S. 1642 (Leahy). Extends the immigrant investor regional center pilot program for five additional years and authorizes giving immigrant investor visa priority to aliens seekingadmission under the program. Passed Senate, as amended, on October 3, 2003. Provisionsincorporated into S. 1685 ( P.L. 108-156 ).","S. 2809 (Gregg).","Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Appropriates funds for the State Criminal AlienAssistance Program (SCAAP). Reported by Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept.108-344 ) onSeptember 15, 2004. S. 2810 (Specter). Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Includes funding for the Office ofRefugee Resettlement (ORR). Reported by Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept. 108-345 ) onSeptember 15, 2004. S. 2845 (Collins). National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. S.Amdt. 3807 (McCain-Lieberman), adds title on terrorist travel and effectivescreening, agreed to in Senate on October 1, 2004; S.Amdt. 3933 (Cantwell), requiringbiometric identification information on travel documents of aliens seeking to enter the United States,agreed to in Senate, as modified, on October 5, 2004."],"string":"[\n \"The 108th Congress has considered and is considering legislation on a wide range ofimmigration issues. Two of these issues -- the transfer of immigration authorities and expeditednaturalization through military service -- relate directly to post-September 11, 2001 U.S. efforts toimprove national security. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the 107th Congress establisheda new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-296 ). DHS was tasked with preventing terrorist attacks in the United States and reducing thenation's vulnerability to terrorism, among other responsibilities. Effective March 1, 2003, P.L.107-296 abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice(DOJ), the agency which had administered and enforced the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), (1) and transferred most immigration-related functions to the newly created DHS. Lingering questionsremain, however, about the division of authorities between DOJ and DHS in some areas. Pendinglegislation would amend the INA to explicitly transfer certain authorities to DHS. Like theestablishment of DHS, Operation Iraqi Freedom had a goal of protecting U.S. national security. Thisoperation prompted congressional interest in legislation to expand the citizenship benefits of aliensserving in the military. The 108th Congress has enacted a\",\n \"measure ( P.L.\",\n \"108-136 ) that amendsmilitary naturalization and posthumous citizenship statutes and provides immigration benefits forimmediate relatives of U.S. citizen servicemembers who die as a result of actual combat service. The 108th Congress is currently debating legislation that would implement recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11Commission). The 9/11 Commission's immigration-related recommendations focused primarily ontargeting terrorist travel through an intelligence and security strategy based on reliable identificationsystems and effective, integrated information-sharing. As Congress has considered theserecommendations, however, possible legislative responses have broadened to include significant andpossibly far-reaching changes in the substantive law governing immigration and how that law isenforced, both at the border and in the interior of the United States. Other measures before the 108th Congress -- such as those on temporary workers and business personnel, adjustment of status for unauthorized aliens, and noncitizen eligibility for public benefits-- concern more perennial immigration-related questions. These include how to use the immigrationsystem to meet U.S. labor needs, how to address unauthorized immigration to the United States, andwhat types of benefits to provide to noncitizens. Of course, today's heightened security concernshave likewise added new dimensions to these old questions.\",\n \"In the current debate over consularidentification cards, for example, issues of unauthorized immigration and security have been raised. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action orare of significant congressional interest. (2) The finalsection of the report lists enacted legislation andselected bills receiving action. For decades, the administrative authority to interpret, implement, enforce, and adjudicateimmigration law within the United States lay almost exclusively with one officer: the AttorneyGeneral. The most general statement of this power was found in �103(a)(1) of the INA, thefundamental statute regulating the entry and stay of aliens. With some exceptions, immigrationfunctions were delegated to INS, which was headed by a Commissioner who reported to the AttorneyGeneral. On March 1, 2003, primary responsibility for securing our borders and managing the immigration process shifted to DHS. This transfer was effectuated through general language in theHomeland Security Act (HSA; P.L. 107-296 ): Congress did not amend every affected section of theINA to change all references to the Attorney General that were effectively superceded by the generaltransfer of authority.\",\n \"However, Congress did amend the language of �103(a) of the INA, first in�1102 of the HSA and later in Division L, �105, of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ). This section now states: The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigrationand naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers,functions, and duties conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State .... Provided, however , That determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to allquestions of law shall be controlling. The revised language reflects the transfer of general authority, but may leave certain issues unresolved. First, exactly what immigration powers and functions are to be retained by the AttorneyGeneral? Laws to date make clear that the Attorney General is to remain responsible foradministrative adjudications by immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and thatdeterminations and rulings by the Attorney General on questions of law are to be controlling. However, the intended extent of these and possible other retained powers may not be altogether clearat the operational level.\",\n \"Second, to the degree that authority over immigration is now fragmentedor overlapping, how are the respective authorities of DHS and the Attorney General to becoordinated and reconciled? It has been argued that only a section-by-section revision of the INA, replacing references to the Attorney General with references to the Secretary of Homeland Security where appropriate, willtruly clarify the allocation of authorities between the two departments. (3) A bill to replace certain INAreferences to the Attorney General with references to the Secretary of Homeland Security( H.R. 1416 ) was adopted by the House on June 24, 2003, and reported by the SenateGovernmental Affairs Committee on November 25, 2003. As passed by the House and reported bythe Senate Committee, this bill, the \\\"Homeland Security Technical Corrections Act of 2003,\\\" wouldremove specified references to the Attorney General, INS, and the INS Commissioner in INA �103(leaving intact the controlling nature of the Attorney General's determinations of law) and in INA�287(g), which concerns acceptance of state services to carry out immigration enforcement. According to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security report on H.R. 1416 ( H.Rept.\",\n \"108-104 ), the bill \\\"improves the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and honors the originalintentions of the drafters by making grammatical and technical corrections.\\\" Nonetheless, questionsmay remain as to how far this provision would fully clarify and resolve outstanding issues ofauthority. (4) Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 there has been considerableinterest in legislation to expand the citizenship benefits of aliens serving in the military. Thereported deaths in action of noncitizen soldiers have drawn attention to provisions of the INA thatgrant posthumous citizenship to those who die as a result of active-duty service during a period ofhostilities. The INA also provides for expedited naturalization for noncitizens serving in the UnitedStates military. During peacetime, noncitizens in the military may petition to naturalize after threeyears aggregate military service rather than the requisite five years of legal permanent residence. During periods of military hostilities, noncitizens serving in the armed forces can naturalizeimmediately. In the wake of September 11, 2001, and the war against terrorism, President George W. Bush officially designated the period beginning on September 11, 2001, as a \\\"period of hostilities,\\\" whichtriggered immediate naturalization eligibility for active-duty U.S. military servicemembers.\",\n \"At thetime of the designation (July 3, 2002), the Department of Defense and the former INS announcedthat they would work together to ensure that military naturalization applications were processedexpeditiously. As of February 2003, there were 37,000 noncitizens serving in active duty in the U.S.armed forces, almost 12,000 noncitizens serving in the selected reserves, and another 8,000 servingin the inactive national guard and ready reserves. Of the many pending bills containing provisions concerning expedited or posthumous citizenship as the result of military service, H.R. 1588 , the \\\"National DefenseAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,\\\" became P.L. 108-136 on November 24, 2003. Title XVIIof H.R. 1588 , entitled \\\"Naturalization and Other Immigration Benefits for MilitaryPersonnel and Families,\\\" amends existing military naturalization statutes by: reducing the periodof service required for naturalization based on peacetime service from three years to one year;waiving fees for naturalization based on military service during peacetime or wartime; permittingdiscretionary revocation of naturalization granted on or after the date of enactment throughpeacetime or wartime service if the citizen were discharged from military service under other thanhonorable conditions before serving honorably for an aggregate period of five years; permittingnaturalization processing overseas in U.S.\",\n \"embassies, consulates, and military bases; providing forpriority consideration for military leave and transport to finalize naturalization; and extendingnaturalization based on wartime service to members of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary's designee within the DHS Bureau ofCitizenship and Immigration Services is authorized to request posthumous citizenship immediatelyupon obtaining permission from the next-of-kin. P.L. 108-136 expands immigration benefits available to the immediate relatives (spouses, children, and parents) of citizens, including posthumous citizens, who die from injuries or illnessesresulting from or aggravated by serving in combat. Such relatives would remain classified asimmediate relatives of a U.S. citizen for immigration purposes, notwithstanding the death of theservicemember, and could self-petition for immigrant status. Certain adjustment requirements andthe public charge ground of inadmissibility would be waived. In addition, children and parents, aswell as spouses, of U.S. citizens who die during honorable active-duty service would be eligible tonaturalize without prior residence or a specified period of physical presence in the United States. This includes survivors of posthumous citizens who died on or after September 11, 2001. P.L.\",\n \"108-136 also amends the relevant sections of the INA to change references to the Attorney General to references to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The effective date of the provisionsin P.L. 108-136 would be retroactive to September 11, 2001, except for the fee waivers andprovision for naturalization proceedings abroad, which shall take effect on October 1, 2004. (5) The report of 9/11 Commission concluded that the key officials responsible for determiningalien admissions (consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors in the United States) were notconsidered full partners in counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result,opportunities to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed. The 9/11 Commission contendedthat \\\"(t)here were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travelvulnerabilities.\\\" (6) The 9/11 Commission's immigration-related recommendations focused primarily on targeting terrorist travel through an intelligence and security strategy based on reliable identification systemsand effective, integrated information-sharing. As Congress has considered these recommendations,however, possible legislative responses have broadened to include significant and possiblyfar-reaching changes in the substantive law governing immigration and how that law is enforced,both at the border and in the interior of the United States.\",\n \"(7) There are several major bills that seek to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and some propose significant revisions to U.S. immigration law and policy. The bills that wouldrevise immigration law include H.R. 10 , to provide for reform of the intelligencecommunity, terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and international cooperation andcoordination, and for other purposes; S. 2845 , the National Intelligence Reform Act of2004; S. 2774 / H.R. 5040 , the 9/11 Commission Report ImplementationAct of 2004; and H.R. 5024 , the 9/11 Commission Recommendations ImplementationAct of 2004. Of these bills, H.R. 10 as reported by the House Committee on the Judiciaryon October 5, 2004, proposes the most extensive revisions of the INA. During the Senate floordebate on S. 2845, S.Amdt. 3807 , which added a title on \\\"terrorist travel andeffective screening,\\\" was accepted on October 1, 2004. The major immigration areas underconsideration in these comprehensive 9/11 Commission bills include: asylum, biometric trackingsystems, border security, document security, exclusion, immigration enforcement, and visaissuances. (8) The INA provides for the temporary admission of various categories of foreign workers andbusiness personnel. Foreign nationals admitted to the United States on a temporary basis are knownas nonimmigrants.\",\n \"The major nonimmigrant category for temporary workers is the H visa. The Hvisa category includes the H-1B visa for professional specialty workers, the H-2A visa foragricultural workers, and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural workers, among other visa classifications. Foreign nationals also may be temporarily admitted to the United States for work- orbusiness-related purposes under other nonimmigrant categories, including the B-1 visa for businessvisitors, the E visa for treaty traders and investors, and the L-1 visa for intracompany transfers. (9) The economic prosperity of the 1990s fueled a drive to increase the levels of employment-based immigration. Both Congress and the Federal Reserve Board expressed concern at that time that ascarcity of labor could curtail the pace of economic growth. A primary response was to increase thesupply of foreign temporary professional (H-1B) workers through FY2003. The 108th Congress nowweighs whether to renew these increased H-1B visa ceilings or keep the statutory limit of 65,000. The FY2004 cap was reached in March 2004, and DHS recently announced that the FY2005 cap wasreached on the first day of the fiscal year -- October 1, 2004. The 106th Congress enacted the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (\",\n \"P.L.\",\n \"106-313 ) with bipartisan support in October 2000. That law raised the number of H-1Bvisas by 297,500 over three years. It also made changes in the use of H-1B fees for the educationand training of U.S. residents, notably earmarking a portion of training funds for skills that are ininformation technology shortage areas and adding a math, science, and technology education grantprogram. Separate legislation ( P.L. 106-311 ) increased the H-1B fee, authorized through FY2003,from $500 to $1,000. The 107th Congress enacted provisions that allow H-1B workers to remainbeyond the six-year statutory limit if their employers have petitioned for them to become legalpermanent residents. Certain labor market protections aimed at firms whose workforce is more than15% H-1B workers (known as H-1B dependent employers) lapsed at the end of FY2003. Those opposing any extension of the increased H-1B visa ceilings or an easing of admissions requirements assert that there is no compelling evidence of a labor shortage in these professionalareas that cannot be met by newly graduating students and the retraining of the existing U.S. workforce. They argue further that the education of U.S. students and training of U.S. workers should begiven priority over fostering a reliance on\",\n \"foreign workers.\",\n \"Proponents of maintaining current H-1B levels assert that the education of students and the retraining of the current workforce are long-term responses to potential labor shortages, and thatH-1B workers are essential if the United States is to remain globally competitive. Some proponentsargue that employers should be free to hire the best people for the jobs, maintaining that marketforces should regulate H-1B visas, not an arbitrary ceiling. Pending bills would make various changes to current law on H-1B visas. S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 would broaden the lay-off protection provisions pertaining to H-1Bdependent employers to cover all H-1B employers, and would give the Department of Labor theauthority to initiate investigations of H-1B employers if there is reasonable cause. H.R. 4166 would make the following provisions permanent: the attestation requirement concerningnondisplacement of U.S. workers applicable to H-1B-dependent employers and willful violators; thefiling fee applicable to H-1B petitioners; and the Secretary of Labor's authority to investigate anemployer's alleged failure to meet specified labor attestation conditions. Two other bills( H.R. 2235 and H.R. 2688 ) would suspend or eliminate H-1B visas. H.R. 3534 would amend the H visa category more generally.\",\n \"It would eliminate thecurrent subcategories, including the H-1B visa, and replace them with a single category coveringaliens coming temporarily to the United States to perform skilled or unskilled work. (10) Concerns have been voiced that the L visa category, which allows executives and managers of multinational corporations to work temporarily in the United States, is being misused. This visacategory permits multinational firms to transfer top-level personnel to their locations in the UnitedStates for five to seven years. Intracompany transfers enter on L-1 visas, and their spouses andchildren enter on L-2 visas. Although the number of L visas (L-1s and L-2s combined) issued hastripled in the past 20 years, the number of L visas that the Department of State issued in FY2002(112,624) is down from a high of 120,538 in FY2001. Some are now charging that firms are using the L visa to transfer \\\"rank and file\\\" professional employees rather than limiting these transfers to top-level personnel, thus circumventing immigrationlaws aimed at protecting U.S. employees from the potential adverse employment effects associatedwith an increase in the number of foreign workers.\",\n \"Proponents of current law maintain that anyrestrictions on L visas would prompt many multinational firms to leave the United States, as wellas undermine reciprocal agreements that currently permit U.S. corporations to transfer theiremployees abroad. Legislation that would amend the L-1 visa is before the 108th Congress ( S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 , S. 1635 , H.R. 2154 , H.R. 2702 , H.R. 4166 , and H.R. 4415 ). All of these bills have provisions aimed atrestricting the outsourcing of U.S. jobs to L-1 visa holders (that is, the importing of L-1 workers toperform U.S. jobs). On October 4, 2004, the Senate Judiciary committee reported S. 1635 , which was introduced by Senator Saxby Chambliss, chair of the Senate JudiciarySubcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship. As reported, S. 1635 would amend the INA to prohibit under certain circumstances entry of an alien with specializedknowledge who will be stationed primarily at the worksite of an employer other than the petitioningemployer. S. 1635 also would eliminate the six-month requirement of prior continuousoverseas employment for blanket petitions (thus subjecting all L-1 aliens to a one-year requirement),and would direct DHS to maintain L-1 statistics. H.R. 4166 has similar provisionsrevising\",\n \"the L visa. Among the other pending bills, H.R.\",\n \"4415 would eliminatespecialized knowledge as a basis for obtaining an L visa and would limit the number of L-1 visasto 35,000 annually. Several of the bills ( S. 1452 / H.R. 2849 and H.R. 2702 ) include labor attestation requirements designed to protect U.S. workers fromdisplacement or other potentially adverse effects on the labor market brought on by importing L-1visa holders. (11) The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the U.S.-Singapore FTA create separate categories of entry for citizens of each country to engage in a wide range of business and investmentactivities as nonimmigrants. Chapter 14 of the U.S.-Chile FTA and Chapter 11 of theU.S.-Singapore FTA address four specific categories of nonimmigrant admissions currently governedby U.S. immigration law: business visitors (parallel to the INA's B-1 visa category); treaty tradersand investors (parallel to the E visa category); intracompany transfers (parallel to the L visacategory); and professional workers (parallel to the H-1B visa category). Legislation to implement the Chile and Singapore FTAs was introduced on July 15, 2003, as S. 1416 / H.R. 2738 and S. 1417 / H.R. 2739 ,respectively. The House passed H.R. 2738 and H.R. 2739 on July 24,2003, and the Senate passed them on\",\n \"July 31,2003.\",\n \"The Chile FTA implementing law is P.L.108-77 , and the Singapore FTA implementing law is P.L. 108-78 . These laws amend severalsections of the INA. Foremost, the laws amend INA �101(a)(15)(H) to carve out a portion of theH-1B visas -- designated as the H-1B-1 visa -- for professional workers entering through the FTAs. In many ways the FTA professional worker visa requirements parallel the H-1B visa requirements,notably having similar educational requirements. The H-1B visa, however, specifies that theoccupation require highly specialized knowledge, while the FTA professional worker visa specifiesthat the occupation require only specialized knowledge. P.L. 108-77 contains a numerical limit of 1,400 new entries under the FTA professional worker visa from Chile, and P.L. 108-78 contains a limit of 5,400 for Singapore. Under the laws, the FTAprofessional visa is initially issued for one year, but can be renewed without limit; by comparison,an H-1B worker is limited to a total stay of six years. The laws count an FTA professional workeragainst the H-1B cap the first year he or she enters and again after the fifth year he or she seeksrenewal.\",\n \"Although the FTA professional worker would remain a temporary resident and would onlybe permitted to work for an employer who had met the applicable labor attestation requirements, heor she could legally remain in the United States indefinitely. These FTA provisions on the temporary entry of business personnel and professional workers are raising concerns among many in the field of immigration because immigration law traditionallyis spelled out by Congress, not the executive branch. Some assert that the U.S. Trade Representative(USTR) negotiated these immigration provisions without any authority or direction from Congress. This assertion implies that the USTR did not honor its obligations of the \\\"fast track authority,\\\" foundin the Trade Promotion Authority objectives of the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ), to regularlyand formally consult with Congress during the FTA negotiations in return for expedited legislativeprocedures, which among other things bar amendments to the FTA enabling legislation. Moregenerally, some point out that these provisions would constrain current and future Congresses whenthey consider revising immigration law on business personnel, treaty investors and traders,intracompany transfers, and professional workers because the United States would run the risk ofviolating the FTAs.\",\n \"The USTR maintains that the temporary entry of professionals falls within Trade Promotion Authority objectives regarding the opening of foreign country markets for U.S. services andinvestment, and that ensuring cross-border mobility of professionals and other business persons iscritical for U.S. companies in developing new markets and business opportunities abroad. TheUSTR further argues that the temporary business personnel provisions in the FTAs are notimmigration policy because they only affect temporary entry. The USTR points out that it issued anotice of intent to negotiate provisions to facilitate the temporary entry of business persons inOctober 2001 and that it briefed congressional staff on the FTA provisions on numerous occasions. Currently, the United States has two main programs for temporarily importing low-skilled workers, sometimes referred to as guest workers. Agricultural workers enter through the H-2Aprogram and nonagricultural workers enter through the H-2B program. Pending bills ( S. 1645 / H.R. 3142 , S. 2185 , and H.R. 3604 ) propose to overhaulthe H-2A program. Among other provisions, these bills would streamline the process of importingH-2A workers and make changes to existing H-2A requirements regarding minimum benefits,wages, and working conditions.\",\n \"With respect to agricultural guest worker proposals, the HouseAgriculture Committee held a hearing in January 2004 to review the potential impact of suchproposals on the agricultural sector. S. 2010 and S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 would reform the H-2B program. Among other changes, both would allow the importing ofH-2B workers to perform short-term labor or services; current law limits H-2B workers to theperformance of temporary work. S. 2010 , S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 ,and other bills ( S. 2252 / H.R. 4052 , S. 2258 , and H.R. 4041 ) would increase the potential number of H-2B workers by either raising thestatutory cap on the program, currently set at 66,000 per year, or exempting certain H-2B workersfrom the cap. H.R. 3534 proposes to amend the H visa category more generally. Itwould eliminate the current subcategories, including the H-2A and H-2B visas, and replace themwith a single category covering aliens coming temporarily to the United States to perform skilled orunskilled work. Also before the 108th Congress are proposals to create new temporary worker programs ( S. 1387 , S. 1461 / H.R. 2899 , S. 2010 , S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 , and H.R. 3651\",\n \"). These bills would amendthe INA to establish new nonimmigrant visas. S.\",\n \"1387 would establish two new visas,one for seasonal workers and one for nonseasonal workers. S. 1461 / H.R. 2899 would likewise establish two new nonimmigrant visas. One would cover aliens coming to theUnited States to perform temporary work, and the other would cover unauthorized alien workers. The new visa category proposed in H.R. 3651 would cover unauthorized aliens. Inaddition to reforming the H-2B visa, as discussed above, S. 2010 and S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 would each establish a new temporary worker visa. S. 2010 would establish a new visa for temporary workers in occupation classifications not covered bythe H-1B, H-2A, H-2B, or other specified high-skilled nonimmigrant visa categories. The new visaproposed in S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 would be for temporary workers inoccupation classifications not covered by the H-1B, H-2A, or other specified high-skillednonimmigrant visa categories. (12) Provisions insome of the above bills to enable certain aliens toobtain legal permanent residence are discussed in the next section. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Bureau of Census's CurrentPopulation Survey indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population (commonly referred toas illegal aliens) was 9.3 million in 2002. Almost two-thirds (57%) of these illegal residents\",\n \"werebelieved to be Mexican nationals.\",\n \"(13) Several billsbefore the 108th Congress, some of which arediscussed below, would enable certain unauthorized aliens to adjust to legal permanent resident(LPR) status. Adjustment refers to the process under immigration law by which an individualpresent in the United States is granted legal permanent residence. Some pending guest worker bills (see above) would establish special mechanisms for alien workers in the United States to become LPRs. S. 1645 / H.R. 3142 wouldestablish a two-stage legalization program for agricultural workers; aliens could first apply fortemporary resident status and then, after meeting additional requirements, could apply to adjust toLPR status. Under S. 1461 / H.R. 2899 , S. 2010 , and S. 2381 / H.R. 4262 , certain alien workers could apply directly for LPRstatus. By contrast, S. 1387 , S. 2185 , H.R. 3534 , H.R. 3604 , and H.R. 3651 do not propose special mechanisms for guestworkers to obtain LPR status. (14) A bill that would enable certain unauthorized alien students to become LPRs ( S. 1545 ) has been reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Known as the \\\"DREAM Act,\\\" S. 1545 would establish a two-stage process through which eligible aliens would firstbe granted conditional LPR\",\n \"status and then after meeting additional requirements, could becomefull-fledged LPRs.\",\n \"To be eligible for conditional LPR status under the bill, an alien must have beenunder age 16 at the time of initial entry into the United States, have resided continuously here for atleast five years preceding enactment, and have a high school diploma (or equivalent credential) orhave gained admission to an institution of higher education, among other requirements. Related billshave been introduced in the House ( H.R. 84 , H.R. 1684 , and H.R. 3271 ). (15) In addition, legalizationprovisions in some guest worker bills and otherimmigration bills would also enable certain unauthorized alien students to become LPRs. Provisionsin the unauthorized student bills cited above related to eligibility for higher education benefits arediscussed separately below. Prior to 1996, LPRs were eligible for federal public benefits, such as Medicaid, under termscomparable to citizens, and states were not permitted to restrict access to federal programs on thebasis of immigration status. The 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. 104-193 ) made most newly enteringLPRs ineligible for federal public benefits for five years; after five years, it allowed states to continuebarring LPRs from federal public benefits, including Medicaid and the State Children's HealthInsurance Program (SCHIP).\",\n \"(16) Nonetheless, allnoncitizens, regardless of status, who otherwise meetthe eligibility requirements for Medicaid, are eligible for emergency Medicaid. (17) On December 8, 2003, President Bush signed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-173 ). It includes a provision to reimburse healthcareproviders for uncompensated treatment given to unauthorized aliens, aliens paroled (18) into the UnitedStates for the purpose of receiving eligible services, and Mexican citizens permitted to enter theUnited States with border crossing cards (also referred to as \\\"laser visas\\\"). Specifically, P.L.108-173 instructs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to pay local governments,hospitals, or other providers such amounts as they can demonstrate were used to provideuncompensated emergency health services to unauthorized aliens, aliens paroled into the UnitedStates, and Mexican citizens entering with border crossing cards. Funding is allocated to statesbased on a formula, and the state allotment is available to reimburse health care providers in thatstate.\",\n \"For each of fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the provision appropriates $250 million, of which: $167 million is designated to states based on the percentage of unauthorized aliens residing in the state compared to the total number of unauthorized aliens in the United States;and $83 million is designated to the 6 states with the highest percentage ofunauthorized alien apprehensions for the fiscal year. P.L. 108-173 also requires the Secretary of HHS to establish a process, including measures to protect against fraud and abuse, for hospitals and other health care providers to apply for reimbursement. Section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA; Division C of P.L. 104-208 ) made unauthorized aliens ineligible for postsecondary educationbenefits based on state residence unless equal benefits were made available to all U.S. citizensregardless of state of residence. Bills before the 108th Congress (including S. 1545 , asreported) would repeal IIRIRA �505 and, as discussed above, would enable certain unauthorizedalien students to become LPRs. Pending House bills ( H.R. 84 and H.R. 1684 ) also would make alien students who apply for relief under their terms eligible for federalpostsecondary education benefits, such as student financial aid, while\",\n \"their applications are pending. S.\",\n \"1545 , as reported, does not contain such provisions. (19) The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVER; P.L. 107-173 )required that by October 26, 2004 all visas issued have biometric identifiers. Although theDepartment of State (DOS) has said that it will meet the deadline, it is not clear that DHS will havethe readers for the new biometric visas in place at all points of entry by the specified date. (20) EBSVER also established biometric requirements for visa waiver program (VWP) countries, whosenationals are allowed to enter the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure withoutfirst obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. (21) The act mandated that by October 26, 2004,the government of each VWP country must certify that it has established a program to issuemachine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate a biometric identifier. EBSVER also specified that any person applying for admission to the United States under the VWPmust have a tamper-resistant, machine-readable passport with a biometric identifier, unless thepassport was issued prior to October 26, 2004. The standard agreed upon by the internationalcommunity for the biometric identifier is facial recognition. P.L. 108-299 ( H.R.\",\n \"4417 ) extended for one-year both the deadline for VWP countries to certify that they have a program to issue machine-readable passports with biometricidentifiers, and the requirement that all visas issued have biometric identifiers. The new biometricdeadline is October 26, 2005. Under P.L. 108-299 , any person applying for admission to the UnitedStates under the VWP as of that date would have to have a tamper-resistant, machine-readablepassport with a biometric identifier, unless the passport was issued prior to October 26, 2005. S.Amdt. 3933 was introduced on October 5, 2004, during the floor debate of S. 2845 , the \\\"National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.\\\" S.Amdt. 3933 would require that each VWP country, as a condition of being in the VWP, have a program to issuetamper-resident, machine readable visa documents that incorporate biometric identifiers which arecompatible with the biometric identifiers used in the US-VISIT program. The current debate about consular identification cards in the United States has centered aroundthe matrÃcula consular, the consular card issued by the Mexican government to its citizens in theUnited States when they register with a consulate.\",\n \"In recent years, and especially since theSeptember 11, 2001 attacks, Mexican consulates in the United States and other interested partieshave worked to gain acceptance of the matrÃcula consular as identification for a variety of purposes,with considerable success. The matrÃcula consular raises a number of questions for domestic and foreign policy. With respect to domestic policy, there is much debate about the costs and benefits of the cards in the areasof immigration, public safety and law enforcement, and homeland security. Relevant foreign policyissues include the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, reciprocity of treatment of citizens abroad, andconsular notification in law enforcement situations. Legislation related to consular identification cards is before the 108th Congress. The House-passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2004-FY2005 ( H.R. 1950 )contains provisions to restrict the issuance of such cards by foreign missions. Other pendingmeasures concern acceptance of consular identification cards by U.S. federal entities( H.R. 502 , H.R. 687 , and H.R. 3534 ), and acceptance of thecards for banking purposes ( H.R. 773 and H.J.Res. 58 ). H.R. 4440 would establish consequences under immigration law for the possession or use of consularidentification cards. H.R.\",\n \"10 as reported by the House Judiciary Committee wouldrequire that, for purposes of establishing his or her identity to a federal employee, an alien presentin the United States may present a valid foreign passport or an immigration document issued by DHSor the Department of Justice under the authority of immigration laws, and no other document canbe used for such purposes. (22) IIRIRA (in Title IV, Subtitle A) directed the Attorney General to conduct three pilot programsfor employment eligibility confirmation (i.e., to confirm that new hires are legally eligible to work). It further directed the Attorney General to establish an employment eligibility confirmation systemto be used by employers participating in the pilot programs. Each program was authorized initiallyfor four years. P.L. 107-128 extended the life of each program from four years to six years. The first program to be implemented, known as the \\\"basic pilot program,\\\" began in November 1997. Under IIRIRA, the basic pilot is to operate in at least five of the seven states with the largestestimated unauthorized alien populations. Currently, it is operating in six states (California, Florida,Illinois, Nebraska, New York, and Texas).\",\n \"Although some employers are required to participate ina pilot program, participation in the programs is, for the most part, voluntary. S. 1685 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would amend IIRIRA's pilot program provisions. It would extend each program for an additional five years, therebyauthorizing the basic pilot program until 2008. S. 1685 also would provide for theoperation of the basic pilot program in all states by December 1, 2004. It would not change theIIRIRA provisions concerning voluntary or mandatory participation. During Senate floor consideration, S. 1685 was amended to add unrelated provisions concerning the immigrant investor regional center pilot program. These provisions,which were previously passed by the Senate in another bill ( S. 1642 ), are discussedbelow in the \\\"Other Legislation Receiving Action\\\" section. S. 1685 , as amended, waspassed by the Senate and House. On December 3, 2003, the President signed the bill into law ( P.L.108-156 ). Earlier in the session, a related bill ( H.R. 2359 ) had been considered in the House. As reported by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. 2359 , like S.\",\n \"1685 ,would have extended each pilot program for an additional five years and would have provided forthe operation of the basic pilot program in all states. Additionally, H.R. 2359 wouldhave allowed the pilot program confirmation system to be used for government inquiries about anindividual's immigration status. A separate provision of IIRIRA (�642(c)) directed the former INSto respond to inquiries by federal, state, or local government agencies seeking to verify or ascertainthe citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agencies for anypurpose authorized by law. H.R. 2359 would have provided that such inquiries maybe submitted and responded to using the employment eligibility confirmation system. A modified version of H.R. 2359 , which contained all the above provisions, wasconsidered on the House floor on October 28, 2003. A motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill,as amended, failed. The 231 to 170 vote on the motion fell short of the required two-thirds vote. The refugee ceiling for FY2004 was 70,000, with 50,000 of these numbers allocated among the regions of the world and the remaining 20,000 comprising an \\\"unallocated reserve\\\" to be used if, andwhere, the need for additional refugee slots arose.\",\n \"Actual FY2004 refugee admissions totaled52,868.\",\n \"The proposed refugee admissions for FY2005, provided to Congress during the annualrefugee consultation, again sets the refugee ceiling at 70,000 and includes 20,000 unallocated refugeenumbers. Refugee numbers that are unused in a fiscal year are lost; they do not carry over into thefollowing year. The \\\"Lautenberg amendment\\\" requires the Attorney General to designate categories of former Soviet and Indochinese nationals for whom less evidence is needed to prove refugee status, andprovides for adjustment to LPR status for certain former Soviet and Indochinese nationals deniedrefugee status. P.L. 108-7 extended the Lautenberg amendment through FY2003. The ConsolidatedAppropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ) extends the amendment through FY2004. Inaddition, it amends the Lautenberg amendment to also require the designation of categories ofIranian nationals, specifically religious minorities, for whom less evidence is needed to prove refugeestatus. Another provision in P.L. 108-199 instructs the Secretary of State to utilize private voluntary organizations with refugee-related expertise in the identification, referral, and processing of refugeesoverseas. Currently, the identification and referral of refugees for the U.S. refugee program is doneprimarily by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The \\\"McCain amendment,\\\" first enacted in 1996, made the adult children of certain Vietnamese\",\n \"refugees eligible for U.S.\",\n \"refugee resettlement. P.L. 107-185 revised and re-enacted the amendmentfor FY2002 and FY2003. Among its provisions, this law enabled adult children previously deniedresettlement to have their cases reconsidered. In the 108th Congress, H.R. 2792 wouldextend the amendment, as revised by P.L. 107-185 , through FY2005. Resettlement Funding. For FY2003, Congress provided $478.0 million for HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). This total included$34.2 million transferred to ORR from the former INS for the unaccompanied alien minors program,pursuant to P.L. 107-296 . For FY2004, P.L. 108-199 provides $450.3 million for ORR programs. The Bush Administration's request for ORR for FY2005 is $473 million. On September 9, 2004,the House passed H.R. 5006 , the FY2005 appropriations for the Departments of Labor,Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED), and included$491.3 million for ORR. H.R. 5006 also would give ORR the authority to carry overunexpended funds. The Senate reported bill for the FY2005 L-HHS-ED appropriations( S. 2810 ) included $477.2 million for ORR. (23) North Korean Refugees.\",\n \"Since the constitution of Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea) guarantees citizenship to all Koreans, and given thediplomatic complexities of the Korean peninsula, residents of Democratic People's Republic ofKorea (i.e., North Korea) generally have not been considered eligible for refugee status. (24) H.R. 4011 , The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, passed by the House andSenate on October 4, 2004, would require that a national of the North Korea not be considered anational of the South Korea for purposes of eligibility for refugee or asylum status. H.R.4011 would also require the Secretary of State to facilitate the submission of applicationsfor refugee status from North Koreans. In addition, the bill would require the Secretary of State tosubmit a report to Congress which describes the situation of North Korean refugees, and explainsU.S. government policy towards North Korean nationals outside of North Korea. Furthermore, H.R.4011 would require annual reports for six years on North Korean who applied for andreceived asylum and refugee status. P.L. 108-99 extends a provision in immigration law that allows for the admission of immigrants to perform religious work.\",\n \"These religious workers enter under the fourth preference category ofemployment-based immigration, known as \\\"special immigrants,\\\" and are subject to an annual capof 5,000. P.L. 108-99 extends this religious worker provision for five additional years, throughSeptember 30, 2008. Ministers of religion are treated separately from religious workers; the specialimmigrant provision covering them is permanent. Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-649 ), ministers of religion were admitted to the United States without numerical limits, and there was no separate provision for religious workers. Religious workers immigrated through one of the more general categories of numerically-limited,employment-based immigration that were in effect at that time. The Immigration Act of 1990amended the INA to redefine the special immigrant category (which is subject to an overall cap) toinclude ministers of religion as well as religious workers, and created a new nonimmigrant (i.e.,temporary) visa for religious workers, commonly referred to as the R visa. The 1990 Act alsocontained a \\\"sunset\\\"of the special immigrant provision for religious workers on September 30, 1994. The provision was subsequently extended through September 30, 1997, and then again throughSeptember 30, 2003. (25) P.L.\",\n \"106-386 created a new nonimmigrant category, known as the T visa or T status, for aliens who are victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons. To qualify for the T category, in additionto being a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, the alien must: be physically present in the United States, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or a U.S. port of entry because of suchtrafficking; have complied with any reasonable request for assistance to law enforcementin the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking, or be under age 15;and be likely to suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm uponremoval. To receive T status, the alien must also be admissible to the United States or obtain a waiver of inadmissibility. The act also makes aliens who have a bona fide application for T status eligible toreceive certain public benefits to the same extent as refugees. Additionally, the spouse, children,and, in some cases, parents of an alien granted T status may be given derivative T status in order toavoid extreme hardship. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 ( P.L.\",\n \"108-193 ) changes eligibility for T status by: (1) raising the age of the exemption for complying with reasonablerequests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers from age 15 to age 18; (2)making unmarried aliens under age 18, who are the siblings of trafficking victims who are under age21, eligible for derivative T status; (3) preventing the aging-out of children who were under age 21when their parents filed applications for T status; and (4) removing public charge as a ground forinadmissibility to T status. P.L. 108-193 also authorizes $15 million in each of fiscal years 2004 and2005 for the Secretary of HHS to provide services to victims of trafficking. The Social Security program provides monthly cash benefits to qualified retired and disabled workers, their dependents, and survivors. Generally, a worker must have 10 years of SocialSecurity-covered employment to be eligible for retirement benefits (less time is required fordisability and survivor benefits). Most jobs in the United States are covered under Social Security.\",\n \"Noncitizens (aliens) who work in Social Security-covered employment must pay Social Securitypayroll taxes, including those who are in the United States working temporarily and those who maybe working in the United States without authorization, with some exceptions. By statute, the workof aliens under certain visa categories (e.g., H-2A agricultural workers) is not covered by SocialSecurity. On March 2, 2004, the President signed into law the Social Security Protection Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-203 , H.R. 743 ), under which an alien whose application for Social Securitybenefits is based on a Social Security Number (SSN) issued January 1, 2004, or later is required tohave work authorization at the time an SSN is assigned, or at any later time, to be eligible forbenefits under the Social Security program. Aliens whose applications are based on SSNs issuedbefore January 1, 2004, would have all Social Security-covered earnings count toward eligibility,regardless if they never had authorization to work in the United States. (26) The diversity visa lottery offers an opportunity for immigration to nationals of countries that do not have high levels of immigration.\",\n \"Aliens from eligible countries had until noon on December30, 2003 to submit their applications for the FY2005 diversity visa lottery. Aliens who are selectedthrough the lottery, if they are otherwise admissible under the INA, may become legal permanentresidents of the United States. Participation in the diversity visa lottery is limited annually to 55,000aliens from countries that are under-represented among recent immigrant admissions to the UnitedStates. In FY2001, over 8 million aliens from around the world sent in applications for the FY2003lottery. Of the diversity visas awarded in FY2002, European immigrants comprised 39.4% of thediversity visa recipients and African immigrants received 38.1% While the diversity lottery has not been directly amended since its enactment in 1990, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA) temporarily reducesthe 55,000 annual ceiling by up to 5,000 visas annually. Beginning in FY1999, the diversity ceilingbecame 50,000 to offset immigrant visa numbers made available to certain unsuccessful asylumseekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and formerly communist countries in Europe who are beinggranted LPR status under special rules established by NACARA. While the offset is temporary, itis not clear how many years it will be in effect to handle these adjustments\",\n \"of status.\",\n \"Some question the continuation of the diversity visa lottery, given that family members often wait years for a visa to immigrate to the United States. They state a preference that the 55,000 visasbe used for backlog reduction of the other visa categories. Supporters of the diversity visa, however,point to the immigration dominance of nationals from a handful of countries and argue that thediversity visa provides \\\"new seed\\\" immigrants for an immigration system weighteddisproportionately to family-based immigrants. (27) The House Judiciary Subcommittee onImmigration, Border Security and Claims has reported H.R. 775 , which would eliminatethe diversity visa lottery. S. 710 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would make aliens who commit acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, or severe violations of religious freedom abroadinadmissible to, and removable from, the United States. Aliens who committed acts of torture orextrajudicial killings also would be ineligible for asylum, refugee status, or withholding of removal. In addition, S. 710 would expand the authority of the Office of Special Investigations,within DOJ's Criminal Division, to detect, investigate, and take legal action to denaturalize alienswho participated in torture, extrajudicial killings, or genocide abroad.\",\n \"The bill would authorize suchsums as necessary to ensure that the Office of Special Investigations can carry out its new obligationswhile continuing its original duties regarding Nazi War criminals. S. 1129 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would create procedures for DHS officers to follow when they encounter an unaccompanied alien child, and would requirethe establishment of procedures to determine the age of an unaccompanied minor. S. 1129 also would establish conditions for the detention of unaccompanied alien children, and wouldallow an unaccompanied alien to be released to specified persons other than the child's parents. Thebill would require that unaccompanied alien children have counsel to represent them in immigrationproceedings, and would require the establishment of a pilot program to study providing guardians ad litem to assist unaccompanied alien children involved in immigration proceedings. Iraqi Scientists. S. 205 , as passed by the Senate, would amend the INA to provide for the nonimmigrant admission of certain scientistsand others with information about the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, and their families. S. 205 would place a numerical limit of 500 on this category. The bill also would grantthe Attorney General discretion to adjust these nonimmigrants\",\n \"to LPR status.\",\n \"Irish Peace Process Program. H.R. 2655 , as passed by the House, would amend and extend through FY2008 a visa program that enablesyoung adults residing in Northern Ireland or certain counties within the Republic of Ireland to worktemporarily in the United States. Immigrant Investor Pilot Program. S. 1642 , as passed by the Senate, would extend the immigrant investor regional centerpilot program for five additional years. It also would authorize DHS to give priority in processingimmigrant investor visa petitions to aliens seeking admission under the pilot program. The text of S. 1642 was added as an amendment to an unrelated bill to extend and expand theemployment eligibility verification pilot programs ( S. 1685 , discussed above) duringconsideration of that bill on the Senate floor. S. 1685 , as amended to include the textof S. 1642 , was passed by the Senate and House, and signed into law by the Presidentas P.L. 108-156 . State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). SCAAP provides reimbursement to state and local governments for thedirect costs associated with incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens. For FY2003 and FY2004,the INA authorizes the appropriation of such sums as necessary for SCAAP. P.L. 108-199 provides$300 million for\",\n \"SCAAP for FY2004. S.\",\n \"460 , as passed by the Senate, would authorizeappropriations for SCAAP, as follows: such sums as necessary for FY2003; $750 million forFY2004; $850 million for FY2005; and $950 million each year for FY2006-FY2010. The Housecompanion bill is H.R. 933 . Other pending bills ( H.R. 1095 , H.R. 1519 ) would authorize different levels of funding for SCAAP for FY2004 throughFY2008. H.R. 4754 , the Commerce, Justice, State Department Appropriations whichpassed the House on July 8, 2004, included $325 million for SCAAP and the Senate version, S. 2809 provided $220 million for the program. S. 2809 was reportedfavorably on September 15, 2004. (28) Waivers for Nonimmigrant Physicians. Foreign physicians in the United States on J-1 visas must return to their home country after completing theireducation or training unless they are granted a waiver. Waiver recipients are eligible to change statusto H-1B status, which is discussed above. State departments of health can request waivers under the\\\"Conrad 30\\\" or \\\"State 30\\\" program. Under current law, the \\\"Conrad 30\\\" program provisions applyto foreign physicians admitted to the United States in J-1 status, or acquiring such status, before June1, 2004. Pending bills, including H.R. 4453 , would make changes to\",\n \"the \\\"Conrad 30\\\"program. H.R.\",\n \"4453 , which has been approved by the House Judiciary Subcommitteeon Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, would strike the June 1, 2004 cut-off date and insteadmake the Conrad program provisions applicable to foreign physicians admitted in or acquiring J-1status before the date that is one year after enactment of the bill. In addition, H.R. 4453 would exempt state-sponsored waiver recipients from the H-1B cap. On September 30, 2004, theHouse Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 4453 after adopting a substitute amendmentthat would extend the program until June 2006. It would allow five physicians in each state topractice in areas not specifically designated as \\\"under-served\\\" by the Department of Health andHuman Services. These physicians however, must still provide care to under-served populations. (29) Nonpayment of Child Support. S. 1609 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would establish consequences underimmigration law for failure to pay child support. The bill would amend the INA to makenonpayment of child support a ground of inadmissibility as well as a basis for determining that anindividual is not a person of good moral character for various purposes, including naturalization. P.L. 108-7 ( H.J.Res. 2 ). Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.\",\n \"Includes provisions related to transfer of immigration authorities to DHS and refugee-relatedprovisions. Passed House on January 8, 2003. Passed Senate, as amended, on January 23, 2003. House and Senate agreed to conference report ( H.Rept. 108-10 ) on February 13, 2003. Signed onFebruary 20, 2003. P.L. 108-77 ( H.R. 2738 ). United States-Chile Free Trade AgreementImplementation Act. Reported by Ways and Means Committee ( H.Rept. 108-224 , Part I) on July21, 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-224 , Part II) on July 22, 2003. PassedHouse on July 24, 2003. Passed Senate on July 31, 2003. Signed on September 3, 2003. P.L. 108-78 ( H.R. 2739 ). United States-Singapore Free Trade AgreementImplementation Act. Reported by Ways and Means Committee ( H.Rept. 108-225 , Part I) on July21, 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-225 , Part II) on July 22, 2003. PassedHouse on July 24, 2003. Passed Senate on July 31, 2003. Signed on September 3, 2003. P.L. 108-99 ( H.R. 2152 ). Amends INA to extend special immigrant religiousworker program for 5 additional years. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-271 ) onSeptember 16, 2003. Passed House on September 17, 2003. Passed Senate\",\n \"on October 3, 2003. Signed on October 15, 2003. P.L. 108-136 ( H.R. 1588 ).\",\n \"National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2004. Reported by Armed Services Committee ( H.Rept. 108-106 ) on May 16, 2003; supplementalreport ( H.Rept. 108-106 , Part II) filed on May 21, 2003. Passed House on May 22, 2003. PassedSenate, as amended, on June 4, 2003. Signed on November 24, 2003. P.L. 108-156 ( S. 1685 ). Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee (without written report) on November 6, 2003. PassedSenate, as amended, on November 12, 2003. Passed House on November 19, 2003. Signed onDecember 3, 2003. P.L. 108-173 ( H.R. 1 ). Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act of 2003. Passed House on June 27, 2003. Passed Senate, as amended, on July7, 2003. House agreed to conference report ( H.Rept. 108-391 ) on November 22, 2003; Senateagreed on November 25, 2003. Signed on December 8, 2003. P.L. 108-193 ( H.R. 2620 ). Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Actof 2003. Reported by International Relations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-264 , Part I) on September5, 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-264 , Part II) on September 29, 2003. Passed House, as amended, on November 5, 2003. Passed Senate on December 9, 2003.\",\n \"Signed onDecember 19, 2003. P.L. 108-199 ( H.R. 2673 ). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004.\",\n \"Originallyintroduced as the FY2004 Agriculture Appropriations bill. Includes refugee-related and SCAAPprovisions. Reported by Appropriations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-193 ) on July 9, 2003. PassedHouse on July 14, 2003. Passed Senate, as amended, on November 6, 2003. House agreed toconference report ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) on December 8, 2003; Senate agreed on January 22, 2004. Signed on January 23, 2004. P.L. 108-203 ( H.R. 743 ). Social Security Protection Act of 2004. Addresses alien eligibility for Social Security benefits. Reported by Ways and Means Committee ( H.Rept.108-46 ) on March 24, 2003. Passed House, as amended, on April 2, 2003. Reported by SenateFinance Committee ( S.Rept. 108-176 ) on October 29, 2003. Passed Senate, as amended, onDecember 9, 2003. Signed on March 2, 2004. P.L. 108-299 ( H.R. 4417 ). Amends the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 to modify certain deadlines for machine-readable, tamper-resistant entryand exit documents. Passed House on June 14, 2004. Passed Senate on July 22, 2004. Signed onAugust 9, 2004. H.R. 10 (Hastert). 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act. Reported by Intelligence Committee ( H.Rept. 108-724 , Part I), Armed Services Committee ( H.Rept. 108-724 ,Part II), and Financial Services Committee\",\n \"( H.Rept. 108-724 , Part III) on October 4, 2004. Reportedby Government Reform Committee ( H.Rept.\",\n \"108-724 , Part IV) and Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept.108-724 , Part V) on October 5, 2004. H.R. 775 (Goodlatte). Security and Fairness Enhancement (SAFE) for America Act of 2003. Amends the INA to eliminate the diversity immigrant program. Forwarded bySubcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims to Judiciary Committee on September14, 2004. H.R. 1416 (Cox). Homeland Security Technical Corrections Act of 2003. Reported by Select Committee on Homeland Security ( H.Rept. 108-104 ) on May 15, 2003. PassedHouse, as amended, on June 24, 2003. Reported by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee( S.Rept. 108-214 ) on November 25, 2003. H.R. 1950 (Hyde). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005. Reported by International Relations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part I) on May 16, 2003;supplemental report ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part II) filed on June 12, 2003. Reported by Armed ServicesCommittee ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part III) on June 30, 2003. Reported by Energy and CommerceCommittee ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part IV) on July 11, 2003. Passed House on July 16, 2003. H.R. 2655 (Walsh). Amends and extends the Irish Peace Process Cultural and Training Program Act of 1998. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-260\",\n \", Part I) onSeptember 4, 2003.\",\n \"Passed House, as amended, on October 7, 2003. H.R. 4011 (Leach). North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. Reported by International Relations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-478 , Part I) on May 4, 2004. Passed House, asamended, on July 21, 2004. Passed Senate, as amended, on September 28, 2004. House agreed toSenate amendment on October 4, 2004. H.R. 4453 (Moran). Access to Rural Physicians Improvement Act of 2004. Forwarded by Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims to Judiciary Committeeon June 3, 2004. Reported by Judiciary Committee ( H.Rept. 108-730 ) on September 30, 2004. H.R. 4754 (Wolf). Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Appropriates funds for the State Criminal AlienAssistance Program (SCAAP). Reported by Appropriations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-576 ) on July1, 2004. Passed House, as amended, on July 8, 2004. H.R. 5006 (Regula). Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Includes funding for the Office ofRefugee Resettlement (ORR) and gives ORR authority to carry over unexpended funds. Reportedby Appropriations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-636 ) on September 7, 2004. Passed House, as amended,on September 9, 2004. S. 205 (Biden). Iraqi\",\n \"Scientists Immigration Act of 2003.\",\n \"Reported by Judiciary Committee (without written report) on January 30, 2003. Passed Senate on March 20, 2003. S. 460 (Feinstein). State Criminal Alien Assistance Program Reauthorization Act of 2003. Passed Senate on November 25, 2003. S. 710 (Leahy). Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act of 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee on November 6, 2003; S.Rept. 108-209 filed on November 24, 2003. S. 1129 (Feinstein). Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee (without written report) on June 3, 2004. S. 1545 (Hatch). Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee on November 25, 2003; S.Rept. 108-224 filed on February9, 2004. S. 1609 (Hatch). Parental Responsibility Obligations Met through Immigration System Enforcement Act. Reported by Judiciary Committee (without written report) on May 13,2004. S. 1635 (Chambliss). L-1 Visa (Intracompany Transferee) Reform Act of 2003. Reported by Judiciary Committee (without written report) on October 4, 2004. <108> S. 1642 (Leahy). Extends the immigrant investor regional center pilot program for five additional years and authorizes giving immigrant investor visa priority to aliens seekingadmission under the program. Passed Senate, as amended, on October 3, 2003. Provisionsincorporated into S. 1685 ( P.L. 108-156 ).\",\n \"S. 2809 (Gregg).\",\n \"Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Appropriates funds for the State Criminal AlienAssistance Program (SCAAP). Reported by Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept.108-344 ) onSeptember 15, 2004. S. 2810 (Specter). Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. Includes funding for the Office ofRefugee Resettlement (ORR). Reported by Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept. 108-345 ) onSeptember 15, 2004. S. 2845 (Collins). National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. S.Amdt. 3807 (McCain-Lieberman), adds title on terrorist travel and effectivescreening, agreed to in Senate on October 1, 2004; S.Amdt. 3933 (Cantwell), requiringbiometric identification information on travel documents of aliens seeking to enter the United States,agreed to in Senate, as modified, on October 5, 2004.\"\n]","isConversational":false}}},{"rowIdx":12396,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"string","value":"train_12396"},"question":{"kind":"string","value":"Write a detailed summary of the following government report."},"answer":{"kind":"string","value":"When reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) are included in an annual budget resolution, their purpose is to require committees to develop and report reconciliation legislation that will achieve the budgetary goals set forth in the annual budget resolution. The reconciliation directives included in the budget resolution specify several things, including the committee instructed to report reconciliation legislation, the level of budgetary changes the committee should report, and the date by which the committee should report. Although reconciliation directives included in an annual budget resolution direct a committee to report legislation achieving a specific budgetary outcome by a specific date, there is no procedural mechanism for enforcing this date. Committees have often reported reconciliation legislation in response to their directives after the date specified with no impact on whether the resultant legislation was considered under House and Senate procedures as reconciliation legislation. In some years, committees have not formally responded to the reconciliation directive instructing them to report legislation. Although there is no procedural mechanism for enforcing the date included in the committee's reconciliation directive, Congress may employ methods of moving forward with reconciliation legislation that falls within a non-reporting committee's jurisdiction in the event that the committee has not yet reported. These methods vary by chamber and are employable only in certain situations. Both the legislative committees and the Budget Committees in both chambers have important roles to play in using the reconciliation process. This report examines the timing of certain stages of the reconciliation process and the extent to which the submission due date included in a reconciliation instruction is a predictor for the timing of committee response. Specifically, it provides information on the dates by which committees have been directed to respond to reconciliation directives and the timing of House and Senate committees in responding to such directives in the past 14 Congresses (101st-114th Congresses). This report will be updated as needed."},"documents":{"kind":"list like","value":["The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it is agreeing upon budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. In some cases, for these goals to be achieved, Congress must pass legislation that alters current revenue, direct spending, or debt limit laws. In this situation Congress seeks to reconcile existing law with its current priorities. The reconciliation process is still a relatively new congressional process in that there have been only 24 reconciliation bills passed by Congress since the first use of reconciliation in 1980. Budget reconciliation is an optional congressional process that consists of several different stages ( Figure 1 ). The first stage is the adoption of the budget resolution. If Congress intends to use the reconciliation process, reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) must be included in the annual budget resolution.","These directives trigger the second stage of the process by instructing individual committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions related to spending, revenue, or the debt limit. These directives detail which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change to be achieved in the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the impact of the budgetary change should be measured. If a single committee is directed in the budget resolution to develop reconciliation legislation, it will likely be instructed to report this language directly to its full chamber. If, however, several committees are directed to report reconciliation legislation, they will typically be directed to submit the language to their respective Budget Committees for packaging, without any substantive change, into an omnibus measure. During the second stage of the reconciliation process, the specified committee develops legislation in response to the reconciliation directive included in the budget resolution. The committee will then meet to vote whether to report that language.","The committee may vote to report the language favorably or unfavorably, the latter meaning that although it satisfied its directive, the committee did not support the language. As stated above, if more than one committee has been directed to report reconciliation legislation, they are directed to submit such language to their respective Budget Committees. Each Budget Committee then packages all committee responses into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions and votes on whether to report the omnibus reconciliation bill to the full chamber. In this way, both the legislative committees and the Budget Committees in both chambers have important roles to play in using the reconciliation process. During the final stages of the reconciliation process, the reported legislation is considered under expedited procedures in both the House and Senate. As with all legislation, any differences in the reconciliation legislation as passed by the two chambers must be resolved before the bill can be sent to the President for the final stage of the process: either approval or veto. Sometimes the reconciliation process triggered in the annual budget resolution of a specific year is not completed until the subsequent year.","For instance, the FY2006 budget resolution, agreed to on April 28, 2005, included reconciliation directives that resulted in the enactment of two reconciliation bills, but these bills were not signed into law until February and May of 2006. As described above, Congress has the option of including reconciliation directives in its annual budget resolution. These directives trigger the reconciliation process, and without their inclusion in a budget resolution, no measure would be eligible to be considered under expedited reconciliation procedures. When reconciliation directives are included in an annual budget resolution, their purpose is to require committees to develop and report legislation that will allow Congress to achieve the budgetary goals set forth in the annual budget resolution. These directives detail which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change that should exist within the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the budgetary change should occur. They might also include language regarding the type of budgetary change that should be reported (revenue, spending, or debt limit legislation), as well as other procedural provisions, contingencies, and programmatic direction.","In this way, the reconciliation process allows the Budget Committees to assist Congress in implementing the budgetary changes outlined in the budget resolution while, at the same time, protecting legislative committee jurisdiction over direct spending and revenue laws by allowing them to report legislative changes of their choice. As described above, reconciliation directives in a budget resolution direct a specific committee or committees to develop legislation achieving a desired budgetary outcome. In both the House and Senate, reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution have directed either a single committee to report or multiple committees to report. In cases when only one committee has been directed to report, the process directs the committee to report its reconciliation legislation directly to its full chamber. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee to report reconciliation legislation, then those committees are directed to submit their legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees. Each Budget Committee then packages the committee responses into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions and votes on whether to report the omnibus reconciliation bill.","Any legislative committee with jurisdiction over spending, revenues, or the debt limit may be directed to report reconciliation legislation, and many have been instructed to report reconciliation legislation at some point. Because the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means each have jurisdiction within their respective chambers over all revenue and debt limit legislation—as well as some direct spending legislation—these committees are often directed to report some type of reconciliation legislation when reconciliation directives are included in a budget resolution. Since 1989, 14 budget resolutions have included reconciliation directives to Senate committees. Thirteen of those 14 directed the Senate Finance Committee to report reconciliation legislation. Similarly, since 1989, 14 budget resolutions have included reconciliation directives to House committees. Thirteen of those 14 directed the House Ways and Means Committee to report reconciliation legislation. In current practice, reconciliation may include direct spending legislation but does not include discretionary spending provisions. Discretionary spending is subject to other enforcement mechanisms. The Appropriations Committees have been directed to report reconciliation legislation on only two occasions and have not been directed to do so since 1981. Individual committees are sometimes given several separate reconciliation directives within a","single budget resolution.","In 2000, for instance, the budget resolution included four separate reconciliation instructions to the House Ways and Means Committee. There are several reasons why a budget resolution may include multiple directives to a single committee. First, a committee may be directed to report more than one kind of reconciliation legislation with a separate directive given for each type. Section 310 of the Budget Act recognizes three types of reconciliation legislation that committees may be directed to report: spending, revenue, and debt limit. The Budget Act also recognizes that committees may be directed to report a combination of spending and revenue legislation, including a direction to achieve deficit-neutral reductions. If a committee is given more than one directive—for instance, to increase revenues and decrease spending—then the committee may respond with separate pieces of legislation. Under current practice in the Senate, however, this provision has been interpreted to mean that no more than one reconciliation measure of each type is permitted.","Reconciliation instructions, therefore, may result in the creation of no more than three reconciliation bills that may be considered on the floor under expedited procedures—and only if they are divided so that there is one for spending, one for revenue, and one for the debt limit. A committee may also be asked to report reconciliation legislation that achieves budgetary goals over different periods of time. Lastly, reconciliation directives may be separated to make clear that the directives are intended to achieve separate policy goals. Reconciliation directives included in an annual budget resolution direct a committee to report (or submit to the Budget Committee) legislation by a specific date. For example: (b) Not later than June 20, 1980, each committee specified in subsection (a) shall submit its recommendations to the Committee on the Budget of its House. (1) Not later than July 23, 1999, the Senate Committee on Finance shall report to the Senate a reconciliation bill. As can be seen in Table 1 , these due dates may vary in several respects. In some years, they have been the same for both the House and Senate committees.","Due dates have sometimes been as early as April or as late as October and have fallen within every month between except August (due to the annually scheduled recess). The decision regarding when to set committee response dates may be influenced by various factors. One factor may be a desire to achieve the President's legislative priorities as quickly as possible, particularly in the first year of his term. For instance, in 2001, President George W. Bush proposed the enactment of revenue reductions. Congress used reconciliation to consider revenue reduction legislation, setting a May due date for committee submissions and clearing the measure for the President by May 26. Conversely, submission deadlines may be set for later in the session when the need for extensive negotiations is foreseen. For example, the FY1996 budget resolution was adopted on June 29, but the submission date for reconciliation legislation was September 22. In 1990, prolonged negotiations with the President over a \"budget summit\" agreement delayed the adoption of the budget resolution until October, which also prolonged the triggering of the reconciliation process.","As a result, the FY1991 budget resolution set a submission deadline in both chambers of October 15, five days after the annual budget resolution was agreed to. When a single committee is directed to report multiple pieces of reconciliation legislation, staggered deadlines may be used to regulate the pace of legislative activity. For example, the reconciliation instructions included in the FY2006 budget resolution in 2005 included three sets of instructions for the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee with three different due dates. These due dates were staggered with a week between each, allowing the committees time to develop and report legislation to satisfy each individual directive. The Budget Act includes a budget process timetable stating that Congress is to complete action on reconciliation legislation on or before June 15. There is no corresponding enforcement mechanism, however, for ensuring that reconciliation legislation be completed by that date, and Congress has instead followed a timetable established by the committee due dates in reconciliation directives in the budget resolution.","Another provision in the Budget Act prohibits House consideration of any resolution providing for adjournment of more than three days during the month of July if the House has not completed action on any required reconciliation legislation. There is no procedural mechanism, such as a point of order, for enforcing the date specified in the reconciliation directive as it appears in the budget resolution. Committees have sometimes reported reconciliation legislation in response to their directives after the date specified in the directive with no impact on whether the resultant legislation was considered as reconciliation legislation. In other words, the late response of one or more committees did not cause the bill to lose its privileged status as a reconciliation bill. In the case of omnibus reconciliation measures, the House and Senate Budget Committees have at times delayed reporting a bill until tardy committee submissions were received. During the first years in which the reconciliation process was used, explicit extensions were sometimes granted to committees that were unable to meet their reporting due date. For instance, in 1983, the House and Senate extended their committee submission due date from July 22 to September 23.","Since this specific extension, however, the House has not employed the use of due date extensions, although the Senate continued the practice through the 1980s. Because committee due dates have no mechanism for enforcement, in current practice neither chamber uses formal committee due date extensions. In some years, committees have not formally responded to the reconciliation directive instructing them to report legislation. There may be several reasons for the lack of a formal committee submission. For instance, there may have been a shift in policy priorities and Congress no longer desires to pass reconciliation legislation. It could also be that a committee fails to approve reconciliation language, or it may be that although committees did not respond formally to the directive, they reported freestanding legislation that was not considered under reconciliation procedures but may have satisfied the goal of the reconciliation directive. As explained above, there is no procedural mechanism for requiring a committee to report reconciliation legislation by the date indicated in the reconciliation directive. Each chamber, however, may employ methods of moving forward with reconciliation legislation and include legislative language that falls within the non-reporting committee's jurisdiction in the event that the committee has","not yet reported.","These methods vary by chamber. In the House, if a committee has not responded to a reconciliation directive, it may still be possible to consider reconciliation legislation on the House floor that would satisfy the committee's directive. The Budget Act states that the House Rules Committee may make in order amendments to a reconciliation bill to satisfy reconciliation directives if a committee has not submitted reconciliation legislation to the House Budget Committee. This would be in order only if there were a reconciliation bill available for consideration by the House either reported from the Budget Committee or received from the Senate. In the Senate, if a committee has not responded to a reconciliation directive, it may still be possible to consider reconciliation legislation on the Senate floor that would satisfy the committee's directive. This would be in order on the floor in the form of a motion to recommit the bill to that committee with instructions that it report the measure back to the Senate forthwith with an amendment. Unlike amendments to the reconciliation bill, the motion to recommit would not have to be germane if it were made in this situation.","Such a motion to recommit would allow any Senator to craft legislative language within the directed committee's jurisdiction on the floor. The following section provides information on the timing of committee responses to reconciliation directives during the period covering 1989-2015 and offers insight on the extent to which the submission due date included in a reconciliation instruction is a predictor for the timing of committee responses. Table 2 provides information on the timing of House committee responses to reconciliation directives. The table includes only reconciliation acts that involved multiple committee directives. It includes the relevant reconciliation act, the number of directives to House committees included in the budget resolution, the number of committee responses that were submitted on time, the number of responses that were submitted late, the number of House committee directives that were not formally responded to, and the number of days before or after the deadline that the last reporting committee submitted its response. It does not speak to the content of the response.","The table also includes the date the House Budget Committee reported, the number of days between the final included committee submission to the House Budget Committee, and the date when the House Budget Committee reported. The data in Table 2 show that directed committees have sometimes submitted reconciliation legislation before the due date, at the due date, and after the due date, and in some cases, committees never formally responded. Further, the table shows that reconciliation legislation has been passed by the House regardless of whether committees reported late or whether some committees never formally submitted a response. Table 2 illustrates at least three practices of the House Budget Committee. First, the Budget Committee has sometimes delayed the reporting of an omnibus reconciliation bill in order to allow a committee that has missed its directed date to submit its response. Conversely, it shows that in some cases, the Budget Committee has not waited for all committees to submit before reporting the bill. Lastly, it shows that, except for in one case, once the House Budget Committee has received the last submission to ultimately be included in the omnibus bill, it reports the legislation without substantial delay.","In the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, the committee responses ranged from all committees submitting on time (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to all committees submitting late (Deficit Reduction Act of 1997). Several omnibus bills included both timely and tardy responses. In some years, reconciliation was included in budget resolutions adopted by one or both chambers, but in the absence of final agreement, the process was not triggered. Such years are not included in this report. Table 4 presents a timeline of four particular stages of reconciliation action in the House for eight different reconciliation acts. The figure includes reconciliation acts agreed to by both chambers that involved multiple committee instructions with the same due date. It shows (1) the date that the budget resolution that directed committees to report reconciliation was agreed to by both chambers, (2) the date by which the instructed committees were directed to submit their responses to the House Budget Committee, (3) the date that the last responding committee submitted reconciliation legislation to the House Budget Committee, and (4) the date that the House Budget Committee reported reconciliation legislation. Figure 2 shows the variability in timing for three of the","four stages.","Although the first stage shown (budget resolution agreed to) tends to occur between April and June, the timing for the other three stages varies. Further, there is considerable variation in the total time taken for all four stages to be completed. In one case it took only a month (1997), and in another other case it took almost 11 months (2009/2010). There is also variability in the stages as they relate to one another. For instance, sometimes the first two stages (adoption of budget resolution and the due date for committee submission) have been within the same month, and sometimes they have been several months apart. This is also true for the relationship between the second and third stages (committee submission due dates and actual committee submission date). However, the amount of time between stages three and four (the submission date of the last committee formally submitting and the date the budget committee reports an omnibus bill) has been fairly consistent, except in one case.","As in Table 2 , this shows that, except in one case, the House Budget Committee has reported the omnibus legislation shortly after it has received the final submission to be included in the omnibus bill. Table 3 provides information on the timing of Senate committee responses to reconciliation directives. The table includes only reconciliation acts that involved multiple committee directives. It includes the relevant reconciliation act, the number of directives to Senate committees included in the budget resolution, the number of committee responses that were submitted on time, the number of committee responses that were submitted late, the number of committees directives that were not formally responded to, and the number of days before or after the deadline that the last reporting committee submitted its response. It does not speak to the content of the response. The table also includes the date the Senate Budget Committee reported the omnibus bill, the number of days between the final included committee submission to the Senate Budget Committee, and the date when the Senate Budget Committee reported.","The data in Table 3 illustrate that directed committees have sometimes reported or submitted reconciliation legislation before the due date, at the due date, and after the due date and that, in some cases, committees never formally responded. Further, the table shows that reconciliation legislation has been passed by the Senate regardless of whether committees submitted late or whether some committees never formally submitted a response. Table 3 illustrates at least three practices of the Senate Budget Committee. First, the Budget Committee has sometimes delayed the reporting of a reconciliation bill to allow a committee that has missed its deadline to submit. Conversely, it shows that in some cases, the Budget Committee has not waited for all committees to submit before reporting the omnibus reconciliation bill. Lastly, it shows that once the Senate Budget Committee has received the last submission to be included in the omnibus, it reports the legislation without substantial delay. In the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, the committee responses ranged from all committees submitting on time (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to all committees submitting late (Deficit Reduction Act). Several omnibus bills included both timely and tardy responses.","Table 3 presents a timeline of reconciliation action in the Senate for six particular reconciliation acts. The figure includes reconciliation acts agreed to by both chambers that involved multiple committee instructions with the same due date. It shows (1) the date that the budget resolution that directed committees to report reconciliation was agreed to by both chambers, (2) the date by which the instructed committees were directed to submit their responses to the Senate Budget Committee, (3) the date that the last responding committee submitted reconciliation legislation to the Senate Budget Committee, and (4) the date that the Senate Budget Committee reported reconciliation legislation. Figure 3 shows variability in timing for three of the four stages. Although the first stage shown (budget resolution agreed to) tends to occur between April and June, the timing for the other three stages varies. Further, there is considerable variation in the total time taken for all four stages to be completed. In one case, it took only one month (1997), and in another case it took eight months (2005). There is also variability in the stages as they relate to one another.","For instance, sometimes the first two stages (adoption of budget resolution and the due date for committee submission) have been within the same month, and sometimes they have been several months apart. This is also true for the relationship between the second and third stages (committee submission due dates and actual committee submission date). However, the amount of time between stages three and four (the submission date of the last committee formally submitting and the date the budget committee reports an omnibus bill) has been fairly consistent. As in Table 3 , this shows that the Senate Budget Committee reports legislation shortly after it has received the last submission to be included in the omnibus bill. The following tables provide more detailed information on House and Senate committee responses to reconciliation directives. Table 4 pertains to the House, and Table 5 pertains to the Senate.","Both include the relevant Congress and session, the fiscal year to which the budget resolution pertains, the budget resolution number, the date the budget resolution was agreed to by both chambers, the committees directed to report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee was directed to respond, the date on which the committee responded, the date that the budget committee reported a reconciliation bill (if applicable), and the reconciliation legislation that was subsequently passed by Congress. The date of response for each committee has been determined in two ways, depending on whether the committee was directed to report to the full chamber or to submit to the Budget Committee. In the case that a committee was instructed to report directly to the full chamber, the date of the committee report was used. In the case that the committee was directed to report to its Budget Committee, the date on the submission letters accompanying its reconciliation responses was used. These letters were found in committee reports and committee prints accompanying the reconciliation legislation. In some cases these letters had been inserted into the Congressional Record . In some cases, the tables do not show a committee","response date.","Committees have not always formally responded to the reconciliation directive instructing them to report legislation. There may be a number of reasons for the lack of a formal submission. For instance, there may have been a shift in policy priorities over the course of the year and Congress no longer desired to consider reconciliation legislation within that committee's jurisdiction. It may also be that even though committees did not respond formally to the reconciliation directive, they did report freestanding legislation that would have satisfied the goal of the reconciliation directive."],"string":"[\n \"The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it is agreeing upon budgetary goals for the upcoming fiscal year. In some cases, for these goals to be achieved, Congress must pass legislation that alters current revenue, direct spending, or debt limit laws. In this situation Congress seeks to reconcile existing law with its current priorities. The reconciliation process is still a relatively new congressional process in that there have been only 24 reconciliation bills passed by Congress since the first use of reconciliation in 1980. Budget reconciliation is an optional congressional process that consists of several different stages ( Figure 1 ). The first stage is the adoption of the budget resolution. If Congress intends to use the reconciliation process, reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) must be included in the annual budget resolution.\",\n \"These directives trigger the second stage of the process by instructing individual committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions related to spending, revenue, or the debt limit. These directives detail which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change to be achieved in the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the impact of the budgetary change should be measured. If a single committee is directed in the budget resolution to develop reconciliation legislation, it will likely be instructed to report this language directly to its full chamber. If, however, several committees are directed to report reconciliation legislation, they will typically be directed to submit the language to their respective Budget Committees for packaging, without any substantive change, into an omnibus measure. During the second stage of the reconciliation process, the specified committee develops legislation in response to the reconciliation directive included in the budget resolution. The committee will then meet to vote whether to report that language.\",\n \"The committee may vote to report the language favorably or unfavorably, the latter meaning that although it satisfied its directive, the committee did not support the language. As stated above, if more than one committee has been directed to report reconciliation legislation, they are directed to submit such language to their respective Budget Committees. Each Budget Committee then packages all committee responses into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions and votes on whether to report the omnibus reconciliation bill to the full chamber. In this way, both the legislative committees and the Budget Committees in both chambers have important roles to play in using the reconciliation process. During the final stages of the reconciliation process, the reported legislation is considered under expedited procedures in both the House and Senate. As with all legislation, any differences in the reconciliation legislation as passed by the two chambers must be resolved before the bill can be sent to the President for the final stage of the process: either approval or veto. Sometimes the reconciliation process triggered in the annual budget resolution of a specific year is not completed until the subsequent year.\",\n \"For instance, the FY2006 budget resolution, agreed to on April 28, 2005, included reconciliation directives that resulted in the enactment of two reconciliation bills, but these bills were not signed into law until February and May of 2006. As described above, Congress has the option of including reconciliation directives in its annual budget resolution. These directives trigger the reconciliation process, and without their inclusion in a budget resolution, no measure would be eligible to be considered under expedited reconciliation procedures. When reconciliation directives are included in an annual budget resolution, their purpose is to require committees to develop and report legislation that will allow Congress to achieve the budgetary goals set forth in the annual budget resolution. These directives detail which committee(s) should report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee(s) should report, the dollar amount of budgetary change that should exist within the reconciliation legislation, and the time period over which the budgetary change should occur. They might also include language regarding the type of budgetary change that should be reported (revenue, spending, or debt limit legislation), as well as other procedural provisions, contingencies, and programmatic direction.\",\n \"In this way, the reconciliation process allows the Budget Committees to assist Congress in implementing the budgetary changes outlined in the budget resolution while, at the same time, protecting legislative committee jurisdiction over direct spending and revenue laws by allowing them to report legislative changes of their choice. As described above, reconciliation directives in a budget resolution direct a specific committee or committees to develop legislation achieving a desired budgetary outcome. In both the House and Senate, reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution have directed either a single committee to report or multiple committees to report. In cases when only one committee has been directed to report, the process directs the committee to report its reconciliation legislation directly to its full chamber. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee to report reconciliation legislation, then those committees are directed to submit their legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees. Each Budget Committee then packages the committee responses into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions and votes on whether to report the omnibus reconciliation bill.\",\n \"Any legislative committee with jurisdiction over spending, revenues, or the debt limit may be directed to report reconciliation legislation, and many have been instructed to report reconciliation legislation at some point. Because the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means each have jurisdiction within their respective chambers over all revenue and debt limit legislation—as well as some direct spending legislation—these committees are often directed to report some type of reconciliation legislation when reconciliation directives are included in a budget resolution. Since 1989, 14 budget resolutions have included reconciliation directives to Senate committees. Thirteen of those 14 directed the Senate Finance Committee to report reconciliation legislation. Similarly, since 1989, 14 budget resolutions have included reconciliation directives to House committees. Thirteen of those 14 directed the House Ways and Means Committee to report reconciliation legislation. In current practice, reconciliation may include direct spending legislation but does not include discretionary spending provisions. Discretionary spending is subject to other enforcement mechanisms. The Appropriations Committees have been directed to report reconciliation legislation on only two occasions and have not been directed to do so since 1981. Individual committees are sometimes given several separate reconciliation directives within a\",\n \"single budget resolution.\",\n \"In 2000, for instance, the budget resolution included four separate reconciliation instructions to the House Ways and Means Committee. There are several reasons why a budget resolution may include multiple directives to a single committee. First, a committee may be directed to report more than one kind of reconciliation legislation with a separate directive given for each type. Section 310 of the Budget Act recognizes three types of reconciliation legislation that committees may be directed to report: spending, revenue, and debt limit. The Budget Act also recognizes that committees may be directed to report a combination of spending and revenue legislation, including a direction to achieve deficit-neutral reductions. If a committee is given more than one directive—for instance, to increase revenues and decrease spending—then the committee may respond with separate pieces of legislation. Under current practice in the Senate, however, this provision has been interpreted to mean that no more than one reconciliation measure of each type is permitted.\",\n \"Reconciliation instructions, therefore, may result in the creation of no more than three reconciliation bills that may be considered on the floor under expedited procedures—and only if they are divided so that there is one for spending, one for revenue, and one for the debt limit. A committee may also be asked to report reconciliation legislation that achieves budgetary goals over different periods of time. Lastly, reconciliation directives may be separated to make clear that the directives are intended to achieve separate policy goals. Reconciliation directives included in an annual budget resolution direct a committee to report (or submit to the Budget Committee) legislation by a specific date. For example: (b) Not later than June 20, 1980, each committee specified in subsection (a) shall submit its recommendations to the Committee on the Budget of its House. (1) Not later than July 23, 1999, the Senate Committee on Finance shall report to the Senate a reconciliation bill. As can be seen in Table 1 , these due dates may vary in several respects. In some years, they have been the same for both the House and Senate committees.\",\n \"Due dates have sometimes been as early as April or as late as October and have fallen within every month between except August (due to the annually scheduled recess). The decision regarding when to set committee response dates may be influenced by various factors. One factor may be a desire to achieve the President's legislative priorities as quickly as possible, particularly in the first year of his term. For instance, in 2001, President George W. Bush proposed the enactment of revenue reductions. Congress used reconciliation to consider revenue reduction legislation, setting a May due date for committee submissions and clearing the measure for the President by May 26. Conversely, submission deadlines may be set for later in the session when the need for extensive negotiations is foreseen. For example, the FY1996 budget resolution was adopted on June 29, but the submission date for reconciliation legislation was September 22. In 1990, prolonged negotiations with the President over a \\\"budget summit\\\" agreement delayed the adoption of the budget resolution until October, which also prolonged the triggering of the reconciliation process.\",\n \"As a result, the FY1991 budget resolution set a submission deadline in both chambers of October 15, five days after the annual budget resolution was agreed to. When a single committee is directed to report multiple pieces of reconciliation legislation, staggered deadlines may be used to regulate the pace of legislative activity. For example, the reconciliation instructions included in the FY2006 budget resolution in 2005 included three sets of instructions for the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee with three different due dates. These due dates were staggered with a week between each, allowing the committees time to develop and report legislation to satisfy each individual directive. The Budget Act includes a budget process timetable stating that Congress is to complete action on reconciliation legislation on or before June 15. There is no corresponding enforcement mechanism, however, for ensuring that reconciliation legislation be completed by that date, and Congress has instead followed a timetable established by the committee due dates in reconciliation directives in the budget resolution.\",\n \"Another provision in the Budget Act prohibits House consideration of any resolution providing for adjournment of more than three days during the month of July if the House has not completed action on any required reconciliation legislation. There is no procedural mechanism, such as a point of order, for enforcing the date specified in the reconciliation directive as it appears in the budget resolution. Committees have sometimes reported reconciliation legislation in response to their directives after the date specified in the directive with no impact on whether the resultant legislation was considered as reconciliation legislation. In other words, the late response of one or more committees did not cause the bill to lose its privileged status as a reconciliation bill. In the case of omnibus reconciliation measures, the House and Senate Budget Committees have at times delayed reporting a bill until tardy committee submissions were received. During the first years in which the reconciliation process was used, explicit extensions were sometimes granted to committees that were unable to meet their reporting due date. For instance, in 1983, the House and Senate extended their committee submission due date from July 22 to September 23.\",\n \"Since this specific extension, however, the House has not employed the use of due date extensions, although the Senate continued the practice through the 1980s. Because committee due dates have no mechanism for enforcement, in current practice neither chamber uses formal committee due date extensions. In some years, committees have not formally responded to the reconciliation directive instructing them to report legislation. There may be several reasons for the lack of a formal committee submission. For instance, there may have been a shift in policy priorities and Congress no longer desires to pass reconciliation legislation. It could also be that a committee fails to approve reconciliation language, or it may be that although committees did not respond formally to the directive, they reported freestanding legislation that was not considered under reconciliation procedures but may have satisfied the goal of the reconciliation directive. As explained above, there is no procedural mechanism for requiring a committee to report reconciliation legislation by the date indicated in the reconciliation directive. Each chamber, however, may employ methods of moving forward with reconciliation legislation and include legislative language that falls within the non-reporting committee's jurisdiction in the event that the committee has\",\n \"not yet reported.\",\n \"These methods vary by chamber. In the House, if a committee has not responded to a reconciliation directive, it may still be possible to consider reconciliation legislation on the House floor that would satisfy the committee's directive. The Budget Act states that the House Rules Committee may make in order amendments to a reconciliation bill to satisfy reconciliation directives if a committee has not submitted reconciliation legislation to the House Budget Committee. This would be in order only if there were a reconciliation bill available for consideration by the House either reported from the Budget Committee or received from the Senate. In the Senate, if a committee has not responded to a reconciliation directive, it may still be possible to consider reconciliation legislation on the Senate floor that would satisfy the committee's directive. This would be in order on the floor in the form of a motion to recommit the bill to that committee with instructions that it report the measure back to the Senate forthwith with an amendment. Unlike amendments to the reconciliation bill, the motion to recommit would not have to be germane if it were made in this situation.\",\n \"Such a motion to recommit would allow any Senator to craft legislative language within the directed committee's jurisdiction on the floor. The following section provides information on the timing of committee responses to reconciliation directives during the period covering 1989-2015 and offers insight on the extent to which the submission due date included in a reconciliation instruction is a predictor for the timing of committee responses. Table 2 provides information on the timing of House committee responses to reconciliation directives. The table includes only reconciliation acts that involved multiple committee directives. It includes the relevant reconciliation act, the number of directives to House committees included in the budget resolution, the number of committee responses that were submitted on time, the number of responses that were submitted late, the number of House committee directives that were not formally responded to, and the number of days before or after the deadline that the last reporting committee submitted its response. It does not speak to the content of the response.\",\n \"The table also includes the date the House Budget Committee reported, the number of days between the final included committee submission to the House Budget Committee, and the date when the House Budget Committee reported. The data in Table 2 show that directed committees have sometimes submitted reconciliation legislation before the due date, at the due date, and after the due date, and in some cases, committees never formally responded. Further, the table shows that reconciliation legislation has been passed by the House regardless of whether committees reported late or whether some committees never formally submitted a response. Table 2 illustrates at least three practices of the House Budget Committee. First, the Budget Committee has sometimes delayed the reporting of an omnibus reconciliation bill in order to allow a committee that has missed its directed date to submit its response. Conversely, it shows that in some cases, the Budget Committee has not waited for all committees to submit before reporting the bill. Lastly, it shows that, except for in one case, once the House Budget Committee has received the last submission to ultimately be included in the omnibus bill, it reports the legislation without substantial delay.\",\n \"In the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, the committee responses ranged from all committees submitting on time (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to all committees submitting late (Deficit Reduction Act of 1997). Several omnibus bills included both timely and tardy responses. In some years, reconciliation was included in budget resolutions adopted by one or both chambers, but in the absence of final agreement, the process was not triggered. Such years are not included in this report. Table 4 presents a timeline of four particular stages of reconciliation action in the House for eight different reconciliation acts. The figure includes reconciliation acts agreed to by both chambers that involved multiple committee instructions with the same due date. It shows (1) the date that the budget resolution that directed committees to report reconciliation was agreed to by both chambers, (2) the date by which the instructed committees were directed to submit their responses to the House Budget Committee, (3) the date that the last responding committee submitted reconciliation legislation to the House Budget Committee, and (4) the date that the House Budget Committee reported reconciliation legislation. Figure 2 shows the variability in timing for three of the\",\n \"four stages.\",\n \"Although the first stage shown (budget resolution agreed to) tends to occur between April and June, the timing for the other three stages varies. Further, there is considerable variation in the total time taken for all four stages to be completed. In one case it took only a month (1997), and in another other case it took almost 11 months (2009/2010). There is also variability in the stages as they relate to one another. For instance, sometimes the first two stages (adoption of budget resolution and the due date for committee submission) have been within the same month, and sometimes they have been several months apart. This is also true for the relationship between the second and third stages (committee submission due dates and actual committee submission date). However, the amount of time between stages three and four (the submission date of the last committee formally submitting and the date the budget committee reports an omnibus bill) has been fairly consistent, except in one case.\",\n \"As in Table 2 , this shows that, except in one case, the House Budget Committee has reported the omnibus legislation shortly after it has received the final submission to be included in the omnibus bill. Table 3 provides information on the timing of Senate committee responses to reconciliation directives. The table includes only reconciliation acts that involved multiple committee directives. It includes the relevant reconciliation act, the number of directives to Senate committees included in the budget resolution, the number of committee responses that were submitted on time, the number of committee responses that were submitted late, the number of committees directives that were not formally responded to, and the number of days before or after the deadline that the last reporting committee submitted its response. It does not speak to the content of the response. The table also includes the date the Senate Budget Committee reported the omnibus bill, the number of days between the final included committee submission to the Senate Budget Committee, and the date when the Senate Budget Committee reported.\",\n \"The data in Table 3 illustrate that directed committees have sometimes reported or submitted reconciliation legislation before the due date, at the due date, and after the due date and that, in some cases, committees never formally responded. Further, the table shows that reconciliation legislation has been passed by the Senate regardless of whether committees submitted late or whether some committees never formally submitted a response. Table 3 illustrates at least three practices of the Senate Budget Committee. First, the Budget Committee has sometimes delayed the reporting of a reconciliation bill to allow a committee that has missed its deadline to submit. Conversely, it shows that in some cases, the Budget Committee has not waited for all committees to submit before reporting the omnibus reconciliation bill. Lastly, it shows that once the Senate Budget Committee has received the last submission to be included in the omnibus, it reports the legislation without substantial delay. In the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, the committee responses ranged from all committees submitting on time (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990) to all committees submitting late (Deficit Reduction Act). Several omnibus bills included both timely and tardy responses.\",\n \"Table 3 presents a timeline of reconciliation action in the Senate for six particular reconciliation acts. The figure includes reconciliation acts agreed to by both chambers that involved multiple committee instructions with the same due date. It shows (1) the date that the budget resolution that directed committees to report reconciliation was agreed to by both chambers, (2) the date by which the instructed committees were directed to submit their responses to the Senate Budget Committee, (3) the date that the last responding committee submitted reconciliation legislation to the Senate Budget Committee, and (4) the date that the Senate Budget Committee reported reconciliation legislation. Figure 3 shows variability in timing for three of the four stages. Although the first stage shown (budget resolution agreed to) tends to occur between April and June, the timing for the other three stages varies. Further, there is considerable variation in the total time taken for all four stages to be completed. In one case, it took only one month (1997), and in another case it took eight months (2005). There is also variability in the stages as they relate to one another.\",\n \"For instance, sometimes the first two stages (adoption of budget resolution and the due date for committee submission) have been within the same month, and sometimes they have been several months apart. This is also true for the relationship between the second and third stages (committee submission due dates and actual committee submission date). However, the amount of time between stages three and four (the submission date of the last committee formally submitting and the date the budget committee reports an omnibus bill) has been fairly consistent. As in Table 3 , this shows that the Senate Budget Committee reports legislation shortly after it has received the last submission to be included in the omnibus bill. The following tables provide more detailed information on House and Senate committee responses to reconciliation directives. Table 4 pertains to the House, and Table 5 pertains to the Senate.\",\n \"Both include the relevant Congress and session, the fiscal year to which the budget resolution pertains, the budget resolution number, the date the budget resolution was agreed to by both chambers, the committees directed to report reconciliation legislation, the date by which the committee was directed to respond, the date on which the committee responded, the date that the budget committee reported a reconciliation bill (if applicable), and the reconciliation legislation that was subsequently passed by Congress. The date of response for each committee has been determined in two ways, depending on whether the committee was directed to report to the full chamber or to submit to the Budget Committee. In the case that a committee was instructed to report directly to the full chamber, the date of the committee report was used. In the case that the committee was directed to report to its Budget Committee, the date on the submission letters accompanying its reconciliation responses was used. These letters were found in committee reports and committee prints accompanying the reconciliation legislation. In some cases these letters had been inserted into the Congressional Record . In some cases, the tables do not show a committee\",\n \"response date.\",\n \"Committees have not always formally responded to the reconciliation directive instructing them to report legislation. There may be a number of reasons for the lack of a formal submission. For instance, there may have been a shift in policy priorities over the course of the year and Congress no longer desired to consider reconciliation legislation within that committee's jurisdiction. It may also be that even though committees did not respond formally to the reconciliation directive, they did report freestanding legislation that would have satisfied the goal of the reconciliation directive.\"\n]","isConversational":false}}},{"rowIdx":12397,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"string","value":"train_12397"},"question":{"kind":"string","value":"Write a detailed summary of the following government report."},"answer":{"kind":"string","value":"For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Although there has been some modification to the tax system, the tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level since 1993. Prior to the recession that began in 2007, annual increases in driving, with a concomitant increase in fuel use, were sufficient in most years to keep revenue rising steadily. This is no longer the case. Although vehicle miles traveled have recently surpassed prerecession levels, future increases in fuel economy standards are expected to reduce motor fuel consumption and therefore fuel tax revenue in the years ahead. Congress has yet to address the surface transportation program's fundamental revenue issues, and has given limited legislative consideration to raising fuel taxes in recent years. Instead, since 2008 Congress has financed the federal surface transportation program by supplementing fuel tax revenues with transfers from the U.S. Treasury general fund. The most recent reauthorization act, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), was enacted on December 4, 2015, and authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs through September 30, 2020. The act provided $70 billion in general fund transfers to the HTF to support the programs over the five-year life of the act. This use of general fund transfers to supplement the HTF will have been the de facto funding policy for 12 years when the FAST Act expires. The FAST Act did not address funding of surface transportation programs over the longer term. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the HTF revenue shortfalls relative to spending will reemerge following expiration of the FAST Act. The trust fund financing system (which supports both federal highway and public transportation programs) faces a number of challenges. As Congress examines possible options for financing surface transportation infrastructure, it may consider several key points: Raising motor fuel taxes could provide the HTF with sufficient revenue to fully fund the program in the near term, but may not be a viable long-term solution due to expected declines in fuel consumption. It would also not address the equity issue arising from the increasing number of personal and commercial vehicles that are powered electrically and therefore do not pay motor fuel taxes. Replacing the fuels tax with a mileage-based road user charge or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) charge would need to overcome a variety of financial, administrative, and privacy barriers, but could be a solution in the longer term. Treasury general fund transfers could continue to be used to make up for the HTF's projected shortfalls but could require budget offsets of an equal amount. The political difficulty of adequately funding the HTF could lead Congress to consider altering the trust fund system or eliminating it altogether. This might involve a reallocation of responsibilities and obligations among federal, state, and local governments. Private investment and federal loans can meet some surface transportation needs, but many projects are not well suited to alternative financing. Tolling may be an effective way to finance specific roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to have heavy use and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade, but tolls are unlikely to provide broad financial support for surface transportation programs."