudden profane outbursts, tics, grunts and roars, and an inability to understand humor.\\nKaley identified these behaviors as the primary obstacle to Robert’s employment.\\nShe found notable “deficits in terms of fending for himself.” Kaley opined that\\nRobert “wouldn’t make it [living by himself]” because “he doesn’t know how to\\n\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\ninteract with people. He can’t hold a job, he can’t.” She testified that he would be\\nhomeless if he did not reside in a supportive environment.\\n\\n Consistent with Kaley’s testimony, Dr. Lace testified that Robert’s “anxiety\\nand Asperger’s symptoms” would allow only “very brief and very superficial and\\nvery infrequent contact with supervisors and coworkers” and zero contact with the\\npublic. “[H]e would work best on his own with . . . very limited contact with other\\npeople except for supervisors.” Dr. Lace further testified that an adaptive skills test\\nmeasured Robert’s socialization to be “very low” and worse than a random sampling\\nof 100,000 people, his adaptive behavior to be unexpected for someone of average\\nintelligence, and his communication to be only better than one out of 10,000\\nrandomly selected people.\\n\\n “[T]he opinions of non-examining, consulting physicians” by themselves are\\nnot “substantial evidence.” Harvey v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004).\\nInstead, the Social Security Administration directs an ALJ to consider the same set\\nof factors for weighing a non-medical opinion like that of Kaley as a medical opinion\\nlike that of Dr. Lace. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), (f)(1). An ALJ is to consider: (1)\\nthe type of relationship between the source and the claimant, (2) the length of\\nrelationship, (3) the frequency of examination, (4) the nature and extent of the\\nrelationship, (5) the opinion’s supportability with objective medical evidence, (6) the\\nopinion’s consistency with the record, (7) the source’s area of specialty, and (8)\\n“anyfactors . . . which tend to support or contradict the medical opinion.” Id. §\\n404.1527(c). An ALJ must consider “all” of these factors. See id. The\\nAdministration acknowledges that factors such as seeing the claimant more often or\\nproviding better supporting evidence or a better explanation may lead to the\\nconclusion that a non-medical opinion outweighs a medical opinion—and even an\\nopinion from a treating source. See id. § 404.1527(f)(1).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\n The ALJ relied on two of these factors to weigh the opinions of Kaley and Dr.\\nLace—consistency with the record and their respective areas of speciality. Of course,\\none opinion may be credited over another when supported by better or more thorough\\nevidence. See Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 2007). But, the\\nevidence cited in support of Dr. Lace’s opinion—his “expertise in mental health,\\nfamiliarity with the disability review process and his ability to review all of the\\nevidence”—is not better. Other factors such as the length, nature, and extent of\\nRobert’s relationship with Kaley are particularly relevant here—none of which was\\naddressed in the ALJ’s decision. Kaley worked with Robert as his primary counselor\\nfor three and a half years. Her testimony reveals a high degree of familiarity with\\nRobert. She knows his daily habits, routines, and quirks. She knows how he interacts\\nwith others because she routinely observes him in social settings like the common\\narea and group therapy sessions. She described his specific behavior and its\\nconsequences in a variety of social settings.\\n\\n The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Lace could not provide “the kinds of\\nconclusions that you could reach only if you were a treating source” and that the\\nscope of Dr. Lace’s testimony was limited because he never examined or treated\\nRobert. Even so, the ALJ gave Kaley’s testimony no weight. The Administration\\nrecognizes the importance of opinions from those most familiar with the claimant—a\\nreason controlling weight is generally given to medical opinions from treating\\nsources. They tend to be the ones “most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal\\npicture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s)” and to provide a “unique\\nperspective” of the record otherwise unavailable from “objective medical findings\\nalone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations.”\\n20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Although Kaley may not be a medical source, her unique\\nrelationship with Robert provides a detailed, longitudinal picture of his daily social\\nfunctioning that is unavailable from the record evidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\n The ALJ pointed to “[c]linical observations” as support for Robert’s ability to\\n“perform full-time work within the mental parameters of the [RFC].” But, those\\nobservations are inconsistent. During a phone call with an administration employee,\\nRobert demonstrated an ability to understand, concentrate, speak coherently, and\\nanswer questions. At an in-person appointment, however, he demonstrated poor\\ncommunication and eye contact, lack of social relationships, and a vocal tic while\\nmeeting with a psychologist. Although the resolution of “conflicting evidence is\\nwithin the province of the ALJ,” Brachtel v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1997),\\nan ALJ may not discount opinions from “other sources” like Kaley just because the\\nevidence is mixed, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).\\n\\n A review of the record reveals that Kaley’s opinion is not inconsistent with the\\nobservations as a whole. She testified that part of what impedes Robert’s full-time\\nemployment is the volatility of his social reactions. She testified that his triggers are\\nhard to predict. She described instances when his behavior has “escalated” in\\nresponse to “certain personalit[ies],” new environments or people, or disruptions in\\nhis routine. During times when he is agitated and nervous, Robert shouts more and\\nrolls his fingers more.\\n\\n By focusing on observations of Robert’s affect, the ALJ discounted objective\\nmedical evidence produced during the visits. For example, the ALJ noted Robert’s\\n“cooperative and polite” affect at a 2013 evaluation, but the evaluation opined that\\nRobert’s employment prospects were, at best, “marginal . . . in positions that do not\\nplace much emphasis on social maturity and sustained interactions with others.”\\n\\n With regard to Robert’s ADLs, we have “repeatedly observed that the ability\\nto do activities such as light housework and visiting with friends provides little or no\\nsupport for the finding that a claimant can perform full-time competitive work.”\\nHalverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks\\nomitted) (quoting Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005)). And even\\n\\n -16-\\n\\nif conflicting ADLs are sometimes a good reason to discount testimony, Robert’s\\nADLs do not conflict with Kaley’s opinion. The ALJ indicated that, despite Robert’s\\nreported “problems with social interactions,” he takes baths, gets dressed, does\\nchores, reads magazines, prepares meals, rides his bike, goes to movies, goes\\nshopping, attends mandatory weekly meetings, and arranged a ride to a medical\\nappointment on at least one occasion. Kaley testified that these activities are\\ninfrequent. Robert attended one movie by himself over the course of approximately\\ntwo years. That Robert occasionally engages in solitary activities—or even a\\none-time conversation to arrange a ride—does not establish that he has the social\\nskills necessary to maintain full-time employment. In fact, there is substantial\\nevidence in the record to the contrary.\\n\\n Similar to the clinical observations, Robert’s ADLs also paint a mixed picture\\nof his abilities. For example, after Robert arranged the ride, he exhibited behavior at\\nthe appointment that aligns with Kaley’s testimony. “He was frowning/scowling the\\nentire appointment” and “related in a rather odd manner.” He talked “to himself\\nunder his breath, he had a grunting type vocal tic and he presented as if he was\\nagitated.”\\n\\n Finally, the ALJ’s conclusion that Kaley’s opinion was not substantiated by\\n“other evidence” is not supported by the record. Robert’s employment history clearly\\nshows his inability to maintain full-time work without support. He has held two\\nfull-time jobs in his 62 years of life—one for eight years and one for seven—both\\nexclusively while he lived at home with his parents. Even though Robert voluntarily\\nquit a part-time janitorial job sometime shortly before the hearing, that job is hardly\\nevidence of Robert’s ability to maintain full-time employment in a competitive\\nenvironment. He worked “maybe twice a month, once every two weeks, and on a part\\ntime basis making $8 an hour.” Without the support and assistance of his parents,\\nRobert has been unable to maintain a full-time job.\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n\\n In closing, I fear the majority’s decision reflects an increasing tendency to\\n“rubber stamp” an ALJ’s action in contravention of the “scrutinizing analysis” our\\nprecedent requires. See Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1106 (8th Cir. 2014) (Bright,\\nJ., dissenting); Cooper v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 919 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th\\nCir. 1990). The ALJ’s rejection of Kaley’s testimony was error when viewed in light\\nof the record as a whole. I believe the ALJ failed to provide “good reasons” for\\nrejecting Kaley’s testimony, and that error is not harmless. I would reverse and\\nremand to the district court with instructions to remand to the ALJ for reconsideration\\nof Robert’s claim after giving Kaley’s opinion proper weight.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -18-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420589/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRUENDER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643336/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Robert Paul DOLS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1910\n ___________________________\n\n Robert Paul Dols\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Andrew Saul,1 Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\n\n The Social Security Commissioner denied Robert Dols’s application for\nsupplemental security income. After the Commissioner issued a final decision, Dols\n\n 1\n Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019\nand has been automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of\nAppellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\n\nfiled a complaint in the district court,2 which granted the Commissioner’s motion for\nsummary judgment. We affirm.\n\n Dols applied for supplemental security income in September 2013. After the\nclaim was initially denied and denied again upon reconsideration, an administrative\nlaw judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Dols; Dr. Michael Lace, a psychological expert;\nNancy Kaley, Dols’s counselor; and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. The\nALJ issued a decision on September 2, 2015 using the five-step process outlined by\n20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) for evaluating disability. At step two, the ALJ determined\nthat Dols “has the following severe impairments: anxiety, depression, Asperger’s\ndisorder, cerebral dysfunction, obsessive compulsive disorder and [a] history of\nsubstance abuse/dependence.” At step three, the ALJ concluded that Dols’s\nimpairments did not meet or medically equal “the severity of one of the listed\nimpairments.” The ALJ denied Dols benefits, giving great weight to Dr. Lace’s\nopinion and no weight to Kaley’s opinion. The Appeals Council denied Dols’s\nrequest for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.\n\n In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that substantial\nevidence supported both the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols did not meet or equal a listed\nimpairment and the ALJ’s decision to give great weight to Dr. Lace’s opinion. On\nappeal, Dols argues that his severe impairments meet listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and\n12.10. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1 (2013). He also argues that the ALJ\nimproperly “accorded great weight” to Dr. Lace’s opinion and that Kaley’s opinion\nshould have been given more weight than Dr. Lace’s.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n The Honorable Tony N. Leung, Magistrate Judge, United States District Court\nfor the District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred by consent of the parties\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\n -2-\n\n “We review the district court’s determination de novo, affirming the ALJ’s\ndecision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Scott v.\nBerryhill, 855 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We\nmust consider “the evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well as the\nevidence that detracts from it. That we would have come to a different conclusion,\nhowever, is not a sufficient basis for reversal.” Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935\n(8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it\nis possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those\npositions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”\nGoff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005). “In conducting our limited and\ndeferential review of the final agency determination under the substantial-evidence\nstandard, we must view the record in the light most favorable to that determination.”\nChismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\n\n At step two of the five-step process, the ALJ considers “the medical severity\nof [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, “[i]f\nthe impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments [in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,\nsubpt. P, app. 1], the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v.\nYuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “To meet a listing, a claimant must show that he\nor she meets all of the criteria for the listed impairment.” Blackburn v. Colvin, 761\nF.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014).\n\n At the time of the ALJ’s decision, listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.06 required that\na claimant meet the paragraph A and B criteria or the paragraph A and C criteria. 20\nC.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (2013). Listing 12.10 required that a claimant\nmeet both the paragraph A and paragraph B criteria. Id. § 12.10. We assume, without\ndeciding, that the paragraph A criteria have been satisfied for all the listings at issue.\nThus, Dols may meet one of the listings by satisfying the paragraph B or the\nparagraph C criteria. We consider paragraph B first.\n\n\n\n -3-\n\n All four listings have the same paragraph B, which is satisfied when the\nclaimant proves two of four criteria. See Id. §§ 12.02(B), 12.04(B), 12.06(B),\n12.10(B) (2013). The ALJ determined that Dols did not prove any of the four.\nBecause Dols appeals the ALJ’s determination as to only the first two criteria, Dols\nmust succeed on both arguments. Thus, Dols must first show that substantial\nevidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that Dols failed to prove the first\ncriteria because he has a moderate rather than a marked restriction on his activities\nof daily living (“ADLs”). Id.\n\n ADLs “include adaptive activities such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking\npublic transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for\n. . . grooming and hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office.”\nId. § 12.00(C)(1) (2013). The Code of Federal Regulations requires an assessment\nof “the quality of these activities by their independence, appropriateness,\neffectiveness and sustainability” and a determination of “the extent to which [the\nclaimant is] capable of initiating and participating in activities independent of\nsupervision or direction.” Id.\n\n In support of its determination, the ALJ noted that the testifying psychological\nexpert, Dr. Lace, “opined moderate limits.” It also noted that Dols “indicated in his\nNovember 2013 function report that he had no problems performing personal cares\nsuch as bathing or dressing himself”; that “[h]e performs yard work around the sober\nhouse he resides at”; “prepares meals and cleans his house”; rakes and mows the\nlawn; washes laundry; “shops for groceries and some personal items”; that he “can\ncount change, pay bills, use a checkbook or money orders and a savings account”;\nand that he was working part-time.\n\n Dols argues that the ALJ should not have relied on Dols’s statements in his\nfunction report because accepting the “statements at face value in the paragraph B\nanalysis was at odds with the ALJ’s own credibility determination.” During the\n\n -4-\n\nALJ’s step three analysis, it was required to determine Dols’s residual functional\ncapacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). In doing so, the ALJ must assess the\nclaimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of\nwork.” Id. § 416.945(a)(4). The ALJ noted that Dols’s and Kaley’s statements\n“concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Dols’s] symptoms\n[were] not credible to the extent they [were] not consistent with the objective medical\nevidence and other evidence.” Dols claims that the ALJ cannot “have it both ways.”\nHe argues that the ALJ could not base its paragraph B findings on Dols’s statements\nwhile simultaneously finding his statements not credible for the RFC assessment.\n\n But the RFC assessment requires consideration of “all of the relevant medical\nand other evidence.” Id. § 416.945(a)(3). In contrast, the ALJ looked to the function\nreport for an account of Dols’s daily life. The ALJ found Dols’s statements not\ncredible for the RFC assessment only to the extent that they conflicted with medical\nevidence and other evidence. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Dols\ncould reliably describe his daily life but that Dols’s opinion about “physical and\nmental limitations” that would affect what work he could do in a work setting was not\ncredible. Id. § 416.945(a)(1).\n\n In addition, Dols argues that the ALJ’s finding is not supported by substantial\nevidence because Kaley’s testimony demonstrates that he “has serious difficulties in\nperforming his ADLs without the significant supervision and oversight of the Five\nStars residential facility where he lives.” Kaley testified before the ALJ that Dols\ncould drive and grocery shop but that he “would need help with his money.” She\nexplained that staff at the residential facility review his grocery list every two weeks\nand make sure that he does not run out of his medications. Dols also points to the fact\nthat the staff at the residential facility meet with him three times a week.\n\n While Dols has some help with managing money and grocery shopping, he also\nappears to have done those tasks on his own at times. Further, Dols testified that he\n\n -5-\n\ncleans dishes and bathrooms, sweeps and vacuums the house, and reads the\nnewspaper and magazines. A licensed psychologist who examined Dols noted that\nhe arrived early for their meeting and that he had “arranged a ride.” She also\nobserved that he was “casually dressed and adequately groomed.” At the time of the\nhearing before the ALJ, Dols had recently worked as a janitor. And Kaley testified\nthat Dols had biked to a movie.\n\n Given that Dols bears the burden of proving a disability at step three, we\nconclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols has\nonly a moderate restriction on his ADLs. See Blackburn, 761 F.3d at 858 (explaining\nthat the claimant “bears the burden of establishing that he meets all the criteria”). “It\nis not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ or to try the\nissue in this case de novo.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus,\nsubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Dols does not meet the\nparagraph B requirements, and he therefore does not meet listing 12.10, which\nrequires claimants to satisfy both the paragraph A and the paragraph B criteria, or\nlistings 12.02, 12.04, or 12.06 on the basis of paragraph B. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt.\nP, app. 1, §§ 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, 12.10 (2013).\n\n While Dols has not shown that he meets paragraph B, he may still meet listings\n12.02 and 12.043 if he shows that he meets paragraph C. Id. § 12.00 (2013). He\nargues that he satisfies paragraph C’s third criterion, which requires him to show that\na “chronic organic mental disorder” (§ 12.02) or a “chronic affective disorder”\n(§ 12.04) caused a “[c]urrent history of 1 or more years’ inability to function outside\na highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued need for such\nan arrangement.” Id. §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013). “The regulations define highly\n\n\n 3\n While Dols argues on appeal that he satisfies the 12.02 and 12.04 paragraph\nC requirements, he concedes that he does not meet listing 12.06’s different paragraph\nC criteria.\n -6-\n\nsupportive settings to include hospitals, halfway houses, care facilities, and personal\nhome settings that greatly reduce the mental demands placed on [the claimant].”\nMyers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original and internal\nquotation marks omitted).\n\n The ALJ concluded that Dols failed to meet the paragraph C criteria. It\nacknowledged that Dols “currently resides in sober housing” and that he had\npreviously “resided with his parents.” But the ALJ pointed out that the record “shows\nthat [Dols] was the primary caretaker for his mother after his father passed away.”\nIt determined that the “record does not support a finding that [Dols] is required to live\nin residential housing due to his mental impairments when not using mood-altering\nsubstances.”\n\n At the hearing, Kaley testified that Dols had been living at Five Stars for three\nyears. Dols argues that he has met the paragraph C criteria because the support he\nreceives at Five Stars “includes group and individual therapy sessions, facilitated\nattendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, oversight of [his] budget,\nmedications, and grocery delivery order, and general oversight of [his] daily affairs.”\n\n The district court concluded that the evidence indicates Dols may need a\nsupportive living arrangement, but it emphasized that paragraph C requires Dols to\ndemonstrate his need for a highly supportive living arrangement. We agree with the\ndistrict court that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols has\nnot made such a showing here. Though one psychologist stated that Dols “could be\nconsidered for future placement in a semi-independent or shared-living facility with\non-site supports,” his recommendation did not indicate that Dols needs a highly\nsupportive living arrangement. Indeed, as outlined above, Dols has worked part-time,\ncompletes a number of chores around Five Stars, prepares food for himself, and\nsometimes shops for his own groceries. The record also indicates that Dols lived on\nhis own after moving out of his parents’ home before he began living at Five Stars.\n\n\n\n -7-\n\n Further, Dols began living at Five Stars to participate in a relapse recovery\nprogram for his drug and alcohol addictions. He has maintained his sobriety since\n2012. Five Stars was not intended to have permanent residents, but Five Stars\nallowed Dols to stay because he did not “have anywhere else to go and he can’t\nwork.” But paragraph C requires that a chronic organic mental disorder or a chronic\naffective disorder caused the “inability to function outside a highly supportive living\narrangement.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013).\nDols’s alcohol and drug addictions caused his initial residence at Five Stars. And\nwhile Dols attends three meetings a week at Five Stars, the meetings are for his\nalcohol addiction, not for mental health treatment. Kaley testified that nobody at Five\nStars is trained “to deal with populations that have the problems that [Dols] has.”\nEven were we to assume that Five Stars is a highly supportive living environment,\nsubstantial evidence supports a conclusion that Dols has not shown that a chronic\norganic mental disorder or a chronic affective disorder caused his alleged need to stay\nat Five Stars. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols\ndoes not satisfy the paragraph C criteria.\n\n Finally, Dols contests the weight the ALJ gave to Kaley’s and Dr. Lace’s\nopinions. He argues that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to give no weight to\nKaley’s opinion, that Dr. Lace’s opinion should not have been given “great weight,”\nand that Kaley’s opinion should outweigh Dr. Lace’s given her greater familiarity and\nrelationship with Dols. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Dols challenged the\nALJ’s decision to give no weight to Kaley’s opinion in the district court. See Nasser\nv. Astrue, 248 F. App’x 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (declining to consider\narguments raised for the first time on appeal). But even if we assume that Dols raised\nthis argument, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.\n\n According to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, Kaley\nis a non-medical, “other” source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d) (2013); Sloan v. Astrue,\n499 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that non-medical, “other sources”\n\n -8-\n\ninclude rehabilitation counselors). The regulations classify Dr. Lace, a psychological\nexpert, as a medical source. The SSA provides similar factors for weighing both\nKaley’s and Dr. Lace’s opinions, including the examining and treatment relationships,\nthe length of the treatment, the nature and extent of the relationship, supportability,\nconsistency with the record, specialization, and other factors that support or refute the\nopinion. See SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining the\nfactors for non-medical, other sources); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (2013) (explaining\nthe factors for medical sources).\n\n Kaley began counseling Dols in March 2012 and testified about Dols’s life at\nFive Stars. She explained that Dols has Asperger’s, that he “appears angry” when\nrelating to others, does not make eye contact, “grunts when he gets tense,” and “at\ntimes” gets Tourette’s. She was “afraid” that his symptoms “would happen at a job\nsite.” It is not surprising that there is some evidence in a lengthy administrative\nrecord “which detracts from the Commissioner’s determination” about what weight\nto give Kaley’s opinion. See Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir.\n2017). For example, Kaley knew and counseled Dols for a number of years, and\nothers who interacted with Dols supported her observation that Dols has trouble\ncommunicating.\n\n But we consider only whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial\nevidence, not whether we would have made the same decision. See Travis v. Astrue,\n477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007). And some of Kaley’s testimony is contradicted\nor not supported by the record. While Kaley said Dols “got Tourette’s,” Dols does\nnot cite anything in the record indicating that he was diagnosed with such a condition.\nFurther, while Kaley testified that Dols could not hold a job, he had recently worked\nas a janitor with no performance problems. In general, Kaley presented little to no\nevidence other than her personal observations. Instead, she based her opinion about\nDols’s ability to work on her observations as a licensed alcohol and drug counselor,\nnot as an expert with experience in making disability determinations. “[W]e must\n\n -9-\n\nview the record in the light most favorable to [the ALJ’s] determination.”\nChismarich, 888 F.3d at 980.\n\n By contrast, Dr. Lace testified as an expert in mental health, was familiar with\nthe disability review process, and reviewed all of the evidence in the case. He\ntestified that Dols’s mental health problems did not meet or equal any of the listings.\nHe said that certain work restrictions, like “no public contact at all,” should apply to\nDols. He explained that Dols should be “limited to very simple,” routine, repetitive\ntasks and that he was best suited to low-stress work that does not include high-speed\nproduction tasks.\n\n A review of the record as a whole supports Dr. Lace’s testimony. After a\nphone interview with Dols in October 2013, an SSA employee indicated that Dols\nhad no difficulty with understanding, coherency, concentrating, talking, or answering\nquestions. Though one psychologist observed “poor communication skills, [a] lack\nof social relationships, poor eye contact, and [a] vocal tic” in February 2014, a\ndifferent psychologist noted that Dols was “relaxed, casual, cooperative, [and]\nappropriate,” and that Dols was “not depressed” and “not anxious” after four\nmeetings from July 2014 to April 2015. The psychologist additionally observed that\nDols’s speech was coherent with a normal rate and tone and that Dols’s judgment and\ninsight were intact. The psychologist made the same observations following July and\nOctober 2015 meetings with Dols.\n\n This evidence supports Dr. Lace’s opinion and contradicts Kaley’s opinion.\nSee SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 (explaining that evidence from a non-\nmedical, other source could outweigh evidence from a medical source when the non-\nmedical source “has seen the individual more often and has greater knowledge of the\nindividual’s functioning over time” and if the opinion “has better supporting\nevidence and is more consistent with the evidence as a whole” (emphasis added)).\nTo the extent that the Vineland II test measuring adaptive skills and other evidence\n\n -10-\n\nin the record conflicts with Dr. Lace’s opinion, we agree with the district court that\nthe ALJ’s decision was within the “zone of choice.”4 See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d\nat 1042.\n\n In sum, while the ALJ could have weighed the evidence differently, substantial\nevidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Lace’s review of all the evidence\nshould be credited over Kaley’s observations as a non-medical, other source. “It is\nthe function of the ALJ to weigh conflicting evidence.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d\n705, 709 (8th Cir. 2007). We “will not reverse merely because evidence also points\nto an alternate outcome.” Travis, 477 F.3d at 1042.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Robert Paul DOLS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1910\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Robert Paul Dols\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Andrew Saul,1 Commissioner, Social Security Administration\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 19, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nGRUENDER, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n The Social Security Commissioner denied Robert Dols’s application for\\nsupplemental security income. After the Commissioner issued a final decision, Dols\\n\\n 1\\n Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019\\nand has been automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 43(c)(2).\\n\\nfiled a complaint in the district court,2 which granted the Commissioner’s motion for\\nsummary judgment. We affirm.\\n\\n Dols applied for supplemental security income in September 2013. After the\\nclaim was initially denied and denied again upon reconsideration, an administrative\\nlaw judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Dols; Dr. Michael Lace, a psychological expert;\\nNancy Kaley, Dols’s counselor; and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. The\\nALJ issued a decision on September 2, 2015 using the five-step process outlined by\\n20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a) for evaluating disability. At step two, the ALJ determined\\nthat Dols “has the following severe impairments: anxiety, depression, Asperger’s\\ndisorder, cerebral dysfunction, obsessive compulsive disorder and [a] history of\\nsubstance abuse/dependence.” At step three, the ALJ concluded that Dols’s\\nimpairments did not meet or medically equal “the severity of one of the listed\\nimpairments.” The ALJ denied Dols benefits, giving great weight to Dr. Lace’s\\nopinion and no weight to Kaley’s opinion. The Appeals Council denied Dols’s\\nrequest for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.\\n\\n In granting summary judgment, the district court determined that substantial\\nevidence supported both the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols did not meet or equal a listed\\nimpairment and the ALJ’s decision to give great weight to Dr. Lace’s opinion. On\\nappeal, Dols argues that his severe impairments meet listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and\\n12.10. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1 (2013). He also argues that the ALJ\\nimproperly “accorded great weight” to Dr. Lace’s opinion and that Kaley’s opinion\\nshould have been given more weight than Dr. Lace’s.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The Honorable Tony N. Leung, Magistrate Judge, United States District Court\\nfor the District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred by consent of the parties\\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\\n -2-\\n\\n “We review the district court’s determination de novo, affirming the ALJ’s\\ndecision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Scott v.\\nBerryhill, 855 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We\\nmust consider “the evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well as the\\nevidence that detracts from it. That we would have come to a different conclusion,\\nhowever, is not a sufficient basis for reversal.” Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935\\n(8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it\\nis possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those\\npositions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”\\nGoff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005). “In conducting our limited and\\ndeferential review of the final agency determination under the substantial-evidence\\nstandard, we must view the record in the light most favorable to that determination.”\\nChismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\n\\n At step two of the five-step process, the ALJ considers “the medical severity\\nof [the claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, “[i]f\\nthe impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments [in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,\\nsubpt. P, app. 1], the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled.” Bowen v.\\nYuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “To meet a listing, a claimant must show that he\\nor she meets all of the criteria for the listed impairment.” Blackburn v. Colvin, 761\\nF.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n At the time of the ALJ’s decision, listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.06 required that\\na claimant meet the paragraph A and B criteria or the paragraph A and C criteria. 20\\nC.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (2013). Listing 12.10 required that a claimant\\nmeet both the paragraph A and paragraph B criteria. Id. § 12.10. We assume, without\\ndeciding, that the paragraph A criteria have been satisfied for all the listings at issue.\\nThus, Dols may meet one of the listings by satisfying the paragraph B or the\\nparagraph C criteria. We consider paragraph B first.\\n\\n\\n\\n -3-\\n\\n All four listings have the same paragraph B, which is satisfied when the\\nclaimant proves two of four criteria. See Id. §§ 12.02(B), 12.04(B), 12.06(B),\\n12.10(B) (2013). The ALJ determined that Dols did not prove any of the four.\\nBecause Dols appeals the ALJ’s determination as to only the first two criteria, Dols\\nmust succeed on both arguments. Thus, Dols must first show that substantial\\nevidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that Dols failed to prove the first\\ncriteria because he has a moderate rather than a marked restriction on his activities\\nof daily living (“ADLs”). Id.\\n\\n ADLs “include adaptive activities such as cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking\\npublic transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, caring appropriately for\\n. . . grooming and hygiene, using telephones and directories, and using a post office.”\\nId. § 12.00(C)(1) (2013). The Code of Federal Regulations requires an assessment\\nof “the quality of these activities by their independence, appropriateness,\\neffectiveness and sustainability” and a determination of “the extent to which [the\\nclaimant is] capable of initiating and participating in activities independent of\\nsupervision or direction.” Id.\\n\\n In support of its determination, the ALJ noted that the testifying psychological\\nexpert, Dr. Lace, “opined moderate limits.” It also noted that Dols “indicated in his\\nNovember 2013 function report that he had no problems performing personal cares\\nsuch as bathing or dressing himself”; that “[h]e performs yard work around the sober\\nhouse he resides at”; “prepares meals and cleans his house”; rakes and mows the\\nlawn; washes laundry; “shops for groceries and some personal items”; that he “can\\ncount change, pay bills, use a checkbook or money orders and a savings account”;\\nand that he was working part-time.\\n\\n Dols argues that the ALJ should not have relied on Dols’s statements in his\\nfunction report because accepting the “statements at face value in the paragraph B\\nanalysis was at odds with the ALJ’s own credibility determination.” During the\\n\\n -4-\\n\\nALJ’s step three analysis, it was required to determine Dols’s residual functional\\ncapacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). In doing so, the ALJ must assess the\\nclaimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of\\nwork.” Id. § 416.945(a)(4). The ALJ noted that Dols’s and Kaley’s statements\\n“concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Dols’s] symptoms\\n[were] not credible to the extent they [were] not consistent with the objective medical\\nevidence and other evidence.” Dols claims that the ALJ cannot “have it both ways.”\\nHe argues that the ALJ could not base its paragraph B findings on Dols’s statements\\nwhile simultaneously finding his statements not credible for the RFC assessment.\\n\\n But the RFC assessment requires consideration of “all of the relevant medical\\nand other evidence.” Id. § 416.945(a)(3). In contrast, the ALJ looked to the function\\nreport for an account of Dols’s daily life. The ALJ found Dols’s statements not\\ncredible for the RFC assessment only to the extent that they conflicted with medical\\nevidence and other evidence. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Dols\\ncould reliably describe his daily life but that Dols’s opinion about “physical and\\nmental limitations” that would affect what work he could do in a work setting was not\\ncredible. Id. § 416.945(a)(1).\\n\\n In addition, Dols argues that the ALJ’s finding is not supported by substantial\\nevidence because Kaley’s testimony demonstrates that he “has serious difficulties in\\nperforming his ADLs without the significant supervision and oversight of the Five\\nStars residential facility where he lives.” Kaley testified before the ALJ that Dols\\ncould drive and grocery shop but that he “would need help with his money.” She\\nexplained that staff at the residential facility review his grocery list every two weeks\\nand make sure that he does not run out of his medications. Dols also points to the fact\\nthat the staff at the residential facility meet with him three times a week.\\n\\n While Dols has some help with managing money and grocery shopping, he also\\nappears to have done those tasks on his own at times. Further, Dols testified that he\\n\\n -5-\\n\\ncleans dishes and bathrooms, sweeps and vacuums the house, and reads the\\nnewspaper and magazines. A licensed psychologist who examined Dols noted that\\nhe arrived early for their meeting and that he had “arranged a ride.” She also\\nobserved that he was “casually dressed and adequately groomed.” At the time of the\\nhearing before the ALJ, Dols had recently worked as a janitor. And Kaley testified\\nthat Dols had biked to a movie.\\n\\n Given that Dols bears the burden of proving a disability at step three, we\\nconclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols has\\nonly a moderate restriction on his ADLs. See Blackburn, 761 F.3d at 858 (explaining\\nthat the claimant “bears the burden of establishing that he meets all the criteria”). “It\\nis not the role of this court to reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ or to try the\\nissue in this case de novo.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus,\\nsubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Dols does not meet the\\nparagraph B requirements, and he therefore does not meet listing 12.10, which\\nrequires claimants to satisfy both the paragraph A and the paragraph B criteria, or\\nlistings 12.02, 12.04, or 12.06 on the basis of paragraph B. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt.\\nP, app. 1, §§ 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, 12.10 (2013).\\n\\n While Dols has not shown that he meets paragraph B, he may still meet listings\\n12.02 and 12.043 if he shows that he meets paragraph C. Id. § 12.00 (2013). He\\nargues that he satisfies paragraph C’s third criterion, which requires him to show that\\na “chronic organic mental disorder” (§ 12.02) or a “chronic affective disorder”\\n(§ 12.04) caused a “[c]urrent history of 1 or more years’ inability to function outside\\na highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication of continued need for such\\nan arrangement.” Id. §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013). “The regulations define highly\\n\\n\\n 3\\n While Dols argues on appeal that he satisfies the 12.02 and 12.04 paragraph\\nC requirements, he concedes that he does not meet listing 12.06’s different paragraph\\nC criteria.\\n -6-\\n\\nsupportive settings to include hospitals, halfway houses, care facilities, and personal\\nhome settings that greatly reduce the mental demands placed on [the claimant].”\\nMyers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 526 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original and internal\\nquotation marks omitted).\\n\\n The ALJ concluded that Dols failed to meet the paragraph C criteria. It\\nacknowledged that Dols “currently resides in sober housing” and that he had\\npreviously “resided with his parents.” But the ALJ pointed out that the record “shows\\nthat [Dols] was the primary caretaker for his mother after his father passed away.”\\nIt determined that the “record does not support a finding that [Dols] is required to live\\nin residential housing due to his mental impairments when not using mood-altering\\nsubstances.”