| name,TTP
|
| A Threat Group-3390 tool can encrypt payloads using XOR. Threat Group-3390 malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit
|
| "A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence. Additionally, a Turla custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.",T1547.001
|
| "APT-C-36 campaign architecture has included image hosting sites, Pastebin, Discord, GitHub, Google Drive, BitBucket, and Dropbox.",T1583.006
|
| "APT-C-36 has customized existing malware with new capabilities including njRAT, AsyncRAT, LimeRAT, and BitRAT.",T1587.001
|
| APT-C-36 has disguised malicious executables to appear as legitimate files.,T1036.005
|
| "APT-C-36 has gathered information on Colombian financial institutions, including Bancolombia, BBVA, Banco Caja Social, and Davivienda to craft phishing pages.",T1593
|
| APT-C-36 has generated email content impersonating official notifications and documents that direct victims to execute malicious payloads.,T1683.001
|
| APT-C-36 has incorporated virtual private servers (VPS) into its operational infrastructure.,T1583.003
|
| APT-C-36 has prompted victims to open attachments and to accept macros in order to execute the subsequent payload. APT-C-36 has also lured victims into opening malicious files hosted on Google Drive that triggered WebDAV requests to download malware.,T1204.002
|
| APT-C-36 has regularly used compromised email accounts in spearphishing campaigns.,T1586.002
|
| "APT-C-36 has sent emails containing a link that appear to lead to an urgent notification from a government institution, at times using URL shorteners like cort.as, acortaurl.com, and gtly.to.",T1566.002
|
| APT-C-36 has set the ShowWindow property of the Win32_ProcessStartup object to zero to hide PowerShell execution.,T1564.003
|
| "APT-C-36 has used DDNS services such as DuckDNS, noip.com, and con-ip.com to redirect victims to sites or repositories hosting malware implants.",T1568
|
| APT-C-36 has used PowerShell in malware execution including as part of fileless attack chains to download additional payloads.,T1059.001
|
| APT-C-36 has used VBScript for initial malware deployment including within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.,T1059.005
|
| APT-C-36 has used a compromised account to send a phishing email to an address likely used and monitored by the IT team within the same targeted organization.,T1534
|
| APT-C-36 has used compromised Google Drive accounts including one associated with a Colombian government organization.,T1586.003
|
| "APT-C-36 has used encoded and obfuscated files, images, and executables.",T1027.013
|
| APT-C-36 has used junk characters to obfuscate malicious scripts.,T1027.016
|
| APT-C-36 has used phishing pages appearing like legitimate banking login portals to compromise credentials.,T1683.002
|
| APT-C-36 has used process hollowing to execute malware in the memory of legitimate processes.,T1055.012
|
| APT-C-36 has used spearphishing emails with malicious .pdf and .docx files and password protected RAR attachments to avoid being detected by the email gateway.,T1566.001
|
| "APT-C-36 has used steganography to hide malicious code, typically in the resource section of executable files.",T1027.003
|
| "APT-C-36 has utilized well known malware including the Packer-as-a-Service HeartCrypt, PureCrypter, and open-source RATs such as Remcos.",T1588.001
|
| APT-C-36 utilizes tools well known in crime communities and has obtained and used a modified variant of Imminent Monitor.,T1588.002
|
| APT1 gathered a list of running processes on the system using tasklist /v.,T1057
|
| APT1 used the ipconfig /all command to gather network configuration information.,T1016
|
| APT1 used the net use command to get a listing on network connections.,T1049
|
| APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a listing of the services on the system.,T1007
|
| APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key.,T1547.001
|
| APT19 used Base64 to obfuscate executed commands.,T1027.010
|
| APT19 used Base64 to obfuscate payloads.,T1027.013
|
| "APT28 added ""junk data"" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a ""junk length"" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of the command protocol on the wire.",T1001.001
|
| "APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe ""C:\Windows\twain_64.dll"". APT28 also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An APT28 loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload.",T1218.011
|
| APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits. APT28 used reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) against government websites to redirect users to phishing webpages.,T1189
|
| APT28 has conducted credential phishing campaigns with links that redirect to credential harvesting sites.,T1598.003
|
| APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload.,T1546.015
|
| APT28 has used a Wi-Fi Pineapple to set up Evil Twin Wi-Fi Poisoning for the purposes of capturing victim credentials or planting espionage-oriented malware.,T1557.004
|
| APT28 has used large language models (LLMs) to assist in script development and deployment.,T1596
|
| APT28 has used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about satellite capabilities.,T1591
|
| "APT28 has used several malicious applications to steal user OAuth access tokens including applications masquerading as ""Google Defender"" ""Google Email Protection,"" and ""Google Scanner"" for Gmail users. They also targeted Yahoo users with applications masquerading as ""Delivery Service"" and ""McAfee Email Protection"".",T1528
|
| APT28 has used the Office Test persistence mechanism within Microsoft Office by adding the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf to execute code.,T1137.002
|
| APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns.,T1583.003
|
| "APT29 has collected emails from targeted mailboxes within a compromised Azure AD tenant and compromised Exchange servers, including via Exchange Web Services (EWS) API requests.",T1114.002
|
| "APT29 has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations.",T1199
|
| APT29 has compromised email accounts to further enable phishing campaigns and taken control of dormant accounts.,T1586.002
|
| APT29 has disabled Purview Audit on targeted accounts prior to stealing emails from Microsoft 365 tenants.,T1685.002
|
| APT29 has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised networks.,T1105
|
| "APT29 has enrolled their own devices into compromised cloud tenants, including enrolling a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account.",T1098.005
|
| "APT29 has exploited CVE-2019-19781 for Citrix, CVE-2019-11510 for Pulse Secure VPNs, CVE-2018-13379 for FortiGate VPNs, and CVE-2019-9670 in Zimbra software to gain access.",T1190
|
| APT29 has hijacked legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable malware to execute on system startup.,T1037
|
| "APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.",T1583.006
|
| APT29 has renamed malicious DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign; they have also created an Azure AD certificate with a Common Name that matched the display name of the compromised service principal.,T1036.005
|
| APT29 has stolen data from compromised hosts.,T1005
|
| APT29 has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines.,T1651
|
| APT29 has used Dynamic DNS providers for their malware C2 infrastructure.,T1568
|
| APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks.,T1070.004
|
| APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization
|
| APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix.,T1133
|
| APT29 has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to CozyCar installations to download and install SeaDuke.,T1059.001
|
| APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.,T1053.005
|
| APT29 has used the `reg save` command to extract LSA secrets offline.,T1003.004
|
| APT29 has used the `reg save` command to save registry hives.,T1003.002
|
| APT29 has used timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps on their web shells to match other files in the same directory.,T1070.006
|
| APT29 has used unique malware in many of their operations.,T1587.001
|
| APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.,T1204.001
|
| APT29 used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.,T1047
|
| APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints as proxies for defense evasion and network access.,T1090.002
|
| "APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints, typically within the same ISP IP address range, as proxies to hide the true source of C2 traffic.",T1665
|
| "APT29 uses stolen tokens to access victim accounts, without needing a password.",T1528
|
| APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.,T1574.001
|
| APT3 has been known to use -WindowStyle Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
|
| "APT3 has used a tool to dump credentials by injecting itself into lsass.exe and triggering with the argument ""dig.""",T1003.001
|
| APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.,T1546.008
|
| APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators.,T1087.001
|
| APT32 has cleared select event log entries.,T1685.005
|
| "APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group ""Domain Controllers"" /domain. The group has also used the ping command.",T1018
|
| "APT32 has performed code obfuscation, including encoding payloads using Base64 and using a framework called ""Dont-Kill-My-Cat (DKMC). APT32 also encrypts the library used for network exfiltration with AES-256 in CBC mode in their macOS backdoor.",T1027.013
|
| "APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name ""install_flashplayer.exe"".",T1036.004
|
| APT32 has used the `Invoke-Obfuscation` framework to obfuscate their PowerShell.,T1027.010
|
| "APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).",T1574.001
|
| APT32 used the ipconfig /all command to gather the IP address from the system.,T1016
|
| APT32
|
| APT37 has used malware that will issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR.,T1529
|
| "APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments. Additionally, APT38 has used malicious Word documents and shortcut files.",T1204.002
|
| APT38 has created a mutex to avoid duplicate execution.,T1480.002
|
| APT38 has created fake domains to imitate legitimate venture capital or bank domains.,T1583.001
|
| APT38 has injected malicious payloads into the `explorer.exe` process.,T1055
|
| APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion.,T1036.006
|
| "APT38 has renamed system utilities, such as `rundll32.exe` and `mshta.exe`, to avoid detection.",T1036.003
|
| APT38 has unhooked DLLs to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or anti-virus (AV) tools.,T1685
|
| APT38 has used ISO and VHD files to deploy malware and to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security measures.,T1553.005
|
| "APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. Additionally, APT38 has used living-off-the-land scripts to execute a malicious script via a scheduled task.",T1053.005
|
| APT38 has used `msiexec.exe` to execute malicious files.,T1218.007
|
| "APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim's machine. Additionally, APT38 has used batch scripts.",T1059.003
|
| APT38 has used a renamed version of `mshta.exe` to execute malicious HTML files.,T1218.005
|
| APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script.,T1204.001
|
| APT38 has used the RC4 algorithm to decrypt configuration data.,T1140
|
| "APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim's machine. Additionally, APT38 has downloaded other payloads onto a victim's machine.",T1105
|
| APT39 has used malware to set LoadAppInit_DLLs in the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows in order to establish persistence.,T1546.010
|
| APT39 has used malware to turn off the RequireSigned feature which ensures only signed DLLs can be run on Windows.,T1553.006
|
| APT41 cloned victim user Git repositories during intrusions.,T1213.003
|
| "APT41 created a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration. Additionally, APT41 used the makecab.exe utility to both download tools, such as NATBypass, to the victim network and to archive a file for exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence. APT41 added a registry key in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.,T1547.001
|
| "APT41 developed a custom injector that enables an Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass, making malicious processes invisible to Windows logging.",T1685
|
| "APT41 exploited CVE-2020-10189 against Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central through unsafe deserialization, and CVE-2019-19781 to compromise Citrix Application Delivery Controllers (ADC) and gateway devices. APT41 leveraged vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon exploitation or SQL injection for initial access. APT41 exploited CVE-2021-26855 against a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server to gain initial access to the victim network.",T1190
|
| "APT41 extracted user account data from the Security Account Managerr (SAM), making a copy of this database from the registry using the reg save command or by exploiting volume shadow copies.",T1003.002
|
| APT41 has added user accounts to the User and Admin groups.,T1098.007
|
| "APT41 has enumerated IP addresses of network resources and used the netstat command as part of network reconnaissance. The group has also used a malware variant, HIGHNOON, to enumerate active RDP sessions.",T1049
|
| "APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims, perhaps to return architecture related information.",T1083
|
| "APT41 has executed whoami commands, including using the WMIEXEC utility to execute this on remote machines.",T1033
|
| "APT41 has transferred implant files using Windows Admin Shares and the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, then executes files through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).",T1021.002
|
| APT41 has used MiPing to discover active systems in the victim network.,T1018
|
| "APT41 has used hashdump, Mimikatz, Procdump, and the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate to other user accounts.",T1003.001
|
| "APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti for Windows. APT41 has also used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.",T1574.001
|
| APT41 impersonated an employee at a video game developer company to send phishing emails.,T1684.001
|
| APT41 leverages various tools and frameworks to brute-force directories on web servers.,T1595.003
|
| APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations.,T1012
|
| APT41 transfers post-exploitation files dividing the payload into fixed-size chunks to evade detection.,T1030
|
| APT41 used net group commands to enumerate various Windows user groups and permissions.,T1069
|
| APT41 used Linux shell commands for system survey and information gathering prior to exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-19871.,T1059.004
|
| APT41 used RDP for lateral movement. APT41 used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.,T1021.001
|
| APT41 used a ransomware called Encryptor RaaS to encrypt files on the targeted systems and provide a ransom note to the user. APT41 also used Microsoft Bitlocker to encrypt workstations and Jetico
|
| APT41 used built-in net commands to enumerate domain administrator users.,T1087.002
|
| APT41 used built-in net commands to enumerate local administrator groups.,T1087.001
|
| APT41 used ntdsutil to obtain a copy of the victim environment ntds.dit file.,T1003.003
|
| APT41 used scheduled tasks created via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy ransomware.,T1484.001
|
| APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.,T1135
|
| "APT41 used the Acunetix SQL injection vulnerability scanner in target reconnaissance operations, as well as the JexBoss tool to identify vulnerabilities in Java applications.",T1595.002
|
| APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and `net config Workstation` to enumerate victim system basic configuration information.,T1082
|
| APT41 uses packers such as Themida to obfuscate malicious files.,T1027.002
|
| APT41 uses tools such as Mimikatz to enable lateral movement via captured password hashes.,T1550.002
|
| APT42 has created email accounts to use in spearphishing operations.,T1585.002
|
| APT42 has downloaded and executed PowerShell payloads.,T1059.001
|
| APT42 has encoded C2 traffic with Base64.,T1132.001
|
| "APT42 has intercepted SMS-based one-time passwords and has set up two-factor authentication. Additionally, APT42 has used cloned or fake websites to capture MFA tokens.",T1111
|
| "APT42 has leveraged LLMs to search for official emails to build target lists, and conduct reconnaissance on potential business partners.",T1682
|
| APT42 has masqueraded the VINETHORN payload as a VPN application.,T1036.005
|
| "APT42 has registered domains, several of which masqueraded as news outlets and login services, for use in operations.",T1583.001
|
| APT42 has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check for anti-virus products.,T1518.001
|
| APT42 has used a VBScript to query anti-virus products.,T1059.005
|
| APT42 has used custom malware to log keystrokes.,T1056.001
|
| APT42 has used custom malware to steal credentials.,T1555.003
|
| APT42 has used custom malware to steal login and cookie data from common browsers.,T1539
|
| "APT42 has used its infrastructure for C2 and for staging the VINETHORN payload, which masqueraded as a VPN application.",T1608.001
|
| "APT42 has used malware, such as GHAMBAR and POWERPOST, to collect system information.",T1082
|
| "APT42 has used malware, such as GHAMBAR and POWERPOST, to take screenshots.",T1113
|
| APT42 has used scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
|
| "APT42 has used various links, such as links with typo-squatted domains, links to Dropbox files and links to fake Google sites, in spearphishing operations.",T1102
|
| APT5 has accessed Microsoft M365 cloud environments using stolen credentials.,T1078.004
|
| APT5 has acquired a network of compromised systems - specifically an ORB (operational relay box) network - for follow on activities.,T1583.005
|
| APT5 has copied and exfiltrated the SAM Registry hive from targeted systems.,T1003.002
|
| APT5 has created their own accounts with Local Administrator privileges to maintain access to systems with short-cycle credential rotation.,T1098.007
|
| APT5 has deleted scripts and web shells to evade detection.,T1070.004
|
| APT5 has exploited vulnerabilities in externally facing software and devices including Pulse Secure VPNs and Citrix Application Delivery Controllers.,T1190
|
| APT5 has installed multiple web shells on compromised servers including on Pulse Secure VPN appliances.,T1505.003
|
| APT5 has made modifications to the crontab file including in `/var/cron/tabs/`.,T1053.003
|
| APT5 has modified file timestamps.,T1070.006
|
| APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.,T1021.001
|
| APT5 has named exfiltration archives to mimic Windows Updates at times using filenames with a `KB.zip` pattern.,T1036.005
|
| APT5 has staged data on compromised systems prior to exfiltration often in `C:\Users\Public`.,T1074.001
|
| APT5 has used PowerShell to accomplish tasks within targeted environments.,T1059.001
|
| APT5 has used SSH for lateral movement in compromised environments including for enabling access to ESXi host servers.,T1021.004
|
| APT5 has used legitimate account credentials to move laterally through compromised environments.,T1078.002
|
| APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to collect data on web requests from Pulse Secure Connect logs.,T1049
|
| "APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to discover files with .css, .jpg, .png, .gif, .ico, .js, and .jsp extensions in Pulse Secure Connect logs.",T1083
|
| APT5 has used the BLOODMINE utility to parse and extract information from Pulse Secure Connect logs.,T1654
|
| APT5 has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to alter its functionality.,T1055
|
| APT5 has used the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files located at `/home/runtime/logs`.,T1070
|
| Agrius downloaded some payloads for follow-on execution from legitimate filesharing services such as ufile.io and easyupload.io.,T1570
|
| Agrius dumped the SAM file on victim machines to capture credentials.,T1003.002
|
| Agrius engaged in password spraying via SMB in victim environments.,T1110.003
|
| Agrius engaged in various brute forcing activities via SMB in victim environments.,T1110
|
| "Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers.",T1041
|
| Agrius exploits public-facing applications for initial access to victim environments. Examples include widespread attempts to exploit CVE-2018-13379 in FortiOS devices and SQL injection activity.,T1190
|
| Agrius has deployed IPsec Helper malware post-exploitation and registered it as a service for persistence.,T1543.003
|
| "Agrius has used the folder, C:\\windows\\temp\\s\\, to stage data for exfiltration.",T1074.001
|
| Agrius tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts. Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.,T1021.001
|
| Agrius typically deploys a variant of the ASPXSpy web shell following initial access via exploitation.,T1505.003
|
| Agrius used 7zip to archive extracted data in preparation for exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| "Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information.",T1119
|
| "Agrius used several mechanisms to try to disable security tools. Agrius attempted to modify EDR-related services to disable auto-start on system reboot. Agrius used a publicly available driver, GMER64.sys typically used for anti-rootkit functionality, to selectively stop and remove security software processes.",T1685
|
| "Agrius used the Plink tool for tunneling and connections to remote machines, renaming it systems.exe in some instances.",T1036
|
| "Agrius used the tool NBTscan to scan for remote, accessible hosts in victim environments.",T1018
|
| Akira deletes administrator accounts in victim networks prior to encryption.,T1531
|
| Akira encrypts files in victim environments as part of ransomware operations.,T1486
|
| "Akira engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.",T1657
|
| Akira has disabled or modified security tools for defense evasion.,T1685
|
| Akira has used PowerShell scripts for credential harvesting and privilege escalation.,T1059.001
|
| Akira has used RDP for lateral movement.,T1021.001
|
| Akira have used scripts to dump Kerberos authentication credentials.,T1558
|
| Akira uses legitimate utilities such as AnyDesk and PuTTy for maintaining remote access to victim environments.,T1219
|
| Akira uses software such as Advanced IP Scanner and MASSCAN to identify remote hosts within victim networks.,T1018
|
| Akira uses the built-in Nltest utility or tools such as AdFind to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.,T1482
|
| Akira uses utilities such as WinRAR to archive data prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| "Akira uses valid account information to remotely access victim networks, such as VPN credentials.",T1078
|
| Akira will exfiltrate victim data using applications such as Rclone.,T1567.002
|
| An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.,T1547.001
|
| An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.,T1037.001
|
| An APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.,T1140
|
| "An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn ""mysc"" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru ""System"".",T1053.005
|
