Daily Papers

LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set. We study a core safety problem in agentic AI systems: whether individually safe skills can compose into unsafe installed skill sets. We present SkillReact, a compositional security measurement framework with three components: a deterministic static-composition benchmark, a two-rater LLM-assisted human-adjudication pipeline, and an action-based exploitability harness. On 1,520 ClawHub skills, 651 pass individual inspection and form 211,575 pairs; the benchmark flags 22.25% of these as structural candidates. We treat this raw rate as a recall-oriented scanner ceiling and calibrate it against human judgment: in a pattern-stratified audit, roughly one in five flagged pair-pattern hits survives as a real compositional risk (population-weighted validity 18.2%, our headline result), implying about 14K genuine risk memberships in a single registry that per-skill scanning misses by construction, since every pair is individually safe. An action-based harness then probes when these candidates become model-issued tool calls, and finds realization gated by host-model disposition: on an anchor-conditioned dropper subset, Haiku-4-5 issues the dropper-stage tool call on all 39 direct-prompt trials (36 of them the full download-then-execute chain, 3 download-only), Opus-4-7 stops at the download, and Sonnet-4-6 refuses outright. A control that holds the request fixed and varies only the installed skills finds compliance highest with no skills installed: a composition fixes which capabilities are reachable, while the host model decides whether to use them. Together these motivate install-time compositional checks and capability isolation as complements to per-skill scanning.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Unified audio models capable of audio understanding, audio generation and, increasingly, audio editing are proliferating rapidly. Yet a basic question about them remains unanswered: do the two heads of a unified model agree about the same audio? Current practice evaluates each capability in isolation on specialized benchmarks, and never asks whether a model can make sense of its own generations. We present TORUS, the first self-coherence test for audio-native unified models. TORUS comprises 48 three-stage self-coherence tests carrying 432 six-option questions spanning speech, sound and music across five task families. We holistically evaluate five open unified models alongside a Cascaded Baseline that combines state-of-the-art specialized generation, editing and understanding models. The best unified model answers 50.5% of questions against the Cascaded Baseline's 63.2% and a 16.7% chance floor. Models struggle on audio editing. Among the evaluated audio models (specialized and unified), we observe limited self-coherence, and thus position self-coherence as an essential test for future audio systems.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve promising performance, yet their ability to reason remains poorly understood. Existing evaluations largely emphasize task-level accuracy, often conflating pattern matching with reasoning capability. We present X-RAY, an explainable reasoning analysis system that maps the LLM reasoning capability using calibrated, formally verified probes. We model reasoning capability as a function of extractable structure, operationalized through formal properties such as constraint interaction, reasoning depth, and solution-space geometry. X-Ray generates probes via formal tools with controlled structural variations, enabling precise isolation of incremental structural information through formal calibration and verification. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on problems ranging from junior-level to advanced in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Our analysis reveals a systematic asymmetry in LLM reasoning: models are relatively robust to constraint refinement, where additional conditions shrink an existing solution space, but degrade sharply under solution-space restructuring, where modifications alter the underlying structural form of the solution manifold. Moreover, calibrated formal probes differentiate models that appear indistinguishable on standard benchmarks and reveal failure modes that are structurally interpretable rather than opaque. Beyond evaluation, our framework is contamination-free and supports the training and testing of reasoning models.

Large-scale image generation has benefited from advances in data scale, quality, rebalancing, and recaptioning, yet conventional pipelines typically optimize task-specific datasets in isolation. A central challenge is not only how to curate each task-specific corpus, but also how to organize heterogeneous supervision according to the dependencies among generative capabilities. We present a capability-driven data infrastructure that couples capability-specific supervision construction with capability-aligned curriculum scheduling. Its three specialized yet interoperable data engines build complementary relational supervision for text-image grounding, inter-image transformation, and image-knowledge association, while caption experts align T2I and editing supervision across tasks and granularities. A multi-stage curriculum jointly evolves task composition, visual-concept distribution, data quality, and image resolution along the dependency order of capability acquisition, with capability-aware evaluation closing the loop through targeted retrieval, expert construction, and gap-aware resampling. At scale, the framework curates a 440M-image T2I corpus, 120M editing pairs, and over 27M image-entity pairs. With this infrastructure, we train multimodal diffusion models at two scales from scratch, with 3B and 6B sizes respectively. We conduct quantitative evaluation on CPI-Bench, along with qualitative evaluations across diverse text-to-image and editing scenarios. Experimental results present broad visual coverage, versatile rendering, and effective transfer across generative capabilities.

While large language model--powered agents can self-evolve by accumulating experience or by dynamically creating new assets (i.e., tools or expert agents), existing frameworks typically treat these two evolutionary processes in isolation. This separation overlooks their intrinsic interdependence: the former is inherently bounded by a manually predefined static toolset, while the latter generates new assets from scratch without experiential guidance, leading to limited capability growth and unstable evolution. To address this limitation, we introduce a novel paradigm of co-evolutionary Capability Expansion and Experience Distillation. Guided by this paradigm, we propose the Mem^{textbf{2}Evolve}, which integrates two core components: Experience Memory and Asset Memory. Specifically, Mem^{2}Evolve leverages accumulated experience to guide the dynamic creation of assets, thereby expanding the agent's capability space while simultaneously acquiring new experience to achieve co-evolution. Extensive experiments across 6 task categories and 8 benchmarks demonstrate that Mem^{2}Evolve achieves improvement of 18.53\% over standard LLMs, 11.80\% over agents evolving solely through experience, and 6.46\% over those evolving solely through asset creation, establishing it as a substantially more effective and stable self-evolving agent framework. Code is available at: https://buaa-irip-llm.github.io/Mem2Evolve.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

LLM-based coding agents can localize bugs, generate patches, and run tests with diminishing human oversight, yet the scaffolding code that surrounds the language model (the control loop, tool definitions, state management, and context strategy) remains poorly understood. Existing surveys classify agents by abstract capabilities (tool use, planning, reflection) that cannot distinguish between architecturally distinct systems, and trajectory studies observe what agents do without examining the scaffold code that determines why. This paper presents a source-code-level architectural taxonomy derived from analysis of 13 open-source coding agent scaffolds at pinned commit hashes. Each agent is characterized across 12 dimensions organized into three layers: control architecture, tool and environment interface, and resource management. The analysis reveals that scaffold architectures resist discrete classification: control strategies range from fixed pipelines to Monte Carlo Tree Search, tool counts range from 0 to 37, and context compaction spans seven distinct strategies. Five loop primitives (ReAct, generate-test-repair, plan-execute, multi-attempt retry, tree search) function as composable building blocks that agents layer in different combinations; 11 of 13 agents compose multiple primitives rather than relying on a single control structure. Dimensions converge where external constraints dominate (tool capability categories, edit formats, execution isolation) and diverge where open design questions remain (context compaction, state management, multi-model routing). All taxonomic claims are grounded in file paths and line numbers, providing a reusable reference for researchers studying agent behavior and practitioners designing new scaffolds.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as reasoning systems, where reasoning paradigms - such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and multi-agent systems (MAS) - play a critical role, yet their relative effectiveness and cost-accuracy trade-offs remain poorly understood. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive and unified evaluation of reasoning paradigms, spanning direct single-model generation, CoT-augmented single-model reasoning, and representative MAS workflows, characterizing their reasoning performance across a diverse suite of closed-form benchmarks. Beyond overall performance, we probe role-specific capability demands in MAS using targeted role isolation analyses, and analyze cost-accuracy trade-offs to identify which MAS workflows offer a favorable balance between cost and accuracy, and which incur prohibitive overhead for marginal gains. We further introduce MIMeBench, a new open-ended benchmark that targets two foundational yet underexplored semantic capabilities - semantic abstraction and contrastive discrimination - thereby providing an alternative evaluation axis beyond closed-form accuracy and enabling fine-grained assessment of semantic competence that is difficult to capture with existing benchmarks. Our results show that increased structural complexity does not consistently lead to improved reasoning performance, with its benefits being highly dependent on the properties and suitability of the reasoning paradigm itself. The codes are released at https://gitcode.com/HIT1920/OpenLLMBench.