\\n\\n At the hearing, Kaley testified that Dols had been living at Five Stars for three\\nyears. Dols argues that he has met the paragraph C criteria because the support he\\nreceives at Five Stars “includes group and individual therapy sessions, facilitated\\nattendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, oversight of [his] budget,\\nmedications, and grocery delivery order, and general oversight of [his] daily affairs.”\\n\\n The district court concluded that the evidence indicates Dols may need a\\nsupportive living arrangement, but it emphasized that paragraph C requires Dols to\\ndemonstrate his need for a highly supportive living arrangement. We agree with the\\ndistrict court that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Dols has\\nnot made such a showing here. Though one psychologist stated that Dols “could be\\nconsidered for future placement in a semi-independent or shared-living facility with\\non-site supports,” his recommendation did not indicate that Dols needs a highly\\nsupportive living arrangement. Indeed, as outlined above, Dols has worked part-time,\\ncompletes a number of chores around Five Stars, prepares food for himself, and\\nsometimes shops for his own groceries. The record also indicates that Dols lived on\\nhis own after moving out of his parents’ home before he began living at Five Stars.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\n Further, Dols began living at Five Stars to participate in a relapse recovery\\nprogram for his drug and alcohol addictions. He has maintained his sobriety since\\n2012. Five Stars was not intended to have permanent residents, but Five Stars\\nallowed Dols to stay because he did not “have anywhere else to go and he can’t\\nwork.” But paragraph C requires that a chronic organic mental disorder or a chronic\\naffective disorder caused the “inability to function outside a highly supportive living\\narrangement.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sbpt. P, app. 1, §§ 12.02(C), 12.04(C) (2013).\\nDols’s alcohol and drug addictions caused his initial residence at Five Stars. And\\nwhile Dols attends three meetings a week at Five Stars, the meetings are for his\\nalcohol addiction, not for mental health treatment. Kaley testified that nobody at Five\\nStars is trained “to deal with populations that have the problems that [Dols] has.”\\nEven were we to assume that Five Stars is a highly supportive living environment,\\nsubstantial evidence supports a conclusion that Dols has not shown that a chronic\\norganic mental disorder or a chronic affective disorder caused his alleged need to stay\\nat Five Stars. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dols\\ndoes not satisfy the paragraph C criteria.\\n\\n Finally, Dols contests the weight the ALJ gave to Kaley’s and Dr. Lace’s\\nopinions. He argues that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to give no weight to\\nKaley’s opinion, that Dr. Lace’s opinion should not have been given “great weight,”\\nand that Kaley’s opinion should outweigh Dr. Lace’s given her greater familiarity and\\nrelationship with Dols. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Dols challenged the\\nALJ’s decision to give no weight to Kaley’s opinion in the district court. See Nasser\\nv. Astrue, 248 F. App’x 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (declining to consider\\narguments raised for the first time on appeal). But even if we assume that Dols raised\\nthis argument, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.\\n\\n According to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, Kaley\\nis a non-medical, “other” source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d) (2013); Sloan v. Astrue,\\n499 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that non-medical, “other sources”\\n\\n -8-\\n\\ninclude rehabilitation counselors). The regulations classify Dr. Lace, a psychological\\nexpert, as a medical source. The SSA provides similar factors for weighing both\\nKaley’s and Dr. Lace’s opinions, including the examining and treatment relationships,\\nthe length of the treatment, the nature and extent of the relationship, supportability,\\nconsistency with the record, specialization, and other factors that support or refute the\\nopinion. See SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5 (Aug. 9, 2006) (explaining the\\nfactors for non-medical, other sources); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (2013) (explaining\\nthe factors for medical sources).\\n\\n Kaley began counseling Dols in March 2012 and testified about Dols’s life at\\nFive Stars. She explained that Dols has Asperger’s, that he “appears angry” when\\nrelating to others, does not make eye contact, “grunts when he gets tense,” and “at\\ntimes” gets Tourette’s. She was “afraid” that his symptoms “would happen at a job\\nsite.” It is not surprising that there is some evidence in a lengthy administrative\\nrecord “which detracts from the Commissioner’s determination” about what weight\\nto give Kaley’s opinion. See Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir.\\n2017). For example, Kaley knew and counseled Dols for a number of years, and\\nothers who interacted with Dols supported her observation that Dols has trouble\\ncommunicating.\\n\\n But we consider only whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial\\nevidence, not whether we would have made the same decision. See Travis v. Astrue,\\n477 F.3d 1037, 1042 (8th Cir. 2007). And some of Kaley’s testimony is contradicted\\nor not supported by the record. While Kaley said Dols “got Tourette’s,” Dols does\\nnot cite anything in the record indicating that he was diagnosed with such a condition.\\nFurther, while Kaley testified that Dols could not hold a job, he had recently worked\\nas a janitor with no performance problems. In general, Kaley presented little to no\\nevidence other than her personal observations. Instead, she based her opinion about\\nDols’s ability to work on her observations as a licensed alcohol and drug counselor,\\nnot as an expert with experience in making disability determinations. “[W]e must\\n\\n -9-\\n\\nview the record in the light most favorable to [the ALJ’s] determination.”\\nChismarich, 888 F.3d at 980.\\n\\n By contrast, Dr. Lace testified as an expert in mental health, was familiar with\\nthe disability review process, and reviewed all of the evidence in the case. He\\ntestified that Dols’s mental health problems did not meet or equal any of the listings.\\nHe said that certain work restrictions, like “no public contact at all,” should apply to\\nDols. He explained that Dols should be “limited to very simple,” routine, repetitive\\ntasks and that he was best suited to low-stress work that does not include high-speed\\nproduction tasks.\\n\\n A review of the record as a whole supports Dr. Lace’s testimony. After a\\nphone interview with Dols in October 2013, an SSA employee indicated that Dols\\nhad no difficulty with understanding, coherency, concentrating, talking, or answering\\nquestions. Though one psychologist observed “poor communication skills, [a] lack\\nof social relationships, poor eye contact, and [a] vocal tic” in February 2014, a\\ndifferent psychologist noted that Dols was “relaxed, casual, cooperative, [and]\\nappropriate,” and that Dols was “not depressed” and “not anxious” after four\\nmeetings from July 2014 to April 2015. The psychologist additionally observed that\\nDols’s speech was coherent with a normal rate and tone and that Dols’s judgment and\\ninsight were intact. The psychologist made the same observations following July and\\nOctober 2015 meetings with Dols.\\n\\n This evidence supports Dr. Lace’s opinion and contradicts Kaley’s opinion.\\nSee SSR 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6 (explaining that evidence from a non-\\nmedical, other source could outweigh evidence from a medical source when the non-\\nmedical source “has seen the individual more often and has greater knowledge of the\\nindividual’s functioning over time” and if the opinion “has better supporting\\nevidence and is more consistent with the evidence as a whole” (emphasis added)).\\nTo the extent that the Vineland II test measuring adaptive skills and other evidence\\n\\n -10-\\n\\nin the record conflicts with Dr. Lace’s opinion, we agree with the district court that\\nthe ALJ’s decision was within the “zone of choice.”4 See Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d\\nat 1042.\\n\\n In sum, while the ALJ could have weighed the evidence differently, substantial\\nevidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Lace’s review of all the evidence\\nshould be credited over Kaley’s observations as a non-medical, other source. “It is\\nthe function of the ALJ to weigh conflicting evidence.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d\\n705, 709 (8th Cir. 2007). We “will not reverse merely because evidence also points\\nto an alternate outcome.” Travis, 477 F.3d at 1042.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3296,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643337,"string":"4,643,337"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In RE: VEG LIQUIDATION, INC., Formerly Known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC, Debtors. R. Ray Fulmer, II, Appellant, v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.; International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP ; Ball Metal Food Container, LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC ; Andrew Torgove; Lazard Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North America, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC; Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Now Known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC; Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. ; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., Formerly Known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P., Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Fulmer v. Fifth Third Equip. Fin. Co. (In Re Veg Liquidation, Inc.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1786"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Colloton, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1786\\n ___________________________\\n\\n In re: Veg Liquidation, Inc., formerly known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDebtors.\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n R. Ray Fulmer, II,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.;\\n International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP; Ball Metal Food Container,\\n LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC; Andrew Torgove; Lazard\\n Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North\\nAmerica, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC;\\n Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager\\n Creek Acquisition Corp., now known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC;\\n Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P.;\\nSankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), correctly named as, Sankaty\\nCredit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities\\n Fund, L.P.; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian),\\n correctly named as, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore\\nMaster), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., formerly\\n known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager Creek\\n Acquisition Corp.; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty\\n Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellees.\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy\\n Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n R. Ray Fulmer, II, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, sued a number of parties\\ninvolved in the sale of a bankruptcy estate’s assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363. The\\nbankruptcy court1 dismissed Fulmer’s claims on the ground that they were either\\nimpermissible collateral attacks on an earlier order approving the sale or without\\nmerit. The court also denied Fulmer leave to file a second amended complaint. The\\nBankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Fulmer appeals to this court, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The dispute arises from bankruptcy proceedings for Allens, Inc., an Arkansas\\nfood canning enterprise. After encountering financial difficulties, Allens filed for\\nChapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2013. The bankruptcy court authorized bidding\\nprocedures for the sale of substantially all of Allens’s assets. Allens then moved to\\nsell the assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and (f), which authorize the sale of a\\nbankruptcy debtor’s assets when certain conditions are met.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Ben T. Barry, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for\\nthe Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Allens identified Seneca Foods Corporation as the “Stalking Horse”\\npurchaser—that is, the potential purchaser whose opening bid would set the floor at\\nthe auction—and prepared a “stalking horse asset purchase agreement” between\\nAllens and Seneca Foods. The bankruptcy court granted the motion for sale after\\nnotice and a hearing. Allens then served a “Notice of Bid Procedures, Sale Hearing\\nand Objection Deadlines” for the auction on more than 5,000 creditors and parties in\\ninterest through a noticing agent.\\n\\n The auction occurred between February 3 and 6, 2014. At the auction, a\\nmarketing firm retained by Allens estimated the net value of each bid submitted. The\\nmarketing firm ultimately valued Seneca’s opening bid at approximately $117\\nmillion, whereas the unadjusted price in the stalking horse asset purchase agreement\\nhad been $148 million. Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., an entity formed by a group\\nof second lienholders, also submitted a bid, which the marketing firm valued at $160\\nmillion. Allens ultimately deemed Sager Creek the successful bidder for the estate’s\\nassets, but the final asset purchase agreement reflected a sale price of just under $125\\nmillion. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued a detailed order approving the\\nsale to Sager Creek. No appeals were taken, and the sale closed on February 28,\\n2014.\\n\\n Within a few months, the bankruptcy court converted the proceeding to a\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy and appointed Fulmer as trustee of the bankruptcy estate.\\nFulmer brought this action in February 2016, and filed a first amended complaint in\\nApril 2016.\\n\\n In his amended complaint, Fulmer names more than twenty defendants\\nallegedly connected in various ways to the sale of the Allens assets. He groups them\\ninto three categories: the “Committee Defendants,” who were members of the\\nunsecured creditors committee in the Chapter 11 proceeding; the “Fiduciary\\nDefendants,” who were retained by Allens to serve as financial advisors in the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fproceeding; and the “Sager Creek Defendants,” who held interests in Allens as\\nsecond lienholders. The amended complaint asserts fourteen causes of action, all\\narising from the defendants’ alleged conduct in connection with the sale proceedings.\\nThe defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed.\\nR. Bankr. P. 7012(b).\\n\\n The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint and denied as futile Fulmer’s\\nrequest for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court determined that\\nFulmer did not plead a plausible claim of fraud on the court, collusion among bidders\\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363(n), or for post-judgment relief from the sale order under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court concluded that the trustee’s other\\nclaims were barred by the finality of the order approving the asset sale under § 363,\\nand that the proposed amended complaint would be futile. The Bankruptcy Appellate\\nPanel (BAP) affirmed.\\n\\n In an appeal from a decision of the BAP, we are a second reviewing court. We\\nreview de novo both the bankruptcy court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\\nto state a claim, and the court’s denial of leave to amend that rests on a legal\\nconclusion of futility. In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d 944,\\n950 (8th Cir. 2018); In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir.\\n2007).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The first issue on appeal is whether Fulmer’s claims constitute an\\nimpermissible collateral attack on an asset sale in bankruptcy that was consummated\\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363. To evaluate this contention, it is necessary to review Fulmer’s\\nallegations in the first amended complaint.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f As Fulmer tells it, the Committee Defendants and the Sager Creek\\nDefendants—all of them creditors of Allens—were at risk of receiving less than full\\nrepayment as bankruptcy loomed in 2013. The Sager Creek Defendants’ loans were\\nonly partially secured, and Seneca’s stalking horse bid, if successful, would have\\nrelegated $30 million of those defendants’ claims to unsecured creditor status. The\\nCommittee Defendants, for their part, held at least $72 million in unsecured claims\\nfor accounts receivable. The Committee Defendants had also received more than $18\\nmillion from Allens in the ninety days preceding the bankruptcy, such that a trustee\\npotentially could avoid those transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).\\n\\n Fulmer alleges that before the initial bankruptcy filing, one of the Committee\\nDefendants, Ball Metal Food Container Corp., executed an undisclosed agreement\\nwith the Sager Creek Defendants. The agreement, according to Fulmer, provided that\\nBall would receive a lucrative contract with a new entity formed by the Sager Creek\\nDefendants (i.e., Sager Creek Acquisition Corp.) if that entity was the successful\\nbidder in a § 363 sale for Allens’s assets. Ball ultimately had one of the largest\\nclaims as a member of the unsecured creditors’ committee in the Chapter 11\\nproceedings.\\n\\n Fulmer then claims that the Fiduciary Defendants, who were aware of the\\nagreement between Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, manipulated the valuations\\nof the bids at the auction. The terms of Seneca’s bid, Fulmer explains, would have\\nleft $32.9 million in real estate and $74 million in ninety-day avoidance claims with\\nthe Allens estate. The terms of Sager Creek’s final bid, by contrast, gave Sager Creek\\nall of those assets, with a covenant not to pursue the avoidance claims. Yet despite\\nthese differences, the Fiduciary Defendant assisting Allens at the auction valued\\nSeneca’s bid at $117 million and valued Sager Creek’s bid at $160 million. Fulmer\\ncontends that as a result of these actions, the defendants collectively divested the\\nAllens estate of at least $74 million in avoidance claims and up to $32.9 million in\\nreal estate and personal property.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Based on this episode, Fulmer brought numerous claims against the defendants,\\nincluding allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, conversion,\\ninducing breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations and\\nprospective economic relations, negligent interference with prospective economic\\nrelations, deceptive trade practices, and an equitable claim for rescission and\\nreformation. Fulmer argues that the bankruptcy court erred by characterizing these\\nclaims as a collateral attack on the February 2014 sale order, and by misapplying\\nprinciples of res judicata and collateral estoppel.\\n\\n Fulmer’s contention brings to the fore this court’s decision in Regions Bank v.\\nJ.R. Oil Co., 387 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2004). Regions Bank, following In re Met-L-\\nWood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988), held that an order authorizing a sale free\\nand clear of liens under § 363 “is shielded from collateral attack . . . by virtue of the\\nnature of rights transferred under 11 U.S.C. § 363.” 387 F.3d at 732. This is so\\nbecause “[a] proceeding under section 363 is an in rem proceeding. It transfers\\nproperty rights, and property rights are rights good against the world, not just against\\nparties to a judgment or persons with notice of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting In re\\nMet-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017). Plaintiffs are therefore barred from bringing claims\\nthat amount to collateral attacks on the validity of a § 363 sale. In Regions Bank, we\\napplied that rule where a plaintiff brought RICO claims premised on the defendants’\\nalleged fraud in connection with a § 363 sale in a bankruptcy to which the plaintiff\\nwas not a party. Id. at 731-32. This court held that the claims were barred “to the\\nextent [they] relate to the sale.” Id. at 731.\\n\\n In this case, the bankruptcy court’s February 2014 order approved the sale of\\nthe Allens assets to Sager Creek free and clear of all liens under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)\\nand (f). At bottom, Fulmer’s complaint is that Sager Creek won the auction for the\\nAllens assets with an overvalued bid that was supported by an undisclosed agreement\\nbetween an unsecured creditor and the second lienholders who formed Sager Creek.\\nFulmer’s contention amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the February\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f2014 sale order under the reasoning of Regions Bank. In the order, the bankruptcy\\ncourt determined that “all of the Acquired Assets were subject to a competitive and\\ngood faith bidding process,” and that Sager Creek had “submitted the highest or\\notherwise best bid for the Acquired Assets offered at the Auction.” The court also\\nconcluded that the consideration to be provided by Sager Creek was “the highest and\\notherwise best offer for the Acquired Assets.” To sustain Fulmer’s claims, a court\\nwould have to contradict those determinations. The finality accorded to asset sales\\nunder § 363 bars Fulmer’s line of attack.\\n\\n Fulmer’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. He first contends that\\nhis complaint does not collaterally attack the February 2014 sale order, because the\\ndefendants were not parties to the order, and he does not seek reversion of title to the\\nproperty sold. A sale free and clear under § 363, however, is “a judgment that is good\\nas against the world, not merely as against parties to the proceedings.” Id. at 732.\\nThe claims barred in Regions Bank likewise did not seek reversion of title; they were\\nclaims for damages under RICO. Id. at 727-28, 731; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The\\nSeventh Circuit similarly described a suit seeking “heavy damages” from parties\\ninvolved in a § 363 sale as a “thinly disguised collateral attack on the judgment\\nconfirming the sale.” In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d at 1018.\\n\\n Fulmer also argues that the provisions of the sale order that conflict with his\\nclaims were not “integral” to the sale, so his complaint does not attack the sale order’s\\nvalidity. He imports this requirement from 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), which provides that\\nreversal or modification of a § 363(b) sale on direct appeal does not “affect the\\nvalidity of a sale” unless the sale order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 363(m). This court reasoned in In re Trism, Inc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003),\\nthat an appeal could “affect the validity of a sale” under § 363(m) only if it\\nchallenged a provision of the sale order that was “integral to the sale of the estate’s\\nassets.” Id. at 1007.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f Regions Bank did not address whether the bar on collateral attacks is limited\\nto those that challenge “integral” provisions of a § 363 sale. But if there were such\\na limitation, it would be satisfied here. Undermining the sale order’s finding that\\nSager Creek’s consideration was “the highest and otherwise best offer for the\\nAcquired Assets” would “adversely alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange.” Id.\\nWhen modifying or reversing a provision of the sale order would have that effect, the\\nprovision is “integral” to the sale. Id.\\n\\n This is not to say that the rule of finality governing asset sales under § 363\\nforecloses all suits related to sales of a debtor’s assets. For example, a claim that a\\nfiduciary’s conduct kept a prospective bidder from securing adequate funding to make\\na more competitive bid does not necessarily call into question a bankruptcy court’s\\ndetermination that the successful bid was the best offer on the table. See Brown\\nMedia Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2017). Nor does\\nthe finality rule bar a claim against a fiduciary for conduct related to a sale where the\\ntransaction was not subject to approval by the bankruptcy court under § 363. See In\\nre Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 2007); In re Brook\\nValley IV, 347 B.R. 662, 670-71 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). Where a lawsuit “poses no\\nthreat to the finality of the bankruptcy court’s orders,” Brown Media Corp., 854 F.3d\\nat 163, it does not conflict with the principles enunciated in Regions Bank and In re\\nMet-L-Wood. But the finality rule precludes allegations like Fulmer’s that second-\\nguess the bankruptcy court’s determination that the buyer submitted the best bid for\\nthe assets.\\n\\n Fulmer also argues that the sale order is simply unenforceable because the\\nrequired elements for a sale were not adequately proven. But the finality of a\\nbankruptcy court’s orders at the conclusion of direct review “[o]rdinarily . . . stand[s]\\nin the way of challenging their enforceability.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.\\nEspinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 269 (2010) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). We\\nagree with the BAP that Fulmer’s freestanding challenge to the sale order, while\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fpermissible on direct appeal, cannot be raised at this stage. See In re Met-L-Wood,\\n861 F.2d at 1018.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Fulmer argues alternatively that he is entitled to relief from the sale order\\nbecause it was obtained through fraud on the court. A federal court has inherent\\nequitable power to vacate a judgment that is obtained by fraud on the court. Hazel-\\nAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944). A finding of\\nfraud on the court, however, “is justified only by the most egregious misconduct\\ndirected to the court itself, such as bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of\\nevidence by counsel.” Landscape Props., Inc. v. Vogel, 46 F.3d 1416, 1422 (8th Cir.\\n1995). The category is narrowly defined, and does not include “fraud between the\\nparties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury.” United States v. Smiley,\\n553 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).\\n\\n Fulmer’s amended complaint falls short of meeting this demanding standard.\\nFew, if any, of the alleged facts involve conduct directed at the court in the sale\\nproceedings. Fulmer instead repeats his account of the undisclosed agreement\\nbetween Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, and the Fiduciary Defendants’ alleged\\nrole in helping Sager Creek win the auction with an overvalued bid. He then states\\nthat “[n]ot a candid word of the scheme was disclosed to the Court at the 2/12/14 sale\\nhearing.” But nondisclosure, even of a side agreement affecting the outcome of a\\n§ 363 sale, does not rise to the level of fraud on the court. We rejected such a claim\\nin Landscape Properties, holding that a bankruptcy attorney’s failure to disclose a\\npotentially collusive agreement between prospective bidders “d[id] not even come\\nclose to meeting that standard.” 46 F.3d at 1422. Fulmer’s amended complaint thus\\nfails to state a plausible claim for fraud on the court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Fulmer next contends that he should be granted relief from the sale order under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. That rule, made applicable to bankruptcy cases\\nby Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, sets out grounds upon which a court\\nmay relieve a party from a final judgment or order. Fulmer cites Rule 60(b)(4), which\\nallows relief when a “judgment is void,” so long as a motion for relief is filed “within\\na reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).\\n\\n Fulmer argues that the sale order is “void” in light of Czyzewski v. Jevic\\nHolding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). In Jevic, the Supreme Court considered\\nwhether a bankruptcy court may approve the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case that\\nwould distribute assets to creditors in violation of the priority rules that govern\\nnormal distribution plans, without the consent of the affected creditors. Id. at 983.\\nThe Court held that such structured dismissals are not permitted. Id. Fulmer asserts\\nthat the § 363 sale of the Allens assets violated the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules\\nin a similar way—that is, that certain creditors with unsecured claims received value\\nwhile others with identical priority did not.\\n\\n Jevic does not win the day for Fulmer. For one thing, Jevic involved a\\nstructured dismissal and did not hold that § 363 sales must conform to normal priority\\nrules. In fact, the Court noted that some courts in other contexts have approved\\npriority-violating distributions where they serve “significant Code-related\\nobjectives,” such as maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 985. But\\neven if the reasoning of Jevic on priority rules were extended to § 363 sales, it would\\nnot apply in the context of a consummated sale. Whatever force the Bankruptcy\\nCode’s priority rules might have at a sale approval hearing or on direct review of a\\n§ 363 sale, see id. at 986, a deviation from those rules does not render final judgments\\n“void.” See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273-76 (holding confirmed bankruptcy plan was\\nnot void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) despite failing to comply with statutory\\nrequirement); cf. In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376, 388 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that\\nJevic did not add an exception to the text of § 363(m) concerning validity of a sale).\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f C.\\n\\n Fulmer also contends that the bankruptcy court erred by denying as futile his\\nmotion for leave to amend his complaint. In the proposed amendment, Fulmer sought\\nto raise a claim under Rule 60(b)(4) that the § 363 sale was void for lack of due\\nprocess. Due process in bankruptcy generally entitles a party to receive the notice\\nspecified in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,\\nand a judgment is void if the bankruptcy court acted in a manner inconsistent with\\ndue process. Baldwin v. Credit Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, 516 F.3d 734,\\n737 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n Fulmer’s proposed due process claim is premised on his assertion that the\\ndefendants secretly agreed to transfer value from Allens to Sager Creek in the form\\nof avoidance claims and real estate that were purchased for no additional\\nconsideration. Fulmer’s proposed amendment alleges that notice was lacking because\\nthe alleged agreement remained undisclosed. This nondisclosure, he asserts, deprived\\nthe other interested parties of the ability and incentive to scrutinize Sager Creek’s\\nfinal bid.\\n\\n The terms of the Sager Creek bid to which Fulmer principally objects, however,\\nwere stated on the record at the auction hearing. The other interested parties,\\nincluding more than 5,000 known creditors, received timely notice of the auction and\\nthe subsequent sale approval hearing. The record before the bankruptcy court\\ncontained the auction transcript and the final versions of the purchase agreements.\\nAnd interested parties were permitted to file objections in the approval hearing.\\nThese proceedings thus afforded interested parties adequate notice and opportunity\\nto be heard with respect to their claims on the Allens estate. If any wrong was\\nperpetrated by the maintenance of a secret agreement among the defendants, it was\\nnot a deprivation of due process in the bankruptcy court. The February 2014 sale\\norder is not void for lack of due process, and such a claim would have been futile.\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Fulmer’s proposed amendment also adds details about the disputed\\ntransactions, but the alleged acts remain the same. Fulmer asserts that the Sager\\nCreek Defendants and Ball had much to lose if Seneca ended up as the successful\\nbidder for Allens’s assets. The Sager Creek Defendants and Ball made an agreement\\nto support Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Fulmer claims, and they did not adequately\\ndisclose that agreement. The Fiduciary Defendants allegedly played a role by\\novervaluing Sager Creek’s last-minute bid. Fulmer contends that although the\\nbankruptcy court approved the sale, the court acted without an adequate\\nunderstanding of how the bids compared to one another.\\n\\n Fulmer’s claims in the proposed amendment, like those in the complaint that\\nwas dismissed, would undercut the principal findings of the February 2014 sale order,\\nbecause they are premised on the alleged inferiority of Sager Creek’s bid. They are\\nthus barred by the finality rule governing asset sales under § 363. See Regions Bank,\\n387 F.3d at 731-32; In re Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017-18. As for fraud on the\\ncourt, despite new conclusory language, the proposed complaint does not point to any\\naffirmative misrepresentation on a defendant’s part that was directed to the\\nbankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court thus did not err in concluding that the\\nproposed amendment would be futile.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420590/\", \"author_raw\": \"COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COLLOTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643337/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In RE: VEG LIQUIDATION, INC., Formerly Known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC, Debtors. R. Ray Fulmer, II, Appellant, v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.; International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP ; Ball Metal Food Container, LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC ; Andrew Torgove; Lazard Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North America, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC; Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Now Known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC; Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. ; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., Formerly Known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P., Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1786\n ___________________________\n\n In re: Veg Liquidation, Inc., formerly known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDebtors.\n\n ------------------------------\n\n R. Ray Fulmer, II,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant,\n\n v.\n\n Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.;\n International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP; Ball Metal Food Container,\n LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC; Andrew Torgove; Lazard\n Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North\nAmerica, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC;\n Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager\n Creek Acquisition Corp., now known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC;\n Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P.;\nSankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), correctly named as, Sankaty\nCredit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities\n Fund, L.P.; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian),\n correctly named as, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore\nMaster), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., formerly\n known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager Creek\n Acquisition Corp.; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty\n Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.,\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellees.\n ____________\n\f Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy\n Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit\n ____________\n\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\n\n R. Ray Fulmer, II, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, sued a number of parties\ninvolved in the sale of a bankruptcy estate’s assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363. The\nbankruptcy court1 dismissed Fulmer’s claims on the ground that they were either\nimpermissible collateral attacks on an earlier order approving the sale or without\nmerit. The court also denied Fulmer leave to file a second amended complaint. The\nBankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Fulmer appeals to this court, and we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n The dispute arises from bankruptcy proceedings for Allens, Inc., an Arkansas\nfood canning enterprise. After encountering financial difficulties, Allens filed for\nChapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2013. The bankruptcy court authorized bidding\nprocedures for the sale of substantially all of Allens’s assets. Allens then moved to\nsell the assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and (f), which authorize the sale of a\nbankruptcy debtor’s assets when certain conditions are met.\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Ben T. Barry, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for\nthe Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.\n\n -2-\n\f Allens identified Seneca Foods Corporation as the “Stalking Horse”\npurchaser—that is, the potential purchaser whose opening bid would set the floor at\nthe auction—and prepared a “stalking horse asset purchase agreement” between\nAllens and Seneca Foods. The bankruptcy court granted the motion for sale after\nnotice and a hearing. Allens then served a “Notice of Bid Procedures, Sale Hearing\nand Objection Deadlines” for the auction on more than 5,000 creditors and parties in\ninterest through a noticing agent.\n\n The auction occurred between February 3 and 6, 2014. At the auction, a\nmarketing firm retained by Allens estimated the net value of each bid submitted. The\nmarketing firm ultimately valued Seneca’s opening bid at approximately $117\nmillion, whereas the unadjusted price in the stalking horse asset purchase agreement\nhad been $148 million. Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., an entity formed by a group\nof second lienholders, also submitted a bid, which the marketing firm valued at $160\nmillion. Allens ultimately deemed Sager Creek the successful bidder for the estate’s\nassets, but the final asset purchase agreement reflected a sale price of just under $125\nmillion. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued a detailed order approving the\nsale to Sager Creek. No appeals were taken, and the sale closed on February 28,\n2014.\n\n Within a few months, the bankruptcy court converted the proceeding to a\nChapter 7 bankruptcy and appointed Fulmer as trustee of the bankruptcy estate.\nFulmer brought this action in February 2016, and filed a first amended complaint in\nApril 2016.\n\n In his amended complaint, Fulmer names more than twenty defendants\nallegedly connected in various ways to the sale of the Allens assets. He groups them\ninto three categories: the “Committee Defendants,” who were members of the\nunsecured creditors committee in the Chapter 11 proceeding; the “Fiduciary\nDefendants,” who were retained by Allens to serve as financial advisors in the\n\n -3-\n\fproceeding; and the “Sager Creek Defendants,” who held interests in Allens as\nsecond lienholders. The amended complaint asserts fourteen causes of action, all\narising from the defendants’ alleged conduct in connection with the sale proceedings.\nThe defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed.\nR. Bankr. P. 7012(b).\n\n The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint and denied as futile Fulmer’s\nrequest for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court determined that\nFulmer did not plead a plausible claim of fraud on the court, collusion among bidders\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363(n), or for post-judgment relief from the sale order under\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court concluded that the trustee’s other\nclaims were barred by the finality of the order approving the asset sale under § 363,\nand that the proposed amended complaint would be futile. The Bankruptcy Appellate\nPanel (BAP) affirmed.\n\n In an appeal from a decision of the BAP, we are a second reviewing court. We\nreview de novo both the bankruptcy court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\nto state a claim, and the court’s denial of leave to amend that rests on a legal\nconclusion of futility. In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d 944,\n950 (8th Cir. 2018); In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir.\n2007).\n\n II.\n\n A.\n\n The first issue on appeal is whether Fulmer’s claims constitute an\nimpermissible collateral attack on an asset sale in bankruptcy that was consummated\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363. To evaluate this contention, it is necessary to review Fulmer’s\nallegations in the first amended complaint.\n\n -4-\n\f As Fulmer tells it, the Committee Defendants and the Sager Creek\nDefendants—all of them creditors of Allens—were at risk of receiving less than full\nrepayment as bankruptcy loomed in 2013. The Sager Creek Defendants’ loans were\nonly partially secured, and Seneca’s stalking horse bid, if successful, would have\nrelegated $30 million of those defendants’ claims to unsecured creditor status. The\nCommittee Defendants, for their part, held at least $72 million in unsecured claims\nfor accounts receivable. The Committee Defendants had also received more than $18\nmillion from Allens in the ninety days preceding the bankruptcy, such that a trustee\npotentially could avoid those transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).\n\n Fulmer alleges that before the initial bankruptcy filing, one of the Committee\nDefendants, Ball Metal Food Container Corp., executed an undisclosed agreement\nwith the Sager Creek Defendants. The agreement, according to Fulmer, provided that\nBall would receive a lucrative contract with a new entity formed by the Sager Creek\nDefendants (i.e., Sager Creek Acquisition Corp.) if that entity was the successful\nbidder in a § 363 sale for Allens’s assets. Ball ultimately had one of the largest\nclaims as a member of the unsecured creditors’ committee in the Chapter 11\nproceedings.