| "An APT3 downloader first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913; once the server response is verified, it then requests a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81.",T1104
|
| "An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command ""cmd.exe"" /C whoami. The group also uses a tool to execute commands on remote computers.",T1059.003
|
| Andariel has used tasklist to enumerate processes and find a specific string.,T1057
|
| Andariel has used the netstat -naop tcp command to display TCP connections on a victim
|
| AppleJeus has used spearphishing emails to distribute malicious payloads.,T1566
|
| Aquatic Panda captured local Windows security event log data from victim machines using the wevtutil utility to extract contents to an evtx output file.,T1005
|
| Aquatic Panda cleared command history in Linux environments to remove traces of activity after operations.,T1070.003
|
| Aquatic Panda created new Windows services for persistence that masqueraded as legitimate Windows services via name change.,T1543.003
|
| "Aquatic Panda created new, malicious services using names such as Windows User Service to attempt to blend in with legitimate items on victim systems.",T1036.004
|
| Aquatic Panda enumerated logs related to authentication in Linux environments prior to deleting selective entries for defense evasion purposes.,T1654
|
| Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.,T1685
|
| "Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load `exe`, `dll`, and `dat` files into memory. Aquatic Panda loaded a malicious DLL into the legitimate Windows Security Health Service executable (SecurityHealthService.exe) to execute malicious code on victim systems.",T1574.001
|
| "Aquatic Panda has used several publicly available tools, including WinRAR and 7zip, to compress collected files and memory dumps prior to exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.,T1021.001
|
| Aquatic Panda modified the ld.so preload file in Linux environments to enable persistence for Winnti malware.,T1574.006
|
| "Aquatic Panda modified the victim registry to enable the `RestrictedAdmin` mode feature, allowing for pass the hash behaviors to function via RDP.",T1112
|
| Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments.,T1047
|
| Aquatic Panda used malicious shell scripts in Linux environments following access via SSH to install Linux versions of Winnti malware.,T1059.004
|
| Aquatic Panda used remote shares to enable lateral movement in victim environments.,T1021.002
|
| Aquatic Panda used rundll32.exe to proxy execution of a malicious DLL file identified as a keylogging binary.,T1218.011
|
| Aquatic Panda used the last command in Linux environments to identify recently logged-in users on victim machines.,T1087
|
| "BRONZE BUTLER downloader code has included ""0"" characters at the end of the file to inflate the file size in a likely attempt to evade anti-virus detection.",T1027.001
|
| BRONZE BUTLER has incorporated code into several tools that attempts to terminate anti-virus processes.,T1685
|
| BRONZE BUTLER has used net time to check the local time on a target system.,T1124
|
| BlackByte captured credentials for or impersonated domain administration users.,T1078.002
|
| BlackByte collected victim device information then transmitted this via HTTP POST to command and control infrastructure.,T1071.001
|
| BlackByte compressed data collected from victim environments prior to exfiltration.,T1560
|
| BlackByte created malicious services for ransomware execution.,T1569.002
|
| BlackByte created privileged domain accounts during intrusions.,T1136.002
|
| BlackByte deleted ransomware executables post-encryption.,T1070.004
|
| BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender and the Raccine anti-ransomware tool during operations.,T1685
|
| BlackByte enumerated Active Directory information and trust relationships during operations.,T1482
|
| BlackByte enumerated installed security products during operations.,T1518.001
|
| BlackByte executed ransomware using the Windows command shell.,T1059.003
|
| BlackByte exploited vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon and ProxyShell for initial access to victim environments.,T1190
|
| BlackByte has encoded commands in base64-encoded sections concatenated together in PowerShell. BlackByte uses PowerShell commands to disable Windows Defender.,T1140
|
| "BlackByte has encrypted victim files for ransom. Early versions of BlackByte ransomware used a common key for encryption, but later versions use unique keys per victim.",T1486
|
| BlackByte has exploited CVE-2024-37085 in VMWare ESXi software for authentication bypass and subsequent privilege escalation.,T1068
|
| BlackByte has staged tools such as Cobalt Strike at public file sharing and hosting sites.,T1608.001
|
| BlackByte has transferred tools such as Cobalt Strike to victim environments from file sharing and hosting websites.,T1105
|
| BlackByte has used RDP to access other hosts within victim networks.,T1021.001
|
| BlackByte has used Registry Run keys for persistence.,T1547.001
|
| BlackByte has used services such as `anonymfiles.com` and `file.io` to exfiltrate victim data.,T1567
|
| BlackByte has used tools such as AdFind to identify and enumerate domain accounts.,T1087.002
|
| BlackByte has used tools such as AnyDesk in victim environments.,T1219
|
| BlackByte has used tools such as NetScan to enumerate network services in victim environments.,T1046
|
| BlackByte identified system language settings to determine follow-on execution.,T1614.001
|
| BlackByte left ransom notes in all directories where encryption takes place.,T1491.001
|
| BlackByte masqueraded configuration files containing encryption keys as PNG files.,T1036.008
|
| BlackByte modified firewall rules on victim machines to enable remote system discovery.,T1686
|
| BlackByte modified multiple services on victim machines to enable encryption operations. BlackByte has installed tools such as AnyDesk as a service on victim machines.,T1543.003
|
| BlackByte performed Registry modifications to escalate privileges and disable security tools.,T1112
|
| BlackByte queried registry values to determine system language settings.,T1012
|
| BlackByte staged encryption keys on virtual private servers operated by the adversary.,T1583.003
|
| BlackByte stopped execution if identified language settings on victim machines was Russian or one of several language associated with former Soviet republics. BlackByte has used ransomware variants requiring a key passed on the command line for the malware to execute.,T1480
|
| BlackByte transfered tools such as Cobalt Strike and the AnyDesk remote access tool during operations using SMB shares.,T1570
|
| BlackByte transmitted collected victim host information via HTTP POST to command and control infrastructure.,T1041
|
| "BlackByte used SMB file shares to distribute payloads throughout victim networks, including BlackByte ransomware variants during wormable operations.",T1021.002
|
| BlackByte used WMI to delete Volume Shadow Copies on victim machines.,T1047
|
| BlackByte used encoded PowerShell commands during operations. BlackByte has used remote PowerShell commands in victim networks.,T1059.001
|
| BlackByte used process hollowing for defense evasion purposes.,T1055.012
|
| BlackByte used tools such as Arp to identify remotely-connected devices.,T1018
|
| BlackByte used tools such as Arp to pull system network information and identify connected devices.,T1016
|
| BlackByte used tools such as Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz to dump credentials from victim systems.,T1003
|
| BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories.,T1574.001
|
| "Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs by configuring them to execute via the ""wercplsupport"" service.",T1569.002
|
| "Blue Mockingbird has used FRP, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.",T1090
|
| Blue Mockingbird has used JuicyPotato to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege to escalate from web application pool accounts to NT Authority\SYSTEM.,T1134
|
| CURIUM created domains to facilitate strategic website compromise and credential capture activities.,T1583.001
|
| CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items.,T1583.003
|
| "CURIUM deploys information gathering tools focused on capturing IP configuration, running application, system information, and network connectivity information.",T1082
|
| CURIUM has been linked to web shells following likely server compromise as an initial access vector into victim networks.,T1505.003
|
| CURIUM has created dedicated email accounts for use with tools such as IMAPLoader.,T1585.002
|
| CURIUM has created dedicated servers for command and control and exfiltration purposes.,T1583.004
|
| CURIUM has exfiltrated data from a compromised machine.,T1005
|
| CURIUM has lured users into opening malicious files delivered via social media.,T1204.002
|
| CURIUM has used IMAP and SMTPS for exfiltration via tools such as IMAPLoader.,T1041
|
| CURIUM has used SMTPS to exfiltrate collected data from victims.,T1048.002
|
| CURIUM has used social media to deliver malicious files to victims.,T1566.003
|
| "Carbanak has used a VBScript named ""ggldr"" that uses Google Apps Script, Sheets, and Forms services for C2.",T1102.002
|
| Carbanak may use netsh to add local firewall rule exceptions.,T1686
|
| Chimera has nltest /domain_trusts to identify domain trust relationships.,T1482
|
| Chimera has cleared event logs on compromised hosts.,T1685.005
|
| "Chimera has gathered the SYSTEM registry and ntds.dit files from target systems. Chimera specifically has used the NtdsAudit tool to dump the password hashes of domain users via msadcs.exe ""NTDS.dit"" -s ""SYSTEM"" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv and used ntdsutil to copy the Active Directory database.",T1003.003
|
| Chimera has harvested data from remote mailboxes including through execution of \\\c$\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook.ost.,T1114.002
|
| "Chimera has harvested data from victim's e-mail including through execution of wmic /node: process call create ""cmd /c copy c:\Users\\\backup.pst c:\windows\temp\backup.pst"" copy ""i:\\\My Documents\.pst"" copy.",T1114.001
|
| Chimera has has used net user /dom and net user Administrator to enumerate domain accounts including administrator accounts.,T1087.002
|
| Chimera has queried Registry keys using reg query \\\HKU\\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers and reg query \\\HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings.,T1012
|
| Chimera has used net localgroup administrators to identify accounts with local administrative rights.,T1069.001
|
| Chimera has used net share and net view to identify network shares of interest.,T1135
|
| Chimera has used net start and net use for system service discovery.,T1007
|
| Chimera has used netstat -ano | findstr EST to discover network connections.,T1049
|
| Chimera has used tasklist to enumerate processes.,T1057
|
| Chimera has used time /t and net time \\ip/hostname for system time discovery.,T1124
|
| Chimera has used type \\\c$\Users\\Favorites\Links\Bookmarks bar\Imported From IE\citrix for bookmark discovery.,T1217
|
| Chimera has used a Windows version of the Linux touch command to modify the date and time stamp on DLLs.,T1070.006
|
| "Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru ""SYSTEM"" /tn ""update"" /tr ""cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat"" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.",T1053.005
|
| Chimera has used the quser command to show currently logged on users.,T1033
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has created system services to establish persistence for deployed tooling.,T1543.003
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has deployed ransomware from a batch file in a network share.,T1080
|
| "Cinnamon Tempest has downloaded files, including Cobalt Strike, to compromised hosts.",T1105
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has maintained leak sites for exfiltrated data in attempt to extort victims into paying a ransom.,T1657
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has obtained highly privileged credentials such as domain administrator in order to deploy malware.,T1078.002
|
| "Cinnamon Tempest has uploaded captured keystroke logs to the Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service, Aliyun OSS.",T1567.002
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used Group Policy to deploy batch scripts for ransomware deployment.,T1484.001
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used Impacket for lateral movement via WMI.,T1047
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used SMBexec for lateral movement.,T1021.002
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used a customized version of the Impacket wmiexec.py module to create renamed output files.,T1059.006
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used a customized version of the Iox port-forwarding and proxy tool.,T1090
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used compromised user accounts to deploy payloads and create system services.,T1078
|
| "Cinnamon Tempest has used open-source tools including customized versions of the Iox proxy tool, NPS tunneling tool, Meterpreter, and a keylogger that uploads data to Alibaba cloud storage.",T1588.002
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used search order hijacking to launch Cobalt Strike Beacons. Cinnamon Tempest has also abused legitimate executables to side-load weaponized DLLs.,T1574.001
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used the Iox and NPS proxy and tunneling tools in combination create multiple connections through a single tunnel.,T1572
|
| Cinnamon Tempest has used weaponized DLLs to load and decrypt payloads.,T1140
|
| Cobalt Group has used odbcconf to proxy the execution of malicious DLL files.,T1218.008
|
| Cobalt Group has used the command cmstp.exe /s /ns C:\Users\ADMINI~W\AppData\Local\Temp\XKNqbpzl.txt to bypass AppLocker and launch a malicious script.,T1218.003
|
| Contagious Interview developed malicious NPM packages for delivery to or retrieval by victims.,T1587
|
| Contagious Interview had identified and solicited victims through code repositories such as GitHub.,T1593.003
|
| "Contagious Interview had identified and solicited victims through social media such as LinkedIn, X, and Telegram.",T1593.001
|
| "Contagious Interview had impersonated HR hiring personnel through social media, job board notifications, and conducted interviews with victims in order to entice them to download malware disguised as legitimate applications or malicious scripts from code repositories.",T1684.001
|
| "Contagious Interview has acquired virtual private servers from services such as Stark Industries Solutions and RouterHosting. Contagious Interview has also utilized hosting providers to include Tier.Net, Majestic Hosting, Leaseweb Singapore, and Kaopu Cloud.",T1583.003
|
| Contagious Interview has appeared to have used AI to generate images and content to facilitate their campaigns.,T1588.007
|
| "Contagious Interview has configured C2 endpoints to review IP geolocation, request headers, victim environment details and runtime conditions prior to delivering payloads.",T1480
|
| Contagious Interview has configured malicious webpages to identify the victim
|
| Contagious Interview has convinced victims to disable Docker and other container environments and run code on their machine natively in attempts to bypass container isolation and ensure device infection.,T1685
|
| Contagious Interview has created and maintained personas on code repositories to distribute malicious payloads.,T1585
|
| "Contagious Interview has created fake email accounts to correspond with social media accounts, fake LinkedIn personas, code repository accounts, and job announcements on development job board services. Contagious Interview has also utilized fake email accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services.",T1585.002
|
| Contagious Interview has delivered BeaverTail malware masquerading as legitimate software or applications. Contagious Interview has also delivered malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software drivers.,T1036
|
| Contagious Interview has developed malware that utilizes Qt cross-platform framework to include BeaverTail.,T1587.001
|
| "Contagious Interview has downloaded remote management and monitoring software such as ""AnyDesk"" for post compromise activities.",T1219.002
|
| Contagious Interview has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4.,T1573.001
|
| Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to create a .desktop entry to run on startup on GNOME-based Linux devices.,T1547.013
|
| Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to place a .bat file in the Startup Folder.,T1547.001
|
| Contagious Interview has exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1041
|
| Contagious Interview has exfiltrated stolen passwords to Dropbox.,T1567.002
|
| Contagious Interview has exfiltrated victim information using FTP.,T1048.003
|
| Contagious Interview has leveraged Telegram API to exfiltrate stolen data.,T1567
|
| Contagious Interview has leveraged malware variants configured to dump credentials from the macOS keychain.,T1555.001
|
| Contagious Interview has lured victims to click on a malicious link that led to download of a malicious payload. Contagious Interview has also leveraged links to malicious payloads on social media and code repositories.,T1204.001
|
| Contagious Interview has obfuscated JavaScript code using Base64 and variable substitutions.,T1027.010
|
| Contagious Interview has registered accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services to check for reporting associated with their infrastructure and to evaluate new potential infrastructure.,T1681
|
| Contagious Interview has registered domains to leverage in their social engineering campaigns. Contagious Interview has also registered domains to utilize for C2.,T1583.001
|
| Contagious Interview has relied on users to install a malicious library from a code repository to infect the victim
|
| Contagious Interview has requested victims to disable Docker and other container environments in attempts to thwart container isolation and ensure device infection.,T1497
|
| Contagious Interview has researched specific professional groups such as software developers for targeting. Contagious Interview has also researched individuals who work in roles related to cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.,T1589
|
| Contagious Interview has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader `coremedia.sh` and a bash script `cloud.sh`.,T1546.004
|
| Contagious Interview has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader coremedia.sh and a bash script cloud.sh.,T1059.004
|
| Contagious Interview has used TCP port 1224 for C2.,T1571
|
| Contagious Interview has used fake job advertisements and messages sent via social media to spearphish targets. Contagious Interview has also leveraged hiring websites to solicit victims.,T1566.003
|
| "Contagious Interview has used remote management and monitoring software such as ""AnyDesk"".",T1588.002
|
| Contagious Interview has used services such as Astrill VPN.,T1583
|
| "Contagious Interview has used web services such as Dropbox to receive stolen data and Google Drive, Firebase, GitHub, and Telegram to disseminate files. Contagious Interview has also used a cloud platform such as Vercel for C2 operations leveraging malicious web applications and static pages. Contagious Interview has also used Slack to coordinate their activities.",T1583.006
|
| Contagious Interview has utilized VBS scripts to open cmd.exe and run commands to include the go_batch.bat batch file.,T1059.003
|
| "Contagious Interview has utilized open-source indicator of compromise repositories to determine their exposure to include VirusTotal, and MalTrail.",T1593
|
| CopyKittens has used -w hidden and -windowstyle hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
|
| Daggerfly compromised web servers hosting updates for software as part of a supply chain intrusion.,T1584.004
|
| Daggerfly has attempted to use scheduled tasks for persistence in victim environments.,T1053.005
|
| Daggerfly has used legitimate software to side-load PlugX loaders onto victim systems. Daggerfly is also linked to multiple other instances of side-loading for initial loading activity.,T1574.001
|
| "Daggerfly has used signed, but not notarized, malicious files for execution in macOS environments.",T1553.002
|
| Daggerfly has used strategic website compromise to deliver a malicious link requiring user interaction.,T1204.001
|
| "Daggerfly used Reg to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM), System, and Security Windows registry hives from victim machines.",T1012
|
| "Daggerfly used a renamed version of rundll32.exe, such as ""dbengin.exe"" located in the `ProgramData\Microsoft\PlayReady` directory, to proxy malicious DLL execution.",T1036.003
|
| Daggerfly uses HTTP for command and control communication.,T1071.001
|
| Dark Caracal
|
| DarkHydrus has used -WindowStyle Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
|
| "DarkVishnya physically connected Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks, and inexpensive laptops to the target organization's environment to access the company's local network.",T1200
|
| Deep Panda has used -w hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.,T1564.003
|
| Deep Panda uses net.exe to connect to network shares using net use commands with compromised credentials.,T1021.002
|
| "Dragonfly has cleared Windows event logs and other logs produced by tools they used, including system, security, terminal services, remote services, and audit logs. The actors also deleted specific Registry keys.",T1685.005
|
| "Dragonfly has created a directory named ""out"" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.",T1074.001
|
| Dragonfly has disabled host-based firewalls. The group has also globally opened port 3389.,T1686
|
| Dragonfly used the command query user on victim hosts.,T1033
|
| "EVILNUM has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to run a legitimate TeamViewer application to connect to compromised machines.",T1219.002
|
| Earth Lusca collected information on user accounts via the whoami command.,T1033
|
| "Earth Lusca employed a PowerShell script called RDPConnectionParser to read and filter the Windows event log ""Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational"" (Event ID 1024) to obtain network information from RDP connections. Earth Lusca has also used netstat from a compromised system to obtain network connection information.",T1049
|
| Earth Lusca has placed a malicious payload in `%WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll` so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.,T1574.001
|
| Earth Lusca has used a DCSync command with Mimikatz to retrieve credentials from an exploited controller.,T1003.006
|
| Earth Lusca used the command ipconfig to obtain information about network configurations.,T1016
|
| "Earth Lusca used the command powershell ""Get-EventLog -LogName security -Newest 500 | where {$_.EventID -eq 4624} | format-list - property | findstr ""Address"""" to find the network information of successfully logged-in accounts to discovery addresses of other machines. Earth Lusca has also used multiple scanning tools to discover other machines within the same compromised network.",T1018
|
| "Earth Lusca used the command schtasks /Create /SC ONLOgon /TN WindowsUpdateCheck /TR ""file path"" /ru system for persistence.",T1053.005
|
| Ember Bear attempts to collect mail from accessed systems and servers.,T1114
|
| Ember Bear deletes files related to lateral movement to avoid detection.,T1070.004
|
