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https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 321 | 7A. FINANCIAL CRISES - CHRONICLE
- 322 - proceeding, about 66,000 claims - exceeding $873 billion - have been filed against Lehman as of
September 2010.»375
For many years supervisors and governments had ignored analyses of relationships in the financial
system, and warnings about them. In the months and days b... |
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- 323 - Merrill Lynch by the Bank of America. In the eyes of the financial institutions, these events, and the
acceler ation in the rate at which they unfolded, confirmed the fear that they stood at the brink of the
abyss, and that the same applied to the institutions they depende... |
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- 324 - into a state -chartered bank that was a member of the Federal Reserve System, subject to supervision
by the Fed and New York State. The Fed would begi n to supervise the two new bank holding
companies. The two companies gained the immediate benefit of emergency access to t... |
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- 325 - September 29, without a deal in place.»393 The Fed started looking for banks willing and able to take
over Wachovia. Obstacles were: knowledge of the books, i.e. the r isks, and government support, in
this case from the FDIC. Wachovia itself came with a proposal for indepe... |
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- 326 - commercial paper directly from eligible issuers. This program, which allowed firms to roll over their
debt, would be widely used by financial and nonfinancial firms.» Including foreign banks such as UBS
and Dexia, and companies like Toyota and McDonald’s.397
The mise... |
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- 327 - “shared sacrifice” among AIG’s creditors e ffectively altered the relationship between the government
and the markets, signaling an implicit “too big to fail” guarantee for certain firms. The report said the
New York Fed should have insisted on concessions from counterpart... |
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- 328 - Paulson informed Lewis. He also told him «that the Fed, as its [= BofA’s] regulator, had the legal
authority to replace Bank of America’s management and board if they embarked on a “destructive”
strategy that had “no reas onable legal basis.”»409
In spite of the support... |
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- 329 -
As from here, the chronicle has a somewhat different character. The remainder of the chronicle is
more impressionistic. It adds support for the hypothesis of the structural character of p henomena. But
it is not strictly necessary for the analysis and explanation, and fo... |
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- 330 - The ECB cuts interest rates to 1.5% from 2%.»419
6/3/08. «The Bank of England (BofE) has created £75bn of new money to pump into the economy
over the next three months. The BofE conceded that it had run out of options on i nterest rates after
cutting rates as close to ... |
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- 331 - eliminating gaps in the regulatory system and fostering international coordination.»424
It becomes known that in the last quarter of 2008, the gross domestic product (GDP ) of the USA
shrank at a rate of 6.3% per year. That of the UK shrank 1.6% as compared to the preced... |
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- 332 - possible changes to the credit rating industry. Among the issues discussed were investor reliance on
the credit rating agencies, ways to increase competition in the industry, and possible new business
models for the rating agencies.»432
15/4/09. «Fortis Bank has see n a €... |
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- 333 - further to over 100% (net 66%).443 In spending more than their income, governments take an unknown
but in principle large risk.444 They make themselves dependent on the capital market (or specific
lenders) and interest rates. Bec ause government expenditure is specified by... |
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- 334 -
Gross government debt 1983-2011
OECD countries with largest GDP
050100150200250
1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
YearPercent of GDPUnited States
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Spain
Gross government debt 1983-2011
Minor early euro countries
020406080100120140160180... |
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- 335 - banks. This is the largest bank failure so far in 2009, with $4.1 billion assets.»446
8/5/09. «The European Central Bank announces that it would lower its main refinancing rate to 1%
and continue to provide unlimited short -term and longer -term liquidity to the market f... |
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- 336 - the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of
various govern ments;
monetary policy and the availability and terms of credit;
accounting practices, including, mark -to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of off -
bal... |
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- 337 - year, which was better than had been expected. The official gross domestic product figure was down
from 8.6% annual growth seen in the first quarter of 2008.»455
June 2009 .