Generative image editing models struggle with structured statistical charts when data modifications require geometric synchronization. We formalize this task as Visuo-Logical Cascading Editing (VLCE). However, existing methods remain confined to localized text substitutions and struggle with dependency-aware cascading updates. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce ChartSync, an expert-validated benchmark constructed via a programmatic rendering pipeline that guarantees deterministic visuo-logical coupling for the ground truth. ChartSync comprises 870 triplets across 9 chart categories and 4 task types, including 235 geometry-coupled VLCE instances that specifically test cascading text-to-geometry synchronization. We further evaluate these instances via a two-tier framework combining objective visual metrics with a vision-language model judge paradigm to assess low-level fidelity alongside multimodal comprehension and reasoning. Evaluating 14 image editing models and one code-mediated pipeline reveals a nuanced capability gap: most open-source models suffer severe drops in geometric synchronization, while only two frontier proprietary models show emerging VLCE capability, with their residual errors mainly involving semantic isolation and background corruption. Our detailed error analysis deconstructs these failure paradigms to identify core meta-abilities for guiding future multimodal architectures. The ChartSync dataset and code are publicly released at https://github.com/kaka-yjk/ChartSyncCodebase.

Multi-teacher on-policy distillation (MOPD) extends on-policy distillation (OPD) by routing domain-specific data to specialized teachers, integrating their capabilities through dense token-level supervision on student-generated trajectories. However, domain routing only distinguishes the supervision sources for different domains; updates from all domains still act on shared parameters. When teachers differ substantially in response style and domain expertise, supervision that is effective in isolation may still lead to persistent gradient conflicts and capability degradation during joint optimization. To address this challenge, we propose Cross-Teacher Guarding for MOPD (Road MOPD), which introduces non-routed teachers as auxiliary cross-domain critics on the same student trajectories and coordinates multi-teacher supervision through token-level credit assignment and gradient updates. Specifically, cross-teacher-guided credit assignment uses teacher agreement to strengthen token-level corrections jointly supported by the teachers and attenuate conflicting signals; preventive multi-teacher gradient projection uses auxiliary gradients from the same trajectories to constrain potentially conflicting updates and adaptively controls projection strength to retain target-domain learning signals. In experiments, Road MOPD mitigates degradation in the disadvantaged domain, gains over 5 percentage points under high conflict, and improves overall performance in low-conflict and three-domain settings.

Empathetic conversation is psychologically supposed to be the result of conscious alignment and interaction between the cognition and affection of empathy. However, existing empathetic dialogue models usually consider only the affective aspect or treat cognition and affection in isolation, which limits the capability of empathetic response generation. In this work, we propose the CASE model for empathetic dialogue generation. It first builds upon a commonsense cognition graph and an emotional concept graph and then aligns the user's cognition and affection at both the coarse-grained and fine-grained levels. Through automatic and manual evaluation, we demonstrate that CASE outperforms state-of-the-art baselines of empathetic dialogues and can generate more empathetic and informative responses.

The rapid emergence of diverse large language models (LLMs) has spurred the development of LLM routers that assign user queries to the most suitable model. However, existing LLM routers typically perform a single-round, one-to-one mapping (i.e., assigning each query to a single model in isolation), which limits their capability to tackle complex tasks that demand the complementary strengths of multiple LLMs. In this paper, we present Router-R1, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based framework that formulates multi-LLM routing and aggregation as a sequential decision process. Router-R1 instantiates the router itself as a capable LLM, leveraging its reasoning ability to interleave "think" actions (internal deliberation) with "route" actions (dynamic model invocation), and integrates each response into its evolving context. To guide learning, we employ a lightweight rule-based reward comprising format rewards, final outcome rewards, and a novel cost reward for performance and cost trade-off optimization, opening a pathway toward optimizing performance-cost tradeoffs via RL. Router-R1 also conditions only on simple model descriptors such as pricing, latency, and example performance, enabling strong generalization to unseen model selection. Experiments on seven general and multi-hop QA benchmarks show that Router-R1 outperforms over several strong baselines, achieving superior performance while maintaining robust generalization and cost management.Code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/Router-R1.

A dense, pretrained language model can be retrofitted with recurrent depth and learn an iterative latent transition that persists after outcome-only annealing. Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct is split into a Prelude, a weight-tied Recurrent Block, and a Coda, with an identity-preserving one-loop path and a re-entry bridge on later loops. At loop 1 the retrofit remains non-inferior to its base on a preregistered ARC battery. Three findings. First, the mechanism is a reusable procedure rather than terminal-answer lookup, and installs at two budgets: 6M trained parameters over frozen base weights and 180M full-block. With intermediate-step supervision, the model computes one task step per loop and persists when only final answers are graded. The adapter matched the full block overall (83.8% versus 84.0%), led through depth 11, and trailed beyond. Verbal fine-tuning reached 79-86% on controlled verbal renderings (zero-shot transfer was minimal), and adapter verbal training begun from the installed mechanism outpaced matched fresh training by 18.6 points, including on a held-out test set. Second, the operation extrapolates to roughly 1.5 times its supervised depth, holding 70% accuracy through depth 18. Third, a same-size scratchpad-trained model matched the recurrent model within its learned horizon but collapsed beyond it. The recurrent model won overall, 84% versus 72%, retained 53% versus 2.5% beyond depth 10, and answered 7.6 times faster. An iterative transformer can therefore perform deeper reasoning in latent space faster than comparable or larger models fine-tuned on the same task, in a system-level comparison. A second task, running the rule in reverse, exposed the limits: the inverse was learnable in isolation, but no continuation acquired it while preserving the installed mechanism and general capability, a catastrophic-interference boundary. Learned depth selection remains open.

We introduce the Pistis model family, comprising 27B- and 9B-parameter multimodal large language models built on Qwen3.6 and Qwen3.5, respectively, and developed through a general and scalable post-training framework. The framework first establishes a strong foundation through large-scale multimodal supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Building on this SFT foundation, we propose Interleaved Distillation and Reinforcement Learning (IDRL), a novel post-training paradigm that tightly integrates on-policy distillation and reinforcement learning within a single training loop. By alternating between the two objectives, rather than optimizing either in isolation or combining them in a static joint loss, IDRL enables more effective knowledge transfer, greater optimization stability, and more precise credit assignment for long-horizon agentic trajectories, leading to stronger performance while mitigating common capability trade-offs. At both model scales, the framework produces two specialized variants: Pistis-Thinking, designed to strengthen deep multimodal reasoning, and Pistis-Agentic, which additionally incorporates agentic trajectory data to support long-horizon planning, iterative reasoning, and tool use. Pistis-Agentic is particularly strong in multimodal search. Both scales outperform their corresponding base models. Beyond model-parameter optimization, we further introduce Pistis-Auto-Harnessing (PAH), a system-level method that automatically improves the agent's inference harness through iterative optimization. Experiments demonstrate that PAH enhances the model performance without updating the model parameters or increasing the interaction budget.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by LLMs promise adaptive, reasoning-driven enterprise workflows, yet granting agents autonomous control over tools, memory, and communication introduces attack surfaces absent from deterministic pipelines. While current research largely addresses prompt-level exploits and narrow individual vectors, it lacks a holistic architectural model for enterprise-grade security. We introduce AgenticCyOps (Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations), a framework built on a systematic decomposition of attack surfaces across component, coordination, and protocol layers, revealing that documented vectors consistently trace back to two integration surfaces: tool orchestration and memory management. Building on this observation, we formalize these integration surfaces as primary trust boundaries and define five defensive principles: authorized interfaces, capability scoping, verified execution, memory integrity & synchronization, and access-controlled data isolation; each aligned with established compliance standards (NIST, ISO 27001, GDPR, EU AI Act). We apply the framework to a Security Operations Center (SOC) workflow, adopting the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the structural basis, with phase-scoped agents, consensus validation loops, and per-organization memory boundaries. Coverage analysis, attack path tracing, and trust boundary assessment confirm that the design addresses the documented attack vectors with defense-in-depth, intercepts three of four representative attack chains within the first two steps, and reduces exploitable trust boundaries by a minimum of 72% compared to a flat MAS, positioning AgenticCyOps as a foundation for securing enterprise-grade integration.

Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace. We ask whether such committees can be gamed by shortcuts, cues a benchmark rewards but a clinician would ignore. Across seven cohorts on six public datasets spanning text (MedQA-USMLE, MedMCQA, MIMIC-CXR reports), imaging (NIH ChestX-ray14, MIMIC-CXR-JPG, CheXpert) and tabular ICU records (SUPPORT2), Gemini committees resist these cues in isolation (flip 5-16%), yet a socially plausible shortcut spreads: when two peers assert the same wrong answer, the holdout under test adopts it in 38% of cases, as does a false "pre-screen" system flag, on both capability tiers. Of three oversight agents, a gate cannot separate adoption from honest agreement (false-positive rate 100%); a same-lineage judge reading only the transcript flags adoption on text (precision 100%, recall 93%) but collapses onto the gate in imaging; a referee that privately re-queries the holdout transfers to imaging (77-88% precision, 13-21% false-positive rate). Tripling a cue's visual salience does not move contagion, whereas a second peer voice raises it by half again. Gaming a hidden rubric is near-silent: only 1/10 text and 1/134 imaging drifters name the rubric they moved toward. What games a committee is social plausibility, and only a referee independent of self-report catches it. Code: https://github.com/criticaldata/benchmaxxing

Multi-teacher on-policy distillation (M-OPD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for consolidating domain-specialized reinforcement learning (RL) experts into a single generalist student via dense, token-level reward supervision. Despite its practical success, the optimization dynamics governing multi-teacher capability integration remain poorly understood, and open, rigorously reproducible recipes are conspicuously lacking. In this work, we establish a controlled M-OPD benchmark on SmolLM3-3B-Base with oracle routing, isolating capability integration from routing ambiguity. Our investigation reveals a pronounced capability integration gap: standard M-OPD captures only 35.6% of the available headroom relative to a domain-routed oracle ensemble, with concise tasks such as instruction following suffering severe degradation and premature stagnation. Crucially, we show that this failure stems not from gradient conflict, but from a severe misallocation of the token-level optimization budget. This pathology is driven by three orthogonal factors: structural sequence-length disparities across domains, dynamic convergence drift due to non-uniform learning rates, and multi-step reward staleness from asynchronous policy updates. To resolve these imbalances, we introduce Open-MOPD, a principled framework incorporating token-share balancing, gap-aware dynamic budget allocation, and student reward refresh. Together, these mechanisms systematically restore cross-domain balance, elevating headroom recovery from 35.6% to 83.4% in a single deployable student. We fully open-source our end-to-end post-training recipe, training trajectories, and evaluation suites on an academically accessible hardware budget.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

On-policy distillation (OPD), which aligns a student with the teacher's token-level distribution on the student's own rollouts, is an effective paradigm for transferring capabilities across LLMs. Prevailing approaches assume a teacher at least as capable as the student: they either distill a larger model into a smaller one, which fails at the frontier where no larger teacher exists, or consolidate multiple domain experts trained from a shared base, which requires costly training at the student's scale. We introduce Weak-to-Strong On-Policy Distillation (W2S-OPD), a simple yet effective OPD framework that improves the strong student by distilling from multiple weak models. W2S-OPD constructs a proxy teacher in logit space from a contrast pair of a positive and a negative model, both smaller than the student and cheap to obtain. Their logit difference isolates the capability direction, which is added to the student's own base model, yielding a proxy teacher that couples this direction while staying distributionally adjacent to the student. The student then distills it by minimizing the per-token reverse KL on its own rollouts. We instantiate the contrast pair as i) a post-RL expert against its pre-RL initialization, isolating the skill RL instills, ii) a larger against a smaller base model, isolating the capability from scale, and iii) a small base model with correct versus wrong hints, isolating the instance-level direction toward the solution. Across four math and three code benchmarks, W2S-OPD outperforms OPD, enables the student to surpass the domain teacher, and keeps improving the student even when every supervision source is weaker. Analysis shows different contrasts yield distinct signals: the post-RL and hint contrasts emphasize reasoning frameworks, while the scale contrast emphasizes the solving procedure. Our code will be available at https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/W2S-OPD.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Large language model safeguards decide whether to answer before seeing how an answer will be used. This creates a basic problem for dual-use tasks: the same answer can help an authorized professional or an attacker, while an attacker can imitate a benign request and interaction history. We separate the capability released by the model from the evidence available about downstream use. When that evidence is copyable, we derive the exact worst-case floor on attacker assistance while preserving useful answers. The result yields a safety trilemma: Useful Capability, Reliable Safety, and Open Access cannot coexist. We then show how a trusted credential can complement existing safeguards by adding hard-to-copy information that predicts actual downstream use, and identify the stronger condition needed to eliminate the floor. Evidence from dual-use evaluations, adaptive attacks, and deployed trusted-access programs supports the practical relevance of these conditions.

Agent skill libraries are becoming routable software assets: a retrieved skill can contribute instructions, scripts, resource bindings, and execution assumptions to an agent. This makes retrieval failures more specific than broad irrelevance. A system can find the right capability family yet expose the wrong same-capability representative. We study this failure as same-capability risk-exposure retrieval. Each benchmark unit pairs a helpful skill with a query-specific risky sibling that shares the capability family but differs on an execution-controlling contract, such as the required resource, precondition, procedure, or artifact. We introduce SameCapRisk-Bench, an auditable benchmark with 1,190 skill-risk units and 1,686 evaluation query cases: 694 marked-sibling units under public library pressure and 496 hard role-flip units where the same two skills swap helpful/risky roles across paired queries. The release records admission evidence, cue/leakage checks, source hashes, family relations, and fixed candidate pools. The benchmark reports helpful ranking together with harmful sibling rate (HSR@K), the top-K exposure of the marked risky sibling. On this benchmark, public SkillRouter, SkillRet, and R3-Skill retrieve helpful skills at high Recall@3 (0.848--0.888) but also expose marked risky siblings frequently (HSR@3 0.346--0.372). A fully public score-and-cluster pipeline lowers HSR@3 to 0.128--0.182, with Recall@3 of 0.713--0.776. Under a benchmark-trained reference scorer, public text-cluster and controlled resolvers reach HSR@3 0.012 and 0.007; the latter attains Recall@3 0.833. Skill retrieval should therefore report both capability matching and same-family risk exposure, with HSR serving as a targeted exposure certificate for fixed skill libraries.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

AI agents increasingly browse the web on users' behalf, yet they consume webpages as screenshots or text, exposing their LLMs to unvetted third-party content. Browsers enforce semantics under which what an element can do depends on what it is and where it comes from, not on what it says. Agents flatten these semantics, so injected text can persuade the LLM to exercise the user's authority for content that has none. As LLMs remain easy to persuade, the agent's interface to the web must itself ensure the integrity of what the agent reads, interprets, and does. We propose Intact, which runs on an unmodified browser. Intact builds GenTree, a bespoke representation that captures provenance and web semantics. Intact passes the page via GenTree to the LLM one element at a time, so the LLM decides on each element without any other element's text. Its harness executes each step only within the capabilities of the step's element and asks the user before acting on third-party content. On 1,270 real webpages, GenTree attributes 2.3x as many elements to third parties as the browser, which misattributes 58.7% of them to the first party. On 1,091 of these webpages with injected attacks, only 12.8% of attacks get through Intact's planner, each at most as a consent request, against 73.1% for a conventional planner. Isolation disrupts functionality on only 3.7% of tasks, and a parallel schedule could remove most of its added latency.

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of sandbagging, which we define as strategic underperformance on an evaluation. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

Open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) enable scientific progress and broad deployment. However, they make it difficult to control access to sensitive capabilities. Current practice either suppresses dangerous capabilities before release or mediates access through closed services that use specialized model variants, input/output monitors, and API permissions. The former is susceptible to jailbreaks while sacrificing capability for all users to mitigate the risks posed by a few, and the latter is fundamentally incompatible with open-weight release. In this paper, we propose Tiered Language Models (TLMs), where a single set of released weights supports multiple capability levels. In its default public configuration, a TLM behaves as a conventional LLM. A compact secret key specifies a permutation over a small parameter subset, inducing an alternative computation graph over the same weights that exposes additional capabilities. We develop a training protocol that jointly pretrains both configurations from scratch, then fine-tunes the keyed configuration on private data with regularization to preserve the public model's behavior. We pretrain 180M- and 650M-parameter TLMs and demonstrate that the keyed configuration can acquire a new language, gain instruction-following ability, and memorize private factual knowledge, whereas the public configuration exhibits none of these capabilities. Moreover, we show that our approach extends naturally to multiple hierarchical tiers. Because authorization operates on the model's weight structure rather than in the input space, the mechanism resists fine-tuning-based extraction and partial key compromise. In general, TLMs take a step toward reconciling open-weight release with selective capability control.