| "Ember Bear deploys web shells following initial access for either follow-on command execution or protocol tunneling. Example web shells used by Ember Bear include P0wnyshell, reGeorg, P.A.S. Webshell, and custom variants of publicly-available web shell examples.",T1505.003
|
| Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.,T1119
|
| "Ember Bear gathers credential material from target systems, such as SSH keys, to facilitate access to victim environments.",T1003
|
| Ember Bear gathers victim system information such as enumerating the volume of a given device or extracting system and security event logs for analysis.,T1005
|
| Ember Bear has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access.,T1078.001
|
| Ember Bear has acquired malware and related tools from dark web forums.,T1588.001
|
| Ember Bear has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.,T1560
|
| "Ember Bear has compromised information technology providers and software developers providing services to targets of interest, building initial access to ultimate victims at least in part through compromise of service providers that work with the victim organizations.",T1195
|
| Ember Bear has conducted password spraying against Outlook Web Access (OWA) infrastructure to identify valid user names and passwords.,T1110.003
|
| Ember Bear has dumped configuration settings in accessed IP cameras including plaintext credentials.,T1552.001
|
| Ember Bear has enumerated SECURITY and SYSTEM log files during intrusions.,T1654
|
| Ember Bear has exfiltrated images from compromised IP cameras.,T1125
|
| Ember Bear has obtained exploitation scripts against publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities from public repositories.,T1588.005
|
| "Ember Bear has renamed tools to match legitimate utilities, such as renaming GOST tunneling instances to `java` in victim environments.",T1036.005
|
| "Ember Bear has used DNS tunnelling tools, such as dnscat/2 and Iodine, for C2 purposes.",T1071.004
|
| "Ember Bear has used PowerShell commands to gather information from compromised systems, such as email servers.",T1059.001
|
| Ember Bear has used ProxyChains to tunnel protocols to internal networks.,T1572
|
| Ember Bear has used WMI execution with password hashes for command execution and lateral movement.,T1047
|
| Ember Bear has used exploits to enable follow-on execution of frameworks such as Meterpreter.,T1203
|
| Ember Bear has used pass-the-hash techniques for lateral movement in victim environments.,T1550.002
|
| Ember Bear has used publicly available tools such as MASSCAN and Acunetix for vulnerability scanning of public-facing infrastructure.,T1595.002
|
| Ember Bear has used tools such as NMAP for remote system discovery and enumeration in victim environments.,T1046
|
| Ember Bear has used tools such as Nmap and MASSCAN for remote service discovery.,T1018
|
| Ember Bear has used tools such as Rclone to exfiltrate information from victim environments to cloud storage such as `mega.nz`.,T1567.002
|
| Ember Bear has used various non-standard ports for C2 communication.,T1571
|
| "Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.",T1583.003
|
| Ember Bear have used VPNs both for initial access to victim environments and for persistence within them following compromise.,T1133
|
| Ember Bear is linked to the defacement of several Ukrainian organization websites.,T1491.002
|
| Ember Bear uses legitimate Sysinternals tools such as procdump to dump LSASS memory.,T1003.001
|
| Ember Bear uses remotely scheduled tasks to facilitate remote command execution on victim machines.,T1053.005
|
| Ember Bear uses socket-based tunneling utilities for command and control purposes such as NetCat and Go Simple Tunnel (GOST). These tunnels are used to push interactive command prompts over the created sockets. Ember Bear has also used reverse TCP connections from Meterpreter installations to communicate back with C2 infrastructure.,T1095
|
| "Ember Bear uses valid network credentials gathered through credential harvesting to move laterally within victim networks, often employing the Impacket framework to do so.",T1021
|
| FIN13 can identify user accounts associated with a Service Principal Name and query Service Principal Names within the domain by utilizing the following scripts: `GetUserSPNs.vbs` and `querySpn.vbs`.,T1087.002
|
| FIN13 has assigned newly created accounts the sysadmin role to maintain persistence.,T1098.007
|
| FIN13 has compressed the dump output of compromised credentials with a 7zip binary.,T1560.001
|
| FIN13 has created MS-SQL local accounts in a compromised network.,T1136.001
|
| FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system `/tmp` directory. FIN13 also has used `attrib.exe` to hide gathered local host information.,T1564.001
|
| FIN13 has created scheduled tasks in the `C:\Windows` directory of the compromised network.,T1053.005
|
| FIN13 has downloaded additional tools and malware to compromised systems.,T1105
|
| FIN13 has enumerated all users and roles from a victim
|
| FIN13 has executed net view commands for enumeration of open shares on compromised machines.,T1135
|
| "FIN13 has exploited known vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-1000486 (Primefaces Application Expression Language Injection), CVE-2015-7450 (WebSphere Application Server SOAP Deserialization Exploit), CVE-2010-5326 (SAP NewWeaver Invoker Servlet Exploit), and EDB-ID-24963 (SAP NetWeaver ConfigServlet Remote Code Execution) to gain initial access.",T1190
|
| FIN13 has extracted the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives using the `reg.exe` binary for obtaining password hashes from a compromised machine.,T1003.002
|
| "FIN13 has gathered stolen credentials, sensitive data such as point-of-sale (POS), and ATM data from a compromised network before exfiltration.",T1005
|
| FIN13 has harvested the NTDS.DIT file and leveraged the Impacket tool on the compromised domain controller to locally decrypt it.,T1003.003
|
| FIN13 has injected fraudulent transactions into compromised networks that mimic legitimate behavior to siphon off incremental amounts of money.,T1565
|
| FIN13 has leveraged SMB to move laterally within a compromised network via application servers and SQL servers.,T1021.002
|
| FIN13 has leveraged `WMI` to move laterally within a compromised network via application servers and SQL servers.,T1021.006
|
| FIN13 has leveraged `xp_cmdshell` and Windows Command Shell to execute commands on a compromised machine. FIN13 has also attempted to leverage the
|
| FIN13 has logged the keystrokes of victims to escalate privileges.,T1056.001
|
| "FIN13 has masqueraded WAR files to look like legitimate packages such as, wsexample.war, wsexamples.com, examples.war, and exampl3s.war.",T1036.005
|
| "FIN13 has observed the victim's software and infrastructure over several months to understand the technical process of legitimate financial transactions, prior to attempting to conduct fraudulent transactions.",T1657
|
| FIN13 has obtained administrative credentials by browsing through local files on a compromised machine.,T1552.001
|
| FIN13 has obtained memory dumps with ProcDump to parse and extract credentials from a victim
|
| FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.,T1021.001
|
| FIN13 has replaced legitimate KeePass binaries with trojanized versions to collect passwords from numerous applications.,T1556
|
| FIN13 has researched employees to target for social engineering attacks.,T1589
|
| FIN13 has searched for infrastructure that can provide remote access to an environment for targeting efforts.,T1590.004
|
| FIN13 has used HTTP requests to chain multiple web shells and to contact actor-controlled C2 servers prior to exfiltrating stolen data.,T1071.001
|
| FIN13 has used IISCrack.dll as a side-loading technique to load a malicious version of httpodbc.dll on old IIS Servers (CVE-2001-0507).,T1574.001
|
| FIN13 has used PowerShell commands to obtain DNS data from a compromised network.,T1059.001
|
| FIN13 has used `Ping` and `tracert` for network reconnaissance efforts.,T1016.001
|
| FIN13 has used scheduled tasks names such as `acrotyr` and `AppServicesr` to mimic the same names in a compromised network
|
| FIN13 has used the PowerShell utility `Invoke-SMBExec` to execute the pass the hash method for lateral movement within an compromised environment.,T1550.002
|
| FIN13 has utilized `certutil` to decode base64 encoded versions of custom malware.,T1140
|
| "FIN13 has utilized obfuscated and open-source web shells such as JspSpy, reGeorg, MiniWebCmdShell, and Vonloesch Jsp File Browser 1.2 to enable remote code execution and to execute commands on compromised web server.",T1505.003
|
| "FIN13 has utilized publicly available tools such as Mimikatz, Impacket, PWdump7, ProcDump, Nmap, and Incognito V2 for targeting efforts.",T1588.002
|
| FIN13 has utilized the following temporary folders on compromised Windows and Linux systems for their operations prior to exfiltration: `C:\Windows\Temp` and `/tmp`.,T1074.001
|
| FIN13 has utilized tools such as Incognito V2 for token manipulation and impersonation.,T1134.003
|
| "FIN4 has created rules in victims' Microsoft Outlook accounts to automatically delete emails containing words such as ""hacked,"" ""phish,"" and ""malware"" in a likely attempt to prevent organizations from communicating about their activities.",T1564.008
|
| FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus.,T1685
|
| "FIN6 has renamed the ""psexec"" service name to ""mstdc"" to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service.",T1036.004
|
| FIN6 has used kill.bat script to disable security tools.,T1059.003
|
| "FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations. Additionally, FIN7 has used malicious USBs that acted as virtual keyboards to install malware and txt files that decode to PowerShell commands.",T1091
|
| FIN7 has added a firewall rule to allow TCP port 59999 inbound and a rule to allow sshd.exe on TCP port 9898.,T1686
|
| "FIN7 has attempted to run Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe. Additionally, FIN7 has mimicked WsTaskLoad.exe, which is associated with the Wondershare software suite, by using a malicious executable under the same name.",T1036.005
|
| "FIN7 has compiled a list of victims by filtering companies by revenue using Zoominfo, which is a service that provides business information.",T1591
|
| FIN7 has compromised a digital product website and modified multiple download links to point to trojanized versions of offered digital products.,T1608.004
|
| FIN7 has compromised targeted organizations through exploitation of CVE-2021-31207 in Exchange.,T1190
|
| "FIN7 has conducted broad phishing campaigns using malicious links. Additionally, FIN7 has sent spearphishing emails containing a typosquatted link to ""ip-sccanner.com.""",T1566.002
|
| "FIN7 has decoded a malicious PowerShell script using `certutil -decode hex` and has decoded an XOR-obfuscated block of data with the key `qawsed1q2w3e`, which led to the installation of Lizar.",T1140
|
| "FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware. Additionally, FIN7 has deployed ransomware as the end payload during big game hunting.",T1486
|
| FIN7 has gained initial access by compromising a victim
|
| FIN7 has identified IT staff and employees who had higher levels of administrative rights.,T1591.004
|
| "FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use in phishing campaigns. Additionally, FIN7 has registered a malicious domain as `advanced-ip-sccanner.com` that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox which contained the malicious executable.",T1583.001
|
| FIN7 has set up Amazon S3 buckets to host trojanized digital products.,T1583.006
|
| "FIN7 has staged legitimate software, that was trojanized to contain an Atera agent installer, on Amazon S3. FIN7 has also used an open directory web server as a staging server for payloads and other tools, such as OpenSSH and 7zip.",T1608.001
|
| FIN7 has used .txt files to conceal PowerShell commands.,T1564.003
|
| "FIN7 has used Kerberoasting PowerShell commands such as, `Invoke-Kerberoast` for credential access and to enable lateral movement.",T1558.003
|
| "FIN7 has used `attrib +h ""C:\ProgramData\ssh""` to make the SSH folder hidden.",T1564.001
|
| FIN7 has used `rundll32.exe` to execute malware on a compromised network.,T1218.011
|
| FIN7 has used compromised credentials for access as SYSTEM on Exchange servers.,T1078.003
|
| "FIN7 has used csvde.exe, which is a built-in Windows command line tool, to export system information. Additionally, WsTaskLoad has gathered system information, such as operating system and hostname.",T1082
|
| FIN7 has used malicious USBs to emulate keystrokes to launch PowerShell to download and execute malware from the adversary
|
| FIN7 has used random junk code to obfuscate malware code.,T1027.016
|
| FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 to execute `net time`.,T1124
|
| "FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 to perform process discovery by executing `tasklist /v`. Additionally, WsTaskLoad.exe executes `tasklist /v` to perform process discovery.",T1057
|
| FIN7 has used the command `cmd.exe /C quser` to collect user session information.,T1033
|
| "FIN7 has used the command `net group ""domain admins"" /domain` to enumerate domain groups.",T1069.002
|
| "FIN7 has utilized a variety of tools such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, and the remote management tool, Atera for targeting efforts.",T1588.002
|
| "FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence. Specifically, FIN7 has used OpenSSH to establish persistence.",T1053.005
|
| "FIN7 used a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieved an additional payload. Additionally, FIN7 has executed a custom obfuscation of the shellcode invoker in PowerSploit called POWERTRASH.",T1059.001
|
| "FIN7 used the command prompt to launch commands on the victim's machine. Additionally, FIN7 has used cmd.exe to open the Run dialog by sending the ""Windows + R"" keys through malicious USBs acting as virtual keyboards.",T1059.003
|
| FIN8 has attempted to map to C$ on enumerated hosts to test the scope of their current credentials/context. FIN8 has also used smbexec from the Impacket suite for lateral movement.,T1021.002
|
| FIN8 has cleared logs during post compromise cleanup activities.,T1685.005
|
| FIN8 has deleted tmp and prefetch files during post compromise cleanup activities. FIN8 has also deleted PowerShell scripts to evade detection on compromised machines.,T1070.004
|
| "FIN8 has deployed ransomware such as Ragnar Locker, White Rabbit, and attempted to execute Noberus on compromised networks.",T1486
|
| FIN8 has executed the command `quser` to display the session details of a compromised machine.,T1033
|
| FIN8 has retrieved a list of trusted domains by using nltest.exe /domain_trusts.,T1482
|
| "FIN8 has used sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service that also makes SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption, as part of their command and control.",T1102
|
| FIN8 has used PowerShell Scripts to check the architecture of a compromised machine before the selection of a 32-bit or 64-bit version of a malicious .NET loader.,T1082
|
| FIN8 has used a Batch file to automate frequently executed post compromise cleanup activities. FIN8 has also executed commands remotely via `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
|
| "FIN8 has used an expired open-source X.509 certificate for testing in the OpenSSL repository, to connect to actor-controlled C2 servers.",T1588.003
|
| FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.,T1018
|
| FIN8 has used open-source tools such as Impacket for targeting efforts.,T1588.002
|
| FIN8 has used the Ping command to check connectivity to actor-controlled C2 servers.,T1016.001
|
| "Ferocious Kitten has named malicious files update.exe and loaded them into the compromise host's ""Public"" folder.",T1036.005
|
| Fox Kitten has base64 encoded payloads to avoid detection.,T1027.013
|
| Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts to avoid detection.,T1027.010
|
| GALLIUM used netstat -oan to obtain information about the victim network connections.,T1049
|
| "GALLIUM used reg commands to dump specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, and obtain password hashes.",T1003.002
|
| GALLIUM used whoami and query user to obtain information about the victim user.,T1033
|
| GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.,T1574.001
|
| GALLIUM used a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as ping to identify remote systems.,T1018
|
| "Gamaredon Group has delivered self-extracting 7z archive files within malicious document attachments. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has used an obfuscated .drv file.",T1027
|
| "Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has distributed malicious LNK files compressed in ZIP archives.",T1566.001
|
| "Gamaredon Group has embedded malicious macros in document templates, which executed VBScript. Gamaredon Group has also delivered Microsoft Outlook VBA projects with embedded macros. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has executed VBScript files using wscript.exe.",T1059.005
|
| "Gamaredon Group has inserted malicious macros into existing documents, providing persistence when they are reopened. Gamaredon Group has loaded the group's previously delivered VBA project by relaunching Microsoft Outlook with the /altvba option, once the Application.Startup event is received.",T1137
|
| Gamaredon Group has queried ` HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\WindowsUpdates` to obtain the C2 addresses. Gamaredon Group has queried ` HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\WindowsUpdates` to obtain the C2 addresses.,T1012
|
| Gamaredon Group has replicated to removable media by leveraging the User Assist Reg Key and creating LNKs on all network and removable drives available on the infected host.,T1091
|
| Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as `CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1`. Gamaredon Group has searched the ping records to obtain the C2 address and has used ping to search for the C2
|
| Gamaredon Group has used hidcon to run batch files in a hidden console window. Gamaredon Group has also executed PowerShell in a hidden window.,T1564.003
|
| Gamaredon Group has used Cloudflare
|
| Gamaredon Group has used LNK files to hide malicious scripts for execution.,T1027.012
|
| Gamaredon Group has used PowerShell scripts to identify security software on the victim machine.,T1518.001
|
| Gamaredon Group has used SOCKS5 over port 9050 for C2 communication.,T1095
|
| Gamaredon Group has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure outside of Russia.,T1583.003
|
| Gamaredon Group has used WMI to execute scripts used for discovery and for determining the C2 IP address. Gamaredon Group has used the following WMI query to search for a ping record: `Select From Win32_PingStatus where Address =
|
| Gamaredon Group has used `mshta.exe` to execute malicious files.,T1218.005
|
| Gamaredon Group has used an obfuscated PowerShell script that used `System.Reflection.Assembly` to gather and send victim information to the C2.,T1620
|
| "Gamaredon Group has used fast flux DNS to mask their command and control channel behind rotating IP addresses. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has used a low-frequency variant of the single-flux method.",T1568.001
|
| Gamaredon Group has used geoblocking to limit downloads of the malicious file to specific geographic locations.,T1480
|
| "Gamaredon Group has used legitimate process names to hide malware including svchosst. Additionally, Gamaredon Group disguised malicious ZIP archives as Office documents that are related to the invasion.",T1036.005
|
| "Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated PowerShell scripts for staging. Additionally, (LinkById : G0047) has used PowerShell based tools later in its attack chain. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has used the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-Command` to download and execute the next stage payload.",T1059.001
|
| Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated VBScripts with randomly generated variable names and concatenated strings.,T1001
|
| Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated or encrypted scripts.,T1027.010
|
| "Gamaredon Group has used several ways to try to resolve the C2 server, including: public third-party websites, an adversary-operated Telegraph channel, the ngrok utility and the TXT record of a hardcoded C2 domain.",T1102.002
|
| Gamaredon Group has used the Cloudflare Tunnel client to proxy C2 traffic.,T1090
|
| Gamaredon Group has used the same TLS certificate across its infrastructure.,T1587.003
|
| "Gamaredon Group macros can scan for Microsoft Word and Excel files to inject with additional malicious macros. Gamaredon Group has also used its backdoors to automatically list interesting files (such as Office documents) found on a system. Gamaredon Group has also identified directory trees, folders and files on the compromised host.",T1083
|
| "Gamaredon Group tools decrypted additional payloads from the C2. Gamaredon Group has also decoded Base64-encoded source code of a downloader. Additionally, Gamaredon Group has decoded Telegram content to reveal the IP address for C2 communications.",T1140
|
| Gorgon Group has used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.,T1564.003
|
| Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the taskkill command.,T1685
|
| Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.,T1112
|
| HAFNIUM has abused compromised credentials to exfiltrate data from SharePoint.,T1213.002
|
| HAFNIUM has abused service principals in compromised environments to enable data exfiltration.,T1078.004
|
| HAFNIUM has abused service principals with administrative permissions for data exfiltration.,T1550.001
|
| "HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using `ping`, including attempts to contact `google.com`.",T1016.001
|
| HAFNIUM has cleared actor-performed actions from logs.,T1685.005
|
| HAFNIUM has collected IP information via IPInfo.,T1016
|
| HAFNIUM has discovered leaked corporate credentials on public repositories including GitHub.,T1593.003
|
| "HAFNIUM has enumerated domain controllers using `net group ""Domain computers""` and `nltest /dclist`.",T1018
|
| HAFNIUM has exploited multiple vulnerabilities to compromise edge devices and on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server.,T1190
|
| HAFNIUM has gained initial access through password spray attacks.,T1110.003
|
| HAFNIUM has granted privileges to domain accounts and reset the password for default admin accounts.,T1098
|
| HAFNIUM has hidden files on a compromised host.,T1564.001
|
| HAFNIUM has incorporated leased devices into covert networks to obfuscate communications.,T1583.005
|
| HAFNIUM has moved laterally from on-premises environments to steal passwords from Azure key vaults.,T1555.006
|
| HAFNIUM has searched file contents on a compromised host.,T1083
|
| HAFNIUM has targeted unpatched applications to elevate access in targeted organizations.,T1068
|
| HAFNIUM has used procdump to dump the LSASS process memory.,T1003.001
|
| HAFNIUM has used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on the victim
|
| HAFNIUM has used `tasklist` to enumerate processes.,T1057
|
| HAFNIUM has used `whoami` to gather user information.,T1033
|
| HAFNIUM has used compromised devices in covert networks to obfuscate communications.,T1584.005
|
| HAFNIUM has used the Exchange Power Shell module Set-OabVirtualDirectoryPowerShell to export mailbox data.,T1059.001
|
| HAFNIUM has used web shells and MSGraph to export mailbox data.,T1114.002
|
| Higaisa collected the system GUID and computer name.,T1082
|
| Higaisa collected the system volume serial number.,T1680
|
| Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
|
| Higaisa named a shellcode loader binary svchast.exe to spoof the legitimate svchost.exe.,T1036.004
|
| Higaisa used cmd.exe for execution.,T1059.003
|
| Higaisa
|
| "INC Ransom can use SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe, a native Windows utility, to disable Windows Defender.",T1685
|
| "INC Ransom has acquired and used several tools including MegaSync, AnyDesk, esentutl and PsExec.",T1588.002
|
| INC Ransom has downloaded tools to compromised servers including Advanced IP Scanner.,T1105
|
| INC Ransom has enumerated domain groups on targeted hosts.,T1069.002
|
| INC Ransom has exploited known vulnerabilities including CVE-2023-3519 in Citrix NetScaler for initial access.,T1190
|
| INC Ransom has named a PsExec executable winupd to mimic a legitimate Windows update file.,T1036.005
|
| INC Ransom has scanned for domain admin accounts in compromised environments.,T1087.002
|
| INC Ransom has staged data on compromised hosts prior to exfiltration.,T1074
|
| INC Ransom has stolen and encrypted victim
|
| INC Ransom has used 7-Zip and WinRAR to archive collected data prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| INC Ransom has used AnyDesk and PuTTY on compromised systems.,T1219
|
| INC Ransom has used Internet Explorer to view folders on other systems.,T1135
|
| INC Ransom has used Megasync to exfiltrate data to the cloud.,T1537
|
| INC Ransom has used RDP to test network connections.,T1049
|
| INC Ransom has used WMIC to deploy ransomware.,T1047
|
| INC Ransom has used `cmd.exe` to launch malicious payloads.,T1059.003
|
| INC Ransom has used a rapid succession of copy commands to install a file encryption executable across multiple endpoints within compromised infrastructure.,T1570
|
| INC Ransom has used compromised valid accounts for access to victim environments.,T1078
|
| INC Ransom has used phishing to gain initial access.,T1566
|
| INC Ransom has used valid accounts over RDP to connect to targeted systems.,T1071
|
| Inception has ensured persistence at system boot by setting the value regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s.,T1218.010
|
| Inception has maintained persistence by modifying Registry run key value HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.,T1547.001
|
| Indrik Spider has conducted Kerberoasting attacks using a module from GitHub.,T1558.003
|
| Indrik Spider has created local system accounts and has added the accounts to privileged groups.,T1136.001
|
| "Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using BitPaymer. Additionally, Indrik Spider used PsExec to execute a ransomware script.",T1486
|
| Indrik Spider has exfiltrated data using Rclone or MEGASync prior to deploying ransomware.,T1567.002
|
| Indrik Spider has modified registry keys to prepare for ransomware execution and to disable common administrative utilities.,T1112
|
| Indrik Spider has purchased access to victim VPNs to facilitate access to victim environments.,T1583
|
| Indrik Spider has stored collected data in a .tmp file.,T1074.001
|
| "Indrik Spider has used Cobalt Strike to empty log files. Additionally, Indrik Spider has cleared all event logs using `wevutil`.",T1685.005
|
| Indrik Spider has used SSH for lateral movement.,T1021.004
|
| Indrik Spider has used a service account to extract copies of the `Security` Registry hive.,T1012
|
| Indrik Spider has used valid accounts for initial access and lateral movement. Indrik Spider has also maintained access to the victim environment through the VPN infrastructure.,T1078
|
| Indrik Spider used wmic.exe to add a new user to the system.,T1136
|
| Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using ipconfig.,T1016
|
| Ke3chang performs discovery of permission groups net group /domain.,T1069.002
|
| Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using netstat.,T1049
|
| Ke3chang performs operating system information discovery using systeminfo and has used implants to identify the system language and computer name.,T1082
|
| Ke3chang performs process discovery using tasklist commands.,T1057
|
| Kimsuky can gather a list of all processes running on a victim
|
| Kimsuky has accessed a Local State files associated with Chromium-based browsers that contain the AES key used to encrypt passwords stored in the browser to include `app_bound_encrypted_key`.,T1552.004
|
| "Kimsuky has also impersonated legitimate people, such as a foreign advisor, an embassy employee, and a think tank employee. Kimsuky has also purported to be a Japanese diplomat to communicate with the victims.",T1684.001
|
| Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.,T1686
|
| Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.,T1685
|
| Kimsuky has checked for the presence of antivirus software with powershell Get-CimInstance -Namespace root/securityCenter2 - classname antivirusproduct. Kimsuky has also obtained details on antivirus software through WMI queries using `Win32_OperatingSystem` and `SecurityCenter2.AntiVirusProduct`. Kimsuky has also checked the status of Windows Defender through the use `cmd /s sc query WinDefend`.,T1518.001
|
| "Kimsuky has collected Office, PDF, and HWP documents from its victims. Kimsuky has also harvested victim files through the use of the `RecentFiles()` function that collects paths of recently accessed files by parsing .lnk shortcuts from `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent`.",T1005
|
| "Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others. Kimsuky has also used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about potential targets of interest.",T1591
|
| Kimsuky has created accounts with net user.,T1136.001
|
| Kimsuky has decoded malicious VBScripts using Base64. Kimsuky has also decoded malicious PowerShell scripts using Base64. Kimsuky has decoded RC4 obfuscated files prior to downloading files from their infrastructure.,T1140
|
| Kimsuky has deleted the exfiltrated data on disk after transmission. Kimsuky has also used an instrumentor script to terminate browser processes running on an infected system and then delete the cookie files on disk. Kimsuky has deleted files using the `Remove-Item` PowerShell commandlet to remove traces of executed payloads. Kimsuky has also removed remnants of files used for delivery to include .log and .zip files.,T1070.004
|
| Kimsuky has delivered malicious payloads within Zip archives.,T1027.015
|
| "Kimsuky has detected and killed virtual environments by using the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-CimInstance` that searches the classname of the computer system manufacturer through an if statement of `if($computerSystem.Manufacturer -match ""VMware"" -or $computerSystem.Manufacturer -match ""Microsoft"" -or $computerSystem.Manufacturer -match ""VirtualBox"")`.",T1497.001
|
| "Kimsuky has disabled actively running virtual environments using the `KillMe` function to include VMware, Microsoft Hypervisors, and VirtualBox.",T1489
|
| "Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks. Kimsuky has established persistence by creating a scheduled task named ""ChromeUpdateTaskMachine"" through the PowerShell cmdlet `Register-ScheduleTask` which was set to execute another PowerShell script once, then five minutes after its creation and periodically repeat every 30 minutes. Kimsuky has also set scheduled tasks that run periodically using the PT1M repetition pattern leveraging naming conventions of Anti-Virus software to include ""AhnlabUpdate"".",T1053.005
|
| Kimsuky has encoded malicious PowerShell scripts using Base64.,T1027.010
|
| "Kimsuky has enumerated OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the ""systeminfo"" command. Kimsuky has also obtained system information such as OS type, OS version, and system type through querying various Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) classes including `Win32_OperatingSystem`.",T1082
|
| Kimsuky has enumerated drives.,T1680
|
| Kimsuky has executed Windows commands by using `cmd` and running batch scripts. Kimsuky has also used `cmd.exe` to automatically open downloaded decoy pdf documents with the system
|
| Kimsuky has executed malware with regsvr32s.,T1218.010
|
| Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for uploading victim system information.,T1567.002
|
| Kimsuky has gathered the identity of the user by querying `System.Security.Principal` namespace using the `GetCurrent()` method.,T1033
|
| Kimsuky has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.,T1204.004
|
| Kimsuky has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) to create scheduled tasks to include using naming conventions that mimic legitimate applications. Kimsuky has leveraged obfuscation VBScript to form a string in `WScript.Shell` which has downloaded a malicious payload to the victim environment.,T1559.001
|
| Kimsuky has leveraged dynamic API resolution using custom hashing techniques.,T1027.007
|
| Kimsuky has leveraged the PowerShell `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue` command to continue execution through system events.,T1564.011
|
| Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence. Kimsuky has also modified the registry entry for `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key for persistence with the name WindowsSecurityCheck.,T1112
|
| "Kimsuky has obfuscated HTTP Post request communications utilizing XOR with a designated key, followed by Base64 encoding.",T1132.002
|
| Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding. Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format. Kimsuky has obfuscated strings using Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions that complicate static analysis.,T1027
|
| Kimsuky has obfuscated code by filling scripts with junk code and concatenating strings to hamper analysis and detection.,T1027.016
|
| Kimsuky has obfuscated code within files by converting hexadecimal strings to decimal numbers using the `CLng function` in combination with processing arithmetic operations and leveraging the `Chr function` to generate readable characters. Kimsuky has also encoded files with Base64 and RC4. Kimsuky has utilized XOR and RC4 to encode malicious payloads.,T1027.013
|
| Kimsuky has performed padding of PowerShell command line code with over 100 spaces.,T1027.001
|
| "Kimsuky has signed files with the name EGIS CO,. Ltd. and has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.",T1553.002
|
| Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure.,T1657
|
| "Kimsuky has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection by allocating memory using `VirtualAllocEx()`, then decrypting a DLL with `WriteProcessMemory()` and invoking execution through `CreateRemoteThread()`.",T1055.001
|
| Kimsuky has the ability to steal data from the clipboard.,T1115
|
| Kimsuky has the ability to use form-grabbing to extract emails and passwords from web data forms.,T1185
|
| Kimsuky has used Blogspot pages and a Github repository for C2. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for downloading payloads and uploading victim system information.,T1102.002
|
| "Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools. Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT, which contained four Javascript files for bypassing defenses, collecting sensitive information and screenshots, and exfiltrating data.",T1059.007
|
| Kimsuky has used LLMs to better understand publicly reported vulnerabilities.,T1596
|
| "Kimsuky has used QuickZip to archive stolen files before exfiltration. Kimsuky has used the Send() function to compress all collected data into a zip file named init,.zip, then renames it to init.dat, before exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT and a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.,T1102.001
|
| "Kimsuky has used TRANSLATEXT to redirect clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.",T1205
|
| Kimsuky has used Visual Basic to download malicious payloads. Kimsuky has also used malicious VBA macros within maldocs disguised as forms that trigger when a victim types any content into the lure. Kimsuky has also leveraged VBScript (VBS) scripts to execute temp.vbs every 19 minutes using a scheduled task to run QuasarRAT.,T1059.005
|
| Kimsuky has used `ipconfig/all` and web beacons sent via email to gather network configuration information. Kimsuky has also identified Host IP addresses leveraging the WMI class `Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration`.,T1016
|
| Kimsuky has used a PowerShell-based keylogger as well as a tool called MECHANICAL to log keystrokes. Kimsuky has also leveraged Native Windows API functions such as `GetAsyncKeyState()` along with others to capture keystrokes every 50 milliseconds and stores data in a file stored in the temp directory.,T1056.001
|
| Kimsuky has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type. Kimsuky has also masqueraded malicious LNK files as PDF objects using the double extension .pdf.lnk.,T1036.007
|
| "Kimsuky has used compromised and acquired infrastructure to host and deliver malware including Blogspot to host beacons, file exfiltrators, and implants. Kimsuky has also hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.",T1608.001
|
| "Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns. Kimsuky has also distributed emails with attached compressed zip files that contained malicious .LNK files masquerading as legitimate files. Kimsuky has delivered tailored PDF documents that contain malicious links.",T1566.001
|
| Kimsuky has used funds from stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to acquire operational infrastructure.,T1583
|
| Kimsuky has used links in e-mail to steal account information including web beacons for target profiling. Kimsuky has also utilized QR codes (also known as Quishing) to direct victims to malicious links through the reliance of a mobile device to scan a code with an embedded malicious URL.,T1598.003
|
| "Kimsuky has used malware, such as TRANSLATEXT, to steal and exfiltrate browser cookies.",T1539
|
| Kimsuky has used spearphishing to gain initial access and intelligence.,T1566
|
| Kimsuky has used the LNK icon location to execute malicious scripts. Kimsuky has also padded the LNK target field properties with extra spaces to obscure the script.,T1027.012
|
| Kimsuky has utilized Native APIs to collect data from victim hosts and facilitate execution of malicious scripts.,T1106
|
| Kimsuky has utilized a mutex to detect whether its malware is actively running on the victim host. Kimsuky has leveraged PowerShell to store the Process ID (PID) of the currently running malicious PowerShell script into a file named pid.txt which is saved locally on the victim host in the %TEMP% Directory and is queried prior to execution of subsequent PowerShell script to prevent duplication.,T1480.002
|
| Kimsuky has utilized the Sleep function to ensure execution of scripts.,T1678
|
| LAMEHUG has sent spearphishing emails impersonating Ukrainian government officials.,T1684.001
|
| LAPSUS$ has accessed local password managers and databases to obtain further credentials from a compromised network.,T1555.005
|
| LAPSUS$ has called victims
|
| LAPSUS$ has obtained tools such as RVTools and AD Explorer for their operations.,T1588.002
|
| "LAPSUS$ has payed employees, suppliers, and business partners of target organizations for credentials.",T1586.002
|
| LAPSUS$ has reconfigured a victim
|
| "LAPSUS$ has targeted various collaboration tools like Slack, Teams, JIRA, Confluence, and others to hunt for exposed credentials to support privilege escalation and lateral movement.",T1552.008
|
| Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command Responder file path -i IP address -rPv on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.,T1557.001
|
| Lazarus Group has abused the KernelCallbackTable to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.,T1574.013
|
| Lazarus Group has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.,T1585.001
|
| "Lazarus Group has replaced `win_fw.dll`, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload. Lazarus Group utilized DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads through abuse of the legitimate processes `wsmprovhost.exe` and `dfrgui.exe`.",T1574.001
|
| Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.,T1218.005
|
| Lazarus Group has used net use to identify and establish a network connection with a remote host.,T1049
|
| Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to execute a malicious DLL.,T1218
|
| Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the ADMIN$ share via SMB to conduct lateral movement.,T1021.002
|
| "Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services..",T1685
|
| "Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including ""suicide scripts"" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.",T1070.004
|
| Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used forfiles.exe to execute .htm files.,T1202
|
| LazyScripter has leveraged the BatchEncryption tool to perform advanced batch script obfuscation and encoding techniques.,T1027.010
|
| "Leviathan has conducted reconnaissance against target networks of interest looking for vulnerable, end-of-life, or no longer maintainted devices against which to rapidly deploy exploits.",T1595.002
|
| Leviathan has obfuscated code using base64.,T1027.013
|
| Leviathan has obfuscated code using gzip compression.,T1027.015
|
| Leviathan has used compromised legitimate websites as command and control nodes for operations.,T1584.004
|
| "Leviathan has used compromised networking devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) devices, as operational command and control infrastructure.",T1584.008
|
| Leviathan has used exploits against publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities for initial access into victim networks.,T1190
|
| Lotus Blossom has configured tools such as Sagerunex to run as Windows services.,T1543.003
|
| Lotus Blossom has installed tools such as Sagerunex by writing them to the Windows registry.,T1112
|
| Lotus Blossom has performed checks to determine if a victim machine is able to access the Internet.,T1016.001
|
| Lotus Blossom has retrieved process tokens for processes to adjust the privileges of the launch process or other items.,T1134
|
| Lotus Blossom has run commands such as `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\service name\Parameters` to verify if installed implants are running as a service.,T1012
|
| Lotus Blossom has used WMI to enable lateral movement.,T1047
|
| Lotus Blossom has used `net` commands and tools such as AdFind to profile domain accounts associated with victim machines and make Active Directory queries.,T1087.002
|
| Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `dir` to examine the local filesystem of victim machines.,T1083
|
| Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `ipconfig` and `netstat` to gather network information on compromised hosts.,T1016
|
| Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `netstat` to identify system network connections.,T1049
|
| Lotus Blossom has used custom tools to compress and archive data on victim systems.,T1560.003
|
| Lotus Blossom has used port scanners to enumerate services on remote hosts.,T1046
|
| Lotus Blossom has used publicly available tools such as the Venom proxy tool to proxy traffic out of victim environments.,T1090.001
|
| "Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools such as a Python-based cookie stealer for Chrome browsers, Impacket, and the Venom proxy tool.",T1588.002
|
| Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools to steal cookies from browsers such as Chrome.,T1539
|
| Lotus Blossom has used tools such as AdFind to make Active Directory queries.,T1482
|
| Lotus Blossom has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments.,T1090.003
|
| LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.,T1005
|
| LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.,T1608.005
|
| LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.,T1053.005
|
| LuminousMoth has disguised their exfiltration malware as `ZoomVideoApp.exe`.,T1036.005
|
| LuminousMoth has exfiltrated data to Google Drive.,T1567.002
|
| LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.,T1608.001
|
| LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.001
|
| LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.,T1560
|
| LuminousMoth has obtained an ARP spoofing tool from GitHub.,T1588.002
|
| LuminousMoth has obtained and used malware such as Cobalt Strike.,T1588.001
|
| LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.,T1608.004
|
| LuminousMoth has sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious Dropbox download link.,T1566.002
|
| LuminousMoth has signed their malware with a valid digital signature.,T1553.002
|
| LuminousMoth has split archived files into multiple parts to bypass a 5MB limit.,T1030
|
| LuminousMoth has used ARP spoofing to redirect a compromised machine to an actor-controlled website.,T1557.002
|
| LuminousMoth has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
|
| LuminousMoth has used an unnamed post-exploitation tool to steal cookies from the Chrome browser.,T1539
|
| LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines.,T1091
|
| LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.,T1112
|
| "LuminousMoth has used malware that scans for files in the Documents, Desktop, and Download folders and in other drives.",T1083
|
| LuminousMoth has used unique malware for information theft and exfiltration.,T1587.001
|
| "Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via `""powershell.exe"" /c net user DefaultAccount /active:yes` to connect to a targeted Exchange server over RDP.",T1078.001
|
| "Magic Hound gathered credentials from two victims that they then attempted to validate across 75 different websites. Magic Hound has also collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the US, Europe, and Israel.",T1589.001
|
| Magic Hound has added a user named DefaultAccount to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.,T1098.007
|
| Magic Hound has captured the user-agent strings from visitors to their phishing sites.,T1592.002
|
| Magic Hound has collected names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks to which a device has previously connected.,T1016.002
|
| Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.,T1016.001
|
| "Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j and ProxyShell vulnerabilities; CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in on-premises MS Exchange Servers; and CVE-2018-13379 in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPNs.",T1595.002
|
| Magic Hound has copied tools within a compromised network using RDP.,T1570
|
| Magic Hound has disabled antivirus services on targeted systems in order to upload malicious payloads.,T1685
|
| Magic Hound has executed scripts to disable the event log service.,T1685.001
|
| "Magic Hound has obtained and used tools like Havij, sqlmap, Metasploit, Mimikatz, and Plink.",T1588.002
|
| "Magic Hound has registered fraudulent domains such as ""mail-newyorker.com"" and ""news12.com.recover-session-service.site"" to target specific victims with phishing attacks.",T1583.001
|
| "Magic Hound has stolen domain credentials by dumping LSASS process memory using Task Manager, comsvcs.dll, and from a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller using Mimikatz.",T1003.001
|
| Magic Hound has used BitLocker and DiskCryptor to encrypt targeted workstations.,T1486
|
| Magic Hound has used Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for RDP traffic.,T1090
|
| "Magic Hound has used KPortScan 3.0 to perform SMB, RDP, and LDAP scanning.",T1046
|
| Magic Hound has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims.,T1598.003
|
| Magic Hound has used `dllhost.exe` to mask Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) and `MicrosoftOutLookUpdater.exe` for Plink.,T1036.005