1/6/09. «The US economy shrank in the first three months of 2009 at a slower pace than had
or... |
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- 338 - to Washington” about the economic interests and representation of emerging economies.»462
18/6/09. «President Obama reveals a dramatic overhaul of way [sic] the U.S. government oversees
financial markets. The sweeping changes, criticized by some as too hasty, aim to pro... |
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- 339 - Commission Inquiry Financial System is installed.»464
«The Tweede Kamer approved a proposal stating that the purpose of the inquiry is to make a
contribution to adequate operation of the financial system in general and in the Netherlands in
particula r. On this basis the ... |
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- 340 -
November 2009.
25/11/09. «The Chancellor tells the House that the Bank of England provided liquidity to Halifax
Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland from October 2008. The support provided peaked at
£36.6 billion for RBS (17 October 2008) and £2 5.4 billion fo... |
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- 341 - Greece's budget deficit in 2009 is revised upwards to 12. 7%, from 3.7%, and more than four times the
maximum [of 3%] allowed by EU rules.»478
April 2010.
«8 April 2010: the difference (or “spread”) between yields of Greek government bonds over their
German equival... |
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- 342 - cause the same underpricing of risk on these l oans that eventually brought about the mortgage
meltdown and the financial crisis.»483
This must have been anindividual action of FHFA, and premature at that. It cannot have been based
on a sound evaluation. The FCIC was stil... |
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- 343 - Chapter 7.
The financial crises of 2007 -2013.
Part B. Analysis.
Table of contents of this chapter.
1. Introductory notes.
2. Education and sciences.
3. Risk, rating, risk management and liability.
4. Failures of governments and parliaments.
5. National su... |
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- 344 - quantities, such as the size of the suppl y or demand on a given day. The value of an enterprise (on the
stock market for example) is determined in part by its income of the last year and quarter, and the
expectations for the future. Its income can be called a marginal quan... |
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- 345 - general takes much more time than reacting to a need for output reduction. Finally, for both people
and enterprises it is important that there is a big difference between the risks of spending more and
spending less. In general the risk of spendin g too much is appreciably ... |
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- 346 - mechanisms described above. The details do not matter; in the end they make n o difference.
Preliminary note on the role of government and supervision.
When a sector of the economy, or society as a whole, becomes aware of having underestimated
uncertainty or risks, s... |
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- 347 -
2. The concept of “cause” in relation to the crisis.
In this study, “a cause” means something - a circumstance, mechanism, act, inaction, omission, or
whatever - which has a given consequence. A cause is by definition sufficien t for a consequence to be
realized. But ... |
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- 348 - will understand that the risk manage ment was inadequate because limits were fictional and
competitors real, and because more risk may mean more profit and market share.
Inquiries like those of the CDW and FCIC should serve a practical purpose. In the case of the
crisis:... |
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- 349 - The next section, 7B.2, Education and sciences, tries to answer the question: how could so many
people fail if the education system is excellent and economic science is at a hi gh level? The section
tries to solve the apparent inconsistency.
Like the above subsection abou... |
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- 350 - documents.
This analysis, part B of chapter 7 about the financial crises, is based on the Chronicle and
numerous preliminary studies about specific persons and organizat ions. For several of these persons
and organizations a document has been made with the most indicati... |
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- 351 - 3. The textbook The heart of the economy .
4. Two editions of the textbook Economics of Sloman c.s., separated by a crisis.
5. The textbook Essentia ls of Strategic Management - The Quest for Competitive Advantage.
4. The education and science of law.
5. Closing remar... |
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- 352 - It only requires replacement of a politicall y desired fiction by what your eyes show you. And
comparison of the (purely logical) conclusions of this report with the thinking of the people around
you, on radio and TV, in news items and “analyses” in newspapers, journals and... |
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- 353 - conditio sine qua non for a successful career. And that an appeal to a code marks an employee for
ever. That it leads to isolation in the organization and immeasurable misery. But to nothing useful.28
The education program is neither the only problem, nor the ultimate cau... |
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- 354 - the financial economic system and politics than most other disciplines, and faile d disastrously. That is
why it is studied more closely: to explain this failure. And to find out what can be done about it.
