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- 222 - The influence of the tax payer on this process is nil. He has no power. He is not really
represented. As a consequence, distribution problems are “solved” at his cost: by creating
budget deficits, and by creating the need of tax increases.61 Due to inadequate representa... |
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- 223 - Mutual dependencies between the investigating and investigated organizations cause silences
which can easily prevent necessary improvement and correction.
Internal sy stems of control are not independent but part of the hierarchy. The top can use the
system to bette... |
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- 224 - Most people are not aware of what could be regulated differently. Many people wrongly
believe that society cannot be organized better. They don’t realize that already something as
simple as extension of the law for ordinary people to government officials woul d greatly ... |
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- 225 - and ask for correction. They show no efforts to end the misconduct. The reports are as many warnings
against talks on the basis of trust.
The possibilities and failure of integrity officers.
This section presents con clusions of the time the author was still thinki... |
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- 226 - important harmful implications for the organization. Both with respect to th e work climate, human
resources policy, and accountability of expenditure.
In their annual report the integrity officers can propose the SG to supplement the code of conduct
with examples taken... |
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- 227 - Apart from other reasons, when you reflect on what talks should produce, it quickly becomes clear
why they make no sense. The SG and his close associates are almost perfect models of contradictory
words and deeds. The facts show that the SG very well knows what is expect... |
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- 228 - the disastrous failure of the risk management of the North -South metro line pro ject of Amsterdam and
the subprime crisis may be the best known examples. But the most telling support comes from the
excessive government reactions to whistleblowing. Of which the excessiven... |
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- 229 - Useful and necessary, but insufficient.
If only as a warning. The insufficiency of the second class is argued as a preparation against politica l
blah-blah suggesting that they are sufficient.
Conditions which are necessary and possibly sufficient.
The main i... |
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- 230 - rule might be: an equal share for everyone in a given hierarchical line, from the lowest level
involved to the very top.75 The sharing reflects the character of a hierarchical organization.
8. Agreement in group decision making mean s sharing liability. Agreement with th... |
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- 231 - benefits. Policy papers do not one -sidedly stress supposed benefits, but openly discuss costs, risks
and potential negative effects as well. Criticism is taken and treated seriously and professionally.
In genera l, justified criticism has consequences. Failure and succes... |
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- 232 - required, and without the least positive effect. 80 Keeping up appearances by trickery only makes
things worse.
All of the above points are well -known. If they were ignored structurally for more than 10 years,
why should one expect them to be respected as from now? Jus... |
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- 233 - properties, on important events in the course of history, such as wars and crises.
9. Training in information management. Including evaluation of information. Making aware of the
fact that kindness displayed at teatime says nothing at all about people’s integrity and com... |
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- 234 - system for tracking down violations, and for prosecuting and judging violators. Violators are not
punished. In short: the codes are no more than paper. As regards whistleblower regulations: they are
biased to such an extent as to make them useless (or harmful!) in most im... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 234 | 6. ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL OPERATION
- 235 - Because of the generally available evidence about whistleblowers in public administration, the
absence of whistleblowers in many cases where they should have given a warning signal, the silence
about practices as described in the reports, and the general nature of the cau... |
https://digitalcorpora.s3.amazonaws.com/corpora/files/CC-MAIN-2021-31-PDF-UNTRUNCATED/zipfiles/0000-0999/0000.zip | 0000563.pdf | 235 | - 236 -
Governed by Lies
Book 2
The financial crises of 2007 -2013 |
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- 237 - Chapter 7.
The financial crises of 2007 -2013.
Introduction.
The title of this chapter, “The financial crises of 2007 -2013”, plural, refers to the subprime or
liquidity crisis of 2007 -2008, and the crisis of the government debts of Greece and other EU countries ... |
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- 238 - ness in another sense has not been pu rsued. As little attention as possible is given to matters which are
not essential for the explanation of the crises or the refutation of incorrect explanations. Such as details
of “new” financial products.2
In the first instance the ... |
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- 239 - organizations long before the subprime crisis actually took place. How can these two facts be
reconciled? To answer this an d similar questions the Analysis pays ample attention to the functioning
of those parts of public admini stration which had legal duties with respect... |
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- 240 - then on it decreased more or less gradually to about 5% in 2010.