},"documents":{"kind":"list like","value":["Almost every conversation about surface transportation finance begins with a two-part question: What are the \"needs\" of the national transportation system, and how does the nation pay for them? This report is aimed almost entirely at discussing the \"how to pay for them\" question. Since 1956, federal surface transportation programs have been funded largely by taxes on motor fuels that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). A steady increase in the revenues flowing into the HTF due to increased motor vehicle use and occasional increases in fuel tax rates accommodated growth in surface transportation spending over several decades. In 2001, though, trust fund revenues stopped growing faster than spending. In 2008 Congress began providing Treasury general fund transfers to keep the HTF solvent. Every year since 2008, there has been a gap between the dedicated tax revenues flowing into the HTF and the cost of the surface transportation spending Congress has authorized. Congress has filled these shortfalls with a series of further transfers, largely from the Treasury's general fund. These transfers have shifted a total of $143.6 billion to the HTF. The last $70 billion of these transfers were authorized in the Fixing America's Surface","Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L.","114-94 ), which was signed by President Barack Obama on December 4, 2015. The FAST Act funds federal surface transportation programs from FY2016 through FY2020. When the act expires the de facto policy of relying on general fund transfers to sustain the HTF will be 12 years old. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the imbalance between motor fuel tax receipts and HTF expenditures will reemerge and the HTF balance will approach zero in FY2021. In consequence, funding and financing surface transportation is expected to continue to be a major issue for Congress. The HTF has two separate accounts—highways and mass transit. The primary revenue sources for these accounts are an 18.3-cent-per-gallon federal tax on gasoline and a 24.3-cent-per-gallon federal tax on diesel fuel. Although the HTF has other sources of revenue, such as truck registration fees and a truck tire tax, and is also credited with interest paid on the fund balances held by the U.S. Treasury, fuel taxes in most years provides roughly 85%-90% of the amounts paid into the fund by highway users. The transit account receives 2.86 cents per gallon of fuel taxes, with the remainder of the tax revenue flowing","into the highway account.","An additional 0.1-cent-per-gallon fuel tax is reserved for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Fund, which is not part of the transportation program. Since the trust fund was created in 1956, motor fuel taxes have increased four times: in 1959, 1982, 1990, and 1993. Since the 1993 increase, additional changes to the taxation structure have modestly boosted trust fund revenues. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ), for example, provided the trust fund with increased future income by changing elements of federal \"gasohol\" taxation. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users ( P.L. 109-59 ; SAFETEA) included a number of changes designed to bolster the trust fund, mainly by addressing tax fraud. SAFETEA also provided for the transfer of some general fund revenue associated with transportation-related activities to the trust fund. It was believed at the time of SAFETEA's passage that the tax changes, a $12.5 billion unexpended balance in the trust fund, and higher fuel tax revenue due to expected economic growth would be sufficient to finance the surface transportation program through FY2009. This prediction proved to be incorrect.","The shortfalls resulting from the overly optimistic forecasts associated with SAFETEA were rectified by Treasury general fund contributions. In September 2008, Congress enacted a bill that transferred $8 billion of Treasury general funds to shore up the HTF. Other transfers followed (see Table 1 ). The era of automatic trust fund growth may be over. Annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are no longer increasing at the 2% average rate experienced from the 1960s until 2008; although vehicle use is growing again after slumping between 2008 and 2012 due to the sluggish economy, total mileage is projected to grow at an average of roughly 1% per year over the next 20 years. Meanwhile, other policy changes are weakening the link between driving activity and motor fuel tax revenues. Under new rules issued in 2012, combined new passenger car and light truck Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards are expected to reach 41.0 miles per gallon in model year 2021 and 49.7 miles per gallon in model year 2025. This will eventually reduce the number of gallons of fuel used, although the impact in the near term will be modest.","The expanding fleets of hybrid and electric vehicles, respectively, pay less or nothing by way of fuel taxes, raising equity issues that are likely to become more prominent as the electric vehicle fleet expands. An increase in the existing fuel tax rates would provide immediate relief to the trust fund. As a rule of thumb, adding a penny to federal motor fuel taxes provides the trust fund with roughly $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion per year. The prospect of reduced motor fuel consumption, however, casts doubt on the ability of the motor fuel taxes to support increased surface transportation spending beyond the next decade, even with modest increases in tax rates. Since FY2008, the balance of federal highway user tax revenues in the HTF has been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. The 2015 surface transportation act addressed the HTF shortfall through FY2020 by authorizing the use of Treasury general funds for transportation purposes. CBO projects that from FY2021 to FY2026 the gap between dedicated surface transportation revenues and spending will average $20.1 billion annually ( Table 2 ).","In 2020, as Congress considers surface transportation reauthorization, it could again face a choice between finding new sources of income for the surface transportation program and settling for a smaller program, which might look very different from the one currently in place. Figure 1 shows the impact of the general fund transfers within the context of the underlying imbalance between HTF revenues and projected spending for FY2016-FY2026. Table 2 provides projections of the gap between HTF receipts and outlays following the expiration of the FAST Act at the end of FY2020. In recent decades, Congress has typically sought to reauthorize surface transportation programs for periods of five or six years. As the table indicates, a five-year reauthorization beginning in FY2021 faces a projected gap between revenues and outlays of nearly $101 billion. A six-year reauthorization would face a gap of almost $125 billion. These projections assume that spending on federal highway and public transportation programs would remain as it is today, adjusted for anticipated inflation.","When the FAST Act expires at the end of FY2020, the balance in the HTF resulting from previous years' income is expected to be $12.1 billion—an amount equal to approximately two and a half months of outlays. CBO projects that this balance, plus incoming revenue, will allow the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to pay their obligations to states and transit agencies until sometime in FY2021. However, without a reduction in the size of the surface transportation programs, an increase in revenues, or further general fund transfers, the balance in the HTF is projected to be close to zero near the end of FY2021 (see Table 3 ). At that point, both FHWA and FTA would likely have to delay payments for completed work. Based strictly on projected income and expenses, the HTF would move from a positive balance of $12.1 billion at the start of FY2021 to a negative balance of $88.5 billion at the end of FY2025. However, current law does not allow the HTF to incur negative balances.","Unless this is changed, $88.5 billion represents the minimum amount the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance would need to find over the FY2021-FY2025 period in some combination of additional revenue and budget offsets for general fund transfers, should Congress choose to continue funding surface transportation at the current, or \"baseline,\" level, adjusted for inflation. Because the HTF currently provides all but about $2 billion of annual spending authorized for the highway and transit programs (the main exception being the FTA Capital Investment Grants Program), these numbers have implications for the size of the program Congress may approve to follow the FAST Act. Highway and transit spending based solely on the revenue projected to flow into the HTF under current law would be limited to roughly $41 billion in FY2021, significantly less than the \"baseline\" FY2021 outlays of roughly $58 billion. The projected year-to-year decline in HTF revenue implies that FHWA and FTA would have less contract authority each year to spend on projects through FY2026. Reducing expenditures might not provide immediate relief from the demands on the HTF.","Because transportation projects can take years to complete, both the highway and public transportation programs must make payments in future years pursuant to commitments that have already been incurred. As of FY2018, obligated but unspent contract authority for highway projects in progress is projected to be roughly $64 billion. This does not count another $24 billion in available but unobligated contract authority. For public transportation programs the equivalent figures for FY2018 are projected to be almost $16 billion in unpaid obligations and another $10 billion in unobligated contract authority. The obligated amounts represent legal obligations of the U.S. government and must be paid out of future years' HTF receipts. The first federal tax on gasoline (1 cent per gallon) was imposed in 1932, during the Hoover Administration, as a deficit-reduction measure following the depression-induced fall in general revenues. The rate was raised to help pay for World War II (to 1.5 cents per gallon) and raised again during the Korean War (to 2 cents per gallon). The Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-627) established the HTF and raised the rate to 3 cents per gallon to pay for the construction of the Interstate Highway System.","The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 (P.L. 86-342) raised the rate to 4 cents per gallon. The gasoline tax remained at 4 cents from October 1, 1959, until March 31, 1983. During this period, revenues grew automatically from year to year as fuel consumption grew along with increases in vehicle miles traveled. Since 1983 lawmakers have passed legislation raising the tax rates on highway fuel use three times. Although infrequent, these rate increases were quite large in a proportional sense. The gasoline tax was raised on April 1, 1983, from 4 to 9 cents per gallon, a 125% increase; on September 1, 1990, from 9 to 14 cents (not counting the additional 0.1 cent for LUST), or 55%; and on October 1, 1993, from 14 to 18.3 cents, or 31%. Increasing the rate of the fuel taxes has never been popular. The last three increases were accomplished with difficulty and were influenced by the broader budgetary environment and the politics of the time. The increase in the fuel tax rate under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA; P.L. 97-424 , Title V) occurred in the lame-duck session of the 97 th Congress.","In the \"Great Compromise,\" supporters of increased highway spending had come to an agreement with transit supporters (mostly from the Northeast) that a penny of a proposed 5-cents-per-gallon increase would be dedicated to a new mass transit account within the HTF. This meant that support for the bill during the lame-duck session was widespread and bipartisan. During the congressional elections of 1982 the Democrats had picked up 26 seats in the House of Representatives. The economy was experiencing a major recession, and some argued that increased highway spending would stimulate the economy. President Reagan's opposition to an increase in the \"gas tax\" softened during the lame-duck session. On November 23, 1982, he announced that he would support passage of STAA, even though it would \"mean an increase in the highway user fee, or gas tax, of 5 cents a gallon.... Our country's outstanding highway system was built on the user fee principle—that those who benefit from a use should share in its cost.\" Nonetheless, the bill faced a series of filibusters in the Senate, which were eventually overcome by four cloture votes. The conference report was again filibustered, and President Reagan helped secure the votes needed","for cloture.","President Reagan signed STAA into law on January 6, 1983, more than doubling the highway fuel tax to 9 cents per gallon. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90; P.L. 101-508 ), enacted November 5, 1990, was passed under the pressure of impending final FY1991 sequestration orders issued by President George H. W. Bush under Title II of P.L. 99-177 , the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH). OBRA90 included budget cuts, tax changes, and the Budget Enforcement Act ( P.L. 101-508 ), which rescinded the FY1991 sequestration orders. OBRA90 also raised the tax on gasoline by 5 cents per gallon, to 14 cents. Half the increase went to the HTF (2 cents to the highway account and 0.5 cents to the mass transit account), with the other 2.5 cents per gallon to be deposited in the general fund for deficit reduction. This was the first time since 1957 the motor fuel tax had been used as a source of general revenue. Section 9001 expressed the sense of Congress that all motor fuel taxes should be directed to the HTF as soon as possible.","The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93; P.L. 103-66 ) Section 13241(a) made further changes in regard to fuel taxes: The 2.5-cents-per-gallon fuel tax dedicated to deficit reduction in OBRA90 was redirected to the HTF beginning October 1, 1995, and its authorization was extended to September 30, 1999. The highway account received 2 cents per gallon and the mass transit account 0.5 cents per gallon of the rededicated amount. An additional permanent 4.3-cents-per-gallon fuel tax took effect in October 1993 and was dedicated to deficit reduction. This brought the gasoline tax to 18.3 cents per gallon, although for two years (October 1, 1993, to October 1, 1995) 6.8 cents per gallon of this was deposited in the general fund, dedicated to deficit reduction. On October 1, 1995, the amount going to the general fund dropped to 4.3 cents per gallon, and the amount dedicated to the HTF increased to 14 cents per gallon. Subsequently, under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-34 ), all motor fuel tax revenue was redirected to the HTF (3.45 cents per gallon to the highway account and 0.85 cents to the mass transit account), effective October 1, 1997.","(The LUST fund continues to receive the revenue from an additional 0.1 cents-per-gallon tax.) Since 2001, revenue flowing into the HTF has not met expectations in most years, and has generally lagged inflation since FY2007. In some years, HTF revenue has declined even in nominal terms (unadjusted for inflation) due to reduced vehicle travel. Because of the fixed nature of the cents-per-gallon gasoline and diesel taxes, the only way the taxes can generate additional revenue for the HTF is if motor-fuel consumption rises. In recent years, as gasoline prices have fallen, the vehicle miles traveled have increased, and gasoline sales have exceeded 2007 levels. An improving U.S. job market and wage growth may have contributed to record high VMT. The renewed popularity of vehicles with relatively low fuel economy suggests demand for motor fuel may remain stronger than anticipated a few years ago. However, to date CBO continues to forecast declines in gasoline tax revenues through FY2027. The political difficulty of increasing motor fuel taxes has led to interest in alternative approaches for supporting the HTF.","These involve tying motor fuel tax rates to the price of fuel, changing the structure of the current fuel taxes, and charging drivers for the distance they drive rather than the fuel they consume, as well as freight-related charges and a variety of options unrelated to transportation. A differently designed gas tax might be indexed to both inflation (either inflation generally or highway construction cost inflation) and fuel-efficiency improvements. This new design would be imposed after raising the current gas tax rate to compensate for the loss in purchasing power since the last rate increase in 1993. If the motor fuels taxes for gasoline and diesel had been adjusted in 2016 to keep pace with the change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer price index since 1993, the 18.3-cents-per-gallon gasoline tax would now be 31 cents per gallon, and the 24.3-cents-per-gallon diesel tax would be 41.1 cents per gallon. Consequently, the first step in implementing this method of \"fixing\" the gas tax would be to raise the base tax rate for gasoline by roughly 13 cents per gallon and to raise the rate for diesel by roughly 17 cents per gallon.","Future adjustments would depend on the inflation rate in future years. Tax-rate adjustments to make up for revenue lost due to greater fuel efficiency could be determined by dividing miles driven by vehicle category by the total amount of fuel consumed by that category and comparing the quotient to the previous year. Although fuel-economy standards for new vehicles are to rise sharply over the next few years, the average efficiency of the entire vehicle fleet will rise slowly because of the large number of older vehicles on the road. Consequently, an annual efficiency adjustment to the fuel tax rates would likely be small. One approach to reducing the political obstacles to higher fuel taxes is to couple a fuels-tax increase with income-tax rebates approximating the average cost of the fuels tax increase to the typical driver. The cost of the rebates would be less than the additional taxes collected because truckers, other commercial users, and individuals who do not file income-tax returns would not receive the rebates. The rebates could be phased out after several years while the higher tax rates would continue. This solution raises a number of issues.","The proposal could be seen, in effect, as a general fund transfer. Depending on the language of the House and Senate budget resolutions, the rebates might have to be offset by spending reductions elsewhere in the federal budget. Also, unless the higher tax rates were indexed for inflation, revenues would again be on a downward slope after the tax increase occurs. Under the sales tax concept, the federal motor fuel tax would be assessed as a percentage of the retail price of fuel rather than as a fixed amount per gallon. Some states already levy taxes on motor fuels in this way, either alongside or in place of fixed cents-per-gallon taxes on motor fuel purchases. If fuel prices rise in the future, sales tax revenues could rise from year to year even if consumption does not increase. Conversely, however, a decline in motor fuel prices could lead to a drop in sales tax revenue. Many states that tied fuel taxes to prices after the price shocks of the 1970s encountered revenue shortfalls in the 1980s, when fuel prices fell dramatically. Over a 20-year period, most of these variable state fuel taxes disappeared.","Recently, however, Virginia eliminated its cents-per-gallon fuel taxes in favor of a sales tax on fuel and a general sales tax increase that was dedicated to transportation purposes. The Virginia law mandates that the tax be imposed on the average wholesale price (calculated twice each year) but sets price floors; if prices of motor fuels fall beneath those floors, the amount of fuel tax charged per gallon is not reduced further. A federal sales tax on motor fuel would likely be at best an interim solution to the long-term problem of financing transportation infrastructure because, as with the current motor fuel tax, it relies on fuel consumption to fund transportation programs. To the extent that improved vehicle efficiency or adoption of hybrid or electric vehicles leads to long-term declines in fuel usage, a sales tax on fuel may not lead to increases in trust fund revenues. In addition, a sales tax calibrated to produce a desired amount of revenue in an environment of high motor fuel prices could significantly underperform if fuel prices were to be lower than anticipated. Economists have long favored mileage-based user charges as an alternative source of highway funding.","Under the user charge concept, motorists would pay fees based on distance driven and, perhaps, on other costs of road use, such as wear and tear on roads, traffic congestion, and air pollution. The funds collected would be spent for surface transportation purposes. The concept is not new: federal motor fuel taxes are a form of indirect road user charge insofar as road use is loosely related to fuel consumption. Some states have charged trucks by the mile for many years, and toll roads charge drivers based on miles traveled and the number of axles on a vehicle, which is used as a proxy for weight. Recent technological developments, as well as the evident shortcomings of motor fuel taxes, have led to renewed interest in the user charge concept, including establishment of a pilot program in legislation enacted in 2015. Mileage-based road user charges (often referred to as vehicle miles traveled charges, or VMTs) could range from a flat cent-per-mile charge based on a simple odometer reading to a variable charge based on vehicle movements tracked by the Global Positioning System (GPS).","Other proposals envision mileage-based road user charges that would mimic the way Americans now pay their fuel taxes by collecting the charge at the pump. Most road user charge proposals would require electric vehicle users to pay for their use of the roads. Implementation of a mileage-based road user charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuels tax, including public concern about personal privacy; the higher costs to establish, collect, and enforce this charge (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections); the administrative challenge of the billing process given the size of the vehicle fleet (estimated at roughly 263 million vehicles); and the setting and adjusting of the road user charge rates, which would likely be as controversial as increasing the motor fuels taxes. Another barrier to implementation is how to fairly charge the \"unbanked,\" those who have no bank accounts or credit/debit cards. A nationwide mileage-based road user charge would be analogous to a national toll.","This raises the prospect that vehicles using toll roads might be charged twice, although this effectively happens now in that toll road users also pay tax on the motor fuel they consume while using the toll road. Technically, it would be possible for a road user charge to replace an existing toll, but this could cause complications with respect to the servicing of bonds funded by toll-road revenue. Since 1982, the HTF has financed most federal public transportation programs as well as highway programs. If a mileage-based road user charge were to be used strictly for highway purposes, it might reasonably be characterized as a user fee even if the amount paid by each individual driver does not correspond precisely to the social cost (such as pollution and traffic congestion costs) of that user's driving. A road user charge that funded both highways and public transportation might arguably be seen more as a tax than a user fee. This distinction raises a number of legal issues. Any legislation establishing a road user charge would have to clearly identify what the charge would be spent on.","If the existing HTF were to be retained, legislation would have to specify what share of the revenue would be credited to the separate highway and mass transit accounts within the fund. In addition to options discussed above, a wide range of additional proposals has been suggested to generate revenue for the HTF. These proposals largely originated from the work of the two SAFETEA congressional commissions and of groups such as the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and Transportation Research Board (TRB). For example, AASHTO's Matrix of Illustrative Surface Transportation Revenue Options lists 33 potential HTF revenue options with yield estimates in tabular form. Many of these options involve taxes on freight movements or energy. It should be emphasized that the revenue estimates from these exercises are merely suggestive; the revenue obtained from any given measure would depend on changes in the price of motor fuels, growth in the number of annual auto registrations, and other factors. If Congress chooses not to impose new taxes and fees dedicated to the HTF, it could still maintain or expand the surface transportation program with general fund monies.","Any of the financing options discussed above could be used to sustain the existing federal financing mechanism, the HTF, but could also be used to support the general fund if Congress considers alternatives to the trust fund financing model. This would weaken the historical link between the taxes and fees paid by highway users and spending on the nation's highways and bridges. The Highway Trust Fund was set up as a temporary device that was supposed to disappear when the Interstate System was finished. It has endured, and its breadth of financing has expanded well beyond the Interstates, most significantly with the 1982 creation of the mass transit account within the fund to support public transportation spending. But the HTF is certainly not essential to a federal role in transportation funding. Congress routinely funds large infrastructure projects, such as those constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers, from general fund appropriations. Before 1956, it funded highway projects using annual appropriations. As recently as the 1990s, significant highway programs such as the Appalachian Development Highway System were funded from the general fund.","One alternative would be to eliminate the trust fund structure, thereby doing away with its complicated budget framework of contract authority, obligations, and apportionments. Eliminating the trust fund would force surface transportation to compete with other federal programs for funding each year, possibly leading to less spending on transportation. There could be advantages to moving away from trust fund financing of surface transportation. Until recently, one of the most intractable arguments in reauthorization debates concerned which states were \"donors\" to transportation programs and which were \"donees.\" Donor states were states whose highway users were estimated to pay more to the highway account of the HTF than they received. Donee states received more than they paid. The donor-donee dispute was unique to the federal highway program, and occurred largely because of the ability to track federal fuel tax revenues by state. This issue has faded as injections of general fund revenues into the HTF have made all states donees, and would likely disappear if transportation-related taxes were deposited into the general fund instead of the trust fund. Treating fuel taxes as just another source of federal revenue would also dampen the long-standing link between road user charges","and program spending.","This would provide Congress with greater flexibility to allocate funding among various transportation modes and between transportation and nontransportation uses. Most trust-fund outlays take the form of formula grants over which states have a great deal of spending discretion. While there are numerous federal requirements attached to trust fund expenditures, there have been until recently relatively few performance-oriented goals that the states are required to meet in selecting projects to be undertaken with federal monies. Performance measures might be easier to implement without formula programs that automatically apportion funding to the states. Eliminating the trust fund might also allow for creativity in thinking about the provision of transportation infrastructure across the modal boundaries that now define much of federal transportation spending. Historically, important parts of U.S. transportation infrastructure, such as the transcontinental railroads and the Panama Canal, were authorized by specific congressional enactments rather than grant programs. Reconsidering the trust fund structure might reopen discussion of this approach. Another alternative would be to again devote all trust fund revenues exclusively to highway spending. This would leave transit and other surface transportation programs to be funded exclusively by annual appropriations of general funds. Such a change would","have political implications.","Since the early 1990s, public transportation and cycling advocates, environmentalists, and a wide range of other groups have become full-fledged supporters of the surface transportation program, as it has benefited their interests. The expanded coalition supporting the surface transportation program played an important role in the hard-fought political battles since the early 1990s to pass multiyear surface transportation bills. As was made clear by passage of the FAST Act, Congress has chosen to support the current HTF funding model by transferring funds, mostly from the Treasury general fund. Whether such general fund support should continue is likely to become a major point of contention when Congress debates reauthorizing surface transportation programs beyond FY2020. By FY2020, the last year of the FAST Act, federal highway programs will have been funded for 12 years under a de facto policy of providing a Treasury general fund share. Congress could address the inadequacy of motor fuel taxes to meet surface transportation needs by making the general fund share permanent. The public transportation titles of surface transportation bills already fund the New Starts program with general fund appropriated funds.","The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) budget is also supported by a combination of trust funds and general funds; the general fund amount is supposed to approximate the value of the airways system to military and other government users and to \"societal\" nonusers (people who do not fly but, for example, benefit from the delivery of freight via aircraft). A similar argument could be made regarding the public good benefits of a well-functioning highway system to justify an annual general fund appropriation to support spending on roads. Should Congress agree on a future policy of providing an annual general fund share for federal highway funding, the financing structure of the federal-aid highways program could change. Congress would have the choice of appropriating the general fund share to the HTF and maintaining the programmatic status quo, or it could fund some programs from the trust fund and fund others via appropriations. Congress could also consider a two-pronged approach to authorization. It could authorize the trust funded programs separately from the appropriated programs.","This would give Congress the option of trust funding a very long (perhaps as much as 10-year) authorization bill for programs that fund projects that typically take many years to plan and complete. The long-term authorization could be paired with a series of short-term bills funded with appropriated general funds for programs whose projects are more likely to be completed quickly. Toll roads have a long history in the United States, going back to the early days of the republic. During the 18 th century, most were local roads or bridges that could not be built or improved with local government tax revenue alone. However, beginning with the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 355), federal law has included a prohibition on the tolling of roads that benefited from federal funds. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prospect of toll revenues allowed states to build thousands of miles of limited-access highways without federal aid and much sooner than would have been the case with traditional funding. Despite this, the tolling prohibition was reiterated in the Federal-Aid Highway Act and Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (70 Stat.","374), which authorized funds for the Interstate System, created the HTF, and raised the fuel taxes to pay for their construction. Over the last three decades the prohibition has been moderated so that exceptions to the general ban on tolling now cover the vast majority of federal-aid roads and bridges. There remains a ban on the tolling of existing Interstate System highway surface lane capacity. While new toll facilities have opened in several states, some of those projects have struggled financially. Generally, there are three levels of restrictions on tolling of federal-aid highways. Non-Interstate System highways and bridges may be converted to toll roads but only after reconstruction or replacement. Existing Interstate System surface lane capacity may not be converted to toll roads except under the auspices of two small pilot programs. However, Interstate System bridges and tunnels may be converted if they are reconstructed or replaced. New capacity on the federal-aid highway system generally may be tolled. There are no federal restrictions on tolling of roads off of the federal-aid system. Highway toll revenue nationwide came to $14.025 billion in FY2015, according to FHWA.","While the amount of toll revenue has grown significantly in recent years, toll revenue as a share of total spending on highways has been relatively steady for more than half a century, in the range of roughly 5% to 6%. On average, facility owners collected $2.38 million per mile of toll road or bridge in FY2015, but revenue per mile varies greatly among toll facilities. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. There are three possible means of increasing revenue from tolling: Increase the E xtent of T oll R oads. FHWA statistics identify 5,882 tolled miles of roads, bridges, and tunnels as of January 1, 2016, a net increase of 1,161 miles, or 25%, over 1990. Toll-road mileage comprises only 0.6% of the 1,016,964 miles of public roads eligible for federal highway aid.","While there may be many existing roads on which tolling would be financially feasible, the vast majority of mileage on the federal-aid system probably has too little traffic to make toll collection economically viable. Increase T oll- R oad U sage. The financing of many of the toll roads constructed in the 20 th century was based on the assumption that the new roads would lead to increased vehicle usage. Although vehicles miles traveled declined in the wake of the recession that began in 2007, vehicle use has been rising again since 2014. If this trend continues it bodes well for toll revenues, which would rise with increasing traffic. On the other hand, if demographic trends and social changes, such as the increased popularity of center-city living, eventually lead to slower growth in personal motor vehicle use, then toll revenues may be constrained in the longer term. If that proves to be the case, higher traffic volume may contribute little to increased toll revenues. Increase the A verage T oll per M ile. Raising tolls can be politically challenging, especially when revenue is used for purposes other than building and maintaining the toll facility.","Trucking interests frequently raise opposition to rate changes that increase truck tolls relative to automobile tolls. Where roads are operated by private concessionaires, the operators' contracts with state governments typically specify the maximum rate at which tolls can rise. Additionally, large increases can encourage motorists to use competing nontolled routes. These factors suggest that imposing tolls on individual transportation facilities is likely to be of only limited use in supporting the overall level of highway capital spending. Furthermore, some states, particularly those with low population densities, may have few or no facilities suitable for tolling. Toll collection itself can be costly; collection costs on many existing toll roads exceed 10% of revenues. For these reasons, while tolls may be an effective way of financing specific facilities—especially major roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to be used heavily and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade—they would likely be less effective in providing broad financial support for surface transportation programs. Value capture represents an attempt to cover part or all of the cost of transportation improvements from landowners or developers who benefit from the resulting increase in the value of real property.","Value capture revenue mechanisms include tax increment financing, special assessments, development impact fees, negotiated exactions, and joint development. The federal role in value capture strategies may be limited, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted, but it is worth describing these strategies to provide a fuller picture of the ways in which they might supplement or supplant more commonly used funding and financing mechanisms. Value capture is not a new idea. Land developers built and operated streetcar systems in the late 19 th century as a way to sell houses on the urban fringe, for example. Much of the recent experience with value capture has been associated with public transit. GAO found that the most widely used mechanism is joint development, in which a real estate project at or near a transit station is pursued cooperatively between the public and private sectors. An example might involve a transit agency leasing the unused space over a station, its \"air rights,\" to a developer in exchange for a regular payment. GAO found that joint development has generated relatively small amounts of money for transit agencies.","For example, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority received about $10 million from joint development in FY2016, about 1% of its operating revenue. However, less widely used strategies, such as special assessment districts, are estimated to generate significant amounts of funding for specific projects. In a special assessment district, properties within a defined area are assessed a special tax for a specific purpose. A special assessment district in Seattle produced $25 million of the $53 million (47%) needed to fund the South Lake Union streetcar project. There has been less use of value capture in highway projects, but this appears to be changing. Texas, for example, has authorized the use of tax increment financing through the creation of transportation reinvestment zones to help fund highway projects. Special assessment districts also have been set up in several states, including Florida and Virginia, to fund highway projects. In Virginia a special assessment district was used to help fund the expansion of Route 28 near Washington Dulles International Airport beginning in the late 1980s.","Growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources have led to calls for more private-sector involvement in the provision of highway and transit infrastructure through public-private partnerships (P3s), which can be designed to lessen demands on public-sector funding. Private involvement can take a variety of forms, including design-build and design-build-finance-operate agreements. Typically, the \"public\" in public-private partnerships refers to a state government, local government, or transit agency. The federal government, nevertheless, exerts influence over the prevalence and structure of P3s through its transportation programs, funding, and regulatory oversight. To be viable, P3s involving private financing typically require an anticipated project-related revenue stream from a source such as vehicle tolls, freight container fees, or, in the case of transit station development, building rents. Private-sector resources may come from an initial payment to lease an existing asset in exchange for future revenue, as with the Indiana Toll Road and Chicago Skyway, or they may arise from a newly developed asset that creates a new revenue stream. Either way, a facility user fee, such as a toll, is often the key to unlocking private-sector participation and resources.","In some cases, private-sector financing is backed by \"availability payments,\" regular payments made by government to the private entity based on negotiated quality and performance standards of the facility. Aversion in the private sector to the risk that too few users will be willing to pay for use of a new facility has made availability payment P3s more common over the past few years. As a result, state and local governments are retaining this risk, known as demand risk, more often. It is widely believed that hundreds of billions of dollars of private monies are available globally for infrastructure investment, such as surface transportation. To date, however, the number of transportation P3s in the United States is relatively small, as is the amount of long-term private financing provided. According to one source, from 1993 through September 2017 there were 30 surface transportation P3s involving long-term financing, with total project costs totaling $39 billion. This includes the 99-year lease of the Chicago Skyway; the I-595 managed lanes project in Florida; and the Purple Line light rail transit project in Maryland. P3s and private investment in surface transportation are relatively larger in many other countries, including Portugal, Spain,","and Australia.","It is quite possible that private investment will grow in the future, but many impediments remain. Some of the major ones include the relative attractiveness of the tax-exempt financing available to state and local government, political opposition to tolling and privatization, and difficulties associated with project development. Private-sector financing generated through P3s might best be seen as a supplement to traditional public-sector funding rather than as a substitute. In addition to attracting private capital, P3s may generate new resources for highway and transit infrastructure in at least two ways. First, P3s may improve efficiency through better management and innovation in construction, maintenance, and operation—in effect providing more infrastructure for the same price. Private companies may be more able to examine the full life-cycle cost of investments, whereas public agency decisions are often tied to short-term budget cycles. Such cost reductions may not materialize, however, if the public sector has to spend a substantial amount of time on procurement, oversight, dispute resolution, and litigation. GAO argues that most state governments lack the capacity to manage P3 contracts. Second, P3s may reduce government agencies' costs by transferring the financial risks of building, maintaining, and operating infrastructure to private","investors.","These risks include construction delays, unexpectedly high maintenance costs, and the possibility that demand will be less than forecast. There is a danger, however, that this transfer of risk may prove illusory if major miscalculations force the public agency to renegotiate contracts or provide financial guarantees. Moreover, as GAO points out, not all the risks can or should be shifted to the private sector. For instance, private investors are unlikely to accept the risk of higher construction costs due to delays in the environmental review process. Municipal bonds, debt instruments used by states and all types of local government, are a major source of financing for transportation infrastructure. The interest on municipal bonds is generally exempt from federal income tax; consequently, an investor will usually accept a lower interest rate than on a non-tax-exempt bond, and the borrower can finance a project at a lower cost. The forgone tax revenue is the federal government's contribution to a project financed with municipal bonds. Private activity bonds (PABs) are a type of municipal bond in which a state or local government acts as a financial intermediary for a business or individual.","PABs are not eligible for federal tax exemption unless Congress grants an exception for a certain purpose and other requirements are met. Congress has approved limited use of tax-exempt private activity bonds for airports, docks and wharves, mass commuting facilities, high-speed intercity rail facilities, and qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities (26 U.S.C. §142). In the case of qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities, the Secretary of Transportation must approve the issuance of PABs, and the aggregate amount allocated must not exceed $15 billion (26 U.S.C. §142(m)(2)). As of January 2017, $6.6 billion of the $15 billion had been issued to finance 17 projects, and another $4.3 billion had been allocated to eight other projects. There have been proposals to increase the bond issuance cap so that PABs, which are seen as an important support for P3 deals, can continue to be issued in the future. While municipal bonds are a popular financing method, there are a number of potential disadvantages to their use.","Because they are issued by state and local government, the federal government has less control over the types of projects supported and the amount of the federal contribution than it does with grant and loan programs. Tax-exempt bonds, moreover, can be an inefficient way to subsidize state and local debt because borrowing costs are reduced by less than the forgone revenue. As the Congressional Budget Office notes, \"the remainder of that tax expenditure accrues to bond buyers in the highest income tax brackets.\" Also, tax-exempt bonds are unattractive to investors that do not have a federal tax liability, such as pension funds and foreign individuals and organizations, shrinking the potential funds available to state and local governments. Tax credit bonds, an alternative type of tax-preferred municipal bond, might help to overcome some of these limitations. Tax credit bonds typically do not pay interest. Instead, the investor receives a tax credit, an amount that is the same for investors in different tax brackets. Tax credit bonds, therefore, are more efficient than tax-exempt bonds because the revenue forgone by the federal government equals the reduction in borrowing costs that state and local governments receive.","Unused tax credits may be carried forward to another year or sold to another entity with tax liability. With some types of tax credit bonds known as issuer credit or direct pay bonds, the credit is paid to the issuer and the investor gets interest similar to taxable securities. Consequently, tax credit bonds can be attractive to investors with no federal tax liability. Federal authority exists for state and local governments to issue some types of tax credit bonds, but none can be used to finance transportation projects. Tax credit bonds authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ), known as Build America Bonds, were used to finance a wide range of projects including transportation. The authorization to issue these bonds expired December 31, 2010. An existing federal mechanism for providing credit assistance to relatively large transportation infrastructure projects is financing under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, enacted in 1998. TIFIA provides federal credit assistance in the form of secured loans, loan guarantees, and lines of credit.","Federal credit assistance reduces borrowers' costs and lowers project risk, thereby helping to secure other financing at rates lower than would otherwise be possible. Another purpose of TIFIA funding is to leverage nonfederal funding, including investment from the private sector. Loans must be repaid with a dedicated revenue stream, typically a project-related user fee, such as a toll, but sometimes dedicated tax revenue. As of January 2018, according to DOT, TIFIA had provided assistance of nearly $30 billion to more than 70 projects. The overall cost of the projects supported is estimated to be $107 billion. The FAST Act reduced funding for the TIFIA program after it had been greatly increased under the previous authorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), enacted in July 2012. Prior to MAP-21, the TIFIA authorization was $122 million annually. This was increased to $750 million in FY2013 and $1 billion in FY2014 and FY2015. Under the FAST Act, the direct authorization for TIFIA was $275 million in both FY2016 and FY2017, $285 million in FY2018, and $300 million in both FY2019 and FY2020.","Because the government expects its loans to be repaid, an appropriation need cover only administrative costs and the subsidy cost of credit assistance. According to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the subsidy cost is \"the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan or a loan guarantee, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs.\" According to DOT, $1 in TIFIA funding historically has provided about $10 in credit assistance, a 10% subsidy cost, although in recent years each dollar has provided closer to $14. Seen in isolation, the cut in the TIFIA authorization reduced DOT's capacity to issue loans by approximately $7.25 billion in FY2016, assuming a 10% subsidy cost. However, the FAST Act also allowed states to use funds they receive from two other highway programs to pay for the subsidy and administrative costs of credit assistance. These two programs are the Nationally Significant Freight and Highway Projects Program (NSFHPP), authorized at $800 million in FY2016, and the National Highway Performance Program (NHPP), authorized at $22.3 billion in FY2016.","If states decide to use their formula funding in this way, the potential amount of loans and other credit assistance may be much greater than would be possible using the $275 million direct authorization alone. The Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) Grant Program, funded by general fund appropriations, also can be used by grant recipients to pay the subsidy and administrative costs of a TIFIA loan. Several changes to the TIFIA program in the FAST Act were aimed at making it easier to finance smaller projects, particularly those in rural areas.","These provisions included providing authority for a TIFIA loan to a state infrastructure bank (SIB) to capitalize a \"rural project fund\"; adding transit-oriented development (TOD) infrastructure as an eligible project (TOD infrastructure is a \"project to improve or construct public infrastructure that is located within walking distance of, and accessible to, a fixed guideway transit facility, passenger rail station, intercity bus station, or intermodal facility\"); allowing up to $2 million of TIFIA budget authority each fiscal year to pay the application fees for projects costing $75 million or less instead of requiring payment by the project sponsor; modifying or setting the minimum project cost thresholds for credit assistance at $10 million for TOD projects, the capitalization of a rural project fund, and local government infrastructure projects; and providing for a streamlined application process for loans of $100 million or less.","In addition, the FAST Act authorized the creation of a new National Surface Transportation and Innovative Finance Bureau within DOT to administer federal transportation financing programs, specifically the TIFIA program, the SIB program, the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) Program, and the allocation of authority to issue private activity bonds for qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities. To fulfill this mandate, DOT established the Build America Bureau in July 2016. The bureau also will be responsible for establishing and promoting best practices for innovative financing and P3s, and for providing advice and technical expertise in these areas. The bureau will administer the new discretionary Nationally Significant Freight and Highway Projects grant program, known as INFRA grants, and will have responsibilities related to procurement and project environmental review and permitting. Congress has considered several proposals to create a national infrastructure bank to help finance infrastructure projects. One purported advantage of a national infrastructure bank over other loan programs, such as TIFIA, is that it would have more independence in its operation, such as in project selection, and have greater expertise at its disposal.","Additionally, a national infrastructure bank would likely be set up to help a much wider range of infrastructure projects, including water, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure. Proponents claim that the best projects, or at least those that are the most financially viable, would be selected from across these sectors. In many formulations, capitalization of a national infrastructure bank comes from an appropriation, but in others the bank is authorized to raise its own capital through bond issuance. By issuing securities that are not tax exempt, it could tap pools of private capital that do not invest in tax-exempt bonds, such as pension funds and foreign citizens, the traditional source of much project finance. Tax-exempt municipal securities are unattractive to some investors, either because individual issues are too small to interest them or because the investors do not benefit from the tax preference. Taxable bonds with long maturities might be attractive to some of these investors. An infrastructure bank also might reduce the federal government's share of project costs, putting greater reliance on nonfederal capital and user fees.","Most infrastructure bank proposals assume the bank would improve the allocation of public resources by funding projects with the highest economic returns regardless of infrastructure system or type. Selection of the projects with the highest returns, however, might conflict with the traditional desire of Congress to assure funding for various purposes. In the extreme case, major transportation projects might not be funded if the bank were to exhaust its lending authority on water or energy projects offering higher returns. Limitations of a national infrastructure bank include its duplication of existing programs like TIFIA and the Wastewater and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds. An infrastructure bank may not be the lowest-cost means of increasing infrastructure spending. CBO has pointed out that a special entity that issues its own debt would not be able to match the lower interest and issuance costs of the U.S. Treasury. In some formulations, a national infrastructure bank exposes the federal government to the risk of default. SIBs already exist in many states. In 32 states and Puerto Rico, SIBs were created pursuant to a federal program originally established in surface transportation law in 1995 ( P.L. 104-59 ).","Several other states, among them California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, and Virginia, have state investment banks that are unconnected to the federal program. Local governments have also begun to embrace the idea. The City of Chicago has established a nonprofit organization, the Chicago Infrastructure Trust, as a way to attract private investment for public works projects, and Dauphin County, PA, has established an infrastructure bank funded from a state tax on liquid fuels to make loans to the 40 municipalities and private project sponsors within its borders. One of the biggest stumbling blocks to federally authorized SIBs has been capitalization. States can capitalize the banks using some of their apportioned and allocated highway and transit funds, and any amount of rail program funds. Under the FAST Act, capitalization of a rural project fund may now be made by a loan from the TIFIA program. Federal funds have to be matched with state funds, generally on an 80% federal, 20% state basis.","Authority to use federal transportation funds for this purpose lapsed between the beginning of FY2010 and enactment of the FAST Act in December 2015, and few states took advantage of this authority prior to FY2010 because they preferred to use their federal grant funds for other purposes."],"string":"[\n \"Almost every conversation about surface transportation finance begins with a two-part question: What are the \\\"needs\\\" of the national transportation system, and how does the nation pay for them? This report is aimed almost entirely at discussing the \\\"how to pay for them\\\" question. Since 1956, federal surface transportation programs have been funded largely by taxes on motor fuels that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). A steady increase in the revenues flowing into the HTF due to increased motor vehicle use and occasional increases in fuel tax rates accommodated growth in surface transportation spending over several decades. In 2001, though, trust fund revenues stopped growing faster than spending. In 2008 Congress began providing Treasury general fund transfers to keep the HTF solvent. Every year since 2008, there has been a gap between the dedicated tax revenues flowing into the HTF and the cost of the surface transportation spending Congress has authorized. Congress has filled these shortfalls with a series of further transfers, largely from the Treasury's general fund. These transfers have shifted a total of $143.6 billion to the HTF. The last $70 billion of these transfers were authorized in the Fixing America's Surface\",\n \"Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L.\",\n \"114-94 ), which was signed by President Barack Obama on December 4, 2015. The FAST Act funds federal surface transportation programs from FY2016 through FY2020. When the act expires the de facto policy of relying on general fund transfers to sustain the HTF will be 12 years old. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the imbalance between motor fuel tax receipts and HTF expenditures will reemerge and the HTF balance will approach zero in FY2021. In consequence, funding and financing surface transportation is expected to continue to be a major issue for Congress. The HTF has two separate accounts—highways and mass transit. The primary revenue sources for these accounts are an 18.3-cent-per-gallon federal tax on gasoline and a 24.3-cent-per-gallon federal tax on diesel fuel. Although the HTF has other sources of revenue, such as truck registration fees and a truck tire tax, and is also credited with interest paid on the fund balances held by the U.S. Treasury, fuel taxes in most years provides roughly 85%-90% of the amounts paid into the fund by highway users. The transit account receives 2.86 cents per gallon of fuel taxes, with the remainder of the tax revenue flowing\",\n \"into the highway account.\",\n \"An additional 0.1-cent-per-gallon fuel tax is reserved for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Fund, which is not part of the transportation program. Since the trust fund was created in 1956, motor fuel taxes have increased four times: in 1959, 1982, 1990, and 1993. Since the 1993 increase, additional changes to the taxation structure have modestly boosted trust fund revenues. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ), for example, provided the trust fund with increased future income by changing elements of federal \\\"gasohol\\\" taxation. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users ( P.L. 109-59 ; SAFETEA) included a number of changes designed to bolster the trust fund, mainly by addressing tax fraud. SAFETEA also provided for the transfer of some general fund revenue associated with transportation-related activities to the trust fund. It was believed at the time of SAFETEA's passage that the tax changes, a $12.5 billion unexpended balance in the trust fund, and higher fuel tax revenue due to expected economic growth would be sufficient to finance the surface transportation program through FY2009. This prediction proved to be incorrect.\",\n \"The shortfalls resulting from the overly optimistic forecasts associated with SAFETEA were rectified by Treasury general fund contributions. In September 2008, Congress enacted a bill that transferred $8 billion of Treasury general funds to shore up the HTF. Other transfers followed (see Table 1 ). The era of automatic trust fund growth may be over. Annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are no longer increasing at the 2% average rate experienced from the 1960s until 2008; although vehicle use is growing again after slumping between 2008 and 2012 due to the sluggish economy, total mileage is projected to grow at an average of roughly 1% per year over the next 20 years. Meanwhile, other policy changes are weakening the link between driving activity and motor fuel tax revenues. Under new rules issued in 2012, combined new passenger car and light truck Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards are expected to reach 41.0 miles per gallon in model year 2021 and 49.7 miles per gallon in model year 2025. This will eventually reduce the number of gallons of fuel used, although the impact in the near term will be modest.\",\n \"The expanding fleets of hybrid and electric vehicles, respectively, pay less or nothing by way of fuel taxes, raising equity issues that are likely to become more prominent as the electric vehicle fleet expands. An increase in the existing fuel tax rates would provide immediate relief to the trust fund. As a rule of thumb, adding a penny to federal motor fuel taxes provides the trust fund with roughly $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion per year. The prospect of reduced motor fuel consumption, however, casts doubt on the ability of the motor fuel taxes to support increased surface transportation spending beyond the next decade, even with modest increases in tax rates. Since FY2008, the balance of federal highway user tax revenues in the HTF has been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. The 2015 surface transportation act addressed the HTF shortfall through FY2020 by authorizing the use of Treasury general funds for transportation purposes. CBO projects that from FY2021 to FY2026 the gap between dedicated surface transportation revenues and spending will average $20.1 billion annually ( Table 2 ).\",\n \"In 2020, as Congress considers surface transportation reauthorization, it could again face a choice between finding new sources of income for the surface transportation program and settling for a smaller program, which might look very different from the one currently in place. Figure 1 shows the impact of the general fund transfers within the context of the underlying imbalance between HTF revenues and projected spending for FY2016-FY2026. Table 2 provides projections of the gap between HTF receipts and outlays following the expiration of the FAST Act at the end of FY2020. In recent decades, Congress has typically sought to reauthorize surface transportation programs for periods of five or six years. As the table indicates, a five-year reauthorization beginning in FY2021 faces a projected gap between revenues and outlays of nearly $101 billion. A six-year reauthorization would face a gap of almost $125 billion. These projections assume that spending on federal highway and public transportation programs would remain as it is today, adjusted for anticipated inflation.