The book “History of the American Economy” of Walton & Rockoff. 3... |
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- 355 - the same mistakes not only lacks substantiation, but is incompatible with facts.
• “The Federal Reserve, with better data at hand ”: are the data on ly better than those of 1920 -
1930, or better for the world of 2010 than those of 1920 -1930 for the world of the Great
Dep... |
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- 356 - better than nothing, but their guarantees are limited. Walton & Rockoff could better have
indicated what exactly is insured, and what part, or to what extent.
In short: the quoted section is unscientific because of the lack of substantiation and reflection, and
because ... |
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- 357 - Law Opening Hours Sho ps is not an example of rules which hamper free competition. Some people
even think that compulsory closing times are necessary for honest competition. Because not everyone
can use the new freedoms equally.
A textbook should explain that deregulation... |
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- 358 - In other words: the PD game shows for which type of problems judicial and police organizations
and government can be a solution, and under what condition they can be a solution instead of an
expenditure which does not pay itself back.
Heertje -Van Sandwijk neglect to not... |
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- 359 - reflective, or does it (implicitly) make important a ssumptions without noticing? - 4: sometimes,
sometimes not (both questions) ;
3. Is attention paid to the choice of added value as basic measuring stick, instead of the change of
the value of assets, and is the choice ju... |
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- 360 - The textbook “Essentials of Strategic Management - The Quest for Competitive
Advantag e”.49
This is a textbook for undergraduate and graduate students in business studies.50 Chapter 9 is
entitled “Strategy, Ethics, and Corporate Social Responsibility”. It has a section “... |
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- 361 - hand the unethical behavior of banks is “obviously” caused by greed. On the other hand the need for
finding the cause of the unethical behavior of supervisors and governments does not arise, since their
conduct is simply ignored. The evidently frequent breaching of codes o... |
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- 362 - ● introduction of the subject law in all le vels of education.»
Due to the lack of a scientific attitude in law education and literature, especially the science of law,
but also the education of law, leave very much to be desired. And there are even more reasons than
me... |
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- 363 - 2. The concep t of risk: probability and consequences.
3. Classifications of risks in financial institutions.
4. Decision making, liability and criminal law, and risk management.
5. The lack of understanding of the fundamental position of supervisors as regards informat... |
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- 364 - interests of authorities are inviolable). The logical consequence of this norm is, that those who caused
harm are responsible for reparation or compensation, and are punished if they cannot repair or
compensate. This is a s olution for both the problem of irresponsible beha... |
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- 365 - The use of the concept “risk” in (“profession al”) financial and economic practice is dangerously
sloppy. In general the dimension time is neglected. One speaks of changing risks, but not in terms of
time dependent risks. In financial and economic practice, taking account o... |
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- 366 - combination with laws which permit risk taking with impunity. Practically if not theoretically. Both in
an absolute and a relative sense many more people than a century ago are confronted with
consequences of human error and misconduct , and risks created by people.
The e... |
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- 367 - in conjunction with other assets and liabilities, measuring the extent of market risks of derivative
products alone is not sufficient to understand firms’ total market risk.»68, 69
The same distinction is also made in annua l reports. In that of Freddie70 about 2006 one ... |
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- 368 - Freddie’s problem.
Another paragraph raising questions is the following:
«To date, we have not incurred any credit losses on OTC derivative counterparties or set aside
specific reserves for institutional credit risk exposure. We do not believe such reserves are necessary... |
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- 369 - Which is confirmed by the crisis.76 The capital requirements are fundamentally inadequate.
5. If good or effective risk management is defined as management effective in reducing risks and
their potential consequences to such an extent that they are bearable, then the risk... |
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- 370 - why. They don’t say what risks are prohibited and for what reaso n. On the other hand they do suggest
that 100% safety is undesirable because it would hinder “real economic activity”. But if no limits are
set for risk taking, if liability of institutions and employees is ab... |
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- 371 - 85 moreover that not only the probability matters, but in the first place the product of probability and
consequences.86
Additional difficulties for making estimates of consequences and risk s are the instability of the
system, and the fact that major negative consequence... |
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- 372 - incompatible with any law or regulation. It therefore follows that the FCIC implicitly concludes that
liability and criminal law were (are!) too lax, and should be more strict. But it doesn’t state this
explicitly.