\n\n Fulmer then claims that the Fiduciary Defendants, who were aware of the\nagreement between Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, manipulated the valuations\nof the bids at the auction. The terms of Seneca’s bid, Fulmer explains, would have\nleft $32.9 million in real estate and $74 million in ninety-day avoidance claims with\nthe Allens estate. The terms of Sager Creek’s final bid, by contrast, gave Sager Creek\nall of those assets, with a covenant not to pursue the avoidance claims. Yet despite\nthese differences, the Fiduciary Defendant assisting Allens at the auction valued\nSeneca’s bid at $117 million and valued Sager Creek’s bid at $160 million. Fulmer\ncontends that as a result of these actions, the defendants collectively divested the\nAllens estate of at least $74 million in avoidance claims and up to $32.9 million in\nreal estate and personal property.\n\n -5-\n\f Based on this episode, Fulmer brought numerous claims against the defendants,\nincluding allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, conversion,\ninducing breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations and\nprospective economic relations, negligent interference with prospective economic\nrelations, deceptive trade practices, and an equitable claim for rescission and\nreformation. Fulmer argues that the bankruptcy court erred by characterizing these\nclaims as a collateral attack on the February 2014 sale order, and by misapplying\nprinciples of res judicata and collateral estoppel.\n\n Fulmer’s contention brings to the fore this court’s decision in Regions Bank v.\nJ.R. Oil Co., 387 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2004). Regions Bank, following In re Met-L-\nWood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988), held that an order authorizing a sale free\nand clear of liens under § 363 “is shielded from collateral attack . . . by virtue of the\nnature of rights transferred under 11 U.S.C. § 363.” 387 F.3d at 732. This is so\nbecause “[a] proceeding under section 363 is an in rem proceeding. It transfers\nproperty rights, and property rights are rights good against the world, not just against\nparties to a judgment or persons with notice of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting In re\nMet-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017). Plaintiffs are therefore barred from bringing claims\nthat amount to collateral attacks on the validity of a § 363 sale. In Regions Bank, we\napplied that rule where a plaintiff brought RICO claims premised on the defendants’\nalleged fraud in connection with a § 363 sale in a bankruptcy to which the plaintiff\nwas not a party. Id. at 731-32. This court held that the claims were barred “to the\nextent [they] relate to the sale.” Id. at 731.\n\n In this case, the bankruptcy court’s February 2014 order approved the sale of\nthe Allens assets to Sager Creek free and clear of all liens under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)\nand (f). At bottom, Fulmer’s complaint is that Sager Creek won the auction for the\nAllens assets with an overvalued bid that was supported by an undisclosed agreement\nbetween an unsecured creditor and the second lienholders who formed Sager Creek.\nFulmer’s contention amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the February\n\n -6-\n\f2014 sale order under the reasoning of Regions Bank. In the order, the bankruptcy\ncourt determined that “all of the Acquired Assets were subject to a competitive and\ngood faith bidding process,” and that Sager Creek had “submitted the highest or\notherwise best bid for the Acquired Assets offered at the Auction.” The court also\nconcluded that the consideration to be provided by Sager Creek was “the highest and\notherwise best offer for the Acquired Assets.” To sustain Fulmer’s claims, a court\nwould have to contradict those determinations. The finality accorded to asset sales\nunder § 363 bars Fulmer’s line of attack.\n\n Fulmer’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. He first contends that\nhis complaint does not collaterally attack the February 2014 sale order, because the\ndefendants were not parties to the order, and he does not seek reversion of title to the\nproperty sold. A sale free and clear under § 363, however, is “a judgment that is good\nas against the world, not merely as against parties to the proceedings.” Id. at 732.\nThe claims barred in Regions Bank likewise did not seek reversion of title; they were\nclaims for damages under RICO. Id. at 727-28, 731; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The\nSeventh Circuit similarly described a suit seeking “heavy damages” from parties\ninvolved in a § 363 sale as a “thinly disguised collateral attack on the judgment\nconfirming the sale.” In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d at 1018.\n\n Fulmer also argues that the provisions of the sale order that conflict with his\nclaims were not “integral” to the sale, so his complaint does not attack the sale order’s\nvalidity. He imports this requirement from 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), which provides that\nreversal or modification of a § 363(b) sale on direct appeal does not “affect the\nvalidity of a sale” unless the sale order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C.\n§ 363(m). This court reasoned in In re Trism, Inc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003),\nthat an appeal could “affect the validity of a sale” under § 363(m) only if it\nchallenged a provision of the sale order that was “integral to the sale of the estate’s\nassets.” Id. at 1007.\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f Regions Bank did not address whether the bar on collateral attacks is limited\nto those that challenge “integral” provisions of a § 363 sale. But if there were such\na limitation, it would be satisfied here. Undermining the sale order’s finding that\nSager Creek’s consideration was “the highest and otherwise best offer for the\nAcquired Assets” would “adversely alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange.” Id.\nWhen modifying or reversing a provision of the sale order would have that effect, the\nprovision is “integral” to the sale. Id.\n\n This is not to say that the rule of finality governing asset sales under § 363\nforecloses all suits related to sales of a debtor’s assets. For example, a claim that a\nfiduciary’s conduct kept a prospective bidder from securing adequate funding to make\na more competitive bid does not necessarily call into question a bankruptcy court’s\ndetermination that the successful bid was the best offer on the table. See Brown\nMedia Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2017). Nor does\nthe finality rule bar a claim against a fiduciary for conduct related to a sale where the\ntransaction was not subject to approval by the bankruptcy court under § 363. See In\nre Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 2007); In re Brook\nValley IV, 347 B.R. 662, 670-71 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). Where a lawsuit “poses no\nthreat to the finality of the bankruptcy court’s orders,” Brown Media Corp., 854 F.3d\nat 163, it does not conflict with the principles enunciated in Regions Bank and In re\nMet-L-Wood. But the finality rule precludes allegations like Fulmer’s that second-\nguess the bankruptcy court’s determination that the buyer submitted the best bid for\nthe assets.\n\n Fulmer also argues that the sale order is simply unenforceable because the\nrequired elements for a sale were not adequately proven. But the finality of a\nbankruptcy court’s orders at the conclusion of direct review “[o]rdinarily . . . stand[s]\nin the way of challenging their enforceability.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.\nEspinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 269 (2010) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). We\nagree with the BAP that Fulmer’s freestanding challenge to the sale order, while\n\n -8-\n\fpermissible on direct appeal, cannot be raised at this stage. See In re Met-L-Wood,\n861 F.2d at 1018.\n\n B.\n\n Fulmer argues alternatively that he is entitled to relief from the sale order\nbecause it was obtained through fraud on the court. A federal court has inherent\nequitable power to vacate a judgment that is obtained by fraud on the court. Hazel-\nAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944). A finding of\nfraud on the court, however, “is justified only by the most egregious misconduct\ndirected to the court itself, such as bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of\nevidence by counsel.” Landscape Props., Inc. v. Vogel, 46 F.3d 1416, 1422 (8th Cir.\n1995). The category is narrowly defined, and does not include “fraud between the\nparties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury.” United States v. Smiley,\n553 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).\n\n Fulmer’s amended complaint falls short of meeting this demanding standard.\nFew, if any, of the alleged facts involve conduct directed at the court in the sale\nproceedings. Fulmer instead repeats his account of the undisclosed agreement\nbetween Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, and the Fiduciary Defendants’ alleged\nrole in helping Sager Creek win the auction with an overvalued bid. He then states\nthat “[n]ot a candid word of the scheme was disclosed to the Court at the 2/12/14 sale\nhearing.” But nondisclosure, even of a side agreement affecting the outcome of a\n§ 363 sale, does not rise to the level of fraud on the court. We rejected such a claim\nin Landscape Properties, holding that a bankruptcy attorney’s failure to disclose a\npotentially collusive agreement between prospective bidders “d[id] not even come\nclose to meeting that standard.” 46 F.3d at 1422. Fulmer’s amended complaint thus\nfails to state a plausible claim for fraud on the court.\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n\f Fulmer next contends that he should be granted relief from the sale order under\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. That rule, made applicable to bankruptcy cases\nby Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, sets out grounds upon which a court\nmay relieve a party from a final judgment or order. Fulmer cites Rule 60(b)(4), which\nallows relief when a “judgment is void,” so long as a motion for relief is filed “within\na reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).\n\n Fulmer argues that the sale order is “void” in light of Czyzewski v. Jevic\nHolding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). In Jevic, the Supreme Court considered\nwhether a bankruptcy court may approve the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case that\nwould distribute assets to creditors in violation of the priority rules that govern\nnormal distribution plans, without the consent of the affected creditors. Id. at 983.\nThe Court held that such structured dismissals are not permitted. Id. Fulmer asserts\nthat the § 363 sale of the Allens assets violated the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules\nin a similar way—that is, that certain creditors with unsecured claims received value\nwhile others with identical priority did not.\n\n Jevic does not win the day for Fulmer. For one thing, Jevic involved a\nstructured dismissal and did not hold that § 363 sales must conform to normal priority\nrules. In fact, the Court noted that some courts in other contexts have approved\npriority-violating distributions where they serve “significant Code-related\nobjectives,” such as maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 985. But\neven if the reasoning of Jevic on priority rules were extended to § 363 sales, it would\nnot apply in the context of a consummated sale. Whatever force the Bankruptcy\nCode’s priority rules might have at a sale approval hearing or on direct review of a\n§ 363 sale, see id. at 986, a deviation from those rules does not render final judgments\n“void.” See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273-76 (holding confirmed bankruptcy plan was\nnot void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) despite failing to comply with statutory\nrequirement); cf. In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376, 388 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that\nJevic did not add an exception to the text of § 363(m) concerning validity of a sale).\n\n -10-\n\f C.\n\n Fulmer also contends that the bankruptcy court erred by denying as futile his\nmotion for leave to amend his complaint. In the proposed amendment, Fulmer sought\nto raise a claim under Rule 60(b)(4) that the § 363 sale was void for lack of due\nprocess. Due process in bankruptcy generally entitles a party to receive the notice\nspecified in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,\nand a judgment is void if the bankruptcy court acted in a manner inconsistent with\ndue process. Baldwin v. Credit Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, 516 F.3d 734,\n737 (8th Cir. 2008).\n\n Fulmer’s proposed due process claim is premised on his assertion that the\ndefendants secretly agreed to transfer value from Allens to Sager Creek in the form\nof avoidance claims and real estate that were purchased for no additional\nconsideration. Fulmer’s proposed amendment alleges that notice was lacking because\nthe alleged agreement remained undisclosed. This nondisclosure, he asserts, deprived\nthe other interested parties of the ability and incentive to scrutinize Sager Creek’s\nfinal bid.\n\n The terms of the Sager Creek bid to which Fulmer principally objects, however,\nwere stated on the record at the auction hearing. The other interested parties,\nincluding more than 5,000 known creditors, received timely notice of the auction and\nthe subsequent sale approval hearing. The record before the bankruptcy court\ncontained the auction transcript and the final versions of the purchase agreements.\nAnd interested parties were permitted to file objections in the approval hearing.\nThese proceedings thus afforded interested parties adequate notice and opportunity\nto be heard with respect to their claims on the Allens estate. If any wrong was\nperpetrated by the maintenance of a secret agreement among the defendants, it was\nnot a deprivation of due process in the bankruptcy court. The February 2014 sale\norder is not void for lack of due process, and such a claim would have been futile.\n\n -11-\n\f Fulmer’s proposed amendment also adds details about the disputed\ntransactions, but the alleged acts remain the same. Fulmer asserts that the Sager\nCreek Defendants and Ball had much to lose if Seneca ended up as the successful\nbidder for Allens’s assets. The Sager Creek Defendants and Ball made an agreement\nto support Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Fulmer claims, and they did not adequately\ndisclose that agreement. The Fiduciary Defendants allegedly played a role by\novervaluing Sager Creek’s last-minute bid. Fulmer contends that although the\nbankruptcy court approved the sale, the court acted without an adequate\nunderstanding of how the bids compared to one another.\n\n Fulmer’s claims in the proposed amendment, like those in the complaint that\nwas dismissed, would undercut the principal findings of the February 2014 sale order,\nbecause they are premised on the alleged inferiority of Sager Creek’s bid. They are\nthus barred by the finality rule governing asset sales under § 363. See Regions Bank,\n387 F.3d at 731-32; In re Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017-18. As for fraud on the\ncourt, despite new conclusory language, the proposed complaint does not point to any\naffirmative misrepresentation on a defendant’s part that was directed to the\nbankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court thus did not err in concluding that the\nproposed amendment would be futile.\n\n * * *\n\n The judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -12-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In RE: VEG LIQUIDATION, INC., Formerly Known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC, Debtors. R. Ray Fulmer, II, Appellant, v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.; International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP ; Ball Metal Food Container, LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC ; Andrew Torgove; Lazard Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North America, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC; Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Now Known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC; Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. ; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian), Correctly Named As, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., Formerly Known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, Formerly Known as Sager Creek Acquisition Corp. ; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P., Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-1786\\n ___________________________\\n\\n In re: Veg Liquidation, Inc., formerly known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDebtors.\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n R. Ray Fulmer, II,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.;\\n International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP; Ball Metal Food Container,\\n LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC; Andrew Torgove; Lazard\\n Middle Market LLC; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC; Alvarez & Marsal, North\\nAmerica, LLC; Alvarez & Marsal Private Equity Performance Improvement, LLC;\\n Jonathan Hickman; Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager\\n Creek Acquisition Corp., now known as 412, Inc.; 1903 Onshore Funding, LLC;\\n Cortland Capital Market Services, LLC; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P.;\\nSankaty Credit Opportunities, IV, L.P. (Caymanian), correctly named as, Sankaty\\nCredit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities\\n Fund, L.P.; Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, L.P. (Caymanian),\\n correctly named as, Sankaty Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore\\nMaster), L.P.; Does 1-100; Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC; 412, Inc., formerly\\n known as Sager Creek Vegetable Company, formerly known as Sager Creek\\n Acquisition Corp.; Sankaty Credit Opportunities, (Offshore Master) IV; Sankaty\\n Middle Market Opportunities Fund, (Offshore Master), L.P.,\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAppellees.\\n ____________\\n\\f Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy\\n Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: January 17, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nCOLLOTON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n R. Ray Fulmer, II, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, sued a number of parties\\ninvolved in the sale of a bankruptcy estate’s assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363. The\\nbankruptcy court1 dismissed Fulmer’s claims on the ground that they were either\\nimpermissible collateral attacks on an earlier order approving the sale or without\\nmerit. The court also denied Fulmer leave to file a second amended complaint. The\\nBankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Fulmer appeals to this court, and we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n The dispute arises from bankruptcy proceedings for Allens, Inc., an Arkansas\\nfood canning enterprise. After encountering financial difficulties, Allens filed for\\nChapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2013. The bankruptcy court authorized bidding\\nprocedures for the sale of substantially all of Allens’s assets. Allens then moved to\\nsell the assets under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and (f), which authorize the sale of a\\nbankruptcy debtor’s assets when certain conditions are met.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Ben T. Barry, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for\\nthe Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Allens identified Seneca Foods Corporation as the “Stalking Horse”\\npurchaser—that is, the potential purchaser whose opening bid would set the floor at\\nthe auction—and prepared a “stalking horse asset purchase agreement” between\\nAllens and Seneca Foods. The bankruptcy court granted the motion for sale after\\nnotice and a hearing. Allens then served a “Notice of Bid Procedures, Sale Hearing\\nand Objection Deadlines” for the auction on more than 5,000 creditors and parties in\\ninterest through a noticing agent.\\n\\n The auction occurred between February 3 and 6, 2014. At the auction, a\\nmarketing firm retained by Allens estimated the net value of each bid submitted. The\\nmarketing firm ultimately valued Seneca’s opening bid at approximately $117\\nmillion, whereas the unadjusted price in the stalking horse asset purchase agreement\\nhad been $148 million. Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., an entity formed by a group\\nof second lienholders, also submitted a bid, which the marketing firm valued at $160\\nmillion. Allens ultimately deemed Sager Creek the successful bidder for the estate’s\\nassets, but the final asset purchase agreement reflected a sale price of just under $125\\nmillion. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court issued a detailed order approving the\\nsale to Sager Creek. No appeals were taken, and the sale closed on February 28,\\n2014.\\n\\n Within a few months, the bankruptcy court converted the proceeding to a\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy and appointed Fulmer as trustee of the bankruptcy estate.\\nFulmer brought this action in February 2016, and filed a first amended complaint in\\nApril 2016.\\n\\n In his amended complaint, Fulmer names more than twenty defendants\\nallegedly connected in various ways to the sale of the Allens assets. He groups them\\ninto three categories: the “Committee Defendants,” who were members of the\\nunsecured creditors committee in the Chapter 11 proceeding; the “Fiduciary\\nDefendants,” who were retained by Allens to serve as financial advisors in the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fproceeding; and the “Sager Creek Defendants,” who held interests in Allens as\\nsecond lienholders. The amended complaint asserts fourteen causes of action, all\\narising from the defendants’ alleged conduct in connection with the sale proceedings.\\nThe defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed.\\nR. Bankr. P. 7012(b).\\n\\n The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint and denied as futile Fulmer’s\\nrequest for leave to file a second amended complaint. The court determined that\\nFulmer did not plead a plausible claim of fraud on the court, collusion among bidders\\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363(n), or for post-judgment relief from the sale order under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court concluded that the trustee’s other\\nclaims were barred by the finality of the order approving the asset sale under § 363,\\nand that the proposed amended complaint would be futile. The Bankruptcy Appellate\\nPanel (BAP) affirmed.\\n\\n In an appeal from a decision of the BAP, we are a second reviewing court. We\\nreview de novo both the bankruptcy court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure\\nto state a claim, and the court’s denial of leave to amend that rests on a legal\\nconclusion of futility. In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d 944,\\n950 (8th Cir. 2018); In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir.\\n2007).\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The first issue on appeal is whether Fulmer’s claims constitute an\\nimpermissible collateral attack on an asset sale in bankruptcy that was consummated\\nunder 11 U.S.C. § 363. To evaluate this contention, it is necessary to review Fulmer’s\\nallegations in the first amended complaint.\\n\\n -4-\\n\\f As Fulmer tells it, the Committee Defendants and the Sager Creek\\nDefendants—all of them creditors of Allens—were at risk of receiving less than full\\nrepayment as bankruptcy loomed in 2013. The Sager Creek Defendants’ loans were\\nonly partially secured, and Seneca’s stalking horse bid, if successful, would have\\nrelegated $30 million of those defendants’ claims to unsecured creditor status. The\\nCommittee Defendants, for their part, held at least $72 million in unsecured claims\\nfor accounts receivable. The Committee Defendants had also received more than $18\\nmillion from Allens in the ninety days preceding the bankruptcy, such that a trustee\\npotentially could avoid those transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).\\n\\n Fulmer alleges that before the initial bankruptcy filing, one of the Committee\\nDefendants, Ball Metal Food Container Corp., executed an undisclosed agreement\\nwith the Sager Creek Defendants. The agreement, according to Fulmer, provided that\\nBall would receive a lucrative contract with a new entity formed by the Sager Creek\\nDefendants (i.e., Sager Creek Acquisition Corp.) if that entity was the successful\\nbidder in a § 363 sale for Allens’s assets. Ball ultimately had one of the largest\\nclaims as a member of the unsecured creditors’ committee in the Chapter 11\\nproceedings.\\n\\n Fulmer then claims that the Fiduciary Defendants, who were aware of the\\nagreement between Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, manipulated the valuations\\nof the bids at the auction. The terms of Seneca’s bid, Fulmer explains, would have\\nleft $32.9 million in real estate and $74 million in ninety-day avoidance claims with\\nthe Allens estate. The terms of Sager Creek’s final bid, by contrast, gave Sager Creek\\nall of those assets, with a covenant not to pursue the avoidance claims. Yet despite\\nthese differences, the Fiduciary Defendant assisting Allens at the auction valued\\nSeneca’s bid at $117 million and valued Sager Creek’s bid at $160 million. Fulmer\\ncontends that as a result of these actions, the defendants collectively divested the\\nAllens estate of at least $74 million in avoidance claims and up to $32.9 million in\\nreal estate and personal property.\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f Based on this episode, Fulmer brought numerous claims against the defendants,\\nincluding allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent transfer, conversion,\\ninducing breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations and\\nprospective economic relations, negligent interference with prospective economic\\nrelations, deceptive trade practices, and an equitable claim for rescission and\\nreformation. Fulmer argues that the bankruptcy court erred by characterizing these\\nclaims as a collateral attack on the February 2014 sale order, and by misapplying\\nprinciples of res judicata and collateral estoppel.\\n\\n Fulmer’s contention brings to the fore this court’s decision in Regions Bank v.\\nJ.R. Oil Co., 387 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2004). Regions Bank, following In re Met-L-\\nWood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988), held that an order authorizing a sale free\\nand clear of liens under § 363 “is shielded from collateral attack . . . by virtue of the\\nnature of rights transferred under 11 U.S.C. § 363.” 387 F.3d at 732. This is so\\nbecause “[a] proceeding under section 363 is an in rem proceeding. It transfers\\nproperty rights, and property rights are rights good against the world, not just against\\nparties to a judgment or persons with notice of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting In re\\nMet-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017). Plaintiffs are therefore barred from bringing claims\\nthat amount to collateral attacks on the validity of a § 363 sale. In Regions Bank, we\\napplied that rule where a plaintiff brought RICO claims premised on the defendants’\\nalleged fraud in connection with a § 363 sale in a bankruptcy to which the plaintiff\\nwas not a party. Id. at 731-32. This court held that the claims were barred “to the\\nextent [they] relate to the sale.” Id. at 731.\\n\\n In this case, the bankruptcy court’s February 2014 order approved the sale of\\nthe Allens assets to Sager Creek free and clear of all liens under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)\\nand (f). At bottom, Fulmer’s complaint is that Sager Creek won the auction for the\\nAllens assets with an overvalued bid that was supported by an undisclosed agreement\\nbetween an unsecured creditor and the second lienholders who formed Sager Creek.\\nFulmer’s contention amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the February\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f2014 sale order under the reasoning of Regions Bank. In the order, the bankruptcy\\ncourt determined that “all of the Acquired Assets were subject to a competitive and\\ngood faith bidding process,” and that Sager Creek had “submitted the highest or\\notherwise best bid for the Acquired Assets offered at the Auction.” The court also\\nconcluded that the consideration to be provided by Sager Creek was “the highest and\\notherwise best offer for the Acquired Assets.” To sustain Fulmer’s claims, a court\\nwould have to contradict those determinations. The finality accorded to asset sales\\nunder § 363 bars Fulmer’s line of attack.\\n\\n Fulmer’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. He first contends that\\nhis complaint does not collaterally attack the February 2014 sale order, because the\\ndefendants were not parties to the order, and he does not seek reversion of title to the\\nproperty sold. A sale free and clear under § 363, however, is “a judgment that is good\\nas against the world, not merely as against parties to the proceedings.” Id. at 732.\\nThe claims barred in Regions Bank likewise did not seek reversion of title; they were\\nclaims for damages under RICO. Id. at 727-28, 731; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The\\nSeventh Circuit similarly described a suit seeking “heavy damages” from parties\\ninvolved in a § 363 sale as a “thinly disguised collateral attack on the judgment\\nconfirming the sale.” In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d at 1018.\\n\\n Fulmer also argues that the provisions of the sale order that conflict with his\\nclaims were not “integral” to the sale, so his complaint does not attack the sale order’s\\nvalidity. He imports this requirement from 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), which provides that\\nreversal or modification of a § 363(b) sale on direct appeal does not “affect the\\nvalidity of a sale” unless the sale order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C.\\n§ 363(m). This court reasoned in In re Trism, Inc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003),\\nthat an appeal could “affect the validity of a sale” under § 363(m) only if it\\nchallenged a provision of the sale order that was “integral to the sale of the estate’s\\nassets.” Id. at 1007.\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f Regions Bank did not address whether the bar on collateral attacks is limited\\nto those that challenge “integral” provisions of a § 363 sale. But if there were such\\na limitation, it would be satisfied here. Undermining the sale order’s finding that\\nSager Creek’s consideration was “the highest and otherwise best offer for the\\nAcquired Assets” would “adversely alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange.” Id.\\nWhen modifying or reversing a provision of the sale order would have that effect, the\\nprovision is “integral” to the sale. Id.\\n\\n This is not to say that the rule of finality governing asset sales under § 363\\nforecloses all suits related to sales of a debtor’s assets. For example, a claim that a\\nfiduciary’s conduct kept a prospective bidder from securing adequate funding to make\\na more competitive bid does not necessarily call into question a bankruptcy court’s\\ndetermination that the successful bid was the best offer on the table. See Brown\\nMedia Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 155, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2017). Nor does\\nthe finality rule bar a claim against a fiduciary for conduct related to a sale where the\\ntransaction was not subject to approval by the bankruptcy court under § 363. See In\\nre Brook Valley VII, Joint Venture, 496 F.3d 892, 899 (8th Cir. 2007); In re Brook\\nValley IV, 347 B.R. 662, 670-71 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006). Where a lawsuit “poses no\\nthreat to the finality of the bankruptcy court’s orders,” Brown Media Corp., 854 F.3d\\nat 163, it does not conflict with the principles enunciated in Regions Bank and In re\\nMet-L-Wood. But the finality rule precludes allegations like Fulmer’s that second-\\nguess the bankruptcy court’s determination that the buyer submitted the best bid for\\nthe assets.\\n\\n Fulmer also argues that the sale order is simply unenforceable because the\\nrequired elements for a sale were not adequately proven. But the finality of a\\nbankruptcy court’s orders at the conclusion of direct review “[o]rdinarily . . . stand[s]\\nin the way of challenging their enforceability.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.\\nEspinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 269 (2010) (internal quotation and brackets omitted). We\\nagree with the BAP that Fulmer’s freestanding challenge to the sale order, while\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fpermissible on direct appeal, cannot be raised at this stage. See In re Met-L-Wood,\\n861 F.2d at 1018.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Fulmer argues alternatively that he is entitled to relief from the sale order\\nbecause it was obtained through fraud on the court. A federal court has inherent\\nequitable power to vacate a judgment that is obtained by fraud on the court. Hazel-\\nAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944). A finding of\\nfraud on the court, however, “is justified only by the most egregious misconduct\\ndirected to the court itself, such as bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of\\nevidence by counsel.” Landscape Props., Inc. v. Vogel, 46 F.3d 1416, 1422 (8th Cir.\\n1995). The category is narrowly defined, and does not include “fraud between the\\nparties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury.” United States v. Smiley,\\n553 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).\\n\\n Fulmer’s amended complaint falls short of meeting this demanding standard.\\nFew, if any, of the alleged facts involve conduct directed at the court in the sale\\nproceedings. Fulmer instead repeats his account of the undisclosed agreement\\nbetween Ball and the Sager Creek Defendants, and the Fiduciary Defendants’ alleged\\nrole in helping Sager Creek win the auction with an overvalued bid. He then states\\nthat “[n]ot a candid word of the scheme was disclosed to the Court at the 2/12/14 sale\\nhearing.” But nondisclosure, even of a side agreement affecting the outcome of a\\n§ 363 sale, does not rise to the level of fraud on the court. We rejected such a claim\\nin Landscape Properties, holding that a bankruptcy attorney’s failure to disclose a\\npotentially collusive agreement between prospective bidders “d[id] not even come\\nclose to meeting that standard.” 46 F.3d at 1422. Fulmer’s amended complaint thus\\nfails to state a plausible claim for fraud on the court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n\\f Fulmer next contends that he should be granted relief from the sale order under\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. That rule, made applicable to bankruptcy cases\\nby Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, sets out grounds upon which a court\\nmay relieve a party from a final judgment or order. Fulmer cites Rule 60(b)(4), which\\nallows relief when a “judgment is void,” so long as a motion for relief is filed “within\\na reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).\\n\\n Fulmer argues that the sale order is “void” in light of Czyzewski v. Jevic\\nHolding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). In Jevic, the Supreme Court considered\\nwhether a bankruptcy court may approve the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case that\\nwould distribute assets to creditors in violation of the priority rules that govern\\nnormal distribution plans, without the consent of the affected creditors. Id. at 983.\\nThe Court held that such structured dismissals are not permitted. Id. Fulmer asserts\\nthat the § 363 sale of the Allens assets violated the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules\\nin a similar way—that is, that certain creditors with unsecured claims received value\\nwhile others with identical priority did not.\\n\\n Jevic does not win the day for Fulmer. For one thing, Jevic involved a\\nstructured dismissal and did not hold that § 363 sales must conform to normal priority\\nrules. In fact, the Court noted that some courts in other contexts have approved\\npriority-violating distributions where they serve “significant Code-related\\nobjectives,” such as maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 985. But\\neven if the reasoning of Jevic on priority rules were extended to § 363 sales, it would\\nnot apply in the context of a consummated sale. Whatever force the Bankruptcy\\nCode’s priority rules might have at a sale approval hearing or on direct review of a\\n§ 363 sale, see id. at 986, a deviation from those rules does not render final judgments\\n“void.” See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 273-76 (holding confirmed bankruptcy plan was\\nnot void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) despite failing to comply with statutory\\nrequirement); cf. In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376, 388 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that\\nJevic did not add an exception to the text of § 363(m) concerning validity of a sale).\\n\\n -10-\\n\\f C.\\n\\n Fulmer also contends that the bankruptcy court erred by denying as futile his\\nmotion for leave to amend his complaint. In the proposed amendment, Fulmer sought\\nto raise a claim under Rule 60(b)(4) that the § 363 sale was void for lack of due\\nprocess. Due process in bankruptcy generally entitles a party to receive the notice\\nspecified in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,\\nand a judgment is void if the bankruptcy court acted in a manner inconsistent with\\ndue process. Baldwin v. Credit Based Asset Servicing & Securitization, 516 F.3d 734,\\n737 (8th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n Fulmer’s proposed due process claim is premised on his assertion that the\\ndefendants secretly agreed to transfer value from Allens to Sager Creek in the form\\nof avoidance claims and real estate that were purchased for no additional\\nconsideration. Fulmer’s proposed amendment alleges that notice was lacking because\\nthe alleged agreement remained undisclosed. This nondisclosure, he asserts, deprived\\nthe other interested parties of the ability and incentive to scrutinize Sager Creek’s\\nfinal bid.\\n\\n The terms of the Sager Creek bid to which Fulmer principally objects, however,\\nwere stated on the record at the auction hearing. The other interested parties,\\nincluding more than 5,000 known creditors, received timely notice of the auction and\\nthe subsequent sale approval hearing. The record before the bankruptcy court\\ncontained the auction transcript and the final versions of the purchase agreements.\\nAnd interested parties were permitted to file objections in the approval hearing.\\nThese proceedings thus afforded interested parties adequate notice and opportunity\\nto be heard with respect to their claims on the Allens estate. If any wrong was\\nperpetrated by the maintenance of a secret agreement among the defendants, it was\\nnot a deprivation of due process in the bankruptcy court. The February 2014 sale\\norder is not void for lack of due process, and such a claim would have been futile.\\n\\n -11-\\n\\f Fulmer’s proposed amendment also adds details about the disputed\\ntransactions, but the alleged acts remain the same. Fulmer asserts that the Sager\\nCreek Defendants and Ball had much to lose if Seneca ended up as the successful\\nbidder for Allens’s assets. The Sager Creek Defendants and Ball made an agreement\\nto support Sager Creek Acquisition Corp., Fulmer claims, and they did not adequately\\ndisclose that agreement. The Fiduciary Defendants allegedly played a role by\\novervaluing Sager Creek’s last-minute bid. Fulmer contends that although the\\nbankruptcy court approved the sale, the court acted without an adequate\\nunderstanding of how the bids compared to one another.\\n\\n Fulmer’s claims in the proposed amendment, like those in the complaint that\\nwas dismissed, would undercut the principal findings of the February 2014 sale order,\\nbecause they are premised on the alleged inferiority of Sager Creek’s bid. They are\\nthus barred by the finality rule governing asset sales under § 363. See Regions Bank,\\n387 F.3d at 731-32; In re Met-L-Wood, 861 F.2d at 1017-18. As for fraud on the\\ncourt, despite new conclusory language, the proposed complaint does not point to any\\naffirmative misrepresentation on a defendant’s part that was directed to the\\nbankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court thus did not err in concluding that the\\nproposed amendment would be futile.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -12-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3297,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643338,"string":"4,643,338"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"JUSTICE NETWORK INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. CRAIGHEAD COUNTY; David Boling, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Tommy Fowler, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Bay, City Of; Bono, City Of; Brookland, City Of; Caraway, City Of; Cash, City of ; Egypt, City of ; Jonesboro, City Of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City Of, Defendants - Appellees Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3770"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Kelly, Kobes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3770\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Justice Network Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Craighead County; David Boling, Judge, in his individual and official capacity;\\nTommy Fowler, Judge, In his individual and official capacity; Bay, City of; Bono,\\n City of; Brookland, City of; Caraway, City of; Cash, City of; Egypt, City of;\\n Jonesboro, City of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City of\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 17, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n The Justice Network Inc. (TJN) appeals from the district court’s1 dismissal of\\nits 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Judge David Boling, in his individual and official\\ncapacity; Judge Tommy Fowler, in his individual and official capacity; Craighead\\nCounty, Arkansas; the City of Jonesboro; and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette.2 The suit arises from Craighead\\nCounty District Judges Boling and Fowler’s implementation of an Amnesty Program\\nforgiving all fees that probationers owed to TJN for probation services. We hold that\\nJudges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity on TJN’s claims.