Agent frameworks increasingly delegate work by forking sub-agents; a common default makes the child inherit the parent's full working context. We measure how the effect of inherited state changes with capability, where C_m denotes clean fork-fresh accuracy. We compare 3 inheritance policies: Reset (fork fresh: base evidence only), Selective (curated handoff: + the useful prior conclusion), and Full (implicit fork: + the useful conclusion and d copies of a superseded conclusion) over a same-family ladder (Qwen3 0.6/1.7/4/8B) on a frozen, closed-set, action-scored benchmark. Every task is solvable from the base evidence, so performance loss can be attributed to reliance on stale state. (1) Deference to superseded state falls sharply with measured capability C_m (the slope's confidence interval, CI, excludes zero on every family) across 2 synthetic primitives plus MuSiQue and HotpotQA. (2) On the Qwen3 synthetic ladder, net inheritance harm follows a nonmonotone pattern: a mid-capability model (Qwen3-1.7B) is a statistically significant local minimum of net harm, falling below its fork-fresh baseline (Δ(32)=-0.19 [-0.25, -0.12]) and both neighbors, while the weakest model stays near-neutral and the strongest models stay robust. We call this harmful capability range a danger band. A within-model counting-difficulty sweep shows that the effect depends on model class even at matched C_m, and a live parent-to-child fork reproduces the mid-model harm. (3) Curated Selective handoff improves average accuracy over Full on all 3 datasets, largest at the in-band model, while the fixed-threshold capability router fails on the other datasets; a transferable router would need to predict the balance between reuse benefit and stale-context penalty. The benchmark is frozen and version-hashed.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

Adaptive multimodal reasoning has emerged as a promising frontier in Vision-Language Models (VLMs), aiming to dynamically modulate between tool-augmented visual reasoning and text reasoning to enhance both effectiveness and efficiency. However, existing evaluations rely on static difficulty labels and simplistic metrics, which fail to capture the dynamic nature of difficulty relative to varying model capacities. Consequently, they obscure the distinction between adaptive mode selection and general performance while neglecting fine-grained process analyses. In this paper, we propose AdaptMMBench, a comprehensive benchmark for adaptive multimodal reasoning across five domains: real-world, OCR, GUI, knowledge, and math, encompassing both direct perception and complex reasoning tasks. AdaptMMBench utilizes a Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) metric to evaluate the selection rationality of different reasoning modes, isolating this meta-cognition ability by dynamically identifying task difficulties based on models' capability boundaries. Moreover, AdaptMMBench facilitates multi-dimensional process evaluation across key step coverage, tool effectiveness, and computational efficiency. Our evaluation reveals that while adaptive mode selection scales with model capacity, it notably decouples from final accuracy. Conversely, key step coverage aligns with performance, though tool effectiveness remains highly inconsistent across model architectures.

We introduce PerceptionBench, a benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the atomic visual perception capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Existing benchmarks often fail to isolate perception: holistic evaluations conflate perceptual errors with failures in reasoning or domain knowledge, while application-driven benchmarks only cover narrow, fragmented domains shaped by heuristic designs. To address these limitations, PerceptionBench adopts a bottom-up approach: by diagnosing the earliest failure points in the responses of frontier MLLMs across 42 existing benchmarks, we construct an error taxonomy whose perception branch defines ten atomic perceptual capabilities. Guided by this taxonomy, we construct 3,000 verified questions with short, unambiguous answers, each isolating a single capability, with difficulty stemming from perception rather than reasoning or knowledge. Benchmark results across sixteen frontier MLLMs reveal that atomic perception remains largely unsolved---no model reaches 60\% accuracy, perception-related hallucination is the weakest capability on average, and similar overall scores conceal sharply divergent capability profiles. PerceptionBench thus provides a capability-level standard for measuring and diagnosing the visual perception boundaries of MLLMs.

Agent skills package instructions, executable code, and task-specific resources into reusable artifacts that agents can improve using execution feedback. The same mechanism also enables attackers to evolve malicious skills, making them more effective and less detectable. However, a candidate skill may pass pre-execution scanning yet fail to realize its target under runtime defenses, while a revision that repairs execution may introduce new scanner findings. We introduce SkillDRE, a fully automated framework for evolving complete malicious skill packages through a dual-stage feedback loop. Given a benign task and its associated skills, SkillDRE autonomously constructs and validates a task-conditioned malicious objective and a verifiable judge rule. It then holds both fixed while evolving the skill implementation, with preservation of legitimate task capability. SkillDRE combines scanner-guided evolution with runtime-guided refinement informed by execution outcomes observed under runtime defense. Each runtime-guided revision returns to the pre-execution stage for rescanning and further optimization before re-execution, forming a cross-stage closed loop. Evaluated on SkillsBench across four victim models, SkillDRE achieves an average attack success rate of 45.28%, exceeding the strongest baseline by 40.3%, while its final submitted skills receive no SkillScan findings and largely preserve benign-task performance. These results show that two-stage defense feedback can serve as a useful learning signal for adaptive red teaming and that evaluating either defense stage in isolation can miss the resulting attack capability. Codes is available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/SkillDRE

A language model's memory can be worse than no memory at all when the model or its interface is disposed to act on it: a memory that keeps a wrong conclusion but drops the work behind it leads a model to re-emit the stale value as a confident answer, where an empty memory leads it to abstain. We call this brittle memory. The information loss is definitional; the finding is behavioral, and it turns on one thing, whether the memory kept a re-derivation basis (the source) rather than the answer. We measure it with reclaim evaluation: induce a known drift, compress at a fixed budget, deliver a correction that names the error, and score exact recovery, judge-free. Holding the budget fixed and varying only what the compression keeps isolates correctability from capability and from size; an 8B model and a frontier one wall in the same place. A one-line source-first policy, keep the recomputable source, drop the re-derivable conclusion, restores correctability at equal budget where the source is compact and identifiable, with a length-matched control ruling out "more text." We map where the fix fails, show the failure compounds through memory loops, and replicate across three deployed memory systems, real dialogue (MultiWOZ), and tau-bench, a deployed-agent benchmark where whether a lossy memory becomes a harmful action is a joint model-and-interface property. We release the harness, the paired memory conditions, and validators built to come out false.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-based isolation to protect sensitive data and computations from potentially compromised operating systems (OS). However, TEE applications inevitably interact with the untrusted OS through SDK interfaces, and improper partitioning can introduce severe vulnerabilities such as data leakage and code injection. While prior work has proposed static analysis tools to detect such issues, automated repair remains largely unexplored. This problem is particularly challenging due to three TEE-specific factors: the lack of standardized secure development guidelines, the difficulty of extracting semantic information from low-level C code, and the absence of mature testing and validation methods. In this work, we present TEERepair, a framework for automatically repairing bad partitioning issues in TEE applications. Our approach tackles the above challenges by introducing a domain-specific language (DSL) to encode repair rules that express and capture common TEE security patterns, which are instantiated as patch templates with placeholders for context-specific variables. We then leverage large language models (LLMs) to reason about code semantics and synthesize context-aware patches, and further generate test clients to validate the repairs. We evaluate TEERepair on the TEE Partitioning Errors Benchmark (PartitioningE-Bench), achieving a significantly higher repair success rate of 87.6% compared to baselines. Furthermore, applying TEERepair to real-world TEE projects, we submitted 5 repair pull requests, 2 of which have been confirmed and merged by project maintainers.

Reward-specialized post-training produces strong experts for flow-based generative models, while multi-teacher on-policy distillation (OPD) consolidates their capabilities into a single student. Existing methods, however, route each prompt to a single teacher according to its semantic category, implicitly binding the desired capability to prompt content. This coupling makes capability invocation vulnerable to prompt perturbations and prevents users from explicitly adjusting the strength of the desired capability at inference time. In this work, we introduce CapField-OPD, an OPD framework that integrates multiple teachers into a continuous capability field through explicit capability coordinates. We use teacher models as anchors to construct this field, with the coordinates determining how their outputs are combined. Each capability configuration thus receives a unique supervision target, and capability control no longer depends on prompt semantics. Since the training anchors may not be optimal at inference time, we further profile the learned field on a small calibration set. The coordinate with the highest mean reward serves as the recommended default, while coordinates that are frequently optimal offer a promising candidate set for test-time scaling. Extensive experiments on compositional generation, text rendering, and visual aesthetics demonstrate that CapField-OPD consolidates multiple specialized teachers into a single student while preserving or surpassing their performance, reliably invokes the desired capabilities under semantics-preserving prompt variations, and supports continuous capability control and coordinate-based test-time scaling.