Notwithstanding the fundamental im portance of risks a... |
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- 373 - have be en far less devastating, if the risk management had satisfied the norms of the time. The
problem of the financial institutions may have been that such norms didn’t (and don’t) exist.93 Already
for this reason alone the critical remarks of the commissions ab out the ... |
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- 374 - tell what the Fed did about it in the given year. But they are completely silent.96 The duties of the
Dutch DNB are formulated only vaguely. Because of the national distribution of duties it is
nevertheless clear that the treasury secretary is responsible f or the system as... |
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- 375 - a reason w hy no limits are set on risk taking. The remarks are not discussed by the FCIC, or even
noticed explicitly. Neither in any other document in the dossier by the way. In the FCIC report one
reads:
«Greenspan […] said in a 1999 speech that the successful reso luti... |
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- 376 - generally accepted ethical norms.104 But if their ratings were relative, they cannot be blamed for
much of th e crisis.
2. “Safest” does not mean “safe”. Even AAA could and should not have been considered safe.
3. There is no indication that there was a (regulatory) refe... |
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- 377 - course of time. From weather forecasts to predictions of economic growth. The FCIC nevertheless
seems to expect or require little less than perfect predictions. But it didn’t ask itself what such
predictions could or should look like. It ignores the problem that a responsi... |
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- 378 - related to specific transactions.»116
It is not clear how systemic risk is to be dealt with. Nothing is said about norms for rating agencies
or rating methods, or a system of independent periodic evaluation of ratings. In point 15 on p. 4/12 the
revised version of Basel II... |
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- 379 - As a rule, quants cannot be evaluated by their superiors. They may be believed on the basis of pa st
results, but as experience - including the subprime crisis - shows, these are no guarantee for the future.
So they must have been believed blindly, and against reason. With ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 379 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 380 - understanding can next be explained by the appointment of dishonorable, incompetent persons by
similar persons, and by failings in education.121 Although failings in education are not an excuse:
somebody with the necessary talents can correct th em rather easily. And anyway... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 380 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 381 - For example the annual reports of the GSEs show that institutions were well aware of the
affordable housing policy of the federal government, and actively contributed to its implementatio n.
The FCIC minority report of Wallison shows that the government, especially HUD, exe... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 381 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 382 - Certain aspects of many of the risk management standards have come under criticism for having no
measurable improvement on risk, whether the confidence in estimates and decisions seem to
increase.»129
The first sentence looks like a definition of the concept “risk manage... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 382 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 383 - 6. Inadequate appointments.
7. Deregulation.
8. Housing policy: affordable housing, community reinvestment act, and tax relief.
9. Moral obligations.
10. Government and supervision were un prepared for a crisis. Practical circumstances as explanation
of inconsequent ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 383 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 384 - 10. That all133 principal persons have failed can be explained as follows. The combination of present -
day election systems and the absence of liability an d punishability causes dishonorable and
incompetent governments and parliaments. Honorable people without false preten... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 384 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 385 - last resort for what ha ppens in that system. They determine the boundary conditions. Where “boundary
conditions” are to be understood in a wide sense. Laws determine what is permitted and forbidden, and
the obligations of people and corporations. They determine the kinds a... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 385 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 386 -
3. Insufficient liability as a cause of reckless risk taking and of the transfer of
consequences of risk to innocent outsiders.