\\nAdditionally, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are state government officials\\nwhose actions are not attributable to Craighead County or the City Defendants.\\nAccordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s § 1983 suit.\\n\\n I. Background3\\n TJN is a private probation company, and it offers services to probation clients\\nin Craighead County. Services offered to the probation clients include program and\\ncounseling coordination, public service work, random drug screening, curfew\\nmonitoring, or any other condition of probation ordered by the court. TJN also offers\\na variety of classes to its probation clients, including life skills, parenting skills, anger\\nmanagement, alcohol safety school, and drug offender school.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Arkansas.\\n 2\\n We refer to the City of Jonesboro and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette collectively as “the City Defendants.”\\n 3\\n “We recite these facts as alleged in [TJN’s] complaint and assume them to be\\ntrue.” Awnings v. Fullerton, 912 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Since 1997, TJN has provided probation services to probation clients under the\\njurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of Craighead County. Since that time, it\\nhas also provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the\\nCity Defendants’ courts (“City Courts”). TJN’s Jonesboro branch employed 12 full-\\ntime employees, all residents of Craighead County.\\n\\n From 1997 until February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been\\ncharged in Craighead County District Court (“District Court”) or the City Courts, and\\nwho required probation services, were placed under TJN’s supervision. TJN\\ncontracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement set\\nforth a $35 monthly fee for probation services and included a $15 monthly fee for the\\nsupervision of public service work (a typical condition of probation). A court order\\nissued in conjunction with the Probation Fee Agreement directed each probation\\nclient to pay all probation supervision fees to TJN for each month of supervised\\nprobation.\\n\\n If the probation client failed to abide by the probation order and failed to\\ncomplete his or her court-ordered special conditions, TJN would file an affidavit with\\nthe court indicating what conditions were not completed. The Craighead County\\nprosecutor and the judge would then countersign the affidavit. The judge of the\\nDistrict Court would order the probationer to pay restitution for all outstanding fees\\nowed to TJN. The same process was followed in the City Courts, including the court\\norder directing the probationer to pay fees to TJN. For cases pending in the District\\nCourt, the District Court would collect the fees that the probation clients owed to TJN\\nand forward those funds to TJN. For cases pending in the City Courts, the City Courts\\nwould collect the fees that the probation clients owed and forward those funds to\\nTJN. This system operated for nearly 20 years, from 1997 until 2016.\\n\\n In early 2016, Judges Boling and Fowler were elected Craighead County\\nDistrict Judges. During the election, Judge Boling stated that if he were elected, he\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fwould end the use of TJN’s probation services in his court. Likewise, Judge Fowler\\nstated during his campaign that he opposed the privatization of probation services.\\n\\n On August 11, 2016, Judge Boling was reported in a local newspaper as stating\\n“that he dismissed the case of one defendant on probation and ‘purged’ the remaining\\ndebt that had not paid.” Compl. at 13, ¶ 81, Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty.,\\nNo. 3:17-cv-00169-JM (E.D. Ark. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 1. This “purged” debt\\nincluded court costs and fees that the defendant owed to TJN pursuant to a contract\\nbetween the defendant and TJN. On August 12, 2016, the local newspaper reported\\nthat Judge Boling said he would “consider nonpayment cases on a case-by-case\\nbasis.” Id. at 14, ¶ 84.\\n\\n On December 7, 2016, the local newspaper reported that Judges “Fowler and\\nBoling planned to implement an ‘Amnesty Program’ in January and February 2017.”\\nId. at ¶ 86. “As part of that program, [Judges] Fowler and Boling met with probation\\noffenders who had outstanding fines that were due, to discuss payment options.” Id.\\nat ¶ 87.\\n\\n On January 26, 2017, the local newspaper reported that Judges Fowler and\\nBoling had implemented a “temporary amnesty program,” which “allow[ed] offenders\\nwho were delinquent on their payments to reset their payment plan.” Id. at ¶ 88. The\\nfees owed to TJN were summarily stricken from each new order of probation. Judges\\nBoling and Fowler forgave the fees owed to TJN as part of the “Amnesty Program.”\\nId. at ¶ 90. Judges Fowler and Boling also instituted a “Jail Credit” program. Id. at\\n¶ 91. This program forgave the costs owed to the court and fees owed to TJN in lieu\\nof time served in prison. “[M]any of the probation clients given ‘Jail Credit’ were\\nnever incarcerated.” Id. at 15, ¶ 93.\\n\\n As a result of the Amnesty Program, and the consequent loss of revenue, TJN\\nhas ceased all operations in Craighead County and has been forced to terminate its 12\\n\\n -4-\\n\\femployees. TJN has suffered significant economic loss and will continue to sustain\\nthat loss in the future if the Amnesty Program continues.\\n\\n TJN brought suit against Judges Boling and Fowler; Craighead County; and the\\nCity Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Contracts Clause,\\nU.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. TJN also\\nalleged violations of the Arkansas Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Ark. Const. art.\\nII, § 22. TJN sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants effectuated a custom\\nand policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN, in violation of Article\\n1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article\\n2, Section 17 and Article 2, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. It also sought\\ninjunctive relief enjoining the defendants from executing a custom and policy of\\nannulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN.\\n\\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).\\n\\n The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. First, the court\\nfound that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to absolute judicial immunity\\nagainst all of TJN’s claims because “[u]nless judges act completely outside all\\njurisdiction, they are absolutely immune from suit when acting in their judicial\\ncapacity.” Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00169-JM, 2017 WL\\n5762397, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720,\\n721 (8th Cir. 1997)). The court also noted, “In Arkansas, ‘[a]ll courts of record,\\ndistrict courts, and city courts . . . shall have the authority to suspend the imposition\\nof sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before\\nthe courts unless specifically prohibited by law.’” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in\\noriginal) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-115). According to the district court,\\nArkansas law also provides that “ [d]uring a period of . . . probation, upon the petition\\nof a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court’s own motion, a court may: (1)\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fModify a condition imposed on the defendant.” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original)\\n(quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-312). The district court concluded that the judicial\\ndecisions “modifying, suspending or terminating the terms of probation, previously\\nimposed by the Court, are judicial acts.” Id. (citing John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v.\\nPennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2009) (finding the judge\\ndefendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and were entitled to absolute immunity,\\nwhen they signed and enforced a court order disallowing “credit bonding”)).\\n\\n Second, the district court granted Craighead County and the City Defendants’\\nmotions to dismiss because “[s]tate district court judges are state government officials\\nand are not employees of the cities. Further, even if the judges were employees of the\\ncities, Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s judicial decisions were ‘not a final policy\\ndecision of a type creating municipal liability under § 1983.’” Id. (internal citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n Finally, the court concluded that TJN’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment,\\nratification, and supervisory liability also failed because\\n\\n [n]o supervisor or employee relationship exists between the judges and\\n the City and County defendants. Plaintiff failed to state any facts which\\n would support a finding that the City or County defendants had any\\n authority or control over the judges. And, the probation services at issue\\n were provided to the probation clients. Plaintiff has failed to state facts\\n which demonstrate that the City or County defendants received\\n something of value to which they were not entitled by the forgiveness\\n of a debt owed by the probation clients to the Plaintiff.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f II. Discussion\\n On appeal, TJN argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims\\nagainst Judges Boling and Fowler using judicial immunity. TJN argues that the\\njudges’ termination of TJN as probation services provider and forgiveness of fees due\\nit were not judicial acts but instead administrative decisions. TJN also argues that\\nJudges Boling and Fowler were authorized policymakers whose actions are\\nattributable to Craighead County and the City Defendants; therefore, the district court\\nerred in dismissing TJN’s claims against the municipal defendants.\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s complaint pursuant\\nto Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v.\\nBeebe, 574 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n A. Judicial Immunity\\n We first consider TJN’s argument that Judges Boling and Fowler are not\\nentitled to judicial immunity.\\n\\n “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate\\nassessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). It “is\\nnot overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily\\ncannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. “A judge\\nis immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover for alleged\\ndeprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.” Schottel v.\\nYoung, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). “First,\\na judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in\\nthe judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though\\njudicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S.\\nat 11–12 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f 1. Judicial Capacity\\n “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate\\nto the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a\\njudge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in\\nhis judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In examining\\nthese factors, “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any\\nmistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act,\\nbecause an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a\\njudge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. But “[i]f judicial immunity means anything, it means\\nthat a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error\\n. . . or was in excess of his authority.’” Id. at 12–13 (ellipsis in original) (quoting\\nStump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the\\nact, not the ‘act itself.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). This means that\\nto determine whether an act is judicial, courts “look to the particular act’s relation to\\na general function normally performed by a judge.” Id.\\n\\n Arkansas statutory law creates and circumscribes the judicial sentencing power\\nof district courts and city courts.\\n\\n A district court or city court may:\\n\\n (A) Place a defendant on probation or sentence him or her to public\\n service work; and\\n\\n (B) As a condition of its order, require the defendant to pay a:\\n\\n (i) Fine in one (1) or several sums; and\\n\\n (ii) Probation fee or a public service work supervisory fee\\n in an amount to be established by the district court or city\\n court.\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fArk. Code Ann. § 5-4-322(a)(1). In addition, “[t]he court may discharge the defendant\\nfrom probation at any time.” Id. § 16-93-314(a)(1). And, district courts and city courts\\npossess the “authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of\\nfines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically\\nprohibited by law.” Id. § 16-90-115(a). Finally, “upon the court’s own motion, a court\\nmay . . . [m]odify a condition [of probation] imposed on the defendant.”\\nId. § 16-93-312(a)(1).\\n\\n Did Judge Boling’s and Judge Fowler’s dismissal of probationers’ cases,\\n“purging” of fees that probationers owed, and resetting payment plans for delinquent\\nprobations via court order sufficiently relate to these general functions? We conclude\\nthat they did. The judges’ reviewing of individual probationers’ cases and amending\\nof probation orders are related to the district court’s authorized functions of placing\\na defendant on probation, requiring a defendant to pay a probation fee, discharging\\na defendant from probation at the court’s discretion, suspending the imposition of a\\ndefendant’s fine, and modifying a defendant’s condition of probation.\\n\\n TJN attempts to analogize this case to cases in which courts have held that\\njudges who make staffing decisions engage in administrative personnel decisions, not\\nofficial judicial acts protected by judicial immunity.4 These cases are inapposite.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a judge’s\\ndemotion and discharge of a court employee were administrative acts not protected\\nby judicial immunity); McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(“Hiring and firing of employees is typically an administrative task . . . .The decision\\nto fire the plaintiff did not involve judicial discretion; in other words, the judge did\\nnot utilize his education, training, and experience in the law to decide whether or not\\nto retain plaintiff.”); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cty., Mo., 729 F.2d 541,\\n549 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding county judge’s decision to transfer hearing officer not\\n“official judicial act” but rather “administrative personnel decision”); Clark v.\\nCampbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (holding county judge, in\\nhiring or firing county employees, is not exercising a judicial function but, rather, is\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fTJN’s complaint states that the judges “dismissed” the probationers’ cases, Compl.\\nat 13, ¶ 81; “‘purged’ the remaining debt that had not been paid,” id., and entered\\n“Order[s]” that permitted probationers to “reset their payment plan” where all fees\\nowed were “forgiven” in lieu of time served. Id. at 14, ¶¶ 89, 88, 90. TJN does not\\nallege that these orders mentioned TJN as an independent contractor or employee of\\nthe court or the judges; in fact, it alleges that their fee agreement contract was\\n“stricken” from the judges’ orders and not mentioned at all. Id. at ¶ 89. TJN alleges\\nconduct by the judges that constitute judicial acts, not employment decisions.\\n\\n Furthermore, there was no employment relationship or contract for services\\nbetween the judges, Craighead County, or the City Defendants, nor did the judges\\never “terminate” TJN’s work in their orders; this is because the contractual\\nrelationship at issue is between TJN and the probationers. The complaint provides\\nthat “[e]ach probation client enters into a contract with [TJN], agreeing to pay\\nprobation fees in exchange for services provided, such as drug screenings and\\nclasses.” Id. at 1, ¶ 1.5\\n\\n While a district court or city court “may contract” with a probation services\\nprovider “[u]pon request of the district court judge or city court judge,” Ark. Code\\n\\nperforming administrative and ministerial duties and thus cannot claim judicial\\nimmunity with respect to a civil rights action arising out of those activities);\\nAtcherson v. Sienbenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 538 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (supervising and\\nterminating a probation officer was not acting in a judicial capacity and thus was not\\nprotected by absolute immunity from a civil rights action brought by the probation\\nofficer), vacated on other grounds, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).\\n 5\\n See also id. at 2, ¶ 3 (“Boling and Fowler have unilaterally decreed that [TJN]\\nis not entitled to fees owed under the contracts between each probation client and\\n[TJN].”); id. at 2, ¶ 4 (“As a direct result of Fowler’s and Boling’s interference in the\\ncontractual relationship between [TJN] and the probation clients . . . .”); id. at 9, ¶ 46\\n(“[TJN] contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee\\nAgreement contains, inter alia, a $35 monthly fee for probation services.”).\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fAnn. § 16-17-127(a), the complaint does not allege that either Judge Boling or Judge\\nFowler made such a request. In fact, the complaint shows that neither judge wanted\\nto use the services.\\n\\n Therefore, this case is not analogous to those cases relied upon by TJN in\\nwhich judges have terminated employees.\\n\\n 2. Jurisdiction\\n In examining whether a judge acted “in the complete absence of all\\njurisdiction,” “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed us to construe broadly ‘the scope\\nof the judge’s jurisdiction . . . where the issue is the immunity of a judge.’” Schottel,\\n687 F.3d at 373 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[A]n\\naction—taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before\\nhim—cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502\\nU.S. at 13.\\n\\n TJN argues that Arkansas law makes the Department of Corrections the entity\\nresponsible for the administration of probation services. See Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 12-27-124(a) (“The purpose of this act is to establish a Division of Community\\nCorrection that shall assume the management of all community correction facilities\\nand services, execute the orders of the criminal courts of the State of Arkansas, and\\nprovide for the supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult\\noffenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community.”). While this statute\\nplaces the Department of Corrections in supervision of offenders, it does not\\nauthorize the Department of Corrections to alter the terms of supervision for\\noffenders. Instead, the Arkansas Constitution grants state district courts “original\\njurisdiction, concurrent with [state] Circuit Courts, of misdemeanors” and any\\ncriminal jurisdiction as provided by the Arkansas General Assembly. Ark. Const.\\namend. 80, §§ 7(B), 10; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101 (same). State district\\ncourts also enjoy “original [and exclusive] jurisdiction . . . for the trial of violations\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fof ordinances of any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the\\ndistrict court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101(a)(4).\\n\\n A court may sentence a misdemeanor offender to probation. See id. § 5-4-301\\n(“Crimes for which suspension or probation prohibited—Criteria for suspension or\\nprobation in other cases.”). As explained supra, “[a] district court or city court may:\\n(A) Place a defendant on probation . . . ; and (B) As a condition of its order, require\\nthe defendant to pay a: (i) Fine . . . ; and (ii) Probation fee or a public service work\\nsupervisory fee.” Id. § 5-4-322(a)(1). “A condition of probation shall be closely\\nmonitored and supervised by the district court or city court or by a probation officer.”\\nId. § 5-4-322(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n Based on these statutory provisions, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler did\\nnot act in a clear absence of their jurisdiction because Arkansas law provides that the\\nstate district court and city courts have jurisdiction to modify or dismiss probation\\nsentences and conditions of the misdemeanor offenders.\\n\\n 3. Conclusion on Judicial Immunity\\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler acted within their judicial capacity and did\\nnot act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, we hold that the district court\\ncorrectly dismissed the damages claims against them based on judicial immunity. See\\nMireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.\\n\\n B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief\\n Our conclusion that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity\\ndoes not resolve whether TJN may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition\\nto monetary damages, TJN sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendant\\njudges created a custom and policy with the Amnesty Program; and (2) an injunction\\nprohibiting the defendant judges from implementing their custom and policy using\\nthe Amnesty Program. See Compl. at 25, ¶¶ d–e.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f On appeal, TJN argues that it is entitled to injunctive relief because the judges’\\nconduct was not a judicial act. Appellant’s Br. at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983;\\nLeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (injunctive relief not barred when\\njudges act in enforcement capacity)). It also argues that declaratory relief is available\\nin actions brought against judicial officials. Id. at 55–56 (citing Brandon E. ex rel.\\nListenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000); Ward v. City of Norwalk,\\n640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Francis v. Pellegrino, 224 F. App’x 107, 108\\n(2d Cir. 2007) (summary order)).\\n\\n Judge Boling and Judge Fowler respond that judicial immunity prohibits TJN’s\\nclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they argue that their absolute\\njudicial immunity bars all relief.\\n\\n In Pulliam v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer acting in his\\nor her judicial capacity is not immune from actions under § 1983 seeking prospective\\ninjunctive relief. 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). Congress responded to Pulliam in\\n1996 by amending § 1983 to abrogate its holding.6 Section 1983 provides that “in any\\naction brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s\\njudicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was\\nviolated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words,\\n“judicial immunity typically bars claims for prospective injunctive relief against\\njudicial officials acting in their judicial capacity. Only when a declaratory decree is\\nviolated or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The Senate report indicates that the amendment “restores the doctrine of\\njudicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to . . . Pulliam” because Pulliam had\\ndeparted from “400 years of common-law tradition and weakened judicial immunity\\nprotections.” S. Rep. 104–366, at *36–37, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4216.\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fjudicial immunity.” Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02819-RDP, 2014\\nWL 5090723, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2014).\\n\\n In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that\\na declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief.\\nSee Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F. App’x 763, 766 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he\\ndoctrine of judicial immunity now extends to suits against judges where a plaintiff\\nseeks not only monetary relief, but injunctive relief as well.”). The question then\\nbecomes whether TJN is entitled to declaratory relief post-Pulliam and Congress’s\\namendment to § 1983.\\n\\n Currently, most courts hold that the amendment to § 1983 does not bar\\ndeclaratory relief against judges. See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F.\\nApp’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar\\ndeclaratory relief . . . .”); Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580, 2007 WL 257342, at\\n*1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity protects the\\nDefendants only from Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. But § 1983 does not\\nexplicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief.”); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72\\nF. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he amendment to § 1983 limits the type of\\nrelief available to plaintiffs who sue judges to declaratory relief.”); Bolin v. Story, 225\\nF.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 1996 amendment to § 1983 would limit the\\nrelief available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.”).\\n\\n The Tenth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he only type of relief available to a\\nplaintiff who sues a judge is declaratory relief, but not every plaintiff is entitled to this\\nremedy.” Lawrence, 271 F. App’x at 766 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).\\n“A declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the\\nparties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a\\npast act.” Id. (emphasis added). A complaint “seeking . . . a declaration of past\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fliability” against a judge instead of “future rights” does not satisfy the definition of\\n“declaratory judgment” and renders declaratory relief unavailable. Id. “Furthermore,”\\nretrospective declaratory relief cannot “be granted as ‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment\\ndoes not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal\\nlaw in the past.’” Id. at 766 n.7 (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1553 (10th\\nCir. 1995)).\\n\\n Thus, declaratory relief is limited to prospective declaratory relief. See, e.g.,\\nDavis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-cv-0693 LEK/ATB, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.\\nJan. 22, 2014) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity also does not shield judges from\\nclaims for prospective declaratory relief.[] In this case, plaintiff’s request for\\ndeclaratory relief is purely retrospective. She seeks a declaratory judgment that past\\nactions that occurred in the context of the Family Court proceedings violated her\\nconstitutional rights.” (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\n Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that TJN’s request for declaratory\\nrelief is retrospective; as a result, TJN is not entitled to such relief under § 1983.\\n“Although [TJN] . . . refers to the judges’ actions as ‘policies,’ essentially, . . . [it] is\\nasking the court to invalidate the actions of [Judges Boling and Fowler].” Id.\\n(emphasis added); see also Compl. at 16, ¶ 101.\\n\\n C. Municipal Defendants\\n TJN next argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims against\\nCraighead County and the City Defendants because “Judge Boling and Judge\\nFowler’s actions were done pursuant to an official municipal policy and their conduct\\ncaused a constitutional tort.” Appellant’s Br. at 49.\\n\\n “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a\\ntortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fa respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.\\n658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,\\nwhether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to\\nrepresent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is\\nresponsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.\\n\\n TJN argues that Judges Fowler and Boling were authorized policymakers of\\nCraighead County and the City Defendants and that the judges’ actions should be\\nimputed to Craighead County and the City Defendants. But whether the judges’\\nactions should be imputed to the municipal defendants depends on whether the judges\\nare their employees.\\n\\n We recently addressed whether the Phillips County District Court Clerk “is a\\nstate government official whose actions are not attributable to the City.” Evans v. City\\nof Helena-West Helena, Ark., 912 F.3d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 2019). In Evans, the\\ndistrict court had dismissed a § 1983 complaint based on the clerk’s and Phillips\\nCounty District Court’s status as “state-government officials who are [not] employed\\nby [the City].” Id. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, “conclud[ing]\\nthat the complaint state[d] at least a plausible claim that the clerk was a city official\\nat the time of the alleged wrongdoing, in which case the City could be accountable\\nfor actions of the clerk that establish or carry out an unconstitutional policy or custom\\nof the municipality.” Id. at 1147. This was because when the Arkansas General\\nAssembly established a pilot program creating a limited number of state-funded state\\ndistrict court judgeships, Phillips County was not included in that program. Id. (citing\\nArk. Code Ann. § 16-17-1101(8) (2008)). As a result, “[j]udges outside the pilot\\nprogram, like those in Phillips County, continued to be employees of the cities or\\ncounties, or both, that they served.” Id. It was not until after the events alleged in the\\ncomplaint that Phillips County was “reorganized as [a] state district court[] and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fserved by a state district court judge.” Id. (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-\\n1112(a)(1) (2015)).\\n\\n Following the reasoning of Evans, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are\\nemployees of the State of Arkansas, not Craighead County or the City Defendants.\\nArkansas Code Annotated § 16-17-1111(a)(2) (2011) makes clear that the district\\njudgeships in Craighead County became “state district court judgeships” as of January\\n1, 2013, before the events in this case. It also makes clear that these judges are “state”\\njudges despite the cost-sharing requirements of § 16-17-1106(b)(1)(A). Id.\\n\\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler are not employees of Craighead County or\\nthe City Defendants, their actions cannot be imputed to them. Therefore, the district\\ncourt correctly dismissed the claims against them.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420591/\", \"author_raw\": \"SMITH, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KOBES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643338/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: JUSTICE NETWORK INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. CRAIGHEAD COUNTY; David Boling, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Tommy Fowler, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Bay, City Of; Bono, City Of; Brookland, City Of; Caraway, City Of; Cash, City of ; Egypt, City of ; Jonesboro, City Of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City Of, Defendants - Appellees Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3770\n ___________________________\n\n Justice Network Inc.\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\n\n v.\n\n Craighead County; David Boling, Judge, in his individual and official capacity;\nTommy Fowler, Judge, In his individual and official capacity; Bay, City of; Bono,\n City of; Brookland, City of; Caraway, City of; Cash, City of; Egypt, City of;\n Jonesboro, City of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City of\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\n\n ------------------------------\n\n Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 17, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\fSMITH, Chief Judge.\n\n The Justice Network Inc. (TJN) appeals from the district court’s1 dismissal of\nits 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Judge David Boling, in his individual and official\ncapacity; Judge Tommy Fowler, in his individual and official capacity; Craighead\nCounty, Arkansas; the City of Jonesboro; and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette.2 The suit arises from Craighead\nCounty District Judges Boling and Fowler’s implementation of an Amnesty Program\nforgiving all fees that probationers owed to TJN for probation services. We hold that\nJudges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity on TJN’s claims.\nAdditionally, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are state government officials\nwhose actions are not attributable to Craighead County or the City Defendants.\nAccordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s § 1983 suit.\n\n I. Background3\n TJN is a private probation company, and it offers services to probation clients\nin Craighead County. Services offered to the probation clients include program and\ncounseling coordination, public service work, random drug screening, curfew\nmonitoring, or any other condition of probation ordered by the court. TJN also offers\na variety of classes to its probation clients, including life skills, parenting skills, anger\nmanagement, alcohol safety school, and drug offender school.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\nEastern District of Arkansas.\n 2\n We refer to the City of Jonesboro and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette collectively as “the City Defendants.”\n 3\n “We recite these facts as alleged in [TJN’s] complaint and assume them to be\ntrue.” Awnings v. Fullerton, 912 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019).\n\n -2-\n\f Since 1997, TJN has provided probation services to probation clients under the\njurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of Craighead County. Since that time, it\nhas also provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the\nCity Defendants’ courts (“City Courts”). TJN’s Jonesboro branch employed 12 full-\ntime employees, all residents of Craighead County.\n\n From 1997 until February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been\ncharged in Craighead County District Court (“District Court”) or the City Courts, and\nwho required probation services, were placed under TJN’s supervision. TJN\ncontracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement set\nforth a $35 monthly fee for probation services and included a $15 monthly fee for the\nsupervision of public service work (a typical condition of probation). A court order\nissued in conjunction with the Probation Fee Agreement directed each probation\nclient to pay all probation supervision fees to TJN for each month of supervised\nprobation.\n\n If the probation client failed to abide by the probation order and failed to\ncomplete his or her court-ordered special conditions, TJN would file an affidavit with\nthe court indicating what conditions were not completed. The Craighead County\nprosecutor and the judge would then countersign the affidavit. The judge of the\nDistrict Court would order the probationer to pay restitution for all outstanding fees\nowed to TJN. The same process was followed in the City Courts, including the court\norder directing the probationer to pay fees to TJN. For cases pending in the District\nCourt, the District Court would collect the fees that the probation clients owed to TJN\nand forward those funds to TJN. For cases pending in the City Courts, the City Courts\nwould collect the fees that the probation clients owed and forward those funds to\nTJN. This system operated for nearly 20 years, from 1997 until 2016.\n\n In early 2016, Judges Boling and Fowler were elected Craighead County\nDistrict Judges. During the election, Judge Boling stated that if he were elected, he\n\n -3-\n\fwould end the use of TJN’s probation services in his court. Likewise, Judge Fowler\nstated during his campaign that he opposed the privatization of probation services.\n\n On August 11, 2016, Judge Boling was reported in a local newspaper as stating\n“that he dismissed the case of one defendant on probation and ‘purged’ the remaining\ndebt that had not paid.” Compl. at 13, ¶ 81, Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty.,\nNo. 3:17-cv-00169-JM (E.D. Ark. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 1. This “purged” debt\nincluded court costs and fees that the defendant owed to TJN pursuant to a contract\nbetween the defendant and TJN. On August 12, 2016, the local newspaper reported\nthat Judge Boling said he would “consider nonpayment cases on a case-by-case\nbasis.” Id. at 14, ¶ 84.\n\n On December 7, 2016, the local newspaper reported that Judges “Fowler and\nBoling planned to implement an ‘Amnesty Program’ in January and February 2017.”\nId. at ¶ 86. “As part of that program, [Judges] Fowler and Boling met with probation\noffenders who had outstanding fines that were due, to discuss payment options.” Id.\nat ¶ 87.\n\n On January 26, 2017, the local newspaper reported that Judges Fowler and\nBoling had implemented a “temporary amnesty program,” which “allow[ed] offenders\nwho were delinquent on their payments to reset their payment plan.” Id. at ¶ 88. The\nfees owed to TJN were summarily stricken from each new order of probation. Judges\nBoling and Fowler forgave the fees owed to TJN as part of the “Amnesty Program.”\nId. at ¶ 90. Judges Fowler and Boling also instituted a “Jail Credit” program. Id. at\n¶ 91. This program forgave the costs owed to the court and fees owed to TJN in lieu\nof time served in prison. “[M]any of the probation clients given ‘Jail Credit’ were\nnever incarcerated.” Id. at 15, ¶ 93.\n\n As a result of the Amnesty Program, and the consequent loss of revenue, TJN\nhas ceased all operations in Craighead County and has been forced to terminate its 12\n\n -4-\n\femployees. TJN has suffered significant economic loss and will continue to sustain\nthat loss in the future if the Amnesty Program continues.\n\n TJN brought suit against Judges Boling and Fowler; Craighead County; and the\nCity Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Contracts Clause,\nU.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. TJN also\nalleged violations of the Arkansas Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Ark. Const. art.\nII, § 22. TJN sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants effectuated a custom\nand policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN, in violation of Article\n1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article\n2, Section 17 and Article 2, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. It also sought\ninjunctive relief enjoining the defendants from executing a custom and policy of\nannulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN.\n\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).\n\n The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. First, the court\nfound that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to absolute judicial immunity\nagainst all of TJN’s claims because “[u]nless judges act completely outside all\njurisdiction, they are absolutely immune from suit when acting in their judicial\ncapacity.” Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00169-JM, 2017 WL\n5762397, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720,\n721 (8th Cir. 1997)). The court also noted, “In Arkansas, ‘[a]ll courts of record,\ndistrict courts, and city courts . . . shall have the authority to suspend the imposition\nof sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before\nthe courts unless specifically prohibited by law.’” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in\noriginal) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-115). According to the district court,\nArkansas law also provides that “ [d]uring a period of . . . probation, upon the petition\nof a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court’s own motion, a court may: (1)\n\n -5-\n\fModify a condition imposed on the defendant.” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original)\n(quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-312). The district court concluded that the judicial\ndecisions “modifying, suspending or terminating the terms of probation, previously\nimposed by the Court, are judicial acts.” Id. (citing John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v.\nPennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2009) (finding the judge\ndefendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and were entitled to absolute immunity,\nwhen they signed and enforced a court order disallowing “credit bonding”)).\n\n Second, the district court granted Craighead County and the City Defendants’\nmotions to dismiss because “[s]tate district court judges are state government officials\nand are not employees of the cities. Further, even if the judges were employees of the\ncities, Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s judicial decisions were ‘not a final policy\ndecision of a type creating municipal liability under § 1983.’” Id. (internal citations\nomitted).\n\n Finally, the court concluded that TJN’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment,\nratification, and supervisory liability also failed because\n\n [n]o supervisor or employee relationship exists between the judges and\n the City and County defendants. Plaintiff failed to state any facts which\n would support a finding that the City or County defendants had any\n authority or control over the judges. And, the probation services at issue\n were provided to the probation clients. Plaintiff has failed to state facts\n which demonstrate that the City or County defendants received\n something of value to which they were not entitled by the forgiveness\n of a debt owed by the probation clients to the Plaintiff.\n\nId.\n\n\n\n\n -6-\n\f II. Discussion\n On appeal, TJN argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims\nagainst Judges Boling and Fowler using judicial immunity. TJN argues that the\njudges’ termination of TJN as probation services provider and forgiveness of fees due\nit were not judicial acts but instead administrative decisions. TJN also argues that\nJudges Boling and Fowler were authorized policymakers whose actions are\nattributable to Craighead County and the City Defendants; therefore, the district court\nerred in dismissing TJN’s claims against the municipal defendants.\n\n We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s complaint pursuant\nto Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v.\nBeebe, 574 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2009).\n\n A. Judicial Immunity\n We first consider TJN’s argument that Judges Boling and Fowler are not\nentitled to judicial immunity.