\",\n \"When the FAST Act expires at the end of FY2020, the balance in the HTF resulting from previous years' income is expected to be $12.1 billion—an amount equal to approximately two and a half months of outlays. CBO projects that this balance, plus incoming revenue, will allow the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to pay their obligations to states and transit agencies until sometime in FY2021. However, without a reduction in the size of the surface transportation programs, an increase in revenues, or further general fund transfers, the balance in the HTF is projected to be close to zero near the end of FY2021 (see Table 3 ). At that point, both FHWA and FTA would likely have to delay payments for completed work. Based strictly on projected income and expenses, the HTF would move from a positive balance of $12.1 billion at the start of FY2021 to a negative balance of $88.5 billion at the end of FY2025. However, current law does not allow the HTF to incur negative balances.\",\n \"Unless this is changed, $88.5 billion represents the minimum amount the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance would need to find over the FY2021-FY2025 period in some combination of additional revenue and budget offsets for general fund transfers, should Congress choose to continue funding surface transportation at the current, or \\\"baseline,\\\" level, adjusted for inflation. Because the HTF currently provides all but about $2 billion of annual spending authorized for the highway and transit programs (the main exception being the FTA Capital Investment Grants Program), these numbers have implications for the size of the program Congress may approve to follow the FAST Act. Highway and transit spending based solely on the revenue projected to flow into the HTF under current law would be limited to roughly $41 billion in FY2021, significantly less than the \\\"baseline\\\" FY2021 outlays of roughly $58 billion. The projected year-to-year decline in HTF revenue implies that FHWA and FTA would have less contract authority each year to spend on projects through FY2026. Reducing expenditures might not provide immediate relief from the demands on the HTF.\",\n \"Because transportation projects can take years to complete, both the highway and public transportation programs must make payments in future years pursuant to commitments that have already been incurred. As of FY2018, obligated but unspent contract authority for highway projects in progress is projected to be roughly $64 billion. This does not count another $24 billion in available but unobligated contract authority. For public transportation programs the equivalent figures for FY2018 are projected to be almost $16 billion in unpaid obligations and another $10 billion in unobligated contract authority. The obligated amounts represent legal obligations of the U.S. government and must be paid out of future years' HTF receipts. The first federal tax on gasoline (1 cent per gallon) was imposed in 1932, during the Hoover Administration, as a deficit-reduction measure following the depression-induced fall in general revenues. The rate was raised to help pay for World War II (to 1.5 cents per gallon) and raised again during the Korean War (to 2 cents per gallon). The Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-627) established the HTF and raised the rate to 3 cents per gallon to pay for the construction of the Interstate Highway System.\",\n \"The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 (P.L. 86-342) raised the rate to 4 cents per gallon. The gasoline tax remained at 4 cents from October 1, 1959, until March 31, 1983. During this period, revenues grew automatically from year to year as fuel consumption grew along with increases in vehicle miles traveled. Since 1983 lawmakers have passed legislation raising the tax rates on highway fuel use three times. Although infrequent, these rate increases were quite large in a proportional sense. The gasoline tax was raised on April 1, 1983, from 4 to 9 cents per gallon, a 125% increase; on September 1, 1990, from 9 to 14 cents (not counting the additional 0.1 cent for LUST), or 55%; and on October 1, 1993, from 14 to 18.3 cents, or 31%. Increasing the rate of the fuel taxes has never been popular. The last three increases were accomplished with difficulty and were influenced by the broader budgetary environment and the politics of the time. The increase in the fuel tax rate under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA; P.L. 97-424 , Title V) occurred in the lame-duck session of the 97 th Congress.\",\n \"In the \\\"Great Compromise,\\\" supporters of increased highway spending had come to an agreement with transit supporters (mostly from the Northeast) that a penny of a proposed 5-cents-per-gallon increase would be dedicated to a new mass transit account within the HTF. This meant that support for the bill during the lame-duck session was widespread and bipartisan. During the congressional elections of 1982 the Democrats had picked up 26 seats in the House of Representatives. The economy was experiencing a major recession, and some argued that increased highway spending would stimulate the economy. President Reagan's opposition to an increase in the \\\"gas tax\\\" softened during the lame-duck session. On November 23, 1982, he announced that he would support passage of STAA, even though it would \\\"mean an increase in the highway user fee, or gas tax, of 5 cents a gallon.... Our country's outstanding highway system was built on the user fee principle—that those who benefit from a use should share in its cost.\\\" Nonetheless, the bill faced a series of filibusters in the Senate, which were eventually overcome by four cloture votes. The conference report was again filibustered, and President Reagan helped secure the votes needed\",\n \"for cloture.\",\n \"President Reagan signed STAA into law on January 6, 1983, more than doubling the highway fuel tax to 9 cents per gallon. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90; P.L. 101-508 ), enacted November 5, 1990, was passed under the pressure of impending final FY1991 sequestration orders issued by President George H. W. Bush under Title II of P.L. 99-177 , the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH). OBRA90 included budget cuts, tax changes, and the Budget Enforcement Act ( P.L. 101-508 ), which rescinded the FY1991 sequestration orders. OBRA90 also raised the tax on gasoline by 5 cents per gallon, to 14 cents. Half the increase went to the HTF (2 cents to the highway account and 0.5 cents to the mass transit account), with the other 2.5 cents per gallon to be deposited in the general fund for deficit reduction. This was the first time since 1957 the motor fuel tax had been used as a source of general revenue. Section 9001 expressed the sense of Congress that all motor fuel taxes should be directed to the HTF as soon as possible.\",\n \"The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93; P.L. 103-66 ) Section 13241(a) made further changes in regard to fuel taxes: The 2.5-cents-per-gallon fuel tax dedicated to deficit reduction in OBRA90 was redirected to the HTF beginning October 1, 1995, and its authorization was extended to September 30, 1999. The highway account received 2 cents per gallon and the mass transit account 0.5 cents per gallon of the rededicated amount. An additional permanent 4.3-cents-per-gallon fuel tax took effect in October 1993 and was dedicated to deficit reduction. This brought the gasoline tax to 18.3 cents per gallon, although for two years (October 1, 1993, to October 1, 1995) 6.8 cents per gallon of this was deposited in the general fund, dedicated to deficit reduction. On October 1, 1995, the amount going to the general fund dropped to 4.3 cents per gallon, and the amount dedicated to the HTF increased to 14 cents per gallon. Subsequently, under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-34 ), all motor fuel tax revenue was redirected to the HTF (3.45 cents per gallon to the highway account and 0.85 cents to the mass transit account), effective October 1, 1997.\",\n \"(The LUST fund continues to receive the revenue from an additional 0.1 cents-per-gallon tax.) Since 2001, revenue flowing into the HTF has not met expectations in most years, and has generally lagged inflation since FY2007. In some years, HTF revenue has declined even in nominal terms (unadjusted for inflation) due to reduced vehicle travel. Because of the fixed nature of the cents-per-gallon gasoline and diesel taxes, the only way the taxes can generate additional revenue for the HTF is if motor-fuel consumption rises. In recent years, as gasoline prices have fallen, the vehicle miles traveled have increased, and gasoline sales have exceeded 2007 levels. An improving U.S. job market and wage growth may have contributed to record high VMT. The renewed popularity of vehicles with relatively low fuel economy suggests demand for motor fuel may remain stronger than anticipated a few years ago. However, to date CBO continues to forecast declines in gasoline tax revenues through FY2027. The political difficulty of increasing motor fuel taxes has led to interest in alternative approaches for supporting the HTF.\",\n \"These involve tying motor fuel tax rates to the price of fuel, changing the structure of the current fuel taxes, and charging drivers for the distance they drive rather than the fuel they consume, as well as freight-related charges and a variety of options unrelated to transportation. A differently designed gas tax might be indexed to both inflation (either inflation generally or highway construction cost inflation) and fuel-efficiency improvements. This new design would be imposed after raising the current gas tax rate to compensate for the loss in purchasing power since the last rate increase in 1993. If the motor fuels taxes for gasoline and diesel had been adjusted in 2016 to keep pace with the change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer price index since 1993, the 18.3-cents-per-gallon gasoline tax would now be 31 cents per gallon, and the 24.3-cents-per-gallon diesel tax would be 41.1 cents per gallon. Consequently, the first step in implementing this method of \\\"fixing\\\" the gas tax would be to raise the base tax rate for gasoline by roughly 13 cents per gallon and to raise the rate for diesel by roughly 17 cents per gallon.\",\n \"Future adjustments would depend on the inflation rate in future years. Tax-rate adjustments to make up for revenue lost due to greater fuel efficiency could be determined by dividing miles driven by vehicle category by the total amount of fuel consumed by that category and comparing the quotient to the previous year. Although fuel-economy standards for new vehicles are to rise sharply over the next few years, the average efficiency of the entire vehicle fleet will rise slowly because of the large number of older vehicles on the road. Consequently, an annual efficiency adjustment to the fuel tax rates would likely be small. One approach to reducing the political obstacles to higher fuel taxes is to couple a fuels-tax increase with income-tax rebates approximating the average cost of the fuels tax increase to the typical driver. The cost of the rebates would be less than the additional taxes collected because truckers, other commercial users, and individuals who do not file income-tax returns would not receive the rebates. The rebates could be phased out after several years while the higher tax rates would continue. This solution raises a number of issues.\",\n \"The proposal could be seen, in effect, as a general fund transfer. Depending on the language of the House and Senate budget resolutions, the rebates might have to be offset by spending reductions elsewhere in the federal budget. Also, unless the higher tax rates were indexed for inflation, revenues would again be on a downward slope after the tax increase occurs. Under the sales tax concept, the federal motor fuel tax would be assessed as a percentage of the retail price of fuel rather than as a fixed amount per gallon. Some states already levy taxes on motor fuels in this way, either alongside or in place of fixed cents-per-gallon taxes on motor fuel purchases. If fuel prices rise in the future, sales tax revenues could rise from year to year even if consumption does not increase. Conversely, however, a decline in motor fuel prices could lead to a drop in sales tax revenue. Many states that tied fuel taxes to prices after the price shocks of the 1970s encountered revenue shortfalls in the 1980s, when fuel prices fell dramatically. Over a 20-year period, most of these variable state fuel taxes disappeared.\",\n \"Recently, however, Virginia eliminated its cents-per-gallon fuel taxes in favor of a sales tax on fuel and a general sales tax increase that was dedicated to transportation purposes. The Virginia law mandates that the tax be imposed on the average wholesale price (calculated twice each year) but sets price floors; if prices of motor fuels fall beneath those floors, the amount of fuel tax charged per gallon is not reduced further. A federal sales tax on motor fuel would likely be at best an interim solution to the long-term problem of financing transportation infrastructure because, as with the current motor fuel tax, it relies on fuel consumption to fund transportation programs. To the extent that improved vehicle efficiency or adoption of hybrid or electric vehicles leads to long-term declines in fuel usage, a sales tax on fuel may not lead to increases in trust fund revenues. In addition, a sales tax calibrated to produce a desired amount of revenue in an environment of high motor fuel prices could significantly underperform if fuel prices were to be lower than anticipated. Economists have long favored mileage-based user charges as an alternative source of highway funding.\",\n \"Under the user charge concept, motorists would pay fees based on distance driven and, perhaps, on other costs of road use, such as wear and tear on roads, traffic congestion, and air pollution. The funds collected would be spent for surface transportation purposes. The concept is not new: federal motor fuel taxes are a form of indirect road user charge insofar as road use is loosely related to fuel consumption. Some states have charged trucks by the mile for many years, and toll roads charge drivers based on miles traveled and the number of axles on a vehicle, which is used as a proxy for weight. Recent technological developments, as well as the evident shortcomings of motor fuel taxes, have led to renewed interest in the user charge concept, including establishment of a pilot program in legislation enacted in 2015. Mileage-based road user charges (often referred to as vehicle miles traveled charges, or VMTs) could range from a flat cent-per-mile charge based on a simple odometer reading to a variable charge based on vehicle movements tracked by the Global Positioning System (GPS).\",\n \"Other proposals envision mileage-based road user charges that would mimic the way Americans now pay their fuel taxes by collecting the charge at the pump. Most road user charge proposals would require electric vehicle users to pay for their use of the roads. Implementation of a mileage-based road user charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuels tax, including public concern about personal privacy; the higher costs to establish, collect, and enforce this charge (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections); the administrative challenge of the billing process given the size of the vehicle fleet (estimated at roughly 263 million vehicles); and the setting and adjusting of the road user charge rates, which would likely be as controversial as increasing the motor fuels taxes. Another barrier to implementation is how to fairly charge the \\\"unbanked,\\\" those who have no bank accounts or credit/debit cards. A nationwide mileage-based road user charge would be analogous to a national toll.\",\n \"This raises the prospect that vehicles using toll roads might be charged twice, although this effectively happens now in that toll road users also pay tax on the motor fuel they consume while using the toll road. Technically, it would be possible for a road user charge to replace an existing toll, but this could cause complications with respect to the servicing of bonds funded by toll-road revenue. Since 1982, the HTF has financed most federal public transportation programs as well as highway programs. If a mileage-based road user charge were to be used strictly for highway purposes, it might reasonably be characterized as a user fee even if the amount paid by each individual driver does not correspond precisely to the social cost (such as pollution and traffic congestion costs) of that user's driving. A road user charge that funded both highways and public transportation might arguably be seen more as a tax than a user fee. This distinction raises a number of legal issues. Any legislation establishing a road user charge would have to clearly identify what the charge would be spent on.\",\n \"If the existing HTF were to be retained, legislation would have to specify what share of the revenue would be credited to the separate highway and mass transit accounts within the fund. In addition to options discussed above, a wide range of additional proposals has been suggested to generate revenue for the HTF. These proposals largely originated from the work of the two SAFETEA congressional commissions and of groups such as the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and Transportation Research Board (TRB). For example, AASHTO's Matrix of Illustrative Surface Transportation Revenue Options lists 33 potential HTF revenue options with yield estimates in tabular form. Many of these options involve taxes on freight movements or energy. It should be emphasized that the revenue estimates from these exercises are merely suggestive; the revenue obtained from any given measure would depend on changes in the price of motor fuels, growth in the number of annual auto registrations, and other factors. If Congress chooses not to impose new taxes and fees dedicated to the HTF, it could still maintain or expand the surface transportation program with general fund monies.\",\n \"Any of the financing options discussed above could be used to sustain the existing federal financing mechanism, the HTF, but could also be used to support the general fund if Congress considers alternatives to the trust fund financing model. This would weaken the historical link between the taxes and fees paid by highway users and spending on the nation's highways and bridges. The Highway Trust Fund was set up as a temporary device that was supposed to disappear when the Interstate System was finished. It has endured, and its breadth of financing has expanded well beyond the Interstates, most significantly with the 1982 creation of the mass transit account within the fund to support public transportation spending. But the HTF is certainly not essential to a federal role in transportation funding. Congress routinely funds large infrastructure projects, such as those constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers, from general fund appropriations. Before 1956, it funded highway projects using annual appropriations. As recently as the 1990s, significant highway programs such as the Appalachian Development Highway System were funded from the general fund.\",\n \"One alternative would be to eliminate the trust fund structure, thereby doing away with its complicated budget framework of contract authority, obligations, and apportionments. Eliminating the trust fund would force surface transportation to compete with other federal programs for funding each year, possibly leading to less spending on transportation. There could be advantages to moving away from trust fund financing of surface transportation. Until recently, one of the most intractable arguments in reauthorization debates concerned which states were \\\"donors\\\" to transportation programs and which were \\\"donees.\\\" Donor states were states whose highway users were estimated to pay more to the highway account of the HTF than they received. Donee states received more than they paid. The donor-donee dispute was unique to the federal highway program, and occurred largely because of the ability to track federal fuel tax revenues by state. This issue has faded as injections of general fund revenues into the HTF have made all states donees, and would likely disappear if transportation-related taxes were deposited into the general fund instead of the trust fund. Treating fuel taxes as just another source of federal revenue would also dampen the long-standing link between road user charges\",\n \"and program spending.\",\n \"This would provide Congress with greater flexibility to allocate funding among various transportation modes and between transportation and nontransportation uses. Most trust-fund outlays take the form of formula grants over which states have a great deal of spending discretion. While there are numerous federal requirements attached to trust fund expenditures, there have been until recently relatively few performance-oriented goals that the states are required to meet in selecting projects to be undertaken with federal monies. Performance measures might be easier to implement without formula programs that automatically apportion funding to the states. Eliminating the trust fund might also allow for creativity in thinking about the provision of transportation infrastructure across the modal boundaries that now define much of federal transportation spending. Historically, important parts of U.S. transportation infrastructure, such as the transcontinental railroads and the Panama Canal, were authorized by specific congressional enactments rather than grant programs. Reconsidering the trust fund structure might reopen discussion of this approach. Another alternative would be to again devote all trust fund revenues exclusively to highway spending. This would leave transit and other surface transportation programs to be funded exclusively by annual appropriations of general funds. Such a change would\",\n \"have political implications.\",\n \"Since the early 1990s, public transportation and cycling advocates, environmentalists, and a wide range of other groups have become full-fledged supporters of the surface transportation program, as it has benefited their interests. The expanded coalition supporting the surface transportation program played an important role in the hard-fought political battles since the early 1990s to pass multiyear surface transportation bills. As was made clear by passage of the FAST Act, Congress has chosen to support the current HTF funding model by transferring funds, mostly from the Treasury general fund. Whether such general fund support should continue is likely to become a major point of contention when Congress debates reauthorizing surface transportation programs beyond FY2020. By FY2020, the last year of the FAST Act, federal highway programs will have been funded for 12 years under a de facto policy of providing a Treasury general fund share. Congress could address the inadequacy of motor fuel taxes to meet surface transportation needs by making the general fund share permanent. The public transportation titles of surface transportation bills already fund the New Starts program with general fund appropriated funds.\",\n \"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) budget is also supported by a combination of trust funds and general funds; the general fund amount is supposed to approximate the value of the airways system to military and other government users and to \\\"societal\\\" nonusers (people who do not fly but, for example, benefit from the delivery of freight via aircraft). A similar argument could be made regarding the public good benefits of a well-functioning highway system to justify an annual general fund appropriation to support spending on roads. Should Congress agree on a future policy of providing an annual general fund share for federal highway funding, the financing structure of the federal-aid highways program could change. Congress would have the choice of appropriating the general fund share to the HTF and maintaining the programmatic status quo, or it could fund some programs from the trust fund and fund others via appropriations. Congress could also consider a two-pronged approach to authorization. It could authorize the trust funded programs separately from the appropriated programs.\",\n \"This would give Congress the option of trust funding a very long (perhaps as much as 10-year) authorization bill for programs that fund projects that typically take many years to plan and complete. The long-term authorization could be paired with a series of short-term bills funded with appropriated general funds for programs whose projects are more likely to be completed quickly. Toll roads have a long history in the United States, going back to the early days of the republic. During the 18 th century, most were local roads or bridges that could not be built or improved with local government tax revenue alone. However, beginning with the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 355), federal law has included a prohibition on the tolling of roads that benefited from federal funds. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the prospect of toll revenues allowed states to build thousands of miles of limited-access highways without federal aid and much sooner than would have been the case with traditional funding. Despite this, the tolling prohibition was reiterated in the Federal-Aid Highway Act and Highway Revenue Act of 1956 (70 Stat.\",\n \"374), which authorized funds for the Interstate System, created the HTF, and raised the fuel taxes to pay for their construction. Over the last three decades the prohibition has been moderated so that exceptions to the general ban on tolling now cover the vast majority of federal-aid roads and bridges. There remains a ban on the tolling of existing Interstate System highway surface lane capacity. While new toll facilities have opened in several states, some of those projects have struggled financially. Generally, there are three levels of restrictions on tolling of federal-aid highways. Non-Interstate System highways and bridges may be converted to toll roads but only after reconstruction or replacement. Existing Interstate System surface lane capacity may not be converted to toll roads except under the auspices of two small pilot programs. However, Interstate System bridges and tunnels may be converted if they are reconstructed or replaced. New capacity on the federal-aid highway system generally may be tolled. There are no federal restrictions on tolling of roads off of the federal-aid system. Highway toll revenue nationwide came to $14.025 billion in FY2015, according to FHWA.\",\n \"While the amount of toll revenue has grown significantly in recent years, toll revenue as a share of total spending on highways has been relatively steady for more than half a century, in the range of roughly 5% to 6%. On average, facility owners collected $2.38 million per mile of toll road or bridge in FY2015, but revenue per mile varies greatly among toll facilities. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. There are three possible means of increasing revenue from tolling: Increase the E xtent of T oll R oads. FHWA statistics identify 5,882 tolled miles of roads, bridges, and tunnels as of January 1, 2016, a net increase of 1,161 miles, or 25%, over 1990. Toll-road mileage comprises only 0.6% of the 1,016,964 miles of public roads eligible for federal highway aid.\",\n \"While there may be many existing roads on which tolling would be financially feasible, the vast majority of mileage on the federal-aid system probably has too little traffic to make toll collection economically viable. Increase T oll- R oad U sage. The financing of many of the toll roads constructed in the 20 th century was based on the assumption that the new roads would lead to increased vehicle usage. Although vehicles miles traveled declined in the wake of the recession that began in 2007, vehicle use has been rising again since 2014. If this trend continues it bodes well for toll revenues, which would rise with increasing traffic. On the other hand, if demographic trends and social changes, such as the increased popularity of center-city living, eventually lead to slower growth in personal motor vehicle use, then toll revenues may be constrained in the longer term. If that proves to be the case, higher traffic volume may contribute little to increased toll revenues. Increase the A verage T oll per M ile. Raising tolls can be politically challenging, especially when revenue is used for purposes other than building and maintaining the toll facility.\",\n \"Trucking interests frequently raise opposition to rate changes that increase truck tolls relative to automobile tolls. Where roads are operated by private concessionaires, the operators' contracts with state governments typically specify the maximum rate at which tolls can rise. Additionally, large increases can encourage motorists to use competing nontolled routes. These factors suggest that imposing tolls on individual transportation facilities is likely to be of only limited use in supporting the overall level of highway capital spending. Furthermore, some states, particularly those with low population densities, may have few or no facilities suitable for tolling. Toll collection itself can be costly; collection costs on many existing toll roads exceed 10% of revenues. For these reasons, while tolls may be an effective way of financing specific facilities—especially major roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to be used heavily and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade—they would likely be less effective in providing broad financial support for surface transportation programs. Value capture represents an attempt to cover part or all of the cost of transportation improvements from landowners or developers who benefit from the resulting increase in the value of real property.\",\n \"Value capture revenue mechanisms include tax increment financing, special assessments, development impact fees, negotiated exactions, and joint development. The federal role in value capture strategies may be limited, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted, but it is worth describing these strategies to provide a fuller picture of the ways in which they might supplement or supplant more commonly used funding and financing mechanisms. Value capture is not a new idea. Land developers built and operated streetcar systems in the late 19 th century as a way to sell houses on the urban fringe, for example. Much of the recent experience with value capture has been associated with public transit. GAO found that the most widely used mechanism is joint development, in which a real estate project at or near a transit station is pursued cooperatively between the public and private sectors. An example might involve a transit agency leasing the unused space over a station, its \\\"air rights,\\\" to a developer in exchange for a regular payment. GAO found that joint development has generated relatively small amounts of money for transit agencies.\",\n \"For example, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority received about $10 million from joint development in FY2016, about 1% of its operating revenue. However, less widely used strategies, such as special assessment districts, are estimated to generate significant amounts of funding for specific projects. In a special assessment district, properties within a defined area are assessed a special tax for a specific purpose. A special assessment district in Seattle produced $25 million of the $53 million (47%) needed to fund the South Lake Union streetcar project. There has been less use of value capture in highway projects, but this appears to be changing. Texas, for example, has authorized the use of tax increment financing through the creation of transportation reinvestment zones to help fund highway projects. Special assessment districts also have been set up in several states, including Florida and Virginia, to fund highway projects. In Virginia a special assessment district was used to help fund the expansion of Route 28 near Washington Dulles International Airport beginning in the late 1980s.\",\n \"Growing demands on the transportation system and constraints on public resources have led to calls for more private-sector involvement in the provision of highway and transit infrastructure through public-private partnerships (P3s), which can be designed to lessen demands on public-sector funding. Private involvement can take a variety of forms, including design-build and design-build-finance-operate agreements. Typically, the \\\"public\\\" in public-private partnerships refers to a state government, local government, or transit agency. The federal government, nevertheless, exerts influence over the prevalence and structure of P3s through its transportation programs, funding, and regulatory oversight. To be viable, P3s involving private financing typically require an anticipated project-related revenue stream from a source such as vehicle tolls, freight container fees, or, in the case of transit station development, building rents. Private-sector resources may come from an initial payment to lease an existing asset in exchange for future revenue, as with the Indiana Toll Road and Chicago Skyway, or they may arise from a newly developed asset that creates a new revenue stream. Either way, a facility user fee, such as a toll, is often the key to unlocking private-sector participation and resources.\",\n \"In some cases, private-sector financing is backed by \\\"availability payments,\\\" regular payments made by government to the private entity based on negotiated quality and performance standards of the facility. Aversion in the private sector to the risk that too few users will be willing to pay for use of a new facility has made availability payment P3s more common over the past few years. As a result, state and local governments are retaining this risk, known as demand risk, more often. It is widely believed that hundreds of billions of dollars of private monies are available globally for infrastructure investment, such as surface transportation. To date, however, the number of transportation P3s in the United States is relatively small, as is the amount of long-term private financing provided. According to one source, from 1993 through September 2017 there were 30 surface transportation P3s involving long-term financing, with total project costs totaling $39 billion. This includes the 99-year lease of the Chicago Skyway; the I-595 managed lanes project in Florida; and the Purple Line light rail transit project in Maryland. P3s and private investment in surface transportation are relatively larger in many other countries, including Portugal, Spain,\",\n \"and Australia.\",\n \"It is quite possible that private investment will grow in the future, but many impediments remain. Some of the major ones include the relative attractiveness of the tax-exempt financing available to state and local government, political opposition to tolling and privatization, and difficulties associated with project development. Private-sector financing generated through P3s might best be seen as a supplement to traditional public-sector funding rather than as a substitute. In addition to attracting private capital, P3s may generate new resources for highway and transit infrastructure in at least two ways. First, P3s may improve efficiency through better management and innovation in construction, maintenance, and operation—in effect providing more infrastructure for the same price. Private companies may be more able to examine the full life-cycle cost of investments, whereas public agency decisions are often tied to short-term budget cycles. Such cost reductions may not materialize, however, if the public sector has to spend a substantial amount of time on procurement, oversight, dispute resolution, and litigation. GAO argues that most state governments lack the capacity to manage P3 contracts. Second, P3s may reduce government agencies' costs by transferring the financial risks of building, maintaining, and operating infrastructure to private\",\n \"investors.\",\n \"These risks include construction delays, unexpectedly high maintenance costs, and the possibility that demand will be less than forecast. There is a danger, however, that this transfer of risk may prove illusory if major miscalculations force the public agency to renegotiate contracts or provide financial guarantees. Moreover, as GAO points out, not all the risks can or should be shifted to the private sector. For instance, private investors are unlikely to accept the risk of higher construction costs due to delays in the environmental review process. Municipal bonds, debt instruments used by states and all types of local government, are a major source of financing for transportation infrastructure. The interest on municipal bonds is generally exempt from federal income tax; consequently, an investor will usually accept a lower interest rate than on a non-tax-exempt bond, and the borrower can finance a project at a lower cost. The forgone tax revenue is the federal government's contribution to a project financed with municipal bonds. Private activity bonds (PABs) are a type of municipal bond in which a state or local government acts as a financial intermediary for a business or individual.\",\n \"PABs are not eligible for federal tax exemption unless Congress grants an exception for a certain purpose and other requirements are met. Congress has approved limited use of tax-exempt private activity bonds for airports, docks and wharves, mass commuting facilities, high-speed intercity rail facilities, and qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities (26 U.S.C. §142). In the case of qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities, the Secretary of Transportation must approve the issuance of PABs, and the aggregate amount allocated must not exceed $15 billion (26 U.S.C. §142(m)(2)). As of January 2017, $6.6 billion of the $15 billion had been issued to finance 17 projects, and another $4.3 billion had been allocated to eight other projects. There have been proposals to increase the bond issuance cap so that PABs, which are seen as an important support for P3 deals, can continue to be issued in the future. While municipal bonds are a popular financing method, there are a number of potential disadvantages to their use.\",\n \"Because they are issued by state and local government, the federal government has less control over the types of projects supported and the amount of the federal contribution than it does with grant and loan programs. Tax-exempt bonds, moreover, can be an inefficient way to subsidize state and local debt because borrowing costs are reduced by less than the forgone revenue. As the Congressional Budget Office notes, \\\"the remainder of that tax expenditure accrues to bond buyers in the highest income tax brackets.\\\" Also, tax-exempt bonds are unattractive to investors that do not have a federal tax liability, such as pension funds and foreign individuals and organizations, shrinking the potential funds available to state and local governments. Tax credit bonds, an alternative type of tax-preferred municipal bond, might help to overcome some of these limitations. Tax credit bonds typically do not pay interest. Instead, the investor receives a tax credit, an amount that is the same for investors in different tax brackets. Tax credit bonds, therefore, are more efficient than tax-exempt bonds because the revenue forgone by the federal government equals the reduction in borrowing costs that state and local governments receive.\",\n \"Unused tax credits may be carried forward to another year or sold to another entity with tax liability. With some types of tax credit bonds known as issuer credit or direct pay bonds, the credit is paid to the issuer and the investor gets interest similar to taxable securities. Consequently, tax credit bonds can be attractive to investors with no federal tax liability. Federal authority exists for state and local governments to issue some types of tax credit bonds, but none can be used to finance transportation projects. Tax credit bonds authorized by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ), known as Build America Bonds, were used to finance a wide range of projects including transportation. The authorization to issue these bonds expired December 31, 2010. An existing federal mechanism for providing credit assistance to relatively large transportation infrastructure projects is financing under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, enacted in 1998. TIFIA provides federal credit assistance in the form of secured loans, loan guarantees, and lines of credit.\",\n \"Federal credit assistance reduces borrowers' costs and lowers project risk, thereby helping to secure other financing at rates lower than would otherwise be possible. Another purpose of TIFIA funding is to leverage nonfederal funding, including investment from the private sector. Loans must be repaid with a dedicated revenue stream, typically a project-related user fee, such as a toll, but sometimes dedicated tax revenue. As of January 2018, according to DOT, TIFIA had provided assistance of nearly $30 billion to more than 70 projects. The overall cost of the projects supported is estimated to be $107 billion. The FAST Act reduced funding for the TIFIA program after it had been greatly increased under the previous authorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ), enacted in July 2012. Prior to MAP-21, the TIFIA authorization was $122 million annually. This was increased to $750 million in FY2013 and $1 billion in FY2014 and FY2015. Under the FAST Act, the direct authorization for TIFIA was $275 million in both FY2016 and FY2017, $285 million in FY2018, and $300 million in both FY2019 and FY2020.\",\n \"Because the government expects its loans to be repaid, an appropriation need cover only administrative costs and the subsidy cost of credit assistance. According to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the subsidy cost is \\\"the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan or a loan guarantee, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs.\\\" According to DOT, $1 in TIFIA funding historically has provided about $10 in credit assistance, a 10% subsidy cost, although in recent years each dollar has provided closer to $14. Seen in isolation, the cut in the TIFIA authorization reduced DOT's capacity to issue loans by approximately $7.25 billion in FY2016, assuming a 10% subsidy cost. However, the FAST Act also allowed states to use funds they receive from two other highway programs to pay for the subsidy and administrative costs of credit assistance. These two programs are the Nationally Significant Freight and Highway Projects Program (NSFHPP), authorized at $800 million in FY2016, and the National Highway Performance Program (NHPP), authorized at $22.3 billion in FY2016.\",\n \"If states decide to use their formula funding in this way, the potential amount of loans and other credit assistance may be much greater than would be possible using the $275 million direct authorization alone. The Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) Grant Program, funded by general fund appropriations, also can be used by grant recipients to pay the subsidy and administrative costs of a TIFIA loan. Several changes to the TIFIA program in the FAST Act were aimed at making it easier to finance smaller projects, particularly those in rural areas.\",\n \"These provisions included providing authority for a TIFIA loan to a state infrastructure bank (SIB) to capitalize a \\\"rural project fund\\\"; adding transit-oriented development (TOD) infrastructure as an eligible project (TOD infrastructure is a \\\"project to improve or construct public infrastructure that is located within walking distance of, and accessible to, a fixed guideway transit facility, passenger rail station, intercity bus station, or intermodal facility\\\"); allowing up to $2 million of TIFIA budget authority each fiscal year to pay the application fees for projects costing $75 million or less instead of requiring payment by the project sponsor; modifying or setting the minimum project cost thresholds for credit assistance at $10 million for TOD projects, the capitalization of a rural project fund, and local government infrastructure projects; and providing for a streamlined application process for loans of $100 million or less.\",\n \"In addition, the FAST Act authorized the creation of a new National Surface Transportation and Innovative Finance Bureau within DOT to administer federal transportation financing programs, specifically the TIFIA program, the SIB program, the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) Program, and the allocation of authority to issue private activity bonds for qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities. To fulfill this mandate, DOT established the Build America Bureau in July 2016. The bureau also will be responsible for establishing and promoting best practices for innovative financing and P3s, and for providing advice and technical expertise in these areas. The bureau will administer the new discretionary Nationally Significant Freight and Highway Projects grant program, known as INFRA grants, and will have responsibilities related to procurement and project environmental review and permitting. Congress has considered several proposals to create a national infrastructure bank to help finance infrastructure projects. One purported advantage of a national infrastructure bank over other loan programs, such as TIFIA, is that it would have more independence in its operation, such as in project selection, and have greater expertise at its disposal.\",\n \"Additionally, a national infrastructure bank would likely be set up to help a much wider range of infrastructure projects, including water, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure. Proponents claim that the best projects, or at least those that are the most financially viable, would be selected from across these sectors. In many formulations, capitalization of a national infrastructure bank comes from an appropriation, but in others the bank is authorized to raise its own capital through bond issuance. By issuing securities that are not tax exempt, it could tap pools of private capital that do not invest in tax-exempt bonds, such as pension funds and foreign citizens, the traditional source of much project finance. Tax-exempt municipal securities are unattractive to some investors, either because individual issues are too small to interest them or because the investors do not benefit from the tax preference. Taxable bonds with long maturities might be attractive to some of these investors. An infrastructure bank also might reduce the federal government's share of project costs, putting greater reliance on nonfederal capital and user fees.\",\n \"Most infrastructure bank proposals assume the bank would improve the allocation of public resources by funding projects with the highest economic returns regardless of infrastructure system or type. Selection of the projects with the highest returns, however, might conflict with the traditional desire of Congress to assure funding for various purposes. In the extreme case, major transportation projects might not be funded if the bank were to exhaust its lending authority on water or energy projects offering higher returns. Limitations of a national infrastructure bank include its duplication of existing programs like TIFIA and the Wastewater and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds. An infrastructure bank may not be the lowest-cost means of increasing infrastructure spending. CBO has pointed out that a special entity that issues its own debt would not be able to match the lower interest and issuance costs of the U.S. Treasury. In some formulations, a national infrastructure bank exposes the federal government to the risk of default. SIBs already exist in many states. In 32 states and Puerto Rico, SIBs were created pursuant to a federal program originally established in surface transportation law in 1995 ( P.L. 104-59 ).\",\n \"Several other states, among them California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, and Virginia, have state investment banks that are unconnected to the federal program. Local governments have also begun to embrace the idea. The City of Chicago has established a nonprofit organization, the Chicago Infrastructure Trust, as a way to attract private investment for public works projects, and Dauphin County, PA, has established an infrastructure bank funded from a state tax on liquid fuels to make loans to the 40 municipalities and private project sponsors within its borders. One of the biggest stumbling blocks to federally authorized SIBs has been capitalization. States can capitalize the banks using some of their apportioned and allocated highway and transit funds, and any amount of rail program funds. Under the FAST Act, capitalization of a rural project fund may now be made by a loan from the TIFIA program. Federal funds have to be matched with state funds, generally on an 80% federal, 20% state basis.\",\n \"Authority to use federal transportation funds for this purpose lapsed between the beginning of FY2010 and enactment of the FAST Act in December 2015, and few states took advantage of this authority prior to FY2010 because they preferred to use their federal grant funds for other purposes.\"\n]","isConversational":false}}},{"rowIdx":12398,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"string","value":"train_12398"},"question":{"kind":"string","value":"Write a detailed summary of the following government report."},"answer":{"kind":"string","value":"The historically slow rebound in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the current focus of some within the public policy community on the unequal distribution of the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) across U.S. households. This report examines changes over time and across countries in the shape of the income distribution to afford Members of Congress a broader perspective when deliberating such policy issues as the progressivity of income tax rates, the generosity of social insurance programs, and the level of the minimum wage. If income were equally divided across households, each quintile (fifth) of households would account for 20% of total income. Inequality is the term commonly used to describe an income distribution in which one or more quintiles account for less (more) than 20% of aggregate income. The Congressional Budget Office and others have documented that the bottom fifth has long accounted for much less than its proportionate share (20%) of total income. The bottom quintile's share of income has remained little changed for the past few decades at less than 4%, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. The middle class, defined as the middle 60% of households, received a disproportionately smaller share of the total economic pie in 2011 (45.7%) than in 1968 (53.2%). Over the same period, the disproportionately large income shares of the top 20% and the top 5% of households have trended upward. The top fifth's share of total household income rose from 42.6% in 1968 to 51.1% in 2011; the top 5%'s share rose from 16.3% to 22.3%. Estimates derived from federal income tax data, which allow researchers to look within the top 5% of the U.S. income distribution, suggest that those at the very top have reaped disproportionately larger gains from economic growth. These, among other measures of income dispersion, have led analysts to conclude that inequality has increased in the United States as a result of high-income households pulling further away from those lower in the distribution. Based on the limited data that are comparable across nations, the U.S. income distribution appears to be among the most unequal of all major industrialized countries and the United States appears to be among the nations experiencing the greatest increases in measures of income dispersion. Three leading explanations are put forth for these cross-country differences: (1) other advanced economies devote a larger share of national output to transfers, which tends to equalize income across households; (2) the progressivity of tax rates varies by country and thus has different effects on the distribution of after-tax income; and (3) equality in the distribution of earnings, which account for most household income, varies substantially across countries. The extent to which countries undertake policies that affect their income distributions may reflect national differences in perceptions about the degree of income mobility. In the United States, a longstanding argument against redistributionary policies has been that each person has an equal opportunity to move up the income ladder. Research raises questions about whether Americans' perceptions of their likelihood of upward mobility are exaggerated. Empirical analyses estimate that the United States is a comparatively immobile society, that is, where one starts in the income distribution influences where one ends up to a greater degree than in several advanced economies. Children raised in families at the bottom of the U.S. income distribution are estimated to be especially less likely to ascend the income ladder as adults."},"documents":{"kind":"list like","value":["The historically slow pace of recovery in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the renewed interest among some members of the public policy community in the long-term trend of growing inequality in the distribution of income. In other words, the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) began accruing unequally across U.S. households long before the late 2000s. Inequality is the label commonly applied to income distributions in which a group's share of total income is larger (smaller) than its share of the population (e.g., the top 20% of U.S. households accounted for slightly more than 50% of aggregate household income in 2011, as shown in Table 1 .) Economic theory provides little basis for preferring any particular degree of equality in the distribution of income. In theory, what matters with respect to labor income is that the distribution results from markets that operate efficiently; that is, markets in which the final demand for goods and services and the relative productivity of the firms producing those goods and services determine the demand for labor and the earnings of jobs in each sector of the economy.","Theoretical arguments for a more equal distribution of income than that which results from market forces are based on a number of propositions, including the diminishing marginal utility of income. This refers to the idea that each additional dollar of income yields less and less satisfaction (utility) than the first. For example, one additional dollar of income adds less to the utility of someone earning $100,000 than to the satisfaction of someone earning $20,000. If this proposition is correct, it should be possible to increase the overall economic well-being of society by transferring money from those with high incomes to those with low incomes because the loss in utility will be less for high-income individuals than the gain for low-income individuals. However, the costs commonly associated with income redistribution (e.g., slower economic growth) may offset some and possibly all of any net gain in well-being. With varying perceptions about a trade-off between economic growth and income equality, members of the U.S. public policy community have long debated how best to improve the economic well-being of the population.","This disagreement appears to underlie longstanding congressional deliberations about several policy issues, such as the progressivity of income tax rates, tax treatment of capital gains and inheritance, provision of social insurance (e.g., Social Security) as well as social welfare benefits (e.g., food stamps), and raising the federal minimum wage. It also has extended to consideration of initiatives (e.g., grants for early childhood education and college tuition tax expenditures) that arguably promote equality in the opportunity to move up the income ladder, which an increasingly unequal distribution of income may suggest a lack of and which may itself curb the potential productive capacity of the economy. This report presents recent analysis of the distribution of income and the extent of income mobility in the United States over time and in comparison with other advanced economies. It begins with a discussion of data issues related to measuring income and its distribution. The empirical literature on the development of and explanations for income inequality in the United States are next addressed. The report then compares the U.S. income distribution with the distributions of other industrialized countries and presents explanations for cross-country differences in measures of income dispersion.","To the degree that a more equal distribution of income arises from policy decisions rather than market forces, the willingness of a country to incur any economic costs related to attaining greater equality may reflect varying national beliefs about the opportunity to ascend the income ladder. For that reason, the report closes with an examination of income mobility in the United States and other developed nations. Two common sources of income data are the Annual Social and Economic supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and federal income tax returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The U.S. Census Bureau, which conducts the CPS, calculates \"money income.