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

Existing benchmarks measure capability -- whether a model succeeds on a single attempt -- but production deployments require reliability -- consistent success across repeated attempts on tasks of varying duration. We show these properties diverge systematically as task duration grows, and that pass@1 on short tasks is structurally blind to this divergence. We introduce a reliability science framework for long-horizon LLM agents with four metrics: Reliability Decay Curve (RDC), Variance Amplification Factor (VAF), Graceful Degradation Score (GDS), and Meltdown Onset Point (MOP). We evaluate 10 models across 23,392 episodes on a 396-task benchmark spanning four duration buckets and three domains. Key findings: (1) reliability decay is domain-stratified -- SE GDS drops from 0.90 to 0.44 while document processing is nearly flat (0.74 to 0.71); (2) VAF bifurcates by capability tier -- high VAF is a capability signature, not an instability signal; (3) capability and reliability rankings diverge substantially, with multi-rank inversions at long horizons; (4) frontier models have the highest meltdown rates (up to 19%) because they attempt ambitious multi-step strategies that sometimes spiral; and (5) memory scaffolds universally hurt long-horizon performance across all 10 models. These results motivate reliability as a first-class evaluation dimension alongside capability.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

Practitioners accept a compressed language model once it clears a stack of data-cheap quality guards: perplexity within a small factor of the original, downstream accuracy (for example MMLU) inside a confidence interval, and data-free output-fidelity signals that compare the compressed and original network's internal representations under random probe inputs. This stack has a blind spot. Across three model families, gently-compressed models clear every guard and then invent procedure steps that were never in the instructions when they run a standard operating procedure (SOP) as an agent. The effect is operator-specific: coherent low-rank (SVD) truncation induces it, and magnitude pruning matched to the same perplexity does not. One dissociation isolates the cause. The same compressed weights that CI-win a paired output-fidelity test CI-fail the invented-step canary. The governing axis is the coherence of the compression error times its rate; the magnitude of the damage does not predict it. The data-free fidelity probe is a fidelity oracle by construction, so it cannot see this axis. We characterize the blindspot and dissociation with paired confidence intervals on a pre-registered, powered canary across three architectures. Operator-specificity replicates on all three, and the perplexity-guard evasion appears where the model admits in-guard low-rank headroom. We then give a data-free screen: a two-axis statistic of the compression error (coherent-fraction and error-rate) that flags the failing builds with fixed thresholds across architectures and matches the coherence-times-rate mechanism. Perplexity, MMLU, and fidelity acceptance do not certify agent safety. Screen gently-compressed low-rank builds before agentic deployment

Methods for training language models on sensitive data differ in how they balance capability gains against the risk of leaking private information. In this paper, we present a controlled comparison of data-level and training-level interventions for navigating the capability-privacy tradeoff on synthetic medical records with canaries to probe for leakage. Direct finetuning performs best on capability metrics but leads to the most privacy leakage, while DP-SGD reduces leakage at substantial cost to capabilities. Generating synthetic data from these records offers a more favorable balance, particularly when guided by a uniqueness-aware instruction to replace private details. Relative to naive paraphrasing, privacy-aware rewriting improves privacy protection across a variety of different rewriting models. We also find that more capable rewriting models generally reduce the risks of downstream privacy leakage, although held-out fit does not improve monotonically and increased test-time compute yields inconsistent gains. Overall, these results highlight privacy-aware rewriting as a promising direction for achieving a more favorable trade-off between capabilities and empirical privacy compared to other training-level methods, and our evaluation framework supports comparisons of future models and methods.

Instruction-tuning data are judged by quality metrics, and tuned models are judged by benchmarks, but both judgments pass through an output interface: the surface format in which an answer is written. Using gradient signatures across 12 tasks, four semantically equivalent interfaces, three model families, and controlled corruptions, we show that this interface confounds both measurements. Spectral statistics such as effective rank are provably invariant to interface rotation and empirically blind to semantic corruption, while the direction of the update carries the quality signal. The interface-varying residual is not noise: it identifies each unit's own target task perfectly across all three families. Capability itself is stored relative to the training interface: a skill that raises accuracy by more than 40 points under the training format can be nearly invisible under every other, and correcting a single generation budget flips the measured effect of fine-tuning on GSM8K from a gain into a large loss. Pre-registered interventions delimit where this geometry stops short of control. Data quality and model capability are interface-conditioned quantities, and current practice often reports the interface instead of the content.

We investigate whether post-trained capabilities can be transferred across models without retraining, with a focus on transfer across different model scales. We propose the Master Key Hypothesis, which states that model capabilities correspond to directions in a low-dimensional latent subspace that induce specific behaviors and are transferable across models through linear alignment. Based on this hypothesis, we introduce UNLOCK, a training-free and label-free framework that extracts a capability direction by contrasting activations between capability-present and capability-absent Source variants, aligns it with a Target model through a low-rank linear transformation, and applies it at inference time to elicit the behavior. Experiments on reasoning behaviors, including Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and mathematical reasoning, demonstrate substantial improvements across model scales without training. For example, transferring CoT reasoning from Qwen1.5-14B to Qwen1.5-7B yields an accuracy gain of 12.1% on MATH, and transferring a mathematical reasoning direction from Qwen3-4B-Base to Qwen3-14B-Base improves AGIEval Math accuracy from 61.1% to 71.3%, surpassing the 67.8% achieved by the 14B post-trained model. Our analysis shows that the success of transfer depends on the capabilities learned during pre-training, and that our intervention amplifies latent capabilities by sharpening the output distribution toward successful reasoning trajectories.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

As agent systems become more widely used, multiple agent sessions increasingly run alongside pre-existing user tasks in the same environment, sharing resources with limited capacity or mutually exclusive states. This creates a safety risk: when granted sufficient privileges, an agent may resolve a resource conflict by terminating or otherwise disrupting an existing task rather than reporting it. In this work, we identify and formalize this failure mode, which we term destructive resource preemption: obtaining the resources required for a requested task by terminating, overwriting, evicting, or degrading an incumbent task. To systematically study this risk, we introduce ClashBench, an executable benchmark comprising 268 validated conflict cases across 55 resource types, and evaluate 17 models through Codex, Claude Code, and OpenCode. We observe destructive preemption in 44.5% of trajectories, where the agent completes the requested task while causing the incumbent task to fail its health check. We also show that prompt-based safeguards are insufficient: an instruction to avoid affecting existing tasks reduces but does not eliminate preemption, while an instruction explicitly authorizing the agent to stop local processes increases it. More concerningly, in 31.9% of successful destructive-preemption cases, the final response mentions neither the resource conflict nor the action taken to resolve it, raising concerns about possible concealment. These findings establish destructive resource preemption as a broad safety risk in privileged agent systems and motivate stronger privilege controls, task isolation, and conflict-aware safeguards.

Self-evolving agents accumulate capability by distilling reusable skills from their execution trajectories, but we find this process is not monotonic: past a critical pool size, newly added skills degrade performance instead of improving it. We formalize this capability-contamination phase transition and trace it to a structural cause: once a defective skill enters the decision context, it becomes reference material for distilling later skills, forming cross-round contamination chains. We further show the contamination is structurally irreversible: removing a source skill after the fact cannot erase the flawed reasoning its descendants have already inherited, so post-hoc rollback recovers only a small fraction of the lost performance. This makes skill admission a pre-commit necessity rather than a post-hoc fix, and motivates Verifier-as-Gatekeeper (VaG): a progressive trust hierarchy whose three heterogeneous critics - structural validity, behavioral harmlessness, and semantic consistency - filter each skill individually, coupled with a marginal-gain subset selection that removes combinatorial contamination at the top tier before skills reach the runtime context. On Terminal-Bench 2, unconditional accumulation rises to a peak and then degrades, giving back most of its gains as the pool keeps growing, and post-hoc removal of the culprit skills recovers only a small part of the drop - the empirical signature of irreversibility. In contrast, VaG improves every round, reaching 72% pass@1 with a pool roughly 5x smaller, and its frozen skill pool transfers positively to four other backbones and a second benchmark without re-evolution. Ablations confirm the three critics are complementary and mutually non-substitutable, each intercepting a largely disjoint class of harmful skills.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated. We present SEA, an architecture that confines self-modification to a small steering adapter and a versioned harness around a frozen base model and admits each modification only through an anytime-valid gate that emits an auditable certificate against a fixed error budget. Five loop controllers compose published guarantees; because such gates can only select among behaviors the frozen base already produces, five verifier-in-the-loop mechanisms -- best-of-N, micro-step search, self-authored reproduction oracles, search-layer control, and self-repair -- supply the dense, grader-free signal the gates require, computed from the issue text alone. On a 52-instance SWE-bench Verified subset across four base models, base capability is the dominant, confound-free effect, and on two strong base models a deliberate no-op-composite control isolates the suite's contribution at +4 and +5 (Glm~5.2 24to28; Gpt 29to34, the 65% best), with event logs confirming that its mechanisms fire and prevent regressions. Results are single-run on expensive evaluations; confirming run-to-run variance and adapting the per-task algorithm mix are future work.