\n\n “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate\nassessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). It “is\nnot overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily\ncannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. “A judge\nis immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover for alleged\ndeprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.” Schottel v.\nYoung, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). “First,\na judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in\nthe judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though\njudicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S.\nat 11–12 (internal citations omitted).\n\n\n\n -7-\n\f 1. Judicial Capacity\n “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate\nto the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a\njudge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in\nhis judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In examining\nthese factors, “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any\nmistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act,\nbecause an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a\njudge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. But “[i]f judicial immunity means anything, it means\nthat a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error\n. . . or was in excess of his authority.’” Id. at 12–13 (ellipsis in original) (quoting\nStump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the\nact, not the ‘act itself.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). This means that\nto determine whether an act is judicial, courts “look to the particular act’s relation to\na general function normally performed by a judge.” Id.\n\n Arkansas statutory law creates and circumscribes the judicial sentencing power\nof district courts and city courts.\n\n A district court or city court may:\n\n (A) Place a defendant on probation or sentence him or her to public\n service work; and\n\n (B) As a condition of its order, require the defendant to pay a:\n\n (i) Fine in one (1) or several sums; and\n\n (ii) Probation fee or a public service work supervisory fee\n in an amount to be established by the district court or city\n court.\n\n\n\n -8-\n\fArk. Code Ann. § 5-4-322(a)(1). In addition, “[t]he court may discharge the defendant\nfrom probation at any time.” Id. § 16-93-314(a)(1). And, district courts and city courts\npossess the “authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of\nfines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically\nprohibited by law.” Id. § 16-90-115(a). Finally, “upon the court’s own motion, a court\nmay . . . [m]odify a condition [of probation] imposed on the defendant.”\nId. § 16-93-312(a)(1).\n\n Did Judge Boling’s and Judge Fowler’s dismissal of probationers’ cases,\n“purging” of fees that probationers owed, and resetting payment plans for delinquent\nprobations via court order sufficiently relate to these general functions? We conclude\nthat they did. The judges’ reviewing of individual probationers’ cases and amending\nof probation orders are related to the district court’s authorized functions of placing\na defendant on probation, requiring a defendant to pay a probation fee, discharging\na defendant from probation at the court’s discretion, suspending the imposition of a\ndefendant’s fine, and modifying a defendant’s condition of probation.\n\n TJN attempts to analogize this case to cases in which courts have held that\njudges who make staffing decisions engage in administrative personnel decisions, not\nofficial judicial acts protected by judicial immunity.4 These cases are inapposite.\n\n\n 4\n See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a judge’s\ndemotion and discharge of a court employee were administrative acts not protected\nby judicial immunity); McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1986)\n(“Hiring and firing of employees is typically an administrative task . . . .The decision\nto fire the plaintiff did not involve judicial discretion; in other words, the judge did\nnot utilize his education, training, and experience in the law to decide whether or not\nto retain plaintiff.”); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cty., Mo., 729 F.2d 541,\n549 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding county judge’s decision to transfer hearing officer not\n“official judicial act” but rather “administrative personnel decision”); Clark v.\nCampbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (holding county judge, in\nhiring or firing county employees, is not exercising a judicial function but, rather, is\n\n -9-\n\fTJN’s complaint states that the judges “dismissed” the probationers’ cases, Compl.\nat 13, ¶ 81; “‘purged’ the remaining debt that had not been paid,” id., and entered\n“Order[s]” that permitted probationers to “reset their payment plan” where all fees\nowed were “forgiven” in lieu of time served. Id. at 14, ¶¶ 89, 88, 90. TJN does not\nallege that these orders mentioned TJN as an independent contractor or employee of\nthe court or the judges; in fact, it alleges that their fee agreement contract was\n“stricken” from the judges’ orders and not mentioned at all. Id. at ¶ 89. TJN alleges\nconduct by the judges that constitute judicial acts, not employment decisions.\n\n Furthermore, there was no employment relationship or contract for services\nbetween the judges, Craighead County, or the City Defendants, nor did the judges\never “terminate” TJN’s work in their orders; this is because the contractual\nrelationship at issue is between TJN and the probationers. The complaint provides\nthat “[e]ach probation client enters into a contract with [TJN], agreeing to pay\nprobation fees in exchange for services provided, such as drug screenings and\nclasses.” Id. at 1, ¶ 1.5\n\n While a district court or city court “may contract” with a probation services\nprovider “[u]pon request of the district court judge or city court judge,” Ark. Code\n\nperforming administrative and ministerial duties and thus cannot claim judicial\nimmunity with respect to a civil rights action arising out of those activities);\nAtcherson v. Sienbenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 538 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (supervising and\nterminating a probation officer was not acting in a judicial capacity and thus was not\nprotected by absolute immunity from a civil rights action brought by the probation\nofficer), vacated on other grounds, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).\n 5\n See also id. at 2, ¶ 3 (“Boling and Fowler have unilaterally decreed that [TJN]\nis not entitled to fees owed under the contracts between each probation client and\n[TJN].”); id. at 2, ¶ 4 (“As a direct result of Fowler’s and Boling’s interference in the\ncontractual relationship between [TJN] and the probation clients . . . .”); id. at 9, ¶ 46\n(“[TJN] contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee\nAgreement contains, inter alia, a $35 monthly fee for probation services.”).\n\n -10-\n\fAnn. § 16-17-127(a), the complaint does not allege that either Judge Boling or Judge\nFowler made such a request. In fact, the complaint shows that neither judge wanted\nto use the services.\n\n Therefore, this case is not analogous to those cases relied upon by TJN in\nwhich judges have terminated employees.\n\n 2. Jurisdiction\n In examining whether a judge acted “in the complete absence of all\njurisdiction,” “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed us to construe broadly ‘the scope\nof the judge’s jurisdiction . . . where the issue is the immunity of a judge.’” Schottel,\n687 F.3d at 373 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[A]n\naction—taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before\nhim—cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502\nU.S. at 13.\n\n TJN argues that Arkansas law makes the Department of Corrections the entity\nresponsible for the administration of probation services. See Ark. Code Ann.\n§ 12-27-124(a) (“The purpose of this act is to establish a Division of Community\nCorrection that shall assume the management of all community correction facilities\nand services, execute the orders of the criminal courts of the State of Arkansas, and\nprovide for the supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult\noffenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community.”). While this statute\nplaces the Department of Corrections in supervision of offenders, it does not\nauthorize the Department of Corrections to alter the terms of supervision for\noffenders. Instead, the Arkansas Constitution grants state district courts “original\njurisdiction, concurrent with [state] Circuit Courts, of misdemeanors” and any\ncriminal jurisdiction as provided by the Arkansas General Assembly. Ark. Const.\namend. 80, §§ 7(B), 10; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101 (same). State district\ncourts also enjoy “original [and exclusive] jurisdiction . . . for the trial of violations\n\n -11-\n\fof ordinances of any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the\ndistrict court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101(a)(4).\n\n A court may sentence a misdemeanor offender to probation. See id. § 5-4-301\n(“Crimes for which suspension or probation prohibited—Criteria for suspension or\nprobation in other cases.”). As explained supra, “[a] district court or city court may:\n(A) Place a defendant on probation . . . ; and (B) As a condition of its order, require\nthe defendant to pay a: (i) Fine . . . ; and (ii) Probation fee or a public service work\nsupervisory fee.” Id. § 5-4-322(a)(1). “A condition of probation shall be closely\nmonitored and supervised by the district court or city court or by a probation officer.”\nId. § 5-4-322(a)(3)(A).\n\n Based on these statutory provisions, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler did\nnot act in a clear absence of their jurisdiction because Arkansas law provides that the\nstate district court and city courts have jurisdiction to modify or dismiss probation\nsentences and conditions of the misdemeanor offenders.\n\n 3. Conclusion on Judicial Immunity\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler acted within their judicial capacity and did\nnot act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, we hold that the district court\ncorrectly dismissed the damages claims against them based on judicial immunity. See\nMireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.\n\n B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief\n Our conclusion that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity\ndoes not resolve whether TJN may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition\nto monetary damages, TJN sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendant\njudges created a custom and policy with the Amnesty Program; and (2) an injunction\nprohibiting the defendant judges from implementing their custom and policy using\nthe Amnesty Program. See Compl. at 25, ¶¶ d–e.\n\n -12-\n\f On appeal, TJN argues that it is entitled to injunctive relief because the judges’\nconduct was not a judicial act. Appellant’s Br. at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983;\nLeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (injunctive relief not barred when\njudges act in enforcement capacity)). It also argues that declaratory relief is available\nin actions brought against judicial officials. Id. at 55–56 (citing Brandon E. ex rel.\nListenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000); Ward v. City of Norwalk,\n640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Francis v. Pellegrino, 224 F. App’x 107, 108\n(2d Cir. 2007) (summary order)).\n\n Judge Boling and Judge Fowler respond that judicial immunity prohibits TJN’s\nclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they argue that their absolute\njudicial immunity bars all relief.\n\n In Pulliam v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer acting in his\nor her judicial capacity is not immune from actions under § 1983 seeking prospective\ninjunctive relief. 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). Congress responded to Pulliam in\n1996 by amending § 1983 to abrogate its holding.6 Section 1983 provides that “in any\naction brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s\njudicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was\nviolated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words,\n“judicial immunity typically bars claims for prospective injunctive relief against\njudicial officials acting in their judicial capacity. Only when a declaratory decree is\nviolated or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around\n\n\n\n 6\n The Senate report indicates that the amendment “restores the doctrine of\njudicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to . . . Pulliam” because Pulliam had\ndeparted from “400 years of common-law tradition and weakened judicial immunity\nprotections.” S. Rep. 104–366, at *36–37, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4216.\n\n\n -13-\n\fjudicial immunity.” Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02819-RDP, 2014\nWL 5090723, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2014).\n\n In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that\na declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief.\nSee Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F. App’x 763, 766 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he\ndoctrine of judicial immunity now extends to suits against judges where a plaintiff\nseeks not only monetary relief, but injunctive relief as well.”). The question then\nbecomes whether TJN is entitled to declaratory relief post-Pulliam and Congress’s\namendment to § 1983.\n\n Currently, most courts hold that the amendment to § 1983 does not bar\ndeclaratory relief against judges. See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F.\nApp’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar\ndeclaratory relief . . . .”); Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580, 2007 WL 257342, at\n*1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity protects the\nDefendants only from Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. But § 1983 does not\nexplicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief.”); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72\nF. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he amendment to § 1983 limits the type of\nrelief available to plaintiffs who sue judges to declaratory relief.”); Bolin v. Story, 225\nF.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 1996 amendment to § 1983 would limit the\nrelief available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.”).\n\n The Tenth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he only type of relief available to a\nplaintiff who sues a judge is declaratory relief, but not every plaintiff is entitled to this\nremedy.” Lawrence, 271 F. App’x at 766 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).\n“A declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the\nparties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a\npast act.” Id. (emphasis added). A complaint “seeking . . . a declaration of past\n\n\n\n -14-\n\fliability” against a judge instead of “future rights” does not satisfy the definition of\n“declaratory judgment” and renders declaratory relief unavailable. Id. “Furthermore,”\nretrospective declaratory relief cannot “be granted as ‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment\ndoes not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal\nlaw in the past.’” Id. at 766 n.7 (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1553 (10th\nCir. 1995)).\n\n Thus, declaratory relief is limited to prospective declaratory relief. See, e.g.,\nDavis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-cv-0693 LEK/ATB, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.\nJan. 22, 2014) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity also does not shield judges from\nclaims for prospective declaratory relief.[] In this case, plaintiff’s request for\ndeclaratory relief is purely retrospective. She seeks a declaratory judgment that past\nactions that occurred in the context of the Family Court proceedings violated her\nconstitutional rights.” (internal citation omitted)).\n\n Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that TJN’s request for declaratory\nrelief is retrospective; as a result, TJN is not entitled to such relief under § 1983.\n“Although [TJN] . . . refers to the judges’ actions as ‘policies,’ essentially, . . . [it] is\nasking the court to invalidate the actions of [Judges Boling and Fowler].” Id.\n(emphasis added); see also Compl. at 16, ¶ 101.\n\n C. Municipal Defendants\n TJN next argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims against\nCraighead County and the City Defendants because “Judge Boling and Judge\nFowler’s actions were done pursuant to an official municipal policy and their conduct\ncaused a constitutional tort.” Appellant’s Br. at 49.\n\n “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a\ntortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on\n\n\n\n -15-\n\fa respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.\n658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,\nwhether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to\nrepresent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is\nresponsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.\n\n TJN argues that Judges Fowler and Boling were authorized policymakers of\nCraighead County and the City Defendants and that the judges’ actions should be\nimputed to Craighead County and the City Defendants. But whether the judges’\nactions should be imputed to the municipal defendants depends on whether the judges\nare their employees.\n\n We recently addressed whether the Phillips County District Court Clerk “is a\nstate government official whose actions are not attributable to the City.” Evans v. City\nof Helena-West Helena, Ark., 912 F.3d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 2019). In Evans, the\ndistrict court had dismissed a § 1983 complaint based on the clerk’s and Phillips\nCounty District Court’s status as “state-government officials who are [not] employed\nby [the City].” Id. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, “conclud[ing]\nthat the complaint state[d] at least a plausible claim that the clerk was a city official\nat the time of the alleged wrongdoing, in which case the City could be accountable\nfor actions of the clerk that establish or carry out an unconstitutional policy or custom\nof the municipality.” Id. at 1147. This was because when the Arkansas General\nAssembly established a pilot program creating a limited number of state-funded state\ndistrict court judgeships, Phillips County was not included in that program. Id. (citing\nArk. Code Ann. § 16-17-1101(8) (2008)). As a result, “[j]udges outside the pilot\nprogram, like those in Phillips County, continued to be employees of the cities or\ncounties, or both, that they served.” Id. It was not until after the events alleged in the\ncomplaint that Phillips County was “reorganized as [a] state district court[] and\n\n\n\n\n -16-\n\fserved by a state district court judge.” Id. (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-\n1112(a)(1) (2015)).\n\n Following the reasoning of Evans, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are\nemployees of the State of Arkansas, not Craighead County or the City Defendants.\nArkansas Code Annotated § 16-17-1111(a)(2) (2011) makes clear that the district\njudgeships in Craighead County became “state district court judgeships” as of January\n1, 2013, before the events in this case. It also makes clear that these judges are “state”\njudges despite the cost-sharing requirements of § 16-17-1106(b)(1)(A). Id.\n\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler are not employees of Craighead County or\nthe City Defendants, their actions cannot be imputed to them. Therefore, the district\ncourt correctly dismissed the claims against them.\n\n III. Conclusion\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -17-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: JUSTICE NETWORK INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. CRAIGHEAD COUNTY; David Boling, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Tommy Fowler, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Bay, City Of; Bono, City Of; Brookland, City Of; Caraway, City Of; Cash, City of ; Egypt, City of ; Jonesboro, City Of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City Of, Defendants - Appellees Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 17-3770\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Justice Network Inc.\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant\\n\\n v.\\n\\n Craighead County; David Boling, Judge, in his individual and official capacity;\\nTommy Fowler, Judge, In his individual and official capacity; Bay, City of; Bono,\\n City of; Brookland, City of; Caraway, City of; Cash, City of; Egypt, City of;\\n Jonesboro, City of; Lake City, Arkansas; Monette, City of\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 17, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and KOBES, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fSMITH, Chief Judge.\\n\\n The Justice Network Inc. (TJN) appeals from the district court’s1 dismissal of\\nits 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Judge David Boling, in his individual and official\\ncapacity; Judge Tommy Fowler, in his individual and official capacity; Craighead\\nCounty, Arkansas; the City of Jonesboro; and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette.2 The suit arises from Craighead\\nCounty District Judges Boling and Fowler’s implementation of an Amnesty Program\\nforgiving all fees that probationers owed to TJN for probation services. We hold that\\nJudges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity on TJN’s claims.\\nAdditionally, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are state government officials\\nwhose actions are not attributable to Craighead County or the City Defendants.\\nAccordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s § 1983 suit.\\n\\n I. Background3\\n TJN is a private probation company, and it offers services to probation clients\\nin Craighead County. Services offered to the probation clients include program and\\ncounseling coordination, public service work, random drug screening, curfew\\nmonitoring, or any other condition of probation ordered by the court. TJN also offers\\na variety of classes to its probation clients, including life skills, parenting skills, anger\\nmanagement, alcohol safety school, and drug offender school.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the\\nEastern District of Arkansas.\\n 2\\n We refer to the City of Jonesboro and the Cities of Bay, Bono, Brookland,\\nCaraway, Cash, Egypt, Lake City, and Monette collectively as “the City Defendants.”\\n 3\\n “We recite these facts as alleged in [TJN’s] complaint and assume them to be\\ntrue.” Awnings v. Fullerton, 912 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n -2-\\n\\f Since 1997, TJN has provided probation services to probation clients under the\\njurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of Craighead County. Since that time, it\\nhas also provided probation services to probation clients under the jurisdiction of the\\nCity Defendants’ courts (“City Courts”). TJN’s Jonesboro branch employed 12 full-\\ntime employees, all residents of Craighead County.\\n\\n From 1997 until February 3, 2017, all misdemeanor offenders who had been\\ncharged in Craighead County District Court (“District Court”) or the City Courts, and\\nwho required probation services, were placed under TJN’s supervision. TJN\\ncontracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee Agreement set\\nforth a $35 monthly fee for probation services and included a $15 monthly fee for the\\nsupervision of public service work (a typical condition of probation). A court order\\nissued in conjunction with the Probation Fee Agreement directed each probation\\nclient to pay all probation supervision fees to TJN for each month of supervised\\nprobation.\\n\\n If the probation client failed to abide by the probation order and failed to\\ncomplete his or her court-ordered special conditions, TJN would file an affidavit with\\nthe court indicating what conditions were not completed. The Craighead County\\nprosecutor and the judge would then countersign the affidavit. The judge of the\\nDistrict Court would order the probationer to pay restitution for all outstanding fees\\nowed to TJN. The same process was followed in the City Courts, including the court\\norder directing the probationer to pay fees to TJN. For cases pending in the District\\nCourt, the District Court would collect the fees that the probation clients owed to TJN\\nand forward those funds to TJN. For cases pending in the City Courts, the City Courts\\nwould collect the fees that the probation clients owed and forward those funds to\\nTJN. This system operated for nearly 20 years, from 1997 until 2016.\\n\\n In early 2016, Judges Boling and Fowler were elected Craighead County\\nDistrict Judges. During the election, Judge Boling stated that if he were elected, he\\n\\n -3-\\n\\fwould end the use of TJN’s probation services in his court. Likewise, Judge Fowler\\nstated during his campaign that he opposed the privatization of probation services.\\n\\n On August 11, 2016, Judge Boling was reported in a local newspaper as stating\\n“that he dismissed the case of one defendant on probation and ‘purged’ the remaining\\ndebt that had not paid.” Compl. at 13, ¶ 81, Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty.,\\nNo. 3:17-cv-00169-JM (E.D. Ark. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 1. This “purged” debt\\nincluded court costs and fees that the defendant owed to TJN pursuant to a contract\\nbetween the defendant and TJN. On August 12, 2016, the local newspaper reported\\nthat Judge Boling said he would “consider nonpayment cases on a case-by-case\\nbasis.” Id. at 14, ¶ 84.\\n\\n On December 7, 2016, the local newspaper reported that Judges “Fowler and\\nBoling planned to implement an ‘Amnesty Program’ in January and February 2017.”\\nId. at ¶ 86. “As part of that program, [Judges] Fowler and Boling met with probation\\noffenders who had outstanding fines that were due, to discuss payment options.” Id.\\nat ¶ 87.\\n\\n On January 26, 2017, the local newspaper reported that Judges Fowler and\\nBoling had implemented a “temporary amnesty program,” which “allow[ed] offenders\\nwho were delinquent on their payments to reset their payment plan.” Id. at ¶ 88. The\\nfees owed to TJN were summarily stricken from each new order of probation. Judges\\nBoling and Fowler forgave the fees owed to TJN as part of the “Amnesty Program.”\\nId. at ¶ 90. Judges Fowler and Boling also instituted a “Jail Credit” program. Id. at\\n¶ 91. This program forgave the costs owed to the court and fees owed to TJN in lieu\\nof time served in prison. “[M]any of the probation clients given ‘Jail Credit’ were\\nnever incarcerated.” Id. at 15, ¶ 93.\\n\\n As a result of the Amnesty Program, and the consequent loss of revenue, TJN\\nhas ceased all operations in Craighead County and has been forced to terminate its 12\\n\\n -4-\\n\\femployees. TJN has suffered significant economic loss and will continue to sustain\\nthat loss in the future if the Amnesty Program continues.\\n\\n TJN brought suit against Judges Boling and Fowler; Craighead County; and the\\nCity Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Contracts Clause,\\nU.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. TJN also\\nalleged violations of the Arkansas Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Ark. Const. art.\\nII, § 22. TJN sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants effectuated a custom\\nand policy of annulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN, in violation of Article\\n1, Section 10 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article\\n2, Section 17 and Article 2, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution. It also sought\\ninjunctive relief enjoining the defendants from executing a custom and policy of\\nannulling fees owed by probation clients to TJN.\\n\\n The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).\\n\\n The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. First, the court\\nfound that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to absolute judicial immunity\\nagainst all of TJN’s claims because “[u]nless judges act completely outside all\\njurisdiction, they are absolutely immune from suit when acting in their judicial\\ncapacity.” Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cty., No. 3:17-cv-00169-JM, 2017 WL\\n5762397, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720,\\n721 (8th Cir. 1997)). The court also noted, “In Arkansas, ‘[a]ll courts of record,\\ndistrict courts, and city courts . . . shall have the authority to suspend the imposition\\nof sentences or the imposition of fines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before\\nthe courts unless specifically prohibited by law.’” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in\\noriginal) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-115). According to the district court,\\nArkansas law also provides that “ [d]uring a period of . . . probation, upon the petition\\nof a probation officer or a defendant or upon the court’s own motion, a court may: (1)\\n\\n -5-\\n\\fModify a condition imposed on the defendant.” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original)\\n(quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-312). The district court concluded that the judicial\\ndecisions “modifying, suspending or terminating the terms of probation, previously\\nimposed by the Court, are judicial acts.” Id. (citing John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v.\\nPennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2009) (finding the judge\\ndefendants were acting in a judicial capacity, and were entitled to absolute immunity,\\nwhen they signed and enforced a court order disallowing “credit bonding”)).\\n\\n Second, the district court granted Craighead County and the City Defendants’\\nmotions to dismiss because “[s]tate district court judges are state government officials\\nand are not employees of the cities. Further, even if the judges were employees of the\\ncities, Judge Boling and Judge Fowler’s judicial decisions were ‘not a final policy\\ndecision of a type creating municipal liability under § 1983.’” Id. (internal citations\\nomitted).\\n\\n Finally, the court concluded that TJN’s remaining claims for unjust enrichment,\\nratification, and supervisory liability also failed because\\n\\n [n]o supervisor or employee relationship exists between the judges and\\n the City and County defendants. Plaintiff failed to state any facts which\\n would support a finding that the City or County defendants had any\\n authority or control over the judges. And, the probation services at issue\\n were provided to the probation clients. Plaintiff has failed to state facts\\n which demonstrate that the City or County defendants received\\n something of value to which they were not entitled by the forgiveness\\n of a debt owed by the probation clients to the Plaintiff.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -6-\\n\\f II. Discussion\\n On appeal, TJN argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims\\nagainst Judges Boling and Fowler using judicial immunity. TJN argues that the\\njudges’ termination of TJN as probation services provider and forgiveness of fees due\\nit were not judicial acts but instead administrative decisions. TJN also argues that\\nJudges Boling and Fowler were authorized policymakers whose actions are\\nattributable to Craighead County and the City Defendants; therefore, the district court\\nerred in dismissing TJN’s claims against the municipal defendants.\\n\\n We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of TJN’s complaint pursuant\\nto Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v.\\nBeebe, 574 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n A. Judicial Immunity\\n We first consider TJN’s argument that Judges Boling and Fowler are not\\nentitled to judicial immunity.\\n\\n “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate\\nassessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). It “is\\nnot overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily\\ncannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. “A judge\\nis immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover for alleged\\ndeprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.” Schottel v.\\nYoung, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12). “First,\\na judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in\\nthe judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though\\njudicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S.\\nat 11–12 (internal citations omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f 1. Judicial Capacity\\n “[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate\\nto the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a\\njudge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in\\nhis judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In examining\\nthese factors, “if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any\\nmistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act,\\nbecause an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a\\njudge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. But “[i]f judicial immunity means anything, it means\\nthat a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error\\n. . . or was in excess of his authority.’” Id. at 12–13 (ellipsis in original) (quoting\\nStump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[T]he relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the\\nact, not the ‘act itself.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). This means that\\nto determine whether an act is judicial, courts “look to the particular act’s relation to\\na general function normally performed by a judge.” Id.\\n\\n Arkansas statutory law creates and circumscribes the judicial sentencing power\\nof district courts and city courts.\\n\\n A district court or city court may:\\n\\n (A) Place a defendant on probation or sentence him or her to public\\n service work; and\\n\\n (B) As a condition of its order, require the defendant to pay a:\\n\\n (i) Fine in one (1) or several sums; and\\n\\n (ii) Probation fee or a public service work supervisory fee\\n in an amount to be established by the district court or city\\n court.\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\fArk. Code Ann. § 5-4-322(a)(1). In addition, “[t]he court may discharge the defendant\\nfrom probation at any time.” Id. § 16-93-314(a)(1). And, district courts and city courts\\npossess the “authority to suspend the imposition of sentences or the imposition of\\nfines, or both, in all criminal cases pending before the courts unless specifically\\nprohibited by law.” Id. § 16-90-115(a). Finally, “upon the court’s own motion, a court\\nmay . . . [m]odify a condition [of probation] imposed on the defendant.”\\nId. § 16-93-312(a)(1).\\n\\n Did Judge Boling’s and Judge Fowler’s dismissal of probationers’ cases,\\n“purging” of fees that probationers owed, and resetting payment plans for delinquent\\nprobations via court order sufficiently relate to these general functions? We conclude\\nthat they did. The judges’ reviewing of individual probationers’ cases and amending\\nof probation orders are related to the district court’s authorized functions of placing\\na defendant on probation, requiring a defendant to pay a probation fee, discharging\\na defendant from probation at the court’s discretion, suspending the imposition of a\\ndefendant’s fine, and modifying a defendant’s condition of probation.\\n\\n TJN attempts to analogize this case to cases in which courts have held that\\njudges who make staffing decisions engage in administrative personnel decisions, not\\nofficial judicial acts protected by judicial immunity.4 These cases are inapposite.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that a judge’s\\ndemotion and discharge of a court employee were administrative acts not protected\\nby judicial immunity); McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1986)\\n(“Hiring and firing of employees is typically an administrative task . . . .The decision\\nto fire the plaintiff did not involve judicial discretion; in other words, the judge did\\nnot utilize his education, training, and experience in the law to decide whether or not\\nto retain plaintiff.”); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis Cty., Mo., 729 F.2d 541,\\n549 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding county judge’s decision to transfer hearing officer not\\n“official judicial act” but rather “administrative personnel decision”); Clark v.\\nCampbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (holding county judge, in\\nhiring or firing county employees, is not exercising a judicial function but, rather, is\\n\\n -9-\\n\\fTJN’s complaint states that the judges “dismissed” the probationers’ cases, Compl.\\nat 13, ¶ 81; “‘purged’ the remaining debt that had not been paid,” id., and entered\\n“Order[s]” that permitted probationers to “reset their payment plan” where all fees\\nowed were “forgiven” in lieu of time served. Id. at 14, ¶¶ 89, 88, 90. TJN does not\\nallege that these orders mentioned TJN as an independent contractor or employee of\\nthe court or the judges; in fact, it alleges that their fee agreement contract was\\n“stricken” from the judges’ orders and not mentioned at all. Id. at ¶ 89. TJN alleges\\nconduct by the judges that constitute judicial acts, not employment decisions.\\n\\n Furthermore, there was no employment relationship or contract for services\\nbetween the judges, Craighead County, or the City Defendants, nor did the judges\\never “terminate” TJN’s work in their orders; this is because the contractual\\nrelationship at issue is between TJN and the probationers. The complaint provides\\nthat “[e]ach probation client enters into a contract with [TJN], agreeing to pay\\nprobation fees in exchange for services provided, such as drug screenings and\\nclasses.” Id. at 1, ¶ 1.5\\n\\n While a district court or city court “may contract” with a probation services\\nprovider “[u]pon request of the district court judge or city court judge,” Ark. Code\\n\\nperforming administrative and ministerial duties and thus cannot claim judicial\\nimmunity with respect to a civil rights action arising out of those activities);\\nAtcherson v. Sienbenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526, 538 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (supervising and\\nterminating a probation officer was not acting in a judicial capacity and thus was not\\nprotected by absolute immunity from a civil rights action brought by the probation\\nofficer), vacated on other grounds, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).\\n 5\\n See also id. at 2, ¶ 3 (“Boling and Fowler have unilaterally decreed that [TJN]\\nis not entitled to fees owed under the contracts between each probation client and\\n[TJN].”); id. at 2, ¶ 4 (“As a direct result of Fowler’s and Boling’s interference in the\\ncontractual relationship between [TJN] and the probation clients . . . .”); id. at 9, ¶ 46\\n(“[TJN] contracted individually with each probation client. The Probation Fee\\nAgreement contains, inter alia, a $35 monthly fee for probation services.”).\\n\\n -10-\\n\\fAnn. § 16-17-127(a), the complaint does not allege that either Judge Boling or Judge\\nFowler made such a request. In fact, the complaint shows that neither judge wanted\\nto use the services.\\n\\n Therefore, this case is not analogous to those cases relied upon by TJN in\\nwhich judges have terminated employees.\\n\\n 2. Jurisdiction\\n In examining whether a judge acted “in the complete absence of all\\njurisdiction,” “[t]he Supreme Court has instructed us to construe broadly ‘the scope\\nof the judge’s jurisdiction . . . where the issue is the immunity of a judge.’” Schottel,\\n687 F.3d at 373 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “[A]n\\naction—taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before\\nhim—cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502\\nU.S. at 13.\\n\\n TJN argues that Arkansas law makes the Department of Corrections the entity\\nresponsible for the administration of probation services. See Ark. Code Ann.\\n§ 12-27-124(a) (“The purpose of this act is to establish a Division of Community\\nCorrection that shall assume the management of all community correction facilities\\nand services, execute the orders of the criminal courts of the State of Arkansas, and\\nprovide for the supervision, treatment, rehabilitation, and restoration of adult\\noffenders as useful law-abiding citizens within the community.”). While this statute\\nplaces the Department of Corrections in supervision of offenders, it does not\\nauthorize the Department of Corrections to alter the terms of supervision for\\noffenders. Instead, the Arkansas Constitution grants state district courts “original\\njurisdiction, concurrent with [state] Circuit Courts, of misdemeanors” and any\\ncriminal jurisdiction as provided by the Arkansas General Assembly. Ark. Const.\\namend. 80, §§ 7(B), 10; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101 (same). State district\\ncourts also enjoy “original [and exclusive] jurisdiction . . . for the trial of violations\\n\\n -11-\\n\\fof ordinances of any town, city, or county within the territorial jurisdiction of the\\ndistrict court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-101(a)(4).\\n\\n A court may sentence a misdemeanor offender to probation. See id. § 5-4-301\\n(“Crimes for which suspension or probation prohibited—Criteria for suspension or\\nprobation in other cases.”). As explained supra, “[a] district court or city court may:\\n(A) Place a defendant on probation . . . ; and (B) As a condition of its order, require\\nthe defendant to pay a: (i) Fine . . . ; and (ii) Probation fee or a public service work\\nsupervisory fee.” Id. § 5-4-322(a)(1). “A condition of probation shall be closely\\nmonitored and supervised by the district court or city court or by a probation officer.”\\nId. § 5-4-322(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n Based on these statutory provisions, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler did\\nnot act in a clear absence of their jurisdiction because Arkansas law provides that the\\nstate district court and city courts have jurisdiction to modify or dismiss probation\\nsentences and conditions of the misdemeanor offenders.\\n\\n 3. Conclusion on Judicial Immunity\\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler acted within their judicial capacity and did\\nnot act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, we hold that the district court\\ncorrectly dismissed the damages claims against them based on judicial immunity. See\\nMireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.\\n\\n B. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief\\n Our conclusion that Judges Boling and Fowler are entitled to judicial immunity\\ndoes not resolve whether TJN may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition\\nto monetary damages, TJN sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendant\\njudges created a custom and policy with the Amnesty Program; and (2) an injunction\\nprohibiting the defendant judges from implementing their custom and policy using\\nthe Amnesty Program. See Compl. at 25, ¶¶ d–e.\\n\\n -12-\\n\\f On appeal, TJN argues that it is entitled to injunctive relief because the judges’\\nconduct was not a judicial act. Appellant’s Br. at 54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983;\\nLeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (injunctive relief not barred when\\njudges act in enforcement capacity)). It also argues that declaratory relief is available\\nin actions brought against judicial officials. Id. at 55–56 (citing Brandon E. ex rel.\\nListenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2000); Ward v. City of Norwalk,\\n640 F. App’x 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016); Francis v. Pellegrino, 224 F. App’x 107, 108\\n(2d Cir. 2007) (summary order)).\\n\\n Judge Boling and Judge Fowler respond that judicial immunity prohibits TJN’s\\nclaims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they argue that their absolute\\njudicial immunity bars all relief.\\n\\n In Pulliam v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer acting in his\\nor her judicial capacity is not immune from actions under § 1983 seeking prospective\\ninjunctive relief. 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). Congress responded to Pulliam in\\n1996 by amending § 1983 to abrogate its holding.6 Section 1983 provides that “in any\\naction brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s\\njudicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was\\nviolated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words,\\n“judicial immunity typically bars claims for prospective injunctive relief against\\njudicial officials acting in their judicial capacity. Only when a declaratory decree is\\nviolated or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The Senate report indicates that the amendment “restores the doctrine of\\njudicial immunity to the status it occupied prior to . . . Pulliam” because Pulliam had\\ndeparted from “400 years of common-law tradition and weakened judicial immunity\\nprotections.” S. Rep. 104–366, at *36–37, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4216.\\n\\n\\n -13-\\n\\fjudicial immunity.” Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02819-RDP, 2014\\nWL 5090723, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2014).\\n\\n In this case, TJN has not alleged that declaratory relief was unavailable or that\\na declaratory decree was violated; thus, § 1983 bars TJN’s claim for injunctive relief.\\nSee Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F. App’x 763, 766 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he\\ndoctrine of judicial immunity now extends to suits against judges where a plaintiff\\nseeks not only monetary relief, but injunctive relief as well.”). The question then\\nbecomes whether TJN is entitled to declaratory relief post-Pulliam and Congress’s\\namendment to § 1983.\\n\\n Currently, most courts hold that the amendment to § 1983 does not bar\\ndeclaratory relief against judges. See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F.\\nApp’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity does not bar\\ndeclaratory relief . . . .”); Esensoy v. McMillan, No. 06-12580, 2007 WL 257342, at\\n*1 n.5 (11th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007) (per curiam) (“[J]udicial immunity protects the\\nDefendants only from Appellant’s request for injunctive relief. But § 1983 does not\\nexplicitly bar Appellant’s request for declarative relief.”); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72\\nF. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he amendment to § 1983 limits the type of\\nrelief available to plaintiffs who sue judges to declaratory relief.”); Bolin v. Story, 225\\nF.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 1996 amendment to § 1983 would limit the\\nrelief available to plaintiffs to declaratory relief.”).\\n\\n The Tenth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he only type of relief available to a\\nplaintiff who sues a judge is declaratory relief, but not every plaintiff is entitled to this\\nremedy.” Lawrence, 271 F. App’x at 766 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).\\n“A declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the\\nparties in anticipation of some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a\\npast act.” Id. (emphasis added). A complaint “seeking . . . a declaration of past\\n\\n\\n\\n -14-\\n\\fliability” against a judge instead of “future rights” does not satisfy the definition of\\n“declaratory judgment” and renders declaratory relief unavailable. Id. “Furthermore,”\\nretrospective declaratory relief cannot “be granted as ‘[t]he Eleventh Amendment\\ndoes not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal\\nlaw in the past.’” Id. at 766 n.7 (quoting Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1553 (10th\\nCir. 1995)).\\n\\n Thus, declaratory relief is limited to prospective declaratory relief. See, e.g.,\\nDavis v. Campbell, No. 3:13-cv-0693 LEK/ATB, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.\\nJan. 22, 2014) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity also does not shield judges from\\nclaims for prospective declaratory relief.[] In this case, plaintiff’s request for\\ndeclaratory relief is purely retrospective. She seeks a declaratory judgment that past\\nactions that occurred in the context of the Family Court proceedings violated her\\nconstitutional rights.” (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\n Having reviewed the complaint, we conclude that TJN’s request for declaratory\\nrelief is retrospective; as a result, TJN is not entitled to such relief under § 1983.\\n“Although [TJN] . . . refers to the judges’ actions as ‘policies,’ essentially, . . . [it] is\\nasking the court to invalidate the actions of [Judges Boling and Fowler].” Id.\\n(emphasis added); see also Compl. at 16, ¶ 101.\\n\\n C. Municipal Defendants\\n TJN next argues that the district court erred in dismissing its claims against\\nCraighead County and the City Defendants because “Judge Boling and Judge\\nFowler’s actions were done pursuant to an official municipal policy and their conduct\\ncaused a constitutional tort.” Appellant’s Br. at 49.\\n\\n “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a\\ntortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on\\n\\n\\n\\n -15-\\n\\fa respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.\\n658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,\\nwhether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to\\nrepresent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is\\nresponsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.\\n\\n TJN argues that Judges Fowler and Boling were authorized policymakers of\\nCraighead County and the City Defendants and that the judges’ actions should be\\nimputed to Craighead County and the City Defendants. But whether the judges’\\nactions should be imputed to the municipal defendants depends on whether the judges\\nare their employees.\\n\\n We recently addressed whether the Phillips County District Court Clerk “is a\\nstate government official whose actions are not attributable to the City.” Evans v. City\\nof Helena-West Helena, Ark., 912 F.3d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 2019). In Evans, the\\ndistrict court had dismissed a § 1983 complaint based on the clerk’s and Phillips\\nCounty District Court’s status as “state-government officials who are [not] employed\\nby [the City].” Id. We reversed and remanded for further proceedings, “conclud[ing]\\nthat the complaint state[d] at least a plausible claim that the clerk was a city official\\nat the time of the alleged wrongdoing, in which case the City could be accountable\\nfor actions of the clerk that establish or carry out an unconstitutional policy or custom\\nof the municipality.” Id. at 1147. This was because when the Arkansas General\\nAssembly established a pilot program creating a limited number of state-funded state\\ndistrict court judgeships, Phillips County was not included in that program. Id. (citing\\nArk. Code Ann. § 16-17-1101(8) (2008)). As a result, “[j]udges outside the pilot\\nprogram, like those in Phillips County, continued to be employees of the cities or\\ncounties, or both, that they served.” Id. It was not until after the events alleged in the\\ncomplaint that Phillips County was “reorganized as [a] state district court[] and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -16-\\n\\fserved by a state district court judge.” Id. (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-17-\\n1112(a)(1) (2015)).\\n\\n Following the reasoning of Evans, we hold that Judges Boling and Fowler are\\nemployees of the State of Arkansas, not Craighead County or the City Defendants.\\nArkansas Code Annotated § 16-17-1111(a)(2) (2011) makes clear that the district\\njudgeships in Craighead County became “state district court judgeships” as of January\\n1, 2013, before the events in this case. It also makes clear that these judges are “state”\\njudges despite the cost-sharing requirements of § 16-17-1106(b)(1)(A). Id.\\n\\n Because Judges Boling and Fowler are not employees of Craighead County or\\nthe City Defendants, their actions cannot be imputed to them. Therefore, the district\\ncourt correctly dismissed the claims against them.\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -17-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3298,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643339,"string":"4,643,339"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles LEWIS Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson ; Charlene Deeken Defendants Kimberly Gardner Defendant - Appellant Dale Glass ; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I; Unknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee Defendants"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles Lewis v. Kimberly Gardner"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2555"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Arnold, Kelly\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2555\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Charles Lewis\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n City of St. Louis; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson; Charlene Deeken\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Kimberly Gardner\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n\\n Dale Glass; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I;\\nUnknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fARNOLD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After Charles Lewis spent approximately eight days in jail following the\\ndismissal of criminal charges against him, he sued St. Louis Circuit Attorney\\nKimberly Gardner and others, asserting they were responsible for his delayed release.\\nGardner moved to dismiss Lewis's complaint against her on the grounds of qualified\\nand absolute immunity, but the district court denied her motion. Arguing the district\\ncourt erred in doing so, Gardner has filed this interlocutory appeal. We agree with her\\nthat she is entitled to qualified immunity, and so we do not reach the issue of whether\\nshe is also entitled to absolute immunity.\\n\\n At this stage in the proceedings, we accept as true the facts alleged in Lewis's\\ncomplaint. See Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, 910 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2018). In\\n2016, Charles Lewis was arrested and charged with two counts of making terroristic\\nthreats. He denied making these threats, and he was detained pending trial. At trial\\nthe jury acquitted him of one count but was hung on the second count. Lewis was\\nreturned to jail after trial.\\n\\n About two months later, with the date of the retrial on the second count\\nnearing, the Circuit Attorney's Office, through Gardner and an unknown assistant\\ncircuit attorney, dismissed the remaining charge against Lewis by filing a\\n\\\"Memorandum of Nolle Prosequi.\\\" Five days later Lewis's attorney was notified of\\nthe dismissal of the charge, but two days after that Lewis's attorney discovered\\nLewis's name on the jail roster. When the attorney called the St. Louis City Sheriff's\\nOffice, he was told that Lewis had not been released because there had been \\\"a hold\\nissued by Jefferson County.\\\" The attorney then called the Jefferson County court and\\nwas told that no hold had been issued. Meanwhile, Lewis was transferred to another\\njail in St. Louis, and he repeatedly told officers during and after the transfer that he\\nshould be released, to which at least some replied that the hold from Jefferson County\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fprevented his release. Lewis was eventually released about eight days after the Circuit\\nAttorney's Office had filed the nolle prosequi.\\n\\n As a result of his delayed release, Lewis sued the City of St. Louis and a host\\nof its employees and officials, including Gardner. He asserted that Gardner had\\nviolated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable\\nseizure, had failed to establish policies and train staff to ensure citizens would not be\\nwrongfully imprisoned, had established a pattern or practice whereby citizens were\\nwrongfully imprisoned, and had committed the state-law tort of false imprisonment.\\nGardner moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that she was entitled to\\nqualified immunity because the complaint did not establish how she was personally\\ninvolved in violating a clearly established constitutional right. The district court\\ndisagreed and held that, at this early stage, Lewis had alleged that \\\"Gardner was on\\nnotice of and deliberately indifferent to or authorized the violations alleged.\\\"\\n\\n We review the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de\\nnovo. Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2016). A government official is\\nentitled to qualified immunity if her conduct does not violate clearly established\\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. White v. Pauly,\\n137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). For the right to be clearly established, case law need not\\nbe directly on point, but it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. Id.\\n\\n The district court and Lewis characterize the clearly established right at issue\\nas the right of a person not to be detained after charges against him have been\\ndismissed. As a matter of abstract legal principle, this statement is unexceptionable.\\nBut as the Supreme Court and our court have cautioned on several occasions, \\\"clearly\\nestablished law should not be defined at a high level of generality\\\" but must instead\\n\\\"be particularized to the facts of the case.\\\" Id. at 552; see also Estate of Walker v.\\nWallace, 881 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018). So the relevant question is whether the\\nlaw clearly establishes that Gardner, or someone in her office, must go beyond the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\ffiling of a nolle prosequi to ensure the release of those against whom no charges are\\npending. Lewis bears the burden of showing that the law is clearly established. See\\nEstate of Walker, 881 F.3d at 1060.\\n\\n Lewis alleges in his complaint that Gardner has \\\"a responsibility to\\ncommunicate the dismissal of criminal charges to\\\" the state court, the city's sheriff's\\noffice, and \\\"to those with direct custody over people incarcerated by the City of St.\\nLouis.\\\" But, of course, we need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual\\nallegations as true. See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). Instead,\\nLewis must show that clearly established law imposed this duty on Gardner. He\\nhasn't. Lewis has not offered a single authority purporting to place this responsibility\\nwith Gardner or her subordinates, as opposed to, say, the state court itself; it could\\njust as well be that the state court clerk is responsible for giving notice of the\\ndismissal to those who have custody of Lewis. We can hardly conclude, therefore,\\nthat Gardner violated Lewis's constitutional rights.\\n\\n Even assuming Gardner had the legal responsibility to notify the sheriff and\\nother relevant authorities, Lewis has not actually alleged that Gardner did not satisfy\\nthat responsibility. Nowhere in his complaint does Lewis allege that Gardner did not\\nimmediately notify the requisite people that charges against Lewis had been dropped.\\nIn fact, the reason given for Lewis's continued detention was not a lack of notice\\nregarding the city's dismissal of charges against him; rather, it was that another\\ncounty had put a hold on Lewis's release. Nor does Lewis allege anywhere that\\nGardner was involved in Jefferson County issuing the hold or asserted that she was\\nlegally obligated to investigate or challenge it. We therefore cannot see how Lewis's\\ncomplaint alleges a plausible claim for relief against Gardner on any of Lewis's\\nfederal claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672–75 (2009).\\n\\n We conclude, moreover, that Lewis's state-law false-imprisonment claim\\nagainst Gardner should be dismissed as well. Though ordinarily premature, we may\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ftake up Gardner's interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of her motion to\\ndismiss this claim now because it is inextricably intertwined with the properly\\nappealed matter of qualified immunity. See Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 458\\n(8th Cir. 2010). Our conclusion that Lewis's complaint does not plausibly show that\\nGardner was personally involved in Lewis's delayed release necessarily requires that\\nLewis's false-imprisonment charge against Gardner be dismissed since such a claim\\nlikewise requires Gardner's personal involvement. See State ex rel. Green v. Neill,\\n127 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Mo. banc 2004).\\n\\n We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420592/\", \"author_raw\": \"ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ARNOLD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643339/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Charles LEWIS Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson ; Charlene Deeken Defendants Kimberly Gardner Defendant - Appellant Dale Glass ; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I; Unknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee Defendants\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2555\n ___________________________\n\n Charles Lewis\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\n\n v.\n\n City of St. Louis; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson; Charlene Deeken\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n\n Kimberly Gardner\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\n\n Dale Glass; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I;\nUnknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\n ____________\n\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\n Filed: July 26, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\fARNOLD, Circuit Judge.\n\n After Charles Lewis spent approximately eight days in jail following the\ndismissal of criminal charges against him, he sued St. Louis Circuit Attorney\nKimberly Gardner and others, asserting they were responsible for his delayed release.\nGardner moved to dismiss Lewis's complaint against her on the grounds of qualified\nand absolute immunity, but the district court denied her motion. Arguing the district\ncourt erred in doing so, Gardner has filed this interlocutory appeal. We agree with her\nthat she is entitled to qualified immunity, and so we do not reach the issue of whether\nshe is also entitled to absolute immunity.\n\n At this stage in the proceedings, we accept as true the facts alleged in Lewis's\ncomplaint. See Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, 910 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2018). In\n2016, Charles Lewis was arrested and charged with two counts of making terroristic\nthreats. He denied making these threats, and he was detained pending trial. At trial\nthe jury acquitted him of one count but was hung on the second count. Lewis was\nreturned to jail after trial.\n\n About two months later, with the date of the retrial on the second count\nnearing, the Circuit Attorney's Office, through Gardner and an unknown assistant\ncircuit attorney, dismissed the remaining charge against Lewis by filing a\n\"Memorandum of Nolle Prosequi.\" Five days later Lewis's attorney was notified of\nthe dismissal of the charge, but two days after that Lewis's attorney discovered\nLewis's name on the jail roster. When the attorney called the St. Louis City Sheriff's\nOffice, he was told that Lewis had not been released because there had been \"a hold\nissued by Jefferson County.\" The attorney then called the Jefferson County court and\nwas told that no hold had been issued. Meanwhile, Lewis was transferred to another\njail in St. Louis, and he repeatedly told officers during and after the transfer that he\nshould be released, to which at least some replied that the hold from Jefferson County\n\n\n\n -2-\n\fprevented his release. Lewis was eventually released about eight days after the Circuit\nAttorney's Office had filed the nolle prosequi.\n\n As a result of his delayed release, Lewis sued the City of St. Louis and a host\nof its employees and officials, including Gardner. He asserted that Gardner had\nviolated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable\nseizure, had failed to establish policies and train staff to ensure citizens would not be\nwrongfully imprisoned, had established a pattern or practice whereby citizens were\nwrongfully imprisoned, and had committed the state-law tort of false imprisonment.\nGardner moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that she was entitled to\nqualified immunity because the complaint did not establish how she was personally\ninvolved in violating a clearly established constitutional right. The district court\ndisagreed and held that, at this early stage, Lewis had alleged that \"Gardner was on\nnotice of and deliberately indifferent to or authorized the violations alleged.\"\n\n We review the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de\nnovo. Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2016). A government official is\nentitled to qualified immunity if her conduct does not violate clearly established\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. White v. Pauly,\n137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). For the right to be clearly established, case law need not\nbe directly on point, but it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. Id.\n\n The district court and Lewis characterize the clearly established right at issue\nas the right of a person not to be detained after charges against him have been\ndismissed. As a matter of abstract legal principle, this statement is unexceptionable.\nBut as the Supreme Court and our court have cautioned on several occasions, \"clearly\nestablished law should not be defined at a high level of generality\" but must instead\n\"be particularized to the facts of the case.\" Id. at 552; see also Estate of Walker v.\nWallace, 881 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018). So the relevant question is whether the\nlaw clearly establishes that Gardner, or someone in her office, must go beyond the\n\n -3-\n\ffiling of a nolle prosequi to ensure the release of those against whom no charges are\npending. Lewis bears the burden of showing that the law is clearly established. See\nEstate of Walker, 881 F.3d at 1060.\n\n Lewis alleges in his complaint that Gardner has \"a responsibility to\ncommunicate the dismissal of criminal charges to\" the state court, the city's sheriff's\noffice, and \"to those with direct custody over people incarcerated by the City of St.\nLouis.\" But, of course, we need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual\nallegations as true. See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). Instead,\nLewis must show that clearly established law imposed this duty on Gardner. He\nhasn't. Lewis has not offered a single authority purporting to place this responsibility\nwith Gardner or her subordinates, as opposed to, say, the state court itself; it could\njust as well be that the state court clerk is responsible for giving notice of the\ndismissal to those who have custody of Lewis. We can hardly conclude, therefore,\nthat Gardner violated Lewis's constitutional rights.\n\n Even assuming Gardner had the legal responsibility to notify the sheriff and\nother relevant authorities, Lewis has not actually alleged that Gardner did not satisfy\nthat responsibility. Nowhere in his complaint does Lewis allege that Gardner did not\nimmediately notify the requisite people that charges against Lewis had been dropped.\nIn fact, the reason given for Lewis's continued detention was not a lack of notice\nregarding the city's dismissal of charges against him; rather, it was that another\ncounty had put a hold on Lewis's release. Nor does Lewis allege anywhere that\nGardner was involved in Jefferson County issuing the hold or asserted that she was\nlegally obligated to investigate or challenge it. We therefore cannot see how Lewis's\ncomplaint alleges a plausible claim for relief against Gardner on any of Lewis's\nfederal claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672–75 (2009).\n\n We conclude, moreover, that Lewis's state-law false-imprisonment claim\nagainst Gardner should be dismissed as well. Though ordinarily premature, we may\n\n -4-\n\ftake up Gardner's interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of her motion to\ndismiss this claim now because it is inextricably intertwined with the properly\nappealed matter of qualified immunity. See Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 458\n(8th Cir. 2010). Our conclusion that Lewis's complaint does not plausibly show that\nGardner was personally involved in Lewis's delayed release necessarily requires that\nLewis's false-imprisonment charge against Gardner be dismissed since such a claim\nlikewise requires Gardner's personal involvement. See State ex rel. Green v. Neill,\n127 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Mo. banc 2004).\n\n We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Charles LEWIS Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson ; Charlene Deeken Defendants Kimberly Gardner Defendant - Appellant Dale Glass ; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I; Unknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee Defendants\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2555\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Charles Lewis\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\n City of St. Louis; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson; Charlene Deeken\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n\\n Kimberly Gardner\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant\\n\\n Dale Glass; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I;\\nUnknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: April 16, 2019\\n Filed: July 26, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\fARNOLD, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n After Charles Lewis spent approximately eight days in jail following the\\ndismissal of criminal charges against him, he sued St. Louis Circuit Attorney\\nKimberly Gardner and others, asserting they were responsible for his delayed release.\\nGardner moved to dismiss Lewis's complaint against her on the grounds of qualified\\nand absolute immunity, but the district court denied her motion. Arguing the district\\ncourt erred in doing so, Gardner has filed this interlocutory appeal. We agree with her\\nthat she is entitled to qualified immunity, and so we do not reach the issue of whether\\nshe is also entitled to absolute immunity.\\n\\n At this stage in the proceedings, we accept as true the facts alleged in Lewis's\\ncomplaint. See Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, 910 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2018). In\\n2016, Charles Lewis was arrested and charged with two counts of making terroristic\\nthreats. He denied making these threats, and he was detained pending trial. At trial\\nthe jury acquitted him of one count but was hung on the second count. Lewis was\\nreturned to jail after trial.\\n\\n About two months later, with the date of the retrial on the second count\\nnearing, the Circuit Attorney's Office, through Gardner and an unknown assistant\\ncircuit attorney, dismissed the remaining charge against Lewis by filing a\\n\\\"Memorandum of Nolle Prosequi.\\\" Five days later Lewis's attorney was notified of\\nthe dismissal of the charge, but two days after that Lewis's attorney discovered\\nLewis's name on the jail roster. When the attorney called the St. Louis City Sheriff's\\nOffice, he was told that Lewis had not been released because there had been \\\"a hold\\nissued by Jefferson County.\\\" The attorney then called the Jefferson County court and\\nwas told that no hold had been issued. Meanwhile, Lewis was transferred to another\\njail in St. Louis, and he repeatedly told officers during and after the transfer that he\\nshould be released, to which at least some replied that the hold from Jefferson County\\n\\n\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fprevented his release. Lewis was eventually released about eight days after the Circuit\\nAttorney's Office had filed the nolle prosequi.\\n\\n As a result of his delayed release, Lewis sued the City of St. Louis and a host\\nof its employees and officials, including Gardner. He asserted that Gardner had\\nviolated his constitutional rights to due process and to be free from unreasonable\\nseizure, had failed to establish policies and train staff to ensure citizens would not be\\nwrongfully imprisoned, had established a pattern or practice whereby citizens were\\nwrongfully imprisoned, and had committed the state-law tort of false imprisonment.\\nGardner moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that she was entitled to\\nqualified immunity because the complaint did not establish how she was personally\\ninvolved in violating a clearly established constitutional right. The district court\\ndisagreed and held that, at this early stage, Lewis had alleged that \\\"Gardner was on\\nnotice of and deliberately indifferent to or authorized the violations alleged.\\\"\\n\\n We review the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de\\nnovo. Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2016). A government official is\\nentitled to qualified immunity if her conduct does not violate clearly established\\nconstitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. White v. Pauly,\\n137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). For the right to be clearly established, case law need not\\nbe directly on point, but it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. Id.\\n\\n The district court and Lewis characterize the clearly established right at issue\\nas the right of a person not to be detained after charges against him have been\\ndismissed. As a matter of abstract legal principle, this statement is unexceptionable.\\nBut as the Supreme Court and our court have cautioned on several occasions, \\\"clearly\\nestablished law should not be defined at a high level of generality\\\" but must instead\\n\\\"be particularized to the facts of the case.\\\" Id. at 552; see also Estate of Walker v.\\nWallace, 881 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018). So the relevant question is whether the\\nlaw clearly establishes that Gardner, or someone in her office, must go beyond the\\n\\n -3-\\n\\ffiling of a nolle prosequi to ensure the release of those against whom no charges are\\npending. Lewis bears the burden of showing that the law is clearly established. See\\nEstate of Walker, 881 F.3d at 1060.\\n\\n Lewis alleges in his complaint that Gardner has \\\"a responsibility to\\ncommunicate the dismissal of criminal charges to\\\" the state court, the city's sheriff's\\noffice, and \\\"to those with direct custody over people incarcerated by the City of St.\\nLouis.\\\" But, of course, we need not accept legal conclusions couched as factual\\nallegations as true. See Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). Instead,\\nLewis must show that clearly established law imposed this duty on Gardner. He\\nhasn't. Lewis has not offered a single authority purporting to place this responsibility\\nwith Gardner or her subordinates, as opposed to, say, the state court itself; it could\\njust as well be that the state court clerk is responsible for giving notice of the\\ndismissal to those who have custody of Lewis. We can hardly conclude, therefore,\\nthat Gardner violated Lewis's constitutional rights.\\n\\n Even assuming Gardner had the legal responsibility to notify the sheriff and\\nother relevant authorities, Lewis has not actually alleged that Gardner did not satisfy\\nthat responsibility. Nowhere in his complaint does Lewis allege that Gardner did not\\nimmediately notify the requisite people that charges against Lewis had been dropped.\\nIn fact, the reason given for Lewis's continued detention was not a lack of notice\\nregarding the city's dismissal of charges against him; rather, it was that another\\ncounty had put a hold on Lewis's release. Nor does Lewis allege anywhere that\\nGardner was involved in Jefferson County issuing the hold or asserted that she was\\nlegally obligated to investigate or challenge it. We therefore cannot see how Lewis's\\ncomplaint alleges a plausible claim for relief against Gardner on any of Lewis's\\nfederal claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672–75 (2009).\\n\\n We conclude, moreover, that Lewis's state-law false-imprisonment claim\\nagainst Gardner should be dismissed as well. Though ordinarily premature, we may\\n\\n -4-\\n\\ftake up Gardner's interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of her motion to\\ndismiss this claim now because it is inextricably intertwined with the properly\\nappealed matter of qualified immunity. See Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 458\\n(8th Cir. 2010). Our conclusion that Lewis's complaint does not plausibly show that\\nGardner was personally involved in Lewis's delayed release necessarily requires that\\nLewis's false-imprisonment charge against Gardner be dismissed since such a claim\\nlikewise requires Gardner's personal involvement. See State ex rel. Green v. Neill,\\n127 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Mo. banc 2004).\\n\\n We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3299,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4643617,"string":"4,643,617"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Todd BORCHARDT; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver, Plaintiffs - Appellants Dillon Borchardt, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Todd Borchardt v. State Farm Fire and Casualty C"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-07-29"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2610"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Loken, Kelly, Erickson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2610\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Todd Borchardt; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n Dillon Borchardt\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\\n\\n v.\\n\\n State Farm Fire and Casualty Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\\n Filed: July 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n A fire destroyed Todd and Michele Borchardt’s home located in Byron,\\nMinnesota. A jury determined the fire was intentionally set, although not by Todd,\\n\\fMichelle, or Danielle Shaver, the Borchardts’ daughter. Additionally, the jury found\\nthat Todd, Michele, and Danielle (collectively, “the Borchardts”) each willfully, and\\nwith intent to defraud, concealed or misrepresented a material fact or circumstance\\nrelating to the fire or the insurance claim submitted to State Farm Fire and Casualty\\nCompany (“State Farm”). The district court1 entered judgment awarding no damages\\nto the Borchardts and awarding $9,927.50 in damages to Dillon Borchardt for his\\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts argue on appeal that State Farm failed to prove they\\nmade a material misrepresentation to State Farm and thus the district court erred in\\ndenying their motion for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n In March 2006, Todd and Michele Borchardt purchased a house in Byron,\\nMinnesota, for $254,000.00 with the financial assistance of Todd’s parents. Although\\nthe house was purchased without a loan, the Borchardts borrowed $54,000.00 from\\na bank to finish the basement and make it handicap accessible. Their monthly\\nmortgage payment was $254.00. Michele testified that during her entire relationship\\nwith Todd, approximately 25 years, they experienced financial difficulties. At times,\\nthey borrowed money from other people to pay bills and other times would “finagle\\nthings to pay them.”\\n\\n In September of 2014, the Borchardts’ children, Danielle (aged 23) and Dillon\\n(aged 16), and Danielle’s boyfriend, Jeff Lawson, resided in the home with Todd and\\nMichele. When the house had previously been in foreclosure proceedings, the\\nBorchardts borrowed money from others or withdrew money from a retirement\\naccount to clear the default. Beginning in 2010, the Borchardts tried to sell the home,\\nboth on their own and with the help of real estate agents. No offer to purchase was\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fever conveyed to the Borchardts. In July 2013, Todd lost his job as a custodian at\\nMayo Clinic, a job he had held for 12 years. Michele was unable to perform her\\nduties as an assistant head cook after undergoing surgery in December 2013. While\\nTodd was able to find work through a temporary service mowing lawns, by\\nSeptember 2014 Todd and Michele were behind on all of their bills and no longer had\\nany savings or retirement accounts. They last made a mortgage payment in April\\n2014.\\n\\n On Monday, September 8, 2014, the electricity to the Borchardts’ home was\\ndisconnected for nonpayment. The Borchardts made plans to camp for the weekend\\nbecause the campground had hot showers. Their weekend plans changed to renting\\na local hotel room when it was cold and rainy on Friday morning. Around dinnertime\\non Friday, September 12, 2014, Todd, Michele, Dillon, Danielle, Danielle’s\\nboyfriend, and the family dogs left the home, drove to Taco Bell to eat, and then\\ndrove to the hotel for the night.\\n\\n Sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, September 13, 2014,\\nthe Olmsted County (Rochester) Sheriff’s Department called Danielle’s phone.\\nMichele answered. The deputy told Michele that the house was on fire. Michele and\\nTodd immediately left the hotel and drove to the house to find it engulfed in flames.\\nMichele and Todd were on scene for about an hour and then returned to the hotel\\nwhen it became too emotionally difficult for Michele to watch the fire.\\n\\n As part of its investigation, State Farm retained Doug Noah, a fire investigator,\\nto assist in determining the cause of the fire. Noah opined that the fire was incendiary\\nin origin, the most probable cause arising from application of an open flame to\\ncombustible materials. State Farm also discovered that approximately two years\\nbefore the fire, the Borchardts had no insurance on the house. The Borchardts\\nsubsequently purchased a homeowners policy from State Farm. They received a\\ncancellation notice in January 2014 for nonpayment. The policy lapsed on March 6,\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f2014, when the Borchardts did not make the required payment. In the spring of 2014\\nwhen the Borchardts received their 2013 tax year refund, they bought a new State\\nFarm homeowners policy and paid for the entire year’s premium up front. The policy\\nperiod began on April 28, 2014, and is the policy at issue here.\\n\\n In a sworn proof of loss statement, the Borchardts made a claim to State Farm\\nfor $330,000.00 for the damaged house plus other structures and landscape and a\\nclaim for $202,177.13 for damaged personal property. State Farm denied the claim\\nfor two reasons:\\n\\n 1. The fire was caused or procured by or at the direction of an\\n insured in violation of the terms and conditions of the State Farm\\n policy, as well as the public policy of the state of Minnesota, all\\n of which render the policy void.\\n\\n 2. There has been concealment and misrepresentation of material\\n facts or circumstances concerning the insurance of the subject\\n thereof, contrary to the State Farm policy and/or Minnesota\\n statutory provisions in the submission of this claim.\\n\\n The sole issue tried to the jury was liability as to Todd, Michelle, and\\nDanielle’s insurance claim. The parties agreed that damages would be decided by the\\ncourt if the jury returned a verdict in their favor and the parties were unable to agree\\non the amount. The parties reached a pretrial stipulation on liability and damages as\\nto the value of Dillon’s personal items that were destroyed by the fire.\\n\\n The Borchardts hired Michael Pakkala, a state licensed public insurance\\nadjuster, to assist in preparing an inventory and valuing the items destroyed in the\\nfire. Pakkala testified at trial. Because the Borchardts’ home was completely\\ndestroyed, Pakkala relied on the Borchardts to provide an inventory of the contents.\\nPakkala testified that the accuracy of a contents list is impacted when a home is\\ncompletely destroyed by fire because the homeowners must rely on their recollection\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fof what was present and valuing is more difficult because often there is no brand or\\nreceipt to guide them.\\n\\n At trial, State Farm identified items on the Borchardts’ proof of loss statement\\nthat it argued were material misrepresentations. One of those items was Michele’s\\nwedding ring. She valued her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition prepared in 2000 or\\n2001 at $50.00; on the proof of loss statement to State Farm, Michele claimed her\\nwedding ring was worth at $2,000.00. Michele testified at trial that the family owned\\none non-functioning lawnmower, but the proof of loss statement listed two\\nlawnmowers – one that was 12 years old and one that was 17 years old with no\\nnotation that either was non-functioning. The proof of loss statement contained 13\\ntelevisions, of which four were flat screens. Michele testified they owned 10\\ntelevisions, of which two were flat screens. The Borchardts listed 1,000 DVDs on\\ntheir loss statement. Dillon testified during a deposition that the family owned an\\nestimated 100 DVDs. While two laptop computers were claimed to have been\\ndestroyed, Danielle testified that she only owned one.