|
| Magic Hound has used a web shell to execute `nltest /trusted_domains` to identify trust relationships.,T1482
|
| Magic Hound has used base64-encoded commands.,T1027.010
|
| Magic Hound has used domain administrator accounts after dumping LSASS process memory.,T1078.002
|
| Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence and execution.,T1053.005
|
| Magic Hound has used the Telegram API `sendMessage` to relay data on compromised devices.,T1567
|
| Magic Hound has used the command-line interface for code execution.,T1059.003
|
| Magic Hound malware has communicated with its C2 server over TCP ports 4443 and 10151 using HTTP.,T1571
|
| Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded files and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.,T1027.013
|
| Malteiro collects the installed antivirus on the victim machine.,T1518.001
|
| "Malteiro collects the machine information, system architecture, the OS version, computer name, and Windows product name.",T1082
|
| Malteiro has injected Mispadu
|
| Malteiro has stolen credentials stored in the victim
|
| Malteiro has the ability to deobfuscate downloaded files prior to execution.,T1140
|
| Malteiro has used scripts encoded in Base64 certificates to distribute malware to victims.,T1027.013
|
| Malteiro targets organizations in a wide variety of sectors via the use of Mispadu banking trojan with the goal of financial theft.,T1657
|
| Malteiro will terminate Mispadu
|
| Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).,T1685
|
| Medusa Group has accessed the ntds.dit file to engage in credential dumping.,T1003.003
|
| Medusa Group has attempted to bypass UAC using Component Object Model (COM) interface.,T1548.002
|
| Medusa Group has cleared command history by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.,T1070.003
|
| Medusa Group has communicated through reverse or bind shells over port 443 (HTTPS).,T1071.001
|
| Medusa Group has created a domain account within the victim environment.,T1136.002
|
| Medusa Group has created email accounts used in ransomware negotiations.,T1585.002
|
| Medusa Group has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.,T1585.001
|
| Medusa Group has deleted previously installed tools.,T1070.004
|
| Medusa Group has deleted recovery files such as shadow copies using `vssadmin.exe`.,T1490
|
| "Medusa Group has encrypted files using AES-256 encryption which then appends the file extension "".medusa"" to encrypted files and leaves a ransomware note named ""!READ_ME_MEDUSA!!!.txt.""",T1486
|
| Medusa Group has identified network shares using `cmd.exe /c net share`.,T1135
|
| Medusa Group has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) to bypass UAC.,T1559.001
|
| Medusa Group has leveraged PowerShell for execution and defense evasion. Medusa Group has also utilized PowerShell to execute a bitsadmin transfer from file hosting site.,T1059.001
|
| "Medusa Group has leveraged Remote Access Software for lateral movement and data exfiltration. Medusa Group has also been known to utilize Remote Access Software such as AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise, eHorus, N-Able, PDQ Deploy, PDQ Inventory, SimpleHelp and Splashtop.",T1219
|
| Medusa Group has leveraged Windows Native API functions to execute payloads.,T1106
|
| Medusa Group has leveraged `net user` for account discovery.,T1087.001
|
| "Medusa Group has leveraged certutil, PowerShell, and Windows Command to download additional tools to include RMM services. Medusa Group has also engaged in ""Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver"" (BYOVD) and downloaded vulnerable or signed drivers to the victim environment to disable security tools.",T1105
|
| "Medusa Group has leveraged public facing vulnerabilities in their campaigns against victim organizations to gain initial access. Medusa Group has also utilized CVE-2024-1709 in ScreenConnect, and CVE-2023-48788 in Fortinet EMS for initial access to victim environments.",T1190
|
| Medusa Group has manually turned off and encrypted virtual machines.,T1529
|
| "Medusa Group has modified Registry keys to elevate privileges, maintain persistence and allow remote access.",T1112
|
| Medusa Group has obfuscated PowerShell scripts with Base64 encoding. Medusa Group has also obfuscated the code of dropped kernel drivers using a software known as Safengine Shielden which randomized the code through code mutations and then leveraged an embedded virtual machine interpreter to execute the code.,T1027.010
|
| Medusa Group has obtained host network details utilizing the command `cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all`.,T1016
|
| Medusa Group has packed the code of dropped kernel drivers using the packer ASM Guard.,T1027.002
|
| Medusa Group has queried drivers on the victim device through the command `driverquery`.,T1652
|
| Medusa Group has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable and utilizing `psexec.exe`. Medusa Group has also leveraged I/O control codes (IOCTLs) for terminating and deleting processes of identified security tools.,T1685
|
| Medusa Group has the capability to use living off the land (LOTL) binaries to perform network enumeration. Medusa Group has also utilized the publicly available scanning tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner (`netscan.exe`) to discover device hostnames and network services.,T1046
|
| Medusa Group has used HTTPS for command and control.,T1573.002
|
| Medusa Group has used TOR nodes for communications.,T1090.003
|
| "Medusa Group has used Windows Command Prompt to control and execute commands on the system to include ingress, network, and filesystem enumeration activities.",T1059.003
|
| Medusa Group has used vulnerable or signed drivers to modify security solutions on victim devices.,T1543.003
|
| Medusa Group has utilized PsExec to execute `quser` to discover the user session information.,T1033
|
| Medusa Group has utilized PsExec to execute batch scripts that modify firewall settings. Medusa Group has also enabled and modified firewall rules to allow for RDP connections for lateral movement and device interactions.,T1686
|
| Medusa Group has utilized PsExec to execute scripts and commands within victim environments. Medusa Group has also used the Windows service RoboCopy to search and copy data for exfiltration.,T1569.002
|
| Medusa Group has utilized Rclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage.,T1567.002
|
| Medusa Group has utilized Windows Management Instrumentation to query system information.,T1047
|
| Medusa Group has utilized a file hosting service called filemail.com to host a zip file that contained a RMM service such as ConnectWise.,T1608.002
|
| Medusa Group has utilized a file hosting service named filemail.com to host a zip file that contained malicious payloads that facilitated follow-on actions.,T1583.006
|
| Medusa Group has utilized a hard-coded security tool process list that identifies and terminates using an undocumented IOCTL code 0x222094.,T1057
|
| Medusa Group has utilized legitimate software services such as PDQ Deploy to transfer malicious binaries and tools to other victimized hosts within the target environment.,T1570
|
| Medusa Group has utilized software deployment and management solutions to deploy their encryption payload to include BigFix and PDQ Deploy.,T1072
|
| Medusa Group has utilized the `ShowWindow` API function to hide the current window.,T1564.003
|
| Medusa Group has utilized the `net group` command to query domain groups within the victim environment.,T1069.002
|
| Medusa Group has utilized vulnerable or signed drivers to kill or delete services associated with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.,T1553.002
|
| Medusa Group has utilized webshells to an exploited Microsoft Exchange Server.,T1505.003
|
| Metador has downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised system.,T1105
|
| Metador has encrypted their payloads.,T1027.013
|
| Metador has established persistence through the use of a WMI event subscription combined with unusual living-off-the-land binaries such as `cdb.exe`.,T1546.003
|
| Metador has quickly deleted `cbd.exe` from a compromised host following the successful deployment of their malware.,T1070.004
|
| Metador has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
|
| Metador has used Microsoft
|
| Metador has used the Windows command line to execute commands.,T1059.003
|
| "Metador has used unique malware in their operations, including metaMain and Mafalda.",T1588.001
|
| MirrorFace can modify the system firewall to allow communication to certain ports.,T1686.003
|
| MirrorFace gathered data and files of interest from victim
|
| MirrorFace has crafted malware payloads to appear as Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) files.,T1036.008
|
| MirrorFace has dumped LSASS memory for credential access.,T1003.001
|
| MirrorFace has dumped NTDS.dit through volume shadow copies.,T1003.003
|
| MirrorFace has embedded OneDrive URLs in emails leading to malicious file installation.,T1566.002
|
| "MirrorFace has employed malicious macros and native Windows tools such as csvde.exe, nltest.exe and quser.exe for discovery.",T1082
|
| MirrorFace has exfiltrated stored emails from compromised hosts.,T1114.001
|
| MirrorFace has exploited vulnerabilities in Fortigate and Array AG devices for initial access.,T1190
|
| MirrorFace has gathered data and files of interest on a single victim machine.,T1074.002
|
| MirrorFace has leveraged WMIC on targeted systems post compromise.,T1047
|
| "MirrorFace has lured victims into opening crafted Word, Excel, and SFX files for execution.",T1204.002
|
| MirrorFace has placed specific content in phishing emails to target members of particular political parties.,T1591
|
| MirrorFace has run `nltest.exe /domain_trusts` on compromised systems to discover domain relationships.,T1482
|
| "MirrorFace has run commands to check the content of folders on compromised hosts and has specifically targeted files with .doc, .ppt, .xls, .jtd, .eml, .xps, and .pdf extensions.",T1083
|
| MirrorFace has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to deliver malware payloads.,T1566.001
|
| MirrorFace has sent targeted emails purporting to be from a Japanese political party
|
| MirrorFace has used Base64 encoded shellcode in infection chains to evade detection.,T1027.013
|
| MirrorFace has used Ping for system discovery.,T1018
|
| MirrorFace has used RDP to exfiltrate files of interest.,T1021.001
|
| MirrorFace has used SMB to copy malware between systems in compromised environments.,T1021.002
|
| MirrorFace has used Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) for file exfiltration.,T1048.002
|
| MirrorFace has used Tasklist for discovery post compromise.,T1007
|
| MirrorFace has used Tasklist on compromised hosts for discovery.,T1057
|
| MirrorFace has used a tool named MRSAStealer as a password filter to collect credentials on password changes.,T1556.002
|
| MirrorFace has used ipconfig for reconnaissance.,T1016
|
| MirrorFace has used the the PuTTY suite Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) client for file transfer.,T1071.002
|
| MirrorFace has used tools including the Secure Copy Protocol (SCP) client from PuTTY and Cobalt Strike.,T1588.002
|
| Mofang has encrypted payloads before they are downloaded to victims.,T1027.013
|
| Moonstone Sleet delivered payloads using multiple rounds of obfuscation and encoding to evade defenses and analysis.,T1140
|
| Moonstone Sleet delivered various payloads to victims as spearphishing attachments.,T1566.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet delivers encrypted payloads in pieces that are then combined together to form a new portable executable (PE) file during installation.,T1027
|
| Moonstone Sleet deployed various malware such as YouieLoader that can perform system user discovery actions.,T1033
|
| Moonstone Sleet developed malicious npm packages for delivery to or retrieval by victims.,T1587
|
| Moonstone Sleet embedded payloads in trojanized software for follow-on execution.,T1027.009
|
| Moonstone Sleet gathered victim email address information for follow-on phishing activity.,T1589.002
|
| "Moonstone Sleet has created email accounts to interact with victims, including for phishing purposes.",T1585.002
|
| Moonstone Sleet has deployed ransomware in victim environments.,T1486
|
| "Moonstone Sleet has developed custom malware, including a malware delivery mechanism masquerading as a legitimate game.",T1587.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet has distributed a trojanized version of PuTTY software for initial access to victims.,T1195.002
|
| Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim network configuration.,T1016
|
| Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim organizations through email and social media interaction.,T1591
|
| Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim systems.,T1082
|
| Moonstone Sleet has interacted with victims to gather information via email.,T1598
|
| Moonstone Sleet has used encrypted payloads within files for follow-on execution and defense evasion.,T1027.013
|
| Moonstone Sleet has used social media services to spear phish victims to deliver trojainized software.,T1566.003
|
| Moonstone Sleet registered domains to develop effective personas for fake companies used in phishing activity.,T1583.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet registered virtual private servers to host payloads for download.,T1583.003
|
| "Moonstone Sleet relied on users interacting with malicious files, such as a trojanized PuTTY installer, for initial execution.",T1204.002
|
| Moonstone Sleet retrieved a final stage payload from command and control infrastructure during initial installation on victim systems.,T1105
|
| Moonstone Sleet staged malicious capabilities online for follow-on download by victims or malware.,T1608.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet used curl to connect to adversary-controlled infrastructure and retrieve additional payloads.,T1071.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet used intermediate loader malware such as YouieLoader and SplitLoader that create malicious services.,T1569.002
|
| Moonstone Sleet used registry run keys for process execution during initial victim infection.,T1547.001
|
| Moonstone Sleet used scheduled tasks for program execution during initial access to victim machines.,T1053.005
|
| Moses Staff has downloaded and installed web shells to following path C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\system_web\IISpool.aspx.,T1105
|
| Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can disable the Windows firewall on specific remote machines.,T1686.003
|
| MoustachedBouncer has exploited CVE-2021-1732 to execute malware components with elevated rights.,T1068
|
| "MoustachedBouncer has injected content into DNS, HTTP, and SMB replies to redirect specifically-targeted victims to a fake Windows Update page to download malware.",T1659
|
| MoustachedBouncer has used a reverse proxy tool similar to the GitHub repository revsocks.,T1090
|
| MoustachedBouncer has used malware plugins packed with Themida.,T1027.002
|
| MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to save captured screenshots to `.\AActdata\` on an SMB share.,T1074.002
|
| MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to take screenshots on targeted systems.,T1113
|
| MuddyWater can disable the system
|
| "MuddyWater has attempted to get users to open malicious PDF attachment and to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails. Additionally, MuddyWater has used a Word document with a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro; when enabled, the CertificationKit.ini payload is constructed and executed.",T1204.002
|
| "MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients. MuddyWater has also sent spearphishing emails with the attachment Cybersecurity.doc, which served as the primarily payload for the next stage.",T1566.001
|
| "MuddyWater has decoded base64-encoded PowerShell, JavaScript, and VBScript.",T1140
|
| MuddyWater has developed tools in Python including Out1.,T1059.006
|
| "MuddyWater has established domains, some of which appeared to spoof legitimate domains for use in operations.",T1583.001
|
| MuddyWater has mapped target networks; access to this information and more is then shared/sold to other Iran threat actors.,T1590.004
|
| "MuddyWater has used legitimate tools ConnectWise, RemoteUtilities, and SimpleHelp to gain access to the target environment.",T1588.002
|
| MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victim
|
| MuddyWater has used ports 8043 and 8848 for botnet C2 communication.,T1571
|
| Mustang Panda has also exfiltrated archived files to cloud services such as Dropbox using `curl`.,T1567.002
|
| Mustang Panda has compromised legitimate email accounts to use in their spear-phishing operations.,T1586.002
|
| Mustang Panda has created the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU to maintain persistence. Mustang Panda has also established persistence via the registry key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| "Mustang Panda has delayed the execution of payloads leveraging ping echo requests `cmd /c ping 8.8.8.8 -n 70&&""%temp%\""`.",T1678
|
| Mustang Panda has delivered initial payloads hidden using archives and encoding measures. Mustang Panda has also utilized opaque predicates in payloads to hinder analysis.,T1027
|
| Mustang Panda has delivered malicious links to their intended targets. Mustang Panda has distributed spear-phishing emails with embedded links that direct the victim to a malicious archive hosted on Google or Dropbox.,T1566.002
|
| "Mustang Panda has embedded VBScript components in LNK files to download additional files and automate collection. Mustang Panda has also used VBA macros in maldocs to execute malicious DLLs. Mustang Panda also utilized a VBS Script ""autorun.vbs"" that created persistence through saving the VBS Script in the startup directory which would cause it to run each time the machine was turned on.",T1059.005
|
| Mustang Panda has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. Mustang Panda has also made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger.,T1622
|
| "Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4. Mustang Panda has also leveraged encryption and compression algorithms to obfuscate the traffic between the system and C2 server, methods observed included RC4, AES, XOR with 0x5a, and LZO.",T1573.001
|
| Mustang Panda has executed a JavaScript payload utilizing wscript.exe on the endpoint.,T1059.007
|
| Mustang Panda has exfiltrated stolen data and files to its C2 server.,T1041
|
| Mustang Panda has harvested credentials from memory of lssas.exe with Mimikatz.,T1003.001
|
| Mustang Panda has leveraged Mimikatz DCSync feature to obtain user credentials.,T1003.006
|
| Mustang Panda has leveraged NBTscan to scan IP networks.,T1046
|
| "Mustang Panda has leveraged OpenSSH (sshd.exe) to execute commands, transfer files and spread across the environment communicating over SMB port 445.",T1572
|
| Mustang Panda has leveraged Visual Studio Code
|
| Mustang Panda has leveraged `LoadLibrary` to load DLLs.,T1129
|
| "Mustang Panda has leveraged legitimate software installer executables such as Setup Factory ""IRSetup.exe"" to drop and execute their payload.",T1574.005
|
| "Mustang Panda has leveraged legitimate software tools such as AntiVirus Agents, Security Services, and App Development tools to execute scripts and to side-load dlls.",T1072
|
| Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns. Mustang Panda has also created fake Google accounts to distribute malware via spear-phishing emails. Mustang Panda has also created accounts for spearphishing operations including the use of services such as Proton Mail.,T1585.002
|
| Mustang Panda has modified file timestamps from the export address table (EAT) in malware to make it difficult to identify creation times.,T1070.006
|
| Mustang Panda has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.,T1588.004
|
| Mustang Panda has queried Active Directory for computers using AdFind. Mustang Panda has also utilized SharpNBTScan to scan the victim environment.,T1018
|
| Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the InstallUtil.exe program and its version.,T1518
|
| Mustang Panda has sent malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute. Mustang Panda has also leveraged executable files that display decoy documents to the victim to provide a resemblance of legitimacy with customized themes related to the victim.,T1204.002
|
| Mustang Panda has sent malicious links including links directing victims to a Google Drive folder. Mustang Panda has also utilized webpages with Javascript code that downloads malicious payloads to the victim device.,T1204.001
|
| Mustang Panda has set up Dropbox and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.,T1583.006
|
| Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in c:\windows\temp prior to exfiltration. Mustang Panda has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.,T1074.001
|
| Mustang Panda has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution. Mustang Panda has also utilized RC4 encryption for malicious payloads.,T1140
|
| Mustang Panda has used InstallUtil.exe to execute a malicious Beacon stager.,T1218.004
|
| Mustang Panda has used ipconfig and arp to determine network configuration information. Mustang Panda has also utilized SharpNBTScan to scan the victim environment.,T1016
|
| Mustang Panda has used netstat -ano to determine network connection information.,T1049
|
| Mustang Panda has used tasklist /v to determine active process information. Mustang Panda has also used TONESHELL malware to check the process name and process path to ensure it matches the expected one prior to triggering a custom exception handler.,T1057
|
| Mustang Panda has used China Chopper web shells to maintain access to victims
|
| Mustang Panda has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of PlugX. Mustang Panda has also used Google Drive to host malicious downloads.,T1102
|
| Mustang Panda has used FTP to exfiltrate archive files.,T1048.003
|
| "Mustang Panda has used RAR to create password-protected archives of collected documents prior to exfiltration. Mustang Panda has used WinRAR ""Rar.exe"" to archive stolen files before exfiltration. Mustang Panda has also used TONESHELL and post-exploitation tools such as RemCom and Impacket to execute WinRAR `rar.exe` to archive files for exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| Mustang Panda has used Wevtutil to gather Windows Security Event Logs.,T1654
|
| Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. Mustang Panda has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
|
| "Mustang Panda has used names like `adobeupdate.dat` and `PotPlayerDB.dat` to disguise PlugX, and a file named `OneDrive.exe` to load a Cobalt Strike payload. Mustang Panda has also masqueraded legitimate browser plugin updates to include AdobePlugins.exe.",T1036.005
|
| Mustang Panda has used revoked code signing certificates for its malicious payloads.,T1588.003
|
| Mustang Panda has used various Windows API calls during execution and defense evasion.,T1106
|
| Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file. Mustang Panda has also used reg save on the SYSTEM file Registry location to help extract the NTDS.dit file.,T1003.003
|
| Mustang Panda has utilized TCP-based reverse shells using cmd.exe.,T1095
|
| Mustang Panda has utilized TLS record headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. Mustang Panda has used FakeTLS to communicate with its C2 servers.,T1001.003
|
| "Mustang Panda has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of ""17 03 03"" or ""46 77 4d"".",T1205
|
| Mustang Panda has utilized an established Github account to create a tunnel within the victim environment using Visual Studio Code through the `code.exe tunnel` command.,T1219.001