\" It is the nation's official measure of income. Money income includes wages and salaries, interest, dividends, rent, payments from pensions and retirement savings accounts, and nonmeans-tested cash income (e.g., Social Security, unemployment compensation, and veterans' payments). Calculated on a pre-tax basis, money income does not include the value of noncash government benefits (e.g., food stamps and housing subsidies) and capital gains. \"Market income\" is the measure of income derived from federal tax data made available by the IRS.","Perhaps most prominent among the researchers who use tax data to study the distribution of income are Saez and Piketty. They define pre-tax market income to include all income reported on individual tax returns including wages and salaries, business and farm income, and capital income (e.g., dividends, interest, and rents). The primary differences between money and market income thus defined is that market income excludes cash government benefits and includes realized capital gains. With respect to the distribution of overall economic well-being, measures based on the concepts of money and market income fall short and may be misleading. Consider the case of two families who in every way are equal in terms of wealth and income. Neither owns their home, and they both have substantial savings in interest-earning assets. Suppose one family uses a portion of its savings to buy a home. No one would argue that the family is now worse off, but income measures indicate that to be the case because the family's interest income would have fallen.","In fact, the family that buys its home is earning an implicit income in the use of the house just as it would earn rental income if the house were leased to others. Another weakness in existing income measures as a reflection of overall economic well-being is that they do not account for the implicit income of homemakers. Consider two married-couple households with the same income and both spouses receive wages from their employers. If in one of the households a spouse quits to stay at home and care for their children that household will experience a drop in measured income. Because the unpaid work done at home is not without value, the measured difference in the incomes of the two households will overstate the difference in their living standards. The time period in which income is measured may also affect comparisons in well-being across households. Over the course of the business cycle unemployment rises and falls, affecting labor income. Some households tend to be more adversely affected than others by recessions, so the stage of the business cycle has an influence on relative income. Similarly, income generally varies substantially over the course of an individual's","lifetime.","New entrants to the labor force typically have lower incomes than those who have been working for some time, and income tends to decrease upon retirement. Because of these life-cycle changes in income, the age mix of the population also influences the relative incomes of households. Another difficulty in comparing income across households is deciding on the relevant population. In the case of labor income, the distribution of income among working-age individuals (e.g., 25-64-year olds) may be of most interest. When it comes to overall well-being, it may be more appropriate to consider the distribution of income across households. Because most households can be presumed to pool resources and because some costs of living are fixed, a four-person household may not need twice as much income as a married-couple household for each person to enjoy roughly the same living standard. The ability to achieve economies of scale thus further complicates using the distribution of income across households or tax filing units as a basis for judging economic well-being. The Census Bureau annually publishes a variety of measures that describe the distribution of money income.","One measure divides total money income into quintiles (fifths), with households ordered from lowest to highest income and then divided into five groups of equal size. The income within each group is summed, and its share (percentage) of total household income is calculated. If aggregate income was equally divided across households with income, each quintile would account for 20% of total money income. To the extent that each quintile falls short of or exceeds its proportionate (20%) share, it indicates the degree of inequality in the income distribution. As shown in the last row of Table 1 , the bottom fifth of households in 2011 accounted for much less than the one-fifth of total income it would have gotten if the distribution were perfectly equal. The top 20%, in contrast, accounted for more than twice what it would have gotten in an equal distribution. The top 5%, which is within the top fifth, accounted for more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution. The data thus indicate that income was quite unequally distributed across U.S. households in 2011, and that this has been the case for quite some time.","Households at various points in the distribution also have fared differently from each other over the past few decades. Between 1968 and 2011, the income share of the three middle quintiles fell from 53.2% to 45.7% (see Table 1 ). Although there is no official definition of the middle class, the middle 60% of households is sometimes regarded as such. As for the bottom 20% of households, its income share has stagnated at less than 4.0% since about 1990. In contrast, the income shares of the top fifth and the top 5% of households generally have risen from year to year. The top 20%'s share grew from 42.6% in 1968 to 51.1% in 2011, and the top 5%'s share grew from 16.3% to 22.3%. Another indicator of the degree of inequality is the Gini coefficient. It is a single number that can range between zero (a perfectly equal distribution) and one (a perfectly unequal distribution). The historical trend in the United States is one of almost steadily increasing income inequality (from 0.386 in 1968 to 0.477 in 2011), as depicted in Figure 1 .","During the 2007-2009 recession, the Gini coefficient fell slightly from its previous peak in 2006 of 0.470. Its level since then indicates an income distribution that is much more unequal than in most years since 1968. Researchers who work with the CPS data often calculate an alternative measure of overall inequality (the ratio of income at the 90 th percentile in the distribution to income at the 10 th percentile) because the Gini coefficient does not allow them to ascertain which parts of the income distribution are driving changes in inequality. An increase in the ratio of the median income level (50 th percentile) to the 10 th percentile income level (the 50-10 ratio) suggests that growth in overall inequality (the 90-10 ratio) is due to those near the bottom of the distribution falling further behind the typical household. An increase in the ratio of the 90 th percentile to the median income level (the 90-50 ratio) suggests that growth in overall inequality is due to those near the top of the distribution pulling further ahead of the typical household.","Based on these measures, increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution may have accounted for most of the overall increase in inequality between 1961 and 2002. Looking at just the 1990-2002 period, almost all of the increase in overall inequality appears to be due to an increase in top-half inequality. This pattern of the benefits of economic growth accruing largely to those near the top of the income distribution was estimated to have continued through 2007. The 90-10 ratio may be a poor substitute for estimating overall inequality at a point in time and over time because it is affected by top-coding in the CPS. Top-coding refers to the Census Bureau's long-standing practice of replacing the income reported above a specific level with that income level to ensure confidentiality. For example, if the total money income of a household was $780,000 in 2011, the household's income would have been coded as $250,000 because $250,000 was the threshold income level in that year. Top-coding therefore presents a problem when estimating the extent of inequality in a given year because it constrains the actual distribution of income.","The practice also creates a problem when estimating changes in inequality over time because the top-code thresholds were raised at various times over the years and as a result, the share of households with suppressed incomes has differed over time. These drawbacks to using CPS data, in combination with anecdotal evidence that since the 1990s those in the top 10% have pulled further away from other households, prompted economists to turn to other data sources that better capture those with high incomes. Piketty and Saez developed a time series from the early years of the 20 th century forward based primarily on federal income tax returns to study changes in market income among tax units at the very top of the income distribution. They estimated that between 40% and 45% of total income accrued to the top 10% of the distribution between the two World Wars before falling to about 30% during World War II. The top decile's share remained at 31%-32% until the 1970s when it began trending upward. The top decile's share again exceeded 40% by the mid-1990s and has been at all-time highs in recent years.","In 2010, the latest year for which an estimate is available, the top 10% accounted for over 46% of aggregate market income. Piketty and Saez attribute most of the changes in the top decile's share over time to fluctuations in the top 1% of the distribution. They estimated that before World War I the top 1% accounted for about 18% of total market income. Its share peaked at almost 24% in the late 1920s, fell to about 8% from the late 1950s to the 1970s, and then turned upward. The top 1% was estimated to have accounted for over 17% of total market income in 2010, about equal to its pre-World War I share. Like the CPS, tax returns have limitations for analyzing income inequality (e.g., time-shifting income through use of deferred compensation, such as stock options, and reporting income as earnings or business profits depending on their tax treatment in a given year). Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins et al. attempted to reconcile the smaller increases in money income inequality starting in the 1990s that are estimated by studies based on public-use CPS data with the larger increases in market income inequality of studies based on tax","data.","Using internal Census Bureau data (which is less subject to top-coding than is public-use data) to estimate income shares of those in the 90 th -95 th percentile, the 95 th -99 th percentile, and the top 1%, they found that inequality trends during most of the 1967-2006 period were quite similar to those of studies that used tax data once comparable definitions of income and income-receiving units were employed. Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon more recently estimated that if after-tax, after-transfer income adjusted for household size is analyzed rather than before-tax, before-transfer income of tax units income inequality in the United States increased [between 1979 and 2007] not because the rich got richer, the poor got poorer and the middle class stagnated, but because the rich got richer at a faster rate than the middle and poorer quintiles and this mainly occurred in the 1980s. [Absolute as opposed to relative income] growth was substantial in all quintiles once the influence of government tax and transfer policy as well as the shift in compensation from wages to health insurance provided by employers and the shift to increased in-kind health insurance by government is more fully recognized.","A Congressional Budget Office report also examined after-tax, after-transfer size-adjusted household income over the 1979-2007 period. It too estimated that absolute levels of inflation-adjusted average household income increased across the distribution, but because the rate of increase was much greater among the highest income households, inequality increased after 1979. For example, the top 1% of households saw their average real income rise by 275% from 1979 to 2007; the middle three quintiles experienced a 37% increase; and the bottom fifth recorded an 18% gain. Consequently, in 2007, the share of income after taxes and transfers of the top 20% of size-adjusted households was greater than the combined share of the other 80% of households (58% and 47%, respectively). Two explanations are most commonly offered for the trend toward greater inequality in the distribution of labor income in the United States. One has to do with globalization, that is, the increased integration of countries' economies. The second relates to the nature of recent technological advances. Reduced trade restrictions and increased worldwide flows of goods and services have arguably made less skilled U.S. workers in particular more vulnerable to direct competition from less skilled workers abroad.","In theory, the shift overseas in production of goods and services that predominantly use less-skilled workers has reduced demand in the United States for these workers, thereby putting downward pressure on their wages and further widening the existing wage gap between lower and higher skilled U.S. workers. Economists generally have not agreed about globalization being a major contributor to increasing income inequality because little compelling empirical evidence supports the theory. Analyses of globalization's employment effect to date have tended to find it too small to explain the magnitude of the earnings gap. Other studies have estimated that many jobs possess characteristics which make them susceptible to being offshored and that they are not limited to low-skilled jobs. As it is technological advances (e.g., high-speed telecommunication) that have made these jobs (e.g., call center workers) vulnerable to offshore outsourcing, some have suggested that globalization cannot be separated from the technological change argument (discussed below). Economists generally have found technological change to be the most persuasive explanation for increased inequality at the top of the earnings distribution. Frequently cited evidence underlying this explanation is the comparatively rapid growth in the wage premium paid to more highly skilled (productive)","workers since 1979.","The increase in the \"skill premium\" coincided with substantial growth in the percentage of the labor force with a college education. This suggests that the growth in their supply did not keep pace with the increase in employer demand for highly skilled workers. The increased premium paid to high-skilled workers is commonly ascribed to the nature of technological change in recent decades. Put another way, the kinds of technological advances that have occurred since the late 1970s have been biased in favor of those jobs that require higher levels of education and training. Technological progress seemingly has affected the earnings distribution in two ways. First, information technology (IT) serves as a substitute for low-skilled workers, which has reduced demand for and the relative wages of these workers. Second, IT serves as a complement to high-skilled workers, which has raised demand for and the relative wages of these workers. Autor, Katz, and Kearney have refined this explanation.","They hypothesize that computerization of tasks has polarized the labor market by increasing employer demand for those high-skilled workers who perform non-routine cognitive tasks (e.g., engineers and lawyers); keeping demand stable for those low-skilled workers who perform non-routine manual tasks (e.g., truck drivers and home health care aides); and decreasing demand for the many medium-skilled workers who perform routine tasks (e.g., administrative support and factory workers). They estimated that this pattern of job growth has produced substantial earnings gains among workers in the top quartile (25%) of the distribution. Workers in the bottom quartile were found to have experienced slower gains than workers in the top quartile. Nonetheless, wage growth of the bottom quartile appears to have exceeded that of workers in the middle of the earnings distribution. Two less often mentioned explanations for the increase in U.S. income inequality are the declining role of labor unions and labor standards in wage-setting and the changing demographics of the population.","Some analysts have offered evidence of inconsistencies in the data that do not support the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) explanation and have argued that changes over time in economic institutions and social norms have played a part as well (e.g., the value of the federal minimum wage and the bargaining power of labor unions). Others have examined changes over time in the U.S. age structure, racial and ethnic composition, and household living arrangements (e.g., away from married-couple families and toward single adult households). Cross-country comparisons of income distributions provide another perspective on the extent of inequality in the United States. Measures of income differ from one country to the next. For this reason, researchers typically use data made more comparable by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) project or by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Researchers who analyzed LIS data from the mid-1970s to 2000 agree that the comparatively high level of inequality in the United States has been in place for quite some time and that the United States was among those countries that experienced the largest increases in inequality over the 25-year period.","They found the most equal distributions of disposable household income over the lengthy period were in Scandinavia, Central Europe and Southern Europe, while most English-speaking countries consistently had the highest levels of inequality. Between the mid-1970s and 2000, Sweden, Finland, and Norway appear to have experienced the smallest increases in inequality, whereas the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy seemingly experienced the largest increases. The United States also was estimated to have had the most persistent increase in inequality from the mid-1970s to 2000, whereas the rate at which inequality increased in other industrialized nations generally slowed in the later years of the period. LIS income distribution measures for the mid-2000s for several industrialized nations are presented in Table 2 .The countries are listed in order from lowest Gini coefficient (most equal distribution) to highest (most unequal distribution). According to this measure, the United States ranked among the industrialized countries with the most unequal distributions of disposable (after-tax after cash transfers) household income in the mid-2000s. The comparatively high degree of income inequality in the United States is evident from the 90-10 and 90-50 ratios as well.","As indicated by the 90-10 ratio, those at the top of the U.S. income distribution had more than five times the income of those near the bottom. Those at the top of the U.S. distribution also had about twice the income of the typical household, as indicated by the 90-50 ratio. With virtually no change between the mid and late 2000s in the ranking of countries by extent of inequality in disposable household income, the United States was again among the nations with the most unequal distributions (see Gini coefficients in Table 2 and Table 3 ). U.S. income inequality in the late 2000s surpassed the average for the 20 founding member countries of the OECD (see Table 3 ). Disposable household income inequality in the developed countries of the OECD, including those listed in Table 3 , has generally trended upward since the mid-1980s. While inequality in the United States increased by slightly more than the OECD20 average during the mid-1980s to mid-1990s period, the increase in U.S. inequality was considerably greater relative to the OECD average from the mid-1990s to late 2000s (see the last columns of Table 3 ).","Reasons commonly offered for international differences in income inequality fall into three categories. First, many other countries devote a much larger share of their national output (gross domestic product, GDP) to income transfers, which have an equalizing effect on the distribution of income. Second, taxes in these countries vary with respect to progressivity, and thus have different effects on the distribution of after-tax income. Third, equality in the distribution of earnings, which make up the majority of household income, varies substantially from one country to another. Smeeding estimated a strong correlation between the income share of those at the low end of the distribution and the share of GDP accounted for by transfer payments. His analysis suggests that given the amount of money transferred to households in the United States and the United Kingdom, those at the low end of their respective income distributions do not benefit as much from transfers as low-income households in other countries. From this Smeeding concluded that transfer payments are not as well targeted at low-income households in the United States as they are in many other nations.","The OECD estimated that public cash transfers and household taxes (i.e., income tax payments and social security contributions) substantially reduce inequality between market income and disposable income. These government policies were found to have lowered income inequality by one-fourth on average in the mid-2000s. The redistributive effect of public cash transfers and household taxes was smaller than average in the United States. While transfer payments were found to have reduced inequality by twice as much as taxes on average in OECD countries, the opposite was true in the United States; that is, income tax payments and social security contributions were more responsible than government cash transfers for reducing inequality in the United States. This pattern was confirmed in a study of 36 developed and developing countries that are in the LIS database. Wang and Caminada estimated that \"taxes are important in equalizing incomes\" in only four countries: the United States, Canada, Israel, and Guatemala. Whereas they found that, compared with the other countries analyzed, social transfers make up a low percentage of the U.S.","budget and are not as well targeted at those at the bottom of the income distribution; the researchers suggest that the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) \"makes the US tax system rather progressive.\" Others note that in the United States the relative contributions of transfers and taxes to reducing income inequality changed over time, with cash assistance to those at the bottom of the distribution reduced after passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (popularly known as welfare reform), while the value of the EITC increased greatly. It nonetheless appears that changes in the federal tax system through 2006 (including the EITC and the refundable child tax credit) little affected the rising trend in U.S. household income inequality. When in-kind benefits (e.g., health insurance, education, child and elder care) and indirect taxes (e.g., sales, value-added and property) are taken into account, cross-country differences in inequality at the low end of the distribution are reduced. This again points to the importance of the definition of income when estimating inequality.","Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding estimated that in the United States cash transfers to those at the bottom of the income distribution are comparatively small while in-kind benefits are substantial. Differences between countries' labor market institutions and policies appear to affect the shape of the earnings distribution, particularly for those in the bottom half. It has been suggested that the more centralized or coordinated process of wage-setting in several countries (e.g., Germany) helps to explain the wage compression toward the bottom of their earnings distributions compared with that of the United States. This may be due, in part, to higher private sector unionization rates in some other industrialized countries and a larger share of their workers being affected by union agreements whether or not they are union members. The decrease in union density in the United States and United Kingdom between 1973 and 1998 may have accounted for 3% of the increase in male wage inequality in the United States and 5% in the United Kingdom, for example. Comparatively greater union bargaining power (or higher minimum wages) also may have caused firms in other countries to pay low skilled workers wage rates above their contribution to output.","This, in turn, may have prompted these foreign companies to adopt technologies that raised the productivity of their less skilled employees rather than adopt technologies biased in favor of high skilled workers as has occurred in the United States. To the extent that greater equality in the distribution of income results from policy decisions about taxes and transfers, for example, and not from market forces, that equality may have been achieved at some cost (e.g., slower economic growth). Assuming the costs are recognized, the willingness to incur them may reflect varying degrees of concern across countries about income inequality. The results of a study that compared the relationship between individuals' perceptions of their well-being and the extent of inequality in the United States and Europe suggest that inequality in the distribution of income is less important to people in the United States due to Americans believing that they live in a comparatively mobile society. That is to say, Americans may be less concerned about inequality in the distribution of income at any given point in time partly because of a belief that everyone has an equal opportunity to move up the income ladder.","A review of the literature suggests that Americans' perceptions about their likelihood of changing position in the income distribution may be exaggerated. Intergenerational elasticity (IGE) measures how persistent position in the income distribution is from one generation to the next. IGE is a single number that indicates the extent to which parents' position in the income distribution explains their adult children's relative income. The lower the elasticity, the less likely inequality is to be perpetuated from one generation to the next; that is, the more mobile the society. Empirical analyses have estimated a strong positive relationship—about 0.5—between parent and adult child income in the United States. An IGE of 0.5 suggests that if the income of a child's parents was 30% higher than the average income of families in the parents' generation, then the child's income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation. In other words, in the United States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage of growing up in a (low) high income family may be inherited.","It is difficult to precisely answer the question of whether the importance of parents' relative income to adult children's relative income changed over the period that inequality has been increasing in the United States. This is partly the case because few sources cover multiple generations of adults for which data are available on family income at the time they were children. As described more fully below, empirical analyses suggest that children born into low-income families have not become more likely and may have become less likely to surpass their parents' position at the bottom of the income distribution. Put differently, mobility in the United States does not appear to have offset the increase in cross-sectional inequality in recent decades. Lee and Solon used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for children born between 1952 and 1975 who reached age 25 between 1977 and 2000 to estimate IGEs. They found no major change during the two decades in the influence of parent income on adult sons' incomes. The IGE in each year was estimated to be within 0.1 percentage point of the 0.44 average over the 1980s and 1990s.","Hertz, who also relied on the PSID but used a variety of estimation methods, similarly found no substantial change in mobility among cohorts of male and female children born between 1952 and 1975 when observed as adults starting in the late 1970s. Levine and Mazumder used an entirely different methodology than the aforementioned economists whose research also was based on longitudinal data. Levine and Mazumder examined the incomes of brothers from two cohorts in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). The older group was composed of brothers who entered the labor market during the 1970s; the younger group, brothers who entered the labor market between the early 1980s and mid-1990s. They estimated that family background, as represented by correlations between sibling incomes, was more important to the economic outcomes of the younger cohort (which entered the workforce after 1980). Specifically, the correlation between brothers' incomes doubled from 0.21 for the older group to 0.42 for the younger group. From this marked increase in the correlation, Levine and Mazumder infer that intergenerational mobility decreased substantially at some point between 1983 and 1995.","Aaronson and Mazumder took yet another approach because they used decennial census data which, although it allowed them to cover a longer period, does not follow the same individuals over time as do the PSID and NLS. They estimated that movement between generations from one part of the income distribution to another increased over the 1940-1980 period. Intergenerational mobility then decreased substantially during the 1980s and appears to have remained unchanged during the 1990s. This pattern suggests that the opportunity for children in the United States to attain incomes that exceed their parents' relative incomes was lower after 1980 compared to the preceding four decades. In a more recent article, Mazumder concluded that his research with Aaronson \"and the studies using the PSID are in broad agreement that intergenerational mobility has been roughly flat since 1990.\" Analysts have developed estimates of intergenerational mobility that use differing statistical approaches and are based on the longitudinal surveys and administrative records available in each country. The cross-country estimates usually are derived from earnings of fathers and their adult sons because data on daughters and other sources of income are more limited in countries other than the United States.","Although the rank of the United States differs somewhat from one study to the next, as discussed below, the United States typically is found to be among the least mobile of the advanced economies. Corak reviewed numerous studies that offered differing estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence for each of several advanced economies. Based on his assessment of the preferred IGE for the nations in the meta-analysis, Corak concluded that the United Kingdom, the United States, and France are the least mobile. In these countries, about 41% (France) to 50% (United Kingdom) of the economic advantage high-earning young men have over lower earners may be due to their coming from more affluent families. In the cases of Canada, Finland, Norway, and Denmark, the effect of fathers' on adult sons' relative earnings was found to be lower (about 20% or less). With IGEs of about 30%, mobility in Germany and Sweden falls between these two groups. Studies of intergenerational economic mobility in southern European countries have less often been undertaken due partly to a paucity of long panels that enable comparison of the income of fathers and their adult children.","In a recent study that was designed to overcome data limitations, Cervini-Pia estimated an income elasticity of 0.40 for sons and about the same for daughters in Spain—making it less mobile than many of the advanced economies discussed above but more mobile than the United States (which in Corak's review had a preferred IGE of 0.47). Piraino estimated an intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.435 and an income elasticity of 0.554 for Italy, \"which indicates that about one-half of the economic advantage of Italian fathers is passed on to their sons.\" Mocetti developed higher elasticities for Italy than Piranio, at about 0.50 for earnings and 0.61 for income. Both sets of estimates for Italy suggest that it is less economically mobile than the United States. Jantti et al. developed intergenerational samples for six countries from which they derived estimates of intergenerational mobility at different points in the joint distribution of father and son earnings. The estimation of transition matrices allowed them to compare mobility rates from one quintile to another in the distribution.","The researchers found that the United States has less upward mobility from the bottom quintile and more low-income persistence than the United Kingdom and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) included in their analysis. More specifically, between 20% and 30% of children whose fathers were in the bottom fifth of the earnings distributions remained at the bottom as adults, but for the United States, about 40% of children stayed in the bottom fifth. The authors suggest that, despite these results, Americans have been able to maintain the perception of living in a mobile society because transition rates of the middle three quintiles are similar in the United States and other advanced economies. \"In the U.S., such middle class moves are associated with fairly substantial changes in real living standards (i.e., measured in actual dollars earned) ... [that] are experienced or witnessed by a substantial fraction of the U.S. population.\" A recent study by the Pew Economic Mobility Project (EMP) lends support to Jantti et al.'s estimate of low upward mobility from the bottom fifth of the U.S. income distribution. The analysis found that 43% of children whose parents were in the bottom quintile remained in","the bottom as adults.","The EMP also estimated that children raised by parents in the top quintile tended to be in the top quintile as adults (40%). In contrast, children raised by parents in the three middle quintiles (the middle class) experienced much higher rates of mobility: only 25% of children born to parents in the second fifth were in the same place as adults; only 14% of children whose parents were in the middle fifth stayed in the middle fifth as adults; and only 9% of children raised by parents in the fourth quintile were in the same relative position as adults. Much the same results are evident when it comes to intragenerational mobility in the United States. The likelihood of adults moving from their initial positions in the income distribution has decreased or been unchanged in recent decades, according to available empirical analyses. Bradbury used data from the PSID to analyze family income mobility for working-age married couples over the 1969-2006 period. The various measures of mobility she developed indicate that family income mobility declined between 1969 and 2006, and particularly since the 1980s.","Families, whether they started at the bottom or top of the income distribution, became increasingly less likely to move up or down the income ladder during their working lives. Bradbury concluded that \"family income mobility has been insufficient to stem increases in inequality of long-term income.\" Acs and Zimmerman used PSID data to determine the trend in income mobility among 25-44-year olds between 1989 and 2004. They estimated that intragenerational mobility among young adults has been stable since the 1980s. For example, slightly over one-half of 25-44-year olds were in the lowest quintile of the income distribution in both the 1984-1994 and 1994-2004 periods. About one-fourth of those in the bottom quintile moved up to the second quintile in the 1984-1994 period, the same share also moved up in the following 10-year period. Similarly, in both 1984-1994 and 1994-2004, about 10% of those in the bottom quintile were able to move into the middle quintile of the income distribution; 7%, to the fourth quintile; and 4%, to the top quintile.","Mobility rates from the higher quintiles into the bottom quintile also were little changed over time: 20%-22% of those in the second quintile were downwardly mobile in the 1984-1994 and 1994-2004 periods, whereas 11%-15% of those in the middle quintile fell to the bottom quintile; 6%-7% from the fourth quintile dropped to the bottom as did 3%-4% from the top quintile. These patterns led Acs and Zimmerman to conclude that \"in the context of rising income inequality, stable mobility rates suggest that the distribution of lifetime income must be growing unequal. That is, lifetime or long-term economic inequality is rising.\" Auten and Gee used panel data from income tax returns to examine mobility over the past two decades among tax units aged 25 and older. They similarly found that mobility was about the same in most income quintiles between the 1987-1996 and 1996-2005 periods. Auten and Gee also estimated a slight decrease in overall mobility, with 58.3% of individuals changing quintiles in 1987-1996 compared with 57.5% in 1996-2005. They found that the entire difference resulted from less downward mobility out of the top 20%. Diaz-Gimenez et al.","used PSID data to analyze household income mobility between the 1989-1994 (five-year) and 2001-2007 (six-year) periods. They estimated that income mobility was little changed, but the six-year span of the more recent period suggested a decrease in mobility. Diaz-Gimenez et al. also found less income mobility among households at the bottom and top of the income distribution compared with households in the middle three quintiles. As suggested above by Jantti with regard to cross-country intergenerational mobility, the comparatively high intragenerational mobility of a majority of U.S. households (the middle 60%) may partly account for the seeming misperception among Americans that the United States is a very mobile society. Burkhauser and Couch reviewed the limited literature on intragenerational mobility in the United States and several other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden). Their meta-analysis led them to conclude that there does not appear to be a clear relationship between the extent of income inequality and intragenerational income mobility. In addition, most of the studies found that the majority of cross-sectional (short-term) inequality appears to persist over time. Measures of income dispersion show a distribution of income across U.S.","households that has become comparatively more unequal over time as high-income U.S. households have benefitted disproportionately from economic growth and that is less equal compared with distributions in many other developed countries. It also appears that going from rags to riches is relatively rare; that is, where one starts in the U.S. income distribution greatly influences where one ends up."],"string":"[\n \"The historically slow pace of recovery in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the renewed interest among some members of the public policy community in the long-term trend of growing inequality in the distribution of income. In other words, the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) began accruing unequally across U.S. households long before the late 2000s. Inequality is the label commonly applied to income distributions in which a group's share of total income is larger (smaller) than its share of the population (e.g., the top 20% of U.S. households accounted for slightly more than 50% of aggregate household income in 2011, as shown in Table 1 .) Economic theory provides little basis for preferring any particular degree of equality in the distribution of income. In theory, what matters with respect to labor income is that the distribution results from markets that operate efficiently; that is, markets in which the final demand for goods and services and the relative productivity of the firms producing those goods and services determine the demand for labor and the earnings of jobs in each sector of the economy.\",\n \"Theoretical arguments for a more equal distribution of income than that which results from market forces are based on a number of propositions, including the diminishing marginal utility of income. This refers to the idea that each additional dollar of income yields less and less satisfaction (utility) than the first. For example, one additional dollar of income adds less to the utility of someone earning $100,000 than to the satisfaction of someone earning $20,000. If this proposition is correct, it should be possible to increase the overall economic well-being of society by transferring money from those with high incomes to those with low incomes because the loss in utility will be less for high-income individuals than the gain for low-income individuals. However, the costs commonly associated with income redistribution (e.g., slower economic growth) may offset some and possibly all of any net gain in well-being. With varying perceptions about a trade-off between economic growth and income equality, members of the U.S. public policy community have long debated how best to improve the economic well-being of the population.\",\n \"This disagreement appears to underlie longstanding congressional deliberations about several policy issues, such as the progressivity of income tax rates, tax treatment of capital gains and inheritance, provision of social insurance (e.g., Social Security) as well as social welfare benefits (e.g., food stamps), and raising the federal minimum wage. It also has extended to consideration of initiatives (e.g., grants for early childhood education and college tuition tax expenditures) that arguably promote equality in the opportunity to move up the income ladder, which an increasingly unequal distribution of income may suggest a lack of and which may itself curb the potential productive capacity of the economy. This report presents recent analysis of the distribution of income and the extent of income mobility in the United States over time and in comparison with other advanced economies. It begins with a discussion of data issues related to measuring income and its distribution. The empirical literature on the development of and explanations for income inequality in the United States are next addressed. The report then compares the U.S. income distribution with the distributions of other industrialized countries and presents explanations for cross-country differences in measures of income dispersion.\",\n \"To the degree that a more equal distribution of income arises from policy decisions rather than market forces, the willingness of a country to incur any economic costs related to attaining greater equality may reflect varying national beliefs about the opportunity to ascend the income ladder. For that reason, the report closes with an examination of income mobility in the United States and other developed nations. Two common sources of income data are the Annual Social and Economic supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and federal income tax returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The U.S. Census Bureau, which conducts the CPS, calculates \\\"money income.\\\" It is the nation's official measure of income. Money income includes wages and salaries, interest, dividends, rent, payments from pensions and retirement savings accounts, and nonmeans-tested cash income (e.g., Social Security, unemployment compensation, and veterans' payments). Calculated on a pre-tax basis, money income does not include the value of noncash government benefits (e.g., food stamps and housing subsidies) and capital gains. \\\"Market income\\\" is the measure of income derived from federal tax data made available by the IRS.\",\n \"Perhaps most prominent among the researchers who use tax data to study the distribution of income are Saez and Piketty. They define pre-tax market income to include all income reported on individual tax returns including wages and salaries, business and farm income, and capital income (e.g., dividends, interest, and rents). The primary differences between money and market income thus defined is that market income excludes cash government benefits and includes realized capital gains. With respect to the distribution of overall economic well-being, measures based on the concepts of money and market income fall short and may be misleading. Consider the case of two families who in every way are equal in terms of wealth and income. Neither owns their home, and they both have substantial savings in interest-earning assets. Suppose one family uses a portion of its savings to buy a home. No one would argue that the family is now worse off, but income measures indicate that to be the case because the family's interest income would have fallen.\",\n \"In fact, the family that buys its home is earning an implicit income in the use of the house just as it would earn rental income if the house were leased to others. Another weakness in existing income measures as a reflection of overall economic well-being is that they do not account for the implicit income of homemakers. Consider two married-couple households with the same income and both spouses receive wages from their employers. If in one of the households a spouse quits to stay at home and care for their children that household will experience a drop in measured income. Because the unpaid work done at home is not without value, the measured difference in the incomes of the two households will overstate the difference in their living standards. The time period in which income is measured may also affect comparisons in well-being across households. Over the course of the business cycle unemployment rises and falls, affecting labor income. Some households tend to be more adversely affected than others by recessions, so the stage of the business cycle has an influence on relative income. Similarly, income generally varies substantially over the course of an individual's\",\n \"lifetime.\",\n \"New entrants to the labor force typically have lower incomes than those who have been working for some time, and income tends to decrease upon retirement. Because of these life-cycle changes in income, the age mix of the population also influences the relative incomes of households. Another difficulty in comparing income across households is deciding on the relevant population. In the case of labor income, the distribution of income among working-age individuals (e.g., 25-64-year olds) may be of most interest. When it comes to overall well-being, it may be more appropriate to consider the distribution of income across households. Because most households can be presumed to pool resources and because some costs of living are fixed, a four-person household may not need twice as much income as a married-couple household for each person to enjoy roughly the same living standard. The ability to achieve economies of scale thus further complicates using the distribution of income across households or tax filing units as a basis for judging economic well-being. The Census Bureau annually publishes a variety of measures that describe the distribution of money income.\",\n \"One measure divides total money income into quintiles (fifths), with households ordered from lowest to highest income and then divided into five groups of equal size. The income within each group is summed, and its share (percentage) of total household income is calculated. If aggregate income was equally divided across households with income, each quintile would account for 20% of total money income. To the extent that each quintile falls short of or exceeds its proportionate (20%) share, it indicates the degree of inequality in the income distribution. As shown in the last row of Table 1 , the bottom fifth of households in 2011 accounted for much less than the one-fifth of total income it would have gotten if the distribution were perfectly equal. The top 20%, in contrast, accounted for more than twice what it would have gotten in an equal distribution. The top 5%, which is within the top fifth, accounted for more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution. The data thus indicate that income was quite unequally distributed across U.S. households in 2011, and that this has been the case for quite some time.\",\n \"Households at various points in the distribution also have fared differently from each other over the past few decades. Between 1968 and 2011, the income share of the three middle quintiles fell from 53.2% to 45.7% (see Table 1 ). Although there is no official definition of the middle class, the middle 60% of households is sometimes regarded as such. As for the bottom 20% of households, its income share has stagnated at less than 4.0% since about 1990. In contrast, the income shares of the top fifth and the top 5% of households generally have risen from year to year. The top 20%'s share grew from 42.6% in 1968 to 51.1% in 2011, and the top 5%'s share grew from 16.3% to 22.3%. Another indicator of the degree of inequality is the Gini coefficient. It is a single number that can range between zero (a perfectly equal distribution) and one (a perfectly unequal distribution). The historical trend in the United States is one of almost steadily increasing income inequality (from 0.386 in 1968 to 0.477 in 2011), as depicted in Figure 1 .\",\n \"During the 2007-2009 recession, the Gini coefficient fell slightly from its previous peak in 2006 of 0.470. Its level since then indicates an income distribution that is much more unequal than in most years since 1968. Researchers who work with the CPS data often calculate an alternative measure of overall inequality (the ratio of income at the 90 th percentile in the distribution to income at the 10 th percentile) because the Gini coefficient does not allow them to ascertain which parts of the income distribution are driving changes in inequality. An increase in the ratio of the median income level (50 th percentile) to the 10 th percentile income level (the 50-10 ratio) suggests that growth in overall inequality (the 90-10 ratio) is due to those near the bottom of the distribution falling further behind the typical household. An increase in the ratio of the 90 th percentile to the median income level (the 90-50 ratio) suggests that growth in overall inequality is due to those near the top of the distribution pulling further ahead of the typical household.\",\n \"Based on these measures, increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution may have accounted for most of the overall increase in inequality between 1961 and 2002. Looking at just the 1990-2002 period, almost all of the increase in overall inequality appears to be due to an increase in top-half inequality. This pattern of the benefits of economic growth accruing largely to those near the top of the income distribution was estimated to have continued through 2007. The 90-10 ratio may be a poor substitute for estimating overall inequality at a point in time and over time because it is affected by top-coding in the CPS. Top-coding refers to the Census Bureau's long-standing practice of replacing the income reported above a specific level with that income level to ensure confidentiality. For example, if the total money income of a household was $780,000 in 2011, the household's income would have been coded as $250,000 because $250,000 was the threshold income level in that year. Top-coding therefore presents a problem when estimating the extent of inequality in a given year because it constrains the actual distribution of income.\",\n \"The practice also creates a problem when estimating changes in inequality over time because the top-code thresholds were raised at various times over the years and as a result, the share of households with suppressed incomes has differed over time. These drawbacks to using CPS data, in combination with anecdotal evidence that since the 1990s those in the top 10% have pulled further away from other households, prompted economists to turn to other data sources that better capture those with high incomes. Piketty and Saez developed a time series from the early years of the 20 th century forward based primarily on federal income tax returns to study changes in market income among tax units at the very top of the income distribution. They estimated that between 40% and 45% of total income accrued to the top 10% of the distribution between the two World Wars before falling to about 30% during World War II. The top decile's share remained at 31%-32% until the 1970s when it began trending upward. The top decile's share again exceeded 40% by the mid-1990s and has been at all-time highs in recent years.\",\n \"In 2010, the latest year for which an estimate is available, the top 10% accounted for over 46% of aggregate market income. Piketty and Saez attribute most of the changes in the top decile's share over time to fluctuations in the top 1% of the distribution. They estimated that before World War I the top 1% accounted for about 18% of total market income. Its share peaked at almost 24% in the late 1920s, fell to about 8% from the late 1950s to the 1970s, and then turned upward. The top 1% was estimated to have accounted for over 17% of total market income in 2010, about equal to its pre-World War I share. Like the CPS, tax returns have limitations for analyzing income inequality (e.g., time-shifting income through use of deferred compensation, such as stock options, and reporting income as earnings or business profits depending on their tax treatment in a given year). Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins et al. attempted to reconcile the smaller increases in money income inequality starting in the 1990s that are estimated by studies based on public-use CPS data with the larger increases in market income inequality of studies based on tax\",\n \"data.\",\n \"Using internal Census Bureau data (which is less subject to top-coding than is public-use data) to estimate income shares of those in the 90 th -95 th percentile, the 95 th -99 th percentile, and the top 1%, they found that inequality trends during most of the 1967-2006 period were quite similar to those of studies that used tax data once comparable definitions of income and income-receiving units were employed. Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon more recently estimated that if after-tax, after-transfer income adjusted for household size is analyzed rather than before-tax, before-transfer income of tax units income inequality in the United States increased [between 1979 and 2007] not because the rich got richer, the poor got poorer and the middle class stagnated, but because the rich got richer at a faster rate than the middle and poorer quintiles and this mainly occurred in the 1980s. [Absolute as opposed to relative income] growth was substantial in all quintiles once the influence of government tax and transfer policy as well as the shift in compensation from wages to health insurance provided by employers and the shift to increased in-kind health insurance by government is more fully recognized.\",\n \"A Congressional Budget Office report also examined after-tax, after-transfer size-adjusted household income over the 1979-2007 period. It too estimated that absolute levels of inflation-adjusted average household income increased across the distribution, but because the rate of increase was much greater among the highest income households, inequality increased after 1979. For example, the top 1% of households saw their average real income rise by 275% from 1979 to 2007; the middle three quintiles experienced a 37% increase; and the bottom fifth recorded an 18% gain. Consequently, in 2007, the share of income after taxes and transfers of the top 20% of size-adjusted households was greater than the combined share of the other 80% of households (58% and 47%, respectively). Two explanations are most commonly offered for the trend toward greater inequality in the distribution of labor income in the United States. One has to do with globalization, that is, the increased integration of countries' economies. The second relates to the nature of recent technological advances. Reduced trade restrictions and increased worldwide flows of goods and services have arguably made less skilled U.S. workers in particular more vulnerable to direct competition from less skilled workers abroad.\",\n \"In theory, the shift overseas in production of goods and services that predominantly use less-skilled workers has reduced demand in the United States for these workers, thereby putting downward pressure on their wages and further widening the existing wage gap between lower and higher skilled U.S. workers. Economists generally have not agreed about globalization being a major contributor to increasing income inequality because little compelling empirical evidence supports the theory. Analyses of globalization's employment effect to date have tended to find it too small to explain the magnitude of the earnings gap. Other studies have estimated that many jobs possess characteristics which make them susceptible to being offshored and that they are not limited to low-skilled jobs. As it is technological advances (e.g., high-speed telecommunication) that have made these jobs (e.g., call center workers) vulnerable to offshore outsourcing, some have suggested that globalization cannot be separated from the technological change argument (discussed below). Economists generally have found technological change to be the most persuasive explanation for increased inequality at the top of the earnings distribution. Frequently cited evidence underlying this explanation is the comparatively rapid growth in the wage premium paid to more highly skilled (productive)\",\n \"workers since 1979.\",\n \"The increase in the \\\"skill premium\\\" coincided with substantial growth in the percentage of the labor force with a college education. This suggests that the growth in their supply did not keep pace with the increase in employer demand for highly skilled workers. The increased premium paid to high-skilled workers is commonly ascribed to the nature of technological change in recent decades. Put another way, the kinds of technological advances that have occurred since the late 1970s have been biased in favor of those jobs that require higher levels of education and training. Technological progress seemingly has affected the earnings distribution in two ways. First, information technology (IT) serves as a substitute for low-skilled workers, which has reduced demand for and the relative wages of these workers. Second, IT serves as a complement to high-skilled workers, which has raised demand for and the relative wages of these workers. Autor, Katz, and Kearney have refined this explanation.\",\n \"They hypothesize that computerization of tasks has polarized the labor market by increasing employer demand for those high-skilled workers who perform non-routine cognitive tasks (e.g., engineers and lawyers); keeping demand stable for those low-skilled workers who perform non-routine manual tasks (e.g., truck drivers and home health care aides); and decreasing demand for the many medium-skilled workers who perform routine tasks (e.g., administrative support and factory workers). They estimated that this pattern of job growth has produced substantial earnings gains among workers in the top quartile (25%) of the distribution. Workers in the bottom quartile were found to have experienced slower gains than workers in the top quartile. Nonetheless, wage growth of the bottom quartile appears to have exceeded that of workers in the middle of the earnings distribution. Two less often mentioned explanations for the increase in U.S. income inequality are the declining role of labor unions and labor standards in wage-setting and the changing demographics of the population.\",\n \"Some analysts have offered evidence of inconsistencies in the data that do not support the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) explanation and have argued that changes over time in economic institutions and social norms have played a part as well (e.g., the value of the federal minimum wage and the bargaining power of labor unions). Others have examined changes over time in the U.S. age structure, racial and ethnic composition, and household living arrangements (e.g., away from married-couple families and toward single adult households). Cross-country comparisons of income distributions provide another perspective on the extent of inequality in the United States. Measures of income differ from one country to the next. For this reason, researchers typically use data made more comparable by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) project or by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Researchers who analyzed LIS data from the mid-1970s to 2000 agree that the comparatively high level of inequality in the United States has been in place for quite some time and that the United States was among those countries that experienced the largest increases in inequality over the 25-year period.\",\n \"They found the most equal distributions of disposable household income over the lengthy period were in Scandinavia, Central Europe and Southern Europe, while most English-speaking countries consistently had the highest levels of inequality. Between the mid-1970s and 2000, Sweden, Finland, and Norway appear to have experienced the smallest increases in inequality, whereas the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy seemingly experienced the largest increases. The United States also was estimated to have had the most persistent increase in inequality from the mid-1970s to 2000, whereas the rate at which inequality increased in other industrialized nations generally slowed in the later years of the period. LIS income distribution measures for the mid-2000s for several industrialized nations are presented in Table 2 .The countries are listed in order from lowest Gini coefficient (most equal distribution) to highest (most unequal distribution). According to this measure, the United States ranked among the industrialized countries with the most unequal distributions of disposable (after-tax after cash transfers) household income in the mid-2000s. The comparatively high degree of income inequality in the United States is evident from the 90-10 and 90-50 ratios as well.\",\n \"As indicated by the 90-10 ratio, those at the top of the U.S. income distribution had more than five times the income of those near the bottom. Those at the top of the U.S. distribution also had about twice the income of the typical household, as indicated by the 90-50 ratio. With virtually no change between the mid and late 2000s in the ranking of countries by extent of inequality in disposable household income, the United States was again among the nations with the most unequal distributions (see Gini coefficients in Table 2 and Table 3 ). U.S. income inequality in the late 2000s surpassed the average for the 20 founding member countries of the OECD (see Table 3 ). Disposable household income inequality in the developed countries of the OECD, including those listed in Table 3 , has generally trended upward since the mid-1980s. While inequality in the United States increased by slightly more than the OECD20 average during the mid-1980s to mid-1990s period, the increase in U.S. inequality was considerably greater relative to the OECD average from the mid-1990s to late 2000s (see the last columns of Table 3 ).\",\n \"Reasons commonly offered for international differences in income inequality fall into three categories. First, many other countries devote a much larger share of their national output (gross domestic product, GDP) to income transfers, which have an equalizing effect on the distribution of income. Second, taxes in these countries vary with respect to progressivity, and thus have different effects on the distribution of after-tax income. Third, equality in the distribution of earnings, which make up the majority of household income, varies substantially from one country to another. Smeeding estimated a strong correlation between the income share of those at the low end of the distribution and the share of GDP accounted for by transfer payments. His analysis suggests that given the amount of money transferred to households in the United States and the United Kingdom, those at the low end of their respective income distributions do not benefit as much from transfers as low-income households in other countries. From this Smeeding concluded that transfer payments are not as well targeted at low-income households in the United States as they are in many other nations.\",\n \"The OECD estimated that public cash transfers and household taxes (i.e., income tax payments and social security contributions) substantially reduce inequality between market income and disposable income. These government policies were found to have lowered income inequality by one-fourth on average in the mid-2000s. The redistributive effect of public cash transfers and household taxes was smaller than average in the United States. While transfer payments were found to have reduced inequality by twice as much as taxes on average in OECD countries, the opposite was true in the United States; that is, income tax payments and social security contributions were more responsible than government cash transfers for reducing inequality in the United States. This pattern was confirmed in a study of 36 developed and developing countries that are in the LIS database. Wang and Caminada estimated that \\\"taxes are important in equalizing incomes\\\" in only four countries: the United States, Canada, Israel, and Guatemala. Whereas they found that, compared with the other countries analyzed, social transfers make up a low percentage of the U.S.\",\n \"budget and are not as well targeted at those at the bottom of the income distribution; the researchers suggest that the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) \\\"makes the US tax system rather progressive.\\\" Others note that in the United States the relative contributions of transfers and taxes to reducing income inequality changed over time, with cash assistance to those at the bottom of the distribution reduced after passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (popularly known as welfare reform), while the value of the EITC increased greatly. It nonetheless appears that changes in the federal tax system through 2006 (including the EITC and the refundable child tax credit) little affected the rising trend in U.S. household income inequality. When in-kind benefits (e.g., health insurance, education, child and elder care) and indirect taxes (e.g., sales, value-added and property) are taken into account, cross-country differences in inequality at the low end of the distribution are reduced. This again points to the importance of the definition of income when estimating inequality.\",\n \"Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding estimated that in the United States cash transfers to those at the bottom of the income distribution are comparatively small while in-kind benefits are substantial. Differences between countries' labor market institutions and policies appear to affect the shape of the earnings distribution, particularly for those in the bottom half. It has been suggested that the more centralized or coordinated process of wage-setting in several countries (e.g., Germany) helps to explain the wage compression toward the bottom of their earnings distributions compared with that of the United States. This may be due, in part, to higher private sector unionization rates in some other industrialized countries and a larger share of their workers being affected by union agreements whether or not they are union members. The decrease in union density in the United States and United Kingdom between 1973 and 1998 may have accounted for 3% of the increase in male wage inequality in the United States and 5% in the United Kingdom, for example. Comparatively greater union bargaining power (or higher minimum wages) also may have caused firms in other countries to pay low skilled workers wage rates above their contribution to output.