\\n\\n On the statement, six food dehydrators were mistakenly listed instead of one\\nsix-shelf food dehydrator. Even though Todd had pawned all of his firearms many\\nyears earlier, he included on the loss statement a number of accessories for firearms,\\nincluding ammunition, eight pairs of head sets, a cleaning kit, padded carrying cases,\\nand a hard-sided case. State Farm also argued that the Borchardts’ claim for\\n$1,500.00 in food; $500.00 in liquor; and $500.00 in tea and coffee was implausible\\ngiven the Borchardts’ dire financial circumstances, particularly when Michele\\nborrowed $200.00 from her parents to buy milk and food for the family in the summer\\nof 2014. Given the family’s financial circumstances, State Farm also questioned the\\nloss of 14 pairs of sunglasses, including multiple pairs of designers sunglasses valued\\nat $135.00, $150.00, and $190.00.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The jury determined that the inaccuracies on the Borchardts’ proof of loss\\nstatement were enough to establish a willful intent to defraud State Farm by\\nconcealment or misrepresentation of a material fact or circumstance relating to the\\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that\\nno reasonable juror could have found the misrepresentations about their personal\\nproperty were material. The district court found there was sufficient evidence to\\nallow a reasonable juror to conclude that the Borchardts overstated the value of items\\nlost in the fire by thousands of dollars and thus no expert was required to explain to\\nthe jury that fraudulent statements of this magnitude would be material to an insurer.\\nThe Borchardts appeal, arguing the jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to\\nreturn a verdict in State Farm’s favor because State Farm presented no evidence on\\nthe issue of materiality.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Ryan Data\\nExchange, Ltd. v. Graco, Inc., 913 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).\\nUnder Minnesota law, an insurer has an affirmative defense to coverage if the insured\\nmisrepresents “any material fact with intent to deceive or defraud” the insurer, or if\\nan insured’s material misrepresentation increases the insurer’s risk of loss. Indep.\\nSch. Dist. No. 197 v. Accident & Cas. Ins. of Winterthur, 525 N.W.2d 600, 606\\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Minn. Stat. § 60A.08, subd. 9 (2017). While the insurer bears\\nthe burden of proof, the question of whether there has been a material\\nmisrepresentation is typically to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. (citations\\nomitted). A jury need not identify which act amounted to misrepresentation; it is only\\nnecessary for the jury to find that an insured “committed one act of\\nmisrepresentation.” RKL Landholdings, LLC v. Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., No. A14-\\n0781, 2015 WL 1959846, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 2015) (emphasis in original).\\n“A misrepresentation increases the risk of loss if it impairs the insurer’s ability to\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fmake a reasonable decision to assume the risk of coverage.” Schumann v. AMCO\\nIns. Co., No. C4-02-2150, 2003 WL 21694552, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2003)\\n(citing Howard v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 272 N.W.2d 910, 912–13 (Minn. 1978)).\\n\\n The Borchardts argue that being inaccurate on their proof of loss statement\\ndoes not necessarily equate to being untruthful with an intent to deceive or defraud\\ntheir insurer. While they concede they made mistakes, they contend materiality is not\\nto be presumed. And, in this case, a type of “bottom-line” rule should apply since\\ntheir retained adjuster acted favorably to State Farm by applying a flat 30 percent\\ndepreciation rate on each item, no matter its age or whether it would be subject to\\ndepreciation, and listed items that were not assigned a value. The Borchardts also\\nassert State Farm has not been deceived or defrauded because they remember other\\nitems that were destroyed in the fire and never included in the loss statement. In\\ncontrast, State Farm advances essentially a type of bright-line rule that the quantity\\nand value of the Borchardts’ misrepresentation are per se material and void the\\npolicy.\\n\\n The parties’ divergent views of the law need not be resolved because the\\ndistrict court carefully and accurately defined the applicable law for the jury. The\\njury was instructed on the meaning of “material” and “intent to defraud:”\\n\\n For a concealment or misrepresentation to be “material,” it must\\n be sufficiently substantial to matter to a reasonable insurer. A\\n concealment or misrepresentation that impacts the investigation of an\\n insurer into the cause of a fire is material. Likewise, a concealment or\\n misrepresentation about items of personal property that were allegedly\\n destroyed by a fire is material unless the amount of money involved in\\n the concealment or misrepresentation is so small that a reasonable\\n insurer is not likely to care about it.\\n\\n To act with an “intent to defraud” means to act with the purpose\\n or intention of deceiving or cheating someone else. In considering\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f whether any of the Borchardts acted with an intent to defraud, you may\\n consider whether they acted with a desire or purpose to bring about\\n some gain or benefit to themselves at the expense of State Farm.\\n\\n At the charge conference, there was discussion about how “material” should\\nbe defined. The court accepted the Borchardts choice of language. The instruction\\ninitially proposed by the court listed a number of synonyms: significant, substantial,\\nimportant, or pertinent to a reasonable insurer. State Farm argued that only one was\\nnecessary. The court agreed. State Farm requested “significant” and the Borchardts\\nwanted “substantial.” The court accepted “substantial.”\\n\\n Not only did the Borchardts receive the language in the instruction that they\\nrequested, but their own expert witness, Pakkala, testified on cross-examination about\\nthe importance of an insured providing accurate information. Pakkala acknowledged\\nthe exclusion in insurance policies for lying with the intent to deceive or defraud and\\nagreed that “many insurance companies” take the position that if an insured lies about\\nthe existence of an item, the insured does not get paid. Here, the Borchardts admitted\\nat trial to misrepresenting a number of items they claimed were lost in the fire – as\\nexamples, they submitted 10 times the number of DVDs that Dillon testified in his\\ndeposition were inside the home, they submitted a claim for two flat screen\\ntelevisions that did not exist, and they submitted a claim for two lawnmowers when\\nthey owned only one non-functioning mower. State Farm cast doubt on the\\nplausibility of the Borchardts’ claim for $2,500.00 in food, liquor, coffee, and tea.\\nIn addition, Michele was unable to explain why she valued her wedding ring at an\\namount 50 times more than she valued all of her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition filed\\napproximately 13 years earlier. On this record, there was ample evidence for a\\nreasonable jury to find that the Borchardts’ misrepresentations were material – that\\nis, they were substantial enough to matter to a reasonable insurer.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f Most importantly, it is apparent from the record that the jury did not presume\\nmateriality, as argued by the Borchardts. While deliberating, the jury submitted the\\nfollowing question to the court: “Is there a specified amount State Farm considers to\\nbe a ‘small amount’. ex. % or dollar amount.” The court responded: “As Instruction\\nNo. 13 explains, State Farm has the burden of proving that any concealment or\\nmisrepresentation was ‘material’ – that is, ‘sufficiently substantial to matter to a\\nreasonable insurer.’ You must rely on your own recollection of the evidence in\\ndeciding whether State Farm carried its burden.”\\n\\n We assume the jury followed the court’s instructions, weighed the evidence\\nand credibility of the witnesses, and carefully reached the verdict that it did. Viewing\\nthe evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, we conclude that this record contains\\nsufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s determination that Todd, Michele, and\\nDanielle made material misrepresentations relating to their insurance claims. Their\\nmaterial misrepresentations regarding the personal property lost in the fire voided\\ntheir right to recover at all under the policy. Collins v. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,\\n580 N.W.2d 55, 57–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4420870/\", \"author_raw\": \"ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LOKEN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KELLY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ERICKSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643617/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":7,"string":"7"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Todd BORCHARDT; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver, Plaintiffs - Appellants Dillon Borchardt, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-07-29\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2610\n ___________________________\n\n Todd Borchardt; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\n\n Dillon Borchardt\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\n\n v.\n\n State Farm Fire and Casualty Company\n\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\n ____________\n\n Appeal from United States District Court\n for the District of Minnesota\n ____________\n\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\n Filed: July 29, 2019\n ____________\n\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\n ____________\n\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\n\n A fire destroyed Todd and Michele Borchardt’s home located in Byron,\nMinnesota. A jury determined the fire was intentionally set, although not by Todd,\n\fMichelle, or Danielle Shaver, the Borchardts’ daughter. Additionally, the jury found\nthat Todd, Michele, and Danielle (collectively, “the Borchardts”) each willfully, and\nwith intent to defraud, concealed or misrepresented a material fact or circumstance\nrelating to the fire or the insurance claim submitted to State Farm Fire and Casualty\nCompany (“State Farm”). The district court1 entered judgment awarding no damages\nto the Borchardts and awarding $9,927.50 in damages to Dillon Borchardt for his\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts argue on appeal that State Farm failed to prove they\nmade a material misrepresentation to State Farm and thus the district court erred in\ndenying their motion for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.\n\nI. Background\n\n In March 2006, Todd and Michele Borchardt purchased a house in Byron,\nMinnesota, for $254,000.00 with the financial assistance of Todd’s parents. Although\nthe house was purchased without a loan, the Borchardts borrowed $54,000.00 from\na bank to finish the basement and make it handicap accessible. Their monthly\nmortgage payment was $254.00. Michele testified that during her entire relationship\nwith Todd, approximately 25 years, they experienced financial difficulties. At times,\nthey borrowed money from other people to pay bills and other times would “finagle\nthings to pay them.”\n\n In September of 2014, the Borchardts’ children, Danielle (aged 23) and Dillon\n(aged 16), and Danielle’s boyfriend, Jeff Lawson, resided in the home with Todd and\nMichele. When the house had previously been in foreclosure proceedings, the\nBorchardts borrowed money from others or withdrew money from a retirement\naccount to clear the default. Beginning in 2010, the Borchardts tried to sell the home,\nboth on their own and with the help of real estate agents. No offer to purchase was\n\n\n 1\n The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District\nof Minnesota.\n\n -2-\n\fever conveyed to the Borchardts. In July 2013, Todd lost his job as a custodian at\nMayo Clinic, a job he had held for 12 years. Michele was unable to perform her\nduties as an assistant head cook after undergoing surgery in December 2013. While\nTodd was able to find work through a temporary service mowing lawns, by\nSeptember 2014 Todd and Michele were behind on all of their bills and no longer had\nany savings or retirement accounts. They last made a mortgage payment in April\n2014.\n\n On Monday, September 8, 2014, the electricity to the Borchardts’ home was\ndisconnected for nonpayment. The Borchardts made plans to camp for the weekend\nbecause the campground had hot showers. Their weekend plans changed to renting\na local hotel room when it was cold and rainy on Friday morning. Around dinnertime\non Friday, September 12, 2014, Todd, Michele, Dillon, Danielle, Danielle’s\nboyfriend, and the family dogs left the home, drove to Taco Bell to eat, and then\ndrove to the hotel for the night.\n\n Sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, September 13, 2014,\nthe Olmsted County (Rochester) Sheriff’s Department called Danielle’s phone.\nMichele answered. The deputy told Michele that the house was on fire. Michele and\nTodd immediately left the hotel and drove to the house to find it engulfed in flames.\nMichele and Todd were on scene for about an hour and then returned to the hotel\nwhen it became too emotionally difficult for Michele to watch the fire.\n\n As part of its investigation, State Farm retained Doug Noah, a fire investigator,\nto assist in determining the cause of the fire. Noah opined that the fire was incendiary\nin origin, the most probable cause arising from application of an open flame to\ncombustible materials. State Farm also discovered that approximately two years\nbefore the fire, the Borchardts had no insurance on the house. The Borchardts\nsubsequently purchased a homeowners policy from State Farm. They received a\ncancellation notice in January 2014 for nonpayment. The policy lapsed on March 6,\n\n -3-\n\f2014, when the Borchardts did not make the required payment. In the spring of 2014\nwhen the Borchardts received their 2013 tax year refund, they bought a new State\nFarm homeowners policy and paid for the entire year’s premium up front. The policy\nperiod began on April 28, 2014, and is the policy at issue here.\n\n In a sworn proof of loss statement, the Borchardts made a claim to State Farm\nfor $330,000.00 for the damaged house plus other structures and landscape and a\nclaim for $202,177.13 for damaged personal property. State Farm denied the claim\nfor two reasons:\n\n 1. The fire was caused or procured by or at the direction of an\n insured in violation of the terms and conditions of the State Farm\n policy, as well as the public policy of the state of Minnesota, all\n of which render the policy void.\n\n 2. There has been concealment and misrepresentation of material\n facts or circumstances concerning the insurance of the subject\n thereof, contrary to the State Farm policy and/or Minnesota\n statutory provisions in the submission of this claim.\n\n The sole issue tried to the jury was liability as to Todd, Michelle, and\nDanielle’s insurance claim. The parties agreed that damages would be decided by the\ncourt if the jury returned a verdict in their favor and the parties were unable to agree\non the amount. The parties reached a pretrial stipulation on liability and damages as\nto the value of Dillon’s personal items that were destroyed by the fire.\n\n The Borchardts hired Michael Pakkala, a state licensed public insurance\nadjuster, to assist in preparing an inventory and valuing the items destroyed in the\nfire. Pakkala testified at trial. Because the Borchardts’ home was completely\ndestroyed, Pakkala relied on the Borchardts to provide an inventory of the contents.\nPakkala testified that the accuracy of a contents list is impacted when a home is\ncompletely destroyed by fire because the homeowners must rely on their recollection\n\n -4-\n\fof what was present and valuing is more difficult because often there is no brand or\nreceipt to guide them.\n\n At trial, State Farm identified items on the Borchardts’ proof of loss statement\nthat it argued were material misrepresentations. One of those items was Michele’s\nwedding ring. She valued her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition prepared in 2000 or\n2001 at $50.00; on the proof of loss statement to State Farm, Michele claimed her\nwedding ring was worth at $2,000.00. Michele testified at trial that the family owned\none non-functioning lawnmower, but the proof of loss statement listed two\nlawnmowers – one that was 12 years old and one that was 17 years old with no\nnotation that either was non-functioning. The proof of loss statement contained 13\ntelevisions, of which four were flat screens. Michele testified they owned 10\ntelevisions, of which two were flat screens. The Borchardts listed 1,000 DVDs on\ntheir loss statement. Dillon testified during a deposition that the family owned an\nestimated 100 DVDs. While two laptop computers were claimed to have been\ndestroyed, Danielle testified that she only owned one.\n\n On the statement, six food dehydrators were mistakenly listed instead of one\nsix-shelf food dehydrator. Even though Todd had pawned all of his firearms many\nyears earlier, he included on the loss statement a number of accessories for firearms,\nincluding ammunition, eight pairs of head sets, a cleaning kit, padded carrying cases,\nand a hard-sided case. State Farm also argued that the Borchardts’ claim for\n$1,500.00 in food; $500.00 in liquor; and $500.00 in tea and coffee was implausible\ngiven the Borchardts’ dire financial circumstances, particularly when Michele\nborrowed $200.00 from her parents to buy milk and food for the family in the summer\nof 2014. Given the family’s financial circumstances, State Farm also questioned the\nloss of 14 pairs of sunglasses, including multiple pairs of designers sunglasses valued\nat $135.00, $150.00, and $190.00.\n\n\n\n\n -5-\n\f The jury determined that the inaccuracies on the Borchardts’ proof of loss\nstatement were enough to establish a willful intent to defraud State Farm by\nconcealment or misrepresentation of a material fact or circumstance relating to the\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that\nno reasonable juror could have found the misrepresentations about their personal\nproperty were material. The district court found there was sufficient evidence to\nallow a reasonable juror to conclude that the Borchardts overstated the value of items\nlost in the fire by thousands of dollars and thus no expert was required to explain to\nthe jury that fraudulent statements of this magnitude would be material to an insurer.\nThe Borchardts appeal, arguing the jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to\nreturn a verdict in State Farm’s favor because State Farm presented no evidence on\nthe issue of materiality.\n\nII. Discussion\n\n We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Ryan Data\nExchange, Ltd. v. Graco, Inc., 913 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).\nUnder Minnesota law, an insurer has an affirmative defense to coverage if the insured\nmisrepresents “any material fact with intent to deceive or defraud” the insurer, or if\nan insured’s material misrepresentation increases the insurer’s risk of loss. Indep.\nSch. Dist. No. 197 v. Accident & Cas. Ins. of Winterthur, 525 N.W.2d 600, 606\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Minn. Stat. § 60A.08, subd. 9 (2017). While the insurer bears\nthe burden of proof, the question of whether there has been a material\nmisrepresentation is typically to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. (citations\nomitted). A jury need not identify which act amounted to misrepresentation; it is only\nnecessary for the jury to find that an insured “committed one act of\nmisrepresentation.” RKL Landholdings, LLC v. Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., No. A14-\n0781, 2015 WL 1959846, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 2015) (emphasis in original).\n“A misrepresentation increases the risk of loss if it impairs the insurer’s ability to\n\n -6-\n\fmake a reasonable decision to assume the risk of coverage.” Schumann v. AMCO\nIns. Co., No. C4-02-2150, 2003 WL 21694552, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2003)\n(citing Howard v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 272 N.W.2d 910, 912–13 (Minn. 1978)).\n\n The Borchardts argue that being inaccurate on their proof of loss statement\ndoes not necessarily equate to being untruthful with an intent to deceive or defraud\ntheir insurer. While they concede they made mistakes, they contend materiality is not\nto be presumed. And, in this case, a type of “bottom-line” rule should apply since\ntheir retained adjuster acted favorably to State Farm by applying a flat 30 percent\ndepreciation rate on each item, no matter its age or whether it would be subject to\ndepreciation, and listed items that were not assigned a value. The Borchardts also\nassert State Farm has not been deceived or defrauded because they remember other\nitems that were destroyed in the fire and never included in the loss statement. In\ncontrast, State Farm advances essentially a type of bright-line rule that the quantity\nand value of the Borchardts’ misrepresentation are per se material and void the\npolicy.\n\n The parties’ divergent views of the law need not be resolved because the\ndistrict court carefully and accurately defined the applicable law for the jury. The\njury was instructed on the meaning of “material” and “intent to defraud:”\n\n For a concealment or misrepresentation to be “material,” it must\n be sufficiently substantial to matter to a reasonable insurer. A\n concealment or misrepresentation that impacts the investigation of an\n insurer into the cause of a fire is material. Likewise, a concealment or\n misrepresentation about items of personal property that were allegedly\n destroyed by a fire is material unless the amount of money involved in\n the concealment or misrepresentation is so small that a reasonable\n insurer is not likely to care about it.\n\n To act with an “intent to defraud” means to act with the purpose\n or intention of deceiving or cheating someone else. In considering\n\n -7-\n\f whether any of the Borchardts acted with an intent to defraud, you may\n consider whether they acted with a desire or purpose to bring about\n some gain or benefit to themselves at the expense of State Farm.\n\n At the charge conference, there was discussion about how “material” should\nbe defined. The court accepted the Borchardts choice of language. The instruction\ninitially proposed by the court listed a number of synonyms: significant, substantial,\nimportant, or pertinent to a reasonable insurer. State Farm argued that only one was\nnecessary. The court agreed. State Farm requested “significant” and the Borchardts\nwanted “substantial.” The court accepted “substantial.”\n\n Not only did the Borchardts receive the language in the instruction that they\nrequested, but their own expert witness, Pakkala, testified on cross-examination about\nthe importance of an insured providing accurate information. Pakkala acknowledged\nthe exclusion in insurance policies for lying with the intent to deceive or defraud and\nagreed that “many insurance companies” take the position that if an insured lies about\nthe existence of an item, the insured does not get paid. Here, the Borchardts admitted\nat trial to misrepresenting a number of items they claimed were lost in the fire – as\nexamples, they submitted 10 times the number of DVDs that Dillon testified in his\ndeposition were inside the home, they submitted a claim for two flat screen\ntelevisions that did not exist, and they submitted a claim for two lawnmowers when\nthey owned only one non-functioning mower. State Farm cast doubt on the\nplausibility of the Borchardts’ claim for $2,500.00 in food, liquor, coffee, and tea.\nIn addition, Michele was unable to explain why she valued her wedding ring at an\namount 50 times more than she valued all of her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition filed\napproximately 13 years earlier. On this record, there was ample evidence for a\nreasonable jury to find that the Borchardts’ misrepresentations were material – that\nis, they were substantial enough to matter to a reasonable insurer.\n\n\n\n\n -8-\n\f Most importantly, it is apparent from the record that the jury did not presume\nmateriality, as argued by the Borchardts. While deliberating, the jury submitted the\nfollowing question to the court: “Is there a specified amount State Farm considers to\nbe a ‘small amount’. ex. % or dollar amount.” The court responded: “As Instruction\nNo. 13 explains, State Farm has the burden of proving that any concealment or\nmisrepresentation was ‘material’ – that is, ‘sufficiently substantial to matter to a\nreasonable insurer.’ You must rely on your own recollection of the evidence in\ndeciding whether State Farm carried its burden.”\n\n We assume the jury followed the court’s instructions, weighed the evidence\nand credibility of the witnesses, and carefully reached the verdict that it did. Viewing\nthe evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, we conclude that this record contains\nsufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s determination that Todd, Michele, and\nDanielle made material misrepresentations relating to their insurance claims. Their\nmaterial misrepresentations regarding the personal property lost in the fire voided\ntheir right to recover at all under the policy. Collins v. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,\n580 N.W.2d 55, 57–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).\n\nIII. Conclusion\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n ______________________________\n\n\n\n\n -9-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Todd BORCHARDT; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver, Plaintiffs - Appellants Dillon Borchardt, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-07-29\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eighth Circuit\\n ___________________________\\n\\n No. 18-2610\\n ___________________________\\n\\n Todd Borchardt; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants\\n\\n Dillon Borchardt\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff\\n\\n v.\\n\\n State Farm Fire and Casualty Company\\n\\n lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee\\n ____________\\n\\n Appeal from United States District Court\\n for the District of Minnesota\\n ____________\\n\\n Submitted: June 11, 2019\\n Filed: July 29, 2019\\n ____________\\n\\nBefore LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.\\n ____________\\n\\nERICKSON, Circuit Judge.\\n\\n A fire destroyed Todd and Michele Borchardt’s home located in Byron,\\nMinnesota. A jury determined the fire was intentionally set, although not by Todd,\\n\\fMichelle, or Danielle Shaver, the Borchardts’ daughter. Additionally, the jury found\\nthat Todd, Michele, and Danielle (collectively, “the Borchardts”) each willfully, and\\nwith intent to defraud, concealed or misrepresented a material fact or circumstance\\nrelating to the fire or the insurance claim submitted to State Farm Fire and Casualty\\nCompany (“State Farm”). The district court1 entered judgment awarding no damages\\nto the Borchardts and awarding $9,927.50 in damages to Dillon Borchardt for his\\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts argue on appeal that State Farm failed to prove they\\nmade a material misrepresentation to State Farm and thus the district court erred in\\ndenying their motion for judgment as a matter of law. We affirm.\\n\\nI. Background\\n\\n In March 2006, Todd and Michele Borchardt purchased a house in Byron,\\nMinnesota, for $254,000.00 with the financial assistance of Todd’s parents. Although\\nthe house was purchased without a loan, the Borchardts borrowed $54,000.00 from\\na bank to finish the basement and make it handicap accessible. Their monthly\\nmortgage payment was $254.00. Michele testified that during her entire relationship\\nwith Todd, approximately 25 years, they experienced financial difficulties. At times,\\nthey borrowed money from other people to pay bills and other times would “finagle\\nthings to pay them.”\\n\\n In September of 2014, the Borchardts’ children, Danielle (aged 23) and Dillon\\n(aged 16), and Danielle’s boyfriend, Jeff Lawson, resided in the home with Todd and\\nMichele. When the house had previously been in foreclosure proceedings, the\\nBorchardts borrowed money from others or withdrew money from a retirement\\naccount to clear the default. Beginning in 2010, the Borchardts tried to sell the home,\\nboth on their own and with the help of real estate agents. No offer to purchase was\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District\\nof Minnesota.\\n\\n -2-\\n\\fever conveyed to the Borchardts. In July 2013, Todd lost his job as a custodian at\\nMayo Clinic, a job he had held for 12 years. Michele was unable to perform her\\nduties as an assistant head cook after undergoing surgery in December 2013. While\\nTodd was able to find work through a temporary service mowing lawns, by\\nSeptember 2014 Todd and Michele were behind on all of their bills and no longer had\\nany savings or retirement accounts. They last made a mortgage payment in April\\n2014.\\n\\n On Monday, September 8, 2014, the electricity to the Borchardts’ home was\\ndisconnected for nonpayment. The Borchardts made plans to camp for the weekend\\nbecause the campground had hot showers. Their weekend plans changed to renting\\na local hotel room when it was cold and rainy on Friday morning. Around dinnertime\\non Friday, September 12, 2014, Todd, Michele, Dillon, Danielle, Danielle’s\\nboyfriend, and the family dogs left the home, drove to Taco Bell to eat, and then\\ndrove to the hotel for the night.\\n\\n Sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, September 13, 2014,\\nthe Olmsted County (Rochester) Sheriff’s Department called Danielle’s phone.\\nMichele answered. The deputy told Michele that the house was on fire. Michele and\\nTodd immediately left the hotel and drove to the house to find it engulfed in flames.\\nMichele and Todd were on scene for about an hour and then returned to the hotel\\nwhen it became too emotionally difficult for Michele to watch the fire.\\n\\n As part of its investigation, State Farm retained Doug Noah, a fire investigator,\\nto assist in determining the cause of the fire. Noah opined that the fire was incendiary\\nin origin, the most probable cause arising from application of an open flame to\\ncombustible materials. State Farm also discovered that approximately two years\\nbefore the fire, the Borchardts had no insurance on the house. The Borchardts\\nsubsequently purchased a homeowners policy from State Farm. They received a\\ncancellation notice in January 2014 for nonpayment. The policy lapsed on March 6,\\n\\n -3-\\n\\f2014, when the Borchardts did not make the required payment. In the spring of 2014\\nwhen the Borchardts received their 2013 tax year refund, they bought a new State\\nFarm homeowners policy and paid for the entire year’s premium up front. The policy\\nperiod began on April 28, 2014, and is the policy at issue here.\\n\\n In a sworn proof of loss statement, the Borchardts made a claim to State Farm\\nfor $330,000.00 for the damaged house plus other structures and landscape and a\\nclaim for $202,177.13 for damaged personal property. State Farm denied the claim\\nfor two reasons:\\n\\n 1. The fire was caused or procured by or at the direction of an\\n insured in violation of the terms and conditions of the State Farm\\n policy, as well as the public policy of the state of Minnesota, all\\n of which render the policy void.\\n\\n 2. There has been concealment and misrepresentation of material\\n facts or circumstances concerning the insurance of the subject\\n thereof, contrary to the State Farm policy and/or Minnesota\\n statutory provisions in the submission of this claim.\\n\\n The sole issue tried to the jury was liability as to Todd, Michelle, and\\nDanielle’s insurance claim. The parties agreed that damages would be decided by the\\ncourt if the jury returned a verdict in their favor and the parties were unable to agree\\non the amount. The parties reached a pretrial stipulation on liability and damages as\\nto the value of Dillon’s personal items that were destroyed by the fire.\\n\\n The Borchardts hired Michael Pakkala, a state licensed public insurance\\nadjuster, to assist in preparing an inventory and valuing the items destroyed in the\\nfire. Pakkala testified at trial. Because the Borchardts’ home was completely\\ndestroyed, Pakkala relied on the Borchardts to provide an inventory of the contents.\\nPakkala testified that the accuracy of a contents list is impacted when a home is\\ncompletely destroyed by fire because the homeowners must rely on their recollection\\n\\n -4-\\n\\fof what was present and valuing is more difficult because often there is no brand or\\nreceipt to guide them.\\n\\n At trial, State Farm identified items on the Borchardts’ proof of loss statement\\nthat it argued were material misrepresentations. One of those items was Michele’s\\nwedding ring. She valued her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition prepared in 2000 or\\n2001 at $50.00; on the proof of loss statement to State Farm, Michele claimed her\\nwedding ring was worth at $2,000.00. Michele testified at trial that the family owned\\none non-functioning lawnmower, but the proof of loss statement listed two\\nlawnmowers – one that was 12 years old and one that was 17 years old with no\\nnotation that either was non-functioning. The proof of loss statement contained 13\\ntelevisions, of which four were flat screens. Michele testified they owned 10\\ntelevisions, of which two were flat screens. The Borchardts listed 1,000 DVDs on\\ntheir loss statement. Dillon testified during a deposition that the family owned an\\nestimated 100 DVDs. While two laptop computers were claimed to have been\\ndestroyed, Danielle testified that she only owned one.\\n\\n On the statement, six food dehydrators were mistakenly listed instead of one\\nsix-shelf food dehydrator. Even though Todd had pawned all of his firearms many\\nyears earlier, he included on the loss statement a number of accessories for firearms,\\nincluding ammunition, eight pairs of head sets, a cleaning kit, padded carrying cases,\\nand a hard-sided case. State Farm also argued that the Borchardts’ claim for\\n$1,500.00 in food; $500.00 in liquor; and $500.00 in tea and coffee was implausible\\ngiven the Borchardts’ dire financial circumstances, particularly when Michele\\nborrowed $200.00 from her parents to buy milk and food for the family in the summer\\nof 2014. Given the family’s financial circumstances, State Farm also questioned the\\nloss of 14 pairs of sunglasses, including multiple pairs of designers sunglasses valued\\nat $135.00, $150.00, and $190.00.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -5-\\n\\f The jury determined that the inaccuracies on the Borchardts’ proof of loss\\nstatement were enough to establish a willful intent to defraud State Farm by\\nconcealment or misrepresentation of a material fact or circumstance relating to the\\ninsurance claim. The Borchardts moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that\\nno reasonable juror could have found the misrepresentations about their personal\\nproperty were material. The district court found there was sufficient evidence to\\nallow a reasonable juror to conclude that the Borchardts overstated the value of items\\nlost in the fire by thousands of dollars and thus no expert was required to explain to\\nthe jury that fraudulent statements of this magnitude would be material to an insurer.\\nThe Borchardts appeal, arguing the jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to\\nreturn a verdict in State Farm’s favor because State Farm presented no evidence on\\nthe issue of materiality.\\n\\nII. Discussion\\n\\n We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Ryan Data\\nExchange, Ltd. v. Graco, Inc., 913 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).\\nUnder Minnesota law, an insurer has an affirmative defense to coverage if the insured\\nmisrepresents “any material fact with intent to deceive or defraud” the insurer, or if\\nan insured’s material misrepresentation increases the insurer’s risk of loss. Indep.\\nSch. Dist. No. 197 v. Accident & Cas. Ins. of Winterthur, 525 N.W.2d 600, 606\\n(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Minn. Stat. § 60A.08, subd. 9 (2017). While the insurer bears\\nthe burden of proof, the question of whether there has been a material\\nmisrepresentation is typically to be resolved by the trier of fact. Id. (citations\\nomitted). A jury need not identify which act amounted to misrepresentation; it is only\\nnecessary for the jury to find that an insured “committed one act of\\nmisrepresentation.” RKL Landholdings, LLC v. Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., No. A14-\\n0781, 2015 WL 1959846, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 2015) (emphasis in original).\\n“A misrepresentation increases the risk of loss if it impairs the insurer’s ability to\\n\\n -6-\\n\\fmake a reasonable decision to assume the risk of coverage.” Schumann v. AMCO\\nIns. Co., No. C4-02-2150, 2003 WL 21694552, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2003)\\n(citing Howard v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 272 N.W.2d 910, 912–13 (Minn. 1978)).\\n\\n The Borchardts argue that being inaccurate on their proof of loss statement\\ndoes not necessarily equate to being untruthful with an intent to deceive or defraud\\ntheir insurer. While they concede they made mistakes, they contend materiality is not\\nto be presumed. And, in this case, a type of “bottom-line” rule should apply since\\ntheir retained adjuster acted favorably to State Farm by applying a flat 30 percent\\ndepreciation rate on each item, no matter its age or whether it would be subject to\\ndepreciation, and listed items that were not assigned a value. The Borchardts also\\nassert State Farm has not been deceived or defrauded because they remember other\\nitems that were destroyed in the fire and never included in the loss statement. In\\ncontrast, State Farm advances essentially a type of bright-line rule that the quantity\\nand value of the Borchardts’ misrepresentation are per se material and void the\\npolicy.\\n\\n The parties’ divergent views of the law need not be resolved because the\\ndistrict court carefully and accurately defined the applicable law for the jury. The\\njury was instructed on the meaning of “material” and “intent to defraud:”\\n\\n For a concealment or misrepresentation to be “material,” it must\\n be sufficiently substantial to matter to a reasonable insurer. A\\n concealment or misrepresentation that impacts the investigation of an\\n insurer into the cause of a fire is material. Likewise, a concealment or\\n misrepresentation about items of personal property that were allegedly\\n destroyed by a fire is material unless the amount of money involved in\\n the concealment or misrepresentation is so small that a reasonable\\n insurer is not likely to care about it.\\n\\n To act with an “intent to defraud” means to act with the purpose\\n or intention of deceiving or cheating someone else. In considering\\n\\n -7-\\n\\f whether any of the Borchardts acted with an intent to defraud, you may\\n consider whether they acted with a desire or purpose to bring about\\n some gain or benefit to themselves at the expense of State Farm.\\n\\n At the charge conference, there was discussion about how “material” should\\nbe defined. The court accepted the Borchardts choice of language. The instruction\\ninitially proposed by the court listed a number of synonyms: significant, substantial,\\nimportant, or pertinent to a reasonable insurer. State Farm argued that only one was\\nnecessary. The court agreed. State Farm requested “significant” and the Borchardts\\nwanted “substantial.” The court accepted “substantial.”\\n\\n Not only did the Borchardts receive the language in the instruction that they\\nrequested, but their own expert witness, Pakkala, testified on cross-examination about\\nthe importance of an insured providing accurate information. Pakkala acknowledged\\nthe exclusion in insurance policies for lying with the intent to deceive or defraud and\\nagreed that “many insurance companies” take the position that if an insured lies about\\nthe existence of an item, the insured does not get paid. Here, the Borchardts admitted\\nat trial to misrepresenting a number of items they claimed were lost in the fire – as\\nexamples, they submitted 10 times the number of DVDs that Dillon testified in his\\ndeposition were inside the home, they submitted a claim for two flat screen\\ntelevisions that did not exist, and they submitted a claim for two lawnmowers when\\nthey owned only one non-functioning mower. State Farm cast doubt on the\\nplausibility of the Borchardts’ claim for $2,500.00 in food, liquor, coffee, and tea.\\nIn addition, Michele was unable to explain why she valued her wedding ring at an\\namount 50 times more than she valued all of her jewelry in a bankruptcy petition filed\\napproximately 13 years earlier. On this record, there was ample evidence for a\\nreasonable jury to find that the Borchardts’ misrepresentations were material – that\\nis, they were substantial enough to matter to a reasonable insurer.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -8-\\n\\f Most importantly, it is apparent from the record that the jury did not presume\\nmateriality, as argued by the Borchardts. While deliberating, the jury submitted the\\nfollowing question to the court: “Is there a specified amount State Farm considers to\\nbe a ‘small amount’. ex. % or dollar amount.” The court responded: “As Instruction\\nNo. 13 explains, State Farm has the burden of proving that any concealment or\\nmisrepresentation was ‘material’ – that is, ‘sufficiently substantial to matter to a\\nreasonable insurer.’ You must rely on your own recollection of the evidence in\\ndeciding whether State Farm carried its burden.”\\n\\n We assume the jury followed the court’s instructions, weighed the evidence\\nand credibility of the witnesses, and carefully reached the verdict that it did. Viewing\\nthe evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, we conclude that this record contains\\nsufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s determination that Todd, Michele, and\\nDanielle made material misrepresentations relating to their insurance claims. Their\\nmaterial misrepresentations regarding the personal property lost in the fire voided\\ntheir right to recover at all under the policy. Collins v. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,\\n580 N.W.2d 55, 57–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).