|
| Mustang Panda has utilized meterpreter shellcode.,T1059
|
| Mustang Panda leveraged a captive portal hijack that redirected the victim to a webpage that prompted the victim to download a malicious payload.,T1557
|
| "Mustang Panda utilized ""Hdump"" to dump credentials from memory.",T1003
|
| Mustang Panda
|
| "Mustard Tempest has acquired servers to host second-stage payloads that remain active for a period of either days, weeks, or months.",T1583.004
|
| "Mustard Tempest has hosted payloads on acquired second-stage servers for periods of either days, weeks, or months.",T1608.001
|
| Mustard Tempest has injected malicious JavaScript into compromised websites to infect victims via drive-by download.,T1608.004
|
| Mustard Tempest has poisoned search engine results to return fake software updates in order to distribute malware.,T1608.006
|
| Mustard Tempest has posted false advertisements including for software packages and browser updates in order to distribute malware.,T1583.008
|
| "Mustard Tempest has used drive-by downloads for initial infection, often using fake browser updates as a lure.",T1189
|
| Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL
|
| OilRig actively developed and used a series of downloaders during 2022.,T1587.001
|
| OilRig had downloaded remote files onto victim infrastructure.,T1105
|
| "OilRig has delivered macro-enabled documents that required targets to click the ""enable content"" button to execute the payload on the system.",T1204.002
|
| OilRig has employed keyloggers including KEYPUNCH and LONGWATCH.,T1056.001
|
| OilRig has exfiltrated data via Microsoft Exchange and over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS.,T1048.003
|
| OilRig has incorporated remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools into their operations including ngrok.,T1219
|
| OilRig has modified Windows firewall rules to enable remote access.,T1686.003
|
| OilRig has named a downloaded copy of the Plink tunneling utility as \ProgramData\Adobe.exe.,T1036.005
|
| OilRig has run hostname and systeminfo on a victim.,T1082
|
| OilRig has run ipconfig /all on a victim.,T1016
|
| OilRig has run tasklist on a victim
|
| OilRig has run whoami on a victim.,T1033
|
| OilRig has signed its malware with stolen certificates.,T1553.002
|
| "OilRig has used net group /domain, net group ""domain admins"" /domain, and net group ""Exchange Trusted Subsystem"" /domain to find domain group permission settings.",T1069.002
|
| OilRig has used net localgroup administrators to find local administrators on compromised systems.,T1069.001
|
| "OilRig has used reg query ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"" on a victim to query the Registry.",T1012
|
| OilRig has used PowerShell to upload files from compromised systems.,T1005
|
| OilRig has used Wireshark
|
| OilRig has used a compromised Domain Controller to create a service on a remote host.,T1543.003
|
| OilRig has used an exfiltration tool named STEALHOOK to retreive valid domain credentials.,T1078.002
|
| OilRig has used infostealer tools to copy clipboard data.,T1115
|
| OilRig has used net.exe in a script with net accounts /domain to find the password policy of a domain.,T1201
|
| OilRig has used reg.exe to modify system configuration.,T1112
|
| OilRig used the PowerExchange utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.,T1573.002
|
| "Patchwork has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.",T1598.003
|
| Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.,T1566.002
|
| Play developed and employ Playcrypt ransomware.,T1587.001
|
| "Play has exploited known vulnerabilities for initial access including CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2020-12812 in FortiOS and CVE-2022-41082 and CVE-2022-41040 (""ProxyNotShell"") in Microsoft Exchange.",T1190
|
| Play has leveraged tools to enumerate system information.,T1082
|
| Play has split victims
|
| Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts to disable Microsoft Defender.,T1059.001
|
| Play has used Cobalt Strike to download files to compromised machines.,T1105
|
| Play has used Cobalt Strike to move laterally via SMB.,T1021.002
|
| Play has used Mimikatz and the Windows Task Manager to dump LSASS process memory.,T1003.001
|
| Play has used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) for initial access.,T1133
|
| Play has used WinRAR to compress files prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| Play has used a batch script to remove indicators of its presence on compromised hosts.,T1059.003
|
| Play has used multiple tools for discovery and defense evasion purposes on compromised hosts.,T1588.002
|
| Play has used the Grixba information stealer to list security files and processes.,T1083
|
| Play has used the information stealer Grixba to check for a list of security processes.,T1057
|
| Play has used the information-stealing tool Grixba to scan for anti-virus software.,T1518.001
|
| Play has used tools including Wevtutil to remove malicious files from compromised hosts.,T1070.004
|
| Play has used tools to remove log files on targeted systems.,T1685.005
|
| Play has used valid VPN accounts to achieve initial access.,T1078
|
| "RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network Yandex.Direct.",T1189
|
| Rancor has complied VBScript-generated MOF files into WMI event subscriptions for persistence.,T1546.003
|
| RedCurl has collected emails to use in future phishing campaigns.,T1114.001
|
| RedCurl has collected information about domain accounts using SysInternal
|
| RedCurl has collected information about local accounts.,T1087.001
|
| "RedCurl has collected information about the target system, such as system information and list of network connections.",T1082
|
| RedCurl has deleted files after execution.,T1070.004
|
| RedCurl has downloaded 7-Zip to decompress password protected archives.,T1560.001
|
| RedCurl has established persistence by creating entries in `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
|
| RedCurl has gained access to a contractor to pivot to the victim
|
| RedCurl has placed modified LNK files on network drives for lateral movement.,T1080
|
| RedCurl has searched for and collected files on local and network drives.,T1083
|
| RedCurl has used AES-128 CBC to encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.001
|
| "RedCurl has used HTTP, HTTPS and Webdav protocls for C2 communications.",T1071.001
|
| RedCurl has used PowerShell to execute commands and to download malware.,T1059.001
|
| RedCurl has used VBScript to run malicious files.,T1059.005
|
| RedCurl has used a Python script to establish outbound communication and to execute commands using SMB port 445.,T1059.006
|
| RedCurl has used batch scripts to collect data.,T1119
|
| RedCurl has used batch scripts to exfiltrate data.,T1020
|
| "RedCurl has used cloud storage to exfiltrate data, in particular the megatools utilities were used to exfiltrate data to Mega, a file storage service.",T1537
|
| RedCurl has used malicious files to infect the victim machines.,T1204.002
|
| RedCurl has used malicious links to infect the victim machines.,T1204.001
|
| "RedCurl has used malware with string encryption. RedCurl has also encrypted data and has encoded PowerShell commands using Base64. RedCurl has used `PyArmor` to obfuscate code execution of LaZagne. Additionally, RedCurl has obfuscated downloaded files by renaming them as commonly used tools and has used `echo`, instead of file names themselves, to execute files.",T1027
|
| RedCurl has used netstat to check if port 4119 is open.,T1046
|
| RedCurl has used rundll32.exe to execute malicious files.,T1218.011
|
| RedCurl has used the Windows Command Prompt to execute commands.,T1059.003
|
| RedCurl has used web services to download malicious files.,T1102
|
| "RedCurl mimicked legitimate file names and scheduled tasks, e.g. ` MicrosoftCurrentupdatesCheck` and `MdMMaintenenceTask` to mask malicious files and scheduled tasks.",T1036.005
|
| RedCurl used LaZagne to obtain passwords from memory.,T1003.001
|
| RedCurl used LaZagne to obtain passwords from web browsers.,T1555.003
|
| RedCurl used LaZagne to obtain passwords in files.,T1552.001
|
| RedCurl used LaZagne to obtain passwords in the Registry.,T1552.002
|
| RedEcho has registered domains spoofing Indian critical infrastructure entities.,T1583.001
|
| RedEcho network activity is associated with SSL traffic via TCP 443 and proxied HTTP traffic over non-standard ports.,T1071.001
|
| RedEcho used dynamic DNS domains associated with malicious infrastructure.,T1568
|
| RedEcho uses SSL for network communication.,T1573.002
|
| Rocke has cleared log files within the /var/log/ folder.,T1685.006
|
| "Rocke has used shell scripts which download mining executables and saves them with the filename ""java"".",T1036.005
|
| Saint Bear clones .NET assemblies from other .NET binaries as well as cloning code signing certificates from other software to obfuscate the initial loader payload.,T1027.002
|
| Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.,T1497
|
| Saint Bear gathered victim email information in advance of phishing operations for targeted attacks.,T1589.002
|
| "Saint Bear has used an initial loader malware featuring a legitimate code signing certificate associated with ""Electrum Technologies GmbH.""",T1553.002
|
| Saint Bear has used the Discord content delivery network for hosting malicious content referenced in links and emails.,T1608.001
|
| "Saint Bear has, in addition to email-based phishing attachments, used malicious websites masquerading as legitimate entities to host links to malicious files for user execution.",T1204.001
|
| Saint Bear initial payloads included encoded follow-on payloads located in the resources file of the first-stage loader.,T1027.013
|
| "Saint Bear uses a variety of file formats, such as Microsoft Office documents, ZIP archives, PDF documents, and other items as phishing attachments for initial access.",T1566.001
|
| Salt Typhoon has added SSH authorized_keys under root or other users at the Linux level on compromised network devices.,T1098.004
|
| "Salt Typhoon has cleared logs including .bash_history, auth.log, lastlog, wtmp, and btmp.",T1685.006
|
| Salt Typhoon has cracked passwords for accounts with weak encryption obtained from the configuration files of compromised network devices.,T1110.002
|
| Salt Typhoon has created Linux-level users on compromised network devices through modification of `/etc/shadow` and `/etc/passwd`.,T1136
|
| Salt Typhoon has exfiltrated configuration files from exploited network devices over FTP and TFTP.,T1048.003
|
| Salt Typhoon has exploited CVE-2018-0171 in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software for initial access.,T1190
|
| Salt Typhoon has made changes to the Access Control List (ACL) and loopback interface address on compromised devices.,T1686
|
| Salt Typhoon has modified device configurations to create and use Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels.,T1572
|
| "Salt Typhoon has modified the loopback address on compromised switches and used them as the source of SSH connections to additional devices within the target environment, allowing them to bypass access control lists (ACLs).",T1021.004
|
| Salt Typhoon has used a variety of tools and techniques to capture packet data between network interfaces.,T1040
|
| Salt Typhoon has used configuration files from exploited network devices to help discover upstream and downstream network segments.,T1590.004
|
| Salt Typhoon has used custom tooling including JumbledPath.,T1587.001
|
| Salt Typhoon has used publicly available tooling to exploit vulnerabilities.,T1588.002
|
| Sandworm Team attempts to stop the MSSQL Windows service to ensure successful encryption of locked files.,T1489
|
| Sandworm Team compromised legitimate Linux servers running the EXIM mail transfer agent for use in subsequent campaigns.,T1584.004
|
| "Sandworm Team creates credential capture webpages to compromise existing, legitimate social media accounts.",T1586.001
|
| Sandworm Team exfiltrates data of interest from enterprise databases using Adminer.,T1213.006
|
| "Sandworm Team has acquired open-source tools for their operations, including Invoke-PSImage, which was used to establish an encrypted channel from a compromised host to Sandworm Team's C2 server in preparation for the 2018 Winter Olympics attack, as well as Impacket and RemoteExec, which were used in their 2022 Prestige operations. Additionally, Sandworm Team has used Empire, Cobalt Strike and PoshC2.",T1588.002
|
| Sandworm Team has copied payloads to the `ADMIN$` share of remote systems and run net use to connect to network shares.,T1021.002
|
| Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office and ZIP file attachments via spearphishing emails.,T1566.001
|
| "Sandworm Team has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages, while also hosting these items on legitimate, compromised network infrastructure.",T1583.001
|
| Sandworm Team has used Base64 encoding within malware variants.,T1027
|
| "Sandworm Team has used CaddyWiper, SDelete, and the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on victim systems. Additionally, Sandworm Team has used the JUNKMAIL tool to overwrite files with null bytes.",T1485
|
| Sandworm Team has used Impacket
|
| "Sandworm Team has used ROT13 encoding, AES encryption and compression with the zlib library for their Python-based backdoor.",T1027.010
|
| "Sandworm Team has used `move` to transfer files to a network share and has copied payloads--such as Prestige ransomware--to an Active Directory Domain Controller and distributed via the Default Domain Group Policy Object. Additionally, Sandworm Team has transferred an ISO file into the OT network to gain initial access.",T1570
|
| "Sandworm Team has used dedicated network connections from one victim organization to gain unauthorized access to a separate organization. Additionally, Sandworm Team has accessed Internet service providers and telecommunication entities that provide mobile connectivity.",T1199
|
| "Sandworm Team has used its plainpwd tool, a modified version of Mimikatz, and comsvcs.dll to dump Windows credentials from system memory.",T1003.001
|
| Sandworm Team has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers.,T1219
|
| Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.,T1072
|
| "Sandworm Team leveraged SHARPIVORY, a .NET dropper that writes embedded payload to disk and uses scheduled tasks to persist on victim machines.",T1053.005
|
| Sandworm Team masqueraded malicious installers as Windows update packages to evade defense and entice users to execute binaries.,T1036
|
| "Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an ""EDRPOU"" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spearphishing emails.",T1593
|
| Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers in forums to enable initial access to executing user.,T1608.001
|
| "Sandworm Team staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers on forums to achieve initial, untargetetd access in victim environments.",T1195
|
| Sandworm Team uses Prestige to delete the backup catalog from the target system using: `C:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet` and to delete volume shadow copies using: `C:\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet`.,T1490
|
| "Scattered Spider Spider enumerates a target organization for files and directories of interest, including source code, user provisioning, MFA device registration, network diagrams, and shared credentials in documents or spreadsheets.",T1083
|
| Scattered Spider Spider searches for credential storage documentation on a compromised host.,T1552.001
|
| Scattered Spider adds a federated identity provider to the victim
|
| Scattered Spider creates new user identities within the compromised organization.,T1136
|
| Scattered Spider enumerate and exfiltrate code-signing certificates from a compromised host.,T1552.004
|
| "Scattered Spider enumerates cloud environments including Amazon Web Services (AWS) S3 buckets to identify server and backup management infrastructure, resource access, databases and storage containers .",T1580
|
| Scattered Spider enumerates data stored in cloud resources for collection and exfiltration purposes.,T1530
|
| Scattered Spider has added accounts to the ESX Admins group to grant them full admin rights in vSphere.,T1098
|
| Scattered Spider has added additional trusted locations to Azure AD conditional access policies.,T1556.009
|
| Scattered Spider has also leveraged pre-existing AWS EC2 instances for lateral movement and data collection purposes.,T1021.007
|
| Scattered Spider has assigned user access admin roles in order to gain Tenant Root Group management permissions in Azure.,T1098.003
|
| Scattered Spider has created Amazon EC2 instances within the victim
|
| Scattered Spider has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim environments.,T1585.001
|
| Scattered Spider has deployed a malicious kernel driver through exploitation of CVE-2015-2291 in the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver for Windows (iqvw64.sys).,T1068
|
| Scattered Spider has downloaded the Teleport remote access tool to compromised VMware vCenter Servers.,T1105
|
| "Scattered Spider has enumerated Active Directory security groups including through the use of ADExplorer, ADRecon.ps1, and Get-ADUser.",T1069.002
|
| Scattered Spider has enumerated legitimate domain accounts which are used in the targeted environment.,T1087.002
|
| Scattered Spider has enumerated the vSphere Admins and ESX Admins groups in targeted environments.,T1069
|
| Scattered Spider has executed scripts to identify the underlying operating system to ensure it uses the correct installation package for malicious payloads.,T1082
|
| Scattered Spider has exfiltrated data from compromised VMware vCenter servers through an established C2 channel using the Teleport remote access tool.,T1041
|
| "Scattered Spider has exfiltrated victim data to the MEGA file sharing site, SnowFlake, and AWS S3 buckets.",T1567.002
|
| Scattered Spider has identified vSphere administrator accounts.,T1087
|
| Scattered Spider has impersonated organization IT and helpdesk staff to instruct victims to execute commercial remote access tools to gain initial access.,T1204
|
| "Scattered Spider has installed protocol-tunneling tools on VMware vCenter and adversary-controlled VMs, including Teleport.sh, Chisel (configured to communicate with trycloudflare.com subdomains), MobaXterm, ngrok, Pinggy, and Teleport.",T1572
|
| Scattered Spider has leveraged legitimate remote management tools to maintain persistent access.,T1133
|
| Scattered Spider has manually deleted emails notifying users of suspicious account activity.,T1070.008
|
| Scattered Spider has redirected emails notifying users of suspicious account activity.,T1114.003
|
| Scattered Spider has registered domains to spoof legitimate corporate login portals.,T1583.001
|
| "Scattered Spider has run `SYSTEMD_UNIT_PATH=""/lib/systemd/ system/teleport.service` to establish persistence for the Teleport remote access tool.",T1543.002
|
| Scattered Spider has searched for credentials in password vaults and Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions including HashiCorp Vault.,T1555.005
|
| Scattered Spider has stopped the Volume Shadow Copy service on compromised hosts.,T1490
|
| Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools.,T1685
|
| Scattered Spider has used RDP to enable lateral movement.,T1021.001
|
| Scattered Spider has used SSH to move laterally in victim environments and to access the vSphere vCenter Server GUI.,T1021.004
|
| Scattered Spider has used a combination of credential phishing and social engineering to capture one-time-password (OTP) codes.,T1598
|
| Scattered Spider has used compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to pivot in victim environments.,T1078.004
|
| Scattered Spider has used domains mirroring corporate login portals to socially engineer victims into providing credentials.,T1598.003
|
| Scattered Spider has used help desk voice-based phishing and also called employees at target organizations and compelled them to navigate to fake login portals using adversary-in-the-middle toolkits.,T1598.004
|
| Scattered Spider has used information from previous data breaches to identify employee names to be used in social engineering.,T1589
|
| Scattered Spider has used multifactor authentication (MFA) fatigue by sending repeated MFA authentication requests to targets.,T1621
|
| Scattered Spider has used network reconnaissance commands for discovery including `ping` and `nltest`.,T1016
|
| Scattered Spider has used self-signed and stolen certificates originally issued to NVIDIA and Global Software LLC.,T1553.002
|
| Scattered Spider retrieves browser cookies via Raccoon Stealer.,T1539
|
| Scattered Spider retrieves browser histories via infostealer malware such as Raccoon Stealer.,T1217
|
| Scattered Spider searched the victim
|
| Scattered Spider stages data in a centralized database prior to exfiltration.,T1074
|
| Scattered Spider threat actors search the victim
|
| Scattered Spider utilized social engineering to compel IT help desk personnel to reset passwords and MFA tokens. Scattered Spider has also used Microsoft Teams to pose as internal IT support or help desk personnel.,T1684.001
|
| Sea Turtle accessed victim networks from VPN service provider networks.,T1583
|
| Sea Turtle built adversary-in-the-middle DNS servers to impersonate legitimate services that were later used to capture credentials.,T1583.002
|
| Sea Turtle captured legitimate SSL certificates from victim organizations and installed these on Sea Turtle-controlled infrastructure to enable subsequent adversary-in-the-middle operations.,T1608.003
|
| Sea Turtle collected email archives from victim environments.,T1114.001
|
| Sea Turtle compromised cPanel accounts in victim environments.,T1078.003
|
| Sea Turtle connected over TCP using HTTP to establish command and control channels.,T1071.001
|
| "Sea Turtle created new certificates using a technique called the actors performed ""certificate impersonation,"" a technique in which Sea Turtle obtained a certificate authority-signed X.509 certificate from another provider for the same domain imitating the one already used by the targeted organization.",T1588.004
|
| Sea Turtle deployed the SnappyTCP web shell during intrusion operations.,T1505.003
|
| Sea Turtle downloaded source code files from remote addresses then compiled them locally via GCC in victim environments.,T1027.004
|
| "Sea Turtle executed SnappyTCP using the tool NoHup, which keeps the malware running on a system after exiting the shell or terminal.",T1564.011
|
| Sea Turtle has overwritten Linux system logs and unsets the Bash history file (effectively removing logging) during intrusions.,T1685.006
|
| Sea Turtle has used external-facing SSH to achieve initial access to the IT environments of victim organizations.,T1133
|
| Sea Turtle has used tools such as Adminer during intrusions.,T1588.002
|
| Sea Turtle unset the Bash and MySQL history files on victim systems.,T1690
|
| Sea Turtle used compromised credentials to maintain long-term access to victim environments.,T1078
|
| Sea Turtle used shell scripts for post-exploitation execution in victim environments.,T1059.004
|
| Sea Turtle used the tar utility to create a local archive of email data on a victim system.,T1560.001
|
| Sea Turtle used the tool Adminer to remotely logon to the MySQL service of victim machines.,T1213.006
|
| SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the `credwiz.exe` process and side-load the malicious payload `Duser.dll`.,T1574.001
|
| Sidewinder has used mshta.exe to execute malicious payloads.,T1218.005
|
| Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.,T1574.001
|