In 1991 -2006 home prices approximately doubled.
In 2004 the BCBS made recommendations for cha nges in the capital requirements of Basel I. The
new set of norms is called Basel II.
In the period unde... |
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- 241 -
August 2007. Countrywide, the USA’s largest mortgage lender at the time, is unable to extend its
loans at the repo market, a vital part of its operations.9 It fails to find the bill ions of dollars it needs to
remain in business. The Fed refuses help. Bank of America com... |
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- 242 - 23/6/09. The Temporary Commission Inquiry Financial System (= Commission De Wit, CDW) is
created by the S econd Chamber of the Dutch parliament. It is asked to answer the following questions:
«What are the causes of the recent turbulent developments in the financial system... |
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- 243 - mortg ages. In the USA and before 2004, this percentage had been constant for many years. Between
2004 and 2007 it increased substantially. It was this increase that started the avalanche that grew into a
financial crisis. For this reason it is crucial to get an idea of t... |
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- 244 - expanded access to housing and increased opportunities for homeownership. We are subject to
government oversight and regulation. Our regulators include the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (“OFHEO”), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), t... |
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- 245 - we provide to the nation's residential housing and mortgage industries. Our charter also determines the
types of mortgage loans that we are permitted to purchase […].
Our mission is defined in our cha rter:
to provide stability in the secondary market for residential m... |
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- 246 - 1957.25
The Treaty of Rome is signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Nether lands,
and UK. They form the European Economic Community (EEC). Its objective was to create a
"common market" to increase economic prosperity and contribute towards "an ever... |
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- 247 - turbulence and the end of the Bretton Woods agreements31 prevent the project from being carried out.
1979. In March 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) is created, to stabilize exchange rates and
counter inflation. It also created the European Monetary Cooperation F... |
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- 248 - Pinto notes and quotes the following:
«Most [people] agree that CRA had very little impact in its early years. Announced CRA
commitments over CRA’s first 15 years from 1977 to 1991 totaled less than $9 billion, with almost
half of this total announced in 1990 and 199... |
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- 249 -
1986.
In February 1986 the Single European Act formalized political co -operation within the EC
including competency in monetary policy.38
1988.
In Basel, Switzerland, the national supervisors of the financial system approved an agreement
about capital requi... |
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- 250 -
The ye ar 1988 provides a telltale example of the functioning of the CRA:
«In 1988 the holding company for Union National Bank, a large bank headquartered in Pittsburgh,
requested approval from the Federal Reserve for its merger with Pennbancorp…. Through flexibl e
loa... |
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- 251 - The proposed stages were:
1. Complete the internal market and remove restrictions on further financial integration
(1990 -94);
2. Establish the European Monetary Institute to strengthen central bank cooperation and
prepare for t he European System of Central Banks (ESCB... |
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- 252 - Significant and substantial problems would remain for the poorest families in society. At the same
time, however, the regulatory barriers that now exist are exacerbating the problems of the poor. The
Commission believes that a serious effort to reduce regulatory barriers i... |
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- 253 -
What is measure d How it is measured Convergence criteria
Price stability Harmonised consumer price inflation
rate In the year before admission to euro
not more than 1.5 percentage points
above the rate of the three best
performing EU countries
Sound public finan... |
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- 254 - 1. The Low - and Moderate -Income Housing Goal: loans to borrowers with incomes at or below
the median income for the market area in which they live;
2. The Special Affordable Goal: loans to very low -income borrowers (those with incomes at or
below 60 percent of the are... |
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- 255 -
Affordable housing goals HUD
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008LMIb Sab Ua
Pinto gives the following explanation for the above stipulations in the new GSE law:
«In 1992 the interests of Fannie, community groups, and Congress conver ged re... |
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- 256 - which h e accepted the nomination of the Republican party for the presidency of the USA - his second
term- he said the following:
«Another priority for a new term is to build an ownership society, because ownership brings
security, and dignity, and independence.