Large language model compression has made substantial progress through pruning, quantization, and low-rank decomposition, yet a fundamental limitation persists across all existing methods: compression budgets are allocated without any representation of what individual model components functionally encode. We term this the capability-blind compression problem and argue it is a root cause of two well-documented failures -- the insensitivity of perplexity-based evaluation to reasoning capability loss, and the abrupt phase transitions in model performance recently characterized by Ma et al. (2026). We propose Capability-Guided Compression (CGC), a framework that addresses this by using Sparse Autoencoder (SAE)-derived capability density maps to allocate differential compression budgets across transformer components. Capability density is a formally defined scalar measure combining the feature breadth, activation entropy, and cross-input consistency of a component's SAE feature activation distribution. We prove theoretically that components with higher capability density exhibit lower structural redundancy and reach their individual phase transition points at lower compression ratios, providing the first pre-compression mechanism for component-level phase transition prediction. Experiments on GPT-2 Medium confirm that capability density is statistically independent of Wanda importance scores (Spearman rho = -0.054, n = 384 heads), establishing it as a genuinely novel compression signal orthogonal to all existing importance metrics. We report a negative result on PPL-based compression comparison and provide a principled diagnosis identifying GPT-2 Medium as an insufficient test bed for the full CGC hypothesis. The theoretical framework, density formalism, and orthogonality finding constitute a foundation for capability-aware compression research.

Clinical protocol-execution tasks -- checking a lab value, applying a threshold, placing a correctly structured FHIR order -- are natural candidates for RL from world feedback: once clinical SMEs encode decision logic into a verifier, that verifier grades unlimited rollouts without per-episode annotation. But applying RL requires a sound feedback channel and sufficient base capability. We audit MedAgentBench v1/v2, find a 41.7\% silent-finish ceiling that makes inaction the RL dominant strategy, and construct MedAgentBench-v3 (MAB-v3) (508 tasks, 8.9\% ceiling). Training Qwen3-8B exposes two structural barriers: a capability ceiling (10/20 task types have 0\% base performance, zero gradient) and a format-knowledge barrier (3/20 types require exact clinical codes undiscoverable by exploration). Pure RL reaches 18.2\% pass@1 vs.\ 34.1\% for rule-based SFT; the 15.9~pp gap is attributable entirely to these barriers. A decision/format-knowledge/lookup taxonomy predicts RL learnability and prescribes the fix: SFT to inject codes, RL to learn conditionals.

Open-weight language models can be rendered unsafe through several parameter-level interventions, yet models with matched harmful compliance can exhibit fundamentally different failure modes. We compare harmful supervised fine-tuning (SFT), harmful reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), and refusal-feature abliteration in Qwen2.5-7B and Llama-3.1-8B using harmfulness, capability, self-audit, safety reflection, representation similarity, and refusal-direction repair. All three routes reach near-ceiling harmfulness, but SFT causes the broadest capability loss and representational drift; abliteration yields localized, family-dependent refusal-feature suppression; and RLVR largely preserves base-model capability, explicit safety judgments, and representation geometry while retargeting behavior toward compliance. RLVR models consequently remain unusually responsive to safety-reflection prompts despite complying under direct prompting. We further find that harmful RLVR induces capability-blind compliance: models claim to complete unavailable actions and fabricate information about nonexistent entities. Targeted RLVR calibration substantially reduces this false acceptance without restoring safety or degrading general capability. These results show that harmful compliance, harm recognition, and capability awareness are separable behavioral axes, and that self-audit and hallucination patterns are not necessarily robust safety signals under adaptive post-training.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

Post-hoc safety training (RLHF, DPO) is the dominant way to align large language models, yet jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023), fine-tuning attacks (Qi et al., 2024), and activation-space edits (Arditi et al., 2024) keep recovering the behaviors it was meant to remove. We give this fragility one geometric explanation and follow it into pretraining. We measure the safety update Δ= W_{safe} - W_{base} against the curvature of the model's capabilities (the empirical Fisher of a capability loss). Across five model families, post-hoc safety lands in a suppression regime: Δ is nearly orthogonal to the capability directions, and its small in-subspace part concentrates on a few high-curvature ones. The update is thin but sharp, a refusal gate laid over intact capabilities rather than erasure of them. A kernel-immobility lemma explains why such an update can only mask a capability, not remove it, so a little benign fine-tuning restores it: 100 benign examples cut the AdvBench refusal of Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct and Llama-3-8B-Instruct by 35 to 38 pp. Following the account into pretraining, a pretraining-checkpoint sweep of OLMo-2-1B (Team OLMo et al., 2024) shows the features that refusal attaches to emerging in a sharp transition between 1B and 63B pretraining tokens. We then use the account constructively: models trained from scratch with safety co-training spread continuously across pretraining reach 87 to 98% AdvBench refusal that the same attack erodes by only 2 to 14 pp at every scale from 410M to 6.9B, against 35 to 38 pp for post-hoc installs, at a small cost on short-answer capability probes; a windowed schedule of equal total safety weight installs no refusal. Persistence of the safety signal across pretraining, not its timing, is what buys attack robustness.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

We identify a security-fidelity tradeoff in defending LLMs against indirect prompt injection: defenses resist injected instructions largely by suppressing untrusted text, which corrupts tasks that must preserve it, such as translation and document editing. Attack-success metrics cannot see this, because a model that ignores an injection and one that faithfully processes it as data score identically. We introduce SecFid, a benchmark built so that executing an injection, processing it as data, and ignoring it produce distinguishable outputs. This makes fidelity measurable and exposes a frontier: across 1,168 examples and 48 configurations, no model or defense achieves both objectives. The highest-fidelity model reaches 96.5% fidelity at 47.8% security, while the most secure defenses invert this, at 99.3% security but only 71.0%-73.9% fidelity. Even defenses with identical security differ in how they earn it: some repair hijacks into faithful processing, others simply suppress benign content. A decision-theoretic analysis shows why no fixed choice can be right everywhere: the correct behavior is not a property of the defense but of the deployment, set by its relative cost of a hijack versus a dropped span. Security alone therefore measures only half of robustness, and reporting it without fidelity hides the price at which it was bought.

Benchmark gains are often treated as evidence of greater LLM capability. Yet the same gain can reflect different changes in model behavior. A model may reach new answers, or produce answers that were already within reach. Aggregate scores do not distinguish these changes question by question. We establish a question-level audit under fixed budgets, temperatures, and answer formats. A question is realized when the default deployment procedure produces the correct answer. A question is reachable when a specified probe finds that answer within a fixed budget. We first test whether inference-time layer routing can expand reachability. Under a matched budget, random routes match or exceed structured search in all 43 model and task settings. Answer-blind procedures retain almost none of this gain, which instead requires access to the correct answer. We then ask why reachable answers sometimes fail to appear. Across six cases spanning 0.5B to 31B, silencing one identified MLP block repairs 68 to 92 percent of a predefined failure set. We next test whether training closes the gap by expanding reachability. In five of six matched evaluations, deployed performance rises while the reachable ceiling remains flat or falls. For DAPO, the deployed score rises by 14.7 points while the reachable ceiling falls by 13.3 points. Across the settings we audit, realization and reachability therefore do not always change together. Claims of capability expansion should report both realized performance and reachability under matched evaluation conditions. Code is available at https://github.com/LiZaiyuan0619/reachability-not-realization

The separation power of a machine learning model refers to its ability to distinguish between different inputs and is often used as a proxy for its expressivity. Indeed, knowing the separation power of a family of models is a necessary condition to obtain fine-grained universality results. In this paper, we analyze the separation power of equivariant neural networks, such as convolutional and permutation-invariant networks. We first present a complete characterization of inputs indistinguishable by models derived by a given architecture. From this results, we derive how separability is influenced by hyperparameters and architectural choices-such as activation functions, depth, hidden layer width, and representation types. Notably, all non-polynomial activations, including ReLU and sigmoid, are equivalent in expressivity and reach maximum separation power. Depth improves separation power up to a threshold, after which further increases have no effect. Adding invariant features to hidden representations does not impact separation power. Finally, block decomposition of hidden representations affects separability, with minimal components forming a hierarchy in separation power that provides a straightforward method for comparing the separation power of models.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer).