\",\n \"This, in turn, may have prompted these foreign companies to adopt technologies that raised the productivity of their less skilled employees rather than adopt technologies biased in favor of high skilled workers as has occurred in the United States. To the extent that greater equality in the distribution of income results from policy decisions about taxes and transfers, for example, and not from market forces, that equality may have been achieved at some cost (e.g., slower economic growth). Assuming the costs are recognized, the willingness to incur them may reflect varying degrees of concern across countries about income inequality. The results of a study that compared the relationship between individuals' perceptions of their well-being and the extent of inequality in the United States and Europe suggest that inequality in the distribution of income is less important to people in the United States due to Americans believing that they live in a comparatively mobile society. That is to say, Americans may be less concerned about inequality in the distribution of income at any given point in time partly because of a belief that everyone has an equal opportunity to move up the income ladder.\",\n \"A review of the literature suggests that Americans' perceptions about their likelihood of changing position in the income distribution may be exaggerated. Intergenerational elasticity (IGE) measures how persistent position in the income distribution is from one generation to the next. IGE is a single number that indicates the extent to which parents' position in the income distribution explains their adult children's relative income. The lower the elasticity, the less likely inequality is to be perpetuated from one generation to the next; that is, the more mobile the society. Empirical analyses have estimated a strong positive relationship—about 0.5—between parent and adult child income in the United States. An IGE of 0.5 suggests that if the income of a child's parents was 30% higher than the average income of families in the parents' generation, then the child's income will be 15% above the average for his/her generation. In other words, in the United States, about 50% of the (dis)advantage of growing up in a (low) high income family may be inherited.\",\n \"It is difficult to precisely answer the question of whether the importance of parents' relative income to adult children's relative income changed over the period that inequality has been increasing in the United States. This is partly the case because few sources cover multiple generations of adults for which data are available on family income at the time they were children. As described more fully below, empirical analyses suggest that children born into low-income families have not become more likely and may have become less likely to surpass their parents' position at the bottom of the income distribution. Put differently, mobility in the United States does not appear to have offset the increase in cross-sectional inequality in recent decades. Lee and Solon used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for children born between 1952 and 1975 who reached age 25 between 1977 and 2000 to estimate IGEs. They found no major change during the two decades in the influence of parent income on adult sons' incomes. The IGE in each year was estimated to be within 0.1 percentage point of the 0.44 average over the 1980s and 1990s.\",\n \"Hertz, who also relied on the PSID but used a variety of estimation methods, similarly found no substantial change in mobility among cohorts of male and female children born between 1952 and 1975 when observed as adults starting in the late 1970s. Levine and Mazumder used an entirely different methodology than the aforementioned economists whose research also was based on longitudinal data. Levine and Mazumder examined the incomes of brothers from two cohorts in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). The older group was composed of brothers who entered the labor market during the 1970s; the younger group, brothers who entered the labor market between the early 1980s and mid-1990s. They estimated that family background, as represented by correlations between sibling incomes, was more important to the economic outcomes of the younger cohort (which entered the workforce after 1980). Specifically, the correlation between brothers' incomes doubled from 0.21 for the older group to 0.42 for the younger group. From this marked increase in the correlation, Levine and Mazumder infer that intergenerational mobility decreased substantially at some point between 1983 and 1995.\",\n \"Aaronson and Mazumder took yet another approach because they used decennial census data which, although it allowed them to cover a longer period, does not follow the same individuals over time as do the PSID and NLS. They estimated that movement between generations from one part of the income distribution to another increased over the 1940-1980 period. Intergenerational mobility then decreased substantially during the 1980s and appears to have remained unchanged during the 1990s. This pattern suggests that the opportunity for children in the United States to attain incomes that exceed their parents' relative incomes was lower after 1980 compared to the preceding four decades. In a more recent article, Mazumder concluded that his research with Aaronson \\\"and the studies using the PSID are in broad agreement that intergenerational mobility has been roughly flat since 1990.\\\" Analysts have developed estimates of intergenerational mobility that use differing statistical approaches and are based on the longitudinal surveys and administrative records available in each country. The cross-country estimates usually are derived from earnings of fathers and their adult sons because data on daughters and other sources of income are more limited in countries other than the United States.\",\n \"Although the rank of the United States differs somewhat from one study to the next, as discussed below, the United States typically is found to be among the least mobile of the advanced economies. Corak reviewed numerous studies that offered differing estimates of intergenerational earnings persistence for each of several advanced economies. Based on his assessment of the preferred IGE for the nations in the meta-analysis, Corak concluded that the United Kingdom, the United States, and France are the least mobile. In these countries, about 41% (France) to 50% (United Kingdom) of the economic advantage high-earning young men have over lower earners may be due to their coming from more affluent families. In the cases of Canada, Finland, Norway, and Denmark, the effect of fathers' on adult sons' relative earnings was found to be lower (about 20% or less). With IGEs of about 30%, mobility in Germany and Sweden falls between these two groups. Studies of intergenerational economic mobility in southern European countries have less often been undertaken due partly to a paucity of long panels that enable comparison of the income of fathers and their adult children.\",\n \"In a recent study that was designed to overcome data limitations, Cervini-Pia estimated an income elasticity of 0.40 for sons and about the same for daughters in Spain—making it less mobile than many of the advanced economies discussed above but more mobile than the United States (which in Corak's review had a preferred IGE of 0.47). Piraino estimated an intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.435 and an income elasticity of 0.554 for Italy, \\\"which indicates that about one-half of the economic advantage of Italian fathers is passed on to their sons.\\\" Mocetti developed higher elasticities for Italy than Piranio, at about 0.50 for earnings and 0.61 for income. Both sets of estimates for Italy suggest that it is less economically mobile than the United States. Jantti et al. developed intergenerational samples for six countries from which they derived estimates of intergenerational mobility at different points in the joint distribution of father and son earnings. The estimation of transition matrices allowed them to compare mobility rates from one quintile to another in the distribution.\",\n \"The researchers found that the United States has less upward mobility from the bottom quintile and more low-income persistence than the United Kingdom and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) included in their analysis. More specifically, between 20% and 30% of children whose fathers were in the bottom fifth of the earnings distributions remained at the bottom as adults, but for the United States, about 40% of children stayed in the bottom fifth. The authors suggest that, despite these results, Americans have been able to maintain the perception of living in a mobile society because transition rates of the middle three quintiles are similar in the United States and other advanced economies. \\\"In the U.S., such middle class moves are associated with fairly substantial changes in real living standards (i.e., measured in actual dollars earned) ... [that] are experienced or witnessed by a substantial fraction of the U.S. population.\\\" A recent study by the Pew Economic Mobility Project (EMP) lends support to Jantti et al.'s estimate of low upward mobility from the bottom fifth of the U.S. income distribution. The analysis found that 43% of children whose parents were in the bottom quintile remained in\",\n \"the bottom as adults.\",\n \"The EMP also estimated that children raised by parents in the top quintile tended to be in the top quintile as adults (40%). In contrast, children raised by parents in the three middle quintiles (the middle class) experienced much higher rates of mobility: only 25% of children born to parents in the second fifth were in the same place as adults; only 14% of children whose parents were in the middle fifth stayed in the middle fifth as adults; and only 9% of children raised by parents in the fourth quintile were in the same relative position as adults. Much the same results are evident when it comes to intragenerational mobility in the United States. The likelihood of adults moving from their initial positions in the income distribution has decreased or been unchanged in recent decades, according to available empirical analyses. Bradbury used data from the PSID to analyze family income mobility for working-age married couples over the 1969-2006 period. The various measures of mobility she developed indicate that family income mobility declined between 1969 and 2006, and particularly since the 1980s.\",\n \"Families, whether they started at the bottom or top of the income distribution, became increasingly less likely to move up or down the income ladder during their working lives. Bradbury concluded that \\\"family income mobility has been insufficient to stem increases in inequality of long-term income.\\\" Acs and Zimmerman used PSID data to determine the trend in income mobility among 25-44-year olds between 1989 and 2004. They estimated that intragenerational mobility among young adults has been stable since the 1980s. For example, slightly over one-half of 25-44-year olds were in the lowest quintile of the income distribution in both the 1984-1994 and 1994-2004 periods. About one-fourth of those in the bottom quintile moved up to the second quintile in the 1984-1994 period, the same share also moved up in the following 10-year period. Similarly, in both 1984-1994 and 1994-2004, about 10% of those in the bottom quintile were able to move into the middle quintile of the income distribution; 7%, to the fourth quintile; and 4%, to the top quintile.\",\n \"Mobility rates from the higher quintiles into the bottom quintile also were little changed over time: 20%-22% of those in the second quintile were downwardly mobile in the 1984-1994 and 1994-2004 periods, whereas 11%-15% of those in the middle quintile fell to the bottom quintile; 6%-7% from the fourth quintile dropped to the bottom as did 3%-4% from the top quintile. These patterns led Acs and Zimmerman to conclude that \\\"in the context of rising income inequality, stable mobility rates suggest that the distribution of lifetime income must be growing unequal. That is, lifetime or long-term economic inequality is rising.\\\" Auten and Gee used panel data from income tax returns to examine mobility over the past two decades among tax units aged 25 and older. They similarly found that mobility was about the same in most income quintiles between the 1987-1996 and 1996-2005 periods. Auten and Gee also estimated a slight decrease in overall mobility, with 58.3% of individuals changing quintiles in 1987-1996 compared with 57.5% in 1996-2005. They found that the entire difference resulted from less downward mobility out of the top 20%. Diaz-Gimenez et al.\",\n \"used PSID data to analyze household income mobility between the 1989-1994 (five-year) and 2001-2007 (six-year) periods. They estimated that income mobility was little changed, but the six-year span of the more recent period suggested a decrease in mobility. Diaz-Gimenez et al. also found less income mobility among households at the bottom and top of the income distribution compared with households in the middle three quintiles. As suggested above by Jantti with regard to cross-country intergenerational mobility, the comparatively high intragenerational mobility of a majority of U.S. households (the middle 60%) may partly account for the seeming misperception among Americans that the United States is a very mobile society. Burkhauser and Couch reviewed the limited literature on intragenerational mobility in the United States and several other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, and Sweden). Their meta-analysis led them to conclude that there does not appear to be a clear relationship between the extent of income inequality and intragenerational income mobility. In addition, most of the studies found that the majority of cross-sectional (short-term) inequality appears to persist over time. Measures of income dispersion show a distribution of income across U.S.\",\n \"households that has become comparatively more unequal over time as high-income U.S. households have benefitted disproportionately from economic growth and that is less equal compared with distributions in many other developed countries. It also appears that going from rags to riches is relatively rare; that is, where one starts in the U.S. income distribution greatly influences where one ends up.\"\n]","isConversational":false}}},{"rowIdx":12399,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"string","value":"train_12399"},"question":{"kind":"string","value":"Write a detailed summary of the following government report."},"answer":{"kind":"string","value":"Sub-Saharan Africa has been strongly affected by the global recession, despite initial optimism that the global financial system would have few spillover effects on the continent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated in 2009 that average economic growth in Africa would slow to 1%, from an annual average of over 6% to 1% over the previous five years, before rebounding to 4% in 2010. As a region, Africa is not thought to have undergone a recession in 2009. However, most African countries are thought to require high rates of economic growth in order to outpace population growth and make progress in alleviating poverty. The mechanisms through which the crisis has affected Africa include a contraction in global trade and a related collapse in primary commodity exports, on which many countries are dependent. Foreign investment and migrant worker remittances are also expected to decrease significantly, and some analysts predict cuts in foreign aid in the medium term if the crisis persists. Africa's most powerful economies have proven particularly vulnerable to the downturn: South Africa has experienced a recession for the first time in nearly two decades, and Nigeria and Angola have reported revenue shortfalls due to the fall in global oil prices. Several countries seen as having solid macroeconomic governance, notably Botswana, have sought international financial assistance to cope with the impact of the crisis. At the same time, a number of low-income African countries are projected to experience relatively robust growth in 2009 and 2010, leading some economists to talk of Africa's underlying economic resilience. The 111th Congress has monitored the impact of the global economic crisis worldwide. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), provided $255.6 million for assistance to vulnerable populations in developing countries affected by the crisis. While an initial House report indicated several countries, including five in Africa, should receive priority consideration, the subsequent conference report did not specify recipients. In August 2009, the Obama Administration notified Congress that four African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zambia—would benefit from the funds appropriated in the supplemental. More broadly, U.S. policy responses to the impact of the crisis overseas have focused on supporting the policies of multilateral organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank (AfDB). These organizations have increased their lending commitments and created new facilities to help mitigate the impact of the global crisis on emerging market and developing countries worldwide. This report analyzes Africa's vulnerability to the global crisis and potential implications for economic growth, poverty alleviation, fiscal balances, and political stability. The report describes channels through which the crisis is affecting Africa, and provides information on international efforts to address the impact, including U.S. policies and those of multilateral institutions in which the United States plays a major role. For further background and analysis, see CRS Report RL34742, The Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]."},"documents":{"kind":"list like","value":["Amid signs that the global economy is emerging from the worldwide recession of late 2008 and 2009, African economies appear to be recovering from the crisis with the potential to significantly increase growth rates in the coming year. IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated in March 2010 that African economies were recovering faster than expected from the global downturn. Africa's apparent economic resilience can be explained by a variety of complex factors. Many African governments, particularly those of resource-rich and middle-income countries, lessened the economic blow of the recession by implementing economic stimulus and/or financial sector rescue packages. Sizable assistance by international financial institutions, with U.S. support, also played an important stabilizing role. Still, the drop in economic growth experienced in most African countries in 2008 and 2009 is thought to have significantly negatively affected African countries' ability to make progress in reducing poverty. Moreover, Africa's continued reliance on commodity exports could blunt the expected recovery. Many investors reportedly view Africa's growth in 2010 as stemming from an expected rise in mining activity following its collapse in late 2008, combined with recent gains in communications infrastructure and political stability.","African economies also appear to be benefiting anew from investment and trade with large emerging economies such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil, which appear to have recovered more quickly from the global recession than traditional industrialized nations. In August 2009, the Obama Administration notified Congress that four African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zambia—would benefit from funds appropriated by Congress in 2009 for \"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis,\" with various eligibility requirements. A total of $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) were appropriated for this \"crisis fund\" in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-32 ). As of early 2010, $32.5 million had been obligated for programs in Ghana, $25.2 million for Liberia, $37.9 million for Tanzania, and $25 million for Zambia. Amid signs that the crisis has peaked, policymakers' attention has again shifted toward emphasizing longer-term policies to ensure that growth increases and contributes to broad socio-economic development. In November 2009, U.N.","Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that Africa's future economic prosperity would require industrialization, improved access to global markets, and a \"green agricultural revolution.\" International attention has also focused on stemming Africa's illicit economies, including bribery, theft, money laundering, and trafficking in people, narcotics, and weaponry. A March 2010 study by Global Financial Integrity showed illicit capital outflows from Africa totaled $854 billion between 1970 and 2008, creating a \"staggering\" negative economic impact. What began as a bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble has ballooned into a global financial and economic crisis, leading to the most severe global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Starting in September 2008, credit flows froze, lender confidence dropped, and economies around the world dipped toward recession. Having begun in industrialized countries, this financial crisis quickly spread to emerging market and developing economies. Investors pulled capital from countries, even those with small levels of perceived risk, and caused values of stocks and domestic currencies to plunge. Slumping exports and commodity prices have added to developing countries' woes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the global economy would contract by 1.1% in 2009, but that it could rebound to 3.1%","growth in 2010.","Developing economies may not have played a major role in the onset of the crisis, but they may have less resilient economic systems that can be highly affected by actions in global markets. Most industrialized countries have been able to finance their own rescue packages by borrowing domestically and in international capital markets, but many emerging market and developing economies have insufficient sources of capital and have turned to help from regional development banks, the IMF, the World Bank, and traditional donors such as the Group of Eight (G-8). Many analysts were initially optimistic that the impact of the global financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, \"Africa\") would be negligible. African economies are among the least exposed to the global financial system of any world region, and African banks hold few of the \"toxic assets\" that helped spark the crisis. However, as the financial crisis has deepened into a global economic recession, African economies are experiencing strong negative effects due to a contraction in global trade, including reduced demand for African commodity exports, tighter financing conditions overseas, and a drop in foreign direct investment and other capital inflows.","Additional revenue streams such as tourism and remittances from African workers abroad are also expected to fall, and foreign aid is predicted to decrease, particularly if the crisis persists. In its most recent regional economic analysis on Africa, the IMF estimated that average economic growth in Africa would slow from an average of 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007—a historic high—to 1% in 2009, before recovering to 4% in 2010. The crisis is expected to dampen prospects for reducing African poverty, as at least 7% annual growth is generally considered necessary for outpacing population growth and making significant progress in alleviating the toll of hunger, unemployment, and disease. Anticipated negative growth in some countries, including in Africa's largest economy by far, South Africa, may have further ripple effects for smaller neighboring economies who depend on regional powerhouses for trade, remittances, and employment. Unemployment—already high in all African countries—is expected to rise, with potential implications for political stability. The Obama Administration has emphasized African economic growth as a foreign policy goal.","Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in October 2009 that the Administration seeks to \"help create the right conditions\" for growth through improvements in trade, development and agriculture aid, energy security, public private partnerships, and good governance. The impact of the global economic crisis threatens to undermine long-term U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa, including regional stability, increased trade, the alleviation of poverty and hunger, and socioeconomic development. In August 2009, Congressman Gregory Meeks led a congressional delegation to Africa focusing on the impact of the economic crisis. One participant, Congresswoman Marcia L. Fudge, stated that the delegation spent significant time examining the effect of the global economic crisis on local economies. We were especially interested in how the multilateral development banks and the United States supports, particularly the African Development Bank, are helping countries to obtain grants, loans and technical assistance. We also explored the role and impact of the IMF on the region during this period of economic crisis. While Congress has acted to address the impact of the economic crisis on poor countries, legislators have not specifically targeted this assistance at African countries. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L.","111-32 ), included $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for \"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis.\" The Africa region experienced strong economic growth in recent years, averaging 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007. Growth was facilitated by macroeconomic reforms and driven by high external demand for primary commodities, notably oil and minerals. Trade was bolstered by steady growth in industrialized countries and explosive growth in emerging economic powerhouses such as China and India. Demand for African commodities drove an investment surge in many countries, with foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks nearly doubling between 2003 and 2007. Net private capital inflows—including FDI, remittances, portfolio flows, and other sources—are thought to have quadrupled between 2000 and 2008. These changes followed decades of post-independence economic stagnation. While Africa's recent growth was driven by the global commodity boom, many other factors contributed as well. Both net oil exporters and oil importers experienced growth of over 5% between 2004 and 2008 ( Figure 2 ), and investment extended beyond traditional foreign interests in extractive industries.","The IMF reported in 2008 that Africa's \"fast growers are a diverse group, including resource-rich and landlocked countries and resource-poor countries that have not had large gains in their terms of trade.\" In many countries, productivity increased and domestic investment improved, in part due to remittances from African workers overseas. Domestic demand also grew, notably in telecommunications as mobile phone and internet use spread rapidly. Recent growth has been aided by policy reforms, as many African governments have improved economic governance through better banking regulations, oversight mechanisms, and fiscal restraint, which brought down inflation, encouraged private investment, and instilled greater macroeconomic stability. Some believe international debt relief programs contributed to these trends. The rate of armed conflict has also declined since the start of the decade, making some countries and the region more attractive to foreign investment. Despite these positive trends, economic growth has failed to raise incomes sufficiently to trigger significant progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other anti-poverty benchmarks.","Progress on the MDGs has been slower in Africa than in any other region: according to the World Bank, the rate in Africa of those living on less than $1.25 per day has hovered around 50% since 1981, while the number of poor people, in absolute terms, has nearly doubled, from 200 million in 1981 to 380 million in 2005. Economic development is constrained in many countries by numerous structural factors, including a lack of technological investment in agriculture; limited communications and transportation infrastructure; high population growth; high ratios of foreign debt to national income; and the burden of disease. Many countries rely on external aid to balance their budgets and provide basic services. Unrest and instability continue in many areas, and few states constitute transparent and representative democratic regimes. African exports are the least diversified of all developing regions. Many African economies remain reliant on primary commodity exports, which has rendered them vulnerable to external shocks. Natural resource extraction, while effective at creating growth and drawing foreign investment, is also associated with high levels of corruption, labor exploitation, environmental degradation, and internal displacement.","During recent periods of high resource revenues, oil- and mineral-producing countries failed to use such revenues to further increase productivity, significantly diversify their economies, or improve social services. Simultaneously, windfall profits may have contributed to already endemic corruption in some countries. Many analysts argue that despite recent economic reforms, growth and development are limited in many African countries by policy choices that restrict competitiveness. According to the World Bank, Africa is the world's second most trade-restrictive region (after South Asia), and African countries have among the world's fewest and weakest services trade liberalization commitments. The region, on average, also displays \"the worst rankings in business environment, governance, logistics, and other trade facilitation indicators.\" Labor productivity is the lowest, on average, of any world region. Due to low levels of regional integration, Africa has consistently had considerably lower rates of intraregional trade than other world regions. Service provision, such as electricity, is severely limited in many countries, impacting individual household consumption as well as the economic feasibility of private firms. In addition, African economies continue to be affected by the lingering impact of the 2008 food crisis.","In 2008, already rising global food prices spiked to record heights, partly due to high oil prices but also to other complex factors. Those most affected by the crisis were impoverished populations in developing countries, many of whom already suffer from chronic hunger. The crisis strained household budgets and compromised individual resilience to further economic hardship. While African oil exporters benefited from higher oil prices, most oil importers ran fiscal deficits as governments subsidized food imports, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs. The crisis fed high inflation and sparked food riots and political unrest in several countries. The fiscal costs of African policy responses to the crisis doubled between 2007 and 2008, to an average of 1% of GDP, according to the IMF. Many additionally argue that the broader geopolitical environment poses challenges to Africa's development. Some contend that neocolonial relationships continue to dominate Africa's trade ties, while African countries have a limited voice in international trade regulatory bodies. While oil and mineral exporters face low tariffs overseas, exporters of other commodities, such as cotton or sugar, face much higher export barriers.","The global recession has affected most African countries through a variety of mechanisms, or channels, including a decline in global trade, a drop in investment, falling remittances from overseas workers, and possible cuts in foreign aid. These channels are largely connected to Africa's \"real\" economy, rather than its financial sector. World trade was projected to shrink by 11% in 2009, its first decline since 1982 and reportedly the biggest drop since the mid-1940s. Advanced economies are expected to be the hardest hit, with exports projected to drop by over 13%, but poorer nations are nonetheless expected to see exports fall by over 6%. Since the United States, the European Union, and China cumulatively count for nearly 70% of African trade, African exporters are suffering from the decrease in global demand. For example, total exports to the United States from all 41 countries eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) declined by 63% in the first half of 2009, compared to the same period of 2008.","While Africa accounts for less than 2% of global trade, many African economies depend on exports of primary commodities, whose prices on the world market have declined drastically due to the global crisis. The price slump in oil and many mineral commodities, combined with decreased external demand, dealt a severe blow to the region: oil and other mineral fuels represented 68% of African exports to the world by value in 2008; ores, slag and ash about 14%; and precious stones about 4%. African countries are thus exporting less on average, and at lower prices, than a year ago. Investor perceptions of risk have exacerbated the impact of falling commodity prices for resource-rich African countries that are also fragile or post-conflict states. Several other countries depend in part on international tourist arrivals (understood as trade in services), which declined worldwide by about 8% in the first four months of 2009 compared to 2008. Overall, African countries' export exposure to advanced economies—the degree to which economic shifts in developed countries may impact African economies through decreased demand for African exports—has increased in recent years.","According to the IMF, on average, a 1-percentage-point decline in world growth (trade-weighted) is associated with a roughly 0.5-percentage-point drop in GDP growth in Africa. Global trade could drop even further if countries react to the economic crisis by enacting additional trade barriers. African economies face the further risk that the global recession will spark new attempts by developed countries to restrict imports and protect local producers. Some analysts fear that policies aimed at encouraging trade with Africa—such as AGOA, the European Union's \"Everything But Arms\" program, or the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization—could be threatened by political pressures to become more isolationist. The tightening of international credit markets is also expected to render it more difficult for African countries to access trade finance. In prior financial crises, a drop in the availability of trade finance negatively impacted the operations of private firms in developing countries. However, it is unclear whether the current crisis will have a similar impact. In its October 2009 Regional Economic Outlook , the IMF praised African governments for refraining from responding to the crisis with trade restrictions and other policies that could deter future growth.","Indeed, the trade picture for Africa is not without its bright spots, particularly for countries that have made recent significant investments in infrastructure and resource development. For example, Burkina Faso's export performance is expected to expand rapidly in 2009-2010 due to a recovery in the country's cotton sector, combined with a surge in gold exports as four new mines begin full production. Djibouti, a major cargo transportation hub, is also expected to see rapid growth in export volumes as a new shipping terminal in Doraleh (about 4 miles south of Djibouti's existing port) comes online. In Liberia, revitalization of mineral, timber, rubber, and palm oil production is forecasted to drive export growth, with increased exports of coffee and cocoa also contributing. Export growth in Malawi is expected to be boosted by the expansion of a uranium mine in Kayelekera. The value of total U.S. trade with Africa increased by about 29% between 2007 and 2008. After at least three years of continuous growth, however, the value of Africa's exports to the United States decreased in value by about 57% in the first six months of 2009 in comparison to the same period in 2008. U.S.","exports to Africa decreased in value by about 9%. The decline in the value of U.S. imports from Africa largely reflects the decline in oil prices from late 2008 through early 2009, as oil and mineral fuels account for about 80% of all U.S. imports from Africa, and 92% of all U.S. imports under AGOA. Petroleum imports did not decrease in volume as dramatically as they did in value. However, decreases in U.S. and global consumption are likely to continue to have a negative effect on most exports from the region. Because recent growth in Africa was driven in part by commodity exports to China, Africa is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in China's economic growth. In 2007, China was the destination for some 13% of Africa's exports and the source of roughly 10% of Africa's imports. These figures represent a long trend of increased Chinese trade and commercial ties with Africa, particularly with countries rich in natural resources. China's trade with Africa greatly increased in recent years, reportedly growing to $74 billion in the first eight months of 2008, a 62% increase over the previous year.","Even with the impact of the crisis in the second half of 2008, total Sino-African trade for the year was reportedly $106.8 billion, a significant increase from 2007. This trade has spurred Chinese investment in large infrastructure projects in Africa, which in some cases are thought to have helped alleviate constraints on economic competitiveness. Analysts suggest that China is reevaluating some resource extraction agreements, particularly in countries perceived as politically unstable, in light of the global slump. At the same time, recent statistics on China's growth in the first months of 2009 showed robust, if somewhat reduced, economic growth. Furthermore, China's domestic economic stimulus package reportedly relies heavily on infrastructure construction, which has kept demand steady for some primary inputs, such as oil, copper, tin, and lumber. Indeed, while Chinese private-sector engagement with Africa has apparently decreased as a result of the crisis, some Chinese firms and the Chinese government have continued to negotiate economic and resource-acquisition agreements with African countries. Chinese diplomatic outreach to African governments has also continued. Capital flows—which include foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment flows, worker remittances, private charity, and foreign aid—are thought to have helped fuel Africa's recent economic growth.","Between 2000 and 2007, private capital inflows were the most important source of external finance for the region, growing from an estimated $8.9 billion in 2000 to $54.8 billion in 2007—or 6.5 times global foreign aid of $8.5 billion. FDI peaked in 2008 at $32.6 billion, and accounted for between 2.5% and 5% of annual GDP between 2001 and 2007. At the same time, flows of FDI and portfolio investment are clustered among Africa's oil-exporting economies and South Africa ( Figure 5 ), and may have little impact in many African countries. The contraction of capital flows to Africa has been sharp. The IMF estimated that FDI in Africa would drop by roughly 26.7% in 2009, compared to 2008 ( Figure 4 ). Between the second quarter of 2008 and year's end, Africa saw the sharpest contraction in cross-border lending of all emerging regions—over 50%—compared with less than 20% for emerging market countries in other regions. Portfolio investment flows were initially the most impacted by the crisis, reversing from inflows of $18.7 billion in 2006 to outflows of $16.7 billion in 2008 ( Figure 4 ).","These outflows have hit Africa's \"frontier economies\" the hardest as foreign investors fled the region's stock markets for safer, more liquid investments at home. However, limited available research suggests that while portfolio investment declines will have significant impacts on the financial sectors of affected countries, the impact on regional growth is expected to be minimal. FDI remains the largest share of inward capital flows for the region as a whole, and is expected to be a key driver of future growth. Of all forms of international capital flows, remittances—or monies sent home by foreign workers overseas—are thought to be the most stable, reacting least to international politics or events. While Africa receives smaller amounts of remittances than other regions, their impact is thought to be relatively large compared to the size of African economies and due to the fact that Africa's extractive industries often provide little economic trickle-down into the local economy. Recorded remittances to Africa totaled $18.59 billion in 2007, nearly rivaling foreign aid flows; the actual amount is likely higher, since the region receives a large share through informal transfers and unofficial mechanisms and networks.","Within the region, remittances are thought to account for 3.7% of GDP on average, although there is significant variation among countries. Remittances in Lesotho, for example, were reported to be 29% of GDP in 2007, according to the World Bank. By total recorded flows, Nigeria and Kenya receive the highest value of remittances. Global remittance levels were projected to fall 5-8% in 2009, from an estimated $305 billion in 2008, according to the World Bank. In Africa, remittance levels were projected to fall by 4.4% in 2009; while significant, this is a slightly smaller drop in percentage terms than the worldwide average for low- and middle-income countries. Remittance levels could fall further if continuing economic troubles cause destination countries to tighten immigration restrictions. The long-term implications are difficult to assess, as they depend on complex factors such as the share of unskilled jobs in destination countries and the relative value of local currencies compared to currencies in which remittances are earned.","While only a small handful of donors to date—including Italy, France, and Iceland—have reduced bilateral foreign assistance to Africa due to the crisis, the global flow of foreign aid could suffer in the medium term if the global downturn continues. A more significant decline in aid flows, if it occurs, is expected to lag behind other economic indicators due to the long-term planning process in donor countries. Some observers predicted that while aid levels in 2009 and 2010 would be largely unaffected by the crisis, they could drop in 2011 and 2012 as developed countries experience continued fiscal strains and political pressures to balance budgets. Nonetheless, African governments have requested donors to increase aid flows in order to help offset the impact of the crisis on their domestic economies. Analysts continue to debate whether foreign aid has helped or hindered Africa's socioeconomic development in the long run. Many African economies are vulnerable to a downturn in foreign aid flows, particularly those that are not natural resource exporters; many rely on donors for budget support.","Compared to other regions, Africa receives the highest total amount of overseas development assistance (including international debt relief), according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 2006-2007, Africa received the equivalent of nearly $27.19 billion in bilateral overseas development assistance as defined by the OECD, far greater than the next largest recipient, the Middle East and North Africa, which received $14.03 billion. During the 2005 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, members pledged to roughly double annual aid to Africa by 2010. Some countries—such as the United States—committed to a dollar-figure increase, while European countries committed to raising the percentage of national income spent on aid to Africa. According to the organization ONE, which monitors aid commitments and disbursements to Africa, the G-8 Gleneagles commitments amount to raising annual overseas development aid to Africa by $21.48 billion (in 2008 dollars) on top of what was already being spent in 2005, by 2010. The commitment by the United States was to raise annual aid to Africa to a total of $8.8 billion. Most observers believe G-8 aid to Africa will not reach the levels promised at Gleneagles.","This may be attributed mainly to shortfalls by France, Italy, and Germany; other G-8 members, including the United States, are believed to be on track to meet their commitments. In addition, reductions in projected national income in donor countries have negatively affected the real value of European commitments based on a percentage of GDP. Economic growth in Africa began to decrease in the second half of 2008, with average growth falling from nearly 7% in 2007 to just under 5.5% in 2008, according to the IMF. African countries with relatively developed financial markets—such as South Africa and Nigeria—were the first to feel the effects of the crisis. The IMF projected average economic growth in Africa would plunge from 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007 to 1% in 2009. At the same time, average growth rates for the region largely reflect Africa's largest economies, including oil exporters and middle-income countries (of which South Africa is the largest), where the impact of the crisis has been strongest. Median annual economic growth was expected to decelerate from 4.75% on average between 2002 and 2007 to 2.5% in 2009.","While some observers argue that merely sustaining positive average growth (as opposed to a recession) means the impact of the crisis on Africa will be relatively minor compared to other regions, others contend that Africa's developing economies require high levels of growth to outpace demographic trends and translate into significant poverty alleviation. For example, per-capita average GDP in Africa was projected to decline by nearly 1% in 2009. The IMF reported in mid-October that most African economies \"nonetheless seem to be responding to this storm better than those of the past,\" having \"generally avoided the major macroeconomic stabilities that followed previous global slowdowns.\" According to the IMF, Africa is projected to experience an economic recovery in 2010, rebounding to 4% growth on average. Such an outcome would represent a rapid bounce-back compared to sluggish recoveries following previous global recessions. This scenario has led some observers to speak of Africa's underlying economic \"resilience,\" pointing toward robust domestic demand and the lasting effects of macroeconomic reforms.","In late September 2009, World Bank President Robert Zoellick stated, \"Over time, Africa can also become a pole of growth… Coming out of the crisis, there could be a new opportunity.\" Regional averages of economic growth are heavily weighted toward Africa's largest economies, and do not necessarily reflect the expected impact of the crisis on any given country. Because South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola represented over 60% of Africa's combined gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008, regional aggregated statistics disproportionately reflect the impact of the crisis on these countries. Nigeria and Angola have been strongly affected because much of their economies depend on oil exports, while South Africa, by far Africa's largest economy, is already experiencing a recession, its first in 17 years. Middle-income countries (a relatively small category in Africa; see Note, Figure 6 ) and oil exporters are experiencing the strongest negative impact from the global crisis. The impact on middle-income countries is reflected by South Africa, where GDP was projected to decline by 2.25% in 2009, due largely to South Africa's close integration into global financial markets and tight trade links with the rest of the world.","South Africa's neighbors are expected to experience negative spill-over effects due to trade, investment, and financial linkages to the regional economic giant. Another example of a middle-income country experiencing economic distress due to the crisis is Botswana, whose economy is highly dependent on diamond exports. On the other hand, many low-income countries that do not rely on oil or mineral exports—such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda—were projected to experience relatively strong economic growth in 2009, albeit at lower levels than before the crisis. Average GDP in low-income countries is expected to contract by 2.5 percentage points between 2008 and 2009, to relatively strong 4.5% growth. Many of Africa's low-income countries are expected to benefit from positive terms-of-trade movements, as prices of food and fuel imports have fallen. Fragile and post-conflict states, particularly those that rely on primary commodity exports, will be negatively affected by the crisis, but many are also expected to rebound in 2010 if peace and stability gains are consolidated. Idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the global crisis are further expected to exert strong influence in many African countries, including rainfall, declining oil production in some Gulf of Guinea countries, labor strikes, and political","instability.","The economic crisis is already having a deep impact on fiscal and trade balances throughout the region ( Figure 8 and Figure 9 ). In recent years, debt forgiveness and improved fiscal discipline contributed to greater economic stability: between 2004 and 2008, the region's governments maintained a budget surplus of 1.75% on average. During those four years, the surplus in African oil exporters averaged 6.5% of GDP. Fiscal positions have already turned negative due to the crisis: the IMF has projected deficits of 4.75% of GDP in 2009 and 2.72% of GDP in 2010. Fiscal deficits in oil exporters were expected to average over 6% in 2009. Current account positions—the difference between a nation's total exports of goods, services, and transfers, and its total imports of them—were also expected to decline, from a surplus of 1.22% of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 6.23% of GDP in 2009. Weakened commodity prices are exacerbating these effects in oil-producing states.","Fiscal deficits reflect both increased government spending aimed at expanding social safety nets and declining government revenues due to decreases in the collection of taxes and royalties on natural resource extraction, customs and tariffs on trade, and taxes and fees on tourist activity and other consumption. While these effects will vary on a country-by-country basis, many countries are expected to have difficulty financing their deficits. Several African governments had planned to raise long-term financing through the issuance of sovereign bonds, as Gabon successfully did in late 2007. Because of the impact of the crisis on global liquidity, these plans have reportedly either been unsuccessful (South Africa), canceled (Ghana), or delayed (Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda). While some oil exporters and middle-income countries have enacted fiscal stimulus packages, the capacity to do so is expected to be restrained in most African countries, even with international assistance. Combined with the difficulty of raising financing and abating investor risk aversion, budgetary pressures have reportedly caused some major infrastructure projects, including government-funded projects and public-private partnerships, to come under strain. The crisis is expected to set back or reverse efforts to alleviate poverty in Africa, the world's poorest region.","Multilateral organizations project that the economic crisis could increase poverty worldwide by at least 45 million people. In Africa, the IMF estimated that the crisis would add 7 million people to the ranks of those living below US$1.25 a day in 2009, and a further 3 million in 2010. Indeed, while average GDP growth in Africa was expected to remain positive in 2009, per capita GDP was expected to contract in many African countries ( Figure 10 ). The impact on poverty in Africa may be further compounded by the effects of the 2008 food crisis, which made many African families more vulnerable to sudden economic shocks, especially as domestic prices for fuel and food remain relatively high in many countries. Many African households teeter just above the international poverty line, and a small impact on average household income could translate into a large jump in poverty as measured by international standards. Additionally, already insufficient social safety nets are expected to be further strained by a reduction in budget allocations for public services as government revenues drop.","Some predict that the human costs of the economic crisis will be dire: for example, one World Bank analysis estimates that the crisis will directly cause 30,000-50,000 excess infant deaths in Africa, with most of these additional deaths likely to be poorer children, and overwhelmingly female. The economic crisis is expected to compound existing challenges for African food security. The United Nations estimated last year that the proportion of undernourished people in Africa's population rose to 29% in 2008, compared to 28% in 2004-2006, and that it would rise further in 2009; progress in eradicating hunger had already stalled or reversed in 2008 due to the global food crisis. While inflation declined throughout Africa in the second half of 2008 with the slump in oil and food prices on the world market, global food prices have remained higher than they have been in a decade, nearly double historical levels. Moreover, Africa's insulated markets and factors such as poor transportation infrastructure have limited the pass-through of lower global prices to domestic markets. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food crises persist in at least 20 African countries.","While high food prices may serve as an incentive for some crop producers, most analysts believe that they have a net negative effect on Africa's poor. Many believe fallout from the global economic crisis could have implications for Africa's political stability. The Economist Intelligence Unit recently contended that \"as people lose confidence in the ability of government to restore [economic] stability, protests look increasingly likely…. There is growing concern about a possible global pandemic of unrest.\" This may be particularly pertinent for post-conflict and \"fragile\" states, where institutions are especially weak, investors wary, and donors under pressure to pare down financial commitments as their own economies suffer. Analysts' assumptions are based in part on observations from mid-2008, when rising food prices sparked food riots across the continent and were thought to have played a role in political unrest in several countries.","As the crisis pushes up the number of impoverished and unemployed individuals, long-standing potential instability may be ignited—particularly if local populations identify their governments as the culprits of economic hardship, if political or military contenders for power use the economic crisis as a weapon against incumbents, or if observation of unrest in neighboring countries acts as a vector of contagion. Tensions from the crisis may exacerbate preexisting sources of instability in many African countries, including ongoing or recently resolved conflicts, fragile institutions, xenophobia, and income inequality. At the same time, widespread economically driven protests such as those seen in 2008 have not been repeated in 2009, and some believe the threat may be overstated. At the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London in April 2009, member states agreed to inject $1 trillion into the world economy in order to combat the effects of the global crisis. This included a commitment to support growth in emerging market and developing countries.","For example, the G-20 committed to increase lending resources available to the IMF by $250 billion through immediate contributions from some IMF member countries, and to use additional resources from agreed sales of IMF gold to provide $6 billion in additional financing (including concessional lending) for poor countries over the next two to three years. At the same time, some observers contend that \"the legitimate concerns of LICs [low-income countries] in general, and Africa in particular, have not featured prominently in international rescue efforts.\" At the July 2009 G-8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy, members declared that they were \"determined to assist developing countries in coping with the impact of the [economic] crisis\" and committed to fulfilling the Gleneagles commitments on aid (discussed earlier) and improving aid effectiveness, and strengthening global initiatives to achieve the MDGs and other anti-poverty goals. Led by the United States, the G-8 agreed to mobilize $20 billion over the next three years for agricultural development assistance in additional to prior commitments of emergency and humanitarian food aid. The United States committed to doubling U.S. agricultural development assistance to more than $1 billion in 2010, providing at least $3.5 billion over the next","three years.","Significant portions of any increase in agricultural assistance may be directed toward African countries. However, some observers view these pledges as unlikely to be fully upheld. The World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), and the IMF have all stepped up lending to the region since the onset of the financial crisis. These institutions have also reformed several of their existing loan and assistance programs, or created new facilities, to target their efforts to the current crisis. These include, for example, the IMF's Exogenous Shocks Facility, the World Bank's new Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility and Infrastructure Crisis Facility, and the AfDB's new Emergency Liquidity Facility and Trade Finance Initiative. These are aimed at offsetting budget shortfalls, increasing liquidity, and providing financing for infrastructure and trade finance—all of which are considered by many analysts to be crucial to Africa's eventual economic recovery. The World Bank and the AfDB share a development focus, and provide financing for projects as wide-ranging as heavy infrastructure, education and health policies, financial sector development, and natural resource management. World Bank lending to Africa in its 2009 fiscal year (July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009) was $9.9 billion, up 36% from $7.3 billion in","FY2008.","The AfDB, according to its president Donald Kabaruka, is on target to commit $11 billion in 2009, doubling its 2008 commitments. Much of this assistance is at highly discounted interest rates. To ramp up assistance to the World Bank's poorest member countries, World Bank member countries approved the Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility. This facility will allow the Bank to front-load $2 billion of the $42 billion of assistance available under its International Development Association's 2007 financial replenishment (known as IDA-15). A total of 15 African countries had benefitted from front-loading of IDA resources by August 2009. The Democratic Republic of Congo was one of the first countries to take advantage of this new facility, receiving Bank approval for a package totaling $100 million in February 2009. The World Bank's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has expanded or launched five new facilities aimed at supporting the private sector in affected emerging market and developing countries worldwide. The IFC expects financing for these new facilities to total roughly $31 billion between 2009 and 2011.","The World Bank has also initiated several policies aimed at mitigating the impacts of the crisis on Africa in particular, including scaling up its lending and policy advice with a focus on poverty-reducing activities, safety nets, infrastructure support, and budget support to compensate for the loss in private capital flows. Beneficiary countries of World Bank targeted lending include South Africa, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia. In addition, the World Bank's new Infrastructure Crisis Facility (IFC) is making $300 million available to provide top-up financing for viable, privately funded infrastructure projects experiencing financial distress, or which are no longer able to reach financial closure. The Bank is also stepping up knowledge assistance to help countries prepare contingency plans for responding to the crisis. This package of assistance supplements the Bank's $1.2 billion Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), launched in response to the 2008 food crisis. As of January 2009, 10 African countries had received a total of $83 million in GFRP resources to fund seed and fertilizer purchases, safety net programs, and budget support for governments whose fiscal balances were hurt by high fuel costs.","The Bank also increased its lending to projects supporting African agriculture, from $800 million in 2008 to $1 billion in 2009. The Bank also plans to expand infrastructure investments through a $45 billion Infrastructure Recovery and Assets Platform (INFRA), about one-third of whose resources will be spent in Africa, depending on country demand. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) announced four new crisis-response initiatives in March 2009: a $1.5 billion Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF); a $1 billion Trade Finance Initiative (TFI); a framework for accelerated transfer of African Development Fund resources to eligible countries; and enhanced policy advisory support. The newly created ELF aims to provide financing to eligible African beneficiaries to support a broad range of obligations, including underpinning a fiscal stimulus and supporting public-private partnerships at risk. The ELF has a fast-tracked application process, with proposals considered by the AfDB Board within 10 working days. The TFI plans to launch a new line of credit of $500 million designed to enable commercial banks and development institutions in Africa to use Bank resources to support trade financing. Accelerated African Development Fund transfers—concessional loans and grants—are expected to provide budget support and infrastructure financing.","In addition to various ongoing and new projects addressing infrastructure, governance, macroeconomic policy, skills development, humanitarian relief, and other areas, the AfDB has approved several loans in recent months designed primarily to offset the impact of the global economic crisis. The Bank reportedly saw its lending nearly double to $11 billion between mid-2008 and mid-2009, with funds going largely to budgetary support, trade finance, and infrastructure projects (notably ports and airports in Tunisia, Senegal, and Djibouti, where investors had withdrawn). Recent loans explicitly linked to fallout from the crisis include a $1.5 billion loan for Botswana designed to help address a budget deficit estimated at 13.5% of GDP, the first such loan to Botswana from the AfDB in 17 years (June 2009); and a $97.18 million grant to the Democratic Republic of Congo to finance the country's Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impacts of the International Financial Crisis (May 2009). Unlike the AfDB and the World Bank, which fund specific development projects, the IMF provides loans to help countries that cannot meet their international payments and are unable to borrow money from other governments or raise capital on the financial markets at affordable terms.","The IMF is often called the international lender of last resort. The Fund is increasing its financial assistance to Africa in response to the crisis, doubling \"access limits\"—the ceiling amount that countries may borrow—for low-income countries. IMF lending to low-income countries in response to the economic crisis is expected to reach $8 billion by the end of 2010. In Africa, new IMF lending commitments from January to mid-July 2009 were $2.7 billion, an increase from $1.1 billion in 2008. The amount of IMF credit available to the region fell sharply following implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) agreed on at the June 2005 G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland; the total amount of IMF credit available to African countries totals about $4.7 billion, $2 billion of which remains undrawn. Cote D'Ivoire ($581 million) and Zambia ($342 million) have the largest loan programs in the region. With the exception of one loan (to Gabon), all IMF financial assistance to Africa is provided through the IMF's concessional lending facilities, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF).","The IMF has also accelerated long-standing efforts to revamp its lending and policy support programs for African borrowers and other low-income countries. Among recent reforms, the creation of $250 billion worth of IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) and their equi-proportional (all countries receive an amount relative to their IMF quota share) allocation to all member countries is of particular interest, as is the approval of a second SDR allocation (around $33.9 billion) specifically for under-represented countries, many in Africa. African countries are expected to receive around $11 billion in SDRs from the two allocations, which will be helpful for countries in the region that have seen their foreign exchange reserves drop sharply in an effort to avoid defaulting on their foreign financial obligations. African governments established a Committee of Ten African Finance Ministers and Central and Regional Bank Governors (C-10) at an AfDB-organized meeting in Tunis in November 2008. Finance ministers and central bank governors have met several times since then to discuss the impact of the crisis and possible policy responses. Some countries have set up economic monitoring units and deployed limited fiscal and monetary resources. Steps taken by some African governments have reportedly included","fiscal stimulus packages (e.g.","Mauritius, South Africa), targeted assistance to certain sectors (Nigeria, Uganda), expansionary monetary policy (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa), and bond financing of public expenditures (Cape Verde, Kenya). Nevertheless, most African governments have little capacity to fund policy interventions to address the crisis. Effective economic governance continues to be lacking in many countries, and responses are projected to be restrained by the relative unavailability of foreign reserves, insufficient budgetary margins for enacting fiscal stimulus packages, and restrictions on incurring further external debt in countries that have benefited from international debt relief. While multilateral institutions have urged African governments to focus spending on social security nets and infrastructure projects—which have the potential to stimulate the economy while addressing some of the long-term obstacles to economic growth—regional expenditures on infrastructure fell far short of World Bank recommendations even before the crisis hit. Some believe high levels of corruption could additionally impede the effectiveness of government responses to the crisis. There is strong congressional interest in African socioeconomic development and regional stability. Congressional interest in fostering U.S.","economic ties with African countries is evidenced in recent hearings, such as that held in June 2009 by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, on \"U.S.-Africa Trade Relations: Creating a Platform for Economic Growth\"; in pending legislation, such as H.Con.Res. 128 , \"Expressing the sense of Congress that Africa is of significant strategic, political, economic, and humanitarian importance to the United States\" (referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in May 2009); and in existing laws and programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). A consideration of the impact of the crisis may affect bilateral and regional aid levels and programs, U.S. trade policy toward Africa, and analyses of regional and country-level political trends, among other areas. The U.S. government has announced several new policies to aid developing countries affected by the crisis, though it has not, to date, formulated a policy specifically aimed at addressing the impact on Africa. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L.","111-32 , passed into law on June 24, 2009), includes $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for \"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis,\" with certain eligibility criteria. However, while an initial House report on the legislation provided that five African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—should \"receive priority consideration,\" along with several other countries outside the region, the subsequent conference report did not include such specifications. In July 2009, the Obama Administration noted the impact of the economic crisis on developing countries in announcing its commitment to double U.S. agricultural development assistance to more than $1 billion in 2010, and to provide at least $3.5 billion over the next three years. The initiative is global, not uniquely focused on Africa, though the Administration cited the U.S. Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) as a \"model.\" U.S. responses to date have focused on support for multilateral lending and grant initiatives. Moving forward, this may include increased financial support to the international financial institutions to which African countries are expected to apply for economic support during the crisis. In the 2009 Supplemental ( P.L. 111-32 ), Congress approved U.S.","participation in a range of measures designed to increase the amount of financial assistance the IMF may provide to its member states in the wake of the economic crisis. The AfDB has also requested an increase in financing by the G-20. Relevant legislation includes S. 955 , the African Development Fund Replenishment Act of 2009."],"string":"[\n \"Amid signs that the global economy is emerging from the worldwide recession of late 2008 and 2009, African economies appear to be recovering from the crisis with the potential to significantly increase growth rates in the coming year. IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated in March 2010 that African economies were recovering faster than expected from the global downturn. Africa's apparent economic resilience can be explained by a variety of complex factors. Many African governments, particularly those of resource-rich and middle-income countries, lessened the economic blow of the recession by implementing economic stimulus and/or financial sector rescue packages. Sizable assistance by international financial institutions, with U.S. support, also played an important stabilizing role. Still, the drop in economic growth experienced in most African countries in 2008 and 2009 is thought to have significantly negatively affected African countries' ability to make progress in reducing poverty. Moreover, Africa's continued reliance on commodity exports could blunt the expected recovery. Many investors reportedly view Africa's growth in 2010 as stemming from an expected rise in mining activity following its collapse in late 2008, combined with recent gains in communications infrastructure and political stability.\",\n \"African economies also appear to be benefiting anew from investment and trade with large emerging economies such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil, which appear to have recovered more quickly from the global recession than traditional industrialized nations. In August 2009, the Obama Administration notified Congress that four African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zambia—would benefit from funds appropriated by Congress in 2009 for \\\"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis,\\\" with various eligibility requirements. A total of $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) were appropriated for this \\\"crisis fund\\\" in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-32 ). As of early 2010, $32.5 million had been obligated for programs in Ghana, $25.2 million for Liberia, $37.9 million for Tanzania, and $25 million for Zambia. Amid signs that the crisis has peaked, policymakers' attention has again shifted toward emphasizing longer-term policies to ensure that growth increases and contributes to broad socio-economic development. In November 2009, U.N.\",\n \"Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that Africa's future economic prosperity would require industrialization, improved access to global markets, and a \\\"green agricultural revolution.\\\" International attention has also focused on stemming Africa's illicit economies, including bribery, theft, money laundering, and trafficking in people, narcotics, and weaponry. A March 2010 study by Global Financial Integrity showed illicit capital outflows from Africa totaled $854 billion between 1970 and 2008, creating a \\\"staggering\\\" negative economic impact. What began as a bursting of the U.S. housing market bubble has ballooned into a global financial and economic crisis, leading to the most severe global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Starting in September 2008, credit flows froze, lender confidence dropped, and economies around the world dipped toward recession. Having begun in industrialized countries, this financial crisis quickly spread to emerging market and developing economies. Investors pulled capital from countries, even those with small levels of perceived risk, and caused values of stocks and domestic currencies to plunge. Slumping exports and commodity prices have added to developing countries' woes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the global economy would contract by 1.1% in 2009, but that it could rebound to 3.1%\",\n \"growth in 2010.\",\n \"Developing economies may not have played a major role in the onset of the crisis, but they may have less resilient economic systems that can be highly affected by actions in global markets. Most industrialized countries have been able to finance their own rescue packages by borrowing domestically and in international capital markets, but many emerging market and developing economies have insufficient sources of capital and have turned to help from regional development banks, the IMF, the World Bank, and traditional donors such as the Group of Eight (G-8). Many analysts were initially optimistic that the impact of the global financial crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, \\\"Africa\\\") would be negligible. African economies are among the least exposed to the global financial system of any world region, and African banks hold few of the \\\"toxic assets\\\" that helped spark the crisis. However, as the financial crisis has deepened into a global economic recession, African economies are experiencing strong negative effects due to a contraction in global trade, including reduced demand for African commodity exports, tighter financing conditions overseas, and a drop in foreign direct investment and other capital inflows.\",\n \"Additional revenue streams such as tourism and remittances from African workers abroad are also expected to fall, and foreign aid is predicted to decrease, particularly if the crisis persists. In its most recent regional economic analysis on Africa, the IMF estimated that average economic growth in Africa would slow from an average of 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007—a historic high—to 1% in 2009, before recovering to 4% in 2010. The crisis is expected to dampen prospects for reducing African poverty, as at least 7% annual growth is generally considered necessary for outpacing population growth and making significant progress in alleviating the toll of hunger, unemployment, and disease. Anticipated negative growth in some countries, including in Africa's largest economy by far, South Africa, may have further ripple effects for smaller neighboring economies who depend on regional powerhouses for trade, remittances, and employment. Unemployment—already high in all African countries—is expected to rise, with potential implications for political stability. The Obama Administration has emphasized African economic growth as a foreign policy goal.\",\n \"Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in October 2009 that the Administration seeks to \\\"help create the right conditions\\\" for growth through improvements in trade, development and agriculture aid, energy security, public private partnerships, and good governance. The impact of the global economic crisis threatens to undermine long-term U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa, including regional stability, increased trade, the alleviation of poverty and hunger, and socioeconomic development. In August 2009, Congressman Gregory Meeks led a congressional delegation to Africa focusing on the impact of the economic crisis. One participant, Congresswoman Marcia L. Fudge, stated that the delegation spent significant time examining the effect of the global economic crisis on local economies. We were especially interested in how the multilateral development banks and the United States supports, particularly the African Development Bank, are helping countries to obtain grants, loans and technical assistance. We also explored the role and impact of the IMF on the region during this period of economic crisis. While Congress has acted to address the impact of the economic crisis on poor countries, legislators have not specifically targeted this assistance at African countries. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L.\",\n \"111-32 ), included $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for \\\"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis.\\\" The Africa region experienced strong economic growth in recent years, averaging 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007. Growth was facilitated by macroeconomic reforms and driven by high external demand for primary commodities, notably oil and minerals. Trade was bolstered by steady growth in industrialized countries and explosive growth in emerging economic powerhouses such as China and India. Demand for African commodities drove an investment surge in many countries, with foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks nearly doubling between 2003 and 2007. Net private capital inflows—including FDI, remittances, portfolio flows, and other sources—are thought to have quadrupled between 2000 and 2008. These changes followed decades of post-independence economic stagnation. While Africa's recent growth was driven by the global commodity boom, many other factors contributed as well. Both net oil exporters and oil importers experienced growth of over 5% between 2004 and 2008 ( Figure 2 ), and investment extended beyond traditional foreign interests in extractive industries.\",\n \"The IMF reported in 2008 that Africa's \\\"fast growers are a diverse group, including resource-rich and landlocked countries and resource-poor countries that have not had large gains in their terms of trade.\\\" In many countries, productivity increased and domestic investment improved, in part due to remittances from African workers overseas. Domestic demand also grew, notably in telecommunications as mobile phone and internet use spread rapidly. Recent growth has been aided by policy reforms, as many African governments have improved economic governance through better banking regulations, oversight mechanisms, and fiscal restraint, which brought down inflation, encouraged private investment, and instilled greater macroeconomic stability. Some believe international debt relief programs contributed to these trends. The rate of armed conflict has also declined since the start of the decade, making some countries and the region more attractive to foreign investment. Despite these positive trends, economic growth has failed to raise incomes sufficiently to trigger significant progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other anti-poverty benchmarks.\",\n \"Progress on the MDGs has been slower in Africa than in any other region: according to the World Bank, the rate in Africa of those living on less than $1.25 per day has hovered around 50% since 1981, while the number of poor people, in absolute terms, has nearly doubled, from 200 million in 1981 to 380 million in 2005. Economic development is constrained in many countries by numerous structural factors, including a lack of technological investment in agriculture; limited communications and transportation infrastructure; high population growth; high ratios of foreign debt to national income; and the burden of disease. Many countries rely on external aid to balance their budgets and provide basic services. Unrest and instability continue in many areas, and few states constitute transparent and representative democratic regimes. African exports are the least diversified of all developing regions. Many African economies remain reliant on primary commodity exports, which has rendered them vulnerable to external shocks. Natural resource extraction, while effective at creating growth and drawing foreign investment, is also associated with high levels of corruption, labor exploitation, environmental degradation, and internal displacement.\",\n \"During recent periods of high resource revenues, oil- and mineral-producing countries failed to use such revenues to further increase productivity, significantly diversify their economies, or improve social services. Simultaneously, windfall profits may have contributed to already endemic corruption in some countries. Many analysts argue that despite recent economic reforms, growth and development are limited in many African countries by policy choices that restrict competitiveness. According to the World Bank, Africa is the world's second most trade-restrictive region (after South Asia), and African countries have among the world's fewest and weakest services trade liberalization commitments. The region, on average, also displays \\\"the worst rankings in business environment, governance, logistics, and other trade facilitation indicators.\\\" Labor productivity is the lowest, on average, of any world region. Due to low levels of regional integration, Africa has consistently had considerably lower rates of intraregional trade than other world regions. Service provision, such as electricity, is severely limited in many countries, impacting individual household consumption as well as the economic feasibility of private firms. In addition, African economies continue to be affected by the lingering impact of the 2008 food crisis.\",\n \"In 2008, already rising global food prices spiked to record heights, partly due to high oil prices but also to other complex factors. Those most affected by the crisis were impoverished populations in developing countries, many of whom already suffer from chronic hunger. The crisis strained household budgets and compromised individual resilience to further economic hardship. While African oil exporters benefited from higher oil prices, most oil importers ran fiscal deficits as governments subsidized food imports, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs. The crisis fed high inflation and sparked food riots and political unrest in several countries. The fiscal costs of African policy responses to the crisis doubled between 2007 and 2008, to an average of 1% of GDP, according to the IMF. Many additionally argue that the broader geopolitical environment poses challenges to Africa's development. Some contend that neocolonial relationships continue to dominate Africa's trade ties, while African countries have a limited voice in international trade regulatory bodies. While oil and mineral exporters face low tariffs overseas, exporters of other commodities, such as cotton or sugar, face much higher export barriers.\",\n \"The global recession has affected most African countries through a variety of mechanisms, or channels, including a decline in global trade, a drop in investment, falling remittances from overseas workers, and possible cuts in foreign aid. These channels are largely connected to Africa's \\\"real\\\" economy, rather than its financial sector. World trade was projected to shrink by 11% in 2009, its first decline since 1982 and reportedly the biggest drop since the mid-1940s. Advanced economies are expected to be the hardest hit, with exports projected to drop by over 13%, but poorer nations are nonetheless expected to see exports fall by over 6%. Since the United States, the European Union, and China cumulatively count for nearly 70% of African trade, African exporters are suffering from the decrease in global demand. For example, total exports to the United States from all 41 countries eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) declined by 63% in the first half of 2009, compared to the same period of 2008.\",\n \"While Africa accounts for less than 2% of global trade, many African economies depend on exports of primary commodities, whose prices on the world market have declined drastically due to the global crisis. The price slump in oil and many mineral commodities, combined with decreased external demand, dealt a severe blow to the region: oil and other mineral fuels represented 68% of African exports to the world by value in 2008; ores, slag and ash about 14%; and precious stones about 4%. African countries are thus exporting less on average, and at lower prices, than a year ago. Investor perceptions of risk have exacerbated the impact of falling commodity prices for resource-rich African countries that are also fragile or post-conflict states. Several other countries depend in part on international tourist arrivals (understood as trade in services), which declined worldwide by about 8% in the first four months of 2009 compared to 2008. Overall, African countries' export exposure to advanced economies—the degree to which economic shifts in developed countries may impact African economies through decreased demand for African exports—has increased in recent years.\",\n \"According to the IMF, on average, a 1-percentage-point decline in world growth (trade-weighted) is associated with a roughly 0.5-percentage-point drop in GDP growth in Africa. Global trade could drop even further if countries react to the economic crisis by enacting additional trade barriers. African economies face the further risk that the global recession will spark new attempts by developed countries to restrict imports and protect local producers. Some analysts fear that policies aimed at encouraging trade with Africa—such as AGOA, the European Union's \\\"Everything But Arms\\\" program, or the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization—could be threatened by political pressures to become more isolationist. The tightening of international credit markets is also expected to render it more difficult for African countries to access trade finance. In prior financial crises, a drop in the availability of trade finance negatively impacted the operations of private firms in developing countries. However, it is unclear whether the current crisis will have a similar impact. In its October 2009 Regional Economic Outlook , the IMF praised African governments for refraining from responding to the crisis with trade restrictions and other policies that could deter future growth.\",\n \"Indeed, the trade picture for Africa is not without its bright spots, particularly for countries that have made recent significant investments in infrastructure and resource development. For example, Burkina Faso's export performance is expected to expand rapidly in 2009-2010 due to a recovery in the country's cotton sector, combined with a surge in gold exports as four new mines begin full production. Djibouti, a major cargo transportation hub, is also expected to see rapid growth in export volumes as a new shipping terminal in Doraleh (about 4 miles south of Djibouti's existing port) comes online. In Liberia, revitalization of mineral, timber, rubber, and palm oil production is forecasted to drive export growth, with increased exports of coffee and cocoa also contributing. Export growth in Malawi is expected to be boosted by the expansion of a uranium mine in Kayelekera. The value of total U.S. trade with Africa increased by about 29% between 2007 and 2008. After at least three years of continuous growth, however, the value of Africa's exports to the United States decreased in value by about 57% in the first six months of 2009 in comparison to the same period in 2008. U.S.\",\n \"exports to Africa decreased in value by about 9%. The decline in the value of U.S. imports from Africa largely reflects the decline in oil prices from late 2008 through early 2009, as oil and mineral fuels account for about 80% of all U.S. imports from Africa, and 92% of all U.S. imports under AGOA. Petroleum imports did not decrease in volume as dramatically as they did in value. However, decreases in U.S. and global consumption are likely to continue to have a negative effect on most exports from the region. Because recent growth in Africa was driven in part by commodity exports to China, Africa is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in China's economic growth. In 2007, China was the destination for some 13% of Africa's exports and the source of roughly 10% of Africa's imports. These figures represent a long trend of increased Chinese trade and commercial ties with Africa, particularly with countries rich in natural resources. China's trade with Africa greatly increased in recent years, reportedly growing to $74 billion in the first eight months of 2008, a 62% increase over the previous year.\",\n \"Even with the impact of the crisis in the second half of 2008, total Sino-African trade for the year was reportedly $106.8 billion, a significant increase from 2007. This trade has spurred Chinese investment in large infrastructure projects in Africa, which in some cases are thought to have helped alleviate constraints on economic competitiveness. Analysts suggest that China is reevaluating some resource extraction agreements, particularly in countries perceived as politically unstable, in light of the global slump. At the same time, recent statistics on China's growth in the first months of 2009 showed robust, if somewhat reduced, economic growth. Furthermore, China's domestic economic stimulus package reportedly relies heavily on infrastructure construction, which has kept demand steady for some primary inputs, such as oil, copper, tin, and lumber. Indeed, while Chinese private-sector engagement with Africa has apparently decreased as a result of the crisis, some Chinese firms and the Chinese government have continued to negotiate economic and resource-acquisition agreements with African countries. Chinese diplomatic outreach to African governments has also continued. Capital flows—which include foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment flows, worker remittances, private charity, and foreign aid—are thought to have helped fuel Africa's recent economic growth.\",\n \"Between 2000 and 2007, private capital inflows were the most important source of external finance for the region, growing from an estimated $8.9 billion in 2000 to $54.8 billion in 2007—or 6.5 times global foreign aid of $8.5 billion. FDI peaked in 2008 at $32.6 billion, and accounted for between 2.5% and 5% of annual GDP between 2001 and 2007. At the same time, flows of FDI and portfolio investment are clustered among Africa's oil-exporting economies and South Africa ( Figure 5 ), and may have little impact in many African countries. The contraction of capital flows to Africa has been sharp. The IMF estimated that FDI in Africa would drop by roughly 26.7% in 2009, compared to 2008 ( Figure 4 ). Between the second quarter of 2008 and year's end, Africa saw the sharpest contraction in cross-border lending of all emerging regions—over 50%—compared with less than 20% for emerging market countries in other regions. Portfolio investment flows were initially the most impacted by the crisis, reversing from inflows of $18.7 billion in 2006 to outflows of $16.7 billion in 2008 ( Figure 4 ).\",\n \"These outflows have hit Africa's \\\"frontier economies\\\" the hardest as foreign investors fled the region's stock markets for safer, more liquid investments at home. However, limited available research suggests that while portfolio investment declines will have significant impacts on the financial sectors of affected countries, the impact on regional growth is expected to be minimal. FDI remains the largest share of inward capital flows for the region as a whole, and is expected to be a key driver of future growth. Of all forms of international capital flows, remittances—or monies sent home by foreign workers overseas—are thought to be the most stable, reacting least to international politics or events. While Africa receives smaller amounts of remittances than other regions, their impact is thought to be relatively large compared to the size of African economies and due to the fact that Africa's extractive industries often provide little economic trickle-down into the local economy. Recorded remittances to Africa totaled $18.59 billion in 2007, nearly rivaling foreign aid flows; the actual amount is likely higher, since the region receives a large share through informal transfers and unofficial mechanisms and networks.\",\n \"Within the region, remittances are thought to account for 3.7% of GDP on average, although there is significant variation among countries. Remittances in Lesotho, for example, were reported to be 29% of GDP in 2007, according to the World Bank. By total recorded flows, Nigeria and Kenya receive the highest value of remittances. Global remittance levels were projected to fall 5-8% in 2009, from an estimated $305 billion in 2008, according to the World Bank. In Africa, remittance levels were projected to fall by 4.4% in 2009; while significant, this is a slightly smaller drop in percentage terms than the worldwide average for low- and middle-income countries. Remittance levels could fall further if continuing economic troubles cause destination countries to tighten immigration restrictions. The long-term implications are difficult to assess, as they depend on complex factors such as the share of unskilled jobs in destination countries and the relative value of local currencies compared to currencies in which remittances are earned.\",\n \"While only a small handful of donors to date—including Italy, France, and Iceland—have reduced bilateral foreign assistance to Africa due to the crisis, the global flow of foreign aid could suffer in the medium term if the global downturn continues. A more significant decline in aid flows, if it occurs, is expected to lag behind other economic indicators due to the long-term planning process in donor countries. Some observers predicted that while aid levels in 2009 and 2010 would be largely unaffected by the crisis, they could drop in 2011 and 2012 as developed countries experience continued fiscal strains and political pressures to balance budgets. Nonetheless, African governments have requested donors to increase aid flows in order to help offset the impact of the crisis on their domestic economies. Analysts continue to debate whether foreign aid has helped or hindered Africa's socioeconomic development in the long run. Many African economies are vulnerable to a downturn in foreign aid flows, particularly those that are not natural resource exporters; many rely on donors for budget support.\",\n \"Compared to other regions, Africa receives the highest total amount of overseas development assistance (including international debt relief), according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 2006-2007, Africa received the equivalent of nearly $27.19 billion in bilateral overseas development assistance as defined by the OECD, far greater than the next largest recipient, the Middle East and North Africa, which received $14.03 billion. During the 2005 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, members pledged to roughly double annual aid to Africa by 2010. Some countries—such as the United States—committed to a dollar-figure increase, while European countries committed to raising the percentage of national income spent on aid to Africa. According to the organization ONE, which monitors aid commitments and disbursements to Africa, the G-8 Gleneagles commitments amount to raising annual overseas development aid to Africa by $21.48 billion (in 2008 dollars) on top of what was already being spent in 2005, by 2010. The commitment by the United States was to raise annual aid to Africa to a total of $8.8 billion. Most observers believe G-8 aid to Africa will not reach the levels promised at Gleneagles.\",\n \"This may be attributed mainly to shortfalls by France, Italy, and Germany; other G-8 members, including the United States, are believed to be on track to meet their commitments. In addition, reductions in projected national income in donor countries have negatively affected the real value of European commitments based on a percentage of GDP. Economic growth in Africa began to decrease in the second half of 2008, with average growth falling from nearly 7% in 2007 to just under 5.5% in 2008, according to the IMF. African countries with relatively developed financial markets—such as South Africa and Nigeria—were the first to feel the effects of the crisis. The IMF projected average economic growth in Africa would plunge from 6.5% per year between 2002 and 2007 to 1% in 2009. At the same time, average growth rates for the region largely reflect Africa's largest economies, including oil exporters and middle-income countries (of which South Africa is the largest), where the impact of the crisis has been strongest. Median annual economic growth was expected to decelerate from 4.75% on average between 2002 and 2007 to 2.5% in 2009.\",\n \"While some observers argue that merely sustaining positive average growth (as opposed to a recession) means the impact of the crisis on Africa will be relatively minor compared to other regions, others contend that Africa's developing economies require high levels of growth to outpace demographic trends and translate into significant poverty alleviation. For example, per-capita average GDP in Africa was projected to decline by nearly 1% in 2009. The IMF reported in mid-October that most African economies \\\"nonetheless seem to be responding to this storm better than those of the past,\\\" having \\\"generally avoided the major macroeconomic stabilities that followed previous global slowdowns.\\\" According to the IMF, Africa is projected to experience an economic recovery in 2010, rebounding to 4% growth on average. Such an outcome would represent a rapid bounce-back compared to sluggish recoveries following previous global recessions. This scenario has led some observers to speak of Africa's underlying economic \\\"resilience,\\\" pointing toward robust domestic demand and the lasting effects of macroeconomic reforms.\",\n \"In late September 2009, World Bank President Robert Zoellick stated, \\\"Over time, Africa can also become a pole of growth… Coming out of the crisis, there could be a new opportunity.\\\" Regional averages of economic growth are heavily weighted toward Africa's largest economies, and do not necessarily reflect the expected impact of the crisis on any given country. Because South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola represented over 60% of Africa's combined gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008, regional aggregated statistics disproportionately reflect the impact of the crisis on these countries. Nigeria and Angola have been strongly affected because much of their economies depend on oil exports, while South Africa, by far Africa's largest economy, is already experiencing a recession, its first in 17 years. Middle-income countries (a relatively small category in Africa; see Note, Figure 6 ) and oil exporters are experiencing the strongest negative impact from the global crisis. The impact on middle-income countries is reflected by South Africa, where GDP was projected to decline by 2.25% in 2009, due largely to South Africa's close integration into global financial markets and tight trade links with the rest of the world.\",\n \"South Africa's neighbors are expected to experience negative spill-over effects due to trade, investment, and financial linkages to the regional economic giant. Another example of a middle-income country experiencing economic distress due to the crisis is Botswana, whose economy is highly dependent on diamond exports. On the other hand, many low-income countries that do not rely on oil or mineral exports—such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda—were projected to experience relatively strong economic growth in 2009, albeit at lower levels than before the crisis. Average GDP in low-income countries is expected to contract by 2.5 percentage points between 2008 and 2009, to relatively strong 4.5% growth. Many of Africa's low-income countries are expected to benefit from positive terms-of-trade movements, as prices of food and fuel imports have fallen. Fragile and post-conflict states, particularly those that rely on primary commodity exports, will be negatively affected by the crisis, but many are also expected to rebound in 2010 if peace and stability gains are consolidated. Idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the global crisis are further expected to exert strong influence in many African countries, including rainfall, declining oil production in some Gulf of Guinea countries, labor strikes, and political\",\n \"instability.\",\n \"The economic crisis is already having a deep impact on fiscal and trade balances throughout the region ( Figure 8 and Figure 9 ). In recent years, debt forgiveness and improved fiscal discipline contributed to greater economic stability: between 2004 and 2008, the region's governments maintained a budget surplus of 1.75% on average. During those four years, the surplus in African oil exporters averaged 6.5% of GDP. Fiscal positions have already turned negative due to the crisis: the IMF has projected deficits of 4.75% of GDP in 2009 and 2.72% of GDP in 2010. Fiscal deficits in oil exporters were expected to average over 6% in 2009. Current account positions—the difference between a nation's total exports of goods, services, and transfers, and its total imports of them—were also expected to decline, from a surplus of 1.22% of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 6.23% of GDP in 2009. Weakened commodity prices are exacerbating these effects in oil-producing states.\",\n \"Fiscal deficits reflect both increased government spending aimed at expanding social safety nets and declining government revenues due to decreases in the collection of taxes and royalties on natural resource extraction, customs and tariffs on trade, and taxes and fees on tourist activity and other consumption. While these effects will vary on a country-by-country basis, many countries are expected to have difficulty financing their deficits. Several African governments had planned to raise long-term financing through the issuance of sovereign bonds, as Gabon successfully did in late 2007. Because of the impact of the crisis on global liquidity, these plans have reportedly either been unsuccessful (South Africa), canceled (Ghana), or delayed (Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda). While some oil exporters and middle-income countries have enacted fiscal stimulus packages, the capacity to do so is expected to be restrained in most African countries, even with international assistance. Combined with the difficulty of raising financing and abating investor risk aversion, budgetary pressures have reportedly caused some major infrastructure projects, including government-funded projects and public-private partnerships, to come under strain. The crisis is expected to set back or reverse efforts to alleviate poverty in Africa, the world's poorest region.\",\n \"Multilateral organizations project that the economic crisis could increase poverty worldwide by at least 45 million people. In Africa, the IMF estimated that the crisis would add 7 million people to the ranks of those living below US$1.25 a day in 2009, and a further 3 million in 2010. Indeed, while average GDP growth in Africa was expected to remain positive in 2009, per capita GDP was expected to contract in many African countries ( Figure 10 ). The impact on poverty in Africa may be further compounded by the effects of the 2008 food crisis, which made many African families more vulnerable to sudden economic shocks, especially as domestic prices for fuel and food remain relatively high in many countries. Many African households teeter just above the international poverty line, and a small impact on average household income could translate into a large jump in poverty as measured by international standards. Additionally, already insufficient social safety nets are expected to be further strained by a reduction in budget allocations for public services as government revenues drop.\",\n \"Some predict that the human costs of the economic crisis will be dire: for example, one World Bank analysis estimates that the crisis will directly cause 30,000-50,000 excess infant deaths in Africa, with most of these additional deaths likely to be poorer children, and overwhelmingly female. The economic crisis is expected to compound existing challenges for African food security. The United Nations estimated last year that the proportion of undernourished people in Africa's population rose to 29% in 2008, compared to 28% in 2004-2006, and that it would rise further in 2009; progress in eradicating hunger had already stalled or reversed in 2008 due to the global food crisis. While inflation declined throughout Africa in the second half of 2008 with the slump in oil and food prices on the world market, global food prices have remained higher than they have been in a decade, nearly double historical levels. Moreover, Africa's insulated markets and factors such as poor transportation infrastructure have limited the pass-through of lower global prices to domestic markets. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food crises persist in at least 20 African countries.\",\n \"While high food prices may serve as an incentive for some crop producers, most analysts believe that they have a net negative effect on Africa's poor. Many believe fallout from the global economic crisis could have implications for Africa's political stability. The Economist Intelligence Unit recently contended that \\\"as people lose confidence in the ability of government to restore [economic] stability, protests look increasingly likely…. There is growing concern about a possible global pandemic of unrest.\\\" This may be particularly pertinent for post-conflict and \\\"fragile\\\" states, where institutions are especially weak, investors wary, and donors under pressure to pare down financial commitments as their own economies suffer. Analysts' assumptions are based in part on observations from mid-2008, when rising food prices sparked food riots across the continent and were thought to have played a role in political unrest in several countries.\",\n \"As the crisis pushes up the number of impoverished and unemployed individuals, long-standing potential instability may be ignited—particularly if local populations identify their governments as the culprits of economic hardship, if political or military contenders for power use the economic crisis as a weapon against incumbents, or if observation of unrest in neighboring countries acts as a vector of contagion. Tensions from the crisis may exacerbate preexisting sources of instability in many African countries, including ongoing or recently resolved conflicts, fragile institutions, xenophobia, and income inequality. At the same time, widespread economically driven protests such as those seen in 2008 have not been repeated in 2009, and some believe the threat may be overstated. At the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London in April 2009, member states agreed to inject $1 trillion into the world economy in order to combat the effects of the global crisis. This included a commitment to support growth in emerging market and developing countries.\",\n \"For example, the G-20 committed to increase lending resources available to the IMF by $250 billion through immediate contributions from some IMF member countries, and to use additional resources from agreed sales of IMF gold to provide $6 billion in additional financing (including concessional lending) for poor countries over the next two to three years. At the same time, some observers contend that \\\"the legitimate concerns of LICs [low-income countries] in general, and Africa in particular, have not featured prominently in international rescue efforts.\\\" At the July 2009 G-8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy, members declared that they were \\\"determined to assist developing countries in coping with the impact of the [economic] crisis\\\" and committed to fulfilling the Gleneagles commitments on aid (discussed earlier) and improving aid effectiveness, and strengthening global initiatives to achieve the MDGs and other anti-poverty goals. Led by the United States, the G-8 agreed to mobilize $20 billion over the next three years for agricultural development assistance in additional to prior commitments of emergency and humanitarian food aid. The United States committed to doubling U.S. agricultural development assistance to more than $1 billion in 2010, providing at least $3.5 billion over the next\",\n \"three years.\",\n \"Significant portions of any increase in agricultural assistance may be directed toward African countries. However, some observers view these pledges as unlikely to be fully upheld. The World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), and the IMF have all stepped up lending to the region since the onset of the financial crisis. These institutions have also reformed several of their existing loan and assistance programs, or created new facilities, to target their efforts to the current crisis. These include, for example, the IMF's Exogenous Shocks Facility, the World Bank's new Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility and Infrastructure Crisis Facility, and the AfDB's new Emergency Liquidity Facility and Trade Finance Initiative. These are aimed at offsetting budget shortfalls, increasing liquidity, and providing financing for infrastructure and trade finance—all of which are considered by many analysts to be crucial to Africa's eventual economic recovery. The World Bank and the AfDB share a development focus, and provide financing for projects as wide-ranging as heavy infrastructure, education and health policies, financial sector development, and natural resource management. World Bank lending to Africa in its 2009 fiscal year (July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009) was $9.9 billion, up 36% from $7.3 billion in\",\n \"FY2008.\",\n \"The AfDB, according to its president Donald Kabaruka, is on target to commit $11 billion in 2009, doubling its 2008 commitments. Much of this assistance is at highly discounted interest rates. To ramp up assistance to the World Bank's poorest member countries, World Bank member countries approved the Financial Crisis Response Fast-Track Facility. This facility will allow the Bank to front-load $2 billion of the $42 billion of assistance available under its International Development Association's 2007 financial replenishment (known as IDA-15). A total of 15 African countries had benefitted from front-loading of IDA resources by August 2009. The Democratic Republic of Congo was one of the first countries to take advantage of this new facility, receiving Bank approval for a package totaling $100 million in February 2009. The World Bank's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has expanded or launched five new facilities aimed at supporting the private sector in affected emerging market and developing countries worldwide. The IFC expects financing for these new facilities to total roughly $31 billion between 2009 and 2011.\",\n \"The World Bank has also initiated several policies aimed at mitigating the impacts of the crisis on Africa in particular, including scaling up its lending and policy advice with a focus on poverty-reducing activities, safety nets, infrastructure support, and budget support to compensate for the loss in private capital flows. Beneficiary countries of World Bank targeted lending include South Africa, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia. In addition, the World Bank's new Infrastructure Crisis Facility (IFC) is making $300 million available to provide top-up financing for viable, privately funded infrastructure projects experiencing financial distress, or which are no longer able to reach financial closure. The Bank is also stepping up knowledge assistance to help countries prepare contingency plans for responding to the crisis. This package of assistance supplements the Bank's $1.2 billion Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), launched in response to the 2008 food crisis. As of January 2009, 10 African countries had received a total of $83 million in GFRP resources to fund seed and fertilizer purchases, safety net programs, and budget support for governments whose fiscal balances were hurt by high fuel costs.\",\n \"The Bank also increased its lending to projects supporting African agriculture, from $800 million in 2008 to $1 billion in 2009. The Bank also plans to expand infrastructure investments through a $45 billion Infrastructure Recovery and Assets Platform (INFRA), about one-third of whose resources will be spent in Africa, depending on country demand. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) announced four new crisis-response initiatives in March 2009: a $1.5 billion Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF); a $1 billion Trade Finance Initiative (TFI); a framework for accelerated transfer of African Development Fund resources to eligible countries; and enhanced policy advisory support. The newly created ELF aims to provide financing to eligible African beneficiaries to support a broad range of obligations, including underpinning a fiscal stimulus and supporting public-private partnerships at risk. The ELF has a fast-tracked application process, with proposals considered by the AfDB Board within 10 working days. The TFI plans to launch a new line of credit of $500 million designed to enable commercial banks and development institutions in Africa to use Bank resources to support trade financing. Accelerated African Development Fund transfers—concessional loans and grants—are expected to provide budget support and infrastructure financing.\",\n \"In addition to various ongoing and new projects addressing infrastructure, governance, macroeconomic policy, skills development, humanitarian relief, and other areas, the AfDB has approved several loans in recent months designed primarily to offset the impact of the global economic crisis. The Bank reportedly saw its lending nearly double to $11 billion between mid-2008 and mid-2009, with funds going largely to budgetary support, trade finance, and infrastructure projects (notably ports and airports in Tunisia, Senegal, and Djibouti, where investors had withdrawn). Recent loans explicitly linked to fallout from the crisis include a $1.5 billion loan for Botswana designed to help address a budget deficit estimated at 13.5% of GDP, the first such loan to Botswana from the AfDB in 17 years (June 2009); and a $97.18 million grant to the Democratic Republic of Congo to finance the country's Emergency Program to Mitigate the Impacts of the International Financial Crisis (May 2009). Unlike the AfDB and the World Bank, which fund specific development projects, the IMF provides loans to help countries that cannot meet their international payments and are unable to borrow money from other governments or raise capital on the financial markets at affordable terms.\",\n \"The IMF is often called the international lender of last resort. The Fund is increasing its financial assistance to Africa in response to the crisis, doubling \\\"access limits\\\"—the ceiling amount that countries may borrow—for low-income countries. IMF lending to low-income countries in response to the economic crisis is expected to reach $8 billion by the end of 2010. In Africa, new IMF lending commitments from January to mid-July 2009 were $2.7 billion, an increase from $1.1 billion in 2008. The amount of IMF credit available to the region fell sharply following implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) agreed on at the June 2005 G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland; the total amount of IMF credit available to African countries totals about $4.7 billion, $2 billion of which remains undrawn. Cote D'Ivoire ($581 million) and Zambia ($342 million) have the largest loan programs in the region. With the exception of one loan (to Gabon), all IMF financial assistance to Africa is provided through the IMF's concessional lending facilities, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF).\",\n \"The IMF has also accelerated long-standing efforts to revamp its lending and policy support programs for African borrowers and other low-income countries. Among recent reforms, the creation of $250 billion worth of IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) and their equi-proportional (all countries receive an amount relative to their IMF quota share) allocation to all member countries is of particular interest, as is the approval of a second SDR allocation (around $33.9 billion) specifically for under-represented countries, many in Africa. African countries are expected to receive around $11 billion in SDRs from the two allocations, which will be helpful for countries in the region that have seen their foreign exchange reserves drop sharply in an effort to avoid defaulting on their foreign financial obligations. African governments established a Committee of Ten African Finance Ministers and Central and Regional Bank Governors (C-10) at an AfDB-organized meeting in Tunis in November 2008. Finance ministers and central bank governors have met several times since then to discuss the impact of the crisis and possible policy responses. Some countries have set up economic monitoring units and deployed limited fiscal and monetary resources. Steps taken by some African governments have reportedly included\",\n \"fiscal stimulus packages (e.g.\",\n \"Mauritius, South Africa), targeted assistance to certain sectors (Nigeria, Uganda), expansionary monetary policy (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa), and bond financing of public expenditures (Cape Verde, Kenya). Nevertheless, most African governments have little capacity to fund policy interventions to address the crisis. Effective economic governance continues to be lacking in many countries, and responses are projected to be restrained by the relative unavailability of foreign reserves, insufficient budgetary margins for enacting fiscal stimulus packages, and restrictions on incurring further external debt in countries that have benefited from international debt relief. While multilateral institutions have urged African governments to focus spending on social security nets and infrastructure projects—which have the potential to stimulate the economy while addressing some of the long-term obstacles to economic growth—regional expenditures on infrastructure fell far short of World Bank recommendations even before the crisis hit. Some believe high levels of corruption could additionally impede the effectiveness of government responses to the crisis. There is strong congressional interest in African socioeconomic development and regional stability. Congressional interest in fostering U.S.\",\n \"economic ties with African countries is evidenced in recent hearings, such as that held in June 2009 by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, on \\\"U.S.-Africa Trade Relations: Creating a Platform for Economic Growth\\\"; in pending legislation, such as H.Con.Res. 128 , \\\"Expressing the sense of Congress that Africa is of significant strategic, political, economic, and humanitarian importance to the United States\\\" (referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in May 2009); and in existing laws and programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). A consideration of the impact of the crisis may affect bilateral and regional aid levels and programs, U.S. trade policy toward Africa, and analyses of regional and country-level political trends, among other areas. The U.S. government has announced several new policies to aid developing countries affected by the crisis, though it has not, to date, formulated a policy specifically aimed at addressing the impact on Africa. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L.\",\n \"111-32 , passed into law on June 24, 2009), includes $255.6 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for \\\"assistance for vulnerable populations in developing countries severely affected by the global financial crisis,\\\" with certain eligibility criteria. However, while an initial House report on the legislation provided that five African countries—Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia—should \\\"receive priority consideration,\\\" along with several other countries outside the region, the subsequent conference report did not include such specifications. In July 2009, the Obama Administration noted the impact of the economic crisis on developing countries in announcing its commitment to double U.S. agricultural development assistance to more than $1 billion in 2010, and to provide at least $3.5 billion over the next three years. The initiative is global, not uniquely focused on Africa, though the Administration cited the U.S. Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) as a \\\"model.\\\" U.S. responses to date have focused on support for multilateral lending and grant initiatives. Moving forward, this may include increased financial support to the international financial institutions to which African countries are expected to apply for economic support during the crisis. In the 2009 Supplemental ( P.L. 111-32 ), Congress approved U.S.\",\n \"participation in a range of measures designed to increase the amount of financial assistance the IMF may provide to its member states in the wake of the economic crisis. The AfDB has also requested an increase in financing by the G-20. Relevant legislation includes S. 955 , the African Development Fund Replenishment Act of 2009.\"\n]","isConversational":false}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":123,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":17517,"offset":12300,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NTgzNTI5MiwianRpIjoiODZjNWQ3NzgtYjI1ZC00MzYzLWJkNTctYjQxYzc3NTM4MTU0Iiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL01lbW9yeUFzTW9kYWxpdHkvR292UmVwb3J0IiwiZXhwIjoxNzg1ODM4ODkyLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2h1Z2dpbmdmYWNlLmNvIn0.hv5DwZ7zCsLsUwfvYnXQ9cJX_vnCixTEVNajx4__8wnbr3NPTxtUO93lQzjqSQnIlqAbI_CfBmdocZ9_cxMtDg","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":17517,"numBytesParquet":457844401},{"config":"default","split":"validation","numRows":973,"numBytesParquet":26212940},{"config":"default","split":"test","numRows":973,"numBytesParquet":24116173}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":0,"total":0},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id string | question string | answer string | documents list |
|---|---|---|---|
train_12300 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the nation's civil campaign finance regulator. The agency ensures that campaign fundraising and spending is publicly reported; that those regulated by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and by commission regulations comply and have access to guidance; and that publicly fin... | [
"The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is a six-member independent regulatory agency. Congress created the FEC in 1974, after controversial fundraising during 1960s presidential campaigns and the early 1970s Watergate scandal. The commission is responsible for administering federal campaign finance law and for civi... |
train_12301 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. VA carries out its programs nationwide through three administrations and the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for veterans health care program... | [
"The history of the present-day Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) can be traced back to July 21, 1930, when President Hoover issued Executive Order 5398, creating an independent federal agency known as the Veterans Administration by consolidating many separate veterans' programs. On October 25, 1988, President Re... |
train_12302 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. 108-130) gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initial authority to collect user fees from sponsors for the review of animal drug applications. ADUFA mirrors fee programs for human drugs and medical devices. Program authority sunsets October 1, 2008, and FDA wou... | [