In the present repo rt liability always refers to:
Harm caused by avoidable behavior of people. Harm could have been avoided if these peo... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 386 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 387 - afforded under traditional law. Almost all negative consequences had to be borne by innocent
outsiders. Those who caused the crisis by dysfunctioning have hardly suffered at all. Many of
them continued their career as if nothing had happened. Sometimes with a salary which i... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 387 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 388 - possible, compensated;146
3. If avoidable harm or hinder was and/or is caused, and the actor is unwilling and/or unable
to pay compensation or reparation, then the victim can appeal to an independent judge;
4. Who is to decide about subjective aspects;
5. If full repar... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 388 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 389 - As a rule compliance with norms is supervised by o rganizations set up for that purpose. The system
works if these organizations do what they have to do, and if the fines154 for infringement of the norms
are sufficiently large to make compliance cost effective. The history ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 389 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 390 - For th e same reasons actors should be punished if they cannot completely repair or compensate the
damage they have caused. For example when people are wounded, mutilated or killed. Punishment
replaces the part of the costs that the actors cannot pay. Note that t his punish... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 390 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 391 - the risks implied by the necessity to believe people one does not know and cannot reliably assess.162
Doing one’s best after having made an indefensible choice, need not be sufficient to avoid disastrous
errors. Timely reversal of the misstep by resignation is the only way ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 391 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 392 - substantive law, procedural law should be improved in such a way as to safeguard innocent outsiders
as fully as possible, and make the responsible decision makers and actors repair or compensate
damage caused as completely as possible , and if they can’t, punish them. Proce... |
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- 393 - concerning integrity, duty and whistleblowing ar e examples. All cases show that these rules have no
practical significance. Even though it is clear for example that openness of the organizations of the
supervisors would almost certainly have given rise to much more and wel... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 393 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 394 - 2. The political system appo inted dishonorable and incompetent secretaries of the Treasury and
heads of supervisory and other organizations. These people did not understand risks, denied
and/or under estimated them, and so on. They ignored or did not understand signals fro... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 394 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 395 - ibility for the regulation lies with governments and parliaments. Only they make laws. Still, part of the
blame for the fact that nothing is changed goes to the inquiry co mmissions. They were silent about all
subjects mentioned in this subsection.
As usual in this study,... |
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- 396 - fundamental charac teristic of a dictatorship.175 And completely contrary to what is considered
desirable and normal in democratic constitutional states.
The absence of separation of powers is essential for the practical significance of codes of conduct,
integrity codes, ... |
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- 397 - remarkable, because it would be very easy for the top management to do it very differently. After all
there is no real need for the unrealistic suggestion that the organization has only one opinion. On the
contrary: logically speaking it is in general plain nonsense to sugg... |
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- 398 - them questions the present day legal framework of hierarchical organizat ions. As a rule,182 the inquiry
commissions see only the top of organizations, and seem to think that it is representative. However,
there is no logical reason for believing that the formal representat... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 398 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 399 - political world were no more than dogmatic wishful thinking arguments.187 Nobody using his brains
could and would rely on self regulation, and everyone u sing his brains and knowing the main facts
would come to the same conclusions as the GAO and CFTC.188
After Born had ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 399 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 400 - From this it follows that:
• The political system appointed dishonorable incompetent principal persons who did not
understand risks, denied and/or unde restimated them, and so on; did not understand or
ignored signals from their employees, or rejected them without sound a... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 400 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 401 - to be at least three problems:
• If the duties of the top are too extensive and/or difficult, and/or require more than any
human being can provide, then nobo dy is truly competent. Somebody who nevertheless
claims so is by definition dishonorable;
• Dishonorable and inc... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 401 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 402 - be punished. They should be evaluated (by people independent of the organization) to see whether
they are fit for their functions. In general this will entail a change of function or dishonorable
dischar ge (for proven unsuitability). The employee who rightly reported keeps... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 402 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 403 - regulation and deregulation. In the first place they should never have believed any such thing. The
belief was based on unproven illusions. The belief proves their inability to reason properly. The use of
such a belief as the foundation for the ex ecution of a highly respon... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 403 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 404 - Summ ary and conclusions.
The failure of all principal persons in and around the financial system in the years 2000 -2008 can
be explained by the combination of election and appointment processes, and the absence of liability
and punishability.