Agentic coding assistants are increasingly given extra capabilities, such as browser based testing tools and design oriented system prompts, on the assumption that more capability yields better software. This study tested that assumption directly. Ninety independent agent runs built the same application, a real time retrospective board, from one detailed specification, each scored on a fixed 14 criterion functional rubric (42 point maximum) and a visual quality review. The runs spanned several model generations, two agent harnesses, two reasoning effort levels, a testing tool, and two design oriented prompts. Capability tier dominated: frontier models clustered near the ceiling while a low cost local model fell to 24 to 37 points. A criterion level analysis revealed what run totals conceal. Container deployment was the dominant defect, failing first try in 44 percent of runs, with its failure rate shifting sharply across model generations while mean totals moved less than a point. The testing tool raised cost by 42 to 68 percent without improving functional score or reliability, even on interface visible criteria. Raising reasoning effort from High to xHigh lifted first try perfect runs from 28 percent to 89 percent and cut corrective prompts about five fold, for 9 to 29 percent more cost. A design oriented prompt raised visual quality, 4.5 versus 3.0 on a 5 point scale, without lifting function, and a one paragraph paraphrase of its directive reproduced the entire lift. The practical lesson is to match the fix to the failure: most first run failures came from weak reasoning, which a stronger model or more effort prevents, not from visible flaws a checking tool would catch.

Leaderboards rank long-horizon agents by their final outputs. Yet a higher score alone does not establish whether two systems are comparable or which stage accounts for the difference. Unequal evidence, inputs, or budgets can affect scores, and statistical corrections do not remove this mismatch. We introduce compositional controllability to address these questions. A comparison window covers one stage, several stages, or the whole agent. Our central result bounds the gap between observed and controlled score differences using only nuisance outside the window. This yields an admissibility test applied before scores are inspected. Inadmissible comparisons are refused. For admissible pairs, an ordering is certified only when the score gap exceeds the combined sampling and nuisance radii; otherwise, it remains undecided. These decisions give each system a rank interval. We introduce BioLitBench, a benchmark of 2,042 biomedical articles represented as structured claim graphs. Among seven published pipelines, a conventional statistical analysis declares a winner in 14 of 21 pairwise comparisons. Yet the top-ranked system alone received the target review's bibliography. To isolate pipeline performance, our test requires matched inputs and a fixed backbone model. It refuses 11 of the 21 comparisons, including every comparison involving the top-ranked system. Seven of the 14 conventional conclusions fall within these refused pairs. The same comparison windows support stage-level training. We train SCRIBE on Qwen3.8-27B using rewards measured at each stage's exit. Under matched evidence, SCRIBE achieves a certified rank interval of [1,2], with certified advantages over all evaluated published pipelines and the evaluated Claude and OpenAI agents. Under same pool, SCRIBE matches the strongest published retriever and is certified above three published pipelines.

Modern deployments require LLMs to enforce safety policies at scale, yet many controls rely on inference-time interventions that add recurring compute cost and serving complexity. Activation steering is widely used, but it requires runtime hooks and scales cost with the number of generations; conditional variants improve selectivity by gating when steering is applied but still retain an inference-time control path. We ask whether selective refusal can be moved entirely offline: can a mechanistic understanding of category-specific refusal be distilled into a circuit-restricted weight update that deploys as a standard checkpoint? We propose C-Δθ: Circuit Restricted Weight Arithmetic, which (i) localizes refusal-causal computation as a sparse circuit using EAP-IG and (ii) computes a constrained weight update ΔθC supported only on that circuit (typically <5% of parameters). Applying ΔθC yields a drop-in edited checkpoint with no inference-time hooks, shifting cost from per-request intervention to a one-time offline update. We evaluate category-targeted selectivity and capability retention on refusal and utility benchmarks.

Memory self-evolution uses task feedback to iteratively improve executable memory programs that store and retrieve information from past interactions. Existing approaches typically adopt holistic evolution, deriving revision directions from mixed feedback and judging progress by overall performance. This can obscure optimization directions and hide capability-specific gains offset by regressions elsewhere, leaving promising directions underexplored. We introduce capability-driven evolution, which extends search guidance from overall performance to individual capability dimensions, preserving promising revisions and expanding exploration beyond the boundaries of holistic evolution. We propose PrisMem, which uses dependency-aware capability selection to prioritize targets with potential cross-capability benefits and history-guided diagnosis to refine capability specialists. Trace-guided integration compares evaluated programs on paired differential cases, using their behavioral differences to consolidate complementary gains into a unified memory program. Experiments show that PrisMem outperforms the strongest baselines by 10.54 and 7.83 percentage points on BEAM-1M and LongMemEval-M, respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness on million-token histories.

This paper presents C8s, a confidential computing architecture for Kubernetes that provides cryptographically rooted confidentiality, integrity, and verifiability guarantees for Kubernetes clusters from infrastructure operators. These guarantees are cryptographically provable to any independent third party verifier. The architecture is built on hardware Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), specifically AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX, and NVIDIA Confidential Computing support, to establish an attestation-rooted trust boundary around confidential VMs. This design is compatible with managed Kubernetes services such as Amazon EKS, Google GKE, and Microsoft AKS, where the control plane cannot be attested. Under this boundary, three groups gain guarantees that are absent from conventional deployments. Data and artifact owners can deploy sensitive workloads and proprietary artifacts on third-party infrastructure without risking exfiltration. Compute providers can offer execution services without revealing workloads to cloud operators. End users can submit requests that remain opaque to all parties except the attested TEE processing them. Representative workloads include AI inference, securing AI model weights, and training or fine-tuning on sensitive data.

Long-horizon complex tasks require foundation models to accumulate information, maintain internal states, and adapt over extended interactions. Safety should be an intrinsic property of the model itself, rather than a behavioral constraint relying solely on external safeguards or post-hoc alignment such as supervised fine-tuning. This motivates Safety from Within, where safety-relevant capabilities are represented and invoked through the model's native computation. We present Safin-1, a family of foundation models realizing this principle through memory routing and state evolution. Safin-1 is built on Memory-Anchor Routing across Context History (MARCH), a network architecture that maintains structured memory states and selectively retrieves relevant historical information through content-conditioned routing. It supports test-time adaptation of persistent capability states without repeatedly modifying the backbone, enabling controlled specialization over a shared foundation. We investigate this interface on downstream safety tasks through a Safety State, demonstrating effective state-based adaptation with substantial safety improvements. More broadly, the routed-state interface unifies contextual memory and persistent capability adaptation within the model's native computation, reframing memory from a passive record of prior context into an active substrate for maintaining and evolving model behavior. Evaluations across general capabilities, long-context understanding, retrieval, and efficiency further validate Safin-1. These findings provide a path toward safety as a state-native and adaptively maintainable capability. This work is only an initial architectural exploration of Safety from Within, and substantial further work is needed to realize this broader vision.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Despite the advancement of machine learning techniques in recent years, state-of-the-art systems lack robustness to "real world" events, where the input distributions and tasks encountered by the deployed systems will not be limited to the original training context, and systems will instead need to adapt to novel distributions and tasks while deployed. This critical gap may be addressed through the development of "Lifelong Learning" systems that are capable of 1) Continuous Learning, 2) Transfer and Adaptation, and 3) Scalability. Unfortunately, efforts to improve these capabilities are typically treated as distinct areas of research that are assessed independently, without regard to the impact of each separate capability on other aspects of the system. We instead propose a holistic approach, using a suite of metrics and an evaluation framework to assess Lifelong Learning in a principled way that is agnostic to specific domains or system techniques. Through five case studies, we show that this suite of metrics can inform the development of varied and complex Lifelong Learning systems. We highlight how the proposed suite of metrics quantifies performance trade-offs present during Lifelong Learning system development - both the widely discussed Stability-Plasticity dilemma and the newly proposed relationship between Sample Efficient and Robust Learning. Further, we make recommendations for the formulation and use of metrics to guide the continuing development of Lifelong Learning systems and assess their progress in the future.