"The Animal Drug User Fee Act of 2003 (ADUFA I, P.L. 108-130 ) was signed by the President in November 2003. It established a new requirement, effective in FY2004, for FDA to collect fees from sponsors of brand-name animal drugs in order to reduce the backlog of reviews for those products, decrease the time require... |
train_12303 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal-state program whose mission is to enhance the well-being of children by helping custodial parents obtain financial support for their children from the noncustodial parent. Child support payments enable parents who do not live with their children to fulfill their ... | [
"Child support is the cash payment that noncustodial parents are obligated to pay for the financial care of their children. It is usually established when a couple dissolves their relationship (e.g., divorce, separation) or when a custodial parent applies for welfare assistance. The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) ... |
train_12304 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The President submitted his FY2008 appropriations request to Congress on February 5, 2007, including $105.2 billion for programs covered in this appropriations bill: $21.2 billion for Title I (military construction and family housing); $83.9 billion for Title II (veterans affairs); and $163 million for Title III (relat... | [
"Representative Chet Edwards, chair of the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies, introduced the appropriations bill on June 11, 2007. The House passed the bill on June 15 and sent it to the Senate. Senator Jack Reed proposed amendment of the ... |
train_12305 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The State Department's annual release of the Trafficking in Persons report (commonly referred to as the TIP Report) has been closely monitored by Congress, foreign governments, the media, advocacy groups, and other foreign policy observers. The 109th Congress first mandated the report's publication in the Trafficking V... | [
"Congress has led both U.S. and international efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, particularly with its enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 ). Division A of that act, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), established U.... |
train_12306 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The convergence of wireless telecommunications technology with the Internet Protocol (IP) is fostering new generations of mobile technologies. This transformation has created new demands for advanced communications infrastructure and radio frequency spectrum capacity that can support high-speed, content-rich uses. Furt... | [
"The purpose of spectrum policy, law, and regulation is to manage a natural resource for the maximum possible benefit of the public. Electromagnetic spectrum, commonly referred to as radio frequency spectrum or wireless spectrum, refers to the properties in air that transmit electric signals and, with applied techn... |
train_12307 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | In the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 term, concluded June, 2004, the Court accepted for reviewseven environmental cases -- an unusually large number. Five decisions were handed down duringthe term, and two cases were carried over to the upcoming 2004-2005 term. Of the five decided cases, three involve the Clean Air Act (CA... | [
"The broad concern of Alaska DEC is EPA's authority to oversee state administration of theClean Air Act (CAA), and in particular to enforce the act contrary to state determinations. Theprecise issue is whether EPA may issue CAA noncompliance orders to a company, where suchorders effectively overrule a state permit ... |
train_12308 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Homebuyers who were unable to close on their properties by the June 30, 2010, deadline imposed by the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-92) may still be able to receive the first-time homebuyer tax credit if they close before October 1, 2010, so long as they had a binding contract for... | [
"Homebuyers who were unable to close on their purchases by the June 30, 2010, deadline imposed by the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-92 ) have been granted an additional three months in which to complete their sales and still qualify for the first-time homebuyer tax credit. On... |
train_12309 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Given declining state revenues and increased demand for public programs like Medicaid, states have been faced with difficult choices about how to allocate limited funds. To address budget shortfalls, many states have sought to shrink their Medicaid costs in various ways, including reducing the rates at which health car... | [
"Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program through which the federal government provides financial assistance to states for medical care and other services for poor, elderly, and disabled individuals. Although participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, states, as a condition of participation, are req... |
train_12310 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The situation in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which is also known as simply Timor-Leste or East Timor, is relatively calm compared with recent periods of political strife and insurrection. That said, some underlying tensions, such as with the security sector, remain to be resolved. Timor-Leste faces many ser... | [
"On May 20, 2002, the Democratic Republic of East Timor (Timor-Leste) gained its independence, and on September 27, it became the 191 st member of the United Nations. With the help of the United Nations transitional administration, East Timor's independence marked the end of three centuries of Portuguese rule and 2... |
train_12311 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Recent attention concerning National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance pertains to unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. Since these programs were publicly disclosed over the course of two days in June, there has been confusion about what information is being collected and under w... | [
"Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance address unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These programs arise from provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, they rely on separate authorities, collect different types of... |
train_12312 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Treasury and General Government accounts are funded for FY2003 through the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ; Division J). Because the accounts in thisappropriation were not funded, other than under continuing resolution, as the 107th Congressadjourned, legislation was required for that pur... | [
"On March 25, 2003, the President sent a FY2003 supplemental request to Congress, withrequests for additional funding in support of actions in the Middle East. Accounts within theExecutive Office of the President, as well as the Department of Homeland Security would beaffected. With the enactment of the Consolidate... |
train_12313 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original report, ... | [
"This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress , by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original re... |
train_12314 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report is part of a suite of reports that address appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorate, th... | [
"This report is part of a suite of reports that address appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the third title of the homeland security appropriations bill—the National Protection and Programs Directorat... |
train_12315 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The deepening of the financial crisis in 2008 led the Federal Reserve (Fed) to revive an obscure provision found in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 344) to extend credit to nonbank financial firms for the first time since the 1930s. Section 13(3) provides the Fed with greater flexibility than its no... | [
"The financial crisis that began in 2007 and deepened in 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression. The federal policy response was swift, large, creative, and controversial, creating unprecedented tools to grapple with financial instability. Particularly notable were the actions taken by the Federal Reserve (F... |
train_12316 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after almost 40 years of civil war, was drawn into a devastating new conflict in late 2013, when a political dispute that overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines turned violent. Civilians have been routinely targeted in the conflict, often along ethni... | [
"South Sudan emerged in 2011 as the world's newest country, and one of its least developed. After almost 40 years of war between the Sudan government and southern insurgents, southern Sudanese voted in a January 2011 referendum to secede from Sudan. More than 2.5 million people were killed in the civil war and some... |
train_12317 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is the federal authority for regulating contaminants in public water supplies. It includes the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, established in 1996 to help public water systems finance infrastructure projects needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations... | [
"The quality of water delivered by public water systems has been regulated at the federal level since enactment of the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Since then, the Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA) has issued regulations for more than 90 contaminants, and all states (except Wyoming) have assumed primar... |
train_12318 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | For several years, some Members of Congress have favored "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent imm... | [
"For several years, some Members of Congress have favored \"comprehensive immigration reform\" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal perman... |
train_12319 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | U.S. immigration policy is a highly contentious issue in the 110th Congress. The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States is at the highest level in U.S. history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population not seen since the early 20th century. There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. i... | [
"The number of foreign-born people residing in the United States (37 million) is at the highest level in our history and has reached a proportion of the U.S. population (12.4%) not seen since the early 20 th century. Of the foreign-born residents in the United States, approximately one-third are naturalized citizen... |
train_12320 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Congress faces decisions about prioritizing new lock construction projects on the inland waterway system. As both houses debate differing versions of water resources and development bills (S. 2800, H.R. 8) and the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (S. 2975, H.R. 5895), the decision about which of ... | [
"Congress faces decisions about prioritizing lock construction projects on the inland waterway system ( Figure 1 ). It has authorized 20 such projects for construction, and has authorized preconstruction studies of one other. As both houses debate differing versions of water resources and development bills ( S. 280... |
train_12321 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, ( P.L. 109-248 , H.R. 4472 ), emerged from Congress following the passage of separate bills in the House and Senate ( H.R. 3132 and S. 1086 respectively). The act's provisions fall into four categories: a revised sex offender registration system, child and sex related ame... | [
"The President signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act on July 27, 2006. The act serves four basic purposes. First, it reformulates the federal standards for sex offender registration in state, territorial and tribal sexual offender registries, and does so in a manner designed to make the system more ... |
train_12322 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Summary The United States is the world's biggest economy (in nominal dollars), leading trading nation (goods and services), and largest source of and destination for foreign direct investment. The U.S. output of goods and services, or gross domestic product (GDP), totaled $19.5 trillion in 2017. That is almost the comb... | [
"Overview The United States is the world's biggest economy (in nominal dollars), leading trading nation (goods and services), and largest source of and destination for foreign direct investment. The U.S. output of goods and services, or gross domestic product (GDP), totaled $19.5 trillion in 2017. That is almost th... |
train_12323 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | President Obama's first budget request included over $45 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in FY2010. The requested funding level was roughly $4 billion more than was provided in regular annual appropriations in FY2009 by P.L. 111-8. However, it is about $9 billion less than total FY2009 fundi... | [
"Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. HUD's programs are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incom... |
train_12324 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its statutory mission includes providing greater access for all Americans to tele... | [
"The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) with a statutory mission to facilitate domestic and international telecommunications and information policy activities. The NTIA works with other executive branch agencies to develop the Admi... |
train_12325 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Deforestation releases substantial amounts of carbon dioxide, about 17% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Legislation has been proposed for U.S. targets to reduce GHG emissions. The two primary bills, H.R. 2454 and S. 1733, include provisions that would reduce emissions from deforestation and forest ... | [
"Efforts to mitigate climate change have focused on reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions into the atmosphere. Some of these efforts focus on reducing deforestation, since deforestation is a significant source of CO 2 emissions. Deforestation releases about 1.6 GtCO 2 (gigatons or billion metric tons of CO 2 ) ... |
train_12326 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Article III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear "cases" and "controversies." The Constitution further creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibiting diminutions of... | [
"A rticle III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear \"cases\" and \"controversies.\" Additionally, the Constitution creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibitin... |
train_12327 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held in an 8 to 1 decision that if the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) grants premarket approval (PMA) to a medical device, the device manufacturer is immune from certain suits under state tort law, due to an express preemption provision in the Medical De... | [
"In order to elucidate the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. , this report begins by providing background on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) premarket regulation of medical devices and an overview of federal preemption of state law. The report discusses arguments for and against feder... |
train_12328 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The unemployment rate in 2007 averaged just 4.6%, which is low by historic standards and suggests the presence of tight labor market conditions that are related to long-running demographic trends. The oldest members of the baby-boom generation turned age 60 at the end of 2006, and every year thereafter, more of this la... | [
"U.S. employers again have turned their attention to the shortage of labor they anticipate will occur in the not-too-distant future. Concern about this possibility waned when the historically low unemployment rates from 1998 to 2000 rose during, and for some two years after, the March-November 2001 recession. In 20... |
train_12329 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The United States uses a number of policy tools to address the threat of attack using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. These include a set of financial and technical programs known, variously, as cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs, nonproliferation assistance, or, global security... | [
"Many experts have postulated that the threat of attack with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons represents one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. There is widespread agreement—within the U.S. government, among national security policy analysts, and across the political spe... |
train_12330 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Sentencing for all serious federal noncapital crimes begins with the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Congress establishes the maximum penalty and sometimes the minimum penalty for every federal crime by statute. In between, the Guidelines establish a series of escalating sentencing ranges based on the circumstances of t... | [
"The federal Sentencing Guidelines greatly influence the sentences imposed for federal crimes. Once binding on federal courts, the Guidelines are now the starting point for federal sentencing in most cases. They provide the principal standard against which the reasonableness of any sentence imposed is judged. In th... |
train_12331 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas despite provisions in immigration laws that bar the admission of terrorists. Fears that lax enforcement of immigration laws regulating th... | [
"Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens (i.e., noncitizens or foreign nationals) who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas. Fears that lax enforcement of immigration laws regulating the admission of foreign nationa... |
train_12332 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 (P.L. 109-171, S. 1932) on February 8, 2006 concluded a four-year saga of legislative attempts to reauthorize Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and related programs. The original 1996 TANF law authorized five years of funding, through September 2002. Bet... | [
"On December 20, 2006, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 was signed into law ( P.L. 109-432 ), continuing funding for the abstinence-only education block grant (at an annual $50 million rate) and program authority for Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) through June 30, 2007. Earlier, the Deficit Reducti... |
train_12333 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The House and Senate have been considering various approaches to open more federal lands to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting. S. 3525 addresses some of the same topics as H.R. 4089, which passed the House on April 17, 2012. Both concern hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, but the bills take differen... | [
"Several issues related to hunting, fishing, and recreational shooting, on both federal and state lands are addressed in S. 3525 , the Sportsman's Act of 2012. Hunting and conservation have been linked since the advent of federal wildlife legislation, such as the Lacey Act of 1900 (making it a federal crime to ship... |
train_12334 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Security conditions have improved since the Islamic St... | [
"Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Security conditions have improved since the Islam... |
train_12335 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, the 2014 farm bill) was signed into law by President Obama on February 7, 2014, after both the House and Senate voted to approve a conference agreement. The 2014 farm bill establishes agricultural and food policy for the next several years, and also addresses several aspects o... | [
"Federal forestry activities and programs historically have been associated with agriculture, and with agriculture legislation. Forestry programs have been addressed in past periodic omnibus farm bills and other agriculture legislation. These include programs to support management of nonfederal forests, forestry re... |
train_12336 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA) is a core legislative measure guiding U.S. policy toward Tibet. Its stated purpose is "to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard their distinct identity." Among other provisions, the TPA establishes in statute the State Department position of Special Coordinator ... | [
"The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA) is among the primary legislative measures guiding U.S. policy toward Tibet and the Tibetan people. Enacted into law on September 30, 2002, as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 ( P.L. 107-228 ), it lists its \"purpose\" as being \"to support the aspirations... |
train_12337 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in November 2001, has been at an impasse since 2009 and presently shows no signs of restarting, despite an interim agreement reached at the December 2013 Bali Ministerial. The goal of the Doha Round's agriculture negotiations is to make progress simultaneously... | [
"As part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that successfully culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, WTO members agreed to initiate new negotiations for continuing the agricultural trade reform process before the end of the implementation period (i.e., by... |
train_12338 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance, including provisions to raise revenues, in Division A of H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, as passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Ac... | [
"H.R. 3962 , Affordable Health Care for America Act, was passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Co... |
train_12339 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204 . This law has been described by some as the most important andfar-reaching securities legislation since passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. �� 77a et seq .,and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. ï... | [
"Section 101 establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board), a new,independent regulatory body, to oversee the auditing of issuers (publiccompanies which are subject to the federal securities laws). The Board's oversight of auditors is for the purpose ofprotecting the interests of investors. The ... |
train_12340 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (BCTPAA, title II of P.L. 114-26) renewed the "trade promotion authority" (TPA) under which implementing bills for trade agreements that address non-tariff barriers to trade (and certain levels of tariff reduction) are eligible for expedited (... | [
"T he Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (BCTPAA) makes legislation that would implement certain kinds of international trade agreement negotiated by the President eligible for congressional consideration under a set of statutory expedited procedures. The trade agreements in qu... |
train_12341 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | What would happen in 2016 if a candidate for President or Vice President were to die or leave the ticket any time between the national party conventions and the November 8 election day? What would happen if this occurred during presidential transition, either between election day and the December 19, 2016, meeting of t... | [
"Presidential succession in the United States is governed by the 25 th Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that the Vice President \"shall become President\" should the incumbent chief executive die, resign, or be removed from office. The new President then nominates a successor Vice President, subject to... |
train_12342 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The federal budget helps implement Congress's "power of the purse" by expressing Congress's spending priorities among competing aims. The Obama Administration's FY2010 budget described several important changes, including increased funding for certain domestic priorities, major programmatic reforms, and proposed spendi... | [
"The federal budget is central to Congress's ability to assert its \"power of the purse.\" Federal budget decisions express Congress's priorities among competing aims and reinforce Congress's influence on federal policies. The budget also affects, and is affected by, the national economy as a whole. The federal bud... |
train_12343 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Of the nation's 4.1 million miles of public access roads, 2.9 million, or 71%, are in rural areas. Rural roads account for about 30% of national vehicle miles traveled. However, with many rural areas experiencing population decline, states increasingly are struggling to maintain roads with diminishing traffic while at ... | [
"Despite steady urbanization, some 71% of U.S. road mileage is in rural areas. In recent decades, though, many rural areas have lost population, leaving state and local governments with the financial burden of maintaining roads that may carry diminishing traffic yet still be important to a particular community or t... |
train_12344 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Chile experienced a banking crisis from 1981-84 that in relative terms had a cost comparable in size to that perhaps facing the United States today. The Chilean Central Bank acted quickly and decisively in three ways to restore faith in the credit markets. It restructured firm and household loans, purchased nonperformi... | [
"The U.S. Congress is contemplating a $700 billion government assistance package to arrest the financial crisis in the United States. President Bush argued that failure to enact legislation quickly could result in a wholesale failure of the U.S. financial sector. As discussion of the Administration's plan unfolded,... |
train_12345 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Agencies are sometimes criticized for taking too long to promulgate regulations and issue decisions. Some amount of time, of course, is necessary for reasoned decisionmaking. However, unjustified delays have significant costs for regulated entities and the public at large. At the extreme, agency delays can undermine pu... | [
"Administrative agencies have long been criticized by some for taking too long to issue and implement regulations. Of course, there are often justifiable reasons cited for agencies to take time before they act. Agencies are charged with administering complex statutory schemes. Rulemakings generally follow the Admin... |
train_12346 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Twenty-first century criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal operations. These criminals can easily leverage the Internet to carry out traditional crimes such as distributing illicit drugs and sex trafficking. In addition, they exploit the digital world to facilit... | [
"Twenty-first century criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal operations. According to Europol's Organized Crime Threat Assessment, \"Internet technology has now emerged as a key facilitator for the vast majority of offline organised crime activity.\" For inst... |
train_12347 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | On April 9, 2001, the President submitted his FY2002 budget request which included nearly $8 billion for the Departmentof State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). This represents an increase of $925 million (or 13.1%)from theFY2001 enacted level which Congress passed and the President signed into law ( P.L.... | [
"Budgets for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), as well as U.S.contributions toUnited Nations (U.N.) International Organizations, and U.N. Peacekeeping, are within the Commerce, Justice, StateandRelated Agency (CJS) appropriations. Intertwined with the annual appropriations proce... |
train_12348 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Under programs administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), certain highway and bridge projects may be eligible for federal funding. Project approval and the receipt of federal funds are conditioned on the project sponsor (e.g., a local public works or state transpor... | [
"Under programs administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), certain highway and bridge projects may be eligible to receive federal-aid funding. As a condition of receiving those funds, a project sponsor (e.g., a local or state transportation agency) must meet ce... |
train_12349 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Even before passage of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), federal law protected the wolf, which was nearly eradicated in the lower 48 states by the mid-1900s. Following ESA enactment, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) placed four gray wolf subspecies—the eastern timber wolf, the Mexican wolf, the Texas gray wolf,... | [
"For centuries, wolf populations have been under pressure by humans. Wolves are carnivores, feeding not only on a variety of animal species smaller than themselves, but also on very large mammals such as bison, elk, and even moose. Wolves are able to prey on large mammals by hunting cooperatively in packs. However,... |
train_12350 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Congress designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the nation's sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository in 1987, following years of controversy over the site-selection process. Over the strenuous objections of the State of Nevada, the Department of Energy (DOE) submitted a license application fo... | [
"Nevada's Yucca Mountain has been the sole candidate site for the nation's first permanent high-level nuclear waste repository since Congress singled it out in 1987 and halted consideration of any other location. After numerous delays, the Department of Energy (DOE), which was supposed to open a waste repository by... |
train_12351 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The federal Medicaid statute and accompanying regulations include provisions that states can apply to certain program beneficiaries with respect to out-of-pocket cost-sharing, including premiums that may be required on a monthly or quarterly basis, enrollment fees that may be applied on an annual or semiannual basis, a... | [
"Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that, in FY2012, financed the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports, to nearly 57 million people and cost states and the federal government a total of $431 billion. Each state designs and administers its own version... |
train_12352 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Members of Congress may forfeit or lose their congressional pensions upon conviction of certain federal crimes under two different provisions of federal law: 1. Under the so-called "Hiss Act," Members of Congress (and most other officers and employees of the federal government) will forfeit their entire federal employe... | [
"This report discusses the current law with respect to the loss of the federal pension of a Member of Congress for the conviction of certain crimes and the recent law to limit a former Member's receiving service credit toward a federal pension for any time served as a Member of Congress if that person is convicted ... |
train_12353 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | A provision in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71 § 108; 115Stat. 611) permits each airport where federal screeners are currently deployed to request privatescreeners instead of federal screeners starting in November 2004. A pilot program created by theact was established at five airports ... | [
"A particularly interesting facet of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L.107-71 ) is the security screening opt-out provision (Sec. 108) that allows airports, with the approvalof the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to implement a system using private screenersin lieu of federal scr... |
train_12354 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | On May 2-3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta and the Rangoon area of Burma. Estimates of the number of people who died was 135,000 as of early June 2008. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their homes and sources of livelihood. Foreign governments and relief organizations sought to bring in massive aid, b... | [
"Estimates of the death toll of Cyclone Nargis on May 2-3, 2008, were 135,000 as of early June 2008. The United Nations estimated that between 1.6 million and 2.5 million people were affected by the storm, left homeless or without basic sources of livelihood such as food and water. Immediately, foreign governments,... |
train_12355 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The individual states have been acknowledged as the primary regulators of insurance since 1868. Following the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, this system has operated with the explicit blessing of Congress, but has also been subject to periodic scrutiny and suggestions that the time may have come for Congress to reclaim th... | [
"Insurance companies constitute a major segment of the U.S. financial services industry. The industry is often separated into two parts: life and health insurance companies, which also often offer annuity products; and property and casualty insurance companies, which include most other lines of insurance, such as h... |
train_12356 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The House and the Senate have considered immigration measures on a variety of issues in the 114th Congress. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) extends four immigration programs through September 30, 2016: the EB-5 immigrant investor Regional Center Pilot Program, the E-Verify employment eligibilit... | [
"Although immigration has not been a front-burner issue in the 114 th Congress, the House and the Senate have acted on a number of immigration-related measures. Border security has been the focus of much of this legislative activity, with the House and the Senate considering legislation on border security strate gy... |
train_12357 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | With the on-going requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans have come under congressional scrutiny todetermine whether or not they could be safely reduced or terminated. This report examines thehistory and current status of U.S. military ope... | [
"Before February 1993, the Clinton Administration steadfastly refused to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. It then adopted a policy to provide troopsto oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations atWright-Patterson Air Force Base in Day... |
train_12358 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated more than $33 billion for homeland security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas. The Grant Programs Directorate and the National Preparedness Directorate, withi... | [
"This report is an overview of the FY2010 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs that are designed to provide assistance to state and local governments, and public and private entities, such as ports. These programs are primarily used by first responders, which include firefighters, e... |
train_12359 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), owners and operators of eligible land may enter into a contract with the Secretary of Agriculture to enroll land in the program and convert it to less intensive use under an approved conservation plan. In return, participants receive an annual payment that the statute refer... | [
"The Conservation Reserve Program is a federal program originally intended to remove highly erodible croplands from production for periods of 10 to 15 years. Participants in the program agree to remove the land from production and follow an approved conservation plan. The program was established by the Food Securit... |
train_12360 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shut down oil and gas production from the Outer ContinentalShelf in the Gulf of Mexico, the source for 25% of U.S. crude oil production and 20% of natural gasoutput. Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, resulted in the shutdown of most crude oil andnatural gas production in the Gulf of... | [
"Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shut down oil and gas production from the Outer ContinentalShelf in the Gulf of Mexico, the source for 25% of U.S. crude oil production and 20% of natural gasoutput. Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, resulted in the shutdown of most crude oil andnatural gas production in the Gu... |
train_12361 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Brokers and dealers and investment advisers have been held to different standards of conduct in their dealings with investors. In very general terms, a broker-dealer is held to a suitability standard, and an investment adviser is held to a fiduciary duty standard. With passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and C... | [
"Brokers and dealers and investment advisers have been held to different standards of conduct in their dealings with investors. In very general terms, a broker-dealer is held to a suitability standard, and an investment adviser is held to a fiduciary duty standard. With passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform ... |
train_12362 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Today's global economy, or what many call globalization, has a growing impact on the economic futures of American companies, workers, and families. Increasing integration with the world economy makes the U.S. and other economies more productive. For most Americans, this has translated into absolute increases in living ... | [
"The U.S. economy is becoming increasingly open to the world economy. Much of what Americans consume or buy is produced in other countries. Similarly, much of what Americans produce is exported abroad. Huge quantities of capital or money flow into and out of the United States every day, swamping the value of goods ... |
train_12363 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; the U.S. Courts of Appeals and District Courts; Defe... | [
"The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2018 judiciary appropriations, with subsections covering each major action, including the initial submission of the request on May 23, 2017; a hearing held by the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Gove... |
train_12364 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | In November 2003, the U.S. attorney's office in Miami dropped a criminal case againstaformer federal baggage screener charged with stealing from a passenger's luggage. The case was dropped becauseprosecutors fearedthat sensitive security information (SSI) would have to be disclosed. At issue is the ability of the Trans... | [
"RS21727 -- Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and Transportation Security: Background andControversies February 5, 2004 On November 16, 2001, 63 days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed the Aviation andTransportation Security Act (ATSA); and the President signed it into ... |
train_12365 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Belgium in March 2016, which were perpetrated mainly by French and Belgian citizens, have increased focus on the potential security risks posed by the visa waiver program (VWP). The VWP allows nationals from certain countries, many of which are in Europe, to enter ... | [
"On December 8, 2015, the House passed H.R. 158 , the Visa Waiver Program Improvement Act of 2015, by a vote of 407 to 19. H.R. 158 , as passed by the House, was included in the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 114-113 ), which was signed into law on December 18, 2015. Among other things, the act chang... |
train_12366 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | China is the world's most populous country with approximately 1.4 billion people. It has experienced tremendous economic growth over the last three decades with an average annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 9.8% during that period. This has led to an increasing demand for energy, spurring China to more ... | [
"China is the world's most populous country with approximately 1.4 billion people. It has experienced tremendous economic growth over the last three decades with an average annual increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 9.8% during that period. This rapid economic growth has led to an increasing demand for ener... |
train_12367 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | For the first few centuries after the arrival of Europeans in North America, plants and animals of many species were sent between the two land masses. The transfer of non-natives consisted not only of intentional westbound species ranging from pigs to dandelions but also of intentional eastbound species such as grey sq... | [
"It is easy to find well-publicized examples of threats from invasive species: Burmese pythons multiply in South Florida, becoming top carnivores and killing large numbers of native species of reptiles, birds, and mammals. Formosan termites devastate living trees and historic buildings in New Orleans' French Quarte... |
train_12368 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Four types of tax-advantaged accounts can be used to pay for unreimbursed qualifying medical expenses: health care flexible spending accounts (FSAs), health reimbursement accounts (HRAs), health savings accounts (HSAs), and medical savings accounts (MSAs). Qualifying unreimbursed medical expenses are defined in the Int... | [
"Four types of tax-advantaged accounts can be used to pay for qualifying unreimbursed medical expenses: Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs), Health Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs), Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), and Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). Qualifying medical expenses typically include deductibles,... |
train_12369 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil application... | [
"The United States has historically led the international community in establishing regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. The regimes and their member countries use cooperative and coercive measures to achieve nonproliferation and counterproliferation object... |
train_12370 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has exerted great effort inmanipulating the flow of information and prohibiting the dissemination of viewpoints that criticizethe government or stray from the official Communist party view. The introduction of Internettechnology in the mid-1990's presente... | [
"In the early stages of its development, the Internet presented a challenge to Chinesegovernment control over information flows and public opinion. In pursuit of economic growth andmodernization, however, the government actively promoted Internet development. Because it issubject to PRC censorship, yet continues to... |
train_12371 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Energy policy continues to be a major legislative issue, despite passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58). Shortly after EPACT's enactment, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita temporarily shut down production of oil and gas and refining capacity in Texas and Louisiana. World and domestic demand for oil rem... | [
"In the first session of the 110 th Congress, energy policy enters its eighth year as a major legislative issue. The previous Congress passed a massive energy bill, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58 ), but subsequent developments worked to keep crude oil and gasoline prices high and interest in legi... |
train_12372 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), eight agencies are designated components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are funded primarily with annual discretionary appropriations. They also receive significant amounts of funding from other sources, including mandatory funds from ... | [
"The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designated 8 of its 11 operating divisions (agencies) as components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) th... |
train_12373 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Buy America Act is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). These funds are used to make grants to states, localities, and other non-federal government entities for various transportation projects. Specific... | [
"The Buy America Act is the popular name for a group of domestic content restrictions that have been attached to funds administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). These funds are used to make grants to states, localities, and other non-federal government entities for various transportation projects. The... |
train_12374 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal/state program that is designed to promote self-sufficiency of families in which one of the biological parents is living outside of the home. The program achieves its mission by trying to ensure that noncustodial parents meet their financial responsibility to thei... | [
"The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal/state program that is designed to promote self-sufficiency of families in which one of the biological parents is living outside of the home. The program achieves its mission by trying to ensure that noncustodial parents meet their financial responsibility to... |
train_12375 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Communications between congressional committees and constituents and stakeholder groups have changed with the development of social networking services. Many committees now use email, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, Twitter, Facebook, and other services—technologies that were either nonexistent or not widel... | [
"Committees have existed within the House and Senate since the first Congress. Initially, committees were ad-hoc—temporarily convened to address specific pieces of legislation and disbanded after reporting to the House or Senate. By the early 1800s, both the House and Senate \"developed a system of permanent, or st... |
train_12376 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set up a depreciation system designed to equalize tax burdens on different types of assets. The recovery period for nonresidential structures was, however, lengthened in 1993. Economic conditions and practices that may bear on this issue have also changed. Lately, there has been some interest... | [
"The Tax Reform Act of 1986 set up a depreciation system designed to equalize tax burdens on different types of assets. The recovery period for nonresidential structures was, however, lengthened in 1993. Economic conditions and practices that may bear on this issue have also changed. Lately, there has been some int... |
train_12377 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | As Congress searches for ways to generate savings, reduce the deficit, and fund federal programs, it has held hearings and passed legislation to prevent and recover improper payments. Improper payments—which exceeded $137 billion in FY2015—are payments made in an incorrect amount, payments that should not have been mad... | [
"In an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate billions of dollars in improper payments made by federal agencies each fiscal year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA; P.L. 107-300 ; 116 Stat. 2350) in 2002. IPIA established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and ... |
train_12378 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Tax cuts have been addressed recently. Rate reductions and across the board tax cuts were part of the H.R. 1836 , the tax cut signed by the President on June 7. Thisbill includes the changes in standard deductions and rate brackets relating to the marriagepenalty and also included in H.R. 6 , passed earlier by the Hous... | [
"The AMT provides for an alternative tax calculation on a broader tax base than theregular tax. Individuals add back a variety of provisions including not only business provisions but certain itemized deductions (mainly state and local taxes, some medicalexpenses and miscellaneous deductions), the standard deductio... |
train_12379 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report provides an introduction to the Volcker Rule, which is the regulatory regime imposed upon banking institutions and their affiliates under Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-203). The Volker Rule is designed to prohibit "banking entities" from engag... | [
"On December 10, 2013, more than two years after the statutorily mandated deadline, five federal financial regulators published final regulations (hereinafter, the regulations) implementing Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter, Section 619 or the statute). Togeth... |
train_12380 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andsecurity forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forcesoccupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military andcivilian casualties and the massive destruc... | [
"Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andother security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a population variously estimatedat less than one-half to one million) in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the regionby early 2000. (1) Thecon... |
train_12381 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The increasing popularity of breastfeeding has focused attention on how the law facilitates or discourages the practice. One issue that has arisen involves breastfeeding mothers and jury duty, and whether a breastfeeding mother may receive an excuse or deferral from compulsory jury duty. At the present time there is no... | [
"Since 1993, many states have enacted laws relating to breastfeeding. Currently, forty-three states and Puerto Rico have enacted some form of breastfeeding legislation, which most commonly addresses breastfeeding in the workplace and exempting nursing mothers from laws dealing with indecent exposure and/or criminal... |
train_12382 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The 111th Congress is considering legislation to revise the U.S. food safety system, focusing primarily on those laws and programs administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The House has passed a comprehensive bill, H.R. 2749, and the Senate Committ... | [
"The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified as many as 15 federal agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within the... |
train_12383 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The FY2005 Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies appropriations bill was passed as Division H of P.L. 108-447 , an omnibus appropriations bill, and was signed into law on December8, 2004. The bill provides $90.6 billion for Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies. However, the bill also includes ... | [
"On December 8, 2004, the President signed H.R. 4818 , the ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, 2005 ( P.L. 108-447 ). Congress approved the conference committee report on H.R. 4818 ( H.Rept. 108-792 ), which incorporated the Transportation, Treasury, andIndependent Agencies FY2005 Appropriations bill and eight other ap... |
train_12384 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and oversight—to the Palestinians' ongoing conflict with Israel. The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel a... | [
"Congress plays a significant role in U.S. policymaking toward the Palestinians. Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1990s, the United States has sought to help facilitate a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian ... |
train_12385 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The 110th Congress may well face several decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a major subset of which is peace operations. A November 28, 2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive that designates stability operations as "core missions" of the U.S. military marks a major ... | [
"U.S. policymakers have grappled for a decade and a half with issues involved in deploying U.S. military personnel to conduct \"peacekeeping\" missions. This broad, generic term is most generally used to denote missions to maintain peace and establish the basis for representative governance and economic growth. Sin... |
train_12386 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | As part of the implementation for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) required the military departments and defense agencies to create action plans for each of the BRAC Commission's recommendations. These plans, called "Business Plans", describe the implementing actions, ... | [
"Recommendations in the final report of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (hereafter referred to as the BRAC Commission or commission) became binding on November 9, 2005. In September and October 2005, Mr. Michael Wynne, then Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Techno... |
train_12387 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The importance of children's early learning experiences to their development and later success in school and the workforce has become a subject of increasing interest to the public, Members of Congress, and the Administration. During recent congresses many bills have been introduced that would provide funding to states... | [
"The importance of early learning for children's healthy development and positive outcomes in school and the workforce has become a subject of increasing interest to the public, Members of Congress, and the Adm inistration. During recent congresses many bills have been introduced that would provide funding to state... |
train_12388 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report discusses EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as it pertains to mobile sources, including cars, trucks, aircraft, ships, locomotives, nonroad vehicles and engines, and their fuels. The Supreme Court held in 2007 that the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes the agency to address GHG emissio... | [
"This report discusses the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) authority to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from mobile sources of pollution. Mobile sources include cars, trucks, aircraft, ships, locomotives, nonroad vehicles (e.g., tractors, bulldozers), portable equipment (i ncluding lawnmowers, cha... |
train_12389 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | On November 21, 2014, the House of Representatives filed a lawsuit against the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Treasury, pursuant to H.Res. 676. House of Representatives v. Burwell included two claims regarding the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In September 201... | [
"On July 30, 2014, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 676 , which authorized the Speaker of the House to initiate a civil lawsuit against the President and/or officials and employees of the executive branch for a failure to act consistent with their duties under the Constitution and federal law. In his publ... |
train_12390 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The U.S. Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the states and the federal government, with each state having its own government, endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. Although the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution designates "the Laws of the United St... | [
"T he Constitution establishes a \"system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government,\" with each state having its \"own government,\" \"endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence.\" As the Supreme Court has recognized, states \"possess sovereignty concurre... |
train_12391 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The United States and the European Union (EU) economic relationship is the largest in the world—and it is growing. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved since World War II, broadening as the 6-member European Community expanded into the present 28-member European Union. The ties have also become mo... | [
"The bilateral economic relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) is the largest such relationship in the world—and it is growing. It is a relationship forged over several centuries, since the European colonization of North America. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved... |
train_12392 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | In recent years, policymakers and youth advocates have focused greater attention on young people who are neither working nor in school. Generally characterized as "disconnected," these youth may also lack strong social networks that provide assistance in the form of employment connections and other supports such as hou... | [
"A young person's detachment from both the labor market and school is an indicator that he or she may not be adequately making the transition to adulthood. Referred to as \"disconnected\" in the social science literature, youth who are neither working nor in school may have difficulty gaining the skills and knowled... |
train_12393 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | This report discusses FY2018 appropriations (discretionary budget authority) for the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau), historic components of the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. This report will be updated as legislative develop... | [
"This report presents an overview of the FY2018 budget request, related congressional actions, and appropriations (discretionary budget authority) for the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau). These entities historically made up the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA)... |
train_12394 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of employee pension and welfare benefit plans offered by employers. To avoid the inconsistent regulation of employee benefit plans by state laws, ERISA preempts "any and all" state laws as they relate ... | [
"The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of employee pension and welfare benefit plans offered by employers. While ERISA does not require an employer to offer pension and welfare benefits, it does mandate compliance with its provisions i... |
train_12395 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The 108th Congress has considered and is considering legislation on a wide range of immigration issues. Chief among these are the immigration-related recommendations of theNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11Commission), expedited naturalization through military servic... | [
"The 108th Congress has considered and is considering legislation on a wide range ofimmigration issues. Two of these issues -- the transfer of immigration authorities and expeditednaturalization through military service -- relate directly to post-September 11, 2001 U.S. efforts toimprove national security. In the a... |
train_12396 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | When reconciliation directives (also referred to as reconciliation instructions) are included in an annual budget resolution, their purpose is to require committees to develop and report reconciliation legislation that will achieve the budgetary goals set forth in the annual budget resolution. The reconciliation direct... | [
"The purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to bring existing spending, revenue, and debt limit laws into compliance with current fiscal priorities established in the annual budget resolution. When Congress adopts a budget resolution, it is agreeing upon budgetary goals for the upcom... |
train_12397 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Although there has been some modification to the tax system, the tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level ... | [
"Almost every conversation about surface transportation finance begins with a two-part question: What are the \"needs\" of the national transportation system, and how does the nation pay for them? This report is aimed almost entirely at discussing the \"how to pay for them\" question. Since 1956, federal surface tr... |
train_12398 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | The historically slow rebound in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the current focus of some within the public policy community on the unequal distribution of the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) across U.S. households. This report examines chan... | [
"The historically slow pace of recovery in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the renewed interest among some members of the public policy community in the long-term trend of growing inequality in the distribution of income. In other words, the benefits of economic gr... |
train_12399 | Write a detailed summary of the following government report. | Sub-Saharan Africa has been strongly affected by the global recession, despite initial optimism that the global financial system would have few spillover effects on the continent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated in 2009 that average economic growth in Africa would slow to 1%, from an annual average of o... | [
"Amid signs that the global economy is emerging from the worldwide recession of late 2008 and 2009, African economies appear to be recovering from the crisis with the potential to significantly increase growth rates in the coming year. IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated in March 2010 that African economies ... |
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