Trying to get e lected ... |
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- 405 - shows suitability for functions in government or its supervisio n.205 The CV’s or past records give no
reason to suppose that they are capable of ensuring the adequacy of regulation or to supervise public
administration and governmental agencies. Their pretence exceeds thei... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 405 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 406 - The deregulation policy is a good example and proof of the stupidity of the people responsible for
the operation of the financial system, including many economists. It is proof of a failure to learn, and
of a failure to (understand and) apply available knowledge. Notwithsta... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 406 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 407 - revolution.207 Article 4 asserts:
«Freedom means that everything is allowed that does not hinder anyone, so that the exercise of the
natural rights of everyone can only be restricted in order to guarantee the exe rcise of the same rights
by others. The restrictions can on... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 407 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 408 - could be realized without lowering mortgage requirements and substantially increasing the risks for
mortgage sellers and buyers. On the other hand it is clear that HUD exerted pressure on mortgage
sellers, and that HUD and supervisors received and ignored signals about incr... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 408 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 409 - forever” when it came to the goals, they touted their contribution to increasing homeownership. In
addition, Price and other HUD officials told the FCIC that the GSEs never claimed that meeting the
goals would leave them in an unsafe or unsound condition.»
Apart from the ... |
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- 410 - Conversely, reduction or abolishment of the tax deductibility will in general decrease the home prices
and the wealth of homeowners. If prices of economic goods are determined by their proceeds, and if
the tax on the highest part of income is about 50%, then tax deductibili... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 410 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 411 - Abolishing deductibility of mortgage interest in principle m eans a drastic impoverishment of home
owners. However, this impoverishment can only be seen in specialist financial economic statistics. Not
or hardly in the general ones which are used as indicators of welfare an... |
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- 412 - It is quite unclear why people or or ganizations might be expected to observe more (restrictive)
norms than included in law or regulation. The more so if “freedom” is considered very important. It is
clear however why one may expect more from some organizations than from ot... |
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- 413 - kind of rationality is no more than a figment of the imagination, a falsified hypothesis. Perhaps there
were good reasons for letting Lehman go bankrupt. But there is no proof of any policy. On the
contrary: the available evidence sugges ts its absence. Nobody mentioned a c... |
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- 414 - promotion of the systematic reduction of mortgage requirements. And therefore for the fundamental
growth of the risks and poisoning of mor tgage backed securities (MBS). The growth is called
fundamental because the risks of conventional mortgages were bearable, but those of... |
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- 415 - institutions? The last had severely criticized drafts. «When the regulators issued the final guidance in
January 2007, the industry was more supportive. One reason was that mortgage -backed securities and
CDOs were specifically excluded. […] Those exclusions had been added... |
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- 416 - 6. Supervision in the Netherlands.
7. The conclusions and recommendations of the inquiry commissions with respect to supervision.
1. Summa ry and conclusions.
1. None of the studied reports describes which financial supervisor does or should do what, and
where ther... |
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- 417 - GSEs and systemic risk. The recommen dations of these reports were insufficiently (or not)
implemen ted. Neither at the time nor later. They were rejected by the financial supervisors. Partly
on the basis of fake -arguments; part ly by keeping silent about them.
16. In th... |
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- 418 - sound. They bragged about themselves. They always gave an optimistic picture of the financial
system, hampering the ri sk management of all actors in the financial system.
25. This applies with minor adaptations to BIS, IMF en OECD.
26. Notwithstanding claims about the g... |
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- 419 - c. Financial dependencies.
11. Repressive signals and/or actions of supposedly authoritative persons or organizations. Especially
the pr esident and government officials (including Congress).
12. Regulation which is fatally deficient. Supervisors have nothing to fear fro... |
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- 420 - The Chronicle showed that supervision failed disastrously. But it also failed with respect to problems
(“accidents”) unrelated to the processes which resulted in the crises. Problems which also would have
occurred if there had been no crisis. Examp les are: DSB (an upstart ... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 420 | 7B. FINANCIAL CRISES - ANALYSIS
- 421 - system was healthy and that the financial institutions worked well. They couldn’t know. And they
didn’t.
The motivatio n for the rose -colored picture presented by the annual reports may be the same as that
of political organizations in general. They want to “prove” that ... |
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