\\n\\nIII. Conclusion\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n ______________________________\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -9-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":32,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":3200,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NjQ0OTkxOSwianRpIjoiZmYwYmQwMzYtYmVlNS00ZmI1LWIzZDgtNzRhOGQ0ODU1ODIzIiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3ODY0NTM1MTksImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.uEia-1U93zV13Emz70cvQVQXDZvP0jK4i5dvbrB7f-_zM4T8hue8nHQeBnk_amAV7IIGdCWSdcIjAfsJb3UgCQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,643,436 | Damon STEPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COVANCE CENTRAL LABORATORY SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. | Stepp v. Covance Cent. Lab. Servs., Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-3292 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3292\nDAMON STEPP,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643436/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,498 | Vanessa Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-1982 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1982\nVANESSA MATH... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643498/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,499 | United States v. Michael Bonin | 2019-07-26 | 18-1479 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1479\nUNITED STATE... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643499/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,500 | Tristana Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-3403 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3403\n\nTRISTANA HUNT,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643500/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,501 | Damon Stepp v. Covance, Inc. | 2019-07-26 | 18-3292 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3292\nDAMON STEPP,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643501/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,701 | John MCCOTTRELL and Dustin S. Clay, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Marcus WHITE and Labarin Williams, Defendants-Appellees. | John McCottrell v. Marcus White | 2019-07-29 | 17-2295 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Rovner, Hamilton, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889016/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643701/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,769 | John McCottrell v. Marcus White | 2019-07-29 | 17-2295 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2295\n\nJOHN MCCOTTRELL and\nDUSTIN S. CLAY,\n ... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643769/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,643,770 | Anna CHRONIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. | Anna Chronis v. United States | 2019-07-29 | 17-3093 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889018/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/op... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643770/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,808 | Anna Chronis v. United States | 2019-07-29 | 17-3093 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17‐3093\nANNA CHRON... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643808/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,644,080 | Anna Chronis v. United States | 2019-07-29 | 17-3093 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3093\nANNA CHRON... | RIPPLE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644080/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,644,076 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas D. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antwon D. Jenkins, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Douglas Jackson | 2019-07-30 | 15-3693; 14-2898 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Kanne, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3693\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644076/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,096 | United States v. Douglas Jackson | 2019-07-30 | 15-3693 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-3693\nUNITED STATES OF A... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644096/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,644,097 | Timothy J. FAST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASH DEPOT, LTD., Defendant-Appellee. | Timothy Fast v. Cash Depot, Ltd. | 2019-07-30 | 18-3571 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3571\nTIMOTHY J. FAST,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644097/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,168 | Timothy Fast v. Cash Depot, Ltd. | 2019-07-30 | 18-3571 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3571\nTIMOTHY J. FAST,\n... | FLAUM | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644168/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,644,563 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard KRAEMER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Richard Kraemer | 2019-07-31 | 18-2454 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2454\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644563/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,601 | W. James MAC NAUGHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ishaihu HARMELECH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | William Mac Naughton v. Shai Harmelech | 2019-07-31 | 18-2389; 18-2467; 18-2468; 18-2855 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2389, 18‐2467, 18‐2468, & 18‐2855\nW. JAMES MAC NAU... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644601/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,603 | United States v. Richard Kraemer | 2019-07-31 | 18-2454 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2454\nUNITED STATES O... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644603/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,644,604 | Tara L. CRUMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. | Tara Crump v. Andrew M. Saul | 2019-07-31 | 18-3491 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3491\nTARA L. CRUMP,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644604/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,644,644 | William Mac Naughton v. Shai Harmelech | 2019-07-31 | 18-2389 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18‐2389, 18‐2467, 18‐2468,... | RIPPLE | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4644644/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,635,677 | Mark MOORE, Plaintiff - Appellee Michael Harrod; William C. Johnson, Plaintiffs v. John THURSTON, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State for the State of Arkansas, Respondent - Appellant | Mark Moore v. John Thurston | 2019-07-01 | 18-1382 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Wollman, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888850/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/re... | LOKEN | WOLLMAN | STRAS | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635677/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,678 | LAKES AND PARKS ALLIANCE OF MINNEAPOLIS, a Minnesota Non-Profit Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant v. FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, an Agency of the United States, Defendant the Metropolitan Council, a Public Corporation and Political Subdivision of the State of Minnesota, Defendant-Appellee Lakes and Parks Alliance of... | Lakes & Parks Alliance of Minneapolis v. Fed. Transit Admin. | 2019-07-01 | 18-1686; 18-1765 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1686\n ... | SHEPHERD | ERICKSON | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635678/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,996 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kevin James PETROSKE Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Kevin James Petroske | 2019-07-02 | 18-1572 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Erickson, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1572\n... | SHEPHERD | ERICKSON | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635996/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,635,997 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. James Dwayne MYERS Defendant - Appellant | United States v. James Myers | 2019-07-02 | 17-2415 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Benton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2415... | LOKEN | BENTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4635997/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,527 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Rigoberto CERVANTES, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Rigoberto Cervantes | 2019-07-03 | 18-2218 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-22... | COLLOTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636527/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,528 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Michael J. SAGUTO, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Michael Saguto | 2019-07-03 | 18-1276 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1276\n ... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636528/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,530 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jason Jerrell SMITH, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Jason Smith | 2019-07-03 | 18-3221 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Wollman, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-3221\n ... | LOKEN | WOLLMAN | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636530/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,531 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Gabriel John AYRES, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Gabriel Ayres | 2019-07-03 | 18-2534 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Beam, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BEAM, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2534\n ... | COLLOTON | BEAM | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636531/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,532 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Devion L. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Devion Williams | 2019-07-03 | 18-2747 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-27... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636532/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,536 | Stefan A. TOLIN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent | Tolin v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue | 2019-07-03 | 18-2343 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-234... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636536/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,537 | Robert OGLESBY, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Amy LESAN; Chad Hein, Defendants - Appellees | Robert Oglesby v. Amy Lesan | 2019-07-03 | 18-1827 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-18... | COLLOTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636537/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,538 | Piper PARTRIDGE, Individually as Mother and Next of Kin to Keagan Schweikle and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Keagan Schweikle; Dominic Schweikle, Individually as Father and Next of Kin to Keagan Schweikle, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. CITY OF BENTON, ARKANSAS ; Kyle Ellison, Individually and as Employee of ... | Piper Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas | 2019-07-03 | 18-1803 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1803\n... | BENTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636538/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,540 | Melvin Russell TWYFORD, Jr., Plaintiff - Appellant v. COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant - Appellee | Melvin Twyford, Jr. v. Commissioner, Social Security | 2019-07-03 | 18-2084 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636540/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,541 | Marvin Orlando JOHNSON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Doctor Todd A. LEONARD, Mend Correctional Care ; Gwen Blossom, Medical Provider of Mend Correctional Care; Michelle Skroch, Nursing Director of Mend Correctional Care ; Doctor John M. Collier, DDS, of Koala Dental, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants ... | Marvin Orlando Johnson v. Dr. Todd A. Leonard | 2019-07-03 | 18-1833 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1833\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636541/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,542 | MBI ENERGY SERVICES, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Robert HOCH, Defendant - Appellant Charles Kannebecker, as a Stakeholder; Law Office of Charles Kannebecker, LLC, as a Stakeholder, Defendants | MBI Energy Services v. Robert Hoch | 2019-07-03 | 18-1539 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1539\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636542/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,543 | Jerry N. BROWN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. | Jerry Brown v. United States | 2019-07-03 | 17-1420 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888871/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinio... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636543/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,636,545 | Corey KIDD, Petitioner-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee | Corey Kidd v. United States | 2019-07-03 | 18-2465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2465\n ... | BENTON | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4636545/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,149 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Samantha FLUTE, Defendant - Appellee | United States v. Samantha Flute | 2019-07-05 | 17-3727 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Shepherd, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888882/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/... | COLLOTON | SHEPHERD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637149/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,152 | Nelson PINOS GONZALEZ, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent | Nelson Gonzalez v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-05 | 18-3280 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-3280... | BENTON | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637152/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,337 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kyle Dwayne BOLEYN Defendant - Appellant United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Erwin Keith Bell Defendant - Appellant United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Justin Scott Vasey Defendant - Appellant United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Dem... | United States v. Kyle Boleyn | 2019-07-08 | 17-3817; 18-1021; 18-2248; 18-2286; 18-2562 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3817\n ___________________________\n\n United States of Ameri... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637337/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,340 | ST. PAUL PARK REFINING CO., LLC, Doing Business as Western Refining Petitioner v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent St. Paul Park Refining Co., LLC, Doing Business as Western Refining Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board Petitioner | St. Paul Park Ref. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. | 2019-07-08 | 18-2256; 18-2520 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Arnold, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2256\n ... | SHEPHERD | ARNOLD | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637340/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,341 | The MIDWEST DISABILITY INITIATIVE; Gerald Doyen Plaintiffs - Appellants v. JANS ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A Nico's Taco & Tequila Bar, Et Al. Defendants - Appellees | Midwest Disability Initiative v. JANS Enterprises, Inc. | 2019-07-08 | 18-1086 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-108... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637341/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,342 | Andrea Wences GODINEZ; Kelly Michell Wences Godinez, Also Known as Kelly Michelle Wences Godinez; Caleb Moises Wences Godinez; Victorina Godines Alarcon, Also Known as Victorina Godinez Alarcon Petitioners v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States Respondent | Andrea Wences Godinez v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-08 | 18-1060 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1060\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637342/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,590 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tracy PARKER, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Tracy Parker | 2019-07-09 | 17-3732 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3732... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637590/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,592 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Ladronal S. HAMILTON Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Ladronal Hamilton | 2019-07-09 | 17-3794 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3794\n ... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637592/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,593 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kristopher Joseph NATION Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Kristopher Nation | 2019-07-09 | 18-2296 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2296\n ... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637593/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,595 | OIL & GAS TRANSFER L.L.C. Plaintiff - Appellant v. John KARR Defendant - Appellee | Oil & Gas Transfer L.L.C. v. John Karr | 2019-07-09 | 18-2316 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2316\... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,596 | OIL & GAS TRANSFER L.L.C., Plaintiff - Appellee v. John KARR, Defendant - Appellant | Oil & Gas Transfer L.L.C. v. John Karr | 2019-07-09 | 18-1461 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1461\... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637596/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,637,597 | FCS ADVISORS, LLC; Brevet Direct Lending - Short Duration Fund, L.P. Plaintiffs - Appellants v. State of MISSOURI; Douglas Nelson Defendants - Appellees | FCS Advisors, LLC v. State of Missouri | 2019-07-09 | 17-3533 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3533\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4637597/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,592 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Hassan OSMAN Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Hassan Osman | 2019-07-11 | 18-1502 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1502\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638592/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,594 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Frank James GARTH, Also Known as Nitti, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Frank Garth | 2019-07-11 | 18-1715 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Wollman, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1715\n ... | LOKEN | WOLLMAN | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638594/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,638,595 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elfred William PETRUK, Defendant-Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Elfred William Petruk, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Elfred William Petruk | 2019-07-11 | 17-3823; 17-3824 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3823\n ___________________________\n\n United States ... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4638595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,109 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael A. GREEN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Michael Green | 2019-07-12 | 18-1707 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1707\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639109/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,111 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason Michael STRUBBERG, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jason Strubberg | 2019-07-12 | 17-2087 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-2087\n... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639111/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,115 | Jill DILLARD; Jessa Seewald; Jinger Vuolo; Joy Duggar Plaintiffs-Appellees v. CITY OF SPRINGDALE, ARKANSAS ; Washington County, Arkansas ; Kathy O'Kelley; Ernest Cate Defendants Rick Hoyt, in His Individual and Official Capacities Defendant-Appellant Steve Zega; Bauer Publishing Company, L.P. ; Bauer Magazine, L.P. ; B... | Dillard v. City of Springdale, Arkansas | 2019-07-12 | 17-3284; 17-3287 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3284\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639115/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,116 | Diamond D. BLAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Michael BOWERSOX, Warden, Defendant Roger Terry, Deputy Assistant Warden, Defendant-Appellee John Doe 1, SCCC Correctional Officer I; John Doe 2, SCCC Correctional Officer I; Jane Doe 1, SCCC Correctional Officer I; Jane Doe 2, SCCC Correctional Officer I, Defendants | Diamond Blair v. Roger Terry | 2019-07-12 | 18-1486 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1486\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639116/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,117 | ACUITY, a Mutual Insurance Company Plaintiff-Appellant v. REX, LLC; Tab Robert Barks; Ronald Lee Gean; Estate of Jean Carol Gean; Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC; Gaganjot Singh Virk; Auto-Owners Insurance Company; Air EVAC EMS, Inc., Also Known as Air Evac Lifeteam; Deaconess Hospital, Inc.; Heartland Reg... | Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rex, LLC | 2019-07-12 | 18-1735 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Wollman, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1735\n ... | GRUENDER | WOLLMAN | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639117/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,466 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Robert Eugene PUCKETT, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Robert Puckett | 2019-07-15 | 18-3191 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Kelly, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-3191\n ... | LOKEN | KELLY | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639466/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,470 | Jennifer SHOCKLEY, Individually, and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff - Appellee v. PRIMELENDING, a PlainsCapital Company, Defendant - Appellant | Jennifer Shockley v. PrimeLending | 2019-07-15 | 18-1235 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1235\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639470/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,472 | Emad HAROUN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Kevin McAleenan; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli; Ann Marie Jordan-Starks, Defendants - Appellees | Emad Haroun v. U.S. Dept of Homeland Security | 2019-07-15 | 17-3133 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3133\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639472/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,869 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dijon Rasheed BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Dijon Brown | 2019-07-16 | 18-1673 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Benton, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1673\n ... | SMITH | BENTON | STRAS | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639869/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,871 | Ron GOLAN ; Dorit Golan, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants v. FREEEATS.COM, INC., Doing Business as ccAdvertising; AIC Communications, LLC, Doing Business as ccAdvertising; James R. Leininger, Defendants - Appellees | Ron Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc. | 2019-07-16 | 17-3156 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3156\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639871/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,872 | Kimberly WATSO, Individually and on Behalf of C.H. and C.P., Her Minor Children; Kaleen Dietrich, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Tony LOUREY, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Human Services; Scott County; Judge John E. Jacobson, in His Official Capacity; Tribal Court of the Red Lake Band of Chi... | Kimberly Watso v. Tony Lourey | 2019-07-16 | 18-1723 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Benton, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1723\n ... | GRUENDER | BENTON | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639872/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,873 | Jose Luis MEZA-LOPEZ, Also Known as Pariente Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America Respondent - Appellee | Jose Meza-Lopez v. United States | 2019-07-16 | 18-1858 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Beam, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1858... | COLLOTON | BEAM | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639873/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,874 | ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Richard PODHORN; GR3 Construction, LLC; Capital Constructors Development, LLC; SLC Group, LLC; CLS Group, LLC; LCS Group, LLC ; Cornerstone Investors, LLC; CapDev, LLC; Wilmer Farms, LLC; Highland Management Group, LLC ; Maundeigh-Blu, LP; Maundeigh-Blu Manage... | Enterprise Financial Group Inc v. Richard Podhorn | 2019-07-16 | 18-1591 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1591\n ... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639874/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,875 | ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Richard PODHORN; GR3 Construction, LLC; Capital Constructors Development, LLC; SLC Group, LLC; CLS Group, LLC; LCS Group, LLC ; Cornerstone Investors, LLC; CapDev, LLC; Wilmer Farms, LLC; Highland Management Group, LLC ; Maundeigh-Blu, LP; Maundeigh-Blu Manage... | Enterprise Financial Group Inc v. Richard Podhorn | 2019-07-16 | 17-3767 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3767\n ... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639875/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,639,876 | Eduardo ADAME-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent | Eduardo Adame-Hernandez v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-16 | 17-3668 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-36... | COLLOTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4639876/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,702 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adriana GUTIERREZ-RAMIREZ, Also Known as Adriana Peralta, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Adriana Gutierrez-Ramirez | 2019-07-18 | 18-2270 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Arnold, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2270\n ... | SMITH | ARNOLD | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640702/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,703 | Roger D. COTTRELL; Teresa M. Cottrell, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, S.I., Defendant - Appellee | Roger Cottrell v. American Family Mutual Ins. | 2019-07-18 | 17-3716 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3716\n... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640703/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,704 | Mario Ronrico SMITH Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America Respondent - Appellee | Mario Smith v. United States | 2019-07-18 | 17-3201 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888960/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640704/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,705 | Janice DUFFNER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. PETERS, MISSOURI, a Municipality and Political Subdivision of the State of Missouri, Defendant - Appellee. | Janice Duffner v. City of St. Peters, Missouri | 2019-07-18 | 18-1966 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. ... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640705/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,640,706 | Ivan SWEARINGEN, Administrator of the Estate of Ryan James Swearingen; Ronda Swearingen, Administrator of the Estate of Ryan James Swearingen, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. Karl JUDD, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as a Police Officer for the City of Fort Madison, Iowa, Defendant - Appellee. | Ivan Swearingen v. Karl Judd | 2019-07-18 | 18-1126 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4640706/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,245 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kendrick MOODY, Defendant - Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Kendrick Moody, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Kendrick Moody | 2019-07-19 | 18-2040; 18-2041 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Kelly, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2040\n ___________________________\n\n United Sta... | SMITH | KELLY | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641245/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,247 | Scott Lee OWEN, Petitioner - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee. | Scott Owen v. United States | 2019-07-19 | 17-3487 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3487\n... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641247/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,251 | Adam VASSEUR, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Matthew F. SOWELL; Joe L. Jarvis, III, Defendants TEI Construction Services, Inc., Defendant - Appellant | Adam Vasseur v. TEI Construction Services | 2019-07-19 | 18-2841 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Arnold, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2841\n ... | GRUENDER | ARNOLD | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641251/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,537 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Scott Michael HARRY Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Scott Harry | 2019-07-22 | 18-2221 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Wollman, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2221\n ... | SMITH | WOLLMAN | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641537/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,538 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jaunte Lamar BERRY, Sr. Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Jaunte Berry, Sr. | 2019-07-22 | 18-1977 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1977\... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641538/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,894 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Arthur Eugene JENNINGS, Sr., Also Known as Arthur Eugene Jennings, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Arthur Jennings, Sr. | 2019-07-23 | 17-3584 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Beam, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3584\n... | BENTON | BEAM | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641894/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,895 | NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICES OF ARKANSAS, LLC, Doing Business as Covington Court Health and Rehabilitation Center ; NHS Management, LLC; Northport Health Services, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Mark Wesley POSEY, Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Clyde Wesley Posey, and on Behalf of the Wrongful... | Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC v. Posey | 2019-07-23 | 18-2459 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2459\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641895/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,896 | Jeremy HEUTON Plaintiff - Appellant v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant - Appellee | Jeremy Heuton v. Ford Motor Company | 2019-07-23 | 18-2130 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2130\... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641896/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,898 | Irma PEREZ ; John Espino; Joshua Espino; Jeremy Espino; Manuel Espino, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. John and Jane DOES 1-10, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Rick Schmidt, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in Their Individual Capacity ; Raelee Van Winkle, All of Whom Are Named Defendants in ... | Irma Perez v. John and Jane Does 1-10 | 2019-07-23 | 18-2524 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Kelly, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2524\n ... | LOKEN | KELLY | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641898/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,899 | Crystal THOMPSON; Z.T., by and Through His Next Friend Crystal Thompson; Tyler Hutson; G.T., III, by and Through His Next Friend Marinda Hayden; S.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; T.T., by and Through Her Next Friend Marinda Hayden; Gerald Thompson; Mary Estrada Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Andrew DILL D... | Crystal Thompson v. Andrew Dill | 2019-07-23 | 17-3358 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888977/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641899/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,641,900 | AIR EVAC EMS, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. USABLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Doing Business as Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Defendant - Appellee | Air Evac Ems, Inc. v. United Statesble Mut. Ins. Co. | 2019-07-23 | 18-2264 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2264\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4641900/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,280 | Jon D. HIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant - Appellee | Jon Higgins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | 2019-07-24 | 18-1902 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Melloy, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1902... | COLLOTON | MELLOY | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642280/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,281 | Fallou N'DIAYE, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent | Fallou Ndiaye v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-24 | 18-1135 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Melloy, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MELLOY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1135\n ... | BENTON | MELLOY | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642281/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,838 | Z.J., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH Her Next Friend, Je'tuan JONES, Plaintiff - Appellee v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, Through Its Members: Alvin Brooks, Michael Rader, Angela Wasson-Hunt, Sylvester James, and Leland Shurin; Jason Rusley; Michael Jones; Barbara Eckert; Caleb Lenz; William Nauyok; Eric Enderli... | Z. J. v. Kansas City Brd of Police Comm | 2019-07-25 | 17-3365 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889002/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/r... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 6 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642838/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,839 | UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Wesley Paul COONCE, Jr. Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Wesley Coonce, Jr. | 2019-07-25 | 14-2800 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Grasz, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 14-2800\n ... | LOKEN | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642839/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,841 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Marcus FLOYD, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Marcus Floyd | 2019-07-25 | 18-2178 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Wollman, Stras", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LOKEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2178\n ... | LOKEN | WOLLMAN | STRAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642841/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,842 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Lee HALL, III, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Lee Hall, III | 2019-07-25 | 17-3663 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Gruender, Kelly, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3663\n... | GRUENDER | KELLY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642842/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,844 | Sandra LOVELACE ; Stephen Lovelace, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Defendants - Appellees | Sandra Lovelace v. Washington Univ. School of Med | 2019-07-25 | 17-3673 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Arnold, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3673\n ... | SMITH | ARNOLD | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642844/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,848 | Arthur Wayne BROWN, Plaintiff - Appellant v. KANSAS CITY LIVE, LLC; Kansas City Live Entertainment Block 126, LLC; Downtown Irish Pub, LLC, Doing Business as the Dubliner; First Response, Inc.; Security Officer Rosenberger; Security Officer Springer; Mike Sosa, Defendants-Appellees | Arthur Brown v. Kansas City Live, LLC | 2019-07-25 | 18-2527 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Shepherd, Melloy, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2527\n ... | SHEPHERD | MELLOY | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642848/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,642,849 | ADVANCE CONVEYING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC Cross Claimant - Appellee v. LEMARTEC CORPORATION Cross Defendant - Appellant | Advance Conveying Technologies v. Lemartec Corporation | 2019-07-25 | 18-2345 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Benton, Wollman, Grasz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2345... | BENTON | WOLLMAN | GRASZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4642849/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,330 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SHELDON TREE TOP, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Sheldon Tree Top | 2019-07-26 | 18-1816 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Colloton, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KELLY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1816\n... | LOKEN | COLLOTON | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643330/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,333 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Carlos Joe GRADY, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Carlos Grady | 2019-07-26 | 18-1728 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Arnold, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1728\n ... | SMITH | ARNOLD | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643333/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,334 | Shuli MARAMBO Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States Respondent | Shuli Marambo v. William P. Barr | 2019-07-26 | 18-2331 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Arnold, Kobes, Shepherd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2331\... | ARNOLD | KOBES | SHEPHERD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643334/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,335 | Ronald CALZONE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Eric T. OLSON, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, Defendant - Appellee. | Ronald Calzone v. Eric T. Olson | 2019-07-26 | 18-1674 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-167... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643335/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,336 | Robert Paul DOLS, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee | Robert Paul Dols v. Andrew M. Saul | 2019-07-26 | 18-1910 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Colloton, Gruender, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9889014/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/... | COLLOTON | GRUENDER | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643336/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,337 | In RE: VEG LIQUIDATION, INC., Formerly Known as Allens, Inc.; All Veg, LLC, Debtors. R. Ray Fulmer, II, Appellant, v. Fifth Third Equipment Finance Company; Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.; International Paper Company; URS Real Estate, LP ; Ball Metal Food Container, LLC; Syngenta Seeds, Inc.; Teneo Securities, LLC ; ... | Fulmer v. Fifth Third Equip. Fin. Co. (In Re Veg Liquidation, Inc.) | 2019-07-26 | 18-1786 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Colloton, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-1786\n... | SMITH | COLLOTON | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643337/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,338 | JUSTICE NETWORK INC., Plaintiff - Appellant v. CRAIGHEAD COUNTY; David Boling, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Tommy Fowler, Judge, in His Individual and Official Capacity; Bay, City Of; Bono, City Of; Brookland, City Of; Caraway, City Of; Cash, City of ; Egypt, City of ; Jonesboro, City Of; Lake City, ... | Justice Network Inc v. Craighead County | 2019-07-26 | 17-3770 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Kelly, Kobes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 17-3770\n ... | SMITH | KELLY | KOBES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643338/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,339 | Charles LEWIS Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS; Vernon Betts; Jeff Carson ; Charlene Deeken Defendants Kimberly Gardner Defendant - Appellant Dale Glass ; Unknown Assistant Circuit Attorney; Unknown Lieutenant, I; Unknown Lieutenant, II; Unknown Lieutenant, III; Unknown Sheriff's Employee Defendants | Charles Lewis v. Kimberly Gardner | 2019-07-26 | 18-2555 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Arnold, Kelly", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2555\n ... | SMITH | ARNOLD | KELLY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643339/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,643,617 | Todd BORCHARDT; Michele Borchardt; Danielle Shaver, Plaintiffs - Appellants Dillon Borchardt, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee | Todd Borchardt v. State Farm Fire and Casualty C | 2019-07-29 | 18-2610 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Loken, Kelly, Erickson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n No. 18-2610\n... | LOKEN | KELLY | ERICKSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4643617/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 7 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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