| Sidewinder has used base64 encoding for scripts.,T1027.010
|
| Sidewinder has used the Windows service winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 to check installed antivirus products.,T1518.001
|
| "Silence has named its backdoor ""WINWORD.exe"".",T1036.005
|
| "SilverTerrier targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing for business email compromise (BEC) campaigns with the goal of financial theft.",T1657
|
| "Sowbug named its tools to masquerade as Windows or Adobe Reader software, such as by using the file name adobecms.exe and the directory CSIDL_APPDATA\microsoft\security.",T1036.005
|
| Star Blizzard has lured targets into opening malicious .pdf files to deliver malware.,T1204.002
|
| Star Blizzard has registered domains using randomized words and with names resembling legitimate organizations.,T1583.001
|
| Star Blizzard has remotely accessed victims
|
| Star Blizzard has sent emails to establish rapport with targets eventually sending messages with links to credential-stealing sites.,T1598.003
|
| Star Blizzard has used EvilGinx to steal the session cookies of victims directed to phishing domains.,T1539
|
| Star Blizzard has used HubSpot and MailerLite marketing platform services to hide the true sender of phishing emails.,T1583
|
| Star Blizzard has used JavaScript to redirect victim traffic from an adversary controlled server to a server hosting the Evilginx phishing framework.,T1059.007
|
| Star Blizzard has used compromised email accounts to conduct spearphishing against contacts of the original victim.,T1586.002
|
| Star Blizzard has used stolen credentials to sign into victim email accounts.,T1078
|
| Storm-0501 created a new federated domain within the victim Microsoft Entra tenant using Global Administrator level access to establish a persistent backdoor for later use.,T1484.002
|
| Storm-0501 distributed Group Policy Objects to tamper with security products.,T1484.001
|
| "Storm-0501 had used a scheduled task named ""SysUpdate"" that was registered via GPO on devices in the network to distribute the Embargo ransomware.",T1053.005
|
| "Storm-0501 has conducted enumeration of users, roles, and resources within victim Azure tenants using the tool Azurehound.",T1087.004
|
| Storm-0501 has conducted mass deletion of cloud data stores and resources from Azure subscriptions.,T1578.003
|
| Storm-0501 has copied data from the victims environment to their own infrastructure leveraging AzCopy CLI.,T1537
|
| "Storm-0501 has deleted snapshots, restore points, storage accounts, and backup services to prevent remediation and restoration. Storm-0501 has also impacted Azure resources through the targeting of `Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/delete`, `Microsoft.Compute/restorePointCollections/delete`, `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/delete`, and `Microsoft.RecoveryServices/Vaults/backupFabrics/protectionContainers/delete`.",T1490
|
| Storm-0501 has destroyed data and backup files.,T1485
|
| Storm-0501 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site. Storm-0501 has also utilized Rclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage such as MegaSync. Storm-0501 has exfiltrated data to their own infrastructure utilizing AzCopy Command-Line tool (CLI).,T1567.002
|
| "Storm-0501 has exploited N-day vulnerabilities associated with public facing services to gain initial access to victim environments to include Zoho ManageEngine (CVE-2022-47966), Citrix NetScaler ""Citrix Bleed"" (CVE-2023-4966), and Adobe ColdFusion 2016 (CVE-2023-29300 or CVE-2023-38203).",T1190
|
| Storm-0501 has launched Cobalt Strike Beacon files using regsvr32.exe.,T1218.010
|
| Storm-0501 has leveraged Cloud CLI to execute commands and exfiltrate data from compromised environments.,T1059.009
|
| Storm-0501 has leveraged PowerShell to execute commands and scripts.,T1059.001
|
| Storm-0501 has leveraged brute force attacks to obtain credentials.,T1110
|
| "Storm-0501 has leveraged compromised accounts to access Microsoft Entra Connect, which was used to synchronize on-premises identities and Microsoft Entra identities, allowing users to sign into both environments with the same password. Storm-0501 has also used the victim Global Administrator account that lacked any registered MFA method to access victim cloud environments. Storm-0501 has leveraged Storage Account Access Keys within the victim environment.",T1078.004
|
| Storm-0501 has leveraged native Windows tools and commands such as `systeminfo` and open-source tools including OSQuery and ossec-win32 to query details about the endpoint.,T1082
|
| Storm-0501 has leveraged the Azure Owner role to access and steal the Storage Account Access keys using the `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action` operation.,T1552.004
|
| "Storm-0501 has obtained capabilities to exploit N-day vulnerabilities associated with public facing services to gain initial access to victim environments to include Zoho ManageEngine (CVE-2022-47966), Citrix NetScaler ""Citrix Bleed"" (CVE-2023-4966), and Adobe ColdFusion 2016 (CVE-2023-29300 or CVE-2023-38203).",T1588.006
|
| Storm-0501 has reset the password of identified administrator accounts that lack MFA and registered their own MFA method.,T1098.001
|
| Storm-0501 has stolen credentials contained in the password manager Keepass by utilizing Find-KeePassConfig.ps1.,T1555.005
|
| Storm-0501 has used Themida to pack Cobalt Strike payloads.,T1027.002
|
| Storm-0501 has used Windows native utility Nltest `nltest.exe` for discovery.,T1482
|
| Storm-0501 has used compromised Entra Connect Sync Server to move laterally within the victim environment.,T1021.007
|
| "Storm-0501 has used legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools including AnyDesk, NinjaOne, and Level.io.",T1219.002
|
| Storm-0501 has utilized Rclone masqueraded as svhost.exe and scvhost.exe.,T1036.004
|
| Storm-0501 has utilized an obfuscated version of the Active Directory reconnaissance tool ADRecon.ps1 (obfs.ps1 or recon.ps1) to discover domain accounts.,T1087.002
|
| Storm-0501 has utilized the post-exploitation tool known as Evil-WinRM that uses PowerShell over Windows Remote Management (WinRM) for remote code execution.,T1021.006
|
| "Storm-1811 acquired various legitimate and malicious tools, such as RMM software and commodity malware packages, for operations.",T1588.002
|
| Storm-1811 has created Microsoft Teams accounts that spoof IT support and helpdesk members for use in application and voice phishing.,T1036.010
|
| Storm-1811 has created domains for use with RMM tools.,T1583.001
|
| "Storm-1811 has created malicious accounts to enable activity via Microsoft Teams, typically spoofing various IT support and helpdesk themes.",T1585.003
|
| "Storm-1811 has deployed a malicious DLL (7z.DLL) that is sideloaded by a modified, legitimate installer (7zG.exe) when that installer is executed with an additional command line parameter of `b` at runtime to load a Cobalt Strike beacon payload.",T1574.001
|
| Storm-1811 has deployed large volumes of non-malicious email spam to victims in order to prompt follow-on interactions with the threat actor posing as IT support or helpdesk to resolve the problem.,T1667
|
| Storm-1811 has disguised Cobalt Strike installers as a malicious DLL masquerading as part of a legitimate 7zip installation package.,T1036.005
|
| Storm-1811 has distributed malicious links to victims that redirect to EvilProxy-based phishing sites to harvest credentials.,T1566.002
|
| Storm-1811 has initiated voice calls with victims posing as IT support to prompt users to download and execute scripts and other tools for initial access.,T1566.004
|
| Storm-1811 has prompted users to download and execute batch scripts that masquerade as legitimate update files during initial access and social engineering operations.,T1036
|
| Storm-1811 has prompted users to execute downloaded software and payloads as the result of social engineering activity.,T1204.002
|
| Storm-1811 has used OpenSSH to establish an SSH tunnel to victims for persistent access.,T1021.004
|
| "Storm-1811 has used PowerShell for multiple purposes, such as using PowerShell scripts executing in an infinite loop to create an SSH connection to a command and control server.",T1059.001
|
| Storm-1811 has used `cacls.exe` via batch script to modify file and directory permissions in victim environments.,T1222.001
|
| Storm-1811 has used `whoami.exe` to determine if the active user on a compromised system is an administrator.,T1033
|
| Storm-1811 has used a PowerShell script to capture user credentials after prompting a user to authenticate to run a malicious script masquerading as a legitimate update item.,T1056
|
| Storm-1811 has used multiple batch scripts during initial access and subsequent actions on victim machines.,T1059.003
|
| "Storm-1811 has used scripted `cURL` commands, BITSAdmin, and other mechanisms to retrieve follow-on batch scripts and tools for execution on victim devices.",T1105
|
| Storm-1811 has used the Impacket toolset to move and remotely execute payloads to other hosts in victim networks.,T1570
|
| Storm-1811 impersonates help desk and IT support personnel for phishing and social engineering purposes during initial access to victim environments.,T1684.001
|
| Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to the deployment of Black Basta ransomware in victim environments.,T1486
|
| TA2541 has collected system information prior to downloading malware on the targeted host.,T1082
|
| "TA2541 has hosted malicious files on various platforms including Google Drive, OneDrive, Discord, PasteText, ShareText, and GitHub.",T1583.006
|
| "TA2541 has injected malicious code into legitimate .NET related processes including regsvcs.exe, msbuild.exe, and installutil.exe.",T1055
|
| TA2541 has placed VBS files in the Startup folder and used Registry run keys to establish persistence for malicious payloads.,T1547.001
|
| "TA2541 has registered domains often containing the keywords ""kimjoy,"" ""h0pe,"" and ""grace,"" using domain registrars including Netdorm and No-IP DDNS, and hosting providers including xTom GmbH and Danilenko, Artyom.",T1583.001
|
| TA2541 has run scripts to check internet connectivity from compromised hosts.,T1016.001
|
| TA2541 has sent phishing emails with malicious attachments for initial access including MS Word documents.,T1566.001
|
| TA2541 has used TLS encrypted C2 communications including for campaigns using AsyncRAT.,T1573.002
|
| "TA2541 has used VBS files to execute or establish persistence for additional payloads, often using file names consistent with email themes or mimicking system functionality.",T1059.005
|
| TA2541 has used WMI to query targeted systems for security products.,T1047
|
| TA2541 has used a .NET packer to obfuscate malicious files.,T1027.002
|
| TA2541 has used commodity remote access tools.,T1588.002
|
| TA2541 has used file names to mimic legitimate Windows files or system functionality.,T1036.005
|
| TA2541 has used macro-enabled MS Word documents to lure victims into executing malicious payloads.,T1204.002
|
| TA2541 has used multiple strains of malware available for purchase on criminal forums or in open-source repositories.,T1588.001
|
| TA2541 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for installed tools.,T1053.005
|
| TA2541 has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious links to deliver malware.,T1566.002
|
| TA2541 has used tools to search victim systems for security products such as antivirus and firewall software.,T1518.001
|
| TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents.,T1027.013
|
| TA505 has used msiexec to download and execute malicious Windows Installer files.,T1218.007
|
| TA551 has used cmd.exe to execute commands.,T1059.003
|
| TA577 has lured users into executing malicious JavaScript files by sending malicious links via email.,T1204.001
|
| TA577 has sent emails containing links to malicious JavaScript files.,T1566.002
|
| TA577 has sent thread hijacked messages from compromised emails.,T1586.002
|
| TA577 has used BAT files in malware execution chains.,T1059.003
|
| TA577 has used JavaScript to execute additional malicious payloads.,T1059.007
|
| TA577 has used LNK files to execute embedded DLLs.,T1027.009
|
| TA578 has used Google Firebase to host malicious scripts.,T1583.006
|
| TA578 has used JavaScript files in malware execution chains.,T1059.007
|
| TeamTNT has added RSA keys in authorized_keys.,T1098.004
|
| TeamTNT has checked for running containers with docker ps and for specific container names with docker inspect. TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.,T1613
|
| TeamTNT has disabled iptables.,T1686
|
| "TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.",T1685
|
| TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with chattr.,T1222.002
|
| TeamTNT has removed system logs from /var/log/syslog.,T1685.006
|
| TeamTNT has run netstat -anp to search for rival malware connections. TeamTNT has also used `libprocesshider` to modify /etc/ld.so.preload.,T1049
|
| TeamTNT has searched for disk partition and logical volume information.,T1680
|
| TeamTNT targeted misconfigured containers and used container CLI tools.,T1059.013
|
| The BRONZE BUTLER uploader or malware the uploader uses command to delete the RAR archives after they have been exfiltrated.,T1070.004
|
| "Threat Group-3390 has packed malware and tools, including using VMProtect.",T1027.002
|
| "Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload. Threat Group-3390 has also used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as `rc.exe`, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.",T1574.001
|
| Threat Group-3390 has registered domains for C2.,T1583.001
|
| Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.,T1087.001
|
| Threat Group-3390 malware is compressed with LZNT1 compression.,T1027.015
|
| "Threat Group-3390's malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.",T1543.003
|
| "ToddyCat can determine is Kaspersky software is running on an endpoint by running `cmd /c wmic process where name=""avp.exe""`.",T1518.001
|
| "ToddyCat has executed `net group ""domain admins"" /dom` for discovery on compromised machines.",T1069.002
|
| ToddyCat has exploited the ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) to compromise Exchange Servers at multiple organizations.,T1190
|
| ToddyCat has hidden malicious scripts using `powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden`.,T1564.003
|
| "ToddyCat has leveraged xcopy, 7zip, and RAR to stage and compress collected documents prior to exfiltration.",T1560.001
|
| ToddyCat has run `cmd /c start /b tasklist` to enumerate processes.,T1057
|
| ToddyCat has run `net user %USER% /dom` for account discovery.,T1087.002
|
| ToddyCat has run scripts to collect documents from targeted hosts.,T1005
|
| "ToddyCat has run scripts to enumerate recently modified documents having either a .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls or .xlsx extension.",T1083
|
| ToddyCat has sent loaders configured to run Ninja as zip archives via Telegram.,T1566.003
|
| ToddyCat has used .bat scripts and `cmd` for execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.003
|
| ToddyCat has used Powershell scripts to perform post exploit collection.,T1059.001
|
| ToddyCat has used `WinExec` to execute commands received from C2 on compromised hosts.,T1106
|
| ToddyCat has used `ping %REMOTE_HOST%` for post exploit discovery.,T1018
|
| ToddyCat has used a passive backdoor that receives commands with UDP packets.,T1095
|
| ToddyCat has used compromised domain admin credentials to mount local network shares.,T1078.002
|
| ToddyCat has used scheduled tasks to execute discovery commands and scripts for collection.,T1053.005
|
| "Tonto Team has used the ShowLocalGroupDetails command to identify administrator, user, and guest accounts on a compromised host.",T1069.001
|
| Tropic Trooper has created a hidden directory under C:\ProgramData\Apple\Updates\ and C:\Users\Public\Documents\Flash\.,T1564.001
|
| Tropic Trooper has created the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell and sets the value to establish persistence.,T1547.004
|
| Tropic Trooper has detected a target system
|
| Tropic Trooper is capable of enumerating the running processes on the system using pslist.,T1057
|
| Tropic Trooper used letmein to scan for saved usernames on the target system.,T1033
|
| Turla has also used PowerSploit
|
| Turla has modified Registry values to store payloads.,T1112
|
| Turla has named components of LunarWeb to mimic Zabbix agent logs.,T1036.005
|
| Turla has placed LunarWeb install files into directories that are excluded from scanning.,T1564.012
|
| Turla has used fsutil fsinfo drives to list connected drives.,T1120
|
| Turla has used net accounts and net accounts /domain to acquire password policy information.,T1201
|
| "Turla has used net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain to identify domain administrators.",T1069.002
|
| Turla has used net user /domain to enumerate domain accounts.,T1087.002
|
| Turla has used net user to enumerate local accounts on the system.,T1087.001
|
| Turla has used tracert to check internet connectivity.,T1016.001
|
| "Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll, in PowerShell scripts to bypass Windows antimalware products.",T1685
|
| "Turla has used encryption (including salted 3DES via PowerSploit's Out-EncryptedScript.ps1), random variable names, and base64 encoding to obfuscate PowerShell commands and payloads.",T1027.010
|
| Turla has used the Registry to store encrypted and encoded payloads.,T1027.011
|
| Turla may attempt to connect to systems within a victim
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover Group Policy details using the gpresult command.,T1615
|
| "Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover files in specific locations on the hard disk %TEMP% directory, the current user's desktop, the Program Files directory, and Recent. Turla RPC backdoors have also searched for files matching the lPH.dll pattern.",T1083
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover information in the Windows Registry with the reg query command. Turla has also retrieved PowerShell payloads hidden in Registry keys as well as checking keys associated with null session named pipes .,T1012
|
| "Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover network configuration details using the arp -a, nbtstat -n, net config, ipconfig /all, and route commands, as well as NBTscan. Turla RPC backdoors have also retrieved registered RPC interface information from process memory.",T1016
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover operating system configuration details using the systeminfo and set commands.,T1082
|
| "Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands. Turla has also used net group ""Domain Computers"" /domain, net group ""Domain Controllers"" /domain, and net group ""Exchange Servers"" /domain to enumerate domain computers, including the organization's DC and Exchange Server.",T1018
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running processes using the tasklist /v command. Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated processes associated with specific open ports or named pipes.,T1057
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the tasklist /svc command.,T1007
|
| Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover the system time by using the net time command.,T1124
|
| Turla used net use commands to connect to lateral systems within a network.,T1021.002
|
| UNC3886 has attempted to bypass digital signature verification checks at startup by adding a command to the startup config `/etc/init.d/localnet` within the rootfs.gz archive of both FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices.,T1037
|
| UNC3886 has cleared specific events that contained the threat actor
|
| UNC3886 has deployed backdoors that communicate over TCP to compromised network devices and over VMCI to ESXi hosts.,T1095
|
| UNC3886 has deployed custom malware families on Fortinet and VMware systems.,T1587.001
|
| UNC3886 has deployed malware using the victim
|
| UNC3886 has disabled OpenSSL digital signature verification of system files through corruption of boot files.,T1685
|
| "UNC3886 has employed layers of redundancy to maintain access to compromised environments including network devices, hypervisors, and virtual machines.",T1008
|
| UNC3886 has established remote SSH access to targeted ESXi hosts.,T1021.004
|
| UNC3886 has exoloited CVE-2023-34048 to enable command execution on vCenter servers and CVE-2023-20867 in VMware Tools to execute unauthenticated Guest Operations from ESXi hosts to guest VMs.,T1203
|
| "UNC3886 has exploited zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-20867 to enable execution of privileged commands across Windows, Linux, and PhotonOS (vCenter) guest VMs.",T1068
|
| UNC3886 has named a file
|
| UNC3886 has placed a bash installation script into `/etc/rc.local.d/` to establish persistence.,T1037.004
|
| "UNC3886 has replaced atomic indicators mentioned in threat intelligence publications, sometimes as quickly as under a week after release.",T1027.005
|
| UNC3886 has trojanized Fortinet firmware and replaced the legitimate `/usr/bin/tac_plus` TACACS+ daemon for Linux with a malicious version containing credential logging functionality.,T1554
|
| UNC3886 has used MiniDump to dump process memory and search for cleartext credentials.,T1003.001
|
| UNC3886 has used a PowerShell script to search memory dumps for credentials.,T1059.001
|
| UNC3886 has used a bash script to install malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).,T1059.004
|
| UNC3886 has used scripts to timestomp ESXi hosts prior to installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).,T1070.006
|
| UNC3886 has used the LOOKOVER sniffer to sniff TACACS+ authentication packets.,T1040
|
| UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility to listen for specialized command packets on compromised FortiManager devices.,T1205
|
| "UNC3886 has used the esxcli command line utility to modify firewall rules, install malware, and for artifact removal.",T1059.012
|
| UNC3886 has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA on targeted VMs.,T1014
|
| UNC3886 has used the the esxcli command line to remove files created by malicious vSphere Installation Bundles from disk.,T1070.004
|
| UNC3886 has used vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) that contained modified descriptor XML files with the `acceptance-level` set to `partner` which allowed for privilege escalation.,T1548
|
| UNC3886 has used vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to install malware and establish persistence across ESXi hypervisors.,T1505.006
|
| UNC3886 maintained persistence on FortiGate Firewalls through ICMP port knocking.,T1205.001
|
| UNC3886 used `vmtoolsd.exe` to run commands on guest virtual machines from a compromised ESXi host.,T1675
|
| "VOID MANTICORE conducted large-scale data exfiltration in the Stryker operation, consistent with automated or scripted collection against enterprise systems.",T1119
|
| VOID MANTICORE had exported credentials from registry hives to include those stored in HKLM.,T1552.002
|
| VOID MANTICORE had utilized Group Policy logon scripts to distribute the malicious payloads to victim devices through the execution of a batch file.,T1484.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has accessed victim
|
| VOID MANTICORE has avoided interacting with specific directories in order to reduce the likelihood of detection.,T1679
|
| VOID MANTICORE has captured screen content during an active Zoom session.,T1113
|
| VOID MANTICORE has collected cached data and files from within the victim environment.,T1005
|
| VOID MANTICORE has collected video from compromised victim devices.,T1125
|
| VOID MANTICORE has compressed their payloads by leveraging zip files.,T1027.015