Tool-using AI agents are increasingly deployed across enterprise software systems, yet widely used benchmarks primarily evaluate nominal task completion, conflating baseline planning competence with operational fault recovery. We introduce UndoBench, a benchmark spanning 36 base workflows and 36 fault scenarios across 8 enterprise domains, decoupling task competence from recovery capability via counterfactual paired trials under identical seeds alongside wire-level effect-history and environment-state oracles. On 12 held-out TEST workflows across two open-weight models, two frameworks, and three recovery paradigms (5,760 executions / 2,880 paired trials) in the frozen lost-acknowledgment study, nominal competence reached 83.54% while conditional recovery success rate (CRSR) fell to 46.72%, with naive retry producing duplicate external effects in 53.33% of trials. Extensions to commercial API models reproduced this competence-recovery separation. Evaluations across complementary execution boundaries show that recovery is phase-dependent: before mutation, methods perform similarly without duplicate effects among capable trials; during partial mutation, naive retry, per-call idempotency, and zero-privilege journaling collapse on the evaluated composite workflows; after commit but before acknowledgment, verification and server-side idempotency substantially improve safety. These findings demonstrate that evaluating nominal completion alone masks critical, phase-dependent recovery vulnerabilities in autonomous agents.

Coding agent harnesses mediate tool use and authorize actions, yet their security mechanisms and runtime effects remain incompletely characterized. We present HarnessSecurity, the first systematic empirical study and benchmark of open- and closed-source coding agent harnesses. First, we derive a ten-mechanism taxonomy and then assess 400 harness-mechanism cells using independent ratings by researchers and large language model (LLM) judges. We find that about half of confirmed mechanism implementations are opt-in, while closed-source harnesses exhibit substantial evidence gaps. Second, we introduce HarnessSecurity-Bench, a benchmark of 23 tasks across five attack surfaces without sacrificing legitimate task requirements. Using separate deterministic oracles to measure task utility and attack effects with security setting comparisons, we evaluate nine mechanisms across six leading harnesses: Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, gptme, Qwen Code, and GitHub Copilot. Under a controlled LLM baseline GLM-5.2, we conduct 2,500 trials, recording 81,155 tool calls and over 2.2 billion tokens. Enabling auto-approve increases utility and raises attack success from 29.2% to 95.6%. Network isolation and read-only mode reduce attack effects with substantial utility losses, while command allowlisting and command denylisting reduce attack effects with a small utility loss and a utility gain, respectively. Task-level cases show that restrictions on a shared capability can obstruct both legitimate and malicious operations, and that allowed tools or commands can leave unauthorized operations reachable through alternative execution paths. Harness providers should make security settings verifiable, test alternative execution paths to protected operations, and assess attack effects alongside task utility and execution costs.

Abliteration - deleting a model's refusal direction from its weights - is the standard recipe behind popular "uncensored" open-weight models. We show the surgery is not clean. As a disposition probe we use 21,600 decisions under uncertainty - weekly up/down calls on 60 Warsaw Stock Exchange equities over 18 weeks, replayed through a frozen pipeline so the decision-layer model is the only variable. The task elicits no refusals at all, so any between-arm delta is pure side effect. Holding provenance constant (official BF16 checkpoints, a single abliteration author, an identical serving stack, one byte-identical frozen prompt), we compare base and abliterated arms of two Mixture-of-Experts families, Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it and Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507. Three effects replicate across both families (weeks-clustered bootstrap CIs excluding zero): abliterated models are systematically more optimistic (+12.2 pp Gemma, +7.4 pp Qwen; the confirmed preregistered endpoint), justify themselves at greater length, and use fewer explicit uncertainty words in forced self-critiques (both exploratory). A fourth effect reverses sign: the same operation makes Gemma-abliterated less confident and Qwen-abliterated more (family CIs non-overlapping) - one weight surgery, opposite shifts in expressed confidence. Capability covariates rule out instruction-following degradation as the driver, and no arm shows economic skill: the apparent edge of abliterated arms is regime beta, not alpha. Our provenance audit also caught two independent contamination channels - a mismatched-quantizer pilot pair and a stale community chat template that silently mangled the rendered prompt - suggesting toolchain artifacts are the rule in studies of community-modified checkpoints. Whoever deploys an "uncensored" model as an agent is deploying a measurably different decision-maker, not the base model minus refusals.

Windows OS kernel memory is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. By launching such attacks, hackers are succeeding in process privilege escalation and tampering with users data by accessing kernel mode memory. This paper considers a new example of such an attack, which results in access to the files opened in an exclusive mode. Windows built-in security features prevent such legal access, but attackers can circumvent them by patching dynamically allocated objects. The research shows that the Windows 10, version 1809 x64 is vulnerable to this attack. The paper provides an example of using MemoryRanger, a hypervisor-based solution to prevent such attack by running kernel-mode drivers in isolated kernel memory enclaves.

Capability and efficiency are two key dimensions of reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Capability refers to the ability to solve a given problem correctly, whereas efficiency refers to the ability to do so with limited resources. When LLMs use Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to solve problems of controlled hardness, both the number of problems solved correctly and the number of tokens required to reach a correct answer depend on problem hardness and model size. However, how these factors jointly shape capability and efficiency remains poorly understood. Here, we use hierarchical Bayesian models to evaluate the capability and efficiency of LLMs from the DeepSeek-R1-Distill model family across four classes of arithmetic and algorithmic reasoning problems. At a fixed model size, the probability of correctly solving an instance decays approximately exponentially with instance size, our proxy for problem hardness. The decay scale grows sublinearly with model size, indicating that larger models are more capable, but that capability gains diminish with scale. Output length grows as a power law with instance size, which serves as a proxy for difficulty. However, the parameters of this power law do not vary systematically with model size, suggesting that larger models do not become more efficient. Together, these findings reveal potential limitations of naive scaling as a strategy for developing more capable AI systems: capability improves with diminishing returns, while efficiency shows little to no improvement.

Robustness is often regarded as a critical future challenge for real-world applications, where stability is essential. However, as models often learn tasks in a similar order, we hypothesize that easier tasks will be easier regardless of how they are presented to the model. Indeed, in this paper, we show that as models approach high performance on a task, robustness is effectively achieved. Through an empirical analysis of multiple models across diverse datasets and configurations (e.g., paraphrases, different temperatures), we find a strong positive correlation. Moreover, we find that robustness is primarily driven by task-specific competence rather than inherent model-level properties, challenging current approaches that treat robustness as an independent capability. Thus, from a high-level perspective, we may expect that as new tasks saturate, model robustness on these tasks will emerge accordingly. For researchers, this implies that explicit efforts to measure and improve robustness may warrant reduced emphasis, as such robustness is likely to develop alongside performance gains. For practitioners, it acts as a sign that indeed the tasks that the literature deals with are unreliable, but on easier past tasks, the models are reliable and ready for real-world deployment.

LLM agents that invoke privileged tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which adversarial instructions embedded in retrieved data hijack the agent's actions. A growing body of work evaluates defenses against IPI, but the validity of that evaluation is rarely examined. We audit an IPI benchmark and its harness and identify four defect classes -- silent payload non-delivery, attack success scored by tool identity rather than arguments, false-rejection rate conflated with model incapacity, and the absence of an audit trail -- each of which yields a plausible, publishable, and incorrect number. We quantify the distortion by re-scoring identical execution traces under the defective and corrected definitions: on real agent behaviour, the tool-identity scorer reports a 21.7% attack-success rate where the true argument-level rate is 1.2%. In the sharpest case, an open model previously reported at 62.8% registers 0% under the corrected harness -- the prior figure largely an artifact of undelivered payloads and identity-level scoring. We release a harness whose construction makes each defect unrepresentable -- machine-checkable payload placement, argument-level attacker predicates, per-scenario environments, and mandatory trace persistence -- and use it to report three quantities the field does not: whether a compromised agent discloses the attack, the full security/utility operating curve of an LLM-judge defense, and tool-calling capability disentangled from defensive over-blocking. A corrected harness further overturns a reported "capability barrier": a model deemed incapable of tool use is in fact fully capable, its earlier result an artifact of environment mismatch. We argue that evaluation validity is a prerequisite for, not a footnote to, defense claims in agentic security, and provide an instrument that enforces it.