Thanks... |
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- 257 - example the financial institutions.80 The following gives an impression of the substantiation:
«More and more, regulators looked to financial institutions to police themselves —“deregulation”
was the label. Former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: “The market -... |
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- 258 - «Two lessons should have been learned. First, high LTV lending suffers disproportionately high
default rates when home prices come unde r stress. Second, FHA lending with its broader use of
loosened lending standards, experiences an even higher default rate.»88
Pinto show... |
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- 259 - Achieving this balance will require unprecedented cooperation among U.S. and foreign regulators,
market participants, and members of the accounting profession. GAO makes recommendations
designed to help Congress, the regulators, and the industry address this issue.»94
T... |
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- 260 - Develop and adopt a consistent set of capital standards for OTC derivatives dealers
sufficient to ensure that all of the major risks associated with derivatives as well as legally
enforceable netting agreements are reflected in capital.
Establish specific requirement... |
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- 261 - «HUD’s Best Practices Initiative was agreed to by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America
and undertaken by HUD in 1994 after HUD threatened t o go to Congress to get CRA broadened to
apply to mortgage bankers.»98
«Countrywide […] would ultimately announce $1 trillion... |
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- 262 - downpayment. By August 1994, low downpayment mortgage loans had increased to 29 percent.»105
Pinto concludes that in 1992 -1995 HUD succeeded to change the mortgage market radically.
According to him, its success was made possib le by the following four factors:
1. «Th... |
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- 263 - require that GAO study the speculative uses of derivatives and the feasibilit y of imposing taxes
and margin requirements on speculative derivatives activity;
establish principles and standards related to accounting, customer suitability, and risk
management;
req... |
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- 264 - ratios, entered the “A -minus” and “B” subprime market and re -entered the low doc/no doc market. »114,
115
On 17/6/97 the Amsterdam EU summit approves a Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP is an
agreement among the EU member states to facilitate and maintain the s... |
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- 265 - were rational, we are likely to find, with the adoption of flexible underwriting standards, that we are
merely encouraging banks to make unsound loans. If this is the case, current policy will not have
helped its intended beneficiar ies if in future years they are disposse... |
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- 266 - is unnecessary.”»123
September 1998 was the month of the LTCM near -crisis.124 Between January and Septe mber 1998,
LTCM, one of the largest US hedge funds, lost almost 90 percent of its capital.125 The main events of
the mini -crisis can be summarized as follows:
J... |
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- 267 - November Stake of the 16 original partners valued at $30 million (as against $1.6 billion at
the beginning of the year).
(All dates refer to 1998).
The above summary is based on the Chronology of Events on pp. 3 9-40/41 -2 of the GAO report
LTCM: Regulators Need to ... |
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- 268 - (cheques, transfers, bank cards). Payments to tax and social security aut horities can be made in
national currency or euros: there is no prohibition and no compulsion regarding the use of the single
currency.130 Financial markets changed immediately.131
1999.
«FHA ... |
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- 269 - “Under the higher goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will buy an additional $488.3 billion in
mortgages that will be used to provide affordable housing for 7 million more low - and moderate -
income families over the next 10 years. Those new mortgages and families are over ... |
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- 270 - The Working Group will be monitoring and assess ing the effectiveness of the measures outlined
above. If further evidence emerges that indirect regulation of currently unregulated market participants
is not effective in constraining excessive leverage, there are several ma... |
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- 271 - 13. Regulators Recommended Limited Expansion of SEC and CFTC Authority Over Activities of
Affiliates of Broker -Dealers and FCMs, but Regulatory Gap Would Remain;
14. Expanding SEC and CFTC Authority Over Affiliates Would Raise Controversial Issues.»
The following pa... |
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- 272 - CFTC.144
«As the draft report indicates, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) recently
issued a report that made several recommendations in light of this episode. These recommendations
include action to promote greater disclosure of information - b... |
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- 273 - «However, such oversight is not currently applied to all financial institutions that can originate or
transmit risk and does not include effective ways to monitor and assess risks that cut across
markets.»148
SEC.149
«As the scop e of trading and credit activities co... |
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- 274 - information voluntarily.»150
Treasury.151
«The draft report recommends that the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and the
CFTC "develop ways to coordinate the assessment of risks that cross traditional regulatory and
industry boundaries." We believe that ... |
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- 275 - 15%, from 2000 -2006 it falls from 15 to 2%.157
«On 19 June 2000 during the summit in Santa Maria da Feira the ECOFIN Council confirmed that
Greece had fulfilled the necessary conditions to adopt the single currency as of 1 January 2001. The
Council based its decision ... |
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- 276 - (i) promoting mortgage consumer rights, including broader, more equal access to lowest -cost
mortgage credit;
(ii) fighting mortgage discrimination and leading the housing market in serving minority
families, including a pledge to provide $420 billion i n financing for 3... |
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- 277 - «Your CRA business is very important to us. Since 1997, we have done nearly $7 billion in
specially targeted CRA business —all with depositories like yours. But that is just the beginning.
Before the decade is over, Fannie Mae is committed to finance over $20 billion in sp... |
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- 278 -
Unemployment 1981-2010
OECD countries with largest GDP
0510152025
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
YearPercent of civilian labour forceUnited States
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Spain
Unemployment 1981-2010
Minor early euro countries
0246810... |
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- 279 - increased (much) faster than incomes. See the following graph.168 Homes became less affordable. It is
moreover plausible that parts of the mortgage market became saturated, and that it was impossible to
sell more mortg ages under the “old” conditions. So these were (additi... |
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- 280 - On 30/3/01 Fannie Mae published an Information statement. For the year 2000 Fannie doesn’t have
an annual report or a 10K form. The Information statement seems to be meant as a substi tute.169 On p.
46 of the statement Fannie reports that it has been able to exceed the HU... |
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- 281 - Franklin Raines proclaimed, the federally -chartered corporation is running 'neck and neck' with the
Federal Housing Administration as the chief source of public funding for housing.”
“The government is our only competitor,” Mr. Raine s said.
The absurdity of a governme... |
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- 282 - owners for failure. It is unsustainable at the neighborhood level – as foreclosures spread they destroy
neighborhoods.
In 2003 Countrywide was the nation’s 8 th largest subprime lender with a 6% market share. By
2006 it was #3 with a 6.8% share of a subprime market that ... |
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- 283 - have no excuse for ignorance and inaction.186
Note that the quote implicitly shows an essent ial lack of information/ transparency, and that this
lack makes the supervisors half blind or worse. CGFS understands that large risks exist, but due to
lack of information it can... |
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- 284 - generally. At the time the Federal Housing Enterprises Safety and Soundness Enhance ment Act of
1992 was enacted, the outstanding debt of Fannie Mae was about one -fifth, and that of Freddie Mac
was about one -twentieth, of the levels at year -end 2001. In addition, the En... |
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- 285 - A search for “risicotran” a nd “deriva” in DNB’s Annual report 2004 gives no results. There is no
report about the “first results” promised in the last quote. But in the Annual report 2005 a search for
“deriva” yields interesting results. They are presented and discussed i... |
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- 286 - contained risks, but didn’t know their size, we didn’t know where the tail started, and didn’t know
what the tail looked like.»
But you will never know, and need not know. If you think you need to know everything you are not
suitable for your function.204 What matters i... |
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- 287 -
As from 2003 the 10K forms of Fanny Mae unambiguously note that the affordable housing goals
of HUD can only be realized by reduction of the mortgage requirements, and by taking larger risks.
HUD did not react with downward adjustm ents of the goals, but with increa... |
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- 288 - report. HUD ignored them. Though none of the documents in the dossier of this chapter shows any
counter arguments.209
The following tables show the decline of the profitability of Fannie and Freddie in 200 3-2007. The
amounts are in B$. For the notes please see the ori... |
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- 289 - Internal Controls
Internal Audit
Internal Accounting
Risk Management Transactions
Oversight and Reporting
The Board of Directors of Freddie Mac has elected a new chairman and hired a number of senior
executives as its new management team.»214
At Fanni... |
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- 290 - In June Basel II was published. Basel II is the agreement of the BCBS about a revised frame work
for capital measurement and capital standards; “revised” with respect to Basel I. The US Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) says the following about the motives for Bas... |
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- 291 - the enterprises."»221
On 1/11/04 HUD issues a press release about higher housing goals for the GSEs for the coming
years:
«These new affordable housing goals will help the GSEs achieve the standard that Congress
intended - leading the mortgage finance i ndustry in hel... |
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- 292 - interpreted as just as many risks and warnings. The first 13 are addressed to market participan ts, the
last 4 to supervisors:
«Recommendation 14: Aggregate information
The efforts of the Committee on the Global Financial System to develop mechanisms that better
iden... |
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- 293 - "[Appraisers] did help create fictitious equity and were complicit in facilitating trillions of
dollars of loans that never should have been made. There are varying degrees of valuation
inflation performed by appraisers. On the lighter side, there was just the grey area w... |
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- 294 - have differences, the key areas that need significant remedial attention are similar: accounting
systems, i nternal controls, risk management, human resources, corporate governance and growth.
Due to the findings of operational inadequacies at both Fannie Mae and Freddie ... |
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- 295 -
As long as the mortgage rate decreased and home prices increased, th e consequences of inability to
pay interest and amortization were relatively small. If necessary, the debt could be paid by sale of the
home. If home prices decrease, sale may saddle the homeowner ... |
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- 296 -
In 2006 the number of people that couldn’t pay the costs of their mortgage in time started to
increase rather dramatically. As a consequence, the supply of houses increased, and ho me prices
decreased further. Hampering solution of mortgage problems.242 Another conseq... |
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- 297 - warnings of the GSEs co uld be ignored. This while the market developments at least suggested that
the remarks and warnings of the GSEs were justified. To give an example of these remarks and
warnings I give two quotes from the Annual report 2006 of Freddie Mac.248 The fir... |
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- 298 - expected,” said [Director] Lockhart. “A key ind icator of a successful remediation will be the timely
filing of annual and quarterly financial statements by each company with a clean audit opinion based
on a controls -based audit. I am pleased to report that both companie... |
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- 299 - into being to make sure that those responsible for risky activities comply with the conditions and/or
norms. Together the conditions and supervision more or less replace liability.259
In general active causes can be seen. More or less by definition. Passive causes on the o... |
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- 300 - activity is expected to diminish later this year.»264
The other supervisors are now considered in alphabetical order.
DNB, Annual report 2006.265 DNB describes its mission as follows:
«DNB upholds “financial stability” and thereby actively contributes to the welfare... |
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- 301 - increasing debt ratio’s, the low long term interest rate, and the low risk premiums. These phenomena
increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Due to these circumstances monetary policy has not
become simpler.
All in all 2006 was a good year. But because of man... |
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- 302 - and management by financial institutions.» 276
This is not followed by a report about advice or recommendations given, or actions taken or
planned. Whil e one of the few recommendations of CRMPG II directed at supervisors was addressed
to exactly this and similar problems... |
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- 303 - «The mission of t he Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is, and always has been, super -
vision. We supervise all types of banks in all parts of the country, from the smallest community banks
to the trillion dollar “megabanks,” from “ag” banks to credit card banks, a... |
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- 304 - P. 10 enumerates 10 “Fiscal year 2006 highlights”. In the context of this study highlight number 8
seems the most informative:
«Fully implemented supervision by risk for both large a nd community national banks. Effective
supervision tailored examinations to risks presen... |
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- 305 - • About the OTS;
• Year in Review
• OTS Regions;
• OTS Operations.
The first of the Strategic Focal Points is:
«1 Consolidated Supervision.
The OTS utilizes a flexible and seamless approach to its supervisory oversight. Thrift holding
companies and affiliates, ... |
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- 306 - «Despite these pressures, earnings for the year were positive and capital levels remained strong.»293
The second subsection concerns:
«Risk Modelling.
[…] OTS r ecently completed a major enhancement to the Net Portfolio Value (NPV) Model and
began producing new reports... |
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- 307 -
The Message from the chairman , Christopher Cox, is dated November 2006. It covers two pages. It
opens with the fo llowing:
«The prosperity of 300 million Americans and six billion people around the world relies on
trustworthy U.S. capital markets. If you’re a working ... |
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- 308 - These conclusions cannot be logically inferred from the evidence presented.303
For more comprehensive analyses of supervisors, and for similar analysis of BIS, IMF and OECD,
the re ader is referred to the appendices.
A comparison of successive annual reports of 2006 -2... |
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- 309 -
Legend. «Each ABX index is based on a basket of 20 credit default swaps referencing asset -backed
securities containing subprime mortgages of different ratings. An investor seeking to insure against the
default of the underlying securities pays a periodic fee (spre... |
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- 310 - safely ), and with whom this was too risky. The uncertainty (opaqueness) didn’t really increase, but all
of a sudden it became vitally important. Bankers became increasingly more fearful of doing business
with colleagues of other institutions. Of course especiall y with re... |
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- 311 - 31/7/07 they filed for bankruptcy. The fund managers were criminally charged with fraud in their
communication with investors. They were acquitted. The SEC filed a civil lawsuit against them.315 On
p. 127 of its fiscal year 2013 Agency Financial Report the SEC repor ts as ... |
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- 312 - value to provide enough collateral. The bank needed billions, but couldn’t find them. It asked the Fed
for assistance, but the Fed refused. Bank of America comes to the rescue. In October it took over
Countrywide.321
In 2007 the Standard & P oors 500, an index for the v... |
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- 313 - accounting losses —but not necessarily cash losses —if investor sentiment were to turn against
securitized mortgages and market values decline.
Accordingly, once large numbers of delinquencies and losses started showing up in the mortgage
markets generally and in the mo... |
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- 314 - Since the passage of CRA in 1977, lenders an d community organizations have signed over 446 CRA
agreements totaling more than $4.5 trillion in reinvestment dollars flowing to minority and lower
income neighborhoods.»330, 331
Aggregated CRA commitments in billion US$
01... |
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- 315 - Chapter 16 of th e FCIC report gives an impression of the situation.333 Most of the people involved
were insufficiently prepared for the new situation. There must have been a psychic difficulty: after
having worked for many years in a climate of tremendous growth and relat... |
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- 316 - bank told the SEC that it would no t be able to function normally on Friday, the next business day.
Sunday 16/3/08 the bank was taken over by JP Morgan, which was helped with loans and guarantees
by the New York Fed. The FCIC concludes:
«The Commission concludes [that] ... |
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- 317 - $22 billion and $15 billion short of cash, respectively; each had only 78% of the liquidity it would
need under the stress scenario.
The Fed’s internal report on the stress tests criticized Merrill’s “significant amount of illiquid fixed
income assets” and noted that... |
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- 318 - words: trouble was only a matter of time, of waiting. After all, the experience of centuries tells us tha t
(“unexpected”) set -backs are the rule, not the exception. It is not reasonable to assume that the winds
are always favorable. (And to ignore warnings).
In Novembe... |
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- 319 - also emphasized that it was “seriously concerned about the current level of Fannie Mae’s capital” if
the housing market decline continued. »354
It seems incomprehensible that this could be signed by somebody who knew ab out the inquiry of
the Fed, OCC and Morgan Stanley.... |
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- 320 - mismanage ment of the GSEs and the high risk of their products.364
In retrospect, some of those involved offer explanations, though not of OFHE Os or their own
silence of years:
«When interviewed by the FCIC, FHFA officials were very critical of Fannie’s management. John... |
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- 321 - Lehman.370
On 10/9/08 Lehman reported a loss of B$ 4 for the third quarter. This further reduced confidence,
and stimulated their business relat ions to minimize their exposure to Lehman.
On Thursday 11/9/08 J P Morgan asked Lehman to deposit B$ 5 cash collateral before... |
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