|
| VOID MANTICORE has conducted data exfiltration and posted stolen information on data leak sites for the purposes of financial and political extortion. VOID MANTICORE has also sold stolen data to prospective buyers for cryptocurrency.,T1657
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has conducted data wiping attacks on compromised systems. VOID MANTICORE has also manually deleted files from compromised hosts, to include selecting all files and then deleting them.",T1485
|
| VOID MANTICORE has conducted password guessing to gain initial access.,T1110.001
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has created Telegram Accounts. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged online personas such as Handala Hack, Karma, and Homeland Justice on social media to include Telegram. VOID MANTICORE has established and maintained social media accounts on Twitter/X and Telegram to amplify operational claims and stolen data disclosures.",T1585.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has created Windows Registry entries to autorun stage two malware payloads to maintain persistence.,T1547.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has created email accounts to send threatening messages to victims to include
|
| VOID MANTICORE has deleted virtual machines directly from the virtualization platform.,T1490
|
| VOID MANTICORE has deployed custom wipers that overwrite system files and the host devices master boot records (MBR) to corrupt or destroy files.,T1561.002
|
| VOID MANTICORE has developed or obtained trojanized applications used for persistent surveillance of targeted individuals.,T1588.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has disabled Windows Defender protections to allow for follow-on activities within the compromised host.,T1686.003
|
| VOID MANTICORE has dumped LSASS credentials using `comsvcs.dll` via `rundll32.exe`.,T1003.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has emailed victims threatening messages. VOID MANTICORE has used phishing as an initial access vector.,T1566
|
| VOID MANTICORE has exploited public facing vulnerabilities within victim environments to include SharePoint CVE-2019-0604.,T1190
|
| VOID MANTICORE has gathered audio during a Zoom session.,T1123
|
| VOID MANTICORE has gathered details on their intended victims to aid in social engineering efforts for leveraging tailored themes of attacks.,T1589
|
| VOID MANTICORE has gathered system information and disseminated it back to C2.,T1082
|
| VOID MANTICORE has gathered victim email-content from victim servers.,T1114.002
|
| VOID MANTICORE has impersonated individuals familiar to the victim and technical support associated with social messaging services.,T1684.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has installed NetBird on victim devices to create a mesh network that facilitated control of several victim devices at once.,T1219.002
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has leveraged access to administrative control systems to achieve disruptive effects, consistent with administrative account abuse or privilege escalation within existing access.",T1098
|
| VOID MANTICORE has leveraged legitimate built-in features of cloud-based management platforms to include mobile device management (MDM) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) solutions. VOID MANTICORE has also initiated built-in remote wipe instructions using a privileged account within Microsoft Intune.,T1072
|
| VOID MANTICORE has leveraged public facing VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to victim environments.,T1133
|
| VOID MANTICORE has leveraged valid accounts to log into VPN infrastructure. VOID MANTICORE has used compromised valid credentials to gain access to management infrastructure and enterprise control systems. VOID MANTICORE has also validated and tested authentication using compromised credentials prior to malicious actions.,T1078
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications. VOID MANTICORE has leveraged malicious payloads that use nomenclature associated with common applications that include Pictory, KeePass, WhatsApp, and Telegram.",T1036.005
|
| VOID MANTICORE has obtained access to commercial VPN services to launch malicious activity. VOID MANTICORE has also leveraged Starlink internet services. VOID MANTICORE has used operator-controlled Telegram bots and channels as C2 infrastructure.,T1583.006
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has obtained and utilized commercial VPN services, open-source software and publicly available offensive security tools to facilitate malicious activities.",T1588.002
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has registered domains for messaging purposes. VOID MANTICORE has created typosquatted domains and sub-domains in attempts to avoid detection or draw suspicion. VOID MANTICORE has also purchased domains leveraging cryptocurrency platforms to include LiteCoin and Ramzinex. VOID MANTICORE has registered and rotated domains to support public-facing dissemination infrastructure, replacing disrupted domains with new registrations.",T1583.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has scanned victim environments for susceptibility to vulnerability exploitation.,T1595.002
|
| VOID MANTICORE has stored collected data in a password protected compressed file prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has used RDP to move laterally within the victim environment.,T1021.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has used previously compromised Domain Administrator credentials to maintain persistent access.,T1078.002
|
| VOID MANTICORE has used tunneling tools to facilitate destructive attacks on compromised devices.,T1572
|
| VOID MANTICORE has utilized Python scripts to execute its malicious payloads.,T1059.006
|
| VOID MANTICORE has utilized VPS solutions for C2.,T1583.003
|
| "VOID MANTICORE has utilized WMIC to log into the victim host and create a process `process call create ""cmd.exe /c copy \\?\\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\windows\system32\config\system c:\users\public""`.",T1047
|
| VOID MANTICORE has utilized a disk wiping utility to facilitate destructive actions on victim servers. VOID MANTICORE has also utilized legitimate remote disk wiping commands.,T1561.001
|
| VOID MANTICORE has utilized legitimate disk encryption utilities to increase likelihood of encrypting system drives and reduce system recovery efforts.,T1486
|
| VOID MANTICORE malware has exfiltrated collected data via Telegram bot C2 channels using encrypted communications.,T1041
|
| Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh.,T1686.003
|
| Velvet Ant accessed vulnerable Cisco switch devices using accounts with administrator privileges.,T1078.003
|
| Velvet Ant attempted to disable local security tools and endpoint detection and response (EDR) software during operations.,T1685
|
| Velvet Ant executed and installed PlugX as a Windows service.,T1569.002
|
| Velvet Ant exploited CVE-2024-20399 in Cisco Switches to which the threat actor was already able to authenticate in order to escape the NX-OS command line interface and gain access to the underlying operating system for arbitrary command execution.,T1211
|
| Velvet Ant has enumerated existing network connections on victim devices.,T1049
|
| Velvet Ant has enumerated local files and folders on victim devices.,T1083
|
| Velvet Ant has leveraged access to internet-facing remote services to compromise and retain access to victim environments.,T1133
|
| "Velvet Ant has tunneled traffic from victims through an internal, compromised host to proxy communications to command and control nodes.",T1090.001
|
| "Velvet Ant has used a custom tool, ""VELVETTAP"", to perform packet capture from compromised F5 BIG-IP devices.",T1040
|
| Velvet Ant has used random high number ports for PlugX listeners on victim devices.,T1571
|
| "Velvet Ant modified system firewall settings during PlugX installation using `netsh.exe` to open a listening, random high number port on victim devices.",T1686
|
| Velvet Ant sent commands to compromised F5 BIG-IP devices in an encoded format requiring a passkey before interpretation and execution.,T1132
|
| Velvet Ant transferred files laterally within victim networks through the Impacket toolkit.,T1570
|
| Velvet Ant used a modified `/etc/rc.local` file on compromised F5 BIG-IP devices to maintain persistence.,T1037.004
|
| Velvet Ant used the `wmiexec.py` tool within Impacket for remote process execution via WMI.,T1047
|
| Volt Typhoon has archived the ntds.dit database as a multi-volume password-protected archive with 7-Zip.,T1560.001
|
| "Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY.",T1555
|
| Volt Typhoon has collected window title information from compromised systems.,T1010
|
| Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about the target organization
|
| Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance pre-compromise to gain information about the targeted organization.,T1591
|
| Volt Typhoon has conducted pre-compromise reconnaissance on victim-owned sites.,T1594
|
| Volt Typhoon has conducted pre-compromise web searches for victim information.,T1593
|
| Volt Typhoon has created and accessed a file named rult3uil.log on compromised domain controllers to capture keypresses and command execution.,T1056.001
|
| "Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems.",T1680
|
| Volt Typhoon has downloaded an outdated version of comsvcs.dll to a compromised domain controller in a non-standard folder.,T1105
|
| Volt Typhoon has enumerated running processes on targeted systems including through the use of Tasklist.,T1057
|
| Volt Typhoon has executed `net user` and `quser` to enumerate local account information.,T1087.001
|
| "Volt Typhoon has executed multiple commands to enumerate network topology and settings including `ipconfig`, `netsh interface firewall show all`, and `netsh interface portproxy show all`.",T1016
|
| Volt Typhoon has exploited zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access.,T1587.004
|
| "Volt Typhoon has gained initial access through exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities in internet-facing software and appliances such as Fortinet, Ivanti (formerly Pulse Secure), NETGEAR, Citrix, and Cisco.",T1190
|
| Volt Typhoon has gathered victim identify information during pre-compromise reconnaissance.,T1589
|
| Volt Typhoon has identified key network and IT staff members pre-compromise at targeted organizations.,T1591.004
|
| Volt Typhoon has identified target network security measures as part of pre-compromise reconnaissance.,T1590.006
|
| Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.,T1021.001
|
| Volt Typhoon has obtained a screenshot of the victim
|
| Volt Typhoon has obtained credentials insecurely stored on targeted network appliances.,T1552
|
| Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim
|
| Volt Typhoon has obtained victim
|
| Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software.,T1518
|
| Volt Typhoon has run `net localgroup administrators` in compromised environments to enumerate accounts.,T1069.001
|
| Volt Typhoon has run `rd /S` to delete their working directories and deleted systeminfo.dat from `C:\Users\Public\Documentsfiles`.,T1070.004
|
| Volt Typhoon has run system checks to determine if they were operating in a virtualized environment.,T1497.001
|
| Volt Typhoon has saved stolen files including the `ntds.dit` database and the `SYSTEM` and `SECURITY` Registry hives locally to the `C:\Windows\Temp\` directory.,T1074.001
|
| Volt Typhoon has targeted network administrator browser data including browsing history and stored credentials.,T1555.003
|
| Volt Typhoon has targeted the browsing history of network administrators.,T1217
|
| Volt Typhoon has targeted the personal emails of key network and IT staff at victim organizations.,T1589.002
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used Base64-encoded data to transfer payloads and commands, including deobfuscation via certutil.",T1140
|
| Volt Typhoon has used Brightmetricagent.exe which contains a command- line interface (CLI) library that can leverage command shells including Z Shell (zsh).,T1059.004
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used FOFA, Shodan, and Censys to search for exposed victim infrastructure.",T1596.005
|
| Volt Typhoon has used PowerShell including for remote system discovery.,T1059.001
|
| Volt Typhoon has used VPNs to connect to victim environments and enable post-exploitation actions.,T1133
|
| Volt Typhoon has used `net start` to list running services.,T1007
|
| Volt Typhoon has used `netsh` to create a PortProxy Registry modification on a compromised server running the Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG).,T1112
|
| Volt Typhoon has used `netstat -ano` on compromised hosts to enumerate network connections.,T1049
|
| Volt Typhoon has used `wevtutil.exe` and the PowerShell command `Get-EventLog security` to enumerate Windows logs to search for successful logons.,T1654
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for network service discovery.",T1046
|
| Volt Typhoon has used compromised Paessler Router Traffic Grapher (PRTG) servers from other organizations for C2.,T1584.004
|
| Volt Typhoon has used compromised domain accounts to authenticate to devices on compromised networks.,T1078.002
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used legitimate looking filenames for compressed copies of the ntds.dit database and used names including cisco_up.exe, cl64.exe, vm3dservice.exe, watchdogd.exe, Win.exe, WmiPreSV.exe, and WmiPrvSE.exe for the Earthworm and Fast Reverse Proxy tools.",T1036.005
|
| Volt Typhoon has used legitimate network and forensic tools and customized versions of open-source tools for C2.,T1588.002
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used multiple methods, including Ping, to enumerate systems on compromised networks.",T1018
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used native tools and processes including living off the land binaries or ""LOLBins"" to maintain and expand access to the victim networks.",T1218
|
| Volt Typhoon has used public tools and executed the PowerShell command `Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624` to identify associated user and computer account names.,T1033
|
| Volt Typhoon has used publicly available exploit code for initial access.,T1588.006
|
| Volt Typhoon has used the Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX) to obfuscate the FRP client files BrightmetricAgent.exe and SMSvcService.ex) and the port scanning utility ScanLine.,T1027.002
|
| Volt Typhoon has used the Windows command line to perform hands-on-keyboard activities in targeted environments including for discovery.,T1059.003
|
| Volt Typhoon has used the built-in netsh `port proxy` command to create proxies on compromised systems to facilitate access.,T1090.001
|
| "Volt Typhoon has used webshells, including ones named AuditReport.jspx and iisstart.aspx, in compromised environments.",T1505.003
|
| Volt Typhoon relies primarily on valid credentials for persistence.,T1078
|
| WIRTE has XOR encrypted command line strings to conceal malware execution chains.,T1027.010
|
| "WIRTE has attempted to lure users into opening malicious documents including MS Word and Excel files, at times using a decoy document to encourage execution of malicious payloads.",T1204.002
|
| WIRTE has compressed malicious files within RAR and ZIP archives for obfuscation.,T1027.015
|
| WIRTE has directed victims to malicious payloads staged on file sharing services.,T1608.001
|
| WIRTE has exfiltrated collected victim data to C2 infrastructure.,T1041
|
| WIRTE has obtained and used Empire and Rclone for post-exploitation activities.,T1588.002
|
| WIRTE has registered domains designed to mimic legitimate sites for use in phishing campaigns.,T1583.001
|
| WIRTE has staged collected documents of interest in `C:\Users\Public folder`.,T1074.001
|
| WIRTE has used RAR archives containing a legitimate executable and a lure document to execute malicious DLLs via sideloading.,T1574.001
|
| WIRTE has used links embedded in emails to lure users into downloading malicious files.,T1204.001
|
| "WIRTE has used security service provider naming conventions such as ESET and Kasperky (""Kaspersky Update Agent"") in order to appear legitimate.",T1036.005
|
| WIRTE has used the Windows command line as part of infection chains to open documents.,T1059.003
|
| WIRTE has used the `RtlIpv4StringToAddressA` to convert IP-formatted string to a byte array.,T1106
|
| WIRTE has used utilized look-alike domains and graphics of trusted security solution providers to entice victims to click on phishing links.,T1684.001
|
| Water Galura has encrypted files on victim networks through the generation of Qilin ransomware payloads.,T1486
|
| Water Galura has extorted victims for ransomware decryption keys and to prevent publication of data exfiltrated to their Tor data leak site.,T1657
|
| Water Galura operates a news channel on Telegram to make announcements for the Qilin RaaS.,T1585.001
|
| "Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables. Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to "".scr"" to mimic Windows screensavers.",T1036
|
| Winter Vivern PowerShell scripts execute `whoami` to identify the executing user.,T1033
|
| Winter Vivern created dedicated web pages mimicking legitimate government websites to deliver malicious fake anti-virus software.,T1189
|
| Winter Vivern delivered PowerShell scripts capable of taking screenshots of victim machines.,T1113
|
| Winter Vivern delivered exploit payloads via base64-encoded payloads in malicious email messages.,T1140
|
| Winter Vivern delivered malicious JavaScript payloads capable of exfiltrating email messages from exploited email servers.,T1114.001
|
| Winter Vivern delivered malicious JavaScript payloads capable of listing folders and emails in exploited email servers.,T1083
|
| Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts that would subsequently attempt to establish persistence by creating scheduled tasks objects to periodically retrieve and execute remotely-hosted payloads.,T1053.005
|
| Winter Vivern has mimicked legitimate government-related domains to deliver malicious webpages containing links to documents or other content for user execution.,T1204.001
|
| Winter Vivern has used compromised WordPress sites to host malicious payloads for download.,T1584.006
|
| Winter Vivern registered and hosted domains to allow for creation of web pages mimicking legitimate government email logon sites to collect logon information.,T1056.003
|
| Winter Vivern script execution includes basic victim information gathering steps which are then transmitted to command and control servers.,T1082
|
| Wizard Spider has collected data from a compromised host prior to exfiltration.,T1005
|
| Wizard Spider has created and used new accounts within a victim
|
| Wizard Spider has dumped the lsass.exe memory to harvest credentials with the use of open-source tool LaZagne.,T1003.001
|
| "Wizard Spider has gained access to credentials via exported copies of the ntds.dit Active Directory database. Wizard Spider has also created a volume shadow copy and used a batch script file to collect NTDS.dit with the use of the Windows utility, ntdsutil.",T1003.003
|
| Wizard Spider has modified the Registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest by setting the UseLogonCredential registry value to 1 in order to force credentials to be stored in clear text in memory. Wizard Spider has also modified the WDigest registry key to allow plaintext credentials to be cached in memory.,T1112
|
| "Wizard Spider has obtained code signing certificates signed by DigiCert, GlobalSign, and COMOOD for malware payloads.",T1588.003
|
| Wizard Spider has shut down or uninstalled security applications on victim systems that might prevent ransomware from executing.,T1685
|
| "Wizard Spider has staged ZIP files in local directories such as, `C:\PerfLogs\1\` and `C:\User\1\` prior to exfiltration.",T1074.001
|
| "Wizard Spider has used ""whoami"" to identify the local user and their privileges.",T1033
|
| Wizard Spider has used PowerShell cmdlet `Invoke-WCMDump` to enumerate Windows credentials in the Credential Manager in a compromised network.,T1555.004
|
| Wizard Spider has used PowerShell cmdlets `Get-GPPPassword` and `Find-GPOPassword` to find unsecured credentials in a compromised network group policy.,T1552.006
|
| Wizard Spider has used WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and to move laterally. Wizard Spider has also used batch scripts to leverage WMIC to deploy ransomware.,T1047
|
| Wizard Spider has used `services.exe` to execute scripts and executables during lateral movement within a victim
|
| Wizard Spider has used batch scripts that utilizes WMIC to execute a BITSAdmin transfer of a ransomware payload to each compromised machine.,T1197
|
| Wizard Spider has used ipconfig to identify the network configuration of a victim machine. Wizard Spider has also used the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect IP address data from Active Directory.,T1016
|
| "Wizard Spider has used networkdll for network discovery and psfin specifically for financial and point of sale indicators. Wizard Spider has also used AdFind, nltest/dclist, and PowerShell script Get-DataInfo.ps1 to enumerate domain computers, including the domain controller.",T1018
|
| Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.,T1053.005
|
| Wizard Spider has used stolen credentials to copy tools into the %TEMP% directory of domain controllers.,T1570
|
| Wizard Spider has used the WebDAV protocol to execute Ryuk payloads hosted on network file shares.,T1021
|
| Wizard Spider has used the `Invoke-SMBExec` PowerShell cmdlet to execute the pass-the-hash technique and utilized stolen password hashes to move laterally.,T1550.002
|
| Wizard Spider has utilized `rundll32.exe` to deploy ransomware commands with the use of WebDAV.,T1218.011
|
| Wizard Spider has utilized the PowerShell script `Get-DataInfo.ps1` to collect installed backup software information from a compromised machine.,T1518.002
|
| "Wizard Spider has utilized tools such as Empire, Cobalt Strike, Cobalt Strike, Rubeus, AdFind, BloodHound, Metasploit, Advanced IP Scanner, Nirsoft PingInfoView, and SoftPerfect Network Scanner for targeting efforts.",T1588.002
|
| ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named Dropbox Update Setup to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.,T1547.001
|
| ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links in e-mails to deliver malware.,T1566.002
|
| ZIRCONIUM has used web beacons in e-mails to track hits to attacker-controlled URL
|
| admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to list local groups: net localgroup administrator >> %temp%\download,T1069.001
|
| admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about services: net start >> %temp%\download,T1007
|
| "admin@338 actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren ""%temp%\upload"" audiodg.exe",T1036.005
|
| "admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download dir ""c:\Documents and Settings"" >> %temp%\download dir ""c:\Program Files\"" >> %temp%\download dir d:\ >> %temp%\download",T1083
|
| admin@338 actors used the following commands following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download net user /domain >> %temp%\download,T1087.001
|
| menuPass has used InstallUtil.exe to execute malicious software.,T1218.004
|
| menuPass has used net use to conduct connectivity checks to machines.,T1049
|
| "menuPass has used native APIs including GetModuleFileName, lstrcat, CreateFile, and ReadFile.",T1106
|